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K410.01-8A
July-Dec. 1957
Vol. V

RETURN TO:
Director
Research Studies Institute
Attn: Archives Branch
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

[redacted]

CONAD / NORAD

HISTORICAL SUMMARY

(UNCLASSIFIED)

JULY - DECEMBER 1957

VOLUME IV

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

132 Through 182

[redacted] RM—5. 4934

4-2186-5

[redacted]

132

[redacted]

PRIORITY X AF X

COMDR ADC

DIR STAT SVCS USAF WASH D C

[redacted] ADCST-0 8000 . FOR AFASC-6C. The following 1-AF-V14 as of 30 Dec 57.

2 FI SQ/Suffolk/F-102A/26/12/2/12/1-1/0/0/32/1/

5 FI SQ/Suffolk/F-102A/25/12/1/12/1-1/0/0/27/0/

11 FI SQ/Duluth/F-102A/17/11/0/6/0-0/0/0/25/5/

13 FI SQ/Sioux City/F-86L/24/13/0/11/0-0/0/0/31/22/

14 FI SQ/Sioux City/F-86L/23/12/0/11/0-0/0/0/32/27/

15 FI SQ/Davis-Monthan/F-86L/20/10/1/6/3-0/3/3AJQ/33/25/

18 FI SQ/Wurtsmith/F-102A/8/0/3/5/0-0/0/0/28/0/

445 FI SQ/Wurtsmith/F-89J/25/16/4/5/0-0/0/0/27/0/

27 FI SQ/Griffiss/F-94C/1/1/0/0/0-0/0/0/0/0/

27 FI SQ/Griffiss/F-102A/22/11/2/9/0-0/0/0/29/0/ 3 1900Z

465 FI SQ/Griffiss/F-89J/26/16/0/8/2-0/0/0/30/24/ Jan 58

ADCST-0

MAJ O.A. CARROLL/jb RM [illegible] 4934
2621 1 15

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

4-2186-5

132

COMDR ADC

29 FI SQ/Malmstrom/F-89H/13/6/1/6/0-0/0/0/28/23/

42 FI SQ/Greater-Pitts/Negative due to inactivation.

46 FI SQ/Dover/F-94C/23/17/1/5/1-1/1/1AJQ/30/18/

98 FI SQ/Dover/F-89J/25/17/6/2/0-0/0/0/29/0/

47 FI SQ/Niagara Falls/F-86L/28/15/1/12/0-0/0/0/29/22/

48 FI SQ/Langley/F-102A/25/11/6/8/4-4/0/0/39/0/

49 FI SQ/Hanscom/F-86L/25/14/4/7/0-0/0/0/26/11/

54 FI SQ/Ellsworth/F-89J/7/0/2/1/7-3/7/7ALPQ/24/0/

56 FI SQ/Wright-Pat/F-86L/28/19/0/7/2-0/2/2AJQ/39/32/

58 FI SQ/Otis/F-89J/24/16/5/3/0-0/0/0/29/23/

60 FI SQ/Otis/F-94C/28/16/3/9/0-0/0/0/34/30/

59 FI SQ/Goose/F-89J/29/18/7/2/2-0/0/0/21/15/

61 FI SQ/Truax/F-102A/25/15/2/8/10-10/0/0/19/0/Increase due to assignment of crews.

325 FI SQ/Truax/F-102A/25/15/1/9/10-10/0/0/26/4/

62 FI SQ/O'Hare/F-86L/17/10/3/4/0-0/0/0/45/32/

63 FI SQ/O'Hare/F-86L/17/9/3/5/0-0/0/0/0/0/Reassignment of aircrews.

64 FI SQ/McChord/F-102A/24/6/0/18/0-0/0/0/30/0/

318 FI SQ/McChord/F-102A/25/7/0/18/0-0/0/0/31/9/

65 FI SQ/Richards-Gebaur/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.

66 FI SQ/Conard/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.

[redacted]

COMDR ADC

71 FI SQ/Selfridge/F-86L/28/21/1/6/0-0/0/0/36/26/

94 FI SQ/Selfridge/F-86L/28/21/1/6/0-0/0/0/29/24/

74 FI SQ/Thule/F-89D/11/11/0/0/0-0/0/0/16/16/

75 FI SQ/Presque Isle/F-89H/28/18/0/10/1-1/0/0/26/23/

76 FI SQ/Pinecastle/F-89H/28/10/6/12/0-0/0/0/26/0/

82 FI SQ/Travis/F-102A/24/15/0/9/8-8/8/0/29/0/

83 FI SQ/Hamilton/F-86L/18/12/1/5/1-1/0/0/25/19/

84 FI SQ/Hamilton/F-89J/28/20/1/7/1-1/0/0/30/23/

85 FI SQ/Scott/F-86L/25/14/1/10/0-0/0/0/35/29/

86 FI SQ/Youngstown/F-102A/19/5/9/5/8-8/0/0/45/0/

87 FI SQ/Lockbourne/F-86L/28/13/2/7/6-0/0/0/36/29/

93 FI SQ/Kirtland/F-86L/9/4/3/2/0-0/0/0/29/21/

95 FI SQ/Andrews/F-86L/14/7/1/6/0-0/0/0/36/23/

319 FI SQ/Bunkerhill/F-89J/26/14/3/9/0-0/0/0/28/21/

321 FI SQ/Paine/F-89J/28/19/0/9/0-0/0/0/26/20/

321 FI SQ/Paine/F-89H/2/1/0/0/1-0/1/1AJQ/0/0/

322 FI SQ/Larson/F-86L/23/16/0/6/1-0/1/1AJQ/33/30/

323 FI SQ/Harmon/F-102A/25/17/6/0/2-0/0/0/25/12/

324 FI SQ/Westover/F-86L/24/17/1/5/1-0/0/0/28/25/

337 FI SQ/Westover/F-86L/24/17/2/4/1-0/0/0/25/7/

326 FI SQ/Richards-Gebaur/F-102A/24/9/4/10/1-0/1/1AJQ/25/24/

327 FI SQ/George/F-102A/18/14/2/2/2-2/0/0/22/20/

ADCST-0

[redacted]

132

[redacted]

COMDR ADC

329 FI SQ/George/F-86L/24/21/1/2/0-0/0/0/32/28/

330 FI SQ/Stewart/F-86L/25/17/0/8/0-0/0/0/39/16/

331 FI SQ/Stewart/F-86L/25/16/1/8/0-0/0/0/37/24/

332 FI SQ/McGuire/F-102A/28/4/9/15/0-0/0/0/29/0/

539 FI SQ/McGuire/F-86L/23/10/2/11/1-1/0/0/29/19/

354 FI SQ/McGhee-Tyson/Negative due to inactivation.

432 FI SQ/Minn-St. Paul/F-89H/[redacted]1/0/0/1/0-0/0/0/8/4/

433 FI SQ/Minot/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.

437 FI SQ/Oxnard/F-89H/6/5/1/0/1-1/0/0/0/0/

437 FI SQ/Oxnard/F-89J/24/19/0/5/0-0/0/0/29/25/

438 FI SQ/Kinross/F-102A/23/16/0/7/0-0/0/0/26/21/

444 FI SQ/Charleston/F-86L/28/21/3/4/0-0/0/0/34/28/

456 FI SQ/Castle/F-86L/27/19/0/8/0-0/0/0/31/23/

460 FI SQ/Portland/F-89D/23/15/0/8/0-0/0/0/28/25/

482 FI SQ/Seymour Johnson/F-102A/19/13/2/4/0-0/0/0/19/0/

484 FI SQ/K.I. Sawyer/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.

497 FI SQ/Geiger/F-86D/28/17/2/9/0-0/0/0/31/27/

498 FI SQ/Geiger/F-102A/22/11/0/11/0-0/0/0/29/19/

518 FI SQ/Klamath/No aircraft and/or aircrews assigned.

538 FI SQ/Larson/F-86L/21/13/4/4/1-1/0/0/29/24/

551 AEW WG/Otis/RC-121/31/13/0/18/18-18/0/0/47/44/

552 AEW WG/McClellan/RC-121/32/12/1/14/12-7/0/0/5[illegible]/39/

ADCST-0 4 [redacted]

132

[redacted]

COMDR ADC

4677 REV FT/Hill/Misc/6/3/0/3/0-0/0/0/5/5/

4713 REV FT/Griffiss/Misc/10/4/1/5/0-0/0/0/8/8/

4739 REV FT/Goose/No aircraft assigned pending reassignment.

4754 REV FT/Hamilton/Misc/8/5/1/1/1-0/0/0/5/5/

17 TOW SQ/Vincent/Misc/23/20/0/3/3-3/0/0/36/29/

23 TOW SQ/Tyndall/Misc/15/12/2/1/0-0/0/0/24/24/

37 FI SQ/Ethan Allen/F-102A/4/3/0/1/0-0/0/0/0/0/

37 FI SQ/Ethan Allen/F-86D/8/7/0/1/0-0/0/0/31/20/

This report reflects complete coverage. Following supplemental information correction to 2-AF-V14 as of 23 Dec 57.

64 FI SQ/McChord/F-102A/25/9/1/15/30/0/

76 FI SQ/Pinecastle/F-89H/28/12/6/10/26/0/

322 FI SQ/Larson/F-86L/24/18/0/5/34/31/



[redacted]

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133

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION — CLASSIFYING — Adjutant

20 Sept 57

402403

READING FILE

CONOOO6HQAO16
RR RJEDEN RJEDWP RJEDNH RJEPFF
DE RJEPHQ 110
R 201337Z
FM HEDUSAF WASH DC
TO RJEDEN/COMAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
ZEN/COMCONAC MITCHEL AFB NY
RJEDWP/COMAMC WPAFB OHIO
INFO RJEDNH/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
RJEPFF/COMMATS ANDREWS AFB MD
RJEDEN/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO

NCNFO-H

ACTION: WOOOP
INFO WOOPO
N7-11125

ZI UNCLASSIFIED
[redacted]/FROM AFCAV 50534.
MESSAGE IN FOUR PARTS. PART I. REFERENCE IS MADE TO MESSAGE, THIS HEADQUARTERS, AFXPR 1345/57 TO ALMAJCOM DATED 23 AUGUST 1957. PART II. (A) NEW CASTLE AFB, DELAWARE - 95TH, 97TH FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR SQUADRONS AND 82D FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEF) INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958. BASE INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958. (B) MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL, 432D FIS AND 475TH FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEF) INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958. BASE TRANSFERS TO CONAC JANUARY 1958. (C) MCGHEE-TYSON - 354TH, 469TH FIS AND 355TH FIGHTER GROUP (AIR DEF) INACTIVATE JANUARY 1958. BASE UTILIZATION TENTATIVELY PROGRAMMED BY AIR NATIONAL GUARD BEGINNING 2/58.

CLASSIFICATION Changed from
SECRET to UNCLASSIFIED
AUTH: [redacted] by USAF ASG: AFOOP 49815, dtd 4 Oct 57
7 Oct 57
Date

Signature
I. W. LEDOUX
LCDR, USN
Asst Adjutant

UNCLASSIFIED

READING FILE

S[redacted] when ... UNCLASSIFIED 133

(Reproduction of this ... COPY OF INCOMING ... SIFIED MESSAGE

SEE CRYPTO ... PAGE DECLASSIFYING ... of CONAD Adjutant)

PAGE TWO RJEPHQ 110
YOUR MESSAGE ADC ADLPR 7018 (SECRET) 20 AUGUST 1957, PREVIOUS SPAIN COMMITMENT OF 469TH BEING FULFILLED BY USAFE. PART III. IN ORDER TO EFFECT MXIMUM ECONOMY IN O&M FUNDS FOR FY 58, FLYING HOURS WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED IN THE QUARTER PRECEDING THE INACTIVATION DATE. OFFICER PERSONNEL BECOMING SURPLUS TO COMMAND REQUIREMENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS UNDER PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 16E, PART 3, CHAPTER 5, AFM 35-11E. SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS WILL BE ISSUED ON DISPOSITION OF WARRANT OFFICERS AND AIRMEN PERSONNEL. SECRETATIAL FINDING TO PERMIT SECOND PCS IN A FISCAL YEAR WILL BE OBTAINED PRIOR TO MOVE OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED. REQUEST FOR SECRETARIAL FINDING WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, DCS/P, THIS HQ. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE BY YOUR COMMAND TO ALLEVIATE ANY PERSONNEL HARDSHIPS THAT MAY RESULT FROM THIS ACTION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7, PART I, CHAPTER I, AFM 35-11D, AT LEAST 60 DAYS ADVANCED NOTICE WILL BE GIVEN TO PERSONNEL RECEIVING PCS ASSIGNMENTS. INSTRUCTIONS ON DISPOSITION OF AIRCRAFT MADE EXCESS BY THESE ACTIONS WILL FOLLOW SEPARATELY. LOGISTIC SUPPORT FUNCTIONS OF ABOVE BASES IN SUPPORT OF AC&W STATIONS WILL BE REVIEWED AND THIS HQ ADVISED OF DESIRED CHANGES AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE FOR INCLUSION IN FUTURE PROGRAMMING DOCUMENTS.

PAGE THREE RJEPHQ 110
PART IV. YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING INACTIVATION OF THE 75TH AT PRESQUE ISLE AND CLOSURE OF THE BASE IS NOT FAVORABLY CONSIDERED. THIS HEADQUARTERS IS OF THE OPINION THAT ADEQUATE AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL AND SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN THE NORTHEAST. YOUR RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING O'HARE IS STILL UNDER STUDY. YOU WILL BE ADVISED.
BT
201349Z SEP RJEPHQ

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-- PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION

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[redacted] n filled in) COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE 134

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SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING 25 OCT 57

READING FILE

CONAD HIST FILE

403 x 402

CON001
HCA049
RR RJEDEN RJEDWP RJEDBR
DE RJEPHQ 195
R 252018Z ZNJ
FM HEJUSAF WASH DC
TO RJEDEN/COMAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
INFO RJEDEN/CINCNORAD ENT AFB COLO
[redacted]/COMCONAC MITCHELL AFB NY
RJEDWP/COMAMC WPAFB OHIO
RJEDBR/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
BT

CTION: ~~1/6/0~~ NOCOP
INFO: NOOPO
N7-12689

[redacted] / FROM AFOOP-OP-U. 51997.
YOUR MESSAGE ADLPR 7029 (C) 5 OCT 57. THE 42ND FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON, GREATER PITTSBURGH AIRPORT WILL REDUCE TO ONE AIRMAN MANNING JANUARY 1958 AND MOVE WITH OUT PERSONNEL/EQUIPMENT TO STEWART AFB JANUARY 1958. COMMAND JURISDICTION OF GREATER PITTSBURGH WILL TRANSFER TO CONAC JANUARY 1958. THE 42ND FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON WILL INACTIVATE AT STEWART AFB JULY 1958. PART III OF MESSAGE AFCAV 50534, 20 SEP 57 ;-00963. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ON TRANSFER AND DISPOSITION OF BASES CONTAINED IN YOUR MESSAGE ADAIR 10036, 1 OCT 57, WILL BE PROVIDED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. THIS MESSAGE WILL BE DOWNGRADED TO UNCLASSIFIED WHEN PUBLIC RELEASE MADE BY THIS HEADQUARTERS.
BT
25/2025Z OCT

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135

CONAD HIST FILE

CONAD FILE 409

ACTION: NORAD
N7-11917

CONODA
NORAD
RT RJEDEC RJEVP RJEVC
DE RJEPNO 199
R 032200Z
FM HQ USAF WASH DC
TO RJEDEC/COMAIRDEFCOM ENT AFB COLO
INFO RJEDMT/CONAC ENT AFB
RJEP/CONCOMAC MITCHEL AFB
RJEDEC/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
RJEDMT/CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBR
BT
[redacted] FROM AFOOP-OP-A2 91285
THIS MESSAGE IS IN IV PARTS. PART I. REFERENCE MADE TO MESSAGE THIS HEADQUARTERS AFOOP 13A6/57 TO ALMAJCOM, DTG 25 AUGUST 1957.
PART II. THE 6520 FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON, (AIR DEF) O'HARE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, CHICAGO, ILL. WILL BE INACTIVATED JANUARY 1958 (3/58). NO CHANGE IN BASE STATUS. PART III. TO EFFECT MAXIMUM RECOVERY OF O&M FUNDS FOR FY 58, FLYING HOURS AND THE ABOVE UNIT WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED DURING THE QUARTER PRECEDING THE INACTIVATION. INSTRUCTIONS ON DISPOSITION OF AIRCRAFT AND PROCESS OF THIS ACTION WILL FOLLOW SEPARATELY. OPERATIONAL PLANS TO PERMIT SECRET

PAGE TWO RJEPNO 199
PCS IN A FISCAL YEAR WILL BE CONTAINED PRIOR TO MOVE OF INDIVIDUALS CONCERNED. REQUEST FOR SECRETARIAL FLIGHTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, DCS/P, THIS HEADQUARTERS. OFFICER PERSONNEL DECONFLICTING SURPLUS TO COMMAND REQUIREMENTS WILL BE REPORTED TO THIS HEADQUARTERS UNDER PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 10C, PART 3, CHAPTER 2, AFR 35-11E. DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS FOR INCUMBENT OFFICERS AND AIRMEN PERSONNEL ARE CONTAINED IN ALMAJCOM, AFPHP 45377, DATED 16 SEPTEMBER 1957. EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE BY YOUR COMMAND TO ALLEVIATE ANY PERSONNEL HARDSHIPS THAT MAY RESULT FROM THIS ACTION. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 7, PART 1, CHAPTER 1, AFR 35-11D, AT LEAST 60 DAYS ADVANCE NOTICE WILL BE GIVEN TO PERSONNEL RECEIVING PCS REASSIGNMENTS. PART IV. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING REDUCING ACTIVE STATUS OF 6520 FIS AND O'HARE AFD ARE UNDER STUDY AT THIS TIME. YOU WILL BE ADVISED. IN CONNECTION WITH PART III ABOVE, THE PROVISIONS OF HEADQUARTERS USAF MESSAGE AFPHP 102712, DATED 10 SEPTEMBER 1957, ARE APPLICABLE
BT
03/1117Z OCT RJEPNO

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APADC

[redacted]

136

COOP 24 July 1957

SUBJECT: USAF Air Defense Command Reprogramming to Adjust to Deficient Fiscal Year 1958 Funds

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
as Executive Agent for CONAD
Washington 25, D.C.

1. The USAF Air Defense Command has advised this headquarters that the approved USAF Fiscal Year 1958 OLM Appropriation Financial Plan provides the Air Defense Command with a FY 58 OLM budget which is approximately 96 million below stated requirements. To absorb this reduction in funds, the Air Defense Command plans to place at least five currently operational fighter interceptor squadrons on a non-operational basis. In addition, certain vital air defense programs are being recommended for deferment, at least through FY 58.

2. The force reductions and program deferments being recommended by the Air Defense Command cannot be concurred in by this headquarters. CADOP 56-66 establishes a requirement for immediate expansion of our national air defense forces to a level necessary to counter the current and projected threat. The proposed action will result not only in a failure of Air Force elements to meet this program, but will, in fact, effect a serious current reduction in the combat readiness of the Air Defense Command and of the Continental Air Defense Command.

3. In the interests of national security, it is urgently recommended that the Air Defense Command be provided with adequate OLM funds with which to support at least currently established forces.

E.E. PARTRIDGE
General USAF
Commander in Chief

COPY furn ADC

M/R Not Required

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P
Y

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137

[redacted]

18 OCT [illegible]

General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Tommy:

Less than a month ago the Air Defense Command recommendations with respect to the ADC Fighter Program through fiscal year 1961, were delivered to your headquarters personally by the Commander, General Atkinson. These recommendations included two alternative proposals with respect to the improvement of our air defense atomic capability. The first involved increased production of F-101 aircraft, the second a retrofit of the F-102 to provide it an atomic capability. Comments with respect to the latter proposal are offered.

In 1955 the National Security Council directed that an atomic air defense capability be provided as a matter of priority. Two vehicles were considered, the F-89J and the F-102. To meet time scales established by General Fairing, the F-89J was selected. To the credit of all concerned, this capability was established on schedule. Although today the F-89J/[illegible]-1 combination is our most effective destruction system, the aircraft was serious performance limitations. Repeated efforts have been made to develop an atomic capability on the F-102 while this aircraft was still in production. These efforts have failed. The F-102 has been in an operational inventory for nearly a year and it is still not yet an effective weapons system. Numerous pleas by the Air Defense Command to retrofit the F-102 with the [illegible]-1 have been unheeded. Money problems, technical difficulties and force reduction considerations have mitigated against a favorable decision.

Conclusions of the Stanford Research Institute with respect to program slippages, and our experience with the F-102 and F-104 delays have convinced us that we cannot expect quantitative F-101 and F-106 forces until perhaps 1961 or 1962. In the meantime, quantities of atomic armament are being produced at the cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. To make effective use of this armament, we will be forced to keep an obsolete fighter interceptor weapons system through this time period for the lack of the few millions required to modify the F-102. The F-89J, performance-wise, is barely able to cope with today's subsonic

[redacted]

DUPLICATE

57-20-3

[redacted]

137

bombers. It will be hopelessly inadequate to meet the supersonic air breathing threat of tomorrow.

General Atkinson and I are convinced that irrespective of these negative arguments, that the F-102 must be provided an atomic capability without further delay. We are willing to make most any concession with respect to numbers of aircraft, units or other modernization programs, to achieve this capability.

Sincerely,

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

CONAD

M/R for [illegible], Chief of [illegible], [illegible] dated 7 October 1957, coordinated with AOC Generals Grant, Bennett, Agee and Zuehlsdorf.

C of S

SECRETARIAT
Adjutant
Audio-Visual
Protocol

INFO SERVICES

DCS C&E
System
Plans & Rq
Elec Warfare

DCS I
Call & Disem
Risk & Estimates
Sur Intel

DCS P&O
Contractor
Plans Analysis
Conflict Sur Center
Ops Analysis

COMADC
COMNAVFORCONAD
CG ARAA COMD
RCAF LIAISON

4B Allen
Col. Allen
2038 Telephone
17 Oct. 57 Date
Refer to Failed No.

bkm Typists in [illegible]

10-130

This correspondence is [redacted] by reasons stated
Record Evaluation

CONAD HQ FORM 5 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

[redacted]

138

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND

7 January 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCS/Plans and Operations

SUBJECT: Conversions from One Type of Aircraft to Another

1. As far as I know CONAD Headquarters has never expressed any policy on how conversions of units should be handled either insofar as antiaircraft or fighters are concerned. Perhaps this is a deficiency, and in any event I should like for you to give the matter your attention.

2. This subject is brought to mind because of my inquiries regarding the F-102 conversions at George AFB. This change-over was started about April of last year and the first aircraft of the 102 type arrived at George about the first of May. By now some 8 or 9 months have passed and the conversion is not yet completed. In fact, in my opinion, I won't stay in the Air Force long enough to see the day when any F-102 unit will be fully operational. The aircraft itself seems to be a great improvement over the types we have previously used but there is a critical shortage of supporting equipment and I doubt that this situation can be remedied in the life of the aircraft.

3. In spite of these deficiencies it is possible for the first squadron; i.e. the 327th at George, to operate some of its airplanes and in fact on the 15th of January, they are going to undertake the alert duty with the 102. Even the aircraft available are, in my opinion, non-operational. The weapons have never been fired by the people at George and there is no assurance that they could hit anything if they did shoot them. Nevertheless, I concur in placing this squadron on alert because I believe it is expedient for them to get the practice necessary to find out what the aircraft can do in an operational situation.

4. However, we are continuing to convert from operational to non-operational, aircraft in other squadrons throughout the country, and I am not sure that we should allow this to continue. It occurs to me that our operational capability is decreasing at a great rate and that we might want to put on the brakes in order to force the Air Force to meet its obligations insofar as support of the F-102 program is concerned.

/s/ E. E. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

[redacted]

[redacted]

139

27 January 1958

General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff, USAF
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Tommy:

In my letter of 18 October 1957, I informed you of General Atkinson's and my feelings on the urgency to provide the F-102A with a nuclear capability. In your reply of 6 January 1958, you stated you did not feel that the F-102A should be modified to give it an MB-1 capability. On 28 December 1957, General LeMay indicated in a personal letter to General Atkinson that an F-102A/MB-1 modification would not be accomplished, but that a nuclear capability for the F-102A might be possible by equipping it with nuclear Falcons.

As a result of an ARCD study and presentation given to ADC and my staff a few days ago and subsequent evaluation, I am impressed with the potential capabilities of the proposed GAR-1Y and GAR-3-Y missiles.

The GAR-1Y proposal appears to provide the only practical approach to fulfilling the nuclear requirement for the F-102A at an early date and at a minimum cost. Further, the GAR-1Y and GAR-3Y proposals are favored over other propsed air-to-air guided nuclear missiles being considered for the F-101 and F-106 aircraft respectively. Because these nuclear Falcons are basically improved Falcons, their introduction into the air defense system will have a minimum impact on interceptor modifications at a relatively low cost. Also, these missiles can be introduced into the air defense inventory by mid-1960, ppoviding an early approval of these Falcon proposals is made by your headquarters.

For your personal information, I have been informed that ARDC will present the nuclear Falcon evaluation to your staff on 30 January 1958.

I therefore urge that your headquarters support the development of GAR-1Y and GAR-3Y nuclear Falcon proposals for the F-102, F-101, and F-106 aircraft so that these weapons may be introduced into the air defense system at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-In-Chief

DUPLICATE

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

140

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECUR[redacted]

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMM[redacted]

CONAD JUST FILE

[redacted] LE

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (check)	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION ROUTINE 402 X 303	BOOK / MULTI / SINGLE X	AF		
INFO				
FROM: CINCNORAD				

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: AOC CANAIRDEF ST HUBERT QUEBEC CANADA

[redacted] From NOOOP-T X036 .

For Canadian addressee only. CANUSECURITY.

Following information requested by L/Col. Brady SPlansSO, your headquarters. Coordinates of AC&W Sqd., 10th Air Division, Alaska. WAC Chart 118; Fire Island 610915013, Sparrevohn 610715536. WAC Chart 119 Cape Romanzoff 614616552 Bethel 604716154. WAC Chart 135 Cape Newenham 583816204. WAC Chart 136 King Salmon 584215640; Homer 594315132. WAC Chart 137 Middleton Island, 592614619. Fighter Interceptor Squadrons are 31st and 317th at Elmendorf F-102A aircraft and 449th at Ladd F-89J aircraft.

DUPLICATE

READING FILE

DATE	TIME
1	1700Z
MONTH	YEAR
Nov.	57

SYMBOL: NOOOP-T

WRITER: TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): Maj. Schiebel

PHONE: 2088 PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

RELEASER: SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE: R. E. GARVEY, JR. Major, USA Asst Adjutant

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

CONAD HIST FILE

141

13 OCT 1958

General Thomas D. White
Chief of Staff, USAF
Headquarters USAF
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Tommy:

I have just returned from an interesting tour of Alaska and while there, noted a weak link in our defense system which is of great concern to me and which I want to bring to your attention.

Recent permanent construction under the Fiscal Year 1957 and and 1958 Military Construction Programs at King Salmon Air Force Station has provided modern aircraft shelters, barracks, a new POL system, and GAR missile buildings, but has failed to provide a useable runway for year-round operations. This means that King Salmon is currently limited to winter operations for F-102 aircraft and, in fact, the fighter complement of 102's was flown into King Salmon from Elmendorf on the 15th of December, the earliest date at which the existing runway would take them. The present runway will not withstand continued operation with the heavy tire pressures unless the field is frozen, and this means that solely because of lack of suitable runways, the F-102's must be withdrawn to Elmendorf for six to eight months of the year.

