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Dear Mr. Greenewald,

I am writing in response to your FOIA request, which we received on 17 September 2009. We have assigned this request AFHRA inquiries reference number 903. Since your request was made under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act it has been designated FOIA number 2009-3962F. Enclosed is a copy of the requested document, "USAF withdrawal from Southeast Asia,” IRIS number 1009462, Call number K717.0423-1. If you have any other questions, please let us know.

Thank you for your request.

Sincerely,

Kevin Burge
Archivist
AFHRA/RSA

Attachments:
1. "USAF withdrawal from Southeast Asia,” IRIS number 1009462, Call number K717.0423-1
CORONA HARVEST

USAF FORCE WITHDRAWAL

FROM

SOUTHEAST ASIA

1 JANUARY 1970 – 30 JUNE 1971 (U)

PREPARED BY

HQ PACAF

DECLASSIFIED

SAF/AAZD BY AFHRA
A

PROJECT CORONA HARVEST

STUDY

USAF FORCE WITHDRAWAL

FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA

1 JANUARY 1970-30 JUNE 1971 (U)

MICROFILMED BY HOTM

Prepared by:

Headquarters PACAF

L. D. CLAY, Jr., General, USAF
Commander in Chief
Pacific Air Forces

31 May 1972
(Corrected copy: see p. ii.)

HQ PACAF DOA-72-1074

CY # 16 OF 16 CYS

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ABSTAINER

The evaluations in this document represent the efforts of several working groups and critique panels of USAF officers who were knowledgeable in the subjects addressed. They were based on reports, letters, messages, etc., written during the course of the war without benefit of a long-term perspective.

The CORONA HARVEST reports were prepared to acquaint present and future Air Force leaders with air power lessons learned during the Southeast Asia conflict. The CORONA HARVEST project was not undertaken to produce a historical report, but rather was designed to point out problems experienced, identify areas which deserved further study, and recommend future courses of action. Little effort was made to balance this material by pointing out the achievements of airpower during the conflict.

The document is the property of the U.S. Government and is not to be released in whole or in part without the specific permission of HQ USAF (AF/XODD).
(U) This is the first CORONA HARVEST study to address USAF force withdrawals from Southeast Asia. Although the CORONA HARVEST V series is concerned with the January 1970-June 1971 period, proper treatment of the subject requires that the discussion begin with the first incremental withdrawal of U.S. forces in August 1969. The report documents problems encountered by the Air Force in maintaining an effective force during the redeployments, enumerates lessons learned, and offers recommendations.

(U) This PACAF study was revised to incorporate the Air Staff editor's comments which enhanced clarity, consistency, syntax, and grammar. The result is a greatly improved, more readable volume.
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OVERVIEW

(U) Future historians, in researching the contributions of airpower during the Vietnam war, will find an abundance of statistical data relating to U.S. Air Force operations in Southeast Asia: Numbers of bombs dropped, numbers of sorties flown, damages, both sustained and inflicted by U.S. aircraft. What is likely to be lost (if precautions are not taken) is an insight into the problems of USAF management that were experienced during the complexities of the buildup of U.S. forces in Southeast Asia and the subsequent withdrawing of those forces.

(U) The President's announcement in June 1969 of the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces signaled the start of a reduction in American involvement in Southeast Asia. That involvement began, for the Air Force, in the fall of 1961 when the first USAF combat unit deployed to Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon.

(U) Executive decisions in 1964 and 1965 resulted in an escalation of the war that required over 500,000 Air Force personnel to see service in Southeast Asia by the summer of 1971. However, during this same summer the program of withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam was well underway, and it appeared that the process was to be irreversible.

(U) Ostensibly tied to the redeployment schedule for U.S. forces, was the success of Vietnamization—the replacing of American fighting
men by the improved and modernized Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces. By the very nature of the technical expertise required in operating an air force, a most difficult portion of the responsibility for transferring the fighting to the Vietnamese fell on the USAF. For the same reason, it could be expected that the USAF would be required to conduct large-scale operations in Southeast Asia for an indefinite period after other U.S. services had sharply reduced their activity in Southeast Asia.

(U) Complicating matters for the U.S. military were severe budget constraints, the first of which followed closely behind the President's initial withdrawal announcement. It was due, almost solely, to these budgetary constraints that the American forces in Thailand (which drew far less world attention than those forces in South Vietnam) were reduced. Political intervention created additional problems for USAF force planners in Thailand where, on occasion, USAF planning was delayed or negated by decisions at the State Department level.

(U) Looking back from mid-1971, the President's program was working. The Vietnamese Air Force was providing almost all of the air support for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in South Vietnam and Cambodia while the USAF was engaged primarily in out-country interdiction operations. The enemy had not launched a major offensive in South Vietnam during the two years of U.S. redeployments and American casualties were at their lowest point in years.
(U) It appeared, then, that the President was making good his announced goal of providing the Saigon government a reasonable chance for survival. Just when the point would be reached that U.S. military support would no longer be needed might be dictated as much by economic and political factors as by the military situation.

(U) Regardless, the USAF could expect a continuing array of problems in maintaining a viable combat force as the redeployments proceeded toward complete withdrawal of American fighting forces from Southeast Asia.
I. BACKGROUND

A. (U) THE PIVOTAL YEAR

(U) The year 1964, quiescent and low keyed with respect to U.S. presence in South Vietnam (SVN), presents an appropriate beginning for a discussion of events leading to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Southeast Asia (SEA). At that time the U.S. still had a wide range of options available for determining its course of action in Indochina. The American public was, if anything, in favor of taking steps necessary to keep South Vietnam from Communist domination. The antiwar factions in the U.S. and throughout the world were not as vocal as they would later become as the conflict stretched into the longest war in U.S. history.

1. (U) The U.S. Decision to Escalate the War in SEA

(U) Conditions continued to deteriorate in SVN following the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem in November 1963. Washington, while deploiring the murder of Diem, had held hopes that Major General Duong Van Minh's new military regime would lend greater stability to the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Those hopes were soon dashed when Minh's junta was, in turn, deposed on 30 January 1964 in a bloodless coup led by Major General Nguyen Khanh. Amid this turmoil, America's foreign policy for SEA was put to a stern test. The solution seemed to lie in the choice between three possible courses of action: to increase American involvement in the affairs of the RVN; to let things
remain as they were; or to withdraw our troops through some form of face-saving formula such as neutralization.

(U) Instrumental in influencing the course that the U.S. would take were the recommendations of Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert S. McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Maxwell D. Taylor. Following their return from a March 1964 visit to Saigon, Secretary McNamara recommended to President Lyndon B. Johnson a program of increased operations against the Vietcong (VC) guerrillas. Further, both Mr. McNamara and General Taylor concluded that the RVN needed additional U.S. military, economic, and political support, and that such help should be furnished as long as it was necessary to bring Communist aggression and terrorism under control. The direction the U.S. would travel seemed firm on March 26 when Secretary McNamara delivered a speech that had been prepared in concert with President Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In his speech, Mr. McNamara rejected the ideas of "withdrawal," "neutralization," or "peace at any price" in the war against the Communist insurgents.

(U) So it was that 1965 became a pivotal year. Conditions continued to be politically unstable, and offered, perhaps for the last time, an opportunity for the U.S. to make a near-term disengagement from SEA. Instead, the number of U.S. military personnel in SVN was slowly increased, until by the end of the year the force stood at approximately 23,000.
B. (U) 1965-1969--THE ESCALATION YEARS

(U) Increased enemy activity in early 1965 led to a 26 February statement by Secretary McNamara in which he announced plans for a 100,000-man expansion of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the assignment of more than 1,000 additional U.S. advisors to SVN. By the end of 1965, however, U.S. forces in South Vietnam had been increased by 175,000 personnel, and in 1966, an additional 200,000 were deployed. There was a decrease in the rate of deployment during 1967 and 1968 with a force increase in those years of approximately 150,000. The peak of the buildup occurred in January 1969 when the authorized troop strength in SVN reached 549,500. Of that number, approximately 60,000 were USAF personnel. In early 1969, the total number of USAF personnel stationed in Thailand reached 36,000.*

C. (S)(Gp-1)(U) EARLY PLANS FOR REDEPLOYMENT

(S)(Gp-4) The guidelines for military planning in SEA were established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), while the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) directed and coordinated the efforts of the component commands. Detailed air planning and air expertise were provided by Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). While it

*See Figure 1 for total and USAF strengths during the buildup. To avoid encumbering the narrative with extensive listings, locations of USAF units and numbers of aircraft during the buildup are not presented here. For the reader requiring detail, this information is presented in the appendix.
U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

SOUTH VIETNAM

Thousands

FY 62 FY 63 FY 64 FY 65 FY 66 FY 67 FY 68 FY 69

DOD 8,985 15,396 16,532 59,921 247,536 448,851 534,727 538,714

USAF 2,135 3,953 5,050 10,703 36,375 55,737 60,753 60,465

THAILAND

Thousands

FY 62 FY 63 FY 64 FY 65 FY 66 FY 67 FY 68 FY 69

DOD 1,582 4,325 4,335 9,796 24,643 38,968 47,685 47,948

USAF 124 1,048 1,103 6,039 17,222 28,289 35,301 35,907

*Includes USAF.

Figure 1

Source: USAF Management Summary, SEA, 30 July 1971
was to be the latter part of 1969 before any actual reduction in SVN-based U.S. military was to take place, planning for that reduction started much earlier. The first major Operations Plan (OPLAN) concerning possible force withdrawals from SEA was CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 which was in response to a communique issued following the Manila Conference of 24-25 October 1966.

1. (U) The Manila Conference Communique

(U) At the invitation of President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines, the leaders of seven nations in the Asian and Pacific region met at a summit conference in Manila. The participants were: President Johnson of the U.S., Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia, President Chung H. Park of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn of Thailand, Chairman Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky of the Republic of Vietnam, and President Marcos. Particularly applicable to the subject of force withdrawal was the 29th paragraph of the Manila communique which stated that:

Allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression and its Government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

(U) On 4 November 1966, President Johnson stated that withdrawal of allied forces under the Manila communique would require not only a
cessation of infiltration and aggression, but a cessation--rather than a mere subsidence--of violence as well.

2. CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 (5067)

In January 1967, to satisfy the provisions of the Manila communique, the JCS requested that CINCPAC formulate a post-hostilities plan that would provide for the withdrawal of U.S. and Free World Military Assistance (FWMA) forces from SVN within a six-month period. An earlier study by CINCPAC's staff had concluded that it was logistically possible to do so, and on 31 March 1967, CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 "Withdrawal of U.S./FWMA Forces from South Vietnam Within a Six-Month Period," was sent to the JCS.

The plan called for a residual Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) of 13,425 personnel to be left in SVN. It did not identify a specific roll-up period or roll-up force, but assumed that MAAG personnel would be permitted to conduct those operations following the six-month redeployment period. Updated in 1968, OPLAN 67-68 became 67-69 and, in 1969, was renumbered OPLAN 5067. This latest revision provided for a roll-up force, an increased MAAG, and RVNAF improvement and modernization. The plan did not address the redeployment of forces from Thailand.

3. CINCPAC OPLAN 69-69 (5069)

On 30 December 1968, CINCPAC OPLAN 69-69, "A T-Day Plan for Redeployment of Forces" was promulgated. Subsequent changes

*T-Day--Termination of hostilities in SVN."
recommended by the JCS were included, and on 20 June 1969 the plan was renumbered OPLAN 5069. The plan was a statement of unilateral U.S. capabilities to redeploy forces from SEA after hostilities in SVN had terminated and to reduce the Pacific Command (PACOM) force structure to a specified level. It did not provide for a redeployment from SVN under the provisions of the Manila communique and was, therefore, maintained separately from OPLAN 5067. Neither did it provide a basis for the development of a post T-Day force posture nor for budgetary requirements in the PACOM area.

(U) Thus it can be seen that early planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces had been based on the premise that the enemy would withdraw its forces or, at least, that hostilities would cease. Subsequent events would make it apparent that neither of the two CINCPAC OPLANS was tailored to fit the emerging situation.
II. DISCUSSION

A. (U) TROOP WITHDRAWALS BEGIN

(U) Following President Richard M. Nixon's inauguration in January 1969, it was considered by many that an announcement on troop withdrawals from South Vietnam was imminent. Both during the 1968 political campaign and after he took office the President had made it clear that he wished to "de-Americanize" the war in SEA. The manner in which he hoped to accomplish this formidable task remained, however, a matter for speculation until his meeting on Midway Island with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu.

1. (U) Nixon's Midway Announcement

(U) Presidents Nixon and Thieu met on Midway Island on 9 June 1969 to discuss political and military problems related to the war in SEA. The climax of the meeting was Mr. Nixon's long-anticipated announcement on withdrawals. He had "decided to order the immediate redeployment from Vietnam of the divisional equivalent of approximately 25,000 men . . ." The President added that the withdrawal would begin within 30 days and be completed by the end of August 1969.

