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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

SEP 24 2014

Mr. John Greenwald, Jr.
The Black Vault



Reference: F-2014-02216

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

This acknowledges your two 11 September 2014 letters, and is a final response to your F-2014-02216 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request concerning your agreement to pay the fees associated with your request for information on CHAOS, MHCHAOS, Resistance, and Merrimack. Specifically, you agreed to pay for the copy of the CD pertaining to the projects CHAOS, MHCHAOS, Resistance, and Merrimack, and copies of the 11 documents from the listing we sent to you on 29 August 2014 pertaining to the PHOENIX PROGRAM.

For purchase of a CD at a cost of \$10 and the 11 documents, containing 116 pages which you are entitled to 100 pages free. Please send your check or money order for **U.S. \$11.60**, made payable to the **Treasurer of the United States**, citing reference number **F-2014-02216** to ensure proper credit to your account.

One CD containing officially released information regarding projects CHAOS, MHCHAOS, Resistance, and Merrimack is enclosed. Concerning copyrights, no CHAOS, MHCHAOS, Resistance, or Merrimack record created by the Central Intelligence Agency is copyrighted. However, you should assume that any record that appears to have originated from any person or entity other than the US Government is copyrighted, and you would need to seek legal advice concerning your use of such

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Michele Meeks".

Michele Meeks

Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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GROUP 1
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DISt- 14 NOVEMBER 1968

COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI: 13 NOVEMBER 1968

SUBJECT: INTERIOR MINISTER KHIEM'S CLAIM THAT PRIME MINISTER HUONG
IS CAUSE OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM'S HARD STAND ON QUESTION
OF ATTENDANCE AT PARIS TALKS

ACQ: VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 NOVEMBER 1968)

SOURCE:

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(SUMMARY: INTERIOR MINISTER KHIEM ATTRIBUTES PRESIDENT THIEU'S
HARD STAND ON THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ATTENDANCE
AT THE PARIS TALKS TO THIEU'S NATURAL INCLINATION REINFORCED BY THE
SUPPORT OF VICE PRESIDENT KY AND PRIME MINISTER HUONG. KY LATER
MODIFIED HIS POSITION AND AGREED THAT A GVN DELEGATION SHOULD GO TO
PARIS. HUONG, HOWEVER, HAS PERSISTED IN HIS VIEWS. KHIEM THINKS

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Approved for Release
Date 13 April 1990

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THIEU AND KY, AS NORTHERNERS, RECOGNIZE THEIR NEED FOR THE SUPPORT OF HUONG, A SOUTHERNER. KHIEM ALSO THINKS THE GVN'S STABILITY WOULD BE THREATENED IF THIEU UNDERTOOK TO RESOLVE THE IMPASSE WITHOUT HUONG'S SUPPORT OR TO REMOVE HUONG FROM OFFICE. KHIEM HIMSELF THINKS NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE FRUITFUL AND THINKS THE PRESENT IMPASSE IS A TEMPORARY PROBLEM THAT WILL HAVE NO LASTING EFFECTS ON GVN/US RELATIONS. HE IS CONFIDENT THE GVN IS NOW STRONG ENOUGH TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ITS ABILITY TO FIGHT THE POLITICAL WAR WHICH WILL CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. HE IS ESPECIALLY PROUD OF THE SUCCESSES ACHIEVED BY THE PHOENIX PROGRAM. KHIEM DENIES HE IS TO BE MOVED TO THE DEFENSE MINISTRY. HE DOES NOT RULE OUT CABINET CHANGES BUT EXPECTS HIMSELF TO REMAIN AS INTERIOR MINISTER. END SUMMARY.)

1. INTERIOR MINISTER GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM SAID ON 13 NOVEMBER 1968 HE HOPES THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (USG) WILL BE PATIENT AND UNDERSTAND THAT VIETNAMESE PRESTIGE IS INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN/USG) IMPASSE REGARDING GVN ATTENDANCE AT THE PARIS TALKS. HE RECALLED THAT DURING THE EARLY GVN/USG DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO THE BOMBING HALT PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU'S INCLINATION TO TAKE A STRONG STAND HAD BEEN REINFORCED

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BY VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY AND PRIME MINISTER TRAN VAN HUONG. BOTH KY AND HUONG ARE STRONG NATIONALISTS, KHIEM SAID, AND THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT VIETNAM'S IMAGE WOULD SUFFER AND THE GVN MIGHT BE VIEWED AS A U.S. PUPPET IF THE GVN ACCEPTED THE ORIGINAL U.S. PROPOSALS. KHIEM SAID HE HIMSELF REALIZES, AND HAS CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE POSITION, THAT TALKS TO SOLVE THE VIETNAMESE PROBLEM THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE FRUITFUL.

2. KHIEM SAID THAT AS COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE GVN AND USG BEGAN TO DETERIORATE, KY MODIFIED HIS POSITION AND AGREED A GVN DELEGATION SHOULD GO TO PARIS. HUONG, HOWEVER, REMAINED OPPOSED TO ANY SOFTENING IN THE GVN POSITION. ASKED TO EXPLAIN HUONG'S STAND, KHIEM NOTED THAT HUONG HAS NOT BEEN OUT OF SOUTH VIETNAM SINCE 1945 AND IS UNABLE TO VIEW THE WAR AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM. HUONG REGARDS THE WAR SOLELY AS AN INTERNAL MATTER BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AND, BEING A SOUTHERNER, HE PAYS GREAT ATTENTION TO THE INTEGRITY AND LEGITIMACY OF THE SOUTHERN POINT OF VIEW AND IS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE MATTER OF FACE.