The location of King Salmon makes it one of the key air defense positions in Alaska. Without this base we have limited area defense within Alaska and no intercept-identification capability for the Aleutian extension to the DEW Line. Since one of the most likely routes for enemy attack through that area lies across the eastern end of the Aleutian radar chain, this deficiency in intercept-identification capability is a crucial one. Furthermore, lacking interceptor aircraft at King Salmon on a year-round basis, the GCI site at this station and the GCI

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CONAD HIST FILE
402

site at Bethel which will soon be operational will be in only limited use during the summer months.

The runway project at King Salmon Airport has been changed from the Military Construction Program to a 1958 M&O Project (Number Elmendorf 177-8). The 1959 program provides for a 1,000 foot extension to the runways plus over-runs. I am not in a position to evaluate the adequacy of these proposals, but I do know that the present situation is unsatisfactory from many points of view. The Air Force has a great deal of money invested in support facilities at King Salmon, yet has failed to provide for a suitable runway and, as a result, we not only are failing to keep our GCI sites in that area at a high level of effectiveness during part of the year, but we also have a major hole in the defenses which could be readily plugged by the expenditure of a relatively modest amount of money.

I strongly recommend that the King Salmon runway project be given a priority of such a nature that early favorable funding action may be accomplished.

Sincerely,

Gen Partridge
2201
9 Jan 59

E. E. PARTRIDGE
General, USAF
Commander-in-Chief

M/R not required

[redacted] filled .. COPY OF INCOMING CL SIFIED MESSAGE 142

(Reproduction of this message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CONAD Adjutant)

SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

12 Dec 57

COMI026V

READING FILE OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

VB001
00 RJEDDN RJEDKF RJEPHN
DE RFENVD 19/12
O 121450Z
FM CANAIRDEF COC
TO RJEDDN/NORAD ENT AFB COLORADO ACTION: COCOC
RJEPHN/CFECR COC NEWBURGH NY
RJEDKF/CFCCR COC RICHARDS GEBAUR AFB GRANDVIEW MO 57-11895
BT
[redacted] AC769 12 DEC
[redacted]TUS A 121430Z

5 AD	3 SECTOR	1 SECTOR	2 SECTOR	64 AD
00 5/0	YB 13/0	HU 12/0	CH 0/4	JT 8/0
	ON 13/0	BG 7/0		YR 8/0
				TL 13/0

BT
12/1508Z

DUPLICATE

-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY 2 ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION
//ADVANCE COPY OF THIS MSG HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO COC//

CONAD MOT FILE
403

READING FILE

3 2

[redacted] filled ... COPY OF INCOMING CL SIFIED MESSAGE 143

s message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CONAD Adjutant)

SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING | JAN 1958

H
CON020BV002

OO RJEDDN RJEPNB RJEDKF
DE RFEMVB 4/01
O 011530Z
FM CANAIRDEF COC
TO RJEDDN/NORAD COC ENT AFB COLORADO
RJEPNB/CFECR COC NEWBURGH NY
RJEDKF/CFCCR COC RICHARDS GEBAUR AFB GRANDVIEW MO

ACTION COCOC
X8-11

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIA

[redacted] AC730 1 JAN
[redacted] STATUS A 011530Z

5 AD	3 SEC	1 SEC	2 SEC	64 AD
QQ 15/0	YB 22/0	HU 21/0	CH 0/4	JT 10/0
	OW 29/0	BG 13/0		YR 13/0
				TL 8/0

BT
1/1614Z

A-PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE TIME GROUP PRIOR
TO DECLASSIFICATION

///.ADVANCE COPY OF THIS HAS BEEN DILIEVED TO COC ///
QRU FKE

DUPLICATE

409

Copy 2 of 2 Copies

[redacted]

144

15 Jan 58

REGISTERED MAIL
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: Commander Naval Forces, Continental Air Defense Command
TO: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: Status and Location of Naval Forces Fighter Aircraft Report: forwarding of

Encl: (1) Copy of subject report

1. Enclosure (1) is the latest status and location of Naval Forces Fighter aircraft based ashore in the United States.

2. Totals of Available aircraft of combat units only, excluding aircraft aboard carriers, R&D aircraft, pool aircraft and Naval Bases aircraft.

3. This letter may be downgraded to unclassified upon removal of enclosure (1).

COPY TO:
CINCONAD

G. L. KOHR
Chief of Staff

[redacted]

DATE JAN 15, 1958 NAVAL F[redacted] AUGMENTATION AIRCRAFT

144

LOCATION / A/C TYPE	ALL WEATHER			DAY FIGHTER								OTHER	TOTAL	REMARKS
	F9H	F9D	F9H-5,4	F8A	F8F	F8F-2,3,4	F9F-2,3,4	F7U-3	F9F-2,3,4,5	F2H-2	[redacted]			
EASTERN														
AKRON														
ATLANTIC CITY														
CECIL FIELD				6	5						6		17	
CHERRY POINT	29		16	81		55				26	23		129	
CHINCOTEAGUE		22				34	15				13		85	
COLUMBUS														
GLENVIEW														
GLYNCO						35							35	
JACKSONVILLE														
KEY WEST		13				28			10	6			44	
MEMPHIS											3		16	
MIAMI														
NEW YORK						16	47						63	
NIAGARA FALLS						22							22	
NORFOLK														
OCEANA	26		19											
QUONSET				27	48	25				36			181	
SANFORD														
SHERMAN FIELD														
SOUTH WEYMOUTH						12							12	
WILLOW GROVE						29							29	
BRINTON						12							12	
SEALFORT														
NEW ORLEANS														
TOTAL	55	35	35	37	32	292	87		10	67	45		695	
WESTERN														
ALAMEDA	6		4										10	
BROWN FIELD														
CHINA LAKE														
EL CENTRO														
EL TORO														
LOS ALIMITOS		14					6				2		8	
MIRAMAR						17	32				23		86	
MOFFETT FIELD	35					20							20	
MOJAVE				19	7	20							81	
NORTH ISLAND				18									18	
OAKLAND														
POINT MUGU														
SPOKANE														
FALLON														
TOTAL	41	14	4	37	7	57	38				25		223	
CENTRAL														
CHASE FIELD														
CORPUS CHRISTI						85							85	
DALLAS						24							24	
DENVER						30							30	
KINGSVILLE						16							16	
LINCOLN						89							89	
MINNEAPOLIS														
OLATHE								8					8	
ST LOUIS						60							60	
MEMPHIS						16							16	
TOTAL						320		8					328	
GRAND TOTAL	96	49	39	74	39	669	125	[redacted]	10	67	70		1246	

145

~~SECRET~~

Copy furnished

PRIORITY
ROUTINE

X X

DGA ADCOM ENTAFB COLO

DCSOPSDA [illegible]

INFO: CINCONAD ENTAFB COLO (Courier)

604 ADGCL. a. DA 932772. NOTAL b. DA 931678 Oct. NOTAL

c. My ADGCL 588. NOTAL

1. Examination of the proposed package output schedule transmitted by reference a reveals that:

a. Only two-thirds of the ARADCOM units planned for conversion under FY 1959 force structure contained in reference b will be operational by 30 June 1959 and, of the nine FY 59 HERCULES battalions programmed for new areas, only the battalion for Thule AB will be operational at end FY 59;

b. By end FY 59, one half of the operational US Army HERCULES battalions will be overseas.

c. Alaska, Greenland, Okinawa and Europe are given priority for HERCULES deployment over CONUS high-value metropolitan areas. This is in apparent conflict with stated policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. In consideration of the limited availability of HERCULES

ADGCL

J. L. YARRALL, Colonel, GS
2134

1 3

DAVID MADIAS
CWO, W-4, USA
Asst Adj Gen

~~REGRADING DATA CANNO~~ [redacted]
~~BE PREDETERMINED~~

X7-13854

S 3539-57

[redacted] 146

CONFIDENTIAL

world-wide under the reduced FY 59 force structure SAC bases in Alaska, Greenland and Okinawa would not, in the opinion of this headquarters, warrant HERCULES defense before critical CONUS targets. However, because of the early completion of construction, reduction in other air defense means and the need for AAA defense of these areas, this headquarters recommends that interim defenses consisting of battalions minus two firing batteries be provided these areas until the effectiveness levels at existing defenses in CONUS are raised to a minimum acceptable level. It should be noted that small vital target areas in CONUS such as SAC bases will thru FY 61 be provided defense by a battalion minus two firing batteries.

3. In accordance with the above, the following output schedule for active Army HERCULES packages is recommended:

1	July 1958	1 Conversion
1	Aug	1 Conversion, 1 Greenland
1	Sept	1 Alaska
2	Oct	2 Conversion
1	November	1 Conversion
1	December	1 Europe
2	Jan 1959	2 Conversions
3	Feb	2 Conversions, 1 Okinawa
3	March	3 Conversions
2	April	2 Conversions
1	May	1 Conversion, 1 Greenland

ADGCL

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2 3

[redacted] 145

CGARADCOM ENTAFB COLO

1	June	1 Europe
1	July	1 Conversion, 1 New
1	Aug	1 Conversion, 2 New
2	Sept	2 New
4	Oct	2 New, 1 Alaska, 1 Okinawa
2	Nov	1 Conversion, 1 New

4. As stated in reference c, conversion to HERCULES of 18 equivalent CONUS battalions in FY 59-61 is considered inadequate. Reevaluation of non-tactical allocation of HERCULES equipment appears necessary in view of the apparent overall reduction in the HERCULES program.

5. NORAD concurs in our recommendations in paragraph 3 above, as far as Greenland and Alaska are concerned. NORAD has, however, expressed concern over the planned deployment of HERCULES to Europe and Okinawa prior to deployment at critical new areas as approved by the JCS and as recommended to the JCS by NORAD.

We hope? who?

146

[redacted]

NOCOP [illegible] 57

SUBJECT: [illegible] NIKE HERCULES Nuclear Warheads

TO: [illegible] USAF
[illegible] NORAD
[illegible] D. C.

[illegible] 102[illegible] 21 December 1[illegible]6, established the nuclear [illegible] NORAD (then CONAD) [illegible] the Fiscal Year [illegible] period, [illegible] allocation of nuclear warheads for NIKE HERCULES.

[illegible] U. S. [illegible] Defense Command has informed this headquarters [illegible] batteries of NIKE HERCULES are planned [illegible] deployed [illegible] operational before the end of Fiscal Year [illegible] effectiveness of this weapons system it is requested [illegible] Fiscal [illegible] NORAD be amended to add nuclear warheads for these NIKE HERCULES batteries. Specifications [illegible] type, quantity and desired distribution are contained in paragraph [illegible] below.

[illegible] These batteries will defend the critical industrial and population complexes listed below. This fact emphasizes the need for expeditious action in providing these units with atomic weapons. If the warheads and capsules requested have been dispersed [illegible] the limit of Presidential authorizations, it is suggested that sufficient numbers from the JCS reserve might be prepositioned at the battery locations listed as an interim measure.

[illegible] In event the above requested amendment to SM 102[illegible] is approved, it is further requested that these warheads and nuclear capsules be positioned as follows:

DEFENSE AREA	TYPE WARHEAD	TYPE NUCLEAR CAPSULES	NUMBER
New York City	MK 7 MOD 2[illegible]		7
		190-DE	6
		170-DE	1
Chicago	MK 7 MOD 2[illegible]		7
		190-DE	6
		170-DE	1

DUPLICATE

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DEFENSE AREA	TYPE WARHEAD	TYPE NUCLEAR CAPSULES	NUMBER
Philadelphia	MK 7 MOD 2X		7
		19C-DE	6
		17C-DE	1
Washington-Baltimore	MK 7 MOD 2X		7
		19C-DE	6
		17C-DE	1

5. The ratio of nuclear to non-nuclear warheads in the basic load of a HERCULES battery is 1 to 3. The ratio of one medium to six small yield nuclear warheads shown in paragraph 4 above will provide each battery with an atomic capability using medium yield weapons against massed formations at long range as well as a similar capability against single aircraft when using the small yield warhead. In addition, the small yield warhead will be available for use against relatively low-altitude targets.

6. It is emphasized that this request is over and above the allocation contained in CM-[illegible]-X.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

[illegible]

HEADQUARTERS
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AF Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT

NOTICE OF IMPORTANT INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE

30 September 1957
(Date)

TO: COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF _____
CHIEF OF STAFF _____
SECRETARY OF THE JOINT STAFF _____
_____
_____

For your information, the following correspondence has been received:

From: ADCAA-DPROD, USARADCOM Dated: 20 Sep 1957

Classification: SECRET Paragraph 17-11476 Suspense: None

Action Office: MOCOP

SUMMARY. USARADCOM is concerned because SM-1025-56 does not allocate to NORAD any nuclear warheads for NIKE HERCULES missiles for FY 58. They request we initiate action to have the 4th qtr FY 58 allocation of nuclear warheads amended to provide the warheads and nuclear capsules required for operational on-site NIKE Hercules missiles. They list what they think is necessary by number and models and explain why.

[redacted] W. [redacted]UX
LCDR, USN
Asst Adjutant

CONAD SECYT FORM 4 AUG 5

[redacted]

146

HEADQUARTERS
ARMY ANTIAIRCRAFT COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

30 SEP 1957

ADOAA-P&RCD 471.94

SUBJECT: Allocation of NIKE HERCULES Warheads (U)

TO: Commander-in-Chief
North American Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

a. SM-1025-56.

b. SM-74-57.

2. Reference 1a does not allocate to NORAD nuclear warheads for NIKE HERCULES missiles for FY 1958.

3. NIKE HERCULES is planned to be operational by end FY 1958 at four battery sites which will require a total of 28 nuclear warheads. These sites will be located in the New York, Washington-Baltimore, Chicago, and Philadelphia defense areas. The number of nuclear warheads is based on the number of NIKE HERCULES missiles which will initially be deployed at sites selected to receive NIKE HERCULES.

4. It is requested that your Headquarters initiate action to have the fourth quarter FY 1958 allocation of nuclear warheads (reference 1a) amended to provide the following warheads and nuclear capsules which are required for operational on-site NIKE HERCULES missiles:

		Number
Warheads	MK 7 Mod 2E	28
Nuclear capsules	190-DE	24
	170-DE	4

5. The distribution of capsules is based on a six-to-one ratio of small to medium yield warheads. This ratio will provide each battery with one medium yield warhead and six small yield warheads. The medium yield warhead will provide a capability against massed formations at

[redacted]

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ADOAA-P&RCD 471.94
SUBJECT: Allocation of NIKE HERCULES Warheads (U)

long range, as well as providing an enemy weapon kill potential at long range. The small yield warheads will provide a capability against single aircraft at all ranges, enemy weapon kill potential at shorter ranges, and will allow the use of atomic warheads against low-altitude targets.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

H. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

Copy furnished:
DCSOPS, DA

147

PRIORITY
ROUTINE
CGARADCOM ENTAFB COLO

DCSOPSDA WASHDC

INFO: CGUSCONARC FTMONROE VA

CINCONAD (Courier)

CG1RAADCOM FTTOTTEN NY

CG2RAADCOM FTMEADE MD

CG5RAADCOM FTSHERIDAN ILL

CG6RAADCOM FTBAKER CALIF

CO4RAADCOM RICHARDSGEBAURAFB MO

430 ADOAA-3 P&O. Your DA 927877. NOTAL

1. Following is inactivation schedule in order of priority.

a. Gun battalions to be inactivated on 31 December 1957: 69th New York, 518th Hanford, 550th Norfolk, 749th New York, 606th Buffalo-Niagara, 77th Los Angeles, 501st Hanford, 35th Washington-Baltimore, 701st Pittsburgh. Units become nonoperational 15 November.

b. Gun battalions to be inactivated on 30 June 1958: 41st New York, 70th Washington-Baltimore, 16th Boston-Providence,

ADOAA-3 P&O

Col Yarnall/avg

2134 1 3

RE-READING DATA CANCELLED
DETERMINED

AUG 16 1957

1522287 AUG '57

DAVID MADIAS
CWO, W-4, USA
Asst Adj Gen

[redacted] 47

OGARADCOM ENTAFB COLO

20th Seattle, 12th New York, 519th Hanford, 496th Chicago, 33rd Savannah River. Units become nonoperational 15 May 1958.

c. Skysweeper battalions to be inactivated 30 June 1958: 425th and 478th Savannah River, 8th Sault Ste Marie. Units become nonoperational 15 May 1958.

2. Reference message not considered to include Gun battalion and Skysweeper batteries in Greenland, in accordance with information received in fonecon Major Hindman, DCSOPGTA and Major Semmens, this headquarters, 13 August 1957.

3. Considered essential to augment appropriate group and brigade headquarters tables of organization with qualified personnel to furnish training support to National Guard on-site and M-Day units. Specific augmentation will be requested by separate message.

4. This headquarters is concerned over public reaction to withdrawal of all Army air defense units at Sault Ste Marie and Savannah River, where defenses are required and have existed for considerable periods of time. Recommend retention in FY 59 force structure of 8th Skysweeper battalion at Sault Ste Marie and 33rd Gun battalion at Savannah River. A minimum of two NIKE AJAX batteries would be deployed at each of these areas during FY 59. Personnel of the two units mentioned, together with school trained technicians assigned to ARADCOM who are not eligible for HERCULES conversion training, would man NIKE AJAX equipment to be made

[redacted]

SECRET

CGARADCOM ENTAFB COLO

available in June and August 1958 by programmed AJAX to HERCULES conversions. Field type emplacements on government owned or leased land would be used. Modified emergency housing is available at Savannah River and existing troop housing at Sault Ste Marie can be UTILIZED adequate pending construction of facilities for planned FY 60 NIKE deployment.

5. Recommend early press release and declassification of inactivation schedule.

6. This message coordinated with CINCONAD.

148

[redacted]

CONAD HIST
502.03

13 Sep 57

REGRADING DATA CAN
BE PREDETERMINED

ROUTINE
ROUTINE

X

CGARADCOM ENTAFB COLO

DCSOPSDA WASHDC

INFO CGUSCONARC FTMONROE VA

CINCONAD ENTAFB COLO (ROUTINE)

CG1RAADCOM FTMOTTON NY

CG2RAADCOM FTMEADE MD

467 ADCAA-3 P&O. My 430 ADCAA-3 P&O, August.

1. Request paragraph 1 of referenced message be changed to indicate proposed inactivation dates of the 16th AAA Battalion to be 31 December 1957 and the 35th AAA Battalion to be 30 June 1958.

2. The 16th AAA Battalion is a M + 10 High Priority and STRAC Unit. The 35th AAA Battalion is a M + 31 High Priority and STRAC Unit. Special missions assigned to the 16th Battalion should be assigned to the 35th Battalion.

3. Requested change in activation dates due to termination of site lease on 31 December 1957 of Battery C, 16th AAA Battalion.

132148Z SEP 57

ADCAA-3 P&O

K. L. YARRALL, Colonel/GS
2134

1 1

T. F. HORN
CWO, W-3, USA
Asst Adj Gen

149

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 322, Hq USARADCOM, 18 Sep 57, Subj: Replacement Units for STRAC and High Priority Units (U)

HOOPR

1st Ind 30 September 1957

Hq North American Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

TO: Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, Colorado

This headquarters concurs in the assignment of National Guard replacement units for high priority and STRAC units as outlined in Inclosure 1 to basic communication.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl
n/c

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

COPY FOR CHIEF OF STAFF

Lt Col O E Griest
2845
25 Sep 57

rg

(17)

RECEIVED
2 OCT 1957
C of S Conad
10-3

[redacted]

57-1904

NT-11094-B

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[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

1. References in basic communication:

a. Letter ADOAA-3, P&O 322, USARADCOM, 14 August 1957, subject, "Deployment of Army Air Defense Units to Overseas Areas (U)" lists the ARADCOM units assigned High Priority and Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) missions.

(1) High Priority units are placed in preferential status to insure their readiness for deployment early in a general war, or to meet an emergency short of a general war.

(2) STRAC units are in Ready Force A (30-Day) and Western Hemisphere Reserve and maintained in high degree of readiness to meet a limited emergency short of general war.

b. JCS 1899/327 establishes procedures for the Services to coordinate with CONAD on deployment of CONAD forces to overseas areas to counter local aggression.

c. Letter ADOAA-3, P&O 322, USARADCOM, 27 August 1957, subject, "Revised FY 58 Force Structure for USARADCOM" schedules the inactivation of Regular Army Gun and Skysweeper units in two increments (31 December 1957 and 30 June 1958). ARADCOM has since informally advised this office that D/A was directing that all these Gun and Skysweeper units would be inactivated by 31 December 1957, which means they will become nonoperational during October 1957.

2. ARADCOM has advised this office, informally, that D/A plans for National Guard Gun and Skysweeper units to be relieved from their operational mission on 30 September 1957 to start Nike training.

3. The proposed substitution of National Guard units for Regular Army units sent overseas in an emergency is sound and desirable for accomplishing of NORAD's mission. Therefore this headquarters should concur. If the National Guard Gun and Skysweeper units become nonoperational in September 1957 and the Regular Army Gun and Skysweeper units become nonoperational in October 1957, the significance of this correspondence will soon be negated.

[redacted]

[redacted]

ADOAA-3 P&O 322

18 September 1957

SUBJECT: Replacement Units for STRAC and High Priority Units (U)

TOP Command-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. References:

a. Letter ADOAA-3 P&O 322, this headquarters, 14 August 1957, subject; "Deployment of Army Air Defense Units to Overseas Areas". (U)

b. JCS 1899/327

c. Letter ADOAA-3 P&O 322, this headquarters, 27 August 1957, subject: "Revised FY 1958 Force Structure for USARADCOM" (U)

2. Reference 1a notified your headquarters of active Army ARADCOM units designated either to the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) or that have been assigned a High Priority mission. Units involved are the same except that one HighPriority Unit, the 23d AAA Group is not listed in STRAC.

3. National Guard units have been designated by Department of the Army as on-site replacements for STRAC Units, (See Inclosure 1), All units have been designated Special Security Forces (SSF) except as noted ib Inclosure 1. Deployment of ARADCOM STRAC Units would result in the designated National Guard replacement unit reporting on-site.

4. In the event an ARADCOM Unit is deployed overseas because of its High Priority mission, this headquarters will request that the STRAC National Guard replacment unit be ordered into Ferderal Service and assigned to that defense. In the case of the 23d AAA Group, it is planned to recommend to Department of the Army that the 212th AAA Group, New York National Guard, be designated as the replacement unit.

5. As indicated in refernece 1c, AAA gun units assigned to this command will be inactivated by 30 June 1958. The provisions of this letter will then no longer apply.

6. Request your concurrence.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
STRAC NG Replacement List

/s/t/ D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen
Chief of Staff

[redacted]

[redacted]

149

STRATEGIC ARMY CORPS

National Guard Replacement Units (U)

AAA Group, HHB

UNIT	DEFENSE
211th, Mass	Boston-Providence
212th, N.Y*	New York
234th, Calif	Los Angeles
AAA Det (Opr)	
173d, Mass	Boston-Providence
AAA Bn (90mm Gun)	
156th, Del	Washington-Baltimore
210th, N H	New York
286th, Wash **	Seattle
337th, Pa	Pittsburg
685th, Mass	Boston-Providence
713th, S C	Washington-Baltimore
744th, N H	New York
AAA Bn (75mm Gun)	
300th, Mich	S S Marie
464th, Ala **	Savannah River
950th, Ga	Savannah River
Sig Det (RM) Type E	
116th, La	Washington-Baltimore
123d, Del	Washington-Baltiomore
151st, Va	Norfolk
156th, Ala **	New York
157th, Ala *	S S Marie
356th, Mass	Boston-Providence
373d, Pa	Pittsburg
405th, Wash	Seattle
420th, Ga	Savannah River

* Recommended Units
** Non SSF

[redacted]

150

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

DISPOSITION FORM

14

SUBJECT

FROM

DATE

COMMENT NO. 1

CNAD

151

[redacted]

CONAD HIST FILE
502 x 503

9 OCT 57

PRIORITY
Routine

X

CGARADCOM ENTAFB COLO

CG1RAADCOM FTTOTTEN NY

CG2RAADCOM FTMEADE MD

CG5RAADCOM FTSHERIDAN ILL

CG6RAADCOM FTBAKER CALIF

INFO CINCNORAD (COURIER)

521 ADOCR.

1. The following SECRET message DA 930687, 5 October 1957 is transmitted for your information and compliance: Quote

0923157 OCT 57

Asst	
Ex	
Ch Clk	
Ch T&T	✓
Asst	
Ch T&T	

ADOCR

K. L. YARNALL, Colonel/sd

2134

1

3

DAVID MEDIAS
CWO, W-4, USA
Asst Adj Gen

[redacted]

[redacted]

151 COPY

Quote Ref your 497 ADOAA-3 [illegible] TOTAL.

1. (UNCLASS) Vol [illegible] units are relieved of Opn Msn eff 4 Oct 57:

a. 12, 16, 20, 33, 35, 41, 69, 70, 77, 5[illegible]0, 606, 701 and 749 AAA Bns, 90mm Gun.

b. 496, 501, 51[illegible], and 519th AAA Bns, 120mm Gun.

2. (UNCLASS) Units listed para 1 will be inactv eff 20 Dec 57. Confirming orders fol.

3. (UNCLASS) Recm contained in para 2, ref msg, is under study. You will be notified of decision by separate msg. Pending final decision no rpt no action will be taken concerning AAA Bns, 75mm Gun.

4. (SECRET) All ARADCOM units are relieved of STRAC msn with the exception of the fol units which will remain, temporarily, asg to STRAC

15 AAA Gp, [illegible]

AAA Bn, 75mm Gun

425 AAA Bn, 75 mm Gun

478 AAA Bn, 75 mm Gun

515 AAA Ops Det

61 Sig Det Radar Maint

25 Sig Det Radar Maint

5. (UNCLASS) Request DA be furnished prior to 9 Oct 57 the desired composition of the AN/TPS-1D Radar Sec of inactv units, and the desig of Hq to which the Radar Sec will be Asg Unquote

[redacted]

COPY

151 COPY

[redacted]

Quote Ref your 497 ADOAA-3 [illegible] TOTAL.

1. (UNCLASS) Fol [illegible] units are relieved of Opn Msn eff 4 Oct 57:

a. 12, 16, 20, 33, 35, 41, 69, 70, 77, 5[illegible]0, 606, 701 and 749 AAA Bns, 90mm Gun.

b. 496, 501, 51[illegible], and 519th AAA Bns, 120mm Gun.

2. (UNCLASS) Units listed para 1 will be inactv eff 20 Dec 57. Confirming orders fol.

3. (UNCLASS) Recm contained in para 2, ref msg, is under study. You will be notified of decision by separate msg. Pending final decision no rpt no action will be taken concerning AAA Bns, 75mm Gun.

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15 AAA Op, [illegible]

AAA Bn, 75mm Gun

425 AAA Bn, 75 mm Gun

478 AAA Bn, 75 mm Gun

515 AAA Ops Det

61 Sig Det Radar Maint

25 Sig Det Radar Maint

5. (UNCLASS) Request DA be furnished prior to 9 Oct 57 the desired composition of the AN/TPS-1D Radar Sec of inactv units, and the desig of Hq to which the Radar Sec will be Asg Unquote

[redacted]

COPY

151

COARADCOM ENTAFB COLO

2. This headquarters will furnish Department of the Army the information requested in paragraph 5 of above quoted message. Therefore, no repeat no action by your command on paragraph 5 is requested.