(U) While the number was smaller than had been expected, the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces signaled the beginning of an intricate strategy directed at Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. If the President could maintain military pressure on the enemy while dulling the mounting dissent at home, it was possible that Hanoi might conclude a settlement in Paris, or at least scale down the level of fighting.
(U) In addition to his announcement of the first troop withdrawals, the President said that future withdrawals would be examined in the light of the following criteria:

a. Progress in the training and equipping of South Vietnam forces.

b. Progress in the Paris peace talks.

c. The level of enemy activity.

The gradual replacing of U.S. fighting men with RVNAF, (soon to be known as Vietnamization) had begun. Announcing the withdrawal of a relatively small number of troops did little to placate the President's critics in the U.S., and it was too early to tell what effects the program would have on Hanoi's thinking. With the numbers so modest and the withdrawal deadline less than three months away, it was not long before the President was faced with the issue of additional withdrawals.

2. (U) The KEYSTONE Redeployments

The official designation for the incremental withdrawals from SVN became "KEYSTONE". With each increment, a program was developed that provided ceilings for the component services. The JCS had been providing guidance and information on troop strength through the sequentially numbered Southeast Asia Deployment Programs. Program Six was in effect when the initial KEYSTONE redeployment was ordered. The progression from Southeast Asia Deployment Programs Seven through Thirteen coincided with the first seven KEYSTONE increments during the period covered in this report. On occasion, adjustments were made in the individual PACOM Component Service ceilings; however, the total numbers reduced and the
completion dates for the reductions remained unchanged. See Figure 2 for a condensation of the KEYSTONE redeployments.

a. KEYSTONE EAGLE (Increment I).

The first redeployment--KEYSTONE EAGLE--was completed by 31 August in response to the President's Midway Island announcement. The authorized ceiling* for Department of Defense (DOD) personnel in SVN was reduced from 549,500 to 524,500. The Army lost 15,780 spaces, the Navy 1,022, and the Marines 8,198. The Air Force lost no spaces, and its ceiling remained at 61,951.

b. KEYSTONE CARDINAL (Increment II).

On 16 September 1969, President Nixon announced that: "After careful consideration . . . I have decided to reduce the authorized troop ceiling in Vietnam to 484,000 by December 15." This equated to a reduction in authorized spaces of 40,500, but, because the services were already below their authorized numbers, actual reductions totaled 33,500. The reductions by services were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Actual Reductions</th>
<th>Reduction in Authorized Ceilings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>14,082</td>
<td>14,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>5,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>18,465</td>
<td>18,465</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>2,541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33,500</td>
<td>40,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Authorized spaces refers to the maximum ceilings imposed on the component services. The actual numbers of service personnel generally ran lower than authorized. This distinction between "spaces and faces" assumes some importance in a later discussion on the USAF debit/credit account.
Operation KEYSTONE CARDINAL called for a USAF ceiling reduction of 2,541. This was accomplished largely by the following actions involving major units:

1) The previously authorized deployment of two F-4 squadrons to SVN was cancelled.

2) The C-47 and U-10 aircraft of the 5th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) at Tuy Hoa Air Base (AB) were transferred to Korea, Thailand, the Continental United States (CONUS), and to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

3) The 6th SOS was inactivated at Pleiku Air Base with its A-1 aircraft going to the 56th Special Operations Wing in Thailand.

4) The 8th Tactical Bomb Squadron at Phan Rang was inactivated and its B-57 aircraft ferried to CONUS for storage.

Reducing the ceiling by 2,541 left USAF with 59,410 authorized spaces in SVN. The actual number of USAF personnel in-country at the end of 1969 was 58,422.

c. (SJT(4-79)) KEYS tribute (Increment III).

The third increment was announced on 15 December 1969. Although disappointed with the stalemate in Paris and a rise in enemy activity, the President was evidently satisfied with the overall progress in SVN and called for a reduction of 50,000 manpower spaces by 15 April 1970. The third increment reduced the authorized spaces to 434,000. The Army was reduced by 29,553 spaces, the Navy by 2,976, the Marines by 2,895, and the Air Force by 5,576. Major units affected by USAF's reduction were:
1) The 16th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron (TRS) which redeployed to Misawa Air Base, Japan.

2) Three F-4 squadrons—the 557th, 558th, and 559th—which were inactivated at Cam Ranh Bay.

The total action kept USAF below its ceiling of 53,834.

(U)KEYSTONE ROBIN (Increment IV, V, and VI)

(U) The term "cut and try" had been applied to the early reductions with the obvious meaning that the impact of each redeployment would be closely monitored before proceeding with the next. A departure from this technique was announced by the President in his 20 April 1970 address to the nation:

We have now reached a point where we can confidently move from a period of cut and try to a longer-range program for the replacement of Americans by South Vietnamese troops.

I am, therefore, tonight announcing plans for the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops to be completed during the spring of next year. . . .

On 3 June 1970, President Nixon said that of the 150,000 he had announced the month before, 50,000 would be out of SVN by 15 October.

1) KEYSSTONE ROBIN ALFA (Increment IV). In complying with the latest Presidential announcement, the planners arrived at the following reductions in ceilings for the services: Army, 15,169; Navy, 8,800; Marines, 18,631; and Air Force, 7,400.

After completion of the KEYSSTONE ROBIN ALFA redeployment, the new DOD ceiling in SVN was 384,000. The USAF loss
of 7,400 spaces was the greatest yet incurred, and the number would not be approached in subsequent KEYSTONE redeployments through June 1971. In reducing its strength to an authorized 46,434, USAF had only to redeploy approximately 4,700 personnel since it was already well below its previous ceiling.

(U) It was primarily by reducing its strength in-country by six Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS) that USAF was able to attain its goal. The 31st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) with five F-100 squadrons (the 306th, 308th, 309th, 355th, and 416th) redeployed from Tuy Hoa Air Base to CONUS. The 531st TFS was inactivated at Bien Hoa with its F-100s also returning to the CONUS. Additionally, two Attack Squadrons—the 8th and the 90th—turned their A-37s over to the VNAF.

2) KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO (Increment V). On 12 October 1970, the President announced that an additional 40,000 troops would be redeployed from SVN by Christmas. Increment V would bring the authorized DOD ceiling down to 344,000. The Army was reduced by 39,660 spaces, and the Navy by 1,328. The Marines, originally scheduled for no change in strength, gained 1,601 spaces through internal adjustments with the other services while the Air Force ceiling was reduced by 613.

The only major USAF unit affected by KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO was the 45th TRS which redeployed its RF-101s from Tan Son Nhut to the CONUS. After completion of Increment V, the authorized USAF ceiling was 45,821.
3) **KEYSTONE ROBIN CHARLIE (Increment VI).** The final 60,000 space reduction of the KEYSTONE ROBIN series was completed by 15 April 1971 and resulted in a DOD ceiling of 284,000. The Army lost 41,848 spaces, the Navy 5,600, the Marines 12,179, and the Air Force 373.

**KEYSTONE ROBIN CHARLIE** had originally called for a USAF reduction of 200 spaces. After an internal adjustment with the Marines, however, the number became 373. No major units were affected and USAF absorbed the reduction through in-country vacancies that already existed.

**KEYSTONE ORIOLE ALFA (Increment VII).**

President Nixon's next announcement on troop withdrawals came on 7 April 1971 when he called for a reduction in strength of 100,000 by 1 December. The first portion of the 100,000 was redeployed by 30 June and numbered 29,300. **KEYSTONE ORIOLE ALFA** reduced the DOD ceiling in SVN to 254,700 as the Army lost 15,030 spaces, the Navy 516, the Marines 12,769, and the Air Force 985. The new USAF ceiling became 44,463 and no units were affected in making the reduction.

f. **Summary of KEYSTONE Redeployments (Increments I-VII).**

Increments I-VII resulted in the reduction of 17,488 USAF spaces. That number equaled six percent of the total DOD redeployments. Prior to Increment I, 11 percent of the authorized U.S. military spaces in SVN belonged to USAF. This figure rose to 17 percent by the time Increment VII was completed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increment</th>
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<th>Reduction</th>
<th>JCS Program</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
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<td>613</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>344,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>ROBIN CHARLIE</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>284,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>ORIOLE ALFA</td>
<td>29,300</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>254,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Southeast Asia Deployment Programs 7 through 13, JCS.

Figure 2
3. (G-3) (U) The BANNER Redeployments

As the redeployments from SVN began, military leaders deemed it imperative that the force levels in Thailand not be decreased; if anything, they hoped for an increase. However, on 30 September 1969 the President announced the withdrawal of 6,000 military personnel from Thailand by the end of fiscal year (FY) 1970. Another 9,865 were redeployed during FY 1971 and the cessation of reductions, desired by the military, was rendered indefensible by mounting budgetary restrictions.

a. (G-3) (U) BANNER STAR.

At the time of the President's announcement on Thailand reductions, the DOD authorized ceiling in that country stood at 48,065, with the Air Force share numbering 34,982. The first reduction of 6,000 was completed by 1 July 1970: The Army lost 3,006 spaces, the Navy 45, and the Air Force 2,949.

At first, the Air Force had been slated to lose 3,111 spaces during the BANNER STAR redeployment, but after an internal adjustment with the other services (153 spaces from the Army and nine from the Navy) the net result was the reduction of 2,949 in the USAF ceiling. The major actions taken during FY 70 to reduce the USAF ceiling in Thailand were:

1) The inactivation of the 41st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron at Takhli with its 23 EB-66s and 675 spaces.
2) The reduction of EC-121s of the 533rd Reconnaissance Wing (RW) at Korat, from 24 to 16 with a saving of 359 spaces.
3) The deletion of 493 spaces through management actions.
4) The inactivation of the 556th Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadron headquartered at U-Tapao on 1 October 1969 with 400 spaces throughout Thailand.
5) The inactivation of the 609th SOS (A-26s) at Nakhon Phanom which deleted 379 spaces.
6) The return to Clark Air Base of the detachment of F-102s that had been providing air defense alert at Udorn.

Additionally, in a move to maximize management efficiency, all of the remaining F-105s (four squadrons) were consolidated at Takhli. This was accomplished by moving the 44th TFS from Korat to join the three F-105 squadrons already at Takhli.

b. (U) BANNER SUN.

Following the BANNER STAR reductions, the DOD ceiling in Thailand was 42,065 spaces of which 32,033 belonged to USAF. By 1 July 1971, the FY 71 BANNER SUN reductions had resulted in an Air Force ceiling of 26,044 of a total DOD ceiling set at 32,200. After an internal adjustment with the Army (USAF gained 1,311 Army slots), the net losses were 3,876 by the Army and 5,989 by the Air Force. The Navy ceiling remained at 395.

Approximately 3,600 USAF spaces were deleted by the closure of Takhli and the inactivation of the 355th TFW located
there. Twelve F-105s were moved to Korat during September and October 1970 to form the 6010th Wild Weasel Squadron. The remainder of the wing's aircraft (assigned to four TFSs—the 44th, 333rd, 354th, and 357th) were delivered to Kadena and to the CONUS. Other significant reductions during FY 1971 were:

1) The 553rd RW at Korat was redesignated the 553rd Reconnaissance Squadron as the number of its assigned EC-121s was reduced from 16 to nine. The savings in spaces was 420.

2) Two Nakhon Phanom-based A-1 squadrons were inactivated—the 22nd SOS in September and the 602nd SOS in December. The reduction in spaces totaled 886.

3) The 11th TRS with its RF-4s redeployed from Udorn to the CONUS, reducing the authorized spaces by 600.

4) The last F-102 detachment in SEA, the unit at Don Muang, was returned to Clark Air Base with its authorized 57 spaces.

c. (U) Summary of BANNER STAR and BANNER SUN.

Several differences existed between the redeployments from Thailand and those from SVN. Although ostensibly tied to the Vietnamization program, it was nevertheless soon apparent that the incremental withdrawal process from SVN was practically irreversible. Public opinion and administration-induced budget restrictions combined to make a stop, or even a slowdown, in reductions most unlikely. The situation

*Used for fighter or bomber escort to detect and suppress surface-to-air missiles (SAM).
differed in Thailand in that the BANNER redeployments received far less publicity and, most likely, no public outcry would have accompanied a decision to maintain or increase the U.S. force level in that country. Therefore in Thailand, where the U.S. strength consisted largely of USAF hard-core, high-cost tactical units, the reductions were caused almost solely by budget constraints.

