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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

5 November 2010

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.



Reference: F-2011-00039 / DIA 0257-2005

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

In the course of processing your 12 January 2005 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for records on a submarine collision in 1992, DIA located CIA material and referred it to us on 28 September 2010 for review and direct response to you.

We reviewed the material and determined it can be released in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemption (b)(2). An explanation of exemptions is enclosed. As the Acting CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Scott Koch", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Scott Koch  
Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

## Explanation of Exemptions

### Freedom of Information Act:

- (b)(1) exempts from disclosure information currently and properly classified, pursuant to an Executive Order;
- (b)(2) exempts from disclosure information, which pertains solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of the Agency;
- (b)(3) exempts from disclosure information that another federal statute protects, provided that the other federal statute either requires that the matters be withheld, or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. The (b)(3) statutes upon which the CIA relies include, but are not limited to, the CIA Act of 1949;
- (b)(4) exempts from disclosure trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a person and that is privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) exempts from disclosure inter-and intra-agency memoranda or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) exempts from disclosure information from personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;
- (b)(7) exempts from disclosure information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent that the production of the information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings; (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source or, in the case of information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source; (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law; or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger any individual's life or physical safety;
- (b)(8) exempts from disclosure information contained in reports or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, or on behalf of, or for use of an agency responsible for regulating or supervising financial institutions; and
- (b)(9) exempts from disclosure geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.



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**CONTROLS**

UNCLAS

WARNING: TOPIC: ENVIRONMENT, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL, MILITARY

SERIAL: CEP20020802000001

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

**BODY**

COUNTRY: RUSSIA, UNITED STATES

SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 7—Russia: Aspects of International Law  
Restriction on ASW Activity at the Present StageSOURCE: Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3,  
May-June 2002 pp 31-39**TEXT:**

Article by Yevgeniy Karmazin and Vasiliy Lata under rubric  
"Analysis": "Some Aspects of International Law Restriction on ASW  
Activity of States at the Present Stage"

FBIS Translated Text Important political events in the  
world, especially in Eastern European countries, generated a wide  
response among NATO strategists and contributed to the fact that  
their military policy became more flexible. This led to a series  
of agreements between countries of the former Soviet Union on the  
one hand and the United States and its allies in the NATO bloc on  
the other.

These realities of the present world political situation,  
however, by no means signify that there has been a fundamental  
turning point in the West's attitude toward our country. The  
West's policy continues to be based on a developed economy, modern  
armed forces, a powerful military-political potential and a  
mobilization readiness that is maintained at a high level.

Also of no small importance is the fact that the growth in military might of "Third World countries" essentially led to a transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world. At the present time regional instability represents an enormous problem, especially in areas where there has been a proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Under the effect of events occurring in the world, the United States formed a "new military strategy," designed for the period up to 2010. One of the main directions of this strategy, based on the use of high technology, is to create a significant breakaway in the development and improvement of long-range high-precision weapons.

Supremacy at sea over any potential enemy remains an integral part of each of the elements of national security. On the whole, the general change in the world military-political and military-strategic situation was considered in developing the doctrine.<sup>1</sup>

The goals of implementing this strategy are as follows:

middle dot to seize the strategic and operational initiative at sea;  
middle dot to "lock up" the Russian Navy in bases, give it no opportunity for operational actions on the seas and in the ocean, and force it to conduct defensive actions in its own coastal areas.

An annual complex of operational and combat training measures is carried out to work out and check the effectiveness of the main directions of modern US and NATO naval strategy and to exert influence on the world situation. National and bloc naval exercises are the most active and effective form of these measures.

Figure 1 shows the number and subject matter of exercises over the last 15 years.

(Attachment not included)

An analysis shows that the overall number of exercises has decreased somewhat, but the areas where they are conducted are approaching Russian territorial waters and the number of exercises with an ASW theme is growing.<sup>2</sup>

The decrease in the number of exercises was caused by the fact that relations improved with CIS countries and the military-political leadership of NATO countries believes that threats on the part of the Russian Navy weakened. For this same reason the United States and its allies are envisaging a certain reduction and reorganization of armed forces. An average reduction of 25 percent in the numerical strength of naval forces is proposed by placing ships of obsolete classes in the ready reserve.

Figures 2 and 3 show the dynamics of change in the numerical strength of navies of various states.