3. That part of my 504 ADOCR pertaining to non-operational status of Skysweeper battalions is rescinded pending resolution of proposals in my 497 ADOAA-3 P&O.

[redacted]

152

[illegible] STATES [illegible] COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs Colorado

[illegible]CCL 325

22 NOV 1957

SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S)

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. The enclosed draft letter, Subject: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S), has been prepared for forwarding to Department of the Army.

2. Your concurrence in the recommendations listed in paragraph 7 of the draft letter is requested.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
Draft ltr, Subj,
Elimination of
National Guard
M-Day Gun and
Skysweeper Units
from the CONUS
Air Defense Task
Organization (S).

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen GS
Chief of Staff

DUPLICATE

[illegible] DATA CANNOT
BE PREDETERMINED

152

ADGCL 125, Hq USARADCOM, [illegible] Subj: Eliminations of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S)

NCOPR [illegible] 1st Ind [illegible] 7 November 1957

Hq North American Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Air Defense Command, Ent Air Force Base, Colorado

This headquarters concurs with the recommendations listed in paragraph 7 of the [illegible] draft letter, subject, Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S).

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl
n/c

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

1. Recommendations [illegible] letter are:

a. "National Guard M-Day [illegible] skysweeper [illegible] eliminated from the CONUS Army [illegible]"

b. "[illegible] supporting units [illegible] revised Department of Army [illegible] the CONUS Army air defense [illegible]."

2. Concurred in for the reasons outlined [illegible] draft letter, a copy of which is attached to this M/R.

UNCLASSIFIED

[illegible]
NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
[illegible]
[illegible] RADO

OFFICE OF THE ASST SEC[illegible]

[illegible] IMPORTANT [illegible]

22 November 1957

TO: Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff

For your information the following correspondence has been received:

From: USARADCOM Dated 22 Nov 57

Classification: ~~SECRET~~ Panfile X7-13942 Suspense 6 Dec 57

Action Office: [illegible]

SUMMARY:

USARADCOM prepared a draft letter, Subject: Elimination of Nationad Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S), for forwarding to DA. They have asked for our concurrence in the recommendations listed in paragraph 7 of the draft letter. These recommendations are:

(1). National Guard M-Day gun and Skysweeper units be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.

(2). National Guard group and brigade headquarters and supporting units or detachments not required in support of the revised Department of Army Mobilization Plan be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.

[redacted]

NORAD SECY1 [illegible] 4

UNCLASSIFIED

152

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

ADGCL 325

SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S)

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. References:

a. Letter NG-AROT 325 A (AAA) dtd 7 Sep 1955, Subject: Task Organization for National Guard AAA Units w/changes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.

b. DA, Mobilization Troop Program (U) of the Army, Fiscal Year 1957, dtd 1 Sep 1956.

2. The missions presently assigned National Guard M-Day gun and Skysweeper units are to provide replacement for active Army gun and Skysweeper units, to augment established defenses, or to establish new defenses. All CONUS active Army gun units will be deactivated by 20 December 1957 and therefore the National Guard M-Day units are no longer needed as replacements for active Army gun units.

3. It is the opinion of this headquarters that the National Guard M-Day gun and Skysweeper units will not contribute sufficiently to the air defense effort to warrant the expenditure of funds and manpower required to maintain them for the following reasons:

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ADOCL 325
SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S)

a. The addition of gun units to a NIKE defense would increase the effectiveness of these defenses only slightly against the modern threat and then only at lower altitudes.

b. In the establishment of new defenses, guns and/or Skysweepers will provide inadequate defense against modern enemy aircraft or missiles. At most, such weapons serve only to reduce the accuracy of bombers.

c. The time required for an M-day unit to attain an on-site operational capability after alert is too great to permit the units to participate in the critical phase of the air battle.

4. It is recognized that it may be desirable for the National Guard to retain certain gun or Skysweeper battalions, where suitably located geographically, for the purpose of providing organizational integrity until later conversion to missile units. The detailed deployment plans on which the National Guard can base this determination are now under preparation by this headquarters.

5. In view of the recent directive to inactivate all ARADCOM gun battalions in the Continental United States, it appears that the Department of Army Mobilization Plan requires a revision to indicate a greatly decreased number of gun battalions to be redeployed overseas on M[redacted] and M[redacted]. Such revision will also lead to a considerable cutback in the scheduled redeployment overseas of ARADCOM group and brigade headquarters,

152

[redacted]

ADGCL 325
SUBJECT: Elimination of National Guard M-Day Gun and Skysweeper Units from the CONUS Air Defense Task Organization (S)

which, in turn, decreases the requirement for National Guard group and brigade headquarters in being on M-Day.

6. Although not specifically a part of this problem, a related item is the training support for National Guard units. The deactivation of all active Army gun units has eliminated the ARADCOM source of personnel for training support of any National Guard gun units. Such personnel would have to be provided to this command by Department of the Army. The relief of National Guard gun and Skysweeper units from the Continental Air Defense task organization would eliminate the requirement for ARADCOM training support.

7. In view of the foregoing it is recommended that:

a. National Guard M-Day gun and Skysweeper units be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.

b. National Guard group and brigade headquarters and supporting units or detachments not required in support of the revised Department of Army Mobilization Plan be eliminated from the CONUS Army air defense task organization.

8. CINCONAD NORAD concurs.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Copy furnished:
CINCONAD
CINCNE NORAD

153

[redacted]

COPY OF INCOMIN LASSIFIED MESSAGE

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CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING 31 Aug 82

502 X 503 READING FILE

ACTION: COOOP
INFO: COOP; & COOPD
X7-10377

CON021 HQA009AGC012
RR RJEDEN
DE RJKDAG 12C
R 310320Z
FM CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO RJEDEN/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLORADO
ZEN/COMAAC ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
BT

[redacted] FROM OPN 5309.

PART I X D/A HAS INFORMED THIS HQ THAT TENTATIVE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF US ARMY ALASKA WILL BE REDUCED TO 12023 BY END FY 58 X PRESENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH IS 15960 X PHASED REDUCTION OF ARMY FORCES IS PLANNED TO BEGIN OCT 57 X ANTIACCRAFT FORCES NOW 2640 X PLANNED REDUCTION WILL REDUCE THESE FORCES TO 1200 X AA REDUCTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INACTIVATION OF TWO AAA BATTALIONS (75MM SKYSWEEPER) OCT 57, ONE AAA BATTALION (120MM GUN) FEBRUARY 58, AND TWO AAA GROUP HEADQUARTERS APRIL 58 X AAA REMAINING IN ALASKA AFTER PLANNED REDUCTION WILL CONSIST OF TWO 120 MM GUN BATTALLIONS: ONE AT ELMENDORF AND ONE AT EIELSON X D/A PLANS REPLACEMENT OF THESE TWO 120MM BNS

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[redacted] COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

PAGE TWO RJKDAG 12C
WITH TWO NIKE BNS BY NOV 58 X DZA [redacted] NOW DELETE THIRD NIKE BN WHICH WAS PROGRAMMED TO OCCUPY SITES [redacted] LOVE FOX AND SUGAR IN DEFENSE OF LADD AFB IN NOV 59 X CINCAL CONCURS IN PLANNED AA REDUCTION IN ALASKA, WITH ONE EXCEPTION: NIKE SITE LOVE NW OF LADD SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED TO COMPLEMENT THE FOUR NIKE SITES AT EIELSON AFB X ONE NIKE BTRY AT SITE LOVE WILL RAISE LEVEL OF EIELSON DEFENSES TO ACCEPTABLE STANDARD OF 10 AIRCCRAFT KILL PROBABILITY X LADD-EIELSON DEFENSES WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AS AS AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE X ELIMINATION OF SITE LOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADDE EFFECTIVENESS OF SITES AT EIELSON X SITE LOVE AND THE

REPTING ABOVE AND ALL AFTER
SITE LOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE EFFECTIVENESS OF SITES AT EIELSON X SIRE LOVE AND THE FOUR EIELSON SITES WILL PROVIDE ALL THE AA DEFENSE APPROPRIATE FOR LADD UNDER CURRENT AND FORESEEN BUDGETARY CONDITIONS X PART II X SUMMARIZED BELOW IS AA FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDED FOR ALASKA BY CG USARAL AND CONCURRED IN BY THE CINCAL:

1. FY 58
A. ELMENDORFNAFB
   1 120 MM GUN BN
   1 OPERATIONS DET.
   1 RADAR MAINT DET.
   1 RCAT DET
B. EIELSON AFB AREA
   1 120 MM GUN BN
   1 OPERATIONS DET
   1 RADAR MAINT DET
  21 SPACES REQUIRED FOR NIKE CONVERSION

153

COPY OF INCOMING UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE RECLASSIFYING

PAGE THREE RJKDAG 12C
2. FY 59 (NOV 58)
A. ELMENDORF AFB AREA
1 AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)
1 OPNS DET.
1 RCAT DET.
1 NIKE BATTERY, DUAL, (AUGMENTED)
2 NIKE BATTERIES, SINGLE, (AUGMENTED)
B. EIELSON AFB AREA
1. AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)
1 OPNS DET.
4 NIKE BATTERIES, SINGLE (AUGMENTED)
3. FY 60 (NOV 59)
ADD 1 NIKE BTRY TO EIELSON BY (SITE LOVE NW OF LADD) X
PART III. X REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF FORCE STRUCTURE CONTAINED IN
PART II X THIS STRUCTURE SUPERSEDES THAT SHOWN IN ADRP 57-66X
BT
31/0328Z AUG RJKDAG

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP
PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION
//ADVANCE COPY HAS BEEN DELEVERED TO COC//

154

23

ROUTINE
ROUTINE X AF OPN 5309 ~~SECRET~~

CINCNORAD

CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA

INFO: CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF, WASH D C

CG USARADCOM ENT AFB COLORADO SPRINGS COLO (COURIER)

SECRET FROM NOOPR X001

Chief of Staff, USAF, as Executive agent for NORAD. Reference CINCAL message OPN 5309, 31 August. This message in three parts. Part I. Considering threat, 55 per cent reduction of AA forces against 19 per cent reduction of other USARAL forces considered disproportionate. Part II. Concurrence in Part III based on understanding that Department of Army plans third Nike battalion to be operational in FY 61 rather than FY 60. If not correct this headquarters nonconcurs in deletion of third Nike battalion. Part III. This headquarters will concur with CINCAL's proposed plan following USARAL force reduction outlined in reference message to: A. Inactivate two skysweeper battalions and one of three gun battalions in February 58. B. Inactivate two Group Headquarters in April 58. C. Convert two

13 2130
SEP 1957

NOOPR

LT COL O E GRIEST
2845 1 2

J. W. LEDOUX
LCDR, USN
Asst Adjutant

This correspondence is classified ..... in accordance with Para ..... AFR 205-1, or for reasons(s) stated.
Record Evaluation: ☐ Permanent, ☐ Long Time Value ☐ Temporary Until

CONAD HQ FORM 25 FEB 57 5 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

CINCONAD

154

remaining gun battalions to Nike by November 58. b. Construct and man LOVE site on Ladd defense by November 59 as originally planned for third Nike battalion. c. Establish AA force structure as indicated in Part II of reference memorandum.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: Self-Explanatory

CONAD

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET



DISPOSITION FORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (If any)

FILE NO.

SUBJECT: Reduced Army Strength in Alaska

TO: C/S

FROM: DCS/P&O

DATE: 9 Sep 57

COMMENT NO. 1

Lt Col Grieve/rg/2845

1. This headquarters has received a message from CINCAL (OPS 6309 at Tab A) which states that CINCAL plans the following Army force reductions in accordance with Department of Army's tentative authorized strengths for U.S. Army Alaska by the end of FY 1958:

	Total U.S. Army Alaska	AA Forces	Other Army Force
Present Strength	15,960	2,640	13,320
Proposed Strength	12,023	1,200	10,823
Proposed Reduction	3,937	1,440	2,497
Percent of Reduction	24.66%	54.55%	18.75%

2. In accordance with these strength reductions, CINCAL plans:

a. The two Skysweeper battalions inactivated in February 1958.

b. One of the three 120mm gun battalions inactivated in February 1958.

c. The two Group headquarters to be inactivated in April 1958.

3. The remaining two 120mm Gun battalions (one at Elmendorf, one at Eielson) are planned for conversion to Nike battalions by November 1958. CINCAL states that D/A plans are to deploy the third Nike Battalion programmed to occupy sites in Ladd AFB area in November 1959. Headquarters CONARADCOM has learned informally from D/A that plans are to program this third Nike Battalion in FY 1961 rather than FY 1960. CINCAL concurs, except for recommending that LOVE site of the third battalion be constructed and manned, probably as a fifth battery for the Nike Battalion at Eielson AFB (Tab B).

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 1899/298, 19 November 1956, approved three Nike Battalions for Alaska to be operational by 1960.

5. CAPOP 56-56 establishes a requirement for three Nike Battalions in Alaska. Two battalions (one at Elmendorf and one at Ladd-Eielson, to be operational in FY 1959 and the third battalion at Ladd-Eielson to be operational in FY 1960.

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96 REPLACES NME FORM 96, 1 OCT 48 WHICH MAY BE USED.

SUBJECT Reduced Army Strength in Alaska

TO C/S FROM DCS/P&O

6. At Tab C, for approval, is a proposed reply to CINCAL which concurs with CINCAL's proposed plan and the resulting force structure (Part II, CINCAL message OPN 5309 at Tab A) if the Department of Army plans for the third Nike Battalion to be operational in FY 61, but nonconcurs in the "deletion" of the third Nike Battalion.

HARVEY T. ALNESS
Major General, USAF
DCS/Plans & Operations

FM CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO RJEDEN/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLORADO
ZEN/COMAAC ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA

[redacted] / FROM OPN 5309.

PART I. D/A HAS INFORMED THIS HQ THAT TENTATIVE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF US ARMY ALASKA WILL BE REDUCED TO 12023 BY END FY 58. PRESENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH IS 15960. PHASED REDUCTION OF ARMY FORCES IS PLANNED TO BEGIN OCT 57. ANTIAIRCRAFT FORCES NOW 2640. PLANNED REDUCTION WILL REDUCE THESE FORCES TO 1200. AA REDUCTION WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY INACTIVATION OF TWO AAA BATTALIONS (75MM SKYSWEEPER) OCT 57. ONE AAA BATTALION (120MM GUN) FEBRUARY 58, AND TWO AAA GROUP HEADQUARTERS APRIL 58. AAA REMAINING IN ALASKA AFTER PLANNED REDUCTION WILL CONSIST OF TWO 120MM GUN BATTALIONS: ONE AT ELMENDORF AND ONE AT EIELSON. D/A PLANS REPLACEMENT OF THESE TWO 120MM BNS WITH TWO NIKE BNS BY NOV 58. D/A PLAN NOW DELETES THIRD NIKE BN WHICH WAS PROGRAMMED TO OCCUPY SITES GEORGE, LOVE FOX AND SUGAR IN DEFENSE OF LADD AFB IN NOV 59. CINCAL CONCURS IN PLANNED AA REDUCTION IN ALASKA, WITH ONE EXCEPTION: NIKE SITE LOVE NW OF LADD SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED TO COMPLEMENT THE FOUR NIKE SITES AT EIELSON AFB. ONE NIKE BTRY AT SITE LOVE WILL RAISE LEVEL OF EIELSON DEFENSES TO ACCEPTABLE STANDARD OF 10 AIRCRAFT KILL PROBABILITY. LADD-EIELSON DEFENSES WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED AS AN INTEGRATED DEFENSE. ELIMINATION OF SITE LOVE WOULD SERIOUSLY DEGRADE EFFECTIVENESS OF SITES AT EIELSON. SITE LOVE AND THE FOUR EIELSON SITES WILL PROVIDE ALL THE AA DEFENSE APPROPRIATE FOR LADD UNDER CURRENT AND FORESEEN BUDGETARY CONDITIONS. PART II. SUMMARIZED BELOW IS AA FORCE STRUCTURE RECOMMENDED FOR ALASKA BY CG USARAL AND CONCURRED IN BY THE CINCAL:

COPY

154

1. FY 58

A. ELMENDORF AFB

1 120MM GUN BN

1 OPERATIONS DET.

1 RADAR MAINT DET.

1 RCAT DET

B. EIELSON AFB AREA

1 120MM GUN BN

1 OPERATIONS DET

1 RADAR MAINT DET

21 SPACES REQUIRED FOR NIKE CONVERSION

2. FY 59 (NOV 58)

A. ELMENDORF AFB AREA

1 AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)

1 OPNS DET.

1 RCAT DET.

1 NIKE BATTERY, DUAL, (AUGMENTED)

2 NIKE BATTERIES, SINGLE, (AUGMENTED)

B. EIELSON AFB AREA

1 AAA BN HQ (AUGMENTED)

1 OPNS DET.

4 NIKE BATTERIES, SINGLE (AUGMENTED)

3. FY 60 (NOV 59)

ADD 1 NIKE BTRY TO EIELSON BY (SITE LOWE NW OF LADD). PART III. REQUEST YOUR APPROVAL OF FORCE STRUCTURE CONTAINED IN PART II. THIS STRUCTURE SUPERSEDES THAT SHOWN IN ADRP 57-66X

[redacted]

MESSAGE 155

CONAD Adjutant

29 Aug 57

READING FILE

CONAD INST FILE

502 x512

PRIORITY

ACTION: [redacted] COOOP

INFO: COOPO

X7-10264

CON014HQA006GC008
PP RJEDEN
HE RJKDAG 5C
P 290300Z
FM CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO ZEN/CG USARAL FOR RICHARDSON ALASKA
INOF ZEN/CONAAC ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
RJEDEN/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
BT
[redacted] FROM OPN 5306
[redacted] TO RELIEVE THE 450TH AAA BN
(75 MM GUN) AND THE 867TH AA BN (75 MM GUN) AT ALL
AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS IN ALASKA IMMEDIATELY TO PERMIT
THEIR PREPARATION FOR INACTIVATION.
BT
29/0308Z AUR RJKDAG

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--
PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP
PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION

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READING FILE

Copy 2 of 4 Copies

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY OF INCOMING CL SIFIED MESSAGE 156

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SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

ACTION COPY

19 OCT 1957

NORO 012

PRIORITY

A-337-19
P 190300Z
FM CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO USRAL FT RICHARDSON ALASKA
INFO CINCNORAD ENT AFB COLO
COM AAC ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA

ACTION: NOOOP
INFO: NOOPO
N7-12358

[redacted] FM OPN 5354. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO RELIEVE THE [illegible] AAA BN (120 MM GUN) OF ALL AIR DEFENSE MISSIONS IN ALASKA IMMEDIATELY TO PERMIT PREPARATION FOR INACTIVATION.
BT

AC--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY "B" ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION--NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF DATE-TIME-GROUP IS QUOTED.

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7-6

[redacted]

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted] 157

420

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG				CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION Routine	BOOK	MULT	ROUTE		
INFO					
FROM NOOOP-T CINCNORAD					

TO

AOC CANAIRDEF ST HUBERT QUEBEC CANADA

INFO: CHF CFN COORDINATING STAFF OTTAWA ONTARIO CANADA

CANAIRHED OTTAWA ONTARIO CANADA

[redacted] NOOOP-T X055. CANSECURITY. This message in two parts. Part I. Reference MY COOOP-T X034 19 Mar 57. In addition to the two bases mentioned in referenced message Part I, the following bases not have MB-1 capabilities: Griffiss AFB NY, Otis AFB Mass; Dover AFB Del; Bunker Hill AFB Ind, Paine AFB Wash; and Ladd AFB Alaska. Part II. Previous operational restrictions pertaining to the employment of the MB-1 rocket are rescinded effective this date. MB-1 may not be flown in the U. S. during condition of CONAD Air Defense Readiness or higher conditions of alert at the discretion of CONAD Division or higher commanders and will be employed in accordance with CONAD Regulation 55-6 quote Rules of Engagement unquote. Pending further agreements between U.S.-Canada, the MB-1 will be employed

DATE 27 MONTH NOV TIME 1600Z

SYMBOL NOOOP-T

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature if required) Maj Schiebel

PHONE

PAGE NR.

NR OF PAGES 2

SECURITY CL [redacted]

RELEASER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

DUPLICATE

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM

CINCNORAD

in or over Canada only during periods of Air Defense Warning Yellow or Red. All Commanders have been advised to use extreme caution in employing the MB-1 below 5000 feet to minimize damage and hazard to ground installations and personnel.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

M R Letter received from the Chief of Staff USAF ref. Subj (Confidential) Authorization for Employment of the MB-1 Rocket dated 19 Nov 57, Fanfold [illegible]C-7-2654 signed by L Gen Garnett USAF Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Programs, authorized the removal of previous restrictions relative to use of the MB-1. Previous restrictions were: Scrambled against known hostile A/C only employed against known hostile A/C only not to be fired below [illegible]000 feet above the ground. This letter advises that the JCS have been informed of this authority given CINCNORAD.

SYMBOL	PAGE NO.	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY		INITIALS
NOOOP-T	2	2			

DD FORM MAY 55 173-1

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955—352224

158

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CL[redacted]

420

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION ROUTINE INFO ROUTINE	BOOK MULTI SINGLE			

FROM: CINCNORAD

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO:

COMDR ADC ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)

COMCFCCR STE ANT AFB NEWBURGH NY

COMCF CR HAMILTON AFB CALIF

COMCFCCR Richards Gebaur AFB Grandview MO

INFO: COFS USAF WASH DC

CINCSAC OFFUTT AFB NEBRASKA

CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA

CINCPAC PEARL HARBOR TH

CINCLANT NORFOLK VIRGINIA

CC-USARADCOM ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)

COMNAVFORCONAD (COURIER)

COM6CADD PEPPERRELL AFB NEWFOUNDLAND

~~COMCFCCR RICHARDS-GEBAUR~~ AFB GRANDVIEW MO

COM25CADD MCCHORD AFB WASH

COM26CADD ROSLYN AFS ROSLYN NY

COM27CADD NORTON AFB CALIF

COM28CADD HAMILTON AFB CALIF

COM30CADD WILLOW RUN AIRPORT BELLEVILLE MICH

COM31CADD SHELLING AFS ST PAUL MINN

READING FILE

DATE 17 | TIME 16-02

MONTH NOV | YEAR 7

SYMBOL NOOGP-T

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature if required)

PHONE Maj Schiebel | PAGE NR. | NR. OF PAGES

SECURITY CLASSIFICAT[redacted]

SIGNATURE

TYPED (or stamped) NAME AND TITLE

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DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 [redacted] 49. WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

158

COM32CADD
COM58CADD
COM WURTSMITH
COM HAMILTON
COM OXNARD
COM DOVER
COM MAMSTROM
COM GRIFFISS
COM ELLSWORTH
COM OTIS
COM PAINE
COM BUNKER HILL

SECRET FROM NOOP-T X 056 . For Chief of Staff, USAF, as Executive Agent for NORAD. Previous operational restrictions as contained in Para 3b(2(, Annex E, ADUS 1-57, with respect to use of MB-1 rockets are rescinded effective this date. In lieu thereof the following instructions apply. MB-1 weapons will be flown on fighter interceptor A/C only during conditions of Air Defense readiness or higher conditions of alert at the discretion of the CONAD Division Commander or higher authority and will be employed in accordance with CONAD Regulation 55-6, Quote Rules of Engagement Unquote. for destruction of hostile targets. Pending receipt of further authority from Canada, the flight of A/C aremed with MB-1 weapons over Canda will be only during periods, of Air Defense Warning Yellow or Red. All commanders are directed to exercise extreme caution in employin the MB-1 below 5000 feet to minimize damage and hazard to ground installations and personnel.

M/R Letter received from the Chief of Staff USAF ref Subj dated 19 Nov 57, Fanfold #C7-2654 signed by L/Gen Gerhart USAF Dep Chief of Staff, Plans & Programs, authorized the removal of previous restrictions relative to use of the MB-1. Previous restrictions were: Scrambled against known hostile A/C only, employed against known hostile A/C only, not to be fired below 5000 ft. above the ground.

UNCLASSIFIED

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28 October, 1957

NORAD

SUBJECT: Employment of the MB-1 Air-to-Air Rocket in NORAD Operations

TO: Chief of the Air Staff, RCAF
as Executive Agent for NORAD
Ottawa, Canada

1. Reference is made to the Treaties Overflight Agreement dated 28th June, 1957, between Canada and the United States, regarding the terms and conditions under which the MB-1 air-to-air rocket may be carried by United States military aircraft over Canadian territory. The present agreement is effective until 1 July, 1958.

2. Since the MB-1 entered the inventory much experience has been gained over the past eight months in employment of this weapon. Scientific advisory discussions and studies have been carried out and the results of various tests conducted regarding contamination and decontamination in case of an accident involving the MB-1 have been reviewed. The conclusions of all this effort have been highly satisfying and no evidence has emerged which reflects doubt on the effectiveness of the weapon or the safety of its handling and operation, subject to safety precautions now in effect.

3. F-89J aircraft at present comprise the MB-1 defensive force, and increasing numbers of MB-1 armed aircraft are steadily coming into service. When the above-mentioned agreement was negotiated the USAF MB-1 equipped aircraft were concentrated mainly in the territory bordering on the Great Lakes and this fact was mentioned in the Agreement. Now, however, MB-1 equipped squadrons are being deployed throughout the continental United States and Alaska, including the territory extending along the Canada - United States international boundary. Consequently, it is now desired to obtain Canadian agreement to the operation by NORAD of USAF aircraft in the territory bordering the entire length of the international boundary. In accordance with the present agreement, MB-1 armed aircraft will be flown only on the declaration of a state of Air Defence Readiness and thus would enter Canadian air space only in the event of a Yellow or Red Warning.

DUPLICATE

UNCLASSIFIED

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[redacted]

4. NORAD also now desires that Canadian approval be given for the USAF air defense squadron of F-89J fighters based at Goose Bay in Labrador to be armed with the MB-1 rocket. This request is made because of the availability now of MB-1 armed aircraft to defend this highly important northern base which is particularly vulnerable to air attack due to its isolated location beyond the contiguous air defense combat zone. It is pointed out that the RCAF Air Defense Commander exercises operational control over this USAF air defense fighter squadron at Goose Bay, the operational employment of which is in accordance with NORAD agreed procedures. It is also pointed out that storage facilities for atomic weapons already exist at Goose Bay in connection with USAF Strategic Air Command operations already agreed between Canada and the United States.

5. This Command fully appreciates the natural sensitivity with respect to the employment of atomic weapons in or over Canadian territory, but this request is advanced with confidence based on the adequate and satisfactory experience now accumulated with the MB-1 weapon, not only with respect to its high degree of effectiveness generally but also with respect to its safety. In short, to arm the USAF air defense aircraft at Goose Bay with the MB-1 rocket will significantly increase the security of this important operational base, to the common interests of Canada and the USA in the air defense of North America.

6. With the creation of the North American Air Defense Command recently by Canada and the USA, it is the hope of this Command that the matters raised in this letter can be finalized directly with the Canadian military authorities rather than by resort to the Canadian External Affairs - US State Department channels previously followed.