3. KHIEM WENT ON TO OBSERVE THAT THIEU AND KY ARE NOT SOUTHERNERS AND NEED HUONG'S SUPPORT TO PERSUADE SOUTHERNERS TO ACCEPT A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. SHOULD THEY ATTEMPT TO SETTLE IT

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WITHOUT HUONG'S SUPPORT OR TO REMOVE HIM FROM OFFICE, THE GVN'S POLITICAL STABILITY WOULD, IN KHIEM'S OPINION, BE SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED. THUS, THIEU REMAINS VERY CONSCIOUS OF HUONG'S STAND AND IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SURE OF HIS OWN POLITICAL STRENGTH TO ACT WITHOUT HUONG'S UNDERSTANDING AND AGREEMENT. KHIEM SAID HE BELIEVES BOTH THIEU AND KY ARE READY TO COMPROMISE AND COMMENTED THAT GVN OFFICIALS KNEW WHEN THIEU MADE HIS COUNTERPROPOSAL ON 7 NOVEMBER THAT IT WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED BY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE OR USG. THIS IS THE ASKING PRICE, HE SAID, BUT IT IS NEGOTIABLE. KHIEM SAID HE HOPES TO SEE SOME PROGRESS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AFTER THIEU AND KY HAVE HAD ADDITIONAL TIME TO WORK ON HUONG. HE HIMSELF IS TRYING TO PERSUADE HUONG TO MODIFY HIS VIEWS.

4. KHIEM SAID HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF AMBASSADOR BUNKER INFORMED THIEU AND KY THAT THIEU'S 7 NOVEMBER "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA IS UNACCEPTABLE AND ASKED FOR A NEW PROPOSAL FROM THE GVN. HE ALSO IMPLIED IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO DETERMINE MORE FULLY HUONG'S VIEWS ON THE MATTER AND, PERHAPS BY DOING SO, IMPROVE THE SITUATION.

5. (FIELD COMMENT: KHIEM'S CLAIM THAT HUONG'S HARD-LINE STANCE HAS BEEN A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO US/GVN ACCOMMODATION CONTRADICTS EARLIER

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[WHICH REPORTED THAT HUONG HAS BEEN URGING THIEU TO RECONCILE HIS DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. QUICKLY. INFORMATION PRESENTLY AVAILABLE IS INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT A FIRM JUDGMENT OF HUONG'S ROLE IN THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS. [

] SEVERAL SOURCES [

HAVE PORTRAYED HUONG'S ROLE IN GVN DISCUSSIONS OF THE PEACE TALKS ISSUE AS A RELATIVELY MINOR AND INACTIVE ONE. FURTHER INFORMATION ON HUONG'S STANCE IS BEING SOUGHT.]

6. KHIEM SAID HE HAS BEEN ILL AND HAS NOT ATTENDED ALL THE DISCUSSIONS HELD BY GVN OFFICIALS ON THE PARIS TALKS IMPASSE. HE WENT ON TO SAY HE REGARDS THE IMPASSE AS A TEMPORARY PROBLEM AND DOES NOT BELIEVE IT WILL AFFECT BASIC GVN/USG RELATIONSHIPS.

7. KHIEM SAID THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN 1965 THE GVN COULD NOT HAVE SURVIVED BUT THAT HE BELIEVES INTERNAL CONDITIONS NOW PERMIT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS. HE POINTED WITH SOME PRIDE TO THE LATEST COMPUTER REPORTS OF PACIFICATION SUCCESSES AND NOTED THAT THE GVN NOW CONTROLS OVER

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70 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION, ITS ARMED FORCES ARE ORGANIZED AND STRONG, AND GVN EFFICIENCY IS IMPROVING DAILY. IN HIS VIEW, THE GVN IS NOW STRONG ENOUGH TO NEGOTIATE WITHOUR PREJUDICE TO ITS ABILITY TO FIGHT THE POLITICAL WAR WHICH WILL CONTINUE FOR THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. HIS CONTRIBUTION TO AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN GVN, HE SAID, IS THE IMPROVEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE IN HIS MINISTRY'S PROGRAMS AND POLICIES AIMED AT FRUSTRATING COMMUNIST SUBVERSION. KHIEM NOTED WITH PRIDE THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE PHOENIX PROJECT AND POINTED TO ITS CONTINUED SUCCESS AS THE REAL BASIS OF GVN SURVIVAL.

8. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, KHIEM SAID HE WILL NOT BECOME MINISTER OF DEFENSE BUT EXPECTS TO REMAIN AS INTERIOR MINISTER, ADDING THAT SAIGON POLITICIANS CONTINUE TO BUSY THEMSELVES WITH RUMORS OF IMPORTANT CABINET CHANGES. HE OBSERVED THAT GOVERNMENTS REGULARLY CHANGE SENIOR OFFICIALS WITHOUT DISTURBING THEIR POLITICAL ORIENTATION OR STABILITY AND HE DOES NOT RULE OUT CHANGES IN THE FUTURE. HOWEVER, HE WILL REMAIN AS INTERIOR MINISTER, HE SAID.

9. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, MR. COLBY, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL BROWN) CINCPAC

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COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI NOVEMBER 1968 - MARCH 1969

(F) SVN: PHOENIX

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SUBJECT VIET CONG REACTION TO THE ACCELERATED
PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND THE PHOENIX PROGRAM.

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON /23 APRIL 1969/ FIELD NO.