Another difference—somewhat related to the foregoing—was in the area of internal adjustments with the other services. During the KEYSTONE Vietnam redeployments, USAF had little difficulty remaining below its authorized ceiling and had, on occasion, "given" spaces to the other services to accommodate their operational requirements. The opposite was true in Thailand. BANNER STAR and BANNER SUN called for reductions in the USAF authorized ceilings of 3,111 and 7,300 respectively. Plans were successfully developed and implemented to draw the force down by those numbers; however, additional operational requirements were levied against the Air Force and it was necessary to make internal adjustments to provide USAF with the required additional spaces. These adjustments amounted to 162 during BANNER STAR and 1,311 during BANNER SUN. Thailand, with the lower visibility it afforded the U.S. forces, became the logical place to base additional USAF units. A condensed summary of the BANNER reductions is presented on the following page.

*For further discussion on internal adjustments, see pp. 48-50.
B. (TS)(Gp-1)(U) USAF FORCE PLANNING

(U) In this section, the intent is to examine many of the problems faced by the USAF in developing and implementing the various plans and programs necessary to reduce its strength in SEA. These problems included not only Vietnamization and the attendant political considerations, but also the maintenance of a viable force under the dual constraints of continually lower manpower ceilings for SVN and Thailand and ever-present budget restrictions.

(U) The essential difference between programs and plans is that plans are contingency-oriented estimates on how projected resources can be brought to bear on various possibilities, whereas programs are real life, relatively near-time entities designed to cope with present or projected situations that demand orderly solutions.

(U) Requests for force adjustments (force requirement actions) could be initiated at any level of command. With proper justification and documentation, a requirement was submitted to CINCPAC by the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI), or the appropriate

*Net USAF reductions following internal adjustments.*
PACOM Service Component Commander. After coordinating and justifying
the requirement, CINCPAC submitted it to the JCS as a change request
to the existing SEA Deployment Program. The JCS coordinated the request
with the appropriate service and submitted a ceiling adjustment request
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

(U) The appropriate military department selected and alerted the
unit which would meet the requirement. After approving an adjustment
request, OSD made a request through State Department channels for coun-
try clearance.* The JCS would then issue a deployment directive which
was contingent upon receipt of the country clearance while the military
department issued the movement directives for its unit.

(U) The system was designed to work both ways. Force requirement
actions originating at the Washington level were normally referred by
the JCS to CINCPAC for comment. CINCPAC would then solicit comments
and/or impact statements from the appropriate Component Commander(s)
and/or COMUSMACV and COMUSMACVTHAI, as required. Following that,
CINCPAC either recommended approval or disapproval to the JCS. (Fig-
ure 3 depicts the Air Force position in the cycle just discussed.)

Planning for a unilateral withdrawal had been so closely
held that until the actions were announced it was generally thought that
the U.S. would not redeploy any of its troops until the North Vietnamese

*Permission obtained through diplomatic channels from a friendly foreign
nation to permit entry of military units, military personnel, and/or
military-sponsored civilians.

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Army (NVA) had agreed to do at least as much. A dichotomy existed in Air Force planning and programming that saw small segments of the planners engaged in redeployment planning, while the majority was trying to comply with documents that called for increasing forces. For reasons of efficiency it was important that the closely held information be spread over a larger base. This situation improved as the redeployments continued.

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Figure 3

Source: CINCPAC Instruction 5230.10A (J5522), 7 November 1969.

37 As mentioned earlier, none of the pre-redeployment planning had addressed the possibility of a unilateral withdrawal. Even during the redeployments it was evident that the U.S. military was reluctant to withdraw from a job not yet finished. According to the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) Plans, 7AF, the difficulty in contemplating U.S. withdrawals without enemy concessions of any kind caused many U.S. military officers to resist, perhaps unconsciously, the necessary steps to reduce U.S. forces as quickly as President Nixon seemed to visualize.

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1. Cancellation of Early Plans

The CINCPAC OPLANs discussed under "Early Plans for Redeployment" were 5067 and 5069. The former was predicated on certain provisions of the Manila communique being satisfied, while the latter was based on a cessation of hostilities in SVN. The two plans were neither suited nor designed for the situation that developed in 1969. Beginning with the announcement of unilateral U.S. withdrawals from SEA and the concept of Vietnamization, it became apparent that the guidance upon which both plans had been developed would soon become invalid. On 14 May 1970, on the basis of a PACAF recommendation, CINCPAC cancelled the two plans.

2. Budget Restrictions

In October 1970, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC, made the observation that future troop withdrawals would not be determined by Vietnamization alone, but would be influenced by budgetary and manpower constraints as well. He cited as an example the Increment V Redeployment then in progress which had programmed the withdrawal of 10,000 military personnel from SVN during the October-December period. Due to budgetary constraints, and the inability of the Army to maintain its overall authorized strength, Admiral McCain thought the number withdrawn would reach as high as 50,000.*

It is impossible to confine the discussion of budget restrictions to the U.S. military in SEA alone. Inextricably linked to the war in SVN was the President's course of reducing the U.S. military

*The actual figure was 40,000.
presence throughout the world. Living within its budget, PACAF trimmed its forces in the Western Pacific as well as in Southeast Asia. The first budget exercise was concomitant with the early redeployments and the beginning of the Vietnamization program and, except at the highest levels, little information was available to determine which was the driving force for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

a. (U) The Nixon Doctrine

(U) First enunciated by the President at Guam in July 1969, the Nixon Doctrine stated three propositions:

1) The U.S. will keep all its treaty commitments.

2) The U.S. will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied to the U.S. or of a nation whose survival the U.S. considers vital to its security or the security of the region as a whole.

3) In cases involving other types of aggression the U.S. will furnish aid and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate, but the U.S. will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

(U) The impact of the Administration's desire to reduce both U.S. manpower overseas and the budget was evident. In December 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers said in a statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations:
By the end of this fiscal year [1971] well over 300,000 military personnel will have been redeployed from various countries in Asia—265,000 from Vietnam; 20,000 from Korea; 15,700 from Thailand; 9,400 from the Philippines and an as yet undetermined number from Japan. As Secretary [of Defense] Laird has recently pointed out, the incremental cost of the Vietnam war has already been reduced by 50% from $29 billion in FY 1969 to $14.5 billion in FY 70.

In summing up the future role of the U.S. in Asia, Secretary Rogers made it clear that the budget would play a large part. "We are trying," the Secretary said, "to reduce our presence in those countries in a way that is consistent with our other commitments domestically, and also keeping in mind our treaty commitments."

b. (U) Project 703.

Project 703 was a budget exercise that called for the saving of three billion dollars by the U.S. military during FY 1970. Coming concurrently with troop reductions as it did, actions that were attributed to reduced ceilings in SVN and Thailand also appear as actions that took place under Project 703. Outlining the impact of Project 703 on PACAF operations in the Pacific during FY 1970, a PACAF summary cited the results as follows:

1) Inactivation of numerous units.
2) A loss of 275 Unit Equipped (UE) aircraft.
3) Manpower reductions of over 13,000 spaces.
4) Dollar savings of over 29 million dollars exclusive of military personnel pay.
5) A reduction of SEA tactical sorties from approximately 18,000 to 14,000 per month programmed for the period 1 September 1969 to 30 June 1970.

6) The closure of Mactan AB in the Philippines and Tachikawa AB in Japan.

(U) Budget expenditures for the war in SVN reached an all-time high during fiscal year 1969. The final Operation and Maintenance (O&M)* expenses for 7AF and 13AF approximated 403 million dollars for that year. (The expenses of 13AF are included here because, although some of its bases are not in SEA, the activity at those bases was in direct support of the war in SVN.) Under Project 703, the FY 1970 expenditures for the two commands dropped to around 334 million dollars.

c. (":"U) Fiscal Year 1971 Budget Reductions.

(U) Nothing comparable to Project 703 was developed for FY 1971. Based on previous experience, the PACAF comptrollers estimated that O&M expenses for 7AF and 13AF would be approximately 290 million dollars for the year. Even though this was the lowest planned budget since FY 1968, the estimate proved to be pessimistic as the combined expenditures of the two commands totaled somewhat less than 278 million dollars.

(DCS/Plans, 7AF, made the following observation on the impact of the budget restrictions on the war in SEA:

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*O&M—Does not include expenses such as military pay, munitions, family housing, etc.
The throttle controlling the rate at which withdrawal or Vietnamization proceeds is principally budgetary, with subordinate roles being played by personnel ceilings, I&M* success and the level of activity in the war itself.

3. (U) Political Considerations

(U) In early FY 1970, when PACAF first began programming for the combined ceiling/budget reductions in SEA, it became apparent that the USAF would encounter political obstructions in implementing necessary force realignments.

a. (U) Air Defense Alert at Don Muang.

(U) The first such situation developed when PACAF attempted to inactivate the air defense detachment at Don Muang. Alert aircraft were being provided by the 64th and 509th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons (FIS) at Clark for Don Muang, Udorn, and DaNang. Although the 64th was inactivated in December 1969 and the FIS detachments at Udorn and DaNang had ceased operations, PACAF had been unsuccessful in its bid to take similar action at Don Muang Airport in Bangkok, Thailand.

(U) The political implications were clear in that the USAF was providing the Thais a "show of force" in the Bangkok area. Tactically, PACAF argued, F-4s could provide better air defense from the bases located farther north in Thailand. Thirteenth AF requested an increase in the UE aircraft for the remaining FIS at Clark (the 509th)

*I&M--Improvement and Modernization of the RVNAF.
if the alert at Don Muang was to continue. The request was forwarded but PACAF opted to eliminate the detachment at Don Muang and in a message to USAF stated in part:

Militarily, there is little need for an air defense alert detachment at Don Muang and with elimination of this detachment, the 509th would be better able to perform remaining alert commitments with authorized UE of 25 aircraft.

With regard to impact of Project 703 on air defense, we have requested CINCPAC to eliminate the Don Muang detachment if political situation permits.

The situation remained unchanged until the end of FY 70. Headquarters USAF had refused the increase in UE aircraft for the 509th FIS and PACAF was unable to have the requirement for the air defense detachment at Don Muang deleted. Finally, in June 1970, PACAF received authorization to close the Don Muang detachment and did so effective on the 30th of that month.

b. Retention of USAF A-1s.

(U) The effect of the retention of USAF A-1s would not be felt until FY 1972, but the events that led to the decision to retain them provide a look at the variety of considerations that faced force planners.

As of January 1971, the only remaining USAF A-1 squadron in SEA was the 1st SOS at Nakhon Phanom. The A-1s were used for the Search and Rescue (SAR) mission in SEA as well as for support of certain operations in Laos. Under BANNER SUN, the 1st SOS was scheduled for
inactivation at the end of the fiscal year and the official USAF position favored this action when it appeared likely that the retention of an A-1 squadron would result in the loss of a squadron of F-4s. With the A-1s scheduled to be turned over to the VNAF, concern was expressed over the future of SAR operations. In a memo to 7AF, the Director of Aerospace Rescue, Headquarters PACAF, posed the following questions on the capabilities of the VNAF to perform the SAR mission:

Can we expect the VNAF A-1 resources to be sufficiently responsive to our needs?

Can the natural language barrier be overcome in the critical need for communications clarity?

Will command and control of these forces rest with the VNAF or 7th Air Force?

He concluded that even if all the questions could be resolved satisfactorily, he would still be "extremely apprehensive about the ability of the VNAF to perform with the complete loyalty and dedication of purpose which can only be kindled by a strong empathy with a comrade in distress."

As long as Americans were engaged in an air war in SEA, it could hardly be denied that the A-1s with American pilots at the controls offered the best support for SAR operations. It was equally undeniable that a squadron of F-4s offered much more flexibility over a larger range of missions than did a squadron of A-1s. When faced with the decision of which to keep, USAF chose the F-4s. The intertwining forces that acted on the USAF decision were:
Vietnamization. Plans called for the turnover of all A-1 assets to the VNAF in accordance with the President's announced goals.

Budget. Money was not available for both squadrons in FY 72.

Manpower Ceilings. Spaces were not available to support both squadrons during FY 72.

The decision was taken out of USAF hands when the Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtie Godley, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) requested that one USAF A-1 squadron be retained through FY 1972. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced to the CJCS on 23 Dec 1970 that:

I have decided to agree to the request of CIA and State to retain one squadron of A-1s in Thailand during FY 72. The approved end FY 71 personnel ceiling of 32,200 for Thailand and the approved sortie rates for FY 71 are unchanged by this action. Consequently, one F-4 squadron should be redeployed to CONUS by end FY 71 or other reductions should be made to compensate... 

On the day following the SecDef's announcement, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force presented a reclaima keyed to the following points:

We have pressed hard to make Vietnamization a success and although these A-1s will not be made available immediately to the South Vietnamese, they are to be used in the Vietnamization program and should not be diverted.
We should not maintain a force that is dedicated to one facet of the task at the expense of our ability to perform the overall mission.

After A-1s are withdrawn, F-4s will be made available to meet urgent needs in Laos.