7. Your early consideration of this request would be much appreciated by the Commander-in-Chief.

C.R. SLEMON
Air Marshal, RCAF
Deputy Commander-in-Chief

cc: C/S, USAF
as Exec Agent for NORAD

UNCLASSIFIED

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 6

19 April 1957

STATES OF ALERT

1. Purpose. To supplement states of alert instructions published by Continental Air Defense Command.

2. General. Continental Air Defense Command has established states of alert which apply to all air defense units. This directive delineates the states of alert and establishes their application to specific antiaircraft units.

3. Definitions. a. INCREASED INTELLIGENCE WATCH - A condition of command alertness directed by the Commander-in-Chief, CONAD (CINCONAD), when closer scrutiny and evaluation of intelligence is required.

b. States of Preparedness.

(1) NORMAL PREPAREDNESS - A degree of preparedness specified in current operations orders whereby measures are taken to provide a sustained air defense potential.

(2) INCREASED READINESS - Any degree of preparedness greater than NORMAL PREPAREDNESS but less than AIR DEFENSE READINESS whereby measures are instituted to provide increased air defense potential against an unknown or doubtful threat.

(3) AIR DEFENSE READINESS - The maximum degree of preparedness whereby all available forces are placed in a state of immediate combat readiness for a relatively short period of time.

c. AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY - Any state of events which indicates to CINCONAD, or higher authority, that hostile action is in progress or is imminent or is sufficiently probable as to require, in the interest of national security, the implementation of any portion of approved plans and agreements for the defense of the United States. AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY provides the legal authority for implementation of approved plans and agreements and, once established, will remain in effect for the duration of hostilities or until terminated officially by appropriate authority. Within the legal framework of AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY, imminence of attack will be specified by conditions of air defense warning.

d. Conditions of Air Defense Warning.

Rescinds Operations Directive Number 7, this headquarters, 20 May 1953.

UNCLASSIFIED

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(1) WARNING YELLOW - Attack by hostile aircraft is probable. (This means that hostile aircraft are enroute toward an air defense sector, or that unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile are enroute toward or are within an air defense sector.)

(2) WARNING RED - Attack by hostile aircraft is imminent or is taking place. (This means that hostile aircraft are present, or are within the immediate vicinity of an air defense sector, with a high probability of entering the sector.)

(3) WARNING WHITE - Attack by hostile aircraft is improbable. (All Clear.) NOTE: The initial declaration of an AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY will automatically establish a condition of WARNING WHITE for purposes of Security Control of Air Traffic (SCATER), provided no higher degree of warning has been specified.

e. States of Alert. Annexes 1, 2 and 3 define, in detail, the states of alert for NIKE, gun and skysweeper units, respectively.

(1) RELEASED. A status that indicates that an interceptor or fire unit has been released from an air defense commitment.

(2) 3-HOUR ALERT. A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within three hours of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(3) 1-HOUR ALERT. A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within one hour of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(4) 30-MINUTE ALERT. A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within thirty minutes of receipt of an alert, warning or order.

(5) 15-MINUTE ALERT. A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of coming to "Battle Stations" alert within fifteen minutes of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(6) 5-MINUTE ALERT. A degree of preparedness that requires an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of accomplishing a tactical scramble or an effective engagement within five minutes of receipt of an alert, warning, or order.

(7) BATTLE STATIONS. A degree of preparedness that requires

an interceptor or fire unit to be capable of immediately initiating a tactical scramble or an effective engagement.

4. Procedures. a. The state of alert for individual antiaircraft fire units will be prescribed by the antiaircraft defense commander, except that the CONAD division commander concerned may direct the antiaircraft defense commander to bring antiaircraft fire units to BATTLE STATIONS upon declaration of WARNING RED. Commanders will exercise sound judgment to preclude maintaining, unnecessarily, an excessive number of fire units at the higher states of alert. The antiaircraft defense commander is authorized to prescribe varying states of alert within the AA defense depending upon the air defense situation. (For example, 25% might be at BATTLE STATIONS, 25% might be at 5-MINUTE ALERT, and 50% at 15-MINUTE ALERT.) Where practicable, fire units equipped with similar type weapons and at like states of alert should form a balanced defense.

b. The state of alert "BATTLE STATIONS" will be used only in the event an actual attack is imminent or in progress.

c. The state of alert of AN/TPS-1D (AN/FPS-36) radars will be as prescribed by the antiaircraft defense commander. Adequate radar coverage will be maintained from midnight to daylight. During other periods, a sufficient number of these radars to provide adequate radar coverage will be maintained on a 15-MINUTE ALERT status. In event of a declaration of an increased state of preparedness or an INCREASED INTELLIGENCE WATCH, a sufficient number of AN/TPS-1D (AN/FPS-36) radars will be maintained "on-the-air" to provide adequate radar coverage. Upon declaration of WARNING YELLOW or WARNING RED, the number of AN/TPS-1D (AN/FPS-36) radars "on-the-air" should be increased to provide overlapping radar coverage and to increase the traffic handling capacity of the system.

d. Detailed manning requirements will be as prescribed by ARADCOM regional commanders; the prime requisite is that fire units must be capable of accomplishing the assigned mission within the time limits specified.

e. In event of communication failure between a fire unit and its AAOC, the fire unit commander will assume an appropriate state of alert commensurate with the tactical situation.

f. Antiaircraft units at firing ranges, or away from the on-site positions for other non-tactical purposes, will be ordered to return to their tactical on-site positions, in the most expeditious manner upon declaration of an AIR DEFENSE READINESS, AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY or a WARNING RED. Antiaircraft units may be ordered to return to their tactical

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on-site positions at the discretion of the ARADCOM regional commander upon declaration of a lesser state of air defense preparedness.

g. On-site National Guard Special Security Force antiaircraft units normally will be maintained at 4-HOUR ALERT until ordered in Active Federal Service. Thereupon, these units will be directed to assume the appropriate state of alert.

5. ARADCOM-CONAD Actions

ARADCOM Action	CONAD Action
Maintain states of alert prescribed in present directives and increase intelligence watch as per implementing directives.	INCREASED INTELLIGENCE WATCH
Maintain states of alert prescribed in present directives.	NORMAL PREPAREDNESS
30-MINUTE ALERT*	INCREASED READINESS
15-MINUTE ALERT*	AIR DEFENSE READINESS
5-MINUTE ALERT*	AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY
30-MINUTE ALERT*	WARNING WHITE
5-MINUTE ALERT*	WARNING YELLOW
BATTLE STATIONS**	WARNING RED

*-After the nature of the tactical situation is ascertained, the antiaircraft defense commander may order an appropriate number of fire units to a lesser state of alert, if such is warranted.

**-After the nature of the tactical situation is ascertained and, with the concurrence of the CONAD division commander, the antiaircraft defense

Operations Directive Number 6

19 April 1957

commander may decrease an appropriate number of fire units to a lesser state of alert, if such is warranted.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

R. N. NEWBILL
Major, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

3 Annexes
1. States of Alert for NIKE Fire Units
2. States of Alert for Gun Units
3. States of Alert for Skysweeper Units.

DISTRIBUTION: B, N, NG & X
CGUSCONARC (2)
Dept of State & Def, Mil Info Control Committee, DA (20)
CGUSARAL (5)
Each NIKE, 90mm, & 120mm Btry (3)
Each 75mm Btry (12)

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Annex 1
Operations Directive Number 6

19 April 1957

STATES OF ALERT FOR NIKE FIRE UNITS

1. RELEASED: Fire units in this state of alert are those which are temporarily released from air defense commitment; for example, units at firing ranges of participating in local disaster relief activities. Appropriate local security of the area will be maintained. Communications to AAOC (sector of defense) need not be manned. Estimated time of return to an air defense commitment will be included in the report of units in this status.

2. 3-HOUR ALERT: All fire control and launcher control equipment is operable, or capable of becoming operable within three hours. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. NIKE ready missiles are in the magazine. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within three hours.

3. 1-HOUR ALERT: All fire control and launcher control equipment is operable, or capable of becoming operable within one hour. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. NIKE ready missiles are in the magazine. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within one hour.

4. 30-MINUTE ALERT: All fire control and launcher control equipment is operable. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. NIKE ready missiles are in the magazines. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within thirty minutes.

5. 15-MINUTE ALERT: WHITE STATUS - All fire control and launcher control equipment is energized. Intrabattery communications and communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Radars are prepared for operation (low voltage only) and periodically checked. WHITE STATUS requirements are completed in the IrC area. YELLOW STATUS requirements are completed in the launcher area. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS in fifteen minutes.

6. 5-MINUTE ALERT: YELLOW STATUS - All communications, fire control and launcher control equipment is manned and in operation. YELLOW STATUS requirements are completed. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within five minutes.

7. BATTLE STATIONS: BLUE STATUS (ON DECK) - All communications, fire control and launcher control equipment is manned and in operation. NIKE ready missiles are completely prepared for launching. BLUE STATUS requirements are completed. Unit is prepared to fire within 30 seconds.

Annex 1

Annex 2
Operations Directive Number 6

19 April 1957

STATES OF ALERT FOR GUN FIRE UNITS

1. RELEASED: Fire units in this state of alert are those which are temporarily released from air defense commitment; for example, units at firing ranges and units participating in local disaster relief activities. Appropriate local security of the area will be maintained. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) need not be manned. Estimated time of return to an air defense commitment will be included in the report of units in this status.

2. 3-HOUR ALERT: All gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within three hours. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within three hours. (On-site National Guard Special Security Force units will not be required to man AAOC communications and will be permitted a four-hour time limit for their initial alert in event they are called to Federal Service.)

3. 1-HOUR ALERT: All gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within one hour. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within one hour.

4. 30-MINUTE ALERT: All fire control equipment and guns are operable. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within thirty minutes.

5. 15-MINUTE ALERT: All fire control equipment is energized (low voltage only) and periodically checked. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is ready to assume BATTLE STATIONS within fifteen minutes. (Units equipped with SCR-584 will man fire control platoon communications.)

6. 5-MINUTE ALERT: All guns, fire control equipment and communications equipment are manned and in operation. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within five minutes.

7. BATTLE STATIONS: All guns, fire control equipment and communications are manned and in operation. Ready ammunition containers are open and rounds partially withdrawn. Unit is prepared to engage target immediately.

Annex 3
Operations Directive Number 6 19 April 1957

STATES OF ALERT FOR SKYSWEEPER FIRE UNITS

1. RELEASED: Fire units in this state of alert are those which are temporarily released from air defense commitment; for example, units at firing ranges and units participating in local disaster relief activities. Appropriate local security of the area will be maintained. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) need not be manned. Estimated time of return to an air defense commitment will be included in the report of units in this status.

2. 3-HOUR ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within three hours. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within three hours.

3. 1-HOUR ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is operable or capable of becoming operable within one hour. Communications to AAOC (sector or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within one hour.

4. 30-MINUTE ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is operable. Communications to AAOC (battery or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within thirty minutes.

5. 15-MINUTE ALERT: Gun and fire control equipment is energized (low voltage only) and periodically checked. Communications to AAOC (battery or defense) are manned. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE stations within fifteen minutes.

6. 5-MINUTE ALERT: Gun, fire control equipment and all communications are manned and in operation. Ready ammunition is in the revetment. Unit is prepared to assume BATTLE STATIONS within five minutes.

7. BATTLE STATIONS: Gun, fire control equipment and all communications are manned and in operation. Gun ammunition racks are loaded. Unit is prepared to engage target immediately.

Annex 3

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

CHANGE 1
OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 6

12 August 1957

STATES OF ALERT

Operations Directive Number 6, 1957, is changed as follows:

5. ARADCOM-CONAD Actions (superseded) A guide for determination of minimum antiaircraft alert requirements for varying conditions is attached as Annex 4.

3 Annexes

* * * * *

4. (Added) Guide for Determination of AA Minimum Alert Requirements

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

D. B. JOHNSON
Brig Gen, GS
Chief of Staff

J. A. PONGONIS
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

1 Incl
Guide for Determination
of AAA Min Alert Rqr

DISTRIBUTION: B, N, NG & X
CGUSCONARC (2)
Dept of State & Def, Mil Info
Control Committee, DA (20)
CGUSARAL (5)
Each NIKE, 90mm, & 120mm
Btry (3)
Each 75mm Btry (12)

GUIDE FOR DETERMINATION of MINIMUM ANTIAIRCRAFT ALERT REQU MENTS

AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY	AIR DEFENSE WARNING			States of Preparedness			States of Alert						States of Weapons Control			
	Red	Yellow	White	Normal	Increased Readiness	Air Defense Readiness	BS	5 Min	15 Min	30 Min	1 hr	3 hr	Weapons Tight	Weapons Free	Hold Fire	Discreet Fire
				X					25% (1)	25%(2)		75%	X		(3)	(3)
					X			25%		25%	25%	25%	X			
						X		25%	25%	50%			X			
X	X					X	100%							X		
X		X				X		25%	50%	25%			Prior to SCATER X	After SCATER X		
X			X	X					25%(1)	25%(2)		75%	X			
X			X		X			25%	25%	50%						
X			X			X		25%	25%	50%						

NOTE 1 Applies to missile units in Loring, Bos-Prov, Hart-Brid, New York, Wash-Balt, Norfolk, Fairchild, Hanford, Seattle, San Francisco, Travis, Los Angeles.

NOTE 2 Applies to missile units in Nia-Buf, Pitts, Cleveland, Detroit, Chicago, Milwaukee, Ellsworth, also all gun units.

NOTE 3 As appropriate.

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CONAD HIST FILE
512X503

SECURITY CLA[redacted]

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	DOSC OF REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION PRIORITY	X	AF	OTD 14071/X OPLO 12468	SECRET
INFO				

FROM: CINCONAD

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: CINCUSAFE LINDSEY AB, WIESBADEN GERMANY

[redacted]rom COOOP-T X0154. Reference your message OTD 14071/X dated 23 August 1957. This message in four parts. Part I. On site experience by USARADCOM units has proven the capability of the NIKE-AJAX system to effectively operate over extended periods of time. ARADCOM units have been on-site with their original equipment for over three years and these same units are effectively contributing to the present air defense role. Experience factors are available on the failure rate of various components of the NIKE-AJAX system; however, these failures are no different than those encountered in other electronic equipment. Part II. ARADCOM Operations Directive Number 6 prescribes the states of alert for the NIKE units of this command and is in consonance with CONADR 55-8 (States of Alert). Both of these publications will furnish guidance on the alert status for NIKE batteries.

DUPLICATE

DATE	TIME
11	15304
MONTH	YEAR
Sept	1957

SYMBOL: COOOP-T

WRITER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Major Rumpf

PHONE: 2078 — PAGE NO. 1 — NO. OF PAGES 2

SIGNATURE

RELEASER — TYPED NAME AND TITLE: [illegible] LEDOUX, LCDR, USN, Asst Adjutant

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

FROM: CINCONAD

The ARADCOM directive is a workable one and provides maximum time for maintenance and training. It should be noted that with an Air Defense Warning Red, 100 percent of the NIKE units are placed on a state of alert of Quote Battle Stations Unquote. This immediate action status can be maintained over prolonged periods of time provided sufficient personnel are available for crew relief and time is made available for periodic maintenance of the system. However, to preclude personnel fatigue and excessive wear on the system components, it is desirable that a lesser status of alert be maintained whenever the air situation will permit. Part III. In view of the close similarity between the NIKE-AJAX and the NIKE-HERCULES systems, the planning factors used for the AJAX are considered valid for HERCULES. Part IV. Reference your message OPLO 12468. We are sending under separate cover a number of directives which may be of interest to you, including copies of CONADR 55-8 (States of Alert) and ARADCOM Operations Directive Number 6 (States of Alert) which implements CONADR 55-8.

[illegible] concerning prolonged states of alert for [illegible] in answer to a message received [illegible]

SYMBOL | PAGE NR 2 | NR OF PAGES 2 | SECURITY [redacted] | INT

[redacted] lled. COPY OF INCOMING CL. IFIED MESSAGE 162

[redacted] essage in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CONAD Adjutant)

SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING 6Dec1957

CON0037
BV001
RR RFENGK RJEDDN RJEPNB
DE RFEMVB 09/07
R 061400Z
FM CANAIRDEF
TO RFENGK/USAF 64TH AIR DIV
ZEN/STN UPLANDS
ZEN/STN BAGOTVILLE
ZEN/STN SAINT HUBERT
ZEN/STN CHATHAM
ZEN/STN NORTH BAY
ZEN/STN COLD LAKE
ZEN/STN COMOX
ZEN/CANAIRVAN
ZEN/STN LAC SAINT DENIS
ZEN/STN ST MARGARETS
ZEN/STN EDGAR
INFO RJEDDN/CINC NORAD
RJEPNB/CFECR
ZEN/CANAIRHED
ZEN/SPLANSO OC-COC

READING FILE

CONAD HIST FILE
420

ACTION: COOQP
INFO: COCOC
X7-11591

[redacted] 378 06 DEC

THE OPERATIONAL READINESS STATES FOR AIR DEFENCE FIGHTER ORCES WILL BE ALTERED FROM THE STATES SPECIFIED IN ADC OPS PLAN 2 SLANT 57 PD THE STATES SPECIFIED IN ADC OPS PLAN 1 SLNT 58 CMM EFFECTIVE 0001 HOURS Z 1 JAN 58 ARE CLN

A. TWO SQN STATIONS PAREN RCAF PAREN WILL MAINTAIN CLN
(1) TWO CF100 AIRCRAFT AT TEN MINUTES READINESS PD
(2) TEN CF100 AIRCRAFT AT SIXTY MINUTES READINESS PD

B. COMOX WILL MAINTAIN CLN
(1) ONE CF100 AIRCRAFT AT TEN MINUTES READINESS PD
(2) FIVE CF100 AIRCRAFT AT SIXTY MINUTE READINESS PD

Copy 4 of 4 Copies

[redacted] ...led COPY OF INCOMING CL ...IFIED MESSAGE 162

...ssage in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CONAD Adjutant)

SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

PAGE TWO RFEMVB 09/07
C. STATION CHATHAM WILL MAINTAIN FOUR SABRE AIRCRAFT AT SIXTY MINUTES READINESS FROM DAWN TO DUSK PD
D. 64TH CONAD DIVISION WILL MAINTAIN TWO AIRCRAFT AT FIVE INUTES READINESS AT EACH BASE AND THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF TRMAINING AIRCRAFT AT SIXTY MINUTES PD
E. STATION COLD LAKE WILL MAINTAIN SIX CF100 AIRCRAFT AT THREE HOUR READINESS PD RCAF ADC AW FIGTER TWO SQN STATIONS WILL MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF SIX AIRCRAFT CMM LOADED BUT UNARMED CMM CMM IN EXCESS OF THE TEN MINUTE AIRCRAFT PD A ONE SQN STATION WILL MAINTAIN A MINIMUM OF THREE AIRCRAFT CMM LOADED BUT UNARM
IN EXCESS OF THE TEN MINUTE AIRCRAFT PD AIRCRAFT CMM WITH THE EXCEPTIC
OF THOSE AT TEN MINUTE READINESS CMM MAY BE EMPLOYED FOR SQN TRAINING
BT
06/2200Z DEC RFEMVB

A--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION
//ADVANCE COPY OF THIS MSG HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO COC /////

163

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

[redacted]

SPACE DEFENSE SEGMENT AIR COMMUNICATION CENTER

READING FILE

403 X
409

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (CAPS)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG. OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
	BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
ACTION ROUTINE			X	AF	X	
INFO						

FROM: CINCONAD

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION

TO: CONS4CADD PEPPERRELL AFB NEWFOUNDLAND

DUPLICATE

[redacted]rom COOQP-T 6164.

This message in two parts: Part One. Following message was sent to ADC and to AOC CANAIRDEF with info/CONCFECR. Quote USAF Headquarters has developed a schedule for the modernization of the F-89Ds in the 64th CONAD Division area to F-89Js. These aircraft being modernized under Project Quote Bell Boy Unquote are scheduled into the aircraft production line at Northrop Aviation, Hawthorne, Calif. on a predetermined schedule to meet factory input requirements. This schedule requires that aircraft be furnished from the three 64th Air Division squadrons during the period March thru October 1957. The aircraft availability at Thule and Goose will be reduced; however, these units will still be capable of meeting their established alert commitments. The Harmon Squadron is scheduled to lose aircraft to Project Bell Boy through October, at which time they are programmed

DATE	TIME
11	1800Z
MONTH	YEAR
Jul	1957

WRITER

SYMBOL: COOQP-T

READING FILE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: Maj Knott/wdm

PHONE | PAGE 2 | NR. OF

SECURITY [redacted]

RELEASER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
J. W. LEDOUX
LCDR, USN
Asst Adjutant

163

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONTINUATION SHEET

SECURITY CL [redacted]

FROM:

INCONAD

to receive the F-102 aircraft. The monthly loss of the F-89Ds prior to receipt of operationally ready F-102s at Harmon will prohibit this unit from meeting its present scheduled alert commitments for a period of approximately 45 days commencing 1 October 1957. The 64th CONAD Division, by message to ADC, has stated that they cannot meet the Project Bell Boy schedule and maintain alert commitment concurrently. In order to modernize the forces at earliest practicable date, the established schedules for aircraft input to the factory must be met. This Headquarters is willing to accept a reduced air defense capability in the 64th area during the aforementioned phasing period. Commander, 64th CONAD Division is being directed to coordinate with you to establish mutually agreed upon plans for alert commitments during this phasing period. Commander CONAD Forces ADR will be apprised of the reduced alert commitments during the phasing period by Commander, 64th CADD, Unquote. Part Two: Commander 64th CONAD Division will coordinate with ADC CANAIRDEF as outlined in Part One above and will keep the Commander, CONAD Forces Eastern CONAD Region apprised of the resulting alert commitments.

M/R See reverse side.

SYMBOL		PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	INITIALS
COO [redacted]		2	2		

163

[redacted]

M/R Part One of the message repeats to the Comdr, 64 CONAD Div, the information sent to the AOC RCAF/ADF and CFECR. (Following M/R was attached to message: "Capt Colling, ADC aircraft Distribution Section, brought a copy of the attached message from 64th CONAD Division to us seeking our assistance. The schedule of aircraft input to the factory under project Bell Boy must be met. USAF established the schedule and the factory is geared to the established input. ADC must provide the aircraft and by this message to AOC RCAF/ADC we can tell him of reduced aircraft availabilify at Harmon during the phasing period until combat ready F-102s are available. The 59th at Goose merely exchange aircraft in the modernization project while the 61st at Harmon lose the aircraft completely and must wait for the arrival of the F-102s.

Part Two. Places the responsibility for coordination with AOC RCAF/ADC and CFECR on the 64th CONAD Division commander.

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

when filled in COP... 164

TO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING. ASSIFIED ...ESS

VB002

ACTION COPY

PP RJEXFT RJEDEN RFEPFZ
DE RFEMVB 14/21
P211555Z
FM CANAIRDEF

PRIORITY

ACTION: COOOP
INFO: COOPO
17-9981

TO RJEXFT/COMDR 64 AIR DIV PEPPERRELL AFB NFLD
INFO RJEDEN/CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO
RFEPFZ/CANAIRHED

[redacted] AP42 21 AUG 57
... JUL 57 AND FURTHER TO OUR AP 35 DATED
... PD TEMPORARY RUNDOWN OF COMBAT CAPABILITY AT HARMON
DESCRIBED IN YOUR SIGNAL CAN BE AVOIDED BY DEPLOYMENT OF OPERATIONAL
ELEMENT OF ONE CF100 SQN TO THAT BASE PD THIS WOULD PROBABLY
INVOLVE 10 TO 12 AIRCRAFT CMM 24 AIRCREWS AND SUFFICIENT GROUNDCREW
FOR LINE SERVICING AND MINOR MAINTENANCE ONLY TOGETHER WITH
NECESSARY SUPPORTING EQUIPMENT PD SUCH AN EXERCIXE WOULD BE
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS PD UNLESS THERE IS SOME
OVERRIDING DIFFICULTY UNKNOWN AT THIS HQ CMM PROPOSE MEETING AT YOUR

DUPLICATE

PAGE TWO RFEMVB 14/21
HQ AND/OR HARMON AT EARLY DATE TO EXAMINE ADMINISTRATIVE CMM
TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS AND TO PREPARE DRAFT OPERATIONS
ORDER FOR EXERCIXE PD ADVISE PD PARA 2 PD FOR AFHQ PD TELECON AOC
CAOPS REFERS
BT
21/1650Z AUG RFEMVB

A

UNCLASSIFIED

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY

ACTION COPY

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY ...

[redacted]

165

COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

READING FILE

CONAD HIST FILE
403

[redacted]

...ALL DOT... SCHEDULED ... AT THIS ... MESSAGE PERTAINING TO ...ERT ... BY THE FIRST WEEK OF OCTOBER ... F-89D AIRCRAFT FROM NA... ION ... AVAILABLE INFORMATION IND... - ...ED TO PICK UP NEW F-... AI... ...57. THIS SQUADRON S... EDU... OCTOBER. IF THIS SCHEDULE ... COMMENCING ON OR ABOUT ... HARMON AROUND 1 NOVEMBER ... F-102 OPERATIONAL DATE ... AL PROPOSE MAINTAINING MINIMUM ... UNTIL F-102'S ARE OPERA... ON- ...ABILITY BY DEPLOYING FOUR (... F-89J AIRCRAFT FROM GOOSE TO HARMON. ... AIRCRAFT TO BE OPERATED ...

PAGE TWO RUEHGR 04
RESIDUAL UNSCHED. OF THE 84TH ... AFB. THIS SQUADRON DEPLOYS TO TH... 22 OR O... ABOUT 26 OCTOBER. ... RESOURCES WILL THUS BE AVAILA...E AT HARMON TO PERFORM ... ...CATION INTERCEPTS PLUS LIMITED COMBAT ... CAPABILITY. MOREOVER, ... WILL MEET MINIMUM ALERT RE- QUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN AFR ... C, YOUR OPERATIONS PLAN 2-57. REQUEST YOUR COMMENTS ON ABO... PROPOSAL.
DT
10/1...Z OCT EMERG

...PHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL MARKINGS BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION--NO UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCES IF DATE - TIME GROUP IS QUOTE.