SOURCE THIS IS AN ANALYSIS OF AVAILABLE INFORMATION
ON THE SUBJECT PREPARED IN THE FIELD BY A
CAS RESEARCH UNIT. IT IS NOT FULLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE.

SUMMARY. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AS WELL AS SPECIFIC
ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN BY THE VIET CONG FROM LATE NOVEMBER 1968
TO LATE MARCH 1969 INDICATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/
PACIFICATION AND PHOENIX PROGRAMS HAVE BEEN MAJOR COMMUNIST TARGETS.
WHILE THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE HAS SET BACK THE PACIFICATION
EFFORT IN CERTAIN PROVINCES, ITS OVERALL EFFECT ON SUCH EFFORTS
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY HAS BEEN SLIGHT. THE FAILURE TO MAKE A
SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE GVN EFFORTS WOULD APPEAR TO CONSTITUTE

Approved for Release
Date 23 January 1991

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YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF VC WEAKNESS AND INABILITY TO MATCH ACTIONS WITH PLANS, EVEN AGAINST A RELATIVELY VULNERABLE TARGET. END SUMMARY.

1. THE VIET CONG REACTION TO THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND ITS COMPONENT, PHUNG HOANG DONG TIEN, /STEPPED-UP PHOENIX PROGRAM/ HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY A RELATIVELY WIDE GAP BETWEEN CALLS FOR COUNTERACTION AND ACTUAL MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE PROGRAMS. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INAUGURATION OF THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN ON 1 NOVEMBER 1968 REFERENCES TO IT APPEARED IN CAPTURED VC DOCUMENTS. /FIELD COMMENT. THE TERM **ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM** IS NOW PREFERRED TO THE INITIAL TITLE **ACCELERATED PACIFICATION CAMPAIGN.** INITIATED ON 20 OCTOBER 1968, THE PHUNG HOANG DONG TIEN WAS INCORPORATED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE INCREASED PACIFICATION EFFORT. / DURING THE NOVEMBER 1968-JANUARY 1969 PERIOD, SEVERAL COMPREHENSIVE VC DIRECTIVES WERE PROMULGATED AND INCLUDED COUNTERMEASURES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM /GVN/ PROGRAM. AN ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMED FORCES DATED 25 NOVEMBER WAS BROADCAST OVER THE VC LIBERATION RADIO THREE DAYS LATER. A CIRCULAR,

APPARENTLY ISSUED BY VC SUBREGION 3 /SR-3/ ON 26 NOVEMBER AND BY SUBREGION 5 /SR-5/ ON 10 DECEMBER, DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE

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PHOENIX STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES. A DOCUMENT PUBLISHED BY SR-5 ON 12 DECEMBER ALSO DESCRIBED IN DETAIL THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM. DOCUMENTS PICKED UP IN VC MILITARY REGION 2 /MR-2/ AND APPARENTLY PUBLISHED THROUGHOUT THIS NOVEMBER-JANUARY PERIOD MENTIONED A VC ANTI-PACIFICATION PROGRAM WHICH HAD TWO STAGES, "RANG DONG 1 AND 2." SPECIAL EMPHASIS WAS PLACED ON USING TACTICAL MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COUNTERMEASURES.

2. THE DOCUMENTS INDICATE FOUR GENERAL KINDS OF COUNTERMEASURES.

A. MILITARY ATTACKS, WITH AN EMPHASIS ON GUERRILLA WARFARE TECHNIQUES, ON ALLIED UNITS CONDUCTING SWEEP OPERATIONS, ON REGIONAL AND POPULAR FORCES /RF-PF/ INVOLVED IN PACIFICATION TASKS, AND ON THE PACIFICATION TEAMS THEMSELVES.

B. TERRORIST ACTIVITY, STRESSING ASSASSINATION OF GVN ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL AND RETURNEES, PLUS THE DESTRUCTION OF FACILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE PACIFICATION EFFORT.

C. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORTS DIRECTED AT UNCOVERING GVN INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS AND ELIMINATING THEIR MEMBERS, INSERTING VC AGENTS INTO THE NETWORKS AND INCREASING OTHER DEFENSIVE SECURITY MEASURES.

D. PROPAGANDA EFFORTS DIRECTED AT IMPROVING THE VC MORALE, RE-EDUCATING CAPTIVES RELEASED BY THE GVN,

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MOTIVATING THE MASSES TO CONDUCT POLITICAL STRUGGLE, ENCOURAGING SOUTHERN REFUGEES TO RETURN TO THEIR NATIVE VILLAGES AND ENCOURAGING THE DEFECTION OF GVN MILITARY PERSONNEL, PACIFICATION CADRES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

3. THE DEFENSE, CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION OF VC LIBERATED AREAS WERE THE STATED OBJECTIVES OF VC COUNTER-PACIFICATION EFFORTS. WHILE DOCUMENTS REFER TO DAMAGE DONE BY THE PHOENIX AND PACIFICATION PROGRAMS, GVN EFFORTS ARE DESCRIBED AS A FRENZIED **LAST GASP,** DOOMED TO FAILURE.