(Attachment not included)

(Attachment not included)

Nevertheless, the force aspect of the US and NATO military-political course remains unchanged despite the positive changes of the 1990's.

What draws attention is the fact that after the familiar statements by the presidents of the United States and Russia about reducing armed forces and restricting military activities, Russia cut the number of strategic missile submarine cruisers by more than threefold and pulled them back from the US coast. In 1991 we moved all ships out of the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. At the same time, the United States constantly keeps in combat patrol areas over 20 nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles (SSBN's) aimed at targets on Russian territory. There also are 10-12 Los Angeles-Class multipurpose nuclear submarines (SSN's) performing combat patrol duty in the immediate vicinity of Russian shores. They are armed with Tomahawk cruise missiles that can strike strategic targets on our territory. Surface combatants, which come to within 15 km of the RF coast, and land-based patrol aircraft, which come to within 30 km, conduct reconnaissance operations.

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 \*\*\*\*\*/

REF: 1. CEP20020802000001 Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39 ///conduct reconnaissance operations.

SOURCE: Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39

TEXT:

An obvious conclusion follows from what has been said that the time for phasing out our defense at sea unfortunately has not yet come. Therefore ensuring the country's security, including that of its maritime component, is a very important direction of our state's activity.<sup>3</sup>

Considering the significant change in world military-political conditions and the development of a new phase in mutual relations with NATO countries, the Navy's primary missions should include reconnaissance, monitoring the activities of foreign navies, and antisubmarine operations to ensure national security.

Antisubmarine operations encompass a set of measures for combating submarines in ocean, sea and coastal theaters of military operations. These operations are considered a very important method of winning sea supremacy.<sup>4</sup>

The primary missions of ASW operations in peacetime are as follows:

- middle dot protecting friendly territory against missile submarine strikes from ocean and sea sectors;
- middle dot supporting combat activities of combatant ship forces;
- middle dot escorting amphibious forces and supply vessels;
- middle dot hunting foreign submarines that have penetrated into Russian territorial waters and forcing them to surface.<sup>5</sup>

Identifying foreign submarine combat patrol areas and routes, determining their operating techniques and methods, and establishing their characteristics can be individual missions.

ASW operations are accomplished by various Navy subunits: submarine and surface forces and naval aviation.

To perform peacetime missions, a portion of the naval forces must be constantly or periodically in operationally important areas of oceans and seas, including remote areas. Previously these missions were accomplished by combat patrol duty forces, but their composition presently has been cut considerably in connection with economic difficulties.

ASW operations are distinguished by a substantial complexity of organization, preparation and conduct. They also involve great danger to ships and aviation and to their personnel. In addition, the preconditions for navigational, technogenic and environmental accidents and disasters increase considerably during such operations. This also creates considerable interference to navigation and fishing on the high seas and in coastal areas.<sup>6,7</sup>

The acuteness of this problem presently has increased immeasurably and its scale has become global. The problem of accidents and disasters has been transformed chiefly into missions of ensuring the safety of a large number of people on the seas (and not just sailors, as was the case previously) and the safety of all mankind in connection with threats stemming from the sea as a result of the disorderly activities of people themselves.

This is determined above all by the growing scale of economic activities on the seas, which have a stable trend toward development in the future as well. It is determined in addition by the active naval operations of foremost world countries, which are not declining despite the end of the Cold War and despite the presence in navies of ships with nuclear power plants and with nuclear weapons aboard.

A comparative analysis of ASW activities based on information of the neutral international organization Greenpeace persuasively shows that safety at sea is a common problem; it affects fleets of all countries to an equal extent. The need for solving problems of safety at sea and of limiting ASW operations is confirmed by the experience of the Soviet Union/Russian Navy as well as of navies of foreign states in recent decades. Thus, according to Greenpeace data, over 30 submarines have been lost in peacetime, including 11 Soviet/Russian (4 of them nuclear), 4 American (2 nuclear), 3 British and 4 French. From 1961 up to the present day at least 625 persons have died in accidents aboard Soviet/Russian nuclear submarines, and 228 persons died just on two US nuclear submarines.

In addition, submarines suffered from many various breakdowns and incidents that didn't involve the death of personnel. This includes collisions with other submarines and surface ships, fires, getting into the nets of fishing vessels, incidents during the use of practice weapons, collisions with icebergs and so on.