READING FILE

[redacted]

166

SEE CRYPTO

1 NOV 57

READING FILE

CONAD HIST FILE
403 x 409

ACTION: COCOP
INFO: COCOC, COOPO
X7-13074

[redacted]

DUPLICATE

Copy 5 of 6 Copies

[redacted]

COPY OF INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

166

...ssage in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CINCNAD Adjutant)

SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING

PAGE THREE RJTTCK 12
AIR DEFENSE SCRAMBLES WERE ACCOMPLISHED; (2) GUN FIRING SORTIES WERE ACCOMPLISHED; AND (3) FOUR PARTICIPATING AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS EXERCISES EMPLOYING HIGH ALTITUDE, HIGH M/C, MULTIPLE TARGETS. CANUSECURITY.
BT
01/2052Z NOV RJENCY

A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY A ENCRYPTION-- PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION.
//ADVANCE COPY WAS DELIVERED TO C.C//

Copy ____ of ____ Copies

[redacted] COPY OF INCOMING ASSIFIED MESSAGE 167

[redacted] message in whole or in part is prohibited without approval of CONAD Adjutant)

SEE CRYPTO SECTION BEFORE DECLASSIFYING 4 OCT 57

CONAD MIST FILE 420

READING FILE

CONCIHRAS11MAGC515
PR RJEDEN
DE RJKDAG 9C
R 54222Z
FM CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO CINCNORAD ENT AFB COLO
BT

ACTION: NOOOP
INFO: NOOOC
W7-11648

[redacted] ON OPN 5335
[redacted] P-TXO/18 X THE ALASKAN AIR COMMAND IS MAINTAINING ONE F-89J ON 15-MINUTE ALERT LOADED WITH ONE MB-1 ROCKET AND ONE F-89J ON 15 MINUTE ALERT READY FOR INSTANT LOADING WITH ONE MB-1 X THIS IN EFFECT PROVIDES TWO F-89J'S ON 15 MINUTE ALERT WITH M MB-1'S AND IS IN RESPONSE TO ALASKAN COMMAND REGULATION 55-11 CMC DATED 16 SEPTEMBER X
BT
54/2242Z OCT RJKDAG

LGV
A-- PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION-- PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME-GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION
//ADVANCE COPY HAS BEEN DELIEVERED TO COC//

READING FILE

Copy 4 of 8 Copies

168

SECRET
DECLASSIFYING
PARAPHRASE IS NOT REQUIRED

25JAN1957

ACTION CO

AG09
A-933-23
HQA0371236
RR RJEDTN
DE RJKDAG #C
R 2302107
FM CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ALASKA
TO CINCONAD ENT AFB COLO

Action Coop
Info Coop
X7-1313

28 Jan 57
0 4 3

[redacted]OM OPN 5035 YOUR COOOP SIX ZERO FOUR FIVE EIGHT DTG THREE ZERO ZERO ZULU SUBJECT CONDITIONS OF ALERT PD THIS MESSAGE IN ADDITION TO OUR SECRET MESSAGE OPN FIVE FIVE ONE PD THE CONDITIONS OF ALERT REQUIRED FOR AAA WEAIONS IN THE ALASKAN COMMAND AREA ARE AS FOLLOWS CEN ONE SLANT TWO OF ALL ONE TWO ZERO MM GUNS ON TWO ZERO MINUTE STATUS AND ONE SLANT THREE OF ALL MINESWEEPERS ON TWO ZERO MINUTE STATUS PD
BT
23/0215Z JAN RJKDAG

A--PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY B ENCRYPTION--PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION.

REE TO COC//

1 of 1

~~28 Jan 57~~ X7-1313

CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB 23 Jan 57 msg

Secret

1 cy msg OPN 5035

C/AC

23 Jan 57

Cost 7-6

CONAD RIST FILE

420

JOINT MESSAGE FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED 169

ACTION ROUTINE

INFO

FROM CINCONAD

X AF

AP 47

TO AOC CANAIRDEF ST HUBERT QUEBEC CANADA

UNCLASSIFIED From COOOP-T 0136. CANUSECURITY. Reference your AP 47. Publishing of Annex B of CONAD Regulation 55-6 is not possible at this time. The subject of signals to be used to force an intercepted aircraft to change course or land has been under discussion between this headquarters and other interested agencies for over two years. Adoption and concurrence of these signals by all concerned has not been obtained. Presentation of this subject as an off-agenda item will be made at the next SCAT Board Meeting at this headquarters 24-25 September 1957. Additional information on this subject may be available subsequent to this meeting. Consideration of incorporating these signals into any NORAD regulations on Rules of Engagement promulgated in the near future should be made. Your headquarters will be kept advised. [illegible] reverse side.

DATE 10 TIME 1630Z

MONTH Sep YEAR 1957

SYMBOL COOOP-T

TYPED NAME AND TITLE Maj Schiebel

PHONE 2078

PAGE NO. 1 NR PAGES 1

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

UNCLASSIFIED

169

M/R Major Schiebel talked with G/C /Weiser regarding the signals to force an aircra t to change course or land. G/C Weiser advised us that their signals that are a part of ASI2/5 have not been accepted by the Dept of Transport or by Civil Aviation agencies and therefore signals should be deleted wuntil such time as both CONAD and RCAF/ADC and/or NORAD obtain DOT and CAA or ICAD concurrence of the signals. CONAD has been unable to obtain concurrence of CAA on these signals and the necessity of having signals is continually under study. This subject to be presented to the SCAT board meeting 24-25 Sept 57.

[redacted]

170

NOOOP-T

SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement - Guided Missiles

TO: Air Officer Commanding
Air Defence Command
RCAF Station, St. Hubert
Province of Quebec, Canada

1. Reference is made to your letter [redacted]-126 (ADHQ 30) 8 October 1957.

2. The NORAD staff is conducting a study of Operational RCAF/ADC Air Staff Instructions and CONAD regulations to determine pertinent instructions or regulations to be reissued as NORAD regulations.

3. The suggestion as outlined in your paragraph 2 is well met and is being considered for inclusion under "Rules of Engagement" in the new series of NORAD regulations. Prior to publication of these regulations, coordinated action will be taken with your headquarters.

(b) (1) [redacted]

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

Maj Prymire
2078
Nov 57

(b) (1) [redacted]

DUPLICATE

[redacted]

SECRET

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
S836-126 (SPlans)

170

CANADA

Department of National Defence

Royal Canadian Air Force

St Hubert, Que., 6 Oct 57.

Commander-in-Chief,
North American Air Defence Command,
Ent Air Force Base,
Colorado Springs,
Colorado, U.S.A.

Rules of Engagement - Guided Missiles

(b) (1)

[redacted]

(b) (1)

[redacted]

3 Prior to further consideration of this matter at this HQ, your comments on the necessity and feasibility of amending the present rules of engagement would be appreciated. If you consider that such amendment action is required, it is suggested that co-ordinated action between our HQs be undertaken so that related amendments can be issued simultaneously.

[redacted]
for AOC, ADC.

cc: AFHQ

UNCLASSIFIED

171

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

READING FILE

PRECEDENCE	TYPE MSG (CHECK) BOOK HOLD SINGLE	ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	OBJECT REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACTION: ROUTINE INFO: ROUTINE	A	[illegible]	13 X420	

FROM: CINCUNRAD

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TO: COMCFLCK [illegible] AFB NEWBURGH N Y

COMCFLCK RICHARDS-GEBAUR AFB MO

COMCFLCK HAMILTON AFB CALIF

INFO: CINCAL ELMENDORF AFB ANCHORAGE ALASKA

ADC CANAIRDEF ST HUBERT [illegible]

COMDR ADC ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)

USARADCOM ENT AFB COLO (COURIER)

COMNAVFORCONAD (COURIER)

DUPLICATE

[redacted] From NOOOP-T X039. For Canadian addressee only, CANUSECURITY. Reference [illegible] quote CONAD unquote Regulation [illegible]-6, Rules of Engagement dated [illegible] May 1957. Subject regulation under study for revision [redacted] (b) (1)

(b) (1) [redacted]

TIME: 2150

Nov 1957

SYMBOL: NOOOP-T

READING FILE

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature if required): Major Frymire

PHONE: 2075

PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

RELEASER

TYPED NAME AND TITLE: [illegible] W. [illegible] LCDR

UNCLASSIFIED

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 173 REPLACES DD FORM 173, 1 OCT 49, WHICH WILL BE USED UNTIL EXHAUSTED

JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CON[illegible]UATION SHEET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

CINCNORAD

[redacted]

(b) (1) [redacted]

(b) (1) [redacted] These provisions exclude those missiles operating in authorized missile ranges, or missiles for which provisions have otherwise been made. This procedure in no way changes command policy issued in our message COCCO-P 01974 14 Sept 76 which is quoted in part: Quote Commanders of Components of CONAD will not repeat not participate in any inter-service or intra-service agreements concerned with destruction or supporting destruction of launched objects by friendly Services. Unquote. Desire forces be prepared to implement the aforementioned interim procedures ~~[illegible]~~ ON 15 November 1977.

(b) (1) [redacted]

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	SECURITY [redacted]	INITIALS

DD FORM 1 MAY 55 1731

2 2

172

[redacted]

*ALCOM SUPPLEMENT #2
CONAD REGULATION 55-6,
dated 8 October 1956

HEADQUARTERS ALASKAN COMMAND
APO 942, Seattle, Washington
29 April 1957

OPERATIONS

Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures for Interceptors in Air Defense for the Purpose of Alaska is Changed as follows:

	Paragraph
Rules of Engagement for Aircraft Assigned or Attached to the Alaskan Command and Operating in a Coastal ADIZ Prior to a Declaration of War	1
Reports	2

1. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR ALL AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED OR ATTACHED TO THE ALASKAN COMMAND AND OPERATING IN A COASTAL ADIZ PRIOR TO A DECLARATION OF WAR.

a. Prior to a declaration of a state of war, aircraft bearing military insignia of the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) operating within the Alaskan Coastal ADIZ and not committing an act of a hostile aircraft will not be considered hostile solely because said U.S.S.R. aircraft bears the insignia thereof. (b) (1)

(b) (1)

(1) (b) (1)

(2) Take necessary evasive action. (b) (1)

(3) (b) (1)

(b) (1)

*This Supplement supersedes ALCOM Supplement #2 dated 12 Apr 57, to CONAD Regulation 55-6 dated 8 Oct 56.

[redacted]

172

[redacted]

ALCOM SUPPLEMENT #2 TO
CONAD REGULATION 55-6,
dated 8 October 1956

2. REPORTS. Immediately upon attack a MAYDAY report will be transmitted on a prescribed emergency channel, relating particulars as time allows. Immediately upon landing, a flash report, with full particulars, will be transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Alaska, exempt from Reports Control under provisions of paragraph 7 c (3), AFR 174-1A. (UNCLASSIFIED)

BY ORDER OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

T. R. STOUGHTON
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

JOHN S. LINN
Major, USAF
Dep Adj Gen

DISTRIBUTION
USARAL - 2
AAC - 2
J-3, ALCOM - 2
CONAD - 2
AG File - 1

[redacted]

178

[redacted]

*ALCOM SUPPLEMENT
CONAD REGULATION [illegible]
Dated 15 May 1957

HEADQUARTERS ALASKAN COMMAND
APO 942, Seattle, Washington
1 November 1957

OPERATIONS

Rules of Engagement

CONAD Regulation [illegible], 15 May 1957, is supplemented for the Alaskan Theater as follows:

a. DETERMINATION OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.

b. (1) (UNCLASSIFIED) In the course which, if continued, would fly to within three miles of any Alaskan land mass area of responsibility. (NOTE: In that the Little Diomede Island (U.S.) and the Big Diomede Island (USSR) are only two and three-quarters miles apart, the above applies over the Little Diomede + within three miles to the North, South, or East of that island.)

b. ENGAGEMENT OF HOSTILE AIRCRAFT.

b. (1) [redacted] Prior to a declaration of a state of war, aircraft bearing military insignia of the Soviet Union (USSR) operating within the Alaskan Coastal ADIZ and not committing an act of a hostile aircraft will not be considered hostile solely, because said USSR aircraft bears the insignia thereof.

(4) (SECRET) (b) (1)
(b) (1)

(a) [redacted] (b) (1)

(b) [redacted] (b) (1)
(b) (1)

(c) [redacted] (b) (1)
(b) (1)

*This Supplement supersedes AIRCOM Supplement [illegible] to CONAD Regulation 55-6, 15 May

2103

[redacted] 178

ALCOM SUPPLEMENT #1 to
CONAD REGULATION 55-6
dated 13 May 1957

7. (UNCLASSIFIED) Reports submitted in accordance with CONADR 200-2 will be immediately relayed by telephone to the Commander-in-Chief, Alaska, Elmendorf extension 29103, 23100 or 23205.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

OFFICIAL:

T. R. STOUGHTON
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Staff

E. D. BRYSON
Major, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION
NORAD - 2
USARAL - 2
AAC - 2
COMALGEAFRON - 2
J-3,ALCOM - 5
AG - 1

[redacted]

[redacted]

174

HEADQUARTERS
64TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
APO 862, NEW YORK, NEW YORK

ADOOW

22 MAR 1957

SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures, Thule Air Defense Complex

TO: Commander in Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. Inclosed herewith for your review, approval and/or concurrence is a copy of the "Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures" for the Thule Complex, 64th Air Division (Defense)

2. Letter authority, Headquarters, Northeast Air Command, dated 29 December 1953, tentatively authorizes adoption and execution of these "Rules of Engagement" on a temporary basis. However, as far as can be determined by my headquarters, final negotiations at Department of State level have never been resolved and concluded.

3. Due to limited and unreliable communication facilities with the Thule Complex, the Commander, 931st Aircraft Control and Warning Squadron has been designated as Deputy Commander, 64th Air Division (Defense), for the Thule Complex. This designation includes delegation of authority to execute these "Rules" after every possible attempt to contact the Division Commander, has been exhausted within a reasonable time period.

4. The scheduled disestablishment of Headquarters, Northeast Air Command, 1 April 1957, and the ultimate retirement of official records, will negate the authority for these "Rules of Engagement".

5. In view of the above, request your approval of the "Rules", at least on a temporary basis, or until such time as State Department negotiations can be finalized.

6. Pending your concurrence, or until additional instructions are received from your Headquarters, the "Rules" as currently prescribed will continue as authorities for engagement and employment of weapons in the Thule Complex.

7. The classification of Secret on this letter will be cancelled when Inclosure #1 is withdrawn.

1 Incl
Rules of Engagement
Recog Pro, Thule Air
Defense Complex

CARROLL W. McCOLPIN
Colonel, USAF
[redacted]

[redacted]

174

HEADQUARTERS, 64TH AIR DIVISION (DEFENSE)
APO 862, New York, New York
1 February 1957

ANNEX [redacted]

THULE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND RECOGNITION PROCEDURES

PRIOR TO THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY

1. Purpose: This Annex establishes the interceptor procedures and rules of engagement to be followed in the Thule Area, prior to the declaration of a military emergency.

2. Scope: This directive applies to all forces participating in air defense operations under the operational control of the Commander, 64th ~~Air Division (Defense)~~ [redacted].

3. Responsibility: The commanders of all organizations participating in air defense operations are responsible for insuring that:

a. All personnel concerned with the contents of this directive are fully aware of its provisions and understand the extent of their authority.

b. Interceptor and AAA crews gain maximum possible proficiency in recognition (including national markings) of multi-engine and jet aircraft, civil and military, of the United States, Canada, Britain, Western Europe, Russia, and Russian satellite nations. [redacted]

c. Training and proficiency of personnel is such that, within the capabilities of available equipment, hostile aircraft are prevented from reaching their targets and at the same time friendly aircraft are not inadvertently engaged.

4. Definitions: The following definitions are established for the purpose of this directive.

a. Engage: This term is defined as action taken against hostile aircraft by means of interceptors, anti-aircraft artillery, or other ground-to-air weapons, and includes destructions.

b. Close Control: The control of intercepting aircraft when the target and the fighter interceptor positions are known to the director and radio contact can be effected between the director and the interceptor crew.

c. Identification: The determination of an aircraft's friendly or enemy characteristics by any means or combination of means including

[redacted]

[redacted]

visual recognition, flight plan correlation, electronic interrogation, track behavior, etc.

d. Simultaneous Engagement: Engagement of enemy aircraft by both interceptors and anti-aircraft weapons at the same time.

e. Recognition: The visual determination of the type, nationality, ownership, serial number, registration number, markings, behavior and/or number of aircraft in an intercepted target.

5. Engagement:

a. An aircraft will be engaged under the following conditions:

(1) (b) (1) [redacted]

(2) (b) (1) [redacted]

(3) (b) (1) [redacted]

b. (b) (1) [redacted]

(1) (b) (1) [redacted]

(2) (b) (1) [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

c. The authorities contained in paragraph 5a and b above are cumulative at each succeeding higher level of command and may be delegated in writing by the commanders concerned to their appointed representatives at the same level of command.

6. Interception and Recognition: Any aircraft which cannot be identified by the AC&W system within prescribed time limits will be intercepted for recognition purposes. Practice intercepts will not be conducted against known civilian aircraft. The following procedures will be observed during intercepts:

a. Interceptors will fly no closer to the intercepted aircraft than is necessary for positive recognition.

b. At night or during conditions of restricted visibility, interceptions conducted by E-4, E-5 and E-6 fire control system equipped aircraft for identification purposes will be in accordance with current operating instructions.

c. Every effort will be made by the fighter-interceptor pilots to prevent startling the intercepted aircraft aircrews or passengers. The effect desired is one which assures personnel in the intercepted aircraft that the fighter-interceptor is making a routine investigation in the interests of properly conducting the mission of this command.

d. The identification by inter-plane communications will not be attempted by fighter-interceptor pilots.

e. The fighter-interceptor pilot will keep the direction center apprised of marginal conditions of visibility.

(1) When visibility at intercept on altitude is less than two miles, but more than one mile, the interception will be completed only when the fighter-interceptor is under close control or has AI contact with the unidentified aircraft.

(2) When the visibility is less than one mile, the interceptor must have AI contact.

(3) Under exceptional circumstances in which identification is deemed mandatory, the Commander, 93lst ACW&C may waive limitations imposed in (1) and (2) above. The authority to waive limitations will be exercised only after every reasonable attempt to contact the Division Commander or his appointed deputy has failed.

f. When more than one fighter-interceptor is employed on an interception, only one pilot will effect recognition. The remaining aircraft will maintain surveillance from a position where attack could

[redacted]

[redacted]

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be made against the intercepted aircraft. One such surveillance aircraft will, where possible, record the recognition particulars as transmitted by the pilot effecting recognition.

g. The fighter-interceptor pilot effecting recognition, or the other member of the element, will immediately report the quantity, type, nationality, ownership, and any unusual behavior of the intercepted aircraft (or leader of an unidentified formation) to the Direction Center director. Aircraft serial numbers will be obtained and reported only when considered necessary by the director to affect identification and the pilot is so notified.

h. If the intercepted aircraft is positively identified as friendly, the fighter-interceptors will withdraw immediately, unless previous arrangements have been made for simulated attacks against the specific aircraft.

i. If the intercepted aircraft cannot be positively identified as friendly, the interceptor will maintain surveillance and await further instructions from the Direction Center director. During this period, the provisions of paragraph 5a(1) above will apply.

j. The Direction Center director, when unable to identify an aircraft through information passed by the interceptor, will immediately notify the Control Center giving all relevant information.

k. Aircraft under the control of this Command may overfly the Canadian sector when such action is required for identification or engagement purposes. Under these circumstances, Canadian rules of engagement as outlined in ANNEX "F" will apply. (AST 2/5)

l. The employment of anti-aircraft weapons will follow the principle of simultaneous engagement in the destruction of hostile aircraft and/or missiles. Inner defense areas will not be designated. The only limiting factor will be the range of the anti-aircraft weapon.

[redacted]

UNCLASSIFIED

175

[redacted]

COOOP-T

16 MAY 1957

SUBJECT: Rules of Engagement Within Areas Not Sovereign to the United States

TO: Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
As Executive Agent for CONAD
Washington 25, D. C.

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff Document 2084/56 establishes intercession and engagement procedures within territory sovereign to the United States and within the Coastal Air Defense Identification Zones.

2. Joint Chiefs of Staff Document 2019/171 requires State Department negotiations to effect agreements in areas not sovereign to the United States.

3. This Headquarters is unaware of any agreement which may have been established, relative to Rules of Engagement, between the United States and Denmark insofar as Greenland is concerned.

4. Request your concurrence in the use of the attached draft "Rules of Engagement" for the Thule complex for the interim period until official agreements between the United States and Denmark are finalized.

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

1 Incl:
Draft "Thule Rules of Engagement"

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General USA
Chief of Staff

CONAD

Major Schie
2088
14 May 5

G-12218

CONAD X7 6596

Vs on reverse side

UNCLASSIFIED

[redacted]

This letter was retyped because of a minor administrative

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M/R Letter authority, Hq. NEAC, dated 29 Dec 1953, tentatively authorized adoption and execution of the attached "Rules of Engagement" for the Thule Complex, 64th Air Division. With the inclusion of the 64th CONAD Division into CINCONAD's operational chain of command, it has become apparent that no U.S. - Denmark agreement at Department of State level exists which authorizes the engagement and employment of weapons in Greenland.

This letter is being initiated to request JCS concurrence with the "Rules of Engagement" on a temporary basis until U.S.-Denmark agreement can be obtained.

[redacted]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 July 1957

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) Rules for Engagement Within Areas not Sovereign to the United States

TO: Commander-in-Chief
Continental Air Defense Command
Ent Air Force Base
Colorado Springs, Colorado

1. This is an Executive Agency letter in answer to your letter, subject as above, dated 16 May 1957.

2. Headquarters USAF does not have the authority to approve the "Rules of Engagement," for the Thule Complex inclosed in the above referenced letter. Present approved "Rules of Engagement" provides authority for the interception, identification, and engagement of aircraft within the boundaries of territory over which the United States exercises rights of sovereignty and the coastal Air Defense Identification Zones (ADIZ's).

3. The Department of Defense and the Department of State are currently working on a set of negotiating instructions which, when completed, will be submitted to the Danish Government for consideration. Approval of these instructions by the United States and Danish Governments will provide the authorization needed by CONAD for implementation of the "Rules of Engagement" in the Thule area.

4. This Headquarters will continue to monitor current action pertaining to negotiations with Denmark in an effort to obtain early approval of the Danish Government for establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the Thule complex.

Jacob E. Smart

JACOB E. SMART
Major General, U. S. Air Force
Assistant Vice Chief of Staff

8252

[redacted]

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DISPOSITION FORM

[redacted]

FILE NO. | SUBJECT: [illegible]

TO: [illegible] | FROM: [illegible] | DATE: [illegible] Jul 57 | COMMENT NO. 1

[illegible]

1. During the time period when the [illegible] CONAD Division was under the Northeast Air Command, they were [illegible] under "Rules of Engagement" for the Thule, Greenland Complex, [illegible] not been approved by the United States State Department, nor by the [illegible] of the Danish Government.

2. Now that the 64th CONAD [illegible] under the operational control of CONAD, the Commander 64th CONAD Division has requested [illegible] CONAD's concurrence of the "Rules" that were in effect in the past, on a temporary basis and/or until State Department negotiations could be finalized [illegible] Denmark. [illegible] (Incls 1 & 1a).

3. This Headquarters could not [illegible] the tentative rules submitted by the 64th without JCS or DOD approval. [illegible] Chiefs of Staff concurrence was requested until official agreements between the two countries could be finalized. (Incl 2).

4. Executive Agency letter from Department of the Air Force (Incl [illegible]), in answer to CONAD's letter, indicates that USAF could not approve the rules on a tentative basis, and that DOD and Department of State were working on an agreement to submit to the Danish Government for their consideration.

5. In that USAF could not, or would not, concur in the "rules" and no interim guidance has been furnished, CONAD has no engagement authority in Greenland until official agreements are [illegible]. It is therefore proposed that another letter be sent to USAF as Executive Agent for CONAD requesting interim guidance for possible engagements in the Thule Complex until inter-governmental agreements are finalized. Proposed letter is attached as Incl 4 for your recommendations and concurrence.

Harvey T. Alness
HARVEY T. ALNESS
Major General, USAF
DCS/Plans & Operations

4 Incls:
1. Ltr 64th CADD, subj: Rules of Engagement and Recog. Pro, Thule Air Defense Complex, w/ 1.a. rules of Engagement draft, 22 Mar 57.
2. Hq CONAD ltr, Subj: Rules of Engagement Within Areas Not Sovereign... 16 May 57
3. Hq USAF ltr 1 July 1957.
4. Hq CONAD proposed draft to Chief of Staff, USAF.

Did not get Gen Carter & Gen Partridge. Gen P suggested we sent TAX to 64th authorizing pacts and info JCS - also directing 64th [illegible] rules.

CONAD

DD FORM 1 FEB 50 96 REPLACES NME FORM 96 1 OCT [redacted]

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION [redacted]

SPACE BELOW RESERVED FOR COMMUNICATION CENTER

READING FILE

CONAD HIST FILE
420

PRECEDENCE		TYPE MSG (Check)			ACCOUNTING SYMBOL	ORIG OR REFERS TO	CLASSIFICATION OF REFERENCE
		BOOK	MULTI	SINGLE			
ACTION	ROUTINE		X		AF		
INFO	ROUTINE						

FROM: CINCONAD

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION

TO: COM6L4CADD PRPP&RRELL AFB NEWFOUNDLAND

INFO: COFS USAF WASH D C

[redacted] from COOOP-T X0134.

Chief of Staff, USAF, as Executive Agent for CONAD. Reference letter 64th Air Division (Defense) ADOOW, to CINCONAD, Subject: Rules of Engagement and Recognition Procedures, Thule Air Defense Complex dated 22 March 1957. As previously indicated, CINCONAD does not have the authority to approve rules of engagement for Greenland. CINCONAD requested the Chief of Staff USAF as Executive Agent for CONAD to obtain approval. (Reference CONAD letter COOOP-T to C/S USAF as Executive Agent for CONAD, Subject: Rules of Engagement Within Areas not Sovereign to the United States, dated 16 May 1957). The Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, has advised that Headquarters USAF could not approve your rules of engagement and that negotiations were in progress through the Department of State to obtain the

DATE	TIME
MONTH 22	YEAR 160
Aug.	195

WRITER

SYMBOL: COOOP-T

TYPED NAME AND TITLE (Signature, if required): Maj. Schiebal

PHONE [redacted] PAGE NR. 1 NR. OF PAGES 2

SECUR [redacted]

RELEASER

SIGNATURE

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

J. W. [illegible]
LCDR, USN
Asst AG

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM - CONT. ATION SHEET

SECURITY CL[redacted]

FROM CINCONAD

concurrence of the Danish Government (Reference Hq USAF Letter to CINCONAD, Subject: Rules of Engagement Within Areas not Sovereign to the United States, dated 1 July 1957). Until your proposed rules of engagement are formally approved, in the absence of interim instructions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you are directed to continue in force as an interim measure, the Rules of Engagement and recognition procedures for the Thule Air Defense Complex as outlined in your above referenced letter.

SYMBOL	PAGE NR	NR OF PAGES	[redacted]	INIT
COOOP-T	2	2		blm

[redacted]

COPY 179

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND

AIR STAFF INSTRUCTIONS 2/13

AIR RAID WARNING

Purpose

1. This instruction defines the conditions of Air Raid Warnings, outlines circumstances under which these warnings are to be initiated, established procedures for notification of appropriate agencies, and specifies action to be taken.

Scope

2. This instruction is applicable to all units of Air Defence Command and Northeast Air Command in accordance with joint agreements, other agencies under the operational control of Air Defence Command, and is for the guidance of other commands having collateral responsibilities including the USAF Continental Air Defense Command and Alaskan Air Command.

Responsibilities

3. It is the responsibility of commanders of all units of this command to ensure compliance with applicable provisions of this instruction.

Definitions

4. A State of Air Raid Warning is a state of air attack probability relative to an Air Defence Sector and is limited to one of the following:

(a) "Air Raid Warning Red" - Attack by "hostile aircraft" is imminent. (This is interpreted to mean that "Hostile Aircraft" or "Unknown Aircraft Manifestly Hostile in Intent" are within or in the immediate vicinity of an air defence sector with a high probability of entering the subject sector).

(b) "Air Raid Warning Yellow" - Attack by "Hostile Aircraft" is probable. (This is interpreted to mean that "Hostile Aircraft" are en route toward the air defence sector, or unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile, are within the air defence sector).