4. VC PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT PLANS PROVIDE FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO THE ANTI-PACIFICATION PROGRAM. GUERRILLAS IN QUE SON DISTRICT OF QUANG NAM PROVINCE REPORTEDLY WERE ORDERED IN JANUARY 1969 TO CONCENTRATE ON SNIPING AND THE USE OF MINES IN THWARTING THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THE VC IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE WERE DIRECTED IN EARLY FEBRUARY TO MAKE ASSASSINATION LISTS OF GVN VILLAGE AND HAMLET CADRES, PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNIT MEMBERS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT /RD/ PERSONNEL. REPORTS FROM TRAN ON DISTRICT, VINH LONG PROVINCE, INDICATED THAT THE VC WERE ARRANGING TO BRIBE HAMLET AND OUTPOST CHIEFS, AND LOW-LEVEL GVN SECURITY PERSONNEL AS OF DECEMBER 1968.

5. PRIOR TO LAUNCHING THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE ON 22 FEBRUARY

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1969, THE VC APPEAR TO HAVE BEGUN IMPLEMENTING SOME OF THEIR ANTI-PACIFICATION PLANS. THE PHOENIX 1968 YEAR-END REPORT NOTED A GENERAL INCREASE IN VC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. ASSASSINATIONS AND INCIDENTS DIRECTED AGAINST THE CIVILIAN POPULATION SHOWED A STEADY INCREASE BETWEEN LATE NOVEMBER 1968 AND LATE FEBRUARY 1969. THESE ACTIVITIES DEVELOPED UNEVENLY, HOWEVER, AND APPEAR NOT TO HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED ON THE SCALE PLANNED, WHICH PRESUMABLY WAS THE RESULT OF VC WEAKNESS. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, A NOTABLE INCREASE OF TERRORISM IN QUANG NAM PROVINCE, ESPECIALLY DIRECTED AGAINST LOW-LEVEL GOV OFFICIALS, DURING DECEMBER AND JANUARY. A SIMILAR INCREASE IN TERRORISM OCCURRED IN III CORPS IN EARLY FEBRUARY, PARTICULARLY AGAINST THE PHUOC THUY PACIFICATION PROGRAM. THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN ATTACKS ON RD TEAMS IN THUA THIEN, VINH LONG AND BA NUYEN PROVINCES JUST PRIOR TO THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE, AND MORE THREATS OF ASSASSINATION AGAINST PEOPLE'S SELF-DEFENSE CADRES, GOV OFFICIALS AND NF/PF MEMBERS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY DURING THE DECEMBER-FEBRUARY PERIOD. ONE INNOVATION WAS THE ACTIVATION IN JANUARY 1969 OF A COUNTER-PACIFICATION COMMITTEE IN CHAU THANH DISTRICT IN VC SR-5. THE COMMITTEE INCLUDED PERSONNEL FROM YOUTH, WOMEN'S, FINANCE-ECONOMY, SUPPLY COUNCIL, MILITARY AFFAIRS, MILITARY PROSELYTING,

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TRAINING AND PROPAGANDA AND SECURITY SECTIONS.

6. FOLLOWING THE ONSET OF THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE, LIBERATION RADIO BROADCASTS CLAIMED THAT SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE WAS INFLICTED TO THE GVN PROGRAM BY THE OFFENSIVE. COVERT REPORTING FROM BINH DINH PROVINCE REFERS TO A CENTRAL OFFICE FOR SOUTH VIETNAM INSTRUCTION WHICH STATED THAT THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSIVE WAS TO ATTACK THE PROGRAM. A NORTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMAT IN VIENTIANE ALLEGEDLY STATED IN EARLY MARCH THAT THE CHIEF MISSION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS TO HELP DESTROY THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM. BUT A REVIEW OF THE TARGETS ACTUALLY HIT DURING THE OPENING STAGES OF THE OFFENSIVE AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE GVN PACIFICATION EFFORT WAS NOT THE IMMEDIATE OR MAJOR TARGET OF THE OFFENSIVE.

7. THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE DID HARM THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM TO SOME EXTENT, ALTHOUGH THE OVERALL EFFECT WAS NOT GREAT AND THE DAMAGE WAS LOCALIZED. BY MARCH, THERE WERE MORE ATTACKS ON THE PACIFICATION PROGRAM, INCLUDING AN INCREASE IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST ITS PERSONNEL. AS OF 1 MARCH, CORDS REPORTED THAT, AS A RESULT OF THE OFFENSIVE, THE MOMENTUM OF PACIFICATION HAD SLOWED IN QUANG NAM, THUA THIEN, GIA DINH AND DINH TUONG PROVINCES AND THAT ITS MOMENTUM HAD BEEN

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HALTED IN THE RURAL AREAS OF QUANG TIN, KONIUM AND HAU NGHIA PROVINCES. FURTHER, PACIFICATION HAD BEEN SET BACK IN PHUOC THUY WHEN THE GVN SUFFERED MORE THAN A FIVE PERCENT LOSS IN POPULATION CONTROL. THE GVN DEFENSE EFFORT APPEARED TO HAVE COLLAPSED IN THE PROVINCE AND WAS ATTRIBUTED, IN PART, TO THE LOWER CALIBER OF GVN LEADERSHIP THERE. AS A RESULT, THE PHOENIX PROGRAM WAS LARGELY SUSPENDED AND THE RD EFFORT REDUCED TO A SECURITY ROLE.

8. BY MID-MARCH, KONIUM PROVINCE HAD MOVED INTO THE "PACIFICATION SET-BACK" CATEGORY AND THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE SITUATION IN QUANG NGAI PROVINCE HAD DETERIORATED. CORDS IN ITS EARLY MARCH TABULATION NOTED THAT QUANG NGAI PROVINCE HAD MORE RD TEAMS WITHDRAWN FOR SECURITY REASONS THAN ANY OTHER PROVINCE. AS THE MONTH PROGRESSED, PACIFICATION IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE WAS DAMAGED SINCE THE ACCELERATED PACIFICATION PROGRAM HAMLETS WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN HIT ESPECIALLY HARD BY THE VC.