(c) Reclama notwithstanding, a 25 UE A-1 squadron was slated to remain at Nakhon Phanom through FY 1972, clearly illustrating the influence that political considerations had upon the conflict. The Air Force had considered the various factors such as Vietnamization and budget/ceiling reductions in arriving at what it considered the best course of action, but that decision was negated by an agreement which superseded solely military considerations. However, the USAF objective was achieved when the JCS directed CINCPAC to provide FY 1972 spaces to USAF to preclude the loss of an F-4 squadron.

4. (U) Additional Considerations

It was usual for the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), CINCPAC, OSD, and the RVNAF Joint General Staff to request, on short notice, inputs from 7AF relating to reassessment of the war strategy. Due to short lead times, 7AF was often forced to use MACV assumptions with which Seventh did not fully agree. According to the DCS/Plans, 7AF, the Army-dominated staff at MACV also used "Close Hold" and "LIMDIS" as a convenience to limit 7AF participation in planning matters directly involving USAF missions and forces.
He felt that the best examples of the problem occurred during the planning for the incremental withdrawals. He said, "JCS-directed reductions were programmed by MACV, working with CINCPAC, and the decisions regarding component service reductions were withheld from 7AF for lengthy periods. I personally had to go to MACV J-3 on occasion to try to gain information on 7AF's part in the withdrawals." When MACV used the excuse of urgent suspenses or security classification caveats, 7AF's contributions were limited and the resulting product often advanced views in joint channels which were contrary to USAF interests.

(U) Thus, artificial barriers were constructed between USAF and other commands which resulted in problems in inter-command relations. Some notable examples of this occurred during FY 1971.

a. **(U) F-100 Redeployments.**

Faced with both budgetary pressures and the problem of providing space for the Vietnamization program, the Air Staff wished to inactivate two units earlier than programmed. The 35th TFW with four squadrons (the 352nd, 612th, 614th, and 615th) located at Phan Rang AB, SVN, was not programmed to return to the CONUS until early in FY 1972 under Increment VIII. In order to make room at Phan Rang for two Bien Hoa-based USAF units, the Air Staff sought to have two of the 35 TFW's squadrons inactivated under Increment VII. Until the two units at Bien Hoa were moved, the scheduled turnover of some facilities to the VNAF would be delayed. In a letter from General Lucius D. Clay, Jr.,
Commander of 7AF, to General Creighton W. Abrams, COMUSMACV, the Air
Force position was explained:

... The Air Staff is considering inactivation of two [F-100] squadrons in June 1971. This schedule is in consonance with SEAAsia drawdown planning. It permits timely relocation of the 8th SOS and 19th TASS [Tactical Air Support Squadron] to Phan Rang from Bien Hoa, where space is urgently needed for the Vietnamization program.

Sufficient USAF TACAIR* capability will remain to maintain an average of 7,500 sorties per month in FY 72. This is to inform you of the proposed reductions and to recommend that Increment 7 alternative redeployment packages reflect the above reductions.

The response to General Clay's 3 April 1971 letter came ten days later. The answering letter was signed by the Deputy Commander, MACV, General Fred C. Weyland and stated in part that, "in view of the President's speech of 7 April 1971 concerning future redeployments, it is considered necessary that the Increment Seven troop list remain firm. Redeployment of the F-100 squadrons should be possible soon after 1 July 1971--early in Increment Eight."

Following MACV's reply, 7AF sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) and to the Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF) detailing what had transpired. Seventh went on to say that the impact of the delay on Bien Hoa relocations and Vietnamization was significant in that it would require contractors to work around USAF

*TACAIR—Fighter attack forces, excluding Gunships.
units in some critical facilities. However, 7AF indicated it was not an insurmountable problem and proposed the following actions:

1) Conservation of F-100 sorties through the remainder of the fiscal year to reduce operations and maintenance expenses.

2) Inform MACV of intent to employ a continuous stream redeployment of the four F-100 squadrons beginning the first week in July.

(TS)(Gp-4) Both CSAF and CINCPACAF concurred with 7AF's approach to the F-100 problem. In a 21 April message, CSAF instructed 7AF to discontinue further attempts to redeploy two F-100 squadrons during Increment VII and to concentrate on insuring that all four squadrons would be redeployed early in July.

Two days later 7AF received a message from CINCPACAF citing the CSAF message and agreeing that in view of MACV's firm decision on the F-100s, it would be fruitless to pursue the matter further.

Additionally, PACAF stated that it had no objection to the conservation of F-100 sorties. The matter was closed in favor of the MACV position when, on 23 April 1971, Major General Ernest C. Hardin, Jr., Vice Commander, 7AF dispatched the following letter to the Deputy Commander of MACV:

In accordance with your decision in letter dated 13 April 1971, we will include the 4/F-100 squadrons in the proposed Increment 8 redeployment package. We intend to begin redeployment on or about 10 July 1971, to coincide with tanker availability.

Except for the letter from General Clay to General Abrams, most of the correspondence associated with the attempt for an
early return of the F-100s was "Air Force Eyes Only." Whether a more direct approach by CSAF through CINCPAC would have changed the outcome is unknown, but it seemed certain that 7AF's position in dealing with MACV on the problem would have been strengthened had more USAF rationale been released into joint channels.

b. (U) U.S. Navy Use of USAF Resources.

Two situations developed in maintaining joint service activities that caused the Air Force in one case to assume further Navy responsibilities and, in the other, to support an activity in which USAF saw little value. The first problem came to light in a CINCPAC message noting that fiscal considerations called for a reduction in the number of aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin (GOT) beginning in May 1971. In essence, the message stated that the Navy would be unable to support the Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP)* mission to the degree it had in the past. Further, the message directed that the Commander, 7AF, provide the required BARCAP for high priority GOT reconnaissance missions when the Navy task force was unable to do so. The primary problem, as seen by the USAF, was that in providing sorties in support of BARCAP activities, there would be a resultant decrease in the number of attack sorties available for interdiction and ground support missions.

*BARCAP--Fighter cover for reconnaissance missions in North Vietnam (NVN) and the Gulf of Tonkin area.
Another encounter with the Navy centered around the automated MIG and border warning system (SEEK DAWN). During a July 1970 visit to 7AF, General John D. Ryan, CSAF, questioned the operational requirement for the system as the force drawdowns continued in SEA. A 7AF study was conducted that concluded that the SEEK DAWN system was not a real requirement in the conduct of the war. The study pointed out that the automated system in 1969 carried fewer than half the tracks that the manual system had controlled at the height of the war. The study was concurred in by General Clay and forwarded to PACAF and MACV.

Headquarters PACAF agreed with the study as written while MACV requested comments from the Marines and the Navy. The Marines also concurred, but the Navy stated that the system should remain as long as "significant" air activity remained over the GUT, Laos, SVN, and NVN. After MACV and CINCPAC supported the Navy position, the JCS directed the retention of the SEEK DAWN system in SEA for as long as it was required. Air Force was thus directed to expend resources in support of an activity it would rather have seen discontinued. The DCS of 7AF Plans aptly stated the predicament in which USAF found itself:

The 7AF study showed that the automated warning capability was costly to operate and extraneous to Air Force requirements. 7AF was forced to retain the system because of the Navy position that SEEK DAWN still provided a useful service. The primary lesson here is the willingness of one service to cause another to expend funds to provide a joint-use facility that is convenient, but not a hard-core requirement. In a period of stringent budget limitations this situation occurs repeatedly in inter-service efforts.
5. (U)(SIP)(U) Vietnamization*

(U) The Vietnamization of all the fighting forces in SVN was a key U.S. objective. The improvement and modernization of the VNAF received continued emphasis during FYs 70 and 71 with the impact on USAF planning and programming occurring in the areas of base and equipment turnovers.

a. (U)(SIP)(U) Turnover of Facilities.

(U) In 1970, in keeping pace with the Vietnamization program, it became essential that the VNAF expand its operations at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and DaNang. Because of operational requirements, USAF units at those bases could not be phased down and the existing facilities were not adequate to house both USAF and VNAF operations. It had been assumed that USAF strike, attack, and airlift sorties would be decreased as the VNAF built up and accepted increased commitments. It developed that USAF strike/attack sorties were to be continued at a specified level regardless of VNAF contributions. These problems at the joint-use bases were to be compounded by the virtual ban on new construction and plans to close sole-use bases. With large numbers of VNAF personnel and aircraft scheduled to move onto each of these bases, it appeared necessary to either accelerate USAF redeployments, retain sole-use bases and accept some operational degradation, or authorize essential new construction.

*For a detailed study of Vietnamization, see the CORONA HARVEST V study on that subject.
Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and DaNang were not scheduled for turnover to the VNAF until March of 1972. Operational control of Soc Trang Air Base in IV Corps was assumed by the VNAF on 1 November 1970. Operational control of three more bases—Binh Thuy, Nha Trang, and Pleiku—was turned over to the VNAF on 1 May 1971. On the latter three bases, some previously approved construction had been completed and more was underway in support of the Vietnamization program. The complete turnover of facilities on the bases was progressing smoothly with little impact on the VNAF program as FY 1971 ended. Tan Son Nhut was regarded as the potential problem area in the turnover of facilities.

b. (U) VNAF Growth.

(C) By the end of 1969 the VNAF personnel strength had reached 99 percent of the 35,786 authorized, and by April 1970 had surpassed the authorized level. In March of 1971, the authorized level was raised to 52,171, and by June, the number of assigned personnel had reached 46,660, or nearly 90 percent of the new authorization.

The seven major bases in use by the VNAF during the period of this study (located from north to south) were: DaNang, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut, Binh Thuy, and Soc Trang. When the U.S. military began its redeployments in 1969, the number of VNAF aircraft (including helicopters) was approximately 340. By the end of June 1971, the number had reached 950. As a result of its growing strength and the reduction of U.S. forces, the ratio of VNAF to total U.S. TACAIR sorties rose. The VNAF was averaging around 15
percent of the TACAIR sorties in SEA at the start of 1970 but, by June 1971, the percentage had more than doubled.

Funding for the growth of the VNAF came largely from the USAF Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program. The total VNAF budget for FY 1970 was 296.8 million dollars, of which 278.5 was provided from the USAF MASF program. The 278.5 million was divided between training (40.7) and materiel (237.8). An additional 2.1 million dollars were provided from the USAF O&M fund.

The estimated FY 1971 VNAF budget jumped to 426.8 million dollars. The USAF MASF portion of that budget included 27.1 million for training and 377.4 million for materiel, for a total of 404.5 million dollars. Added to that sum was 4.4 million from the USAF O&M fund. Long-range estimates called for the USAF MASF program to provide 448.7 million dollars during FY 1972, 379.9 for FY 1973, and approximately 386 million for both FYs 1974-75. Other costs of the VNAF I&M program were funded through the U.S. Army MASF program and the RVN budget. The ultimate aim for the VNAF I&M program was 50 squadrons and 1,300 aircraft by FY 1974.

6. **USAF Personnel Management in SEA**

Gaining an insight into the management of manpower and personnel resources during the withdrawals from SEA requires an understanding of the following basic terms:

a. **Spaces and Faces.** "Spaces and Faces" were terms used in alluding to the difference between the amount of manpower authorized and
the actual number of deployed personnel. Manpower authorizations (Spaces) were derived from the approved deployments. Persons actually deployed to satisfy manpower authorizations were referred to as "faces."

b. (U) USAF Debit/Credit Account. The debit/credit account was a repository for force structure spaces maintained by each service component. Each service was allocated or provided an approved manpower ceiling (spaces) by country. Uncommitted spaces constituted a credit while spaces authorized in excess of the manpower ceiling resulted in a debit account status. As an example, if the authorized USAF ceiling stood at 30,000 and only 29,000 manpower spaces were allocated to satisfy requirements, the Air Force account was credited with 1,000 spaces.

c. (U) Ceiling Headroom. The ceiling headroom limited the number of faces permitted for deployment to a particular country. These limits were imposed by DOD and derived from agreements with the host country government. The ceiling headroom could correspond with the authorized manpower or could be less than the approved manpower allocated.

d. (U) Headcount. Headcount referred to the number of personnel which were considered deployed to a particular country. All personnel, even if on temporary duty (TUY), on leave status, or out of country for any reason, were included in the headcount.
e. (U) Personnel Headroom. Personnel headroom was the difference between the authorized strength and the headcount (assuming that the actual personnel strength was less than the manpower authorized). During the FYs 1970 and 1971, the USAF maintained a comfortable headroom cushion in SVN while performing its assigned mission, despite the fact that MACV tended to regard the space ceiling as also being a "floor," the minimum essential required. Thailand, as will be seen, was different in that the USAF experienced difficulty in maintaining sufficient ceiling headroom.

7. (U) TDY Control in SVN and Thailand

Shortly after the President's first announcement on troop withdrawals, and anticipating headroom difficulties during the reductions, the Chief of Staff, 7AF, outlined to his staff the procedures for TDY control. Categories were listed in descending order of priority and were sub-categorized in the following manner:

Category I: Functions, activities, or systems, which have or will have an immediate and/or critical impact on combat operations.