For example, in December 1983 a Soviet Victor-III-Class (according to NATO classification) nuclear submarine was on combat patrol duty off the US Atlantic Coast. The submarine had the mission of shadowing the US frigate McCloy, which was performing tests of the newest TASS Towed Array Sensor System underwater surveillance system with a flexible towed long sonar array. The Soviet submarine succeeded in recording information about the system's operating parameters. Moreover, during the shadowing she



identified certain features of a US surface ship interworking with her submarines. Suddenly McCloy ceased the tests and departed for base. Left "without a job," our submarine received an order to change the operating area. She didn't manage to do this. A heavy vibration suddenly arose that required shutting down the main turbine. After coming to a surface condition, the CO discovered that he had received an unexpected "valuable gift" from the Americans—around 400 meters of top secret cable, the TASS array,

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF TAKE 003 \*\*\*\*\*/

REF: 1. CEP20020802000001 Moscow Yademyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39 ///the TASS array,

SOURCE: Moscow Yademyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39

TEXT:

had been wound onto the nuclear submarine's screw. The submarine totally lost way. Two US Navy Spruance-Class destroyers established active tracking of her. The "sailing in company" continued for nine days. The Americans tried to pass in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear submarine's stern and cut off the array. Things took such a serious turn that the CO of our submarine, fearing more decisive actions on the part of the destroyers, ordered his ship, which had a nuclear power plant and nuclear weapons aboard, readied for an explosion. The situation was alleviated only when the Soviet salvage vessel Aldan came to the submarine's assistance. The US destroyers were called back to base and Aldan towed the submarine to Cuba, where she was put up for repairs.8

In March 1984 a Victor-I-Class nuclear submarine was shadowing a carrier strike force consisting of the carrier Kitty Hawk and seven escort ships maneuvering in the Sea of Japan. While coming up to periscope depth to clarify the surface situation, the Soviet submarine's stern ripped the bottom of the US carrier for almost 40 meters. Losing fuel oil through the hole, Kitty Hawk was forced to depart for a Japanese dock. The Soviet nuclear submarine lost a screw and was towed to Chazhma Bay, where she was put up for lengthy repairs.9

An analysis of emergency situations involving submarines shows that in the period from 1967 through 2000 there were collisions of nuclear submarines of the US Navy and the USSR/Russian Navy in a submerged condition almost annually (around 25 times) as a result of the two countries' ASW activities. Twelve of these collisions took place off our shores on approaches to main basing facilities. An example of such an incident is the collision on 11 February 1992 of the US nuclear submarine Baton Rouge (Los Angeles Class) with a Russian Sierra-Class nuclear submarine that was rehearsing combat training missions. What is noteworthy in what happened is the fact that this was the first collision that occurred on a combat training range in our territorial waters. After our submarine changed course, the US nuclear submarine's sonar probably lost her from their field of view. In connection with the fact that there also were several fishing vessels in the area whose noise resembled that of a submarine, the CO of Baton Rouge decided to come up to periscope depth to figure out the situation. This created a situation in which both submarines were in the sonar surveillance "dead zone." Inasmuch as the time had come for the Russian nuclear submarine's next radio

communications session with the Fleet command post, she began coming up to periscope depth. During this time she struck the US nuclear submarine's pressure hull with the forward part of her sail. This resulted in several small holes in the pressure hull that didn't keep Baton Rouge from reaching her base on her own. After the collision, the CO of the Russian submarine, as prescribed, evaded the unknown target by diving to a safe depth. After some time he gave the command to come to a surface condition. Then, after establishing communications with the fishing vessel captains, he inquired whether or not any of them needed help.

The very fact of the collision of submarines as physical bodies is of course accidental, but the reasons which led to this collision were not. They lie above all in the actions of the CO of the US nuclear submarine.10,11

First of all, he violated the boundary of Russian territorial waters, which have been announced in the Notices to Mariners according to the established procedure, and our right to this expanse hasn't been disputed by anyone, including the United States, since 1982.

Secondly, he made an unsanctioned entry onto our combat training range, where another submarine was located, and this created the danger of a collision.

Thirdly, he tried to shadow our nuclear submarine that was located in our territorial waters and that in no way was threatening either Baton Rouge or US Navy ships or US territory.