9. THE HAMLET EVALUATION SYSTEM /HES/ STATISTICS FOR 31 MARCH INDICATED THAT THE FOLLOWING PROVINCES HAD SUFFERED OVER A ONE PERCENT DECREASE IN "RELATIVELY SECURE, GVN-CONTROLLED" POPULATION DURING THE MONTH--QUANG NGAI FROM 62.2 TO 59.3 PERCENT, PHU YEN FROM 89.4 TO 87 PERCENT, KONIUM FROM 92.4 TO 91.4 PERCENT,

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PHUOC LONG FROM 90.1 TO 88.3 PERCENT AND QUANG NAM FROM 65.6 TO 64.2 PERCENT. PHUOC LONG AND KONTIUM WHICH WERE HARDEST HIT AT THE ONSET OF THE FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE CONTINUED TO DECLINE FROM A SECURITY STANDPOINT, ALBEIT AT A LOWER RATE. IN QUANG NAM WHERE PACIFICATION ENCOUNTERED TROUBLE SINCE DECEMBER 1963 AND IN QUANG NGAI WHERE DIFFICULTIES BEGAN IN LATE FEBRUARY, THE SITUATION APPARENTLY CONTINUES TO DECLINE. ACCORDING TO THE 31 MARCH STATISTICS THE SITUATION HAS BEEN STABILIZED IN QUANG TIN, HAU NGHIA, THUA TRIEN, GIA DINH AND DINH TUONG PROVINCES INITIALLY AFFECTED BY THE POST-TET OFFENSIVE AND IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE WHERE SIMILAR DIFFICULTIES HAD BEEN REPORTED DURING MARCH. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS SET OF HES STATISTICS SHOWS AN OVERALL INCREASE FOR THE WHOLE COUNTRY IN THE PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN THE "RELATIVELY SECURE, GUN-CONTROLLED" CATEGORY ON 31 MARCH AS COMPARED TO THE SITUATION ON 28 FEBRUARY.

12. FIELD DISSEM. STATE USARV 7TH AIR FORCE USAID DIR/JUSPAO /MR. NICKEL ONLY/ USARV NAVFORV CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~COMMUNIST MEDIA COMMENT
(excepted from 3/4 FBIS report)ALLIED PACIFICATION, PHOENIX PROGRAMS

The first in a series of articles on pacification, broadcast by Hanoi, describes the people's struggle against pacification as "a comprehensive, fierce, long-term, and persistent one to gradually and completely defeat" it.

The article outlines important tasks for thwarting pacification, including the annihilation of pacification and support forces and development of political and military proselyting offensives. The article says the communists must accurately hit support forces' command headquarters and bivouacs and strike at the support forces as soon as they arrive in "liberated areas, "before they can "commit crimes. "

The article claims that the people have "foiled pacification at its roots, "destroying support forces, wiping out the Phoenix intelligence organization, and punishing the "cruel police and psywar agents. " It says the Phoenix program is used for collecting intelligence and identifying revolutionary cadres in order to assassinate or kidnap them. The Phoenix agents are termed the main forces in controlling and suppressing the people. When these agents are annihilated, the article says, the support forces are deprived of "eyes and ears. "

Moving on to the pacification teams, the article explains that they are responsible for directly building local GVN administrations and political organizations. To destroy pacification teams, the paper says, the

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people have attacked them in their training camps and command posts.

GVN TRIAL OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE LEGISLATORS

The recent arrest and trial of Tran Ngoc Chau on charges of collusion with the enemy brings predictable comment from the communists branding the GVN "fascist and dictatorial." Liberation Radio declares that the convictions of Chou and his fellow legislator "openly trample on the Saigon National Assembly." This event shows that the GVN is so weak that it must resort to terrorizing its opponents. It adds that anyone could be the next victim of terrorization by Thieu, who is being directed in this "comedy" by President Nixon.

An Hanoi broadcast cites Fulbright's statement criticizing the U. S. Embassy for siding with the GVN and his comment that Chau's arrest and trial had "political motives." Another Hanoi broadcast, citing Western sources, describes Chau's first trial as conducted "in a great hurry, lasting only one-half hour."

LAOS

The Pathet Lao news agency charges the Nixon Administration with "intensified and expanded" aggression. It describes the military operations launched last August in the Plain of Jars as "the largest and most reckless and cruel nibbling attack ever undertaken by the U. S. since it started its aggressive war in Laos 15 years ago," and it adds that the use of B-52's for the first time in this area is an "extremely serious act of escalation."

The successes of the "patriots" in the Plain of Jars area nevertheless mark "a new step in the growth of the Laotian Patriotic Armed Forces

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and people" and represent a victory in "defense of the liberated zone and the fatherland."

The same stress on "defense" recurs in other propaganda. It calls upon the armed forces and people to be vigilant against U. S. schemes to retake the area and to "particularly maintain their fighting spirit and self-defense right to defend our sacred Plain of Jars and Xieng Khouang to the end." It urges the "people of all strata and nationalities" in the "areas temporarily controlled by the United States and its lackeys" to "compel the U. S. imperialists and their henchmen to halt their war."

Concern within the U. S. is also noted in a Pathet Lao news agency report of statements by Fulbright and Symington which also notes briefly that to "counter" these statements, Laird on "defended" the U. S. policy of war expansion in Laos but "did not reply directly" to questions on the use of B-52's.