Category II. Functions, activities, or systems, not of a critical nature, that would have a significant impact in less than 90 days.

A. Enhance aircrew safety
B. Augment air base security
C. Upgrade weapons systems or force capability
D. Intelligence gathering
Category III: Functions, activities, or systems that have a long-range impact on mission performance or combat support.

A. Enhance aircrew safety or augment air base security
B. Upgrade weapons system or force capability
C. Intelligence gathering
D. Training
E. Data collection
F. Other

Seventh Air Force recommended that only those TUYs categorized as IIIA or higher should be approved. This was agreed with by PACAF which monitored the various 7AF staff agencies as they reviewed the validity of the requirement for each proposed TDY.

The categories were approved by PACAF and forwarded to Hq USAF and the major commands. The authorized number of TDYs to SVN and Thailand fluctuated and was limited by the amount of headroom available. The headroom problems in Thailand were such that a high category was required before permission for entry into that country in a TDY status would be granted. In SVN, where the Air Force managed to retain greater headroom, the rules were relaxed and, generally, all TDY categories were allowed in-country. The impact of each projected TDY was reviewed by PACAF and approved only if it did not exceed the authorized TDY limit in effect at that time. If the TDY was projected to exceed the limit, PACAF disapproved the request or requested that 7AF name a lower category trade-off to accommodate a higher priority.
TDY. By the very nature of the category system, all requests were well screened before approval, with the result that TUY control was quite effective.

8. (C)(Conf-)(U) SVN Personnel Headroom

After the Cambodian incursion in April 1970, senior Defense and Administration officials were acutely attuned to public sentiment and concerned with the possible impact of related SEA actions. Upon noting that the U.S. military strength in SVN actually increased by over 1,000 during the first week of May, Secretary of Defense Laird advised the JCS that "such increases, even though within the limits of the manpower authorization ceiling, can have potentially troublesome effects."

A 2-percent fluctuation between authorized ceilings and actual troop strength had been approved in the past and resulted in occasional surges such as that described above, but COMUSMACV felt that only in that manner could he have a solid personnel management system. It was felt by MACV that a reversal in personnel procedures from space management to face management would cause a continuing decline in strength without regard for the orderly redeployment of forces. This assessment was concurred with by CINCPAC who noted that a 2-percent fluctuation appeared reasonable. Following the cessation of U.S. ground operations in Cambodia, the problem apparently did not surface again.
As the redeployments continued, COMUSMACV enjoined his component commanders to maintain the service strengths as close to the authorized ceilings as possible. In SVN the Air Force, more than the other services, had maintained its strength well below its authorized number, thereby providing a degree of flexibility in dealing with the incremental reductions. While COMUSMACV had reported that the 150,000 to be withdrawn during Increments IV-VI would not jeopardize the mission in SVN, the initial MACV planning had been based on a minimum troop withdrawal in 1970 and the major portion being redeployed during Increment VI (January-May 1971). This was not to be the case, because with a reduced draft call the Army was unable to provide a sufficient number of personnel for the October-December 1970 period.

With this accelerated reduction in the troop ceiling for SVN, it appeared all the more necessary to COMUSMACV that troop strength be maintained as close to authorized as possible. In May 1971, during Increment VII, a message to the component commands clearly defined MACV's position on the matter:

Although Increment Eight redeployment does not commence until 1 July 71, nor has higher authority approved the troop list . . ., monitoring of current operations has shown that some units contained in Increment Eight troop lists are beginning to implement actions which negate their operational support to MACV mission in the current time frame.

. . . It is requested that component commands support and maintain on board personnel strengths commensurate with approved space reductions so
that at any point during redeployments, personnel strengths are at or near the authorized force level as planned by MACV.

Air Force planners faced a situation in SVN where simply generating the required number of sorties was not enough to satisfy MACV. Instead, MACV insistence on the Air Force maintaining authorized strength levels as long as possible denied USAF the necessary flexibility in meeting beddown requirements. As a case in point, USAF was not allowed to inactivate the two F-100 squadrons at Phan Rang, even though the effective date would have been only one month earlier than that originally planned.

9. (G-7)(U) Thailand Personnel Headroom

As discussed under the BANNER redeployments, the USAF made internal adjustments with the other services in order to maintain a ceiling in Thailand sufficiently high to enable it to perform the DOU-directed operations. As the FY 1970 BANNER STAR redeployment was being completed, the number of spaces required by the Air Force over its new FY 1971 ceiling was set at only 162. However, toward the end of the FY 1971 BANNER STAR redeployment, new, high priority missions in Thailand were introduced which created a requirement for some 2,300* USAF spaces in excess of the proposed FY 1972 ceilings.

In an attempt to relieve the headroom problems, 7AF developed a plan to permit the closure of Korat by permanently relocating

*The final number was adjusted to 1,311.
Korat units to bases closer to their operational areas. Influencing that decision was the fact that the runway at Korat was scheduled for repair. In closing Korat, the Thailand headroom problem could be solved and the cost of runway repair and temporary relocation of the units would be saved. Decisions were pending, however, on future sortie levels which made the closure of another Thailand base impractical at that time. By May 1971, management actions had partially relieved the projected 1 July headroom shortfall*, while the Air Staff had initiated actions to either: (1) extend the FY 71 USAF ceiling through the first half of FY 72 to provide temporary relief, or (2) transfer Army spaces to the USAF thereby providing a permanent solution.

The latter action was not favored by Hq USAF because of the possibility that the use of Army spaces in Thailand might set a precedent that would be a detriment to future USAF planning. The U.S. Army, Pacific staff had already stated that if that course of action was selected, Army FY 72 reductions in Thailand would have to be accommodated by the Air Force.

As the end of FY 1971 approached, CINCPACAF was becoming increasingly concerned over the requirement to reduce PACAF forces in Thailand to meet the 1 July manpower ceiling. It was evident to CINCPACAF that the critical decision on the FY 1972 TACAIR sortie rate might possibly be delayed until well into the new fiscal year.

*Falling short of a goal.
year, and necessary PACAF resources would have to be retained in Thailand in order to satisfy whatever requirements the decision would dictate. The turmoil and confusion was compounded by certain increases in Thailand which were directed by higher headquarters without a corresponding increase in the USAF ceiling. These increases included the previously discussed A-1 squadron that was to remain at Nakhon Phanom for a year longer than planned. The DOD BANNER SUN ceiling remained firm and in order to meet its requirements, it became necessary for the USAF to accept the undesirable second alternative and to make an internal adjustment with the Army for approximately 1,300 spaces.

As the fiscal year drew to a close, it seemed certain that USAF was faced with a ceiling shortfall in Thailand. Also, the prospects of future redeployments from SVN were viewed as a problem that would not be easily overcome. The overall situation at that time drew some remarks from the DCS Plans, 7AF, (June 1970-June 1971), that serve both as a backdrop against which to view the USAF planner's predicament, and as a summarization of this section on USAF force planning:

Until now, the Air Force portion of the incremental withdrawals of U.S. forces from the Republic has been relatively small and could be accommodated essentially by the spaces which accrue to the USAF debit/credit account without impact on major forces or support areas. As redeployments continue, the Air Force share will become increasingly higher as will be evident in the forthcoming Increments 8 and 9. This is creating a situation wherein COMUSMACV must make a choice between retaining either the
tactical force necessary to support his stated higher than programmed monthly sortie levels, or specialized units, such as psychological or electronic warfare squadrons, supported by vested interests within MACV.

An equally difficult situation exists with regard to Thailand. The Air Force is required to reduce strength in Thailand by over 7,000 to meet the OSD established end FY 71 ceiling. Concurrently, the higher than programmed tactical and ARC LIGHT* sortie levels dictate the retention of certain forces which could otherwise be reduced. Compounding this were certain increases in Thailand, directed by higher headquarters without a corresponding increase in the country ceiling. These included retention of the A-1 squadron at NKP (Nakhon Phanom) for a year longer than programmed. . . . Although the validity of such requirements is not questioned, this situation is pointed out because of the anomalies, as in RVN, between force and U.S. presence reductions on the one hand, and lack of a corresponding reduction in requirements and stated levels of activity on the other.

In summary, the "have your cake and eat it too" philosophy prevailing within MACV, coupled with the lack of firm decisions on future activity levels, continues to plague the planner and programmer and precludes accomplishing assigned tasks on other than a crash basis. The impact on other functional areas, materiel, personnel, comptroller, is obvious and contributes to the atmosphere of turbulence prevailing today.

All of this leads to one basic conclusion regarding a major flaw in U.S. military organization. Service components face tangible limitations on funding, manpower and materiel. Unified and sub-unified commanders, responsible for operations but not logistics, tend to view physical limitations merely as surmountable inconveniences.

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*ARC LIGHT--B-52 Combat Operations in Southeast Asia.
Cost effectiveness is ignored. This appears to be particularly true of MACV, which, a little more than a year ago directed the employment of over 500,000 personnel and enjoyed a tactical sortie level in excess of 20,000 per month.

C. (4p-7)(U) IMPACT OF FORCE REDUCTIONS ON USAF

The Commander, 7AF, served as COMUSMACV's Deputy for Air and coordinated air operations with the VNAF, Navy, Marines, and Strategic Air Command (SAC) forces supporting MACV. Broad, general guidance was provided by COMUSMACV, while the Deputy for Air planned, coordinated, and directed air operations. The variety of roles in which the USAF was engaged included attack sorties (tactical air, gunships, and ARC LIGHT), reconnaissance, CAP/escort, and combat support.

(S)(Gp-1) Air activity in SEA reached its peak as 1969 began, with the beginning of redeployments and budget constraints it was not long before the USAF began to feel the impact in such areas as sortie rates and personnel management. Also, as the U.S. force withdrawals continued, the protection of the remaining USAF units became a matter of increasing concern.

1. (U) Operations

The level of combat operations, in terms of sorties, was greater, by the summer of 1971, than in any other conflict in U.S. military aviation history. The volume of these operations must be considered in light of the fact that the USAF had not been relieved of *CAP—Combat Air Patrol.

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other global commitments. Another important consideration is that the 
combat loss rate for USAF aircraft was remarkably low. The U.S. 
enjoyed air supremacy in South Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in 
Laos, was most formidable.

a. *(U)* Sortie Rates.

Paralleling the buildup of other U.S. forces in 
SEA, the number of aircraft possessed by the USAF increased from about 
460 in 1964 to over 1,800 by FY 1969. With reduced authorizations due to 
redployments and budget restrictions, the number of possessed aircraft 
dropped to approximately 1,600 in FY 1970 and 1,100 by the end of FY 1971. 
As of 1 July 1971, the USAF had flown 4,683,301 combat sorties with 
over one million in FY 1969 alone. The number of USAF combat sorties 
decreased during the redeployments and in FY 1971 the total number was 
573,521—the least flown since 1966. (See appendix for complete sortie 
breakdown.)

1) *(U)* Attack Sorties. Attack sorties (excluding 
B-52 ARC LIGHT) averaged around 20,000 sorties a month in SEA during 
FYs 1968 and 1969. They began a linear descent during the next two 
years and by FY 1971 were averaging fewer than 10,000 per month. During 
the same period, the emphasis in operations shifted to Laos, where over
50 percent of all USAF attack sorties were flown in FY 1970, increasing to 60 percent in FY 1971.

2) **ARC LIGHT Sorties.** From a modest beginning of 27 sorties in 1965, the ARC LIGHT program was generating 1,800 sorties a month between February 1968 and July 1969. The SAC B-52 sortie level was reduced from 1,800 to 1,600 per month in July 1969. In March 1970 the sortie rate was further reduced when the SecDef approved a JCS request to redeploy to CONUS all B-52 assets in excess of those needed to maintain a monthly rate of 1,400. The ARC LIGHT sortie rate was again reduced in August 1970. The new rate was established at 1,000 per month and remained there until February 1971 when the JCS authorized a temporary increase to 1,200 a month in support of an increase of activity in Laos. In June, the sortie rate was again dropped to 1,000 per month. By the end of the fiscal year, the number of ARC LIGHT sorties flown during the war in SEA had reached 78,242.

3) **KC-135 Sorties.** Tanker support for both the ARC LIGHT B-52s and for tactical fighter forces was supplied by the SAC KC-135s. In September 1970, all B-52 operations were consolidated at U-Tapao in southern Thailand and the need for refueling operations in support of ARC LIGHT was greatly reduced. The requirement for tanker support of tactical aircraft continued, and by the end of FY 1971 more than 600,000 refuelings had been accomplished in SEA. As in most other operations, tanker activity reached its peak during FY 1969 when 145,525 refuelings were made. The sharp decrease in air operations...
because of redeployments and the independent operations of the U-Tapao-based B-52s reduced the in-flight refuelings during FY 1971 to fewer than 68,000.