(c) "Air Raid Warning White" - Attack by "Hostile Aircraft" is improbable. (This is interpreted to mean that no "Hostile Aircraft" or unknown aircraft, suspected to be hostile, are known to be within or en route toward the air defence sector).

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY

4. NOTE:

Hostile Aircraft. An aircraft may be classified as "Hostile" if it commits a hostile act as defined in ADC ASI 2/5 (App "A" para 1 (h)).

Aircraft Manifestly Hostile in Intent. Aircraft may be classified "Manifestly Hostile in Intent" when the patterns or actions of incoming unknown aircraft indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that a hostile raid is in progress or, when current intelligence is available which indicates that aircraft are airborne and en route toward Canada. Aircraft will be declared "Manifestly Hostile in Intent" only by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command, or representatives specifically appointed by him.

Operational Procedures

5. These procedures are to be followed upon the declaration of states of air raid warnings for the Initial Attack and Subsequent Attack passes:

(a) Initial Attack - Air Defence Procedures. The initial attack procedure is based on the principle that this attack will be simultaneously joined to the limit of the enemy's capability against principal targets throughout Canada and the United States. The first "Air Raid Warning Red or Yellow" will be initiated only by the AOC ADC or his appointed representative. In this regard, the commission of a hostile act by an aircraft does not in itself constitute authority for a Sector Commander to declare an Air Raid Warning; in such instances, the Sector Commander is to be guided by ASI 2/14. During the initial attack phase, the following procedures will be adhered to:

(Includes USAF Div Commanders with Area in Canada)

(i) When one Air Defence Sector is directed to initiate an "Air Raid Warning Red", all other Sectors will institute a warning of not less than an "Air Raid Warning Yellow".

(ii) When one Air Defence Sector is directed to initiate an "Air Raid Warning Yellow", all other Air Defence Sectors will initiate a warning of not less than an "Air Raid Warning Yellow".

[redacted]

(iii) An "Air Raid Warning White" may be used to release all agencies from an "Air Raid Warning Red" or an "Air Raid Warning Yellow". However, when an "Air Raid Warning Red" or an "Air Raid Warning Yellow" has been instituted in accordance with (a) (i) and (ii) above, an "Air Raid

[redacted]

COPY

Warning White" will not be declared until authorized by the Air Officer Commanding Air Defence Command or his appointed representative, who will determine when the initial attack phase is completed.

(b) Subsequent Attack Procedures. After the initial attack phase has been declared over by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Defence Command or his appointed representative, Air Defence Sector Commanders are to initiate the appropriate air raid warning at their own discretion depending upon the air defence situation within or in the immediate vicinity of their respective sectors, except when otherwise directed by higher authority.

(Includes USAF Div Commanders with area in Canada)

Alerting Procedures

6. The following alerting procedures will be adhered to upon the declaration of an air raid warning:

(a) ADCHQ COC will notify by the most expeditious communications available:

(i) #1 ADCC.

(ii) #2 ADCC.

(iii) #3 ADCC.

(iv) #5 Air Division Headquarters.

(v) Headquarters Northeast Air Command. (64th Air Division AC#7)

(vi) Headquarters USAF Continental Air Defense Command.

(vii) Air Force Headquarters (AFHQ will notify all other commands and services).

(b) ADCCs will notify by the most expeditiously communications available:

(i) All Air Defence units within their Sector including AC&W Squadrons, Fighter Squadrons, Ground Observer Corps units and Filter Centres.

(ii) ADCHQ COC, if the Air Raid Warning is initiated by the ADCC.

(iii) Adjacent RCAF and USAF Sectors.

(iv) Civilian Air Defence Warning key points.

(v) The associated Department of Transport Area Control Centre(s).

(vi) CONELRAD Alerting Stations.

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY 179

2/13

(c) In addition, #2 ADCC is to notify the Maritime Commander Atlantic, Halifax, N. S.

Action Required Upon Initial Declaration of an Air Raid Warning

7. Appropriate Commanders are to take action to attain maximum combat potential with forces available for air defence. Such actions are to include any or all of the measures outlined below:

(a) Place all available fighter-interceptor aircraft on a state of alert consistent with the operational situation.

(b) Place all operational AC&W facilities on maximum operational status (only emergency maintenance should be performed on AC&W equipment).

(c) Cancel all training of operational interceptor squadrons.

(d) Order in appropriate Emergency Communications Networks.

(e) Activate the CODC on a full time basis.

(f) Deploy forces as required.

(g) Co-ordinate with the appropriate Area Air Traffic Controller at DOT ATC Centres to ensure the most effective utilization of interceptor aircraft and implementation of approved plans. Implement the Emergency Security Plan AL #7

(h) ~~Institute strict internal security measures as required.~~

(j) Where applicable, request immediate augmentation of forces available from the Navy.

(k) Institute such other administrative, operational, and logistical procedures as are deemed advisable.

General

8. When an "Air Raid Warning White" is declared for the purpose of terminating an "Air Raid Warning Red or Yellow", action taken by units of Air Defence Command will be dictated by the existing situation. The following measures will be effected as required:

(a) As directed, maintain operational preparedness at a degree whereby maximum sustained combat potential is realized.

(b) Ensure that maximum maintenance is performed on fighter-interceptor aircraft and AC&W equipment consistent with the operational situation.

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY 179

(c) Redeploy forces.

(d) Maintain strict internal security.

(e) Analyze enemy capabilities, tactics, and techniques and disseminate recommended counter-measures to operational units.

(f) Institute such other administrative, operational, and logistical procedures as are deemed advisable.

Communications

9. Direct communication is authorized between appropriate agencies for the purpose of coordination and implementation of procedures outlined herein.

/s/t/ (L.E. Wray) A/V/M,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Defence Command.

1 Dec 56

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY 180

2/14

AIR DEFENCE COMMAND

AIR STAFF INSTRUCTIONS

AIR DEFENCE READINESS

Purpose

1 This instruction prescribes measures for increasing the preparedness of the Air Defence System prior to hostilities, and establishes procedures for notification of appropriate agencies.

Scope

2 This instruction is applicable to all units of Air Defence Command and 64th Air Division in accordance with joining agreements, other military agencies under the operational control of Air Defence Command, and is for the guidance of other commands having collateral responsibilities including the USAF Continental Air Defense Command and Alaskan Air Command.

Responsibilities

3 It is the responsibility of the commanders of all units of this command to ensure compliance with applicable provisions of this instruction.

Definitions

4 Air Defence Readiness is a state of preparedness in which the Air Defence System is brought to maximum operational capability.

Operational Procedures

5 Air Defence Readiness may be declared by the Air Defence Commander or his appointed deputy as defined in ASI 2/5, Appendix "A", paras 1 (a) and 1 (b).

Alerting Procedures

6 The following alerting procedures will be followed upon the declaration of an Air Defence Readiness:

(a) ADCHQ COC will notify by the most expeditious communications available:

(i) #1 ADCC.

(ii) #2 ADCC.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

(iii) #3 ADCC.

(iv) #5 Air Division Headquarters.

(v) Headquarters 64th Air Division AL # 7

(vi) Headquarters USAF Continental Air Defense Command.

(vii) Air Force Headquarters.

(b) When Air Defence Readiness is declared ~~by the AOC, ADC or by a Sector Commander for his own Sector~~, the ADCC shall notify the following units by the most expeditious communications available:

~~(i) ADCHQ AOC (if declared by Sector Commander).~~

(i) ~~(ii)~~ All Air Defence units within their Sector including AC&W Squadrons, Fighter Squadrons, Ground Observer Corps units and Filter Centres.

(ii) ~~(iii)~~ Adjacent RCAF and USAF Sectors.

(iii) ~~(iv)~~ The associated Department of Transport Area Control Centre(s).

NOTE: Air Defence Readiness is only to be used for alerting military formations concerned with air defence, and is not to be disseminated to civilian agencies, other than DOT Area Control Centre(s).

Actions Required Upon a Declaration of Air Defence Readiness

7 Appropriate Commanders are to take action to attain maximum combat potential of forces available for air defence. Such actions are to include any or all of the measures listed below:

(a) Place additional fighter aircraft on 2 minutes runway alert.

(b) Recall fighter aircraft from special missions (gunnery, tests, etc).

(c) Cancel training activities that effect combat potential

(d) Place all other available fighter aircraft on readiness states consistent with the operational situation.

1 Dec 56

[redacted]

[redacted]

COPY 180

(e) Activate the GObC for the period required.

(f) Place all radar and communications facilities on maximum operational status.

(g) Co-ordinate with appropriate Area Traffic Controller at DOT ATC Centres to ensure the most effective utilization of interceptor aircraft.

(h) Implement the Emergency Security AL #7
~~Institute strict internal security measures.~~

(j) Institute such other administrative, operational, or logistical procedures as may be deemed advisable consistent with the existing air and/or intelligence situation.

Communications

8 Direct communications is authorized between appropriate agencies for the purpose of co-ordination and implementation of procedures outlined herein.

/s/t/ (L.E. Wray) A/V/M,
Air Officer Commanding,
Air Defence Command.

1 Dec 56

[redacted]

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CONADR 55-2

CONAD REGULATION)
55-2)

HEADQUARTERS CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
Ent AFB, Colorado Springs, Colorado
11 September 1957

OPERATIONS

SCATER

1. Purpose. This Regulation establishes CONAD policies and responsibilities for appropriate CONAD military authorities and provides general instructions for planning and implementation of the Department of Defense/Department of Commerce Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations during an Air Defense Emergency -- Short Title: SCATER. (See Attachment 1.)

2. Scope.

a. This Regulation applies to all echelons of CONAD, including the air defense forces of the Alaskan Command and provides guidance for the 64th Air Division and other agencies having air defense responsibilities to CINCONAD.

b. CAA Air Defense Liaison Officer (CAA ADLO) participation described herein is for informational purposes and is consistent with directives issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).

3. Definitions. Terms used herein are defined in paragraph 1 of Attachment 1.

4. General.

a. Attachment 1 (SCATER) is designed to establish individual responsibilities of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and appropriate military commanders for the security control of civil and non-tactical military air traffic, air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications (civil and military) during an Air Defense Emergency.

b. For the purpose of this Regulation, appropriate military commanders are defined as all designated CONAD commanders.

c. CINCONAD will develop and recommend military plans and regulations as required to implement Attachment 1 (SCATER).

d. CINCONAD, in coordination with CAA has published a CONAD/CAA SCATER Plan. This Plan consists of Department of Defense/Department of Commerce (DOD/DOC) SCATER Plan and CONAD/CAA unclassified supplements. The unclassified supplements contain amplifying instructions relative to the movement of priority civil and non-tactical military air traffic. Appendices and Attachments to these supplements will be developed jointly by CONAD Regions and CAA Regions as prescribed in the supplement and will contain specific data on prior approved movements of air traffic, local flying areas (military and civil) and other pertinent instructions deemed necessary by the CONAD Region commanders.

e. Procedures and operating instructions related to the movement of tactical air traffic and certain requirements for the control of air navigation radio aids and/or aeronautical communications, authentication and other requirements of a classified nature will be published in a separate CONAD/CAA classified SCATER Plan. Appendices and/or attachments to this Plan will be developed jointly by CONAD Region and CAA Regions as prescribed in the Plan.

f. To insure standardization, no deviation will be made in the content or format prescribed in the CONAD/CAA SCATER Plan and classified SCATER Plan without prior approval by CINCONAD. Headquarters CONAD will coordinate any recommended changes in format with CAA.

5. Responsibilities.

a. Commanders CONAD Regions will:

(1) Insure compliance with this Regulation by all units of their command.

(2) Coordinate with appropriate military and CAA agencies on all matters pertaining to military and CAA participation in SCATER actions.

(3) Insure that necessary classified appendices to the CONAD classified SCATER Plan relative to Emergency War Plans (EWP) traffic and other preplanned tactical traffic are prepared, coordinated, and distributed to all interested agencies.

(4) Develop procedures for the periodic review of all appendices and attachments developed by the CONAD Region or Division to insure adequacy of instructions contained therein.

(5) Effect coordination with other Department of Defense agencies and commands within their Region, to insure adequacy of compliance and participation with the SCATER requirements.

(6) Designate a SCATER officer at CONAD Region and CONAD Division level to work in collaboration with the CAA Air Defense Liaison Officer (ADLO) in order to fulfill SCATER requirements. (Due to the effect SCATER action has on the over-all air defense capability, and the requirement for the SCATER officer to deal with civil agencies and other major service commands, it is considered desirable that the SCATER officer be well versed in all aspects of the Air Defense System.)

6. SCATER Tests.

a. SCATER Testing will be accomplished as follows:

(1) Communications Tests.

(a) SCATER Communications Tests will be initiated by the CONAD Combat Operations Center (COC) through the CONAD Region and CONAD Division Control Centers to the Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTC). These tests will not exceed one a week or less than one a month and will not be disseminated beyond the ARTC Centers.

(b) The CONAD Division will log the time the test messages are received from the CONAD Region COC and the time the ARTC Centers respond and authenticate the message. Reasons for delay of more than two minutes, for transmission of the message to the ARTCC and the ARTCC response and authentication, will be recorded with comments on corrective action taken. A copy of this information will be forwarded to the CONAD Division CAA ADLO within 24 hours.

(c) Similar reports will be forwarded to the CAA ADLO by the ARTC Centers for consolidation into monthly SCATER communications test reports. A copy of this report will be forwarded to the CONAD Division commander, CONAD Region COC, CONAD COC, CAA Region, and CAA Washington offices.

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(2) Operational Tests.

(a) SCATER Tests will be conducted in connection with CONAD National, Regional, or Division Exercises whenever practicable or may be initiated at other times by a CONAD Division. Normally, no more than six tests will be conducted during any one calendar year. SCATER tests will not be scheduled oftener than every 60 days, except that a test may be held in conjucntion with a national exercise less than 60 days after a regional or division test. Tests will include completion of fan-out notice by ARTC Centers to CAA and military towers, communications stations, air carrier operations, state aeronautical facilities and other participating organizations, estimated time required for simulating grounding or diverting known air traffic, and estimated time required to shut down radio navigational aids. SCATER tests will not involve the actual grounding or diverting of aircraft nor the shutdown of radio navigation aids. Actual contact with air traffic and actual shutdown of navigation aids will only be accomplished during preplanned national air defense exercises and only when fully coordinated by CINCONAD and the Administrator of CAA, prior to those exercises. To insure maximum participation of air defense and aeronautical facility personnel, each test will be conducted in three phases -- a phase for each eight-hour tour of duty (0001-0800; 0800-1600; 1600-2400 local time). Each phase will be terminated after sufficient time has elapsed for the participating facilities to perform all test actions.

(b) Aeronautical facilities will participate in tests except where such participation will affect the safety of air traffic. In the event an ARTC Center is unable to participate, the ARTC Center will notify the Division Control Center "UNABLE TO PARTICIPATE." In such cases, the phase or phases of the test affected will be re-scheduled for the corresponding period the following day.

(c) SCATER Test Reports from participating aeronautical facilities (civil and military), will be submitted to the CONAD Division CAA ADLO on the standard SCATER test report card. The ADLO will evaluate the reports and prepare an analytical report of the test. A copy of this report will be provided the CONAD Division commanders, CONAD Region COC, Headquarters CONAD, and CAA Region and CAA Washington offices.

(NOOPO)

FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

MARSHALL S. CARTER
Major General, USA
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

W. J. Birmele

W. J. BIRMELE
Lt Col, USAF
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:
A, B, F, & CAA

1 Attachment
DOD/DOC SCATER Plan dtd 7 May 1957

UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency

Short Title: SCATER

This plan supersedes "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic During a Military Emergency" approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Defense July 15, 1952

Foreword

This "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency" has been prepared jointly by Headquarters, United States Air Force, and the Civil Aeronautics Administration in cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Board and Department of the Navy. In the preparation of this plan, the suggestions, recommendations, and opinions submitted by representatives of the interested aviation organizations have been utilized to the maximum extent possible consistent with the capabilities of the defending forces to accomplish their assigned mission. In addition to the foregoing, maximum consideration has been given to the acknowledged contribution of nonmilitary aviation to the overall defense effort.

The development of this plan does not indicate the existence of an Air Defense Emergency nor does it forecast the probability of such an emergency. Therefore, it is imperative that all agencies involved in preparing for or undertaking the implementation of any part of this plan assure that their activities are not construed by the general public as cause for alarm or conjecture.

This plan establishes the individual responsibilities of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and the appropriate military authorities for the security control of civil and nontactical military air traffic, and air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications (civil and military) during an Air Defense Emergency. This plan applies to all United States areas;* however, it may be modified by the responsible commanders of oversea commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet their specific requirements. For purposes of clarity, the language of this plan refers to the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD), and his subordinate echelons as the appropriate military authority.

Maximum utilization of aircraft under this plan will be accomplished in the following manner:

1. Limiting restrictions on air traffic to the absolute minimum consistent with the dictates of currently evaluated military intelligence.

2. Incorporating specific provisions for orderly processing of friendly air traffic. (Under certain conditions, portions of the air defense system might become saturated because of the quantity of flight activity, friendly and hostile. These circumstances, if permitted to exist, would dictate that a large portion of air defense capabilities be absorbed in distinguishing between friendly nontactical and hostile flights. To preclude this ineffective utilization of available forces, special provisions have been included for the orderly processing of friendly operations.)

From the suggestions and recommendations submitted by representatives of the civil aviation industry and military authorities a rating system based on the *purpose of flight* and *communications capabilities* has been developed for civil and nontactical military aviation. (See attachment 1.) This rating system will be utilized for the purpose of providing maximum operations and establishing priority for such operations when system capacity is reached.

In implementing this plan, it must be realized that routine arrangements for local types of flight activities (training, crop dusting, etc.) will generally be accomplished through the CAA Regional Organization.

The CAA will solicit the cooperation of State aviation agencies and local airport authorities in processing a request for such flight activities. Requests for special consideration will be submitted to the appropriate regional facility or office of the CAA for processing through established military and civil channels.

Execution of this plan will require certain immediate implementing actions by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics prior to an actual Air Defense Emergency. In view thereof, such actions which have been taken, in accordance with existing plans, will be subject to immediate review and/or modification.

The Plan

1. Definitions

For the purpose of this plan, the following definitions apply:

a. *Air Defense Emergency.* (b) (1)

(b) (1)

*United States areas are defined in [illegible].

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UNCLASSIFIED

(b) (1)

b. *Air Defense Warning Conditions.*

(1) Warning Red—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are within a CONAD Division area or are in the immediate vicinity of a CONAD Division area with a high probability of entering the area.

(2) Warning Yellow—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are en route toward a CONAD Division area, or unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile are en route to, or are within a CONAD Division area.

(3) Warning White—When during a state of Air Defense Emergency an attack by hostile aircraft (includes missiles) is not considered immediately probable or imminent.

c. *Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) Region.* A major geographical subdivision of the continental United States which delineates the area of air defense responsibility of a CONAD Region Commander. (Example: WESTERN CONAD REGION).

d. *CONAD Division.* A geographical subdivision of a CONAD Region and those CONAD Forces within the Division area.

e. *Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).* The airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready identification, location, and control of aircraft is required in the interest of national security.

f. *CAA Region.* Area of responsibility of a CAA Regional Administrator.

g. *Security Control of Air Traffic.* Includes recognizing, requiring identification procedures, directing, diverting, restricting, prohibiting, or grounding of civil and nontactical military air traffic in the interest of national security.

h. *SCATER.* The short title for the joint Commerce/Defense Department plan for the security control of air traffic and the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

i. *SCAT.* The short title for the security control of air traffic. Current SCAT Rules are included in Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator. Emergency SCAT Rules are included in this plan.

j. *CONELRAD.* The short title for the program for the control of electromagnetic radiations. (However, the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications is included in this plan.)

k. *Tactical Air Traffic.* Military flights actually engaged in operational missions against the enemy, flights engaged in immediate deployment for a combat mission, and preplanned combat and logistical support flights contained in Emergency War Plans.

l. *Nontactical Military Air Traffic.* Military flights other than tactical air traffic, such as administrative, logistical, and training.

m. *Defense Area.* Airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready control of aircraft is required in the interest of the national security during an Air Defense Emergency.

n. *Open Area.* An area within the continental United States not designated as an ADIZ or Defense Area.

o. *United States.* The several States, the District of Columbia, and the several Territories and possessions of the United States (including areas of land or water administered by the United States under international agreement), including the Territorial waters and the overlying airspace thereof.

p. *Security Control Clearance.* Authorization for an aircraft to proceed in accordance with security control instructions during an Air Defense Emergency.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this plan is to establish responsibilities, procedures, and general instructions for the security control of civil and nontactical military air traffic, air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications during an Air Defense Emergency which will provide maximum utilization of aircraft by military and civil agencies engaged in essential operations.

3. Authority

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff directives which outline the United States Air Force responsibilities for the development of plans and policies in concert with the CAA for the establishment of a system for identification and security control of air traffic within the continental United States.

b. Public Law 778, 81st Congress, which authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Secretary of Commerce to undertake security measures relating to the regulation and control of air commerce, and for other purposes.

c. Notice published by the Secretary of Commerce on January 4, 1951, in 16 F. R. 99 delegating to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics authority with respect to security control of air traffic (Public Law 778).

d. Executive Order 10312, December 10, 1951, which provides for emergency control over certain Government and non-Government facilities engaged in radio communications or radio transmission.

e. Subpart 9, Rules of Federal Communications Commission, concerning the alerting and operation of all radio stations in the aviation services.

4. Scope

This plan prescribes the joint action to be taken during an Air Defense Emergency by appropriate military authorities and the CAA:

a. To effect security control of civil and nontactical military aircraft entering, departing, or moving within the United States and the coastal approaches thereto and

b. To effect control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications as may be required.

5. General Provisions

a. Efficient security control of air traffic will be achieved by effective air surveillance, the identification and recognition of aircraft, the air discipline of combat air units engaged in the interception and destruction of enemy airborne weapons, the close coordination between military and civil agencies and the cooperation of all airspace users.

b. In carrying out assigned missions, the CONAD Division Commander will, based on the requirements of the existing military situation, direct the extent of security control of civil and military aircraft other than those engaged in tactical operations and the

control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

c. This plan is not applicable to military aircraft engaged in tactical operations with the exception that CONAD Division Commanders may advise and recommend rerouting of tactical air traffic for short distances to circumnavigate a battle or threatened area during an Air Defense Emergency. Tactical operations will be coordinated with the CONAD Division Commander(s) concerned so as not to delay combat operations.

d. Under certain conditions of alert, in specific areas, the CONAD Division Commander may require a security control clearance for civil and nontactical military aircraft prior to takeoff. Such security control clearance is different from and not to be confused with an operational or air traffic clearance. It will serve normally to insure that the pilot is informed of the current condition of alert and that his operation is of sufficient priority if any capacity restrictions are in effect.

e. Minimum interference to normal air traffic will be planned consistent with the requirements for effective operation of the air defense system.

f. The CONAD Division Commanders, in collaboration with the Civil Aeronautics Administration Regional Administrators, will supplement this plan, as required, with agreements to provide less restrictions for special nontactical military and civil air traffic operations within CONAD Division areas. In developing these agreements, they will take into consideration the peculiar requirements of organized civil defense and disaster relief flights, agricultural and forest-fire patrol flight operations and other essential civil air operations to the end that maximum utilization of these aircraft, consistent with air defense requirements, will be made. With respect to civil aviation, these supplemental agreements will be made through the CAA Regional Administrators.

6. Responsibilities

a. The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, will—

(1) Develop and recommend military regulations which contain rules and procedures to implement this plan.

(2) Coordinate with the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics regarding the institution of procedures for accomplishment of SCATER.

(3) Establish the military requirements for SCATER in designated areas dependent upon the existing military situation.

(4) Issue amended directives or instructions for SCATER when the military situation permits relaxation of existing controls.

b. The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics will—

(1) Promulgate the necessary civil regulations to implement this plan.

(2) Coordinate with the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, prior to the establishment of procedures for SCATER.

(3) Administer SCATER in accordance with requirements established by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command.

(4) Advise the civil aviation industry of the requirements for SCATER.

c. The CONAD Division Commanders will—

(1) Direct the control of all air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications facilities in their areas, as required. (This will normally be accomplshed through CAA.)

(2) Issue security control instructions to appropriate CAA agencies as necessary to insure efficient performance of the air defense mission.

(3) Maintain liaison with appropriate CAA Regional Administrators.

(4) Conduct tests of SCATER in collaboration with the CAA.

(5) Collaborate with the CAA Regional Administrators in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

d. The CAA Regional Administrators will—

(1) Participate with the CONAD Division Commanders in the development of procedures for the implementing and testing of SCATER in the CONAD Division areas.

(2) Insure proper dissemination of SCATER instructions to civil and military aeronautical facilities (including aircraft, airport operators, and State fanout systems) within their areas of responsibility.

(3) Place in effect SCATER procedures in accordance with requirements established by the CONAD Division Commanders.

(4) Maintain liaison with the appropriate CONAD Division Commanders.

(5) Assist the CONAD Division Commanders in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

7. Air Defense Emergency Actions

In an Air Defense Emergency, the following actions will be taken with respect to the CONAD Division area:

a. The CONAD Division Commander, dependent upon the situation in his area, will notify the appropriate CAA Regional Administrator(s) (this will normally be done by direct contact between the CONAD Division Control Center and the appropriate air route traffic control centers):

(1) That a state of Air Defense Emergency exists, and the current condition of Air Defense Warning;

(2) The extent of implementation of this plan that is desired; and

(3) The air traffic capacity of the air defense system and the maximum altitude permitted under the specified conditions.

b. CAA Regional Administrator(s), consistent with the information received from the CONAD Division Commander, will, to the limit of facilities available, impose any or all of the following conditions on air traffic (an air route traffic control center, with the approval of the CONAD Division Commander, has the prerogative to exempt certain categories of aircraft operations from compliance with one or more of these provisions):

(1) *ADIZ Operations*

(a) Require point-to-point flights entering, departing, or moving within the ADIZ, regardless of altitude, be equipped with functioning two-way radio and to conduct either an IFR operation or a DVFR operation, with the additional requirement that a continuous watch be maintained on an appropriate radio frequency. (Operators of agricultural and industrial aircraft, which normally operate in a localized area, may be exempted through an air route traffic control center from compliance with the two-way radio requirement while moving to a new base of operations.)

(b) Restrict point-to-point air traffic entering or operating within ADIZ's to the capacity of the air defense system.

(c) Require commanders of flights to make such additional position reports as considered essential. Reporting points will be determined by local coordination between the CONAD Division Commanders, other appropriate military commanders, and the CAA Regional Administrators.

(d) Place into effect authentication codes and approach and identification procedures, and designate landing points for aircraft prior to entry into the continental limits of the United States when procedures are established and forwarded by the CINCONAD.

(e) Require DVFR flights to operate below a specified maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain.

(2) *Defense Area and Open Area Operations*

(a) Limit VFR and DVFR point-to-point flights to a maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain. (All IFR flights will be identifiable and identified.)

(3) *All Areas of Operation*

(a) Divert and control air traffic to permit immediate takeoff and employment of military aircraft engaged in immediate tactical operations.

(b) Divert and/or ground flights as soon as possible after diversion and/or grounding instructions are received.

(c) Place into effect plans established in accordance with Executive Order 10312 for control of electronic emissions and/or radiations as directed by the CONAD Division Commander.