Other DRV comment continues to publicize U. S. expressions of concern over the situation in Laos. QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 28th refers to statements by Senators Fulbright, Mansfield, and Mathias criticizing intensification of the war, and a Hanoi broadcast in English that da notes Senator Symington's call for the recall of Ambassador Godley to appear before a congressional inquiry.

The 28 February TASS statement is the first to deal with Laos since 10 December 1967, when U. S. "provocations" against both Laos and Cambodia were denounced. The last TASS statement devoted exclusively to Laos was issued 5 February 1965, on the subject of U. S. bombings.

The current statement criticizes the "considerable escalation of the U. S.

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armed intervention" and cites "international commentators" for the view that the United States seeks to create "another seat of war in Southeast Asia" and to "open another front" there.

TASS blames the U.S. for the escalation of armed intervention in Laos which "only makes it more difficult to find ways for the solution of the problems of Indochina and leads to further heightening of tensions in Southeast Asia."

MIDDLE EAST

The past week's large volume of Soviet broadcast material related to the Middle East conflict, highest since the aftermath of the June 1967 war, is highlighted by an extensive Moscow campaign of public protests against "criminal" Israeli actions, the first such campaign on the Middle East since the period immediately after that war.

Total Soviet broadcast material related to the Middle East conflict rose to 15 percent last week. This is well below the 1967 postwar peak, when for two weeks in June the level was sustained at about 43 percent of total broadcast comment, and thereafter gradually diminished.

Along with assaults on Zionism and Israeli policy, Moscow at the same time reaffirms Israel's right to exist as a state. A deputy minister declared that the USSR "did not come out for a liquidation of the state of Israel. All states in the Middle East area, including Israel, should live in peace and peacefully coexist."

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In other current propaganda, Moscow has underlined Israel's existence as a Jewish state. Previous propaganda had not been specific on this point, which contradicts the Palestinian organizations' aim of a democratic, "nonracist" state encompassing Jews, Moslems, and Christians.

SINO - U. S. RELATIONS

Peking's reaction to President Nixon's foreign policy report adheres to the line followed in recent comment in portraying the U.S. as a declining power whose global ambitions exceed its strength at a time of mounting vulnerabilities. In the first, belated Chinese reaction, a lengthy NCNA commentary on February 28 derides the report as an effort to "disguise the ferocious and brutal U.S. imperialism" and as an inadequate prescription for an ailing country in "the grip of overall political, economic, and military crises." While mockingly drawing a picture of diminishing American power as reflected in the President's acknowledgments of a changing world situation, Peking has avoided subjecting the President to vituperative personal attack.

The discussion also contains Peking's most direct response in recent comment to U.S. overtures to the PRC, a subject the Chinese have studiously ignored in the stream of propaganda on the U.S. during the period since the Warsaw talks were resumed. NCNA dismisses the President's principle of negotiation and accuses him of talking hypocritically about his desire to improve relations with the PRC, but it mentions only his reaffirmation of the treaty commitment to the Nationalist Chinese while passing over his references to the Warsaw talks and to unilateral measures taken by the Administration to normalize relations.

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Peking has acknowledged the Warsaw talks this year only in its terse announcements concerning the sessions.

NCNA views the President's stand on Taiwan as exposing "the aggressive nature" of the U. S. in its "criminal scheme" to create two Chinas. While the commentary goes on to scorn the President's professed desire for peace as reflecting an intent to "forcibly occupy the world" and to suppress revolutionary movements, NCNA fails to develop the once-standard picture of the U. S. as an aggressive power menacing the Asian peoples and seeking to encircle China. The commentary devotes minimal attention to Vietnam, observing that the U. S. intends to intensify the war by means of the Vietnamization program. The absence of the encirclement theme is conspicuous in NCNA's discussion of the President's remarks on Soviet-U. S. relations.

A sense of pride is reflected in NCNA's observation that the President's report acknowledged China's "growing strength and her tremendous influence" in the world and that it expressed "apprehensions" over the PRC's development of nuclear weapons. In keeping with Peking's failure to report the President's announcement of a new phase of ABM as a defense against a Chinese nuclear capability, NCNA ignores the statements in the foreign policy report relating the ABM system to a PRC nuclear threat.

Peking's sensitivity to Japan's role in Washington's Asian strategy is evident in NCNA's charge that the United States wants to revive Japanese militarism so that it will cooperate in an alleged U. S. effort to suppress Asian revolutionary movements and carry out "counterrevolutionary criminal activities against China."

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U S S R AND EAST EUROPE

Renewed Soviet propaganda pressure on Romania is evident in a PRAVDA article which sternly lectures "those" who give priority to national obligations at the expense of international duties and underestimate the danger of Western ideological penetration of the socialist countries. An article in Sofia's NARODNA ARMIYA has a similar thrust, calling for further Warsaw Pact "integration" and bitterly accusing "functionaries" who advocate sole reliance on one's own forces of stabbing international socialism in the back.

Both articles seem responsive chiefly to Romanian efforts to publicly play down the "imperialist threat" and the need for strengthened pact alliances at a time when the Soviet Union is seeking to build up the alliances and to combat ideological attacks from European communist as well as noncommunist intellectuals.

The Soviet and Bulgarian articles appear in the wake of AGERPRES publicity for two articles in the Romanian party's theoretical organ, and of apparent Romanian lobbying at a series of Soviet-sponsored theoretical conferences in preparation for the 22 April Lenin centennial. The first article in transparently rejects the Soviet stand on the danger of nationalism and Western bridgebuilding and vigorously defends Romania's right to economic and political autonomy, particularly its developing relations with the West. The second one reflects Bucharest's efforts to use the Lenin centenary for its own propaganda purposes by advancing a flexible Romanian view of the future of Marxism-Leninism and serving notice that Romania will fight its own ideological battles.