4) **Reconnaissance Sorties.** Unlike the other air operations (with the exception of CAP and escort missions), reconnaissance sorties did not decrease in number with the initial force redeployments. Although a significant reduction in the number of reconnaissance aircraft in SEA occurred with the departure of the 16th TRS in March 1970, the number of recce sorties during FY 1970 remained almost unchanged from FY 1969--approximately 130,000. This was due largely to the Cambodian incursion and an increase in activity in Laos. However, as redeployments continued in FY 1971, reconnaissance sorties were affected and for that year dropped to nearly 61,000.

5) **CAP/Escort Sorties.** The greatest number of CAP/escort missions were flown during FY 1967 when there were 17,139 sorties. The number then decreased until FY 1969, when the lowest number since 1965 was flown--7,494. A new requirement for the escort of gunships on interdiction missions shifted the emphasis to Laos and the number of sorties began increasing again, until in FY 1971 almost 9,000 sorties were generated. As the fiscal year ended, the total number of CAP/escort missions flown during the war had reached 73,350.

6) **Combat Support Sorties.** Included in USAF combat support is the armed helicopter (used for air base defense since 1967), in-country airlift (C-7s, C-123s, and C-130s), and all other flying
not classified as combat. A total of 2,894,443 of these sorties had been accomplished by the end of FY 1971, with the great preponderance of the sorties being flown in SVN. Following a curve similar to that of most of the air operations in SEA, the combat support sorties reached a high in FY 1969 when over 650,000 missions were flown. Again, reflecting the redeployments, the number decreased during the next two years and in FY 1970, only 384,248 sorties were generated. During the period from 1966 through FY 1971, over 19 million passengers were flown within SVN by USAF airlift aircraft. The peak was reached in FY 1969 when 4.64 million passengers were carried.

b. **USAF Aircraft Losses.**

Total USAF operational and combat losses in SEA reached 2,005 by the end of FY 1971. The largest number of losses for a single year was sustained during FY 1968 when 462 aircraft were destroyed. Due primarily to the cessation of bombing in NVN, the losses declined steadily from 326 in FY 1969 to 103 in FY 1971.

The loss rate (number of aircraft lost per 1,000 sorties) for USAF tactical aircraft (gunships and B-52s excluded) was at its highest in FY 1965 when the rate was 2.35. This could be attributed for the most part to the air battle in NVN where 19 aircraft were lost in 2,632 sorties for a loss rate of 7.22. From that year forward, the loss rate decreased both in NVN and for the rest of SEA until in FY 1971 the overall loss rate was 0.41.
In the past, Air Force predictions of aircraft losses had proved quite accurate. During FYs 1969 and 1970, respectively, 96 and 89 percent of the forecast losses were actually suffered. Perhaps indicative of the uncertainty about what impact the redeployments and attendant drop in sortie rates might have on USAF losses, was the projection for FY 1971. It was projected that 78 USAF tactical aircraft would be lost during that year. The forecast was, fortunately, pessimistic as the actual number lost was 55 (70 percent).

c. Intelligence Activities.

Intelligence personnel reductions during the period January 1970-June 1971 were most strongly felt during the Lam Son 719* Campaign. At that time, increased photo reconnaissance activity and unexpected developments in the ground combat situation created such a substantial increase in requirements for intelligence analysts and image interpreters that augmentation from other PACAF units was required.

2. Personnel

a. Management.

Personnel management during the war in SEA had always been far from routine. During the buildup, the task of getting the right number of the right personnel to the correct places at the correct time was formidable. Additional personnel problems were: (1)

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* Lam Son 719--The South Vietnamese incursion into Laos which began 8 February 1971 and ended 28 March 1971.
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the one-year tour which made it difficult to maintain a high skill level in the units, (2) ever-changing requirements for personnel; and (3) the "cutting-off/down" of the pipeline while securing assignments for personnel of redeploying units during the withdrawals.


The redeployment of the 31st TFW at Tuy Hoa, SVN, was one example of the problems facing USAF managers. Redeployment of the wing and the inactivation or transfer of subordinate and supported activities resulted in disposition action taken on approximately 4,350 personnel. The DCS Personnel, 7AF, reported the following concerning the redeployment of the wing:

Disposition actions included forming of four cadres (94 per cadre) of experienced personnel for deployment to the gaining activity to enable combat-ready status with minimum delay; selection of ferry crews for the 96 F-100D/F aircraft; forming and deploying two Enroute Support Teams consisting of sufficient weapons systems qualified maintenance personnel (56 each team) to support deploying F-100 aircraft enroute; identifying weapons systems qualified volunteers for reassignment to gaining command; reassigning personnel within WESTPAC and RVN and curtailment of tours. . . . Our actions were guided by a myriad of higher headquarters communications/instructions, which were sometimes vague and contradictory to previous instructions received. Changes to instructions were received after certain actions had been completed and it was necessary to completely reverse actions already accomplished. These problems were further compounded by slippage of deployment dates and delay in finalizing airlift for cadres.

(3) According to him, the crux of the problem was the definite lack of effective communications between all levels. The
officer and airman requirements of TAC including required in-place dates had not been clearly defined to 7AF. Had the requirements been clearly stated, more timely and efficient actions would have been possible. The DCS/Personnel suggested that in "future programs of this nature the gaining commands' requirements should be identified in definitive and simple terms, and include required in-place date(s) and other related planning factors."


According to MACV, an overall morale problem within U.S. forces, especially in the Army, paradoxically stemmed from the success of Vietnamization. MACV reasoned that as the U.S. turned over more of the active fighting to the RVNAF, more free time became available to the troops which led to boredom and discontent. Two wing commanders gave additional insight into the morale problem as it applied to USAF members. The first felt that as the RVNAF took over more of the responsibility of fighting the war, "the rapid return of [our] combat elements should be seriously considered." He noted some dissatisfaction within USAF elements and attributed it primarily to inactivity. The surfacing of disciplinary problems at all levels caused him to reiterate in his end-of-tour report that, "Acceleration of the redeployment of all U.S. military operational forces is highly recommended."

The other wing commander pointed out another area that, while related to morale, was more concerned with the problem he felt arose due to the winding down of the war. He said:
... now that the war has slowed considerably, there is too much interest being taken by outside headquarters in an effort to implant peace-time programs into a quasi war environment. Forced infusion of UPT* graduates rather than experienced personnel; in-theater "morale rides" on combat missions for [non] F-4 back seaters; introduction of less proven weapons systems just to 'see how they go'; and the re-establishment of the annual physical examination are just a few examples of how our concern has shifted from fighting an all out war with the best personnel and material available to simply maintaining an effective presence while transitioning to a peace-time way of life. I believe this is the wrong approach for any headquarters. Actions which negate the combat aspects of our mission simply add to a complacency which develops as the action slows down. And this complacency is deadly! As long as there are bombs to drop in enemy areas where he can and does shoot back, the attitude should be combat oriented all the way. Headquarters programs should foster this attitude rather than give the impression that the war effort is just part of a series of programs -- some combat oriented and some not -- which have to be implemented.

(U) An additional irritant to personnel assigned in SVN was the existence of a less favorable leave system than the system in Thailand. Personnel stationed in SVN were entitled to seven days leave and one seven-day R&R. At the same time Thailand-based personnel were authorized ordinary leave in excess of seven days as well as "rest and recuperation" for aircrew members. In this instance, MACV was able to remedy the problem simply by authorizing a 14-day leave for all servicemen stationed in SVN.

*UPT--Undergraduate Pilot Training.
3. (U) Air Base Defense

With the first redeployments in 1969 came concern that at some time in the future a point would be reached where adequate security would not be available to protect the remaining units in SEA. Through FY 1971, the problem of base security had not reached a critical stage, but attention remained focused on the subject by high-ranking officers. In April 1971 General Clay, then Commander 7AF, stated in a letter to COMUSMACV that:

Bases which have USAF forces on perimeter defense appear acceptably protected against close-in enemy infiltration efforts of the type experienced over the past one or two years. My confidence regarding those with perimeters manned by the Vietnamese is not so high; however, a defense aspect of greater significance is the need to assure that adequate field forces are assigned and specifically tasked for external security operations in support of each air base.

General Clay requested that a review be made of the current and programmed ground force deployment and operational assignments to determine the adequacy and problem areas foreseen in providing for the external defense and security of 7AF air bases. The Army's reply was that the impending withdrawals of U.S. combat support forces and the increased responsibilities for those units remaining would preclude the use of those combat units in the defense of air bases. Consequently, U.S. forces of all types would have to place greater reliance
on their own capabilities to protect themselves and on the security coordination effected with ROK and Army, Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces.

According to PACAF's Director of Security Police, the military capability of the Vietnamese security forces had been closely examined and found wanting. It was regarded as questionable whether the civil/military leadership of the RVN possessed either the will or the ability to provide adequate security on joint use bases. Assuming the foregoing to be correct, PACAF recommended the following steps:

a. Non-mission essential elements should be withdrawn from Vietnamese bases as expeditiously as possible.

b. As installations are prepared for turnover or close-out, plans must provide for the retention of a viable U.S. defense capability up until the moment of turnover or closure.

c. Contingency plans and forces which would permit rapid re-entry of U.S. ground forces should be maintained in an appropriate state of readiness.

The director of security police did not consider it beyond the realm of possibility that the Air Force could find itself in the position of drawing down a base in SVN while simultaneously increasing the security police strength. He said:
This apparently contradictory situation could arise due to the fact that security police base defense operations are based upon the assumption that ground combat units will be available to provide a defensive screen beyond the perimeter of the base.

Phu Cat was offered as an example. In September 1971 it was considered the most secure base in SVN. This was due in great part to the aggressiveness of the ROK forces whose offensive operations had kept the VC/NVA off-balance and prevented them from staging in preparation for attack. Withdrawal of the ROK forces, he felt, would alter the situation, since the Vietnamese were neither willing nor able to provide an adequate screening force. This combination of circumstances could conceivably result in the situation where a base draw-down and simultaneous increase in security police strength could occur.

As the incremental withdrawals continued, it seemed unlikely that Hanoi would be able to resist the temptation to inflict a major defeat on the U.S. if it should become obvious that retaliation would not result. While a major military disaster was not envisioned, the political and psychological effect of the loss of a major American base could be most damaging to the image of the U.S.

D. (U) USAF EFFECTIVENESS DURING THE REDEPLOYMENTS

There are no precedents against which to compare the overall effectiveness of the USAF effort in SEA. That conflict was unique in that the buildup to the 1968-1969 force level was accompanied by multiple constraints on the use of airpower, tending to make any discussion of what the Air Force "might have done" strictly academic. It is easier
to judge the effectiveness of the USAF during the first two years of the U.S. force redeployments, after the U.S. had despaired of military victory and was committed to the course of withdrawal and Vietnamization. The goal became one of conducting an orderly withdrawal while providing the South Vietnamese with the time and resources to become able to cope with the VC/NVA on their own.

(U) The USAF mission was to support COMUSMACV in the prosecution of the war. The U.S. decision to redeploy its forces did not change this mission, nor did it affect the level of enemy activity against which the USAF was targeted. What it did affect was the amount of resources available to the USAF to perform its mission.

(S) In late 1969, as part of SECDEF Project 703, the USAF attack/strike sorties were limited by the JCS to 14,000 per month. The distribution of preplanned tactical air sorties was set at 45 percent for SVN and 55 percent for out-country. When the Cambodian campaign began in May, as high as 25 percent of the total preplanned USAF sorties were used in support of it, although the 14,000 per month sortie limitation remained in effect. In July 1970 the number of attack sorties was further limited to 10,000 per month and while the distribution continued to fluctuate, by the end of that year 73 percent were being flown out-country. The limitation of 10,000 attack sorties per month remained fixed through June 1971 with out-country sorties flown during some months exceeding 80 percent of the total.
(U) This shift in emphasis to increased interdiction was not a result of changing priorities. The Air Force's primary responsibility remained the support of U.S. ground forces in combat. However, during this period the focus continued to shift so that by 1971 most of the ground fighting was being done by the ARVN with almost all of the close air support provided by the VNAF, thus enabling the USAF to devote more of its diminishing resources to the interdiction campaigns in Laos and Cambodia.

(U) One measure of efficiency of USAF interdiction may be gauged by comparing the number of enemy trucks destroyed and damaged during three periods. Between November 1968 and July 1969, some 8,200 trucks were reported either destroyed or damaged. One year later (during the same months), the number of 12,809. A threefold increase was reported between November 1970 and July 1971 when 24,937 enemy trucks (destroyed and damaged) were credited to the USAF. The increased truck interdiction was due to several factors: the introduction of the AC-130 gunship; the system of remote sensors in operation; and the use of improved ordnance, tactics, and airborne sensors.