Fourthly, instead of departing from foreign territorial waters by the shortest path after losing sonar contact with the Russian submarine, Baton Rouge came up to periscope depth, thereby creating the threat of a collision with the fishing vessels. Had the Russian submarine begun surfacing 7-10 seconds earlier, she would have struck the US nuclear submarine with her forebody and would have broken open the US submarine's side, which would have led to the sinking of Baton Rouge. In another case live torpedoes in the torpedo tubes might have detonated, and then both nuclear submarines would have been lost. This underwater incident at the entrance to Kola Bay 10 nm from shore, in an area through which all ships and vessels proceeding to Murmansk, Severomorsk and back pass, could have led to an environmental disaster threatening the northern shores of Russia and Scandinavia with radioactive contamination. Strange as it may seem, neither the ecologists of Norway nor the international Greenpeace, which took the possible environmental consequences of the loss of our submarine Komsomolets in April 1989 so acutely, uttered a word about this incident.12,13

The loss of the nuclear submarine Kursk in August 2000 is among a series of environmentally dangerous disasters. Her loss occurred in an area of intensive fishing, which creates certain difficulties in the fish product industry and serious danger of radioactive contamination of the water medium.14,15 If we take into account one of the main versions of the nuclear submarine's

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF TAKE 004 \*\*\*\*\*/

REF: 1. CEP2002080200001 Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19  
Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39 ///the nuclear  
submarine's

SOURCE: Moscow Yademyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3,  
May-June 2002 pp 31-39

TEXT:

loss advanced by Russia's government commission (a collision with a foreign submarine), then one can be confident that the disaster occurred due to the absence of specific international-law acts limiting antisubmarine activities and prohibiting foreign submarines from being in exercise areas, in this case of the Russian Navy.

A Soviet Yankee-Class strategic nuclear submarine cruiser sank in the Atlantic north of the Bermuda Islands in October 1986. She was returning from combat patrol duty at a depth of 46 meters and an accident occurred aboard the submarine in her missile compartment, evidently after a collision with a US submarine. The explosion of a missile in one of the launch tubes served as the cause of the accident. Three persons died as a result of the explosion and of poisoning by missile fuel vapors. Only the port nuclear power plant was operating during the accident. The submarine came to a surface condition, after which the second side was placed in operation. Despite the entry of water, a fire broke out in the stricken fourth compartment and did not subside. A short circuit occurred in the main power network and the starboard reactor's emergency protection was triggered. The starboard reactor's compensating grid managed to be lowered to the lower stops. One other seaman died performing this operation. The submarine slowly lost her reserve of buoyancy and stability. The port nuclear power plant was shut down. The crew was evacuated to a civilian vessel that had approached. The CO remained aboard the stricken ship along with nine crew members. The submarine's bow gradually began to settle and the screws were exposed. The submariners were forced to abandon the submarine, and she sank at a depth of 5,000 meters at 1103 hours Moscow time on 6 October 1986. According to one of the existing versions, the missile exploded at a depth of 46 meters because it had been crushed due to hydrostatic pressure of the outside water that entered the launch tube as a result of its loss of seal after our missile submarine collided with the US submarine.

One of the US press reports provides substantiation for constructing a hypothesis about the cause of the submarine's loss. On 5 October 1986 the Washington Post reported: "US submarine specialists confirmed that back before Mikhail Gorbachev notified Ronald Reagan about what happened, the United States already knew about the incident on the Soviet submarine. Although they didn't wish to reveal details regarding who transmitted a report about the accident first, it probably came from a US submarine that had been shadowing the Soviet submarine. Such shadowing is a common practice." Later a report appeared in American newspapers that in the first half of October 1986 "a US Navy nuclear submarine received damages to the hull while patrolling in the Atlantic Ocean and arrived in her New London port of registry for drydock repairs." The article clarified that the identified damages concerned the forward bottom part of the hull and the sonar dome. The nature of damages to the hull of our submarine, discovered after she came to a surface condition, confirms that they were left by a foreign submarine that came into direct contact. There are two nuclear reactors and 16 ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads aboard the sunken submarine. 16

The US Navy nuclear submarine Thresher sank 160 km off Cape Cod at a depth of 2,600 meters on 10 April 1963. All 129 crew members perished.