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WEST GERMANY

Continuing hardline statements by GDR leaders and in East German newspaper editorials in the wake of Gromyko's visit to the GDR indicate that the visit had little effect on the GDR's public posture. The communique on Gromyko's visit showed some signs of Soviet-inspired moderation, not sustained in East German comment, and slight variations between the Soviet and East German versions of the communique could be read as suggestive of differences between the two sides.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Panorama STATION WTTG TV
DATE February 6, 1976 12:30 PM CITY Washington, D.C.
SUBJECT An Interview With William Colby

HAURY POVICH: We are going to take a long look at a man who has been subjected to congressional investigation for the better part of a year now. He is William Colby, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, a man who left his office recently. Some say he was fired. He did not leave under the best of circumstances. However, he is proud of his tenure there, and he's also proud of what he did before the Congress. We're going to take probably the most intimate and professional look that you've seen of William Colby today. It is a lengthy interview, and I think that is only indicative of the importance of it. So I hope you can be with us today to get another view of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Lord knows how many critics we have had on this stage of ours over the past few years of the CIA, and they have had their shots at William Colby and his agency and his agents. And now we're going to give Mr. Colby an equal amount of time -- it's not going to be equal in terms of minutes, because if you add up all the minutes of the critics here on this set, it would not equal the amount of time that he got today. But I think his words are meaningful and they kind of even up the score, according to many.

Mr. Colby will be here in a moment. He's a rather controversial man. He's a man who came out of Princeton University, was a World War II hero in intelligence, dropping behind enemy lines on two occasions. And, in fact, there are many who feel that, especially when it came to Norway, he did much to save that country from the Germans during World War II, in what he did. He went back into intelligence in 1950, after staying out for a couple of years to get a law degree, and he went back into the CIA in 1950 and remained there for the next 25 years.

William Colby is a man, I think, who is important to the American people at the moment, I think, for yourselves exactly what that agency has been doing and the charges that have been laid against it. He reacts to all the charges, as well.

* * * * *

POVICH: It is a fine and distinct pleasure that I have now to introduce our guest. It is rare that you would find that a man who directed the CIA and only a week or so out of office would come and talk about what he can talk about. And when I introduce William Colby, I must say to you that there are going to be things that I ask him that I am sure he is going to say, "I cannot comment on that." I only say that in preface because I am sure William Colby, who will be lecturing and who will be writing now, is a man who is going to stand fast by your pledge to the CIA when you entered that agency. And I think in your last news conference you said you would hold yourself to it, that you would not reveal anything that you felt was of national security matters.

WILLIAM COLBY: Right.

POVICH: Do you think the time will change, when a CIA Director and top-level CIA Deputy Directors will be freer to talk about their work?

COLBY: Well, I think they are freer today. I think the public testimony that we've had this past year and public speeches that I've given all around the country and my deputy has given in various parts of the country is an example of our effort to bring as much of intelligence into the open as we can. And I think that is the remarkable change that's occurred over this past very few years.

POVICH: Has there been too much? Some people, some of the critics, for instance, of the current investigations would say, "We have told too much. William Colby has told too much. We have lost the edge."

COLBY: Well, I think the answer to that is that the critics say that formerly we told too little, which may be partly right. And today I think that at the moment we are saying too much. I'm waiting for the pendulum to get back into the center.

POVICH: When you were subjected to the investigations by the Senate and the House, one of your first statements was, in a 30-page document that you presented before the Senate committee, "There were a few missteps by the agency." Would you hold yourself to that description, or would you like to change it now?

COLBY: No. I think that was dead right and I think that has been demonstrated by two of the -- or, three of the reports that have been published since that time: the Rockefeller Commission Report, the Senate Committee Report on Assassinations, and the Senate Committee Report on Chile.

I said that there were a few missteps in our 28-year history, and misdeeds -- I think I used also the phrase. The Rockefeller Commission Report says that the vast majority of our activity was perfectly proper and within our charter, that certain things we did were unproper, some done at the specific direction of the President, some done because there was a gray area as to what should be done and what should not be done, and some done because of an excess of activity; and I think, honestly, at a period when there was some confusion as to whether we were doing the right thing for the government at all -- at the time.

The opening of the mail, for instance, began in 1953, opening mail to and from the Soviet Union, which was running spies in America. It was improper; we should not have done it, but I think the context of it [unintelligible].

As for the massive domestic intelligence activity, I think if you'll look through the reports, you'll find that we essentially had three agents who did things that they shouldn't have. Well, that's hardly a massive activity.

The Assassination Report: After six months of intensive investigation, the Senate committee discovered that we didn't assassinate anybody. There were two attempts made against two individuals -- there were two individuals that we tried to kill; neither of whom...

POVICH: Two heads of state.

COLBY: Not heads of state in both cases, but neither of whom died as a result. Now, that's hardly a grand program of assassination, such as we were alleged to be doing.

And with respect to Chile, I think it shows that our efforts there, with one exception, were aimed at supporting the democratic parties and forces in Chile.

POVICH: When you take a look at that record, coupled with the statement by the Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Frank Church, yesterday -- and by the way, I have talked to Senator Church on many occasions, and he has given you nothing but the utmost admiration for the way you and he have worked together...

COLBY: He's been very kind.