(C) Decreased flexibility was a natural consequence of the redeployments, and the correlation between flexibility and effectiveness became a subject for debate. An October 1970 memorandum from DOD stated that the projected phasedown in sorties and decreased flexibility should not result in any significant reduction in effectiveness. In reply, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans, Jr., said that, "I am
certain you can appreciate that the Air Force challenges this judgment. I believe it would be very unwise for us to withdraw U.S. forces without acknowledging it will have some adverse impact on overall SEAsia combat capability."\(^{112}\)

Despite the conditions existing in SEA during the redeployments, airpower nonetheless provided the flexibility required by COMUSMACV to attain his immediate goals--Vietnamization and the protection of the remaining Americans. Air Force programmers were beset by problems of inadequate guidance and last-minute changes while budget restrictions grew more severe. Through this trying period, the USAF maintained a force that effectively supported COMUSMACV who, in speaking of close air support, said:

\[\ldots\] While air is powerful, it is also flexible \ldots
Where the enemy puts the heat on, whether it's the Plain of Jars or Duc Lap, it's only a matter of hours until tremendous shifts of power can be made. We realize it's not all that effortless on the part of the Air Force \ldots But the whole system is geared to do precisely that, with no long warning to the enemy. It's done right away.

Basically, what we are doing is trying to run up enemy casualties with our firepower, and the biggest weight of firepower comes from TACAIR. And we want to keep our losses down, again by TACAIR. This also includes the B-52s which have been tremendous.

(U) The above interview with General Abrams took place in March 1970. Over a year later General Clay, CINCPACAF, made a speech in Honolulu in which he said that the operations in Cambodia and Laos had "bought
time, a most precious commodity that we were trying to obtain." In
summing up the effectiveness of the interdiction campaigns, General
Clay made the following points:

--Cambodia had survived despite dire predictions to the contrary.
--There was still a sense of stability in Laos and a viable
government.
--The South Vietnam military was better able to blunt Communist
moves.

(U) President Nixon's strategy was working as FY 1971 ended. The
Vietnamese were assuming an increasing share in the fighting of the war.
Of great importance to the President's program, American casualties
decreased and the enemy had met with no significant success during the
redeployments that had taken place. The future remained uncertain at
the time, but the preceding two years of force withdrawal could be
considered as successful ones for the USAF in SEA.
III. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) The Air Force, as was the case with the U.S. military in general, was faced with a unique situation while withdrawing its forces from SEA. Political and budgetary dictates, rather than military successes, were responsible for the unilateral withdrawal of American forces. The Air Force successfully coped with the fluid conditions that ensued; however, problem areas emerged in which the USAF learned new lessons. Those lessons are presented with recommendations for correcting associated deficiencies.

A. (U) LESSON LEARNED

Coordination between 7AF and the sub-unified command (MACV) was hampered by security classifications of planning information and essential rationale. Seventh Air Force planners could not, on occasion, openly communicate with their MACV counterparts due to USAF reluctance to release planning rationale into joint channels. Likewise, "Close Hold" and "LIMDIS" caveats, although ordinarily imposed at the CINCPAC or JCS level, were frequently used by the MACV staff as a means of limiting 7AF participation in matters directly involving Air Force missions and forces.

Rationale

(U) To reduce expenditures and make room for the expanding VNAF, the Air Staff attempted to accelerate the redeployment of some USAF fighter units. Most USAF correspondence on the matter had been "Air Force Eyes Only" which placed 7AF at a disadvantage when
it presented the proposal to MACV without in-depth rationale. Although assured that USAF could meet its sortie requirements without the units, MACV dismissed the proposal, insisting that the Increment Seven troop list remain firm. Similarly, MACV used restrictive security classifications as a means of limiting 7AF participation in the planning for the incremental withdrawals. (pp. 34-35)

Recommendation

To the extent possible, pertinent details of USAF/Joint planning should be exchanged at the earliest time to facilitate effective coordination between the Air Force and the sub-unified command.

B. LESSON LEARNED

During USAF withdrawals from SEA, pertinent information regarding force planning and programming was available to such a select few that the result was often a hurried, last-minute implementation of programs.

Rationale

Air Force planning was handicapped because of the stringent security requirements in effect during the withdrawals. A dichotomy existed in Air Force planning and programming in that small segments of the planning staffs were engaged in redeployment planning, while most were trying to comply with documents that called for increased forces. (pp. 24-25)
Recommendation

In the course of USAF planning for the withdrawal of forces from a combat area, every attempt should be made to spread essential information over the widest practical base in order to reduce confusion and insure an orderly implementation of programs.

C. LESSON LEARNED

Lack of firm guidance, combined with last-minute changes to previous decisions, militated against the effective programming of USAF force withdrawals from SEA.

Rationale

Timely and efficient actions on the disposition of USAF personnel and materiel were complicated due to the difficulty in securing firm decisions regarding impending force structures. Comparatively long lead times are required to insure proper disposition of personnel and materiel. The fact that these lead times were seldom available impacted heavily on personnel and logistics planning. (pp. 48-51, 57-59)

Recommendation

To achieve effective programming, decision-makers at all levels must insure that firm guidance is made available to subordinate levels at the earliest possible time.

D. LESSON LEARNED

In programming its withdrawal from Thailand, the Air Force could not plan on directed force levels being sufficient to allow accomplishment of stated operational requirements.
Rationale

Directed reductions in USAF strength levels were not always accompanied by realistic reductions in operational tasks. In Thailand, the Air Force could not have complied with the FY 1972 operational tasking had the directed force structure been augmented through manpower space adjustments with the Army. The fact that the adjustments were not directed until late in the FY, resulted in an uncertainty that impacted heavily on USAF force planning for FY 1972. Also, Headquarters USAF was concerned that the transfer of Army spaces in order to perform required operations would make the Air Force susceptible to reciprocal actions in subsequent redeployments. This, while it had not actually occurred, would serve to further complicate Air Force force planning. (pp. 21-23, 48-51)

Recommendation

To stabilize future force planning, emphasis should be placed on insuring that operational requirements under conditions of withdrawal are compatible with the forces that will be available.

E. LESSON LEARNED

When the President announced the beginning of U.S. force withdrawals from SEA, military planners found themselves unprepared because a unilateral U.S. withdrawal had not been included in previous planning guidance.
Rationale

Plans written prior to the beginning of the U.S. redeployments assumed conditions such as an agreed cease fire or a negotiated withdrawal. This stemmed from the fact that U.S. military leaders could not foresee U.S. withdrawals from SEA without significant enemy concessions and therefore did not direct planners to prepare for that contingency. The major plans that had been developed for the redeployment of U.S. forces were rendered invalid by the President's program and were discarded after the unilateral redeployments began. (pp. 9-10, 24-25)

Recommendation

Withdrawal planning must examine all methods of disengagement, including the contingency of unilateral withdrawal.

F. LESSON LEARNED

In SVN, the U.S. redeployments caused a decline in aggressive screening operations beyond the perimeters of air bases. As a result, Air Force installations became more vulnerable to attack which placed greater demands on the USAF security forces for perimeter defense.

Rationale

Security police base defense operations were predicated upon the assumption that ground combat units would be available to provide an effective defensive screen beyond the perimeter of a base. Phu Cat was considered the most secure base in SVN, due in great part
to the aggressive offensive operations conducted by the ROK forces in the area. As reductions in U.S. combat strength continued, the responsibility for providing defensive screens for other air bases was falling increasingly to the Vietnamese who had not yet proven that they were either willing or able to perform the mission. With continued redeployments, the Air Force would likely find itself drawing down bases in SVN while simultaneously increasing its security police strength. However, even with these increases, vulnerability to rocket and mortar attacks would remain a serious problem. (pp. 61-63)

Recommendation

As Air Force installations are prepared for turnover or closure, the need for an effective ground defense capability until the moment of base transfer or close-out must be considered.

G. LESSON LEARNED

As combat activities in SEA declined, inactivity and "peace time" programs resulted in morale and disciplinary problems that concerned commanders at all levels.

Rationale

Several wing commanders observed a mounting apathy in their units as the level of combat activity decreased. This attitude was attributed to a shift in emphasis from conducting an all-out effort to merely maintaining an effective presence. Programs which had not existed earlier in the war such as operational readiness inspections...
by higher headquarters were established. Additionally, flight checks and annual physical examinations became requirements. The whole effect was one of a peace-time operation wherein the sense of urgency was lost. The growing discontent within Air Force units fostered an atmosphere that generated problems in discipline and morale. (pp. 59-60)

Recommendation

In a combat theater, every effort should be made to maintain an attitude that is combat oriented at all times. Programs and activities that detract from such an attitude should be avoided to insure that personnel are continually motivated toward mission accomplishment and that their full combat potential is realized.
APPENDIX I

Source: USAF Management
Summary-Southeast Asia
Review, 30 July 71

*Includes USAF

FY 71 data are preliminary.
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| TOTAL    | 460   | 489   | 1,429 | 1,768 | 1,640 | 1,602 | 1,132 |

1 Administrative support and transient aircraft not included. Data reflect aircraft possessed.

**Source:** USAF Management Summary - Southeast Asia Review, 30 July 71
## SOUTH EAST ASIA MAJOR BASE SUMMARY

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1 Strength as of 31 May 69. 
2 Aircraft on Base as of 30 Jun 69. 

**Source:** USAF Management Summary Southeast Asia, 9 Jul 69.
UNCLASSIFIED

USAIR LCRAFT DEPLOYMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Aircraft 711

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<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>CAM RANH BAY</th>
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Personnel 50,268/37,484

Bièn Hoà

- A-37: 24
- HH-43: 2
- HH-53: 2
- O-2: 52
- OV-10: 23

Tuy Hoà

- 5420/3102
- Bàn Me Thuôt: 8
- UH-1: 96/95

Source: USAF Management Summary

Southeast Asia, 20 July 71

Aircraft 421

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Personnel 29,670/25,561

Source: USAF Management Summary

Southeast Asia, 20 July 71

APPENDIX IV
### UNCLASSIFIED

**AIR FORCE COMBAT SORTIES**

*(COMPARISON BY TYPE)*

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**APPENDIX V**

**Source:** USAF Management Summary Southeast Asia Review, 30 Jul 71

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<td><strong>ARC LIGHT</strong></td>
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**SECRET**
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 141-142.


5. Article: "No Cut Seen in Air Role," Air Force Times (U), 21 Apr 71. (U)


11. Ibid., p. 7.


Digest: "Statement by the President," Commander's Digest (U), DOD, 20 Sep 69, p. 89. (U)

18. Message: Programmed Action Directive 70-6 Phase II Reduction (U), CINCPAC to 7AF/13AF and others, 100533Z Oct 69. (S)


20. Press Release: "Address by President Nixon," Department of State Bulletin (U), 5 Jan 70, pp. 1, 2. (U)

Document: SEAsia Deployment Program 9 (U), JCS, 9 Feb 70. (S)

21. Digest: "President Outlines U.S. Policy for Southeast Asia," Commander's Digest (U), DOD, 15 Apr 70, p. 2. (U)

22. Document: SEAsia Deployment Program 10 (U), JCS, 27 Aug 70. (S)

23. Ibid.

24. Documents: USAF Program Documents 72-2, 73-1, and 73-2 (U), USAF. (S)

25. Document: SEAsia Deployment Program 11 (U), JCS, 16 Dec 70. (S)

26. Ibid.

27. Document: SEAsia Deployment Program 12 (U), JCS, 17 Mar 71. (S)

28. Ibid.

29. Document: SEAsia Deployment Program 13 (U), JCS, 17 Jun 71. (S)


Interview: Interview, Mr. A. Taylor, PACAF Programs Management Branch (U), PACAF (XPMQP), 21 Sep 71. (S) Hereafter cited as Taylor Interview.