(d) *Local Operations*—Restrict all local nonmilitary air traffic to designated local area, or, if no local area has been designated for such flights, to within ten (10) miles to takeoff point and to an altitude of not more than 1,500 feet above the terrain. Such flights will be conducted in such a manner as to permit ready recall within time limits prescribed by the CONAD Division Commander. These restrictions will be enforced except as determined by the CONAD Division Commander who may, under certain conditions, restrict all local nonmilitary air traffic in certain areas, or may increase limits as stated above as allowed by Air Defense requirements. Local flying areas will be designated by the appropriate Regional Administrators after coordination with the CONAD Division Commander, and will encompass the areas normally required for such local operations as flights to and from outlying training fields, crop dusting, and other industrial operations in the local areas. Local military flights will be restricted as provided for in the military directive for the Security Control of Military Aircraft.

(e) Place in effect any other restrictions or limitations on air traffic found necessary to assist the CONAD Division Commander to accomplish his mission. (Any such supplemental restrictions or limitations will be by direction of a CONAD Region Commander or higher authority.)

c. In the event of an Air Defense Emergency the following emergency rules for the security control of air traffic (short title, Emergency SCAT Rules) shall apply immediately to aircraft operated anywhere in the United States or within the coastal approaches thereto. These rules shall remain in effect for the duration of the Air Defense Emergency unless superseded by revisions to Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.

(1) *General Rules*

General. Aircraft shall be operated at all times in compliance with the following general rules and also in compliance with the Additional ADIZ Rules when applicable:

(a) No person shall operate an aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with an operable radio receiver and a continuous watch is maintained on an appropriate radio frequency to insure receipt of any special security control instructions which may be issued, except that an ARTC center may exempt aircraft operated on point-to-point flight in the United States outside of an ADIZ, or on local flight anywhere in the United States, from compliance with this rule, provided that the flight is—

(*1*) Confined to altitudes, areas, and time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center, or

(*2*) Conducted in such a manner as to permit visual recall within time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center.

NOTE: Altitudes, areas, and time limits will be as specified by the appropriate CONAD Division.

(b) No person shall operate an aircraft contrary to security control instructions in effect at time of takeoff or any additional security control instructions issued while the aircraft is airborne.

(c) No person shall operate an aircraft into the continental United States, except from departure points designated by the Administrator, and except in conformity with identification procedures established by the Administrator.

(d) No person shall operate an aircraft in an area of the United States or the coastal approaches thereto in which "Full SCATER" has been implemented unless the flight is ordered by or coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division.

NOTE: Normally, nontactical operations will be coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division through a CAA air route traffic control center. The CONAD Division will effect coordination with other CONAD Divisions as required.

(e) No person shall operate an aircraft in an ADIZ without a security control clearance, if such clearance is required by the appropriate ARTC center.

(f) *Emergency situations.* In emergency situations which require immediate decision and action for the safety of the flight, the pilot in command of the aircraft may deviate from the provisions of these rules to the extent required for such emergency. When a deviation is exercised, the pilot in command shall report such deviation to an appropriate aeronautical facility immediately.

NOTE: This report is for security control purposes to determine location of the flight. This report may be in addition to reports required by Civil Air Regulations Part 60.

(g) *Radio failure.*

(*1*) *IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is required.* Normal IFR procedures will apply.

(2) VFR, DVFR, or IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is not required. The pilot in command of the aircraft shall land as soon as practicable.

(2) *Additional ADIZ Rules*

(a) *Point-to-point flights.* No person shall operate an aircraft into or within an Air Defense Identification Zone on point-to-point flights in violation of the following additional rules:

(1) Flight plan. An appropriate flight plan containing the information required by Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, shall be filed with an appropriate aeronautical facility.

(2) Radio requirements for DVFR flights. Aircraft shall be equipped with functioning two-way radio.

(3) Routing restrictions. No person shall operate an aircraft into, within, or out of an ADIZ, except in approved corridors if and when such corridors have been established.

(4) Radio communications.

(i) *IFR operations on an air traffic clearance.* Normal reporting procedures will apply.

(ii) *DVFR operations and IFR operations for which air traffic clearance is not required.* The pilot in command of the aircraft shall insure that a continuous watch is maintained on the appropriate radio frequency and shall report by radio as soon as possible the time and altitude of passing a reporting point specified for security control purposes prior to entering an ADIZ and every reporting point specified for security control purposes within an ADIZ along the route of flight. Every such position report shall include an estimate over the next specified reporting point within the ADIZ.

(5) Adherence to flight plans or air traffic clearances. The pertinent provisions of Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, will apply.

(b) *Local nonmilitary flights.* Aircraft shall not be operated on a local nonmilitary flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of a local flying area designated by the appropriate Regional Administrator, or if no local area has been designated, more than ten (10) miles from the point of takeoff and more than 1,500 feet above the terrain.

(c) *Local military flights.* Aircraft shall not be operated on a local military flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of the local flying area designated by the appropriate military authority.

(3) *Exceptions*

(a) An ARTC center may exempt certain aircraft operations from compliance with any or all of these emergency rules. Flights which may be exempted, after approval has been obtained from CONAD Division Commanders, are: *(1)* local flights, *(2)* flights wholly within the boundaries of an ADIZ, *(3)* flights from points within an ADIZ to points outside thereof, *(4)* flights not currently of significance to the air defense system, or *(5)* military flights which are conducted in accordance with special procedures prescribed by CONAD Division Commanders. Flights may be exempted individually or by category.

(4) *Violations*

(a) The penalty provisions of Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, will apply. Regardless of the penalty provisions of Part 620, it is imperative that all operators understand the tremendous importance of strict compliance with the provisions of this plan. Compliance lends itself to a higher degree of national security and also self-preservation. Ignorance of these rules could not only cause diversion of much-needed air defense weapons from a hostile threat, but also could cause destruction of friendly aircraft. It is primarily for these two specific reasons that these rules are written.

8. Implementing Procedures

In the event of an Air Defense Emergency,

a. Each CONAD Division will instruct the appropriate CAA ARTC center to accomplish one of the following:

(1) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules: These rules are the continuous restrictions applicable to the movement of civil and nontactical military aircraft during an Air Defense Emergency. They will be automatically in effect from the original establishment of an Air Defense Emergency, and will remain in effect for the duration of an Air Defense Emergency, regardless of the changing requirements when "Full SCATER" is implemented or terminated.

(2) Implement Full SCATER: This will entail the grounding and/or diversion of air traffic and the shutting down of navigation aids and aeronautical communications. This action will normally be taken when hostile aircraft are en route to the continental United States or have penetrated the air defense system.

(3) Terminate Full SCATER: This will terminate the extreme restrictions imposed under Full SCATER. This action will normally be taken when an attack phase is considered over and the resumption of operations is authorized under the Emergency SCAT Rules.

(4) If ARTC centers are told to "Apply Emergency SCAT Rules," the CONAD Division will include, as necessary—

(a) Routing restrictions on flights entering any portion of an ADIZ within the CONAD Division area.

(b) Limitations on air traffic in any portion of an ADIZ within the CONAD Division area to the identification capability of the system.

(c) Altitude limitations on DVFR and VFR operations within the CONAD Division area, and

(d) Any other special instructions required by the immediate military situation.

b. CAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers will—

(1) Disseminate over the CAA communications system the instructions received from the CONAD Division.

(2) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules, imposing whatever restrictions are specified by the CONAD Division.

(3) Direct the landing or diversion of nontactical air traffic and the shutdown or controlled operations of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications when instructed to "Implement Full SCATER."

(4) Upon receipt of "Terminate Full SCATER," authorize resumption of air traffic in accordance with Emergency SCAT Rules.

c. Civil and military control towers and aeronautical communications stations (including licensees of air navigation radio aids) will—

(1) Maintain the current SCATER ACTION Form for that facility at appropriate operating positions.

(2) Upon receipt of "Implement Full SCATER," "Terminate Full SCATER," or "Apply Emergency SCAT Rules," take the actions indicated on the facility's SCATER ACTION Form.

(3) Compiy with any special SCATER instructions issued by the appropriate notifying agency as shown on the SCATER ACTION Form.

d. It is desired that the several States participate in SCATER by disseminating SCATER instructions to airports and other aeronautical facilities not served by the CAA communications system.

9. Testing Procedures

To insure that implementing actions can be taken expeditiously, SCATER Tests will be conducted periodically in accordance with procedures developed by CONAD and CAA.

a. Federal civil and military aeronautical facilities will participate in such tests.

b. Non-Federal civil aeronautical facilities, including licensees of air navigation radio aids, will be requested to participate in such tests.

10. Communications

Direct communication is authorized between appropriate agencies, and units, for the purpose of coordination and implementation of the procedures outlined herein.

Attachment 1

APPROVED:

C. E. WILSON,
Secretary of Defense.

SINCLAIR WEEKS,
Secretary of Commerce.

DATE: 7 May 1957.

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ATTACHMENT 1

Consolidated Priority Listing of all Nontactical Military and all Civil Air Traffic

GENERAL

Listings within Category I are of equal priority. Listings within Categories II through V are in order of priority as shown. Aircraft in distress are in a special category and may be assigned any priority at the discretion of the appropriate air defense commander as the seriousness of the tactical situation and the aircraft emergency warrant.

Listings herein are applicable to all aircraft, civil or military, large or small, single or multiengine. The mission itself, and not the aircraft or the ownership, determines the priority which is applicable.

I

A. The air transport of military commanders, their representatives, and key civilian personnel which is of utmost importance to the national security, or which will have an immediate effect upon combat operations of the Armed Forces.

B. Flight operations necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Plan for Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency, including flight inspection of air navigation facilities.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies whose immediate flight is *essential* to the defense effort.

D. Transportation to, from, and within disaster areas of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose immediate movement by air is essential to the prevention, reduction, or alleviation of the effects of disaster.

E. Flight operations whose immediate flight involves the saving of human life in other than disaster areas, including air/sea rescue, hurricane reconnaissance, air evacuation, and the transporting of medical personnel, equipment, and supplies.

F. Evacuation of tactical aircraft (including appropriate Civil Reserve Air Fleet) for their protection.

G. International flights originating overseas that have reached the point of no return.

II

A. The air movement of aircraft, personnel, equipment, and supplies for forces other than those immediately deploying for, in direct support of, or actually engaged in combat operations against the enemy which is essential to the timely accomplishment of assigned missions of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort. This includes AIR CARRIER transportation of persons, mail, and cargo essential to the defense effort.

B. Evacuation of nontactical aircraft for their protection.

C. Ferrying of AIR CARRIER flight equipment between operational stations.

D. Administrative flights of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort, but not bearing on the immediate conduct of combat operations against the enemy, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies, whose expeditious movement by this means is essential to the maintenance of sound air carrier operations.

E. Flight operations essential to the development, production, and delivery of equipment, materials and supplies, essential to the defense effort, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose expeditious movement by this means is essential to the above; prospecting activities in connection with mineral or other natural resources, whose development or exploitation is essential to the above.

F. Flight operations essential to the maintenance of facilities for the transmission of light, heat, power, and communications.

III.

A. Operational testing of air carrier aircraft and equipment or flight testing wherein the objective is the testing or development of new or modified equipment. This is applicable only to those organizations responsible for the testing, development, or modification of aircraft systems and equipment. The flight test priority for other than such organizations will be governed by the priority assigned to the type of flying being conducted by those organizations. For example, a flight test for a unit conducting operational training would be of the same priority as the transition or gunnery flights normally conducted by that organization.

B. Flight operations in connection with the maintenance of production of foodstuffs, critical fibers, and essential wood products.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies not essential to the defense effort.

D. Operational training flights of a tactical unit, such as transition, formation, gunnery, bombing, reconnaissance, navigation, instrument, and target towing, including ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in operational training.

E. Student training flights, the primary objective of which is the instruction and training of pilots and crews engaged in a formal course of instruction, including flight operations in connection with civil flight training.

F. Ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in student training.

IV

A. Administrative and logistical flights in support of assigned missions other than those of exceptionally high priority which are in I A., or II D., Categories.

B. Reserve flying training wherein the objective is the training of reservists not on extended active duty.

C. Ferrying of aircraft to and from organizations engaged in reserve flying training.

D. Air evacuation wherein the saving of life or material is not involved.

E. Flight operations in support of the maintenance of the national economy, such as transportation of personnel, materials, equipment, and supplies whose expeditious movement by this means is an aid to the development, production, and distribution of civilian goods, supplies, material, equipment or services, essential to the maintenance of the national economy.

V

A. Ferrying of aircraft not included in paragraphs II A., II C., III F., and IV C., above.

B. Individual training wherein the objective is the attainment or maintenance of flying proficiency as specified by the respective military services, or civil agencies.

C. The transportation of nonpriority persons or goods.

D. All other flight operations not specifically listed above.

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Plan for the
SECURITY CONTROL OF AIR TRAFFIC AND ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS
during an
AIR DEFENSE EMERGENCY

SHORT TITLE: SCATER

11 SEPTEMBER 1957

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND (CONAD)

CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION (CAA)

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F O R E W O R D

This document, known as CONAD/CAA SCATER Plan, consists of the Department of Defense/Department of Commerce SCATER Plan (hereafter referred to as Basic SCATER Plan) signed by the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce on May 7, 1957, and Supplements thereto developed by CONAD and CAA.

Appendixes and/or Attachments to these Supplements will be developed and distributed by CONAD Regions and/or Divisions, as prescribed in these Supplements.

This Plan is effective at 0001 Greenwich Time, October 1, 1957, and supersedes the Department of Defense/Department of Commerce SCAT Plan dated July 15, 1952: Air Division (Defense) SCATER Plans, and all other SCATER instructions previously issued.

CAA and CONAD have distributed limited copies of this Plan to appropriate national organizations and commands. The CAA Air Defense Liaison Officer (ADLO) at each CONAD Division will, in collaboration with the Division Commander, distribute additional copies to all facilities, agencies and offices within the CONAD Division area concerned with SCATER actions. The CAA ADLO will also distribute SCATER Actions Forms and SCATER Test Report Forms to appropriate agencies within the CONAD Division area.

Particular attention is invited to the following major changes in the Basic SCATER Plan.

1. The term "Air Defense Emergency" has been substituted for "Military Emergency."

2. Air Defense Warning Conditions "Red", "Yellow" and "White" will no longer be disseminated for the purpose of initiating SCATER actions. Such actions will be effected by specific SCATER instructions to " IMPLEMENT FULL SCATER," "TERMINATE FULL SCATER" or "APPLY EMERGENCY SCAT RULES," as prescribed in the SCATER Actions Form.

3. SCATER Test Instructions have been made an integral part of the Basic SCATER Plan. Simulated Air Defense Warnings "APPLE JACK," "LEMON JUICE," "SNOWMAN," and "FADE OUT" will no longer be employed for such tests. SCATER Test Instructions and reporting procedures are prescribed in the SCATER Actions Form and Supplement V this Plan.

4. Emergency SCAT Rules have been established and are incorporated therein. The degree of application of Emergency SCAT Rules required in each CONAD Regional or Division area, depending upon the tactical situation, will be published by Air Defense Emergency NOTAM.

The importance of SCATER actions that may have to be performed in the event of an Air Defense Emergency cannot be over-emphasized. Therefore, it is incumbent on each supervisor to insure that all personnel under his jurisdiction are thoroughly indoctrinated in and capable of performing all required actions.

SCATER
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Appendixes to be distributed only on an immediate operational-need-to-know basis as prescribed in appropriate Supplement. Recipients should list Appendixes in INDEX above, where appropriate.

SCATER
CONAD/CAA

RECORD OF AMENDMENTS

AMENDMENT NO.	DATE	RECORDED BY	DATE	AMENDMENT NO.	DATE	RECORDED BY	DATE

UNCLASSIFIED

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency

Short Title: SCATER

This plan supersedes "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic During a Military Emergency" approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Secretary of Defense July 15, 1952

Foreword

This "Plan for the Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency" has been prepared jointly by Headquarters, United States Air Force, and the Civil Aeronautics Administration in cooperation with the Civil Aeronautics Board and Department of the Navy. In the preparation of this plan, the suggestions, recommendations, and opinions submitted by representatives of the interested aviation organizations have been utilized to the maximum extent possible consistent with the capabilities of the defending forces to accomplish their assigned mission. In addition to the foregoing, maximum consideration has been given to the acknowledged contribution of nonmilitary aviation to the overall defense effort.

The development of this plan does not indicate the existence of an Air Defense Emergency nor does it forecast the probability of such an emergency. Therefore, it is imperative that all agencies involved in preparing for or undertaking the implementation of any part of this plan assure that their activities are not construed by the general public as cause for alarm or conjecture.

This plan establishes the individual responsibilities of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics and the appropriate military authorities for the security control of civil and nontactical military air traffic, and air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications (civil and military) during an Air Defense Emergency. This plan applies to all United States areas;* however, it may be modified by the responsible commanders of oversea commands established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet their specific requirements. For purposes of clarity, the language of this plan refers to the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD), and his subordinate echelons as the appropriate military authority.

Maximum utilization of aircraft under this plan will be accomplished in the following manner:

1. Limiting restrictions on air traffic to the absolute minimum consistent with the dictates of currently evaluated military intelligence.

2. Incorporating specific provisions for orderly processing of friendly air traffic. (Under certain conditions, portions of the air defense system might become saturated because of the quantity of flight activity, friendly and hostile. These circumstances, if permitted to exist, would dictate that a large portion of air defense capabilities be absorbed in distinguishing between friendly nontactical and hostile flights. To preclude this ineffective utilization of available forces, special provisions have been included for the orderly processing of friendly operations.)

From the suggestions and recommendations submitted by representatives of the civil aviation industry and military authorities a rating system based on the *purpose of flight* and *communications capabilities* has been developed for civil and nontactical military aviation. (See attachment 1.) This rating system will be utilized for the purpose of providing maximum operations and establishing priority for such operations when system capacity is reached.

In implementing this plan, it must be realized that routine arrangements for local types of flight activities (training, crop dusting, etc.) will generally be accomplished through the CAA Regional Organization.

The CAA will solicit the cooperation of State aviation agencies and local airport authorities in processing a request for such flight activities. Requests for special consideration will be submitted to the appropriate regional facility or office of the CAA for processing through established military and civil channels.

Execution of this plan will require certain immediate implementing actions by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, and the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics prior to an actual Air Defense Emergency. In view thereof, such actions which have been taken, in accordance with existing plans, will be subject to immediate review and/or modification.

The Plan

1. Definitions

For the purpose of this plan, the following definitions apply:

a. *Air Defense Emergency.* A condition called by CINCONAD when his evaluation indicates that hostile action is in progress or is imminent, or is suffi-

*United States areas are defined in 1.o.

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ciently probable as to require in the interest of national security the nationwide and continuing implementation of emergency air defense measures.

b. *Air Defense Warning Conditions.*

(1) Warning Red—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are within a CONAD Division area or are in the immediate vicinity of a CONAD Division area with a high probability of entering the area.

(2) Warning Yellow—When hostile aircraft (includes missiles) are en route toward a CONAD Division area, or unknown aircraft suspected to be hostile are en route to, or are within a CONAD Division area.

(3) Warning White—When during a state of Air Defense Emergency an attack by hostile aircraft (includes missiles) is not considered immediately probable or imminent.

c. *Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) Region.* A major geographical subdivision of the continental United States which delineates the area of air defense responsibility of a CONAD Region Commander. (Example: WESTERN CONAD REGION).

d. *CONAD Division.* A geographical subdivision of a CONAD Region and those CONAD Forces within the Division area.

e. *Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).* The airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready identification, location, and control of aircraft is required in the interest of national security.

f. *CAA Region.* Area of responsibility of a CAA Regional Administrator.

g. *Security Control of Air Traffic.* Includes recognizing, requiring identification procedures, directing, diverting, restricting, prohibiting, or grounding of civil and nontactical military air traffic in the interest of national security.

h. *SCATER.* The short title for the joint Commerce/Defense Department plan for the security control of air traffic and the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

i. *SCAT.* The short title for the security control of air traffic. Current SCAT Rules are included in Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator. Emergency SCAT Rules are included in this plan.

j. *CONELRAD.* The short title for the program for the control of electromagnetic radiations. (However, the control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications is included in this plan.)

k. *Tactical Air Traffic.* Military flights actually engaged in operational missions against the enemy, flights engaged in immediate deployment for a combat mission, and preplanned combat and logistical support flights contained in Emergency War Plans.

l. *Nontactical Military Air Traffic.* Military flights other than tactical air traffic, such as administrative, logistical, and training.

m. *Defense Area.* Airspace of defined dimensions designated by the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics within which the ready control of aircraft is required in the interest of the national security during an Air Defense Emergency.

n. *Open Area.* An area within the continental United States not designated as an ADIZ or Defense Area.

o. *United States.* The several States, the District of Columbia, and the several Territories and possessions of the United States (including areas of land or water administered by the United States under international agreement), including the Territorial waters and the overlying airspace thereof.

p. *Security Control Clearance.* Authorization for an aircraft to proceed in accordance with security control instructions during an Air Defense Emergency.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this plan is to establish responsibilities, procedures, and general instructions for the security control of civil and nontactical military air traffic, air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications during an Air Defense Emergency which will provide maximum utilization of aircraft by military and civil agencies engaged in essential operations.

3. Authority

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff directives which outline the United States Air Force responsibilities for the development of plans and policies in concert with the CAA for the establishment of a system for identification and security control of air traffic within the continental United States.

b. Public Law 778, 81st Congress, which authorizes the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Secretary of Commerce to undertake security measures relating to the regulation and control of air commerce, and for other purposes.

c. Notice published by the Secretary of Commerce on January 4, 1951, in 16 F. R. 99 delegating to the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics authority with respect to security control of air traffic (Public Law 778).

d. Executive Order 10312, December 10, 1951, which provides for emergency control over certain Government and non-Government facilities engaged in radio communications or radio transmission.

e. Subpart 9, Rules of Federal Communications Commission, concerning the alerting and operation of all radio stations in the aviation services.

4. Scope

This plan prescribes the joint action to be taken during an Air Defense Emergency by appropriate military authorities and the CAA:

a. To effect security control of civil and nontactical military aircraft entering, departing, or moving within the United States and the coastal approaches thereto and

b. To effect control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications as may be required.

5. General Provisions

a. Efficient security control of air traffic will be achieved by effective air surveillance, the identification and recognition of aircraft, the air discipline of combat air units engaged in the interception and destruction of enemy airborne weapons, the close coordination between military and civil agencies and the cooperation of all airspace users.

b. In carrying out assigned missions, the CONAD Division Commander will, based on the requirements of the existing military situation, direct the extent of security control of civil and military aircraft other than those engaged in tactical operations and the

control of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications.

c. This plan is not applicable to military aircraft engaged in tactical operations with the exception that CONAD Division Commanders may advise and recommend rerouting of tactical air traffic for short distances to circumnavigate a battle or threatened area during an Air Defense Emergency. Tactical operations will be coordinated with the CONAD Division Commander(s) concerned so as not to delay combat operations.

d. Under certain conditions of alert, in specific areas, the CONAD Division Commander may require a security control clearance for civil and nontactical military aircraft prior to takeoff. Such security control clearance is different from and not to be confused with an operational or air traffic clearance. It will serve normally to insure that the pilot is informed of the current condition of alert and that his operation is of sufficient priority if any capacity restrictions are in effect.

e. Minimum interference to normal air traffic will be planned consistent with the requirements for effective operation of the air defense system.

f. The CONAD Division Commanders, in collaboration with the Civil Aeronautics Administration Regional Administrators, will supplement this plan, as required, with agreements to provide less restrictions for special nontactical military and civil air traffic operations within CONAD Division areas. In developing these agreements, they will take into consideration the peculiar requirements of organized civil defense and disaster relief flights, agricultural and forest-fire patrol flight operations and other essential civil air operations to the end that maximum utilization of these aircraft, consistent with air defense requirements, will be made. With respect to civil aviation, these supplemental agreements will be made through the CAA Regional Administrators.

6. Responsibilities

a. The Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, will—

(1) Develop and recommend military regulations which contain rules and procedures to implement this plan.

(2) Coordinate with the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics regarding the institution of procedures for accomplishment of SCATER.

(3) Establish the military requirements for SCATER in designated areas dependent upon the existing military situation.

(4) Issue amended directives or instructions for SCATER when the military situation permits relaxation of existing controls.

b. The Administrator of Civil Aeronautics will—

(1) Promulgate the necessary civil regulations to implement this plan.

(2) Coordinate with the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command, prior to the establishment of procedures for SCATER.

(3) Administer SCATER in accordance with requirements established by the Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command.

(4) Advise the civil aviation industry of the requirements for SCATER.

c. The CONAD Division Commanders will—

(1) Direct the control of all air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications facilities in their areas, as required. (This will normally be accomplshed through CAA.)

(2) Issue security control instructions to appropriate CAA agencies as necessary to insure efficient performance of the air defense mission.

(3) Maintain liaison with appropriate CAA Regional Administrators.

(4) Conduct tests of SCATER in collaboration with the CAA.

(5) Collaborate with the CAA Regional Administrators in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

d. The CAA Regional Administrators will—

(1) Participate with the CONAD Division Commanders in the development of procedures for the implementing and testing of SCATER in the CONAD Division areas.

(2) Insure proper dissemination of SCATER instructions to civil and military aeronautical facilities (including aircraft, airport operators, and State fanout systems) within their areas of responsibility.

(3) Place in effect SCATER procedures in accordance with requirements established by the CONAD Division Commanders.

(4) Maintain liaison with the appropriate CONAD Division Commanders.

(5) Assist the CONAD Division Commanders in making supplemental agreements to this plan.

7. Air Defense Emergency Actions

In an Air Defense Emergency, the following actions will be taken with respect to the CONAD Division area:

a. The CONAD Division Commander, dependent upon the situation in his area, will notify the appropriate CAA Regional Administrator(s) (this will normally be done by direct contact between the CONAD Division Control Center and the appropriate air route traffic control centers):

(1) That a state of Air Defense Emergency exists, and the current condition of Air Defense Warning;

(2) The extent of implementation of this plan that is desired; and

(3) The air traffic capacity of the air defense system and the maximum altitude permitted under the specified conditions.

b. CAA Regional Administrator(s), consistent with the information received from the CONAD Division Commander, will, to the limit of facilities available, impose any or all of the following conditions on air traffic (an air route traffic control center, with the approval of the CONAD Division Commander, has the prerogative to exempt certain categories of aircraft operations from compliance with one or more of these provisions):

(1) *ADIZ Operations*

(a) Require point-to-point flights entering, departing, or moving within the ADIZ, regardless of altitude, be equipped with functioning two-way radio and to conduct either an IFR operation or a DVFR operation, with the additional requirement that a continuous watch be maintained on an appropriate radio frequency. (Operators of agricultural and industrial aircraft, which normally operate in a localized area, may be exempted through an air route traffic control center from compliance with the two-way radio requirement while moving to a new base of operations.)

(b) Restrict point-to-point air traffic entering or operating within ADIZ's to the capacity of the air defense system.

(c) Require commanders of flights to make such additional position reports as considered essential. Reporting points will be determined by local coordination between the CONAD Division Commanders, other appropriate military commanders, and the CAA Regional Administrators.

(d) Place into effect authentication codes and approach and identification procedures, and designate landing points for aircraft prior to entry into the continental limits of the United States when procedures are established and forwarded by the CINCONAD.

(e) Require DVFR flights to operate below a specified maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain.