On 22 May 1968 one other US nuclear submarine of the Skipjack Class sank at a depth of 3,600 meters 650 km from the Azores while proceeding from the Strait of Gibraltar to the state of Virginia. According to the existing version, the reason for the disaster was the explosion of one of the torpedoes aboard the nuclear submarine. All 99 crew members perished. Several expeditions were conducted to the areas where the submarines sank. The results of research of the areas showed the presence of appreciable radioactivity in bottom deposits.

What causes fear is that there have been many preconditions for similar disasters in NATO navies. From 1983 through 1987 US submarines experienced 56 collisions and 12 groundings, and there were 113 fires, 85 explosions and 48 floodings of inner spaces and compartments on them. There were 34 emergency incidents registered in 1989 alone that involved US Navy nuclear submarines: SSBN's (8 instances) and nuclear attack submarines (26 instances); among them were 12 fires, 2 nuclear power plant accidents, 3 groundings and 9 collisions.

In the examples cited, emphasis is placed on the antisubmarine activities of submarines, since incidents involving them lead not only to the loss of a large number of personnel, but also to the most serious environmental consequences.

At the present time there are no guarantees that in the absence of international legal standards limiting antisubmarine activities, the next accident on a nuclear submarine of any state armed with nuclear weapons won't lead to a more serious disaster than the loss of the nuclear submarine Kursk. The existing international law of the sea doesn't restrict antisubmarine activities and doesn't prohibit hunting and shadowing submarines and using any technical means leading to a violation of freedom of the high seas without the use of weapons and a display of authority.

From the standpoint of law, submarines in a surface condition are obligated to completely fulfill demands of the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (IRPCS-72). Submarines of the Russian Navy and of the navies of

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF TAKE 005 \*\*\*\*\*/

REF: 1. CEP20020802000001 Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39 ///the navies of

SOURCE: Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39

TEXT:

13 states with which the RF government signed bilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents on and over the high seas must, insofar as possible, adhere to provisions of IRPCS-72 during operations in a surface condition (under peacetime conditions), but experience shows that this isn't enough. Safety measures have been adopted in each country's national naval forces to ensure the navigation safety of its submarines, but to this day there are no international rules of underwater operation.

Back in 1992, after the collision of a Russian Sierra-Class nuclear submarine with the US nuclear submarine Baton Rouge, our side prepared a draft "Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States on Prevention of Incidents With Submerged Submarines Beyond the Territorial Waters." Among other organizational, technical, navigational and international-law measures, this agreement envisages the designation of special mutually coordinated safety and confidence zones with specific coordinates. Based on the principle of equality of areas of sea waters, it is proposed to set aside one safety zone each for the Russian Federation and the United States in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in the areas of permanent basing locations of nuclear submarines: in the Atlantic in an area of the Barents and Kara seas adjoining Severomorsk for the Russian Federation, and in the vicinity of Charleston and Kings Bay naval bases for the United States; in the Pacific in the vicinity of Kamchatka and Vladivostok for the Russian Federation, and in the vicinity of Bangor Naval Base for the United States.

This agreement wasn't signed, however, because of disagreement by the US side, although the Americans couldn't refute a single one of the points of the prepared draft agreement during negotiations between Russian Navy and US Navy representatives. The talks were stopped in 1995 and secret antisubmarine activities in seas washing the shores of Russia continue.

The establishment of generally recognized rules of mutual relations of ships of different flags and a common understanding of one and the same issues of navigation safety assume exceptionally great importance under these conditions. The majority of standards create only legal foundations for regulating various kinds of activity of warships and flying craft, including ASW activities.

For example, the "Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas" points out that ships must remain at a sufficient distance from each other to avoid collisions. But the question of what distances should be considered sufficient isn't resolved within the framework of the agreement. These distances are regulated by appropriate orders and instructions for commanding officers of RF Navy ships. For safety purposes, the commanders of US Navy submarines are prescribed distances of 10-14 nm for shadowing our submarines. Nevertheless, the experience of antisubmarine operations shows that these distances in fact often may be 1.2-1.4 nm.

The Agreement prohibits undertaking any kind of simulated attacks or other feints whatsoever toward each other that may be interpreted as intentions to employ weapons. Unfortunately, this provision is violated by ships and flying craft of various states in the practice of antisubmarine operations.

A dangerous situation may be created not only when ships mutually close, but also when they maneuver and exercise in narrow places on routes of intensive shipping and fishing, when objects of any kind are dropped near ships or on their movement route, and when there are thoughtless experiments and combat training using explosions or any kind of weapons.