32. Ibid.

36. Report: End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Bob Roark (U), Director of Programs, 7AF, 25 Aug 69-25 Jul 70, p. 4. (S)
40. Hearing: Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate (U), Ninety-First Congress, 10 and 11 Dec 70, p. 46. (U)
41. Ibid., p. 47.
42. Ibid.
43. Summary: Project 703 Overview (U), PACAF (XP), 1970. (S)
44. Report: Monthly Reports of Operating Expenses (U), Hq USAF, C22-6, Jul 69 and Jul 70. (U)
45. Ibid., Jul 71.
46. Letter: Redeployment Listing (U), Colonel Paul H. Wine, DCS Plans, 7AF, to D0, 7AF, 12 Mar 70. (S)
47. Message: Request for Elimination of the Air Defense Detachment at Don Muang, Thailand (S), PACAF (DPLFS) to Hq USAF, Nov 69. (S)
48. Report: 509 FIS (U), DCS/Plans, Directorate of Programs, Monthly Historical Report to PACAF History Office, Atch 1, Jun 70. (S)
49. Memo: Vietnamization of the A-1 SAR Mission in South Vietnam (U), Colonel Frederick V. Sohle, Jr., Director of Aerospace Rescue to 7AF, 13 Oct 70. (S)
50. Message: Withdrawal of A-1 Squadrons From Thailand (C), CINCPAC to JCS with Info to CINCPACAF, 291605Z-Oct 70. (TS)
51. Report: Retention of A-1s (U), DCS/Plans, Directorate of Force Plans, Monthly Historical Report to PACAF History Office, Attachment 1, Dec 70. (TS)

52. Ibid.

53. Message: A-1 Force Adjustment (U), CSAF to CINCPAC, 252000Z Jan 71. (S)


55. Interview: Interview with Colonel Alfred W. Mullan, Jr., 7AF DCS/Plans June 1970-June 1971 (U), 27 Apr 72. (S)

56. Memo for the Record: Colonel Irwin P. Graham (U), Hq PACAF (XPP), 2 May 72. (S)

57. Letter: No Title, Subject: F-100 Redeployments (U), General Clay to General Abrams, 3 Apr 71. (TS)

58. Letter: USAF, F-100 Inactivations (U), General Fred C. Weyand (MACV) to General Clay, 13 Apr 71. (TS)

59. Message: F-100 Squadrons (U), 7AF to CINCPACAF with Info to CSAF, 210010Z Apr 71. (TS)

60. Message: F-100 Squadrons (U), CSAF to CINCPACAF with Info to 7AF, 212320Z Apr 71. (TS)

61. Message: F-100 Squadrons (U), CINCPACAF to 7AF with Info to CSAF, 230220Z Apr 71. (TS)

62. Letter: F-100 Redeployment (U), Major General Ernest C. Hardin, Jr., Vice Commander 7AF, to DEPCOMUSMACV, 23 Apr 71. (TS)

63. Message: CVA Deployments (U), CINCPAC to CJCS, 171723Z Mar 71. (TS)

64. Report: End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Roy E. Clark (U), DCS Plans, 7AF, 11 Jul 70-10 Jul 71, p. 3. (S)

65. Ibid.


Letter: Force Requirements in Southeast Asia (U), CINCPAC Instruction 5230.10A, 7 Nov 69, pp. 2, 4-5. (U)


74. Report: End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Willard A. Nichols (U), DCS/Plans, 7AF, 18 Feb 69-15 Feb 70, p. 61. (S)


76. Ibid., p. TSS-8.

77. Ibid.

78. Message: Force Planning (U), COMUSMACV to 7AF/USARV/NAVFORV, 301105Z May 71. (TS)


80. Ibid., pp. 17-18.

81. Report: Thailand Headroom (U), DCS/Plans, Directorate of Force Plans, Monthly Historical Report to PACAF History Office, Atch 1, Mar 71. (S)

82. Message: Force/Activity Levels (U), CINCPACAF to CSAF with Info to 7AF, 032100Z May 71. (TS)


86. Ibid., pp. 8-10.
87. Ibid., p. 12.
88. Ibid., pp. 3-5, 13.
89. Ibid., p. 17.
90. Ibid., p. 14.
91. Ibid., p. 15.
92. Ibid., p. 16.
93. Ibid., p. 23.
94. Ibid., p. 18.
96. Message: 7AF TDY Intelligence Personnel Augmentation (U), 7AF to PACAF, 062229Z Mar 71. (S)
97. Report: End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Wayne L. Lough (U), DCS/Personnel 7AF, 18 Jan 70-17 Jan 71, p. 36. (U)
98. Ibid., p. 37.
100. Report: End-of-Tour Report, Brigadier General Walter T. Galligan (U), 35th TFW Commander, 8 Aug 69-10 Jun 70; Director TACC, 7AF, 10 Jun 70-Jan 71, pp. 15-16. (U)
104. Ibid., p. 40.
105. Letter: Base Harassment (U), Colonel John A. Taylor, PACAF Director of Security Police to PACAF (XPX), 20 Sep 71, p. 1. (U)
106. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
107. Ibid., p. 2.
108. Ibid., p. 1.
   Force Magazine (U), Sep 71, p. 42. (U)
111. Ibid.
112. Memo: Southeast Asia Forces and Activity Levels for FY 72 (U),
   Secretary of the Air Force to Deputy Secretary of Defense, 3 Dec 70,
   p. 5. (TS)
   PACAF, 1 Apr 70, pp. 108-110. (S)
   (U), 15 Sep 71, p. A-7. (U)
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2. "No Cut Seen in Air Role," Air Force Times (U), 21 Apr 71. (U) CH0261284

II. DIGESTS:

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2. "President Outlines U.S. Policy for Southeast Asia," Commander's Digest (U), DOD, 15 Apr 70. (U) CH0116171

III. DOCUMENTS:

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3. SEAsia Deployment Program 9 (U), JCS, 9 Feb 70. (S) CH0261295
4. PACAF History FY 70 Source Document (U), PACAF (DPLF), Vol. III, Bk 1, Document 91, May 70. (TS) CH0247186
5. SEAsia Deployment Program 10 (U), JCS, 27 Aug 70. (S) CH0261296
6. SEAsia Deployment Program 11 (U), JCS, 16 Dec 70. (S) CH0261297
7. SEAsia Deployment Program 12 (U), JCS, 17 Mar 71. (S) CH0261298
8. SEAsia Deployment Program 13 (U), JCS, 17 Jun 71. (S) CH0261299
9. USAF Program Documents 72-2, 73-1, and 73-2 (U), USAF. (S) CH0261300
IV. HISTORIES:
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2. CINCPAC Command History-1969 (U), CINCPAC, n.d. (TS) CH0235007
3. History of Seventh Air Force, 1 Jul-31 Dec 1969 (U), 7AF, n.d. (S) CH0237196
5. MACV Command History-1970 (U), MACV, Top Secret Supplement, 19 Apr 71. (TS) CH0253114

V. LETTERS:
1. Force Requirements in Southeast Asia (U), CINCPAC Instruction 5230.10A, 7 Nov 69. (U) CH0261301
2. Redeployment Listing (U), Colonel Paul H. Wine, DCS Plans, 7AF, to DO, 7AF, 12 Mar 70. (S) CH0249002
3. No Title, Subject: F-100 Redeployments (U), General Clay to General Abrams, 3 Apr 71. (TS) CH0261302
4. USAF, F-100 Inactivations (U), General Fred C. Weyland (MACV) to General Clay, 13 Apr 71. (TS) CH0261303
5. F-100 Redeployment (U), Major General Ernest C. Hardin, Jr., Vice Commander 7AF, to DEPCOMUSMACV, 23 Apr 71. (TS) CH0261305
6. Base Harassment (U), Colonel John A. Taylor, PACAF Director of Security Police to PACAF (Xpx), 20 Sep 71. (U) CH0261305
VI. MEMORANDUMS:

1. Vietnamization of the A-1 SAR Mission in South Vietnam (U),
   Colonel Frederick V. Sohle, Jr., Director of Aerospace Rescue
   to 7AF, 13 Oct 70. (S) CH0261306

2. Southeast Asia Forces and Activity Levels for FY 72 (U),
   Secretary of the Air Force to Deputy Secretary of Defense,
   3 Dec 70. (TS) CH0261307

VII. MESSAGES:

1. Programmed Action Directive 70-6 Phase II Reduction (U),
   CINCPAC to 7AF/13AF and others, 100533Z Oct 69. (S) CH0261308

2. Request for Elimination of the Air Defense Detachment at Don
   Muang, Thailand (S), PACAF (DPLFS) to Hq USAF, Nov 1969. (S) CH0261309

3. Withdrawal of A-1 Squadrons From Thailand (C), CINCPAC to JCS
   with Info to CINCPACAF, 291605Z Oct 70. (TS) CH0261310

4. A-1 Force Adjustment (U), CSAF to CINCPAC, 252000Z Jan 71. (S)
   CH0261311

5. 7AF TDY Intelligence Personnel Augmentation (U), 7AF to PACAF,
   06229Z Mar 71. (S) CH0300839

6. CVA Deployments (U), CINCPAC to CJCS, 171723Z Mar 71. (TS) CH0261312

7. F-100 Squadrons (U), 7AF to CINCPACAF with Info to CSAF,
   210010Z Apr 71. (TS) CH0261313

8. F-100 Squadrons (U), CSAF to CINCPACAF with Info to 7AF,
   212320Z Apr 71. (TS) CH0261314

9. F-100 Squadrons (U), CINCPACAF to 7AF with Info to CSAF,
   230220Z Apr 71. (TS) CH0261315

10. Force/Activity Levels (U), CINCPACAF to CSAF with Info to 7AF,
    032100Z May 71. (TS) CH0261316

11. Force Planning (U), COMUSMACV to 7AF/USARV/NAVFORV, 301105Z
    May 71. (TS) CH0261317

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   Department of State Bulletin (U), 30 Jun 69. (U) CH0261288

2. "Address by President Nixon," Department of State Bulletin (U),
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7. Monthly Reports of Operating Expenses (U), Hq USAF, C22-6, Jul 69 and Jul 70. (U) CH0261319

8. End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Bob Roark (U), Director of Programs, DCS/Plans, 7AF, 25 Aug 69-25 Jul 70. (S) CH0245434

9. Retention of A-1s (U), DCS/Plans, Directorate of Force Plans, Monthly Historical Report to PACAF History Office, Atch 1, Dec 70. (TS) CH0261320

10. End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Wayne L. Lough (U), DCS/Personnel 7AF, 18 Jan 70-17 Jan 71. (U) CH0250196

11. End-of-Tour Report, Brigadier General Walter T. Galligan (U), Commander, 35TFW, 8 Aug 69-10 Jun 70. (U) CH0237880; Director TACC, 7AF, 10 Jun 70-Jan 71. (U) CH0251289

12. Thailand Headroom (U), DCS/Plans, Directorate of Force Plans, Monthly Historical Report to PACAF History Office, Atch 1, Mar 71. (S) CH0261321

13. End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Gilbert D. Hereth (U), 31 TFW Commander, Tuy Hoa AB, RVN, 13 Jun 70-15 May 71. (U) CH0243127

14. End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Alfred W. Mullan, Jr. (U), DCS/Plans, 7AF, 10 Jun 70-Jun 71. (S) CH0300775
15. End-of-Tour Report, Colonel Roy E. Clark (U), DCS/Plans, 7AF, 11 Jul 70-10 Jul 71. (S) CH0253447
16. VNAF Status Review (U), AF Advisory Group, Jun 70. (S) CH0116610
17. VNAF Status Review (U), AF Advisory Group, Jul 71. (S) CH0126006
18. USAF Management Summary, Southeast Asia Review (U), USAF, Various; (S)
   Jan 70. CH0113568  Feb 71. CH0121811
   May 70. CH0115446  20 Jul 71. CH0125690
   30 Dec 70. CH0121580  30 Jul 71. CH0126050
   29 Jan 71. CH0121287  31 Aug 71. CH0126264
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    CHECO, Hq PACAF (DOAD), 14 Sep 71. (C) CH0263140

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   Hq USAF AF/SLP, Vol 1, 6 Aug 71. (S) CH0261323

XI. MISCELLANEOUS:
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2. Hearing: Committee on Foreign Relations, United States
   Senate (U), Ninety-First Congress, 10 and 11 Dec 70. (U) CH0121607
3. Interview: Interview, Mr. A. Taylor, PACAF Programs Management
   Branch (U), PACAF (XPMQP), 21 Sep 71. (S) CH0261325
4. Interview: Interview with Colonel Alfred W. Mullan, Jr. (U), 7AF
   DCS/Plans, Jun 70-Jun 71. (S) CH0300837.
5. Memo for the Record: Colonel Irwin P. Graham (U), Hq PACAF (XPP),
   2 May 72. (S) CH0300838
## Glossary

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command</td>
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<td>Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td></td>
<td>COMUSMTHAI</td>
<td>Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand</td>
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<td>CSAF</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
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<td></td>
<td>DOD</td>
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<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Fighter Interceptor Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FWMA</td>
<td>Free World Military Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>GOT</td>
<td>Gulf of Tonkin</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>I&amp;M</td>
<td>Improvement and Modernization (of RVNAF Forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance, Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MACV</td>
<td>Military Assistance Command, Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>NASF</td>
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<td>NVA</td>
<td>North Vietnamese Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>RVN</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RVNAF</td>
<td>Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RW</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface to Air Missile</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>SEA</td>
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<td>SECDEF</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEEK-DAWN</td>
<td>Automated MIG and Border Warning System</td>
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<td>SOS</td>
<td>Special Operations Squadron</td>
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<td>SVN</td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
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</table>
TACAIR  Tactical Air
TASS  Tactical Air Support Squadron
TDY  Temporary Duty
TFS  Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW  Tactical Fighter Wing
TRS  Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron
UE  Unit Equipped
UPT  Undergraduate Pilot Training
VC  Viet Cong
VNAF  Vietnamese Air Force

Air Force Internal Working Paper

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