(2) *Defense Area and Open Area Operations*

(a) Limit VFR and DVFR point-to-point flights to a maximum altitude. This maximum altitude will normally be stated as 15,000 feet above terrain. (All IFR flights will be identifiable and identified.)

(3) *All Areas of Operation*

(a) Divert and control air traffic to permit immediate takeoff and employment of military aircraft engaged in immediate tactical operations.

(b) Divert and/or ground flights as soon as possible after diversion and/or grounding instructions are received.

(c) Place into effect plans established in accordance with Executive Order 10312 for control of electronic emissions and/or radiations as directed by the CONAD Division Commander.

(d) *Local Operations*—Restrict all local nonmilitary air traffic to designated local area, or, if no local area has been designated for such flights, to within ten (10) miles to takeoff point and to an altitude of not more than 1,500 feet above the terrain. Such flights will be conducted in such a manner as to permit ready recall within time limits prescribed by the CONAD Division Commander. These restrictions will be enforced except as determined by the CONAD Division Commander who may, under certain conditions, restrict all local nonmilitary air traffic in certain areas, or may increase limits as stated above as allowed by Air Defense requirements. Local flying areas will be designated by the appropriate Regional Administrators after coordination with the CONAD Division Commander, and will encompass the areas normally required for such local operations as flights to and from outlying training fields, crop dusting, and other industrial operations in the local areas. Local military flights will be restricted as provided for in the military directive for the Security Control of Military Aircraft.

(e) Place in effect any other restrictions or limitations on air traffic found necessary to assist the CONAD Division Commander to accomplish his mission. (Any such supplemental restrictions or limitations will be by direction of a CONAD Region Commander or higher authority.)

c. In the event of an Air Defense Emergency the following emergency rules for the security control of air traffic (short title, Emergency SCAT Rules) shall apply immediately to aircraft operated anywhere in the United States or within the coastal approaches thereto. These rules shall remain in effect for the duration of the Air Defense Emergency unless superseded by revisions to Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics.

(1) *General Rules*

General. Aircraft shall be operated at all times in compliance with the following general rules and also in compliance with the Additional ADIZ Rules when applicable:

(a) No person shall operate an aircraft unless the aircraft is equipped with an operable radio receiver and a continuous watch is maintained on an appropriate radio frequency to insure receipt of any special security control instructions which may be issued, except that an ARTC center may exempt aircraft operated on point-to-point flight in the United States outside of an ADIZ, or on local flight anywhere in the United States, from compliance with this rule, provided that the flight is—

(*1*) Confined to altitudes, areas, and time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center, or

(*2*) Conducted in such a manner as to permit visual recall within time limits prescribed by the appropriate ARTC center.

NOTE: Altitudes, areas, and time limits will be as specified by the appropriate CONAD Division.

(b) No person shall operate an aircraft contrary to security control instructions in effect at time of takeoff or any additional security control instructions issued while the aircraft is airborne.

(c) No person shall operate an aircraft into the continental United States, except from departure points designated by the Administrator, and except in conformity with identification procedures established by the Administrator.

(d) No person shall operate an aircraft in an area of the United States or the coastal approaches thereto in which "Full SCATER" has been implemented unless the flight is ordered by or coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division.

NOTE: Normally, nontactical operations will be coordinated with the appropriate CONAD Division through a CAA air route traffic control center. The CONAD Division will effect coordination with other CONAD Divisions as required.

(e) No person shall operate an aircraft in an ADIZ without a security control clearance, if such clearance is required by the appropriate ARTC center.

(f) *Emergency situations.* In emergency situations which require immediate decision and action for the safety of the flight, the pilot in command of the aircraft may deviate from the provisions of these rules to the extent required for such emergency. When a deviation is exercised, the pilot in command shall report such deviation to an appropriate aeronautical facility immediately.

NOTE: This report is for security control purposes to determine location of the flight. This report may be in addition to reports required by Civil Air Regulations Part 60.

(g) *Radio failure.*

(*1*) *IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is required.* Normal IFR procedures will apply.

(2) VFR, DVFR, or IFR flights for which an air traffic clearance is not required. The pilot in command of the aircraft shall land as soon as practicable.

(2) *Additional ADIZ Rules*

(a) *Point-to-point flights.* No person shall operate an aircraft into or within an Air Defense Identification Zone on point-to-point flights in violation of the following additional rules:

(1) Flight plan. An appropriate flight plan containing the information required by Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, shall be filed with an appropriate aeronautical facility.

(2) Radio requirements for DVFR flights. Aircraft shall be equipped with functioning two-way radio.

(3) Routing restrictions. No person shall operate an aircraft into, within, or out of an ADIZ, except in approved corridors if and when such corridors have been established.

(4) Radio communications.

(i) *IFR operations on an air traffic clearance.* Normal reporting procedures will apply.

(ii) *DVFR operations and IFR operations for which air traffic clearance is not required.* The pilot in command of the aircraft shall insure that a continuous watch is maintained on the appropriate radio frequency and shall report by radio as soon as possible the time and altitude of passing a reporting point specified for security control purposes prior to entering an ADIZ and every reporting point specified for security control purposes within an ADIZ along the route of flight. Every such position report shall include an estimate over the next specified reporting point within the ADIZ.

(5) Adherence to flight plans or air traffic clearances. The pertinent provisions of Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, will apply.

(b) *Local nonmilitary flights.* Aircraft shall not be operated on a local nonmilitary flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of a local flying area designated by the appropriate Regional Administrator, or if no local area has been designated, more than ten (10) miles from the point of takeoff and more than 1,500 feet above the terrain.

(c) *Local military flights.* Aircraft shall not be operated on a local military flight into or within an ADIZ, outside of the local flying area designated by the appropriate military authority.

(3) *Exceptions*

(a) An ARTC center may exempt certain aircraft operations from compliance with any or all of these emergency rules. Flights which may be exempted, after approval has been obtained from CONAD Division Commanders, are: *(1)* local flights, *(2)* flights wholly within the boundaries of an ADIZ, *(3)* flights from points within an ADIZ to points outside thereof, *(4)* flights not currently of significance to the air defense system, or *(5)* military flights which are conducted in accordance with special procedures prescribed by CONAD Division Commanders. Flights may be exempted individually or by category.

(4) *Violations*

(a) The penalty provisions of Part 620, Regulations of the Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, will apply. Regardless of the penalty provisions of Part 620, it is imperative that all operators understand the tremendous importance of strict compliance with the provisions of this plan. Compliance lends itself to a higher degree of national security and also self-preservation. Ignorance of these rules could not only cause diversion of much-needed air defense weapons from a hostile threat, but also could cause destruction of friendly aircraft. It is primarily for these two specific reasons that these rules are written.

8. Implementing Procedures

In the event of an Air Defense Emergency,

a. Each CONAD Division will instruct the appropriate CAA ARTC center to accomplish one of the following:

(1) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules: These rules are the continuous restrictions applicable to the movement of civil and nontactical military aircraft during an Air Defense Emergency. They will be automatically in effect from the original establishment of an Air Defense Emergency, and will remain in effect for the duration of an Air Defense Emergency, regardless of the changing requirements when "Full SCATER" is implemented or terminated.

(2) Implement Full SCATER: This will entail the grounding and/or diversion of air traffic and the shutting down of navigation aids and aeronautical communications. This action will normally be taken when hostile aircraft are en route to the continental United States or have penetrated the air defense system.

(3) Terminate Full SCATER: This will terminate the extreme restrictions imposed under Full SCATER. This action will normally be taken when an attack phase is considered over and the resumption of operations is authorized under the Emergency SCAT Rules.

(4) If ARTC centers are told to "Apply Emergency SCAT Rules," the CONAD Division will include, as necessary—

(a) Routing restrictions on flights entering any portion of an ADIZ within the CONAD Division area.

(b) Limitations on air traffic in any portion of an ADIZ within the CONAD Division area to the identification capability of the system.

(c) Altitude limitations on DVFR and VFR operations within the CONAD Division area, and

(d) Any other special instructions required by the immediate military situation.

b. CAA Air Route Traffic Control Centers will—

(1) Disseminate over the CAA communications system the instructions received from the CONAD Division.

(2) Apply Emergency SCAT Rules, imposing whatever restrictions are specified by the CONAD Division.

(3) Direct the landing or diversion of nontactical air traffic and the shutdown or controlled operations of air navigation radio aids and aeronautical communications when instructed to "Implement Full SCATER."

(4) Upon receipt of "Terminate Full SCATER," authorize resumption of air traffic in accordance with Emergency SCAT Rules.

c. Civil and military control towers and aeronautical communications stations (including licensees of air navigation radio aids) will—

(1) Maintain the current SCATER ACTION Form for that facility at appropriate operating positions.

(2) Upon receipt of "Implement Full SCATER," "Terminate Full SCATER," or "Apply Emergency SCAT Rules," take the actions indicated on the facility's SCATER ACTION Form.

(3) Comply with any special SCATER instructions issued by the appropriate notifying agency as shown on the SCATER ACTION Form.

d. It is desired that the several States participate in SCATER by disseminating SCATER instructions to airports and other aeronautical facilities not served by the CAA communications system.

9. Testing Procedures

To insure that implementing actions can be taken expeditiously, SCATER Tests will be conducted periodically in accordance with procedures developed by CONAD and CAA.

a. Federal civil and military aeronautical facilities will participate in such tests.

b. Non-Federal civil aeronautical facilities, including licensees of air navigation radio aids, will be requested to participate in such tests.

10. Communications

Direct communication is authorized between appropriate agencies, and units, for the purpose of coordination and implementation of the procedures outlined herein.

Attachment 1

APPROVED:

C. E. WILSON,
Secretary of Defense.

SINCLAIR WEEKS,
Secretary of Commerce.

DATE: 7 May 1957.

ATTACHMENT 1

Consolidated Priority Listing of all Nontactical Military and all Civil Air Traffic

GENERAL

Listings within Category I are of equal priority. Listings within Categories II through V are in order of priority as shown. Aircraft in distress are in a special category and may be assigned any priority at the discretion of the appropriate air defense commander as the seriousness of the tactical situation and the aircraft emergency warrant.

Listings herein are applicable to all aircraft, civil or military, large or small, single or multiengine. The mission itself, and not the aircraft or the ownership, determines the priority which is applicable.

I

A. The air transport of military commanders, their representatives, and key civilian personnel which is of utmost importance to the national security, or which will have an immediate effect upon combat operations of the Armed Forces.

B. Flight operations necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the Plan for Security Control of Air Traffic and Electromagnetic Radiations During an Air Defense Emergency, including flight inspection of air navigation facilities.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies whose immediate flight is *essential* to the defense effort.

D. Transportation to, from, and within disaster areas of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose immediate movement by air is essential to the prevention, reduction, or alleviation of the effects of disaster.

E. Flight operations whose immediate flight involves the saving of human life in other than disaster areas, including air/sea rescue, hurricane reconnaissance, air evacuation, and the transporting of medical personnel, equipment, and supplies.

F. Evacuation of tactical aircraft (including appropriate Civil Reserve Air Fleet) for their protection.

G. International flights originating overseas that have reached the point of no return.

II

A. The air movement of aircraft, personnel, equipment, and supplies for forces other than those immediately deploying for, in direct support of, or actually engaged in combat operations against the enemy which is essential to the timely accomplishment of assigned missions of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort. This includes AIR CARRIER transportation of persons, mail, and cargo essential to the defense effort.

B. Evacuation of nontactical aircraft for their protection.

C. Ferrying of AIR CARRIER flight equipment between operational stations.

D. Administrative flights of vital necessity to the prosecution of the war effort, but not bearing on the immediate conduct of combat operations against the enemy, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies, whose expeditious movement by this means is essential to the maintenance of sound air carrier operations.

E. Flight operations essential to the development, production, and delivery of equipment, materials and supplies, essential to the defense effort, including transportation of personnel, equipment, material, and supplies whose expeditious movement by this means is essential to the above; prospecting activities in connection with mineral or other natural resources, whose development or exploitation is essential to the above.

F. Flight operations essential to the maintenance of facilities for the transmission of light, heat, power, and communications.

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III.

A. Operational testing of air carrier aircraft and equipment or flight testing wherein the objective is the testing or development of new or modified equipment. This is applicable only to those organizations responsible for the testing, development, or modification of aircraft systems and equipment. The flight test priority for other than such organizations will be governed by the priority assigned to the type of flying being conducted by those organizations. For example, a flight test for a unit conducting operational training would be of the same priority as the transition or gunnery flights normally conducted by that organization.

B. Flight operations in connection with the maintenance of production of foodstuffs, critical fibers, and essential wood products.

C. Flight operations in connection with the activities of Federal, State, or local government agencies not essential to the defense effort.

D. Operational training flights of a tactical unit, such as transition, formation, gunnery, bombing, reconnaissance, navigation, instrument, and target towing, including ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in operational training.

E. Student training flights, the primary objective of which is the instruction and training of pilots and crews engaged in a formal course of instruction, including flight operations in connection with civil flight training.

F. Ferrying of aircraft for units engaged in student training.

IV

A. Administrative and logistical flights in support of assigned missions other than those of exceptionally high priority which are in I A., or II D., Categories.

B. Reserve flying training wherein the objective is the training of reservists not on extended active duty.

C. Ferrying of aircraft to and from organizations engaged in reserve flying training.

D. Air evacuation wherein the saving of life or material is not involved.

E. Flight operations in support of the maintenance of the national economy, such as transportation of personnel, materials, equipment, and supplies whose expeditious movement by this means is an aid to the development, production, and distribution of civilian goods, supplies, material, equipment or services, essential to the maintenance of the national economy.

V

A. Ferrying of aircraft not included in paragraphs II A., II C., III F., and IV C., above.

B. Individual training wherein the objective is the attainment or maintenance of flying proficiency as specified by the respective military services, or civil agencies.

C. The transportation of nonpriority persons or goods.

D. All other flight operations not specifically listed above.

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

SCATER
CONAD/CAA
SUPPLEMENT II

MOVEMENT OF PRIORITY CIVIL AND NON-TACTICAL MILITARY AIR TRAFFIC

WHEN FULL SCATER HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED

1. General.

a. Civil or military agencies having a known requirement of sufficient importance to operate aircraft when Full SCATER has been implemented may obtain prior approval from the appropriate CONAD Division Commander. Prior approval will be granted, insofar as practicable, for pre-planned operations essential to the immediate protection of personnel, property and national resources such as bomb damage assessment; ground traffic control; urgently needed medical supplies and equipment; forest fire, pipe line and other national resources patrols; border patrols, etc. The requests for prior approval of such pre-planned operations, containing details of operations, should be forwarded through normal military channels, State Civil Defense Directors, State Directors of Aeronautics, or other governmental agencies, as appropriate, to the CONAD Division Commander for consideration.

b. Other priority civil and non-tactical military flights, such as hurricane evacuation; evacuation of key personnel; airlifting of supplies and equipment; evacuating of transport fleets from probable target areas, etc., may be approved by the CONAD Division Commander if the immediate air defense situation permits. Requests for such approval will be by filing appropriate flight plan, including the purpose of operations and appropriate priority category as prescribed in Attachment I, SCATER, with the ARTC Center controlling the airport of departure.

c. Approval of civil and non-tactical military flights will generally be limited to VFR operations at minimum safe altitudes above the terrain, so as to provide maximum identification. Navigation aids will not normally be available for such movements. In addition, flights will be conducted at pilot's discretion, as there can be no assurance that aircraft will not be inadvertently subject to anti-aircraft and/or airborne defense fire.

d. Where nationwide standardization of prior approved movements is possible, appendixes are prepared as CONAD/CAA Appendixes. Prior approved movements of a more localized nature will be published as CONAD REGION or CONAD DIVISION Appendixes, as appropriate.

2. Distribution. Appendixes to this Supplement will be distributed only to the agency involved and to the air defense and air traffic control facilities/offices concerned.

EFFECTIVE: 1 October 1957

SCATER
CONAD/CAA
U. S. BORDER PATROL APPENDIX I
TO SUPPLEMENT II

PRIOR APPROVED U. S. BORDER PATROL OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. Prior approval is hereby granted to the Assistant Regional Commissioner for Enforcement, U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, having areas within the CONAD Regions for the movement of U. S. Border Patrol aircraft when Full SCATER has been implemented, with the following understanding:

(1) This approval is limited to flights necessary for:

(a) Air surveillance of that portion of the U. S. Border within the CONAD Regions CONAD Divisions.

(b) Apprehending aliens, saboteurs and/or enemy agents, including occupants of downed enemy aircraft.

(c) Assisting the military forces in the rescue of occupants of downed friendly aircraft.

(2) Flights will be made only upon direction of the appropriate Assistant Regional Commissioner for Enforcement.

(3) Aircraft so used will bear appropriate U. S. Border Patrol markings for visual identification, and be equipped with a functioning two-way radio.

(4) All movements will be conducted in accordance with VFR, and at an altitude of not more than 1000 feet above the terrain.

(5) NavAids will not be made available for these operations.

(6) Flight plans will be filed prior to departure. The aircraft identification will be prefixed with "U. S. Border Patrol," and estimated elapsed time to specific geographical points (towns, etc.) approximately every fifty (50) nautical miles along the route of flight will be specified in the "Remarks." Where operations are conducted from locations not served by an aeronautical facility, flight plan will be filed by telephone with the nearest CAA aeronautical facility. In such cases, departure must be made within five (5) minutes of the filed proposed departure, and the actual departure time reported to the CAA aeronautical facility as soon as air/ground communications can be established. Flight plans will be cancelled

with the aeronautical facility serving the airport of landing or, if there is no aeronautical facility, with the nearest CAA facility by radio immediately prior to landing, or by telephone immediately after landing.

(7) Flights will be conducted at pilot's discretion, as there can be no assurance that aircraft will not be inadvertently subject to defense fire.

(8) For the purpose of receiving recall or other instructions from ADC radar or CAA facilities, aircraft will monitor on 121.5-mcs. and will maintain communications with U.S. Border Patrol mobile and fixed ground units. In the event of radio failure, aircraft will be landed at the nearest available airport.

(9) Deviations of more than five (5) nautical miles on either side of the route of flight and/or more than five (5) minutes in elapsed time to a geographical point specified in the flight plan will require flight plan amendment.

(10) Position reports and other identifying information will be provided only when requested by a CAA aeronautical facility or air defense radar.

(11) Aircraft will assist and/or provide information, within operational limitations, pertinent to paragraphs (1) (b) and (c) above, when requested by air defense radar or CAA aeronautical facility.

(12) Prior approved operations may be suspended within a CONAD Division area by the CONAD Division Commanders when required by the immediate air defense situation. This will be accomplished by notifying the appropriate Assistant Regional Commissioner for Enforcement, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Burlington, Vermont (Northeastern Region); Richmond, Virginia (Southeastern Region); St. Paul, Minnesota (Northwestern Region); and/or San Pedro, California (Southwestern Region), through the CAA tower at those locations, that: "PRIOR APPROVED BORDER PATROL OPERATIONS WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA ARE SUSPENDED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED." Upon receipt of this notification, appropriate Assistant Regional Commissioners for Enforcement will direct airborne aircraft to land immediately at the nearest available airport. This approval may subsequently be reinstated by the CONAD Division notifying the Assistant Regional Commissioner(s) concerned that: "PRIOR APPROVED BORDER PATROL OPERATIONS WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA MAY BE RESUMED."

SCATER
CONAD/CAA
U. S. BORDER PATROL APPENDIX I
TO SUPPLEMENT II
(Continued)

(13) The Assistant Regional Commissioners for Enforcement will provide appropriate CAA Control Tower at Burlington, Vermont; Richmond, Virginia and St. Paul, Minnesota with a current list of person or persons and appropriate telephone numbers for forwarding the notification specified in (12) above. The Assistant Regional Commissioners for Enforcement at San Pedro, California, will provide the Long Beach, California CAA Control Tower, the nearest CAA facility, with similar information.

(14) This approval does not constitute authority to operate aircraft contrary to applicable Civil Air Regulations.

b. Request for approval of required movements not listed in 1a(1) above, or when this approval has been suspended, will be as prescribed in paragraph 1b, Supplement II.

c. All concerned are to be notified by a copy of this Appendix, as specified in 2 below, that flights authorized by this approval may be required to operate as prescribed herein.

2. Distribution.

a. Two (2) copies of this Appendix to each air defense and air traffic control facility/office within the CONAD Division area.

b. Assistant Regional Commissioners for Enforcement may effect reproduction and distribution to other Immigration and Naturalization Service Offices, as required.

DISTRIBUTION:

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PRIOR-APPROVED PRIORITY CIVIL DEFENSE OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. Prior approval is hereby granted to Directors of Civil Defense of those states having areas lying within the CONAD Regions and CONAD Division Area for the movement of a sufficient number of aircraft when Full SCATER has been implemented to fulfill pre-planned operations essential to the immediate protection of personnel, property and national resources, with the following understanding:

(1) This approval is limited to flights necessary to fulfill immediate requirements for bomb damage assessment; ground traffic control; fire detection and control; forest, pipe line and other national resources patrols; airlifting of urgently needed medical supplies and equipment, and the emergency evacuation of civil defense aircraft to avoid radio-active fall-out.

(2) Flights will be made only upon direction of a responsible Civil Defense official.

(3) Aircraft so used will be equipped with a functioning two-way radio.

(4) All movements will be conducted in accordance with VFR, and at an altitude of not more than 1000 feet above the immediate terrain.

(5) NavAids will not be made available for these operations.

(6) A continuous listening watch will be maintained on the assigned Civil Defense frequency. In the event of radio failure, aircraft will be landed immediately at the nearest available airport.

(7) Flights will be conducted at pilot's discretion, as there can be no assurance that aircraft will not be inadvertently subject to defense fire.

(8) To preclude congestion of communications and other facilities essential to the immediate air defense requirements, flight plan and position reports will not be filed unless specifically requested by the CONAD Division Commander.

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(9) Prior approved operations may be suspended within a CONAD Division Area by the CONAD Division Commander when required by the immediate air defense situation. This will be accomplished by notifying the appropriate State Director(s) of Civil Defense that "PRIOR APPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE OPERATIONS WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA ARE SUSPENDED UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED." Upon receipt of such notification, appropriate Civil Defense officials will direct airborne aircraft in the Defense Area concerned to land immediately at the nearest available airport. This approval may subsequently be reinstated by the CONAD Division notifying the State Director(s) of Civil Defense concerned that "PRIOR APPROVED CIVIL DEFENSE OPERATIONS WITHIN CONAD DIVISION AREA MAY BE RESUMED."

(10) This approval does not constitute authority to operate aircraft contrary to applicable Civil Air Regulations.

b. Request for approval of required movements not granted herein or when this approval has been suspended will be as prescribed in paragraph 1b, Supplement II.

c. All concerned are to be notified by a copy of this Appendix, as specified in 2 below, that these flights authorized by this approval may be expected to operate without further notification.

2. Distribution.

a. Two (2) copies of this Appendix to each air defense and air traffic control facility/office, State Director of Civil Defense and State Director of Aeronautics within the CONAD Division Area.

b. State Directors of Civil Defense may effect reproduction and distribution to other Civil Defense offices, as may be required.

DISTRIBUTION:

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SUPPLEMENT III

CORRIDORS AND REPORTING POINTS

1. The Commander-in-Chief, Continental Air Defense Command (CINCONAD), may establish the requirement for corridors and reporting points to be used by approved air traffic to enter the United States or designated areas within the United States when Emergency SCAT Rules are in effect. The description and requirements of any such corridors and reporting points established within the CONAD Regions will be issued by NOTAM, and specific operating instructions for air defense and air traffic control personnel will be published by CONAD Region Appendixes to this Supplement.

2. Distribution. Appendixes to this Supplement will be distributed only to air defense and air traffic control facilities/offices within the CONAD Division Area.

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LOCAL OPERATIONS

1. General.

a. When Emergency SCAT Rules are in effect and Full SCATER has not been implemented, local air traffic will be confined to the following local operating areas:

(1) Civil Operations. Ten (10) nautical mile radius of the take-off point and to an altitude of not more than 1500 feet above the terrain, unless a larger local area has been approved, as prescribed in 1.c below.

(2) Military Operations. An area designated by the Military Base Commander after coordination with the appropriate CONAD Division Commander.

b. Local operations will not be conducted when Full SCATER has been implemented.

c. Where normal local operations cannot be accomplished within an area as defined in 1.a above, a larger local area may be designated by the appropriate CAA Regional Administrator, after coordination with the CONAD Division Commander concerned. Request for larger local operating areas must include the details of operation and area required. Where the operations to be conducted will not permit maintaining a continuous listening watch on an appropriate aeronautical frequency, or involve aircraft not equipped with at least a functioning radio receiver, a visual signal for the recall of aircraft in the event Full SCATER is implemented must be available.

d. Airport Managers and Military Base Commanders are requested to post a description of the designated local area and, where applicable, location and function of the visual recall signal at conspicuous locations.

e. A description of military local operating areas as specified in 1a(2) above, and civil local areas designated as specified in 1c above, within each CONAD Division Area will be listed in CONAD Division Appendix 1 and Appendix 2, respectively, to this Supplement.

2. Distribution. Appendixes to this Supplement will be distributed only to air defense and air traffic control facilities/offices within the CONAD Division Area.

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SCATER TESTING PROCEDURES*

1. To insure that SCATER actions can be taken expeditiously, SCATER tests will be conducted as follows:

a. SCATER tests will be conducted in connection with CONAD National, Regional, or Division Exercises whenever practicable or may be initiated at other times by a CONAD Division. Normally, no more than six (6) tests will be conducted during any one calendar year. SCATER tests will not be scheduled oftener than every 60 days, except that a test may be held in conjunction with a national exercise less than 60 days after a regional or division test. To provide for maximum personnel participation, each test will be conducted in three (3) phases-- a phase for each 8-hour period of operations (0000-0800; 0800-1600; 1600-2400 local time). Each phase will be terminated after sufficient time has elapsed for participating facilities to complete all test actions.

b. All Federal facilities concerned with SCATER actions will participate in SCATER tests, except where such participation will involve the safety of aircraft. Nonfederal facilities concerned with SCATER are requested to participate. In the event an ARTC Center is unable to participate, the phase or phases involved will be rescheduled for the corresponding period of the following day.

c. Participation and reporting will be in accordance with procedures prescribed in Section D, SCATER Actions Form, and CONAD Division Combat Center and ARTC Center Implementing Instructions.

d. Participation or nonparticipation will be reported by use of the self-addressed SCATER Test Report Postcard supplied by the CONAD Division CAA ADLO. CONAD Divisions and ARTC Centers will report participation by use of the report form contained in the appropriate Implementing Instructions.

e. A separate test report is to be submitted for each phase of the test. All items of the test report must be completed. Where the action item is either not received or not applicable, the abbreviation "NR" or "NA", as appropriate, is to be listed in lieu of the action time. Where a facility is unable to participate, the reasons for nonparticipation should be recorded on the test report.

f. The CONAD Division CAA ADLO will evaluate all test reports and prepare an analytical report of participation within the CONAD Division Area. This report will contain the number of SCATER action facilities, by category; list of non-participating facilities; action times; general review of any discrepancies noted, and recommended corrective actions. Specific discrepancies will be reported to the facility concerned by separate correspondence.

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g. A copy of the analytical report will be submitted to the CONAD Division Commander; CONAD Forces and Headquarters CONAD, CAA Region and Washington Offices.

* Although it is not mandatory that nonfederal facilities participate in SCATER tests, participation is requested to insure that appropriate action will be taken when actual implementation is necessary.