An analysis of documents shows that a number of standards have not yet been incorporated in international-law acts that would lead to the strengthened safety of warship activities and to

strengthened confidence among states.

The change in the political situation (the absence of a clear enemy) creates favorable conditions for resolving a number of issues of limiting antisubmarine activities and for establishing generally recognized rules of mutual relations of ships, including submarines, belonging to navies of different states. These rules will permit updating provisions of the International Law of the Sea for ensuring safety of activities of navies and of navigation.

Therefore, considering the favorable political situation, it is Russia that must be the initiator of limiting antisubmarine activities on a treaty basis. Implementation of these restrictions will in the final account permit creating an international code of safety of operations of warships and flying craft, which must contain a set of conditions and limitations for antisubmarine activities:

middle dot in time,  
middle dot in size of areas,  
middle dot in depths of the water medium,  
middle dot in maneuvering,  
middle dot in performing combat exercises,  
middle dot in emergency situations.

In the opinion of the authors, it would be advisable to introduce the following standards and limitations at an international level.

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF TAKE 006 \*\*\*\*\*/

REF: 1. CEP20020802000001 Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39 ///an international level.

SOURCE: Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39

TEXT:

1. Achieve a renewal of talks that halted in 1995 on the draft "Agreement Between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States on Prevention of Incidents With Submerged Submarines Beyond the Territorial Waters."
2. Include the maximum number of states, including "Third World countries," in present and future treaties limiting antisubmarine activities.
3. Achieve the fulfillment of all limitations concerning warship operations on the basis of bilateral agreements, and on a mandatory basis and not voluntarily, as happens at the present time according to the existing practice of the International Law of the Sea.
4. Provide for the possibility of regular meetings for the purpose of analyzing and generalizing experience accumulated within the scope of bilateral relations and developing new recommendations. Intervals between such meetings can be rather long, such as 5 years.
5. Create an effective system for promptly determining the

damage and the measure of responsibility of states connected with antisubmarine, reconnaissance and other kinds of activities of navies of different flags.

6. Create security and confidence zones in areas of active antisubmarine activities of states parties to the Agreement on the principle of equality of the parties concerned.

7. Announce the time for the beginning and end of exercises, the composition of forces, and the exercise areas and prohibit approaching these areas to within a distance and in the time periods stipulated by agreements.

8. Surface ships and submarines in a surface condition are not to come within 5 nm of declared exercise areas, and submarines in a submerged condition within 10 nm.

9. Inform the states concerned about areas where submarines surface to preclude preconditions for a collision. Notify forces located in the zone of visibility by established signals about a submarine coming to a surface condition.

10. Provide for actions by commanders of antisubmarine forces in case of the sudden detection of a surface ship or submarine of a foreign state.

11. Announce not only the launch areas, but also the flight paths of missiles.

12. Determine the echelons of depths for submarines conducting antisubmarine operations. In the general case, the difference of depths must be at least 50 meters.

13. Exclude concealed shadowing or other maneuvering that leads to the mutual closing of submarines to a distance of less than 3 nm.

14. Ships shadowing carrier forces are not to close with them to a distance of less than 6 nm during the day and 8-10 nm at night.

15. Exclude the mutual closing of surface ships and submarines in a surface condition to a distance of less than 2 nm during the day and less than 3 nm at night.

Such measures lead to a certain restriction of freedom of the high seas, but they must be accepted by states voluntarily and be fulfilled by the command element of fleets on a mandatory basis.<sup>17</sup>

With positive results in treaty processes, the risk of antisubmarine activities connected above all with the operation of equipment and the life of personnel will be reduced considerably. The risk of environmental disasters and of pollution of the sea and shores of coastal states will be reduced, the catch of fish products will increase, and interference and danger to fishing and shipping will be reduced. Implementing the proposed measures would allow an appreciable saving of material resources.<sup>18</sup>

The success of treaty processes to limit antisubmarine activities on the seas will lead to mutual understanding and to the elimination of mistrust of each other, and it will contribute to the further development of relations between the Russian Navy and



navies of the United States and NATO countries.

Footnotes

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/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF TAKE 007 \*\*\*\*\*/

REF: 1. CEP20020802000001 Moscow Yadernyy Kontrol in Russian 19 Apr 02 No 3, May-June 2002 pp 31-39  
///Mezhdunarodno-pravovoy rezhim morskikh

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