POVICH: ...in the last several months. He says [that] if those missteps and misdeeds, if they were indeed that, there is enough there for criminal action, and he has called for a special prosecutor, maybe enlarging the Watergate special prosecutor's authority, to look into this.

That, to me, is criminal activity, the prospect of criminal activity, the possibility of it, and he wants it investigated. To me, that's more than misstep and misdeed.

COLBY: Well, I...

POVICH: Does he take a different view than you?

COLBY: No, I don't think so. He may think that there are things there that should be prosecuted. With my knowledge of the background, I have said on many occasions, and I still believe, that no jury would convict one of the individuals who was involved in one of these problems. I don't think a jury would convict the man who started opening the Soviet mail in 1953. It may be technically wrong, but I doubt that a jury would convict that individual. I think, similarly, in the other situations there are enough surrounding circumstances that no jury would, in the sense of an American jury reflecting American standards and the atmosphere and attitudes of our people, would not insist on some scapegoat of a CIA employee for some activity years ago which was quite within the consensus of American politics at the time.

POVICH: May I ask you: Do you think that a jury could convict a CIA Director for knowing about criminal activities done by agents and others, such as break-ins, as we hear about in Fairfax County in 1971, in which, allegedly, a CIA Director at the time knew about, and quite possibly he might be subject for prosecution?

COLBY: Again, I think the answer is basically no. I don't think a jury would convict a man who decided that he had to go to find out whether a former CIA employee, who was living with a Cuban at the time and asking some rather strange, probing questions, may have secured some classified documents from CIA. I think he was, indeed, following the specific dictates of the law, which call upon the Director to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Now, I think that probably, as we look at it now, we shouldn't have done it. But remember, that kind of a thing -- he didn't do it all by himself. We went to the police in the neighborhood and discussed with them how to do it.

POVICH: It always -- I would think that the most difficult problem to deal with is the clash between one's individual liberties in this country today and what we call the national

good or the national interest. That club has existed throughout all of these investigations. Where will it end up? Which is the higher good?

COLBY: Well, I think the two can be put together very easily. I think that that is really what we have been doing in this past year. We have been bringing intelligence under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In most countries of the world, this doesn't exist. But I think we're looking at a new meaning of the initials CIA: Constitutional Intelligence for Americans.

I think that, yes, our intelligence system will abide by the laws. There are very few...

POVICH: Do you want them defined better, too, for the CIA? Would the CIA like to see those laws defined better for their...

COLBY: Certainly. I think the past tradition of intelligence was that it operated somewhere outside the law.

POVICH: Yes, I think most people had that...

COLBY: And that's no good in America, and we have finally resolved that in America.

POVICH: Can it, though?

COLBY: Certainly it can, within the United States.

POVICH: It can operate...

COLBY: Within the United States' laws. The United States has lots of secrets, lots of secret activities. We have a secret ballot box, we have the secret grand juries, we have secret relations between attorneys and clients; there are lots of secrets, and our democracy depends upon the respect for those secrets.

Intelligence has some secrets, and the safety of our democracy depends upon good intelligence. So I think we can resolve that without any trouble, and we can abide by the law, within the United States.

Obviously, in certain other countries of the world, espionage is illegal. But within the United States, I think we can follow the Constitution and laws of the United States. And it's a new era for intelligence.

POVICH: To conclude Frank Church's proposals for a special prosecutor, you then would reject that as an answer to this.

COLBY: Well, I think the ordinary Department of Justice procedures are adequate to look into whether any prosecutions should be launched. And, as you know, the Department of Justice is looking into these various things, and they will come out with some conclusion that will either stand up as a valid conclusion or will be criticized at the time.

I don't see any need for a special prosecutor, because I really resist the idea of making CIA employees scapegoats for a revision of our national values of the last 20 years.

POVICH: And you think there are attempts by some to do that?

COLBY: There are some that I think would do so.

POVICH: When -- there are many, many reports now of so-called leaks out of the House committee. Now, you've testified before the Senate committee and you've testified before the House committee. At any time before the House committee, were you somewhat reluctant to tell all that you knew, because of the atmosphere and the character of that committee?

COLBY: Well, certainly. There were a number of times I quite frankly said that there were certain things that were highly sensitive, highly secret, that I really didn't want to give the details, that I would give a general description. And that met with the acceptance by the committee at the time. I think, however, we did provide a vast number of details to the House committee, and a considerable number of these have actually come to public attention.

POVICH: So what you're saying is you frankly told Frank Church more than you told Otis Pike and his committee.

COLBY: Oh, no. No, I approached them both about the same.

POVICH: You did?

COLBY: Yes. Yes. The relationship with the two was one in which we were endeavoring to show the total picture of intelligence and endeavoring to respond to their inquiries, and at the same time protect the identities of people who worked with us, either foreigners or Americans, protect some of the foreign intelligence services that collaborate with us, protect some of the technical systems and means that we have to determine intelligence; and we obviously tried to limit the exposure of some of those sensitive details, at the same time giving an overall picture of intelligence and what it's all about and how it works.

POVICH: When the House committee was close to publishing

its report, a report which would have been rather embarrassing secrets that this country had and the activities of the CIA, what would you have thought of it -- and just by means of addendum, there were published reports of the report in various publications -- but if the House committee had published the report, what would your reaction have been?

COLBY: Well, I think that there are several points here. First, I think that the -- we did not object to criticism. We have never objected to criticism. Some of our own employees have requested permission to publish criticism of the agency, and that's no problem; we let that go.

Secondly, we do object to the publication of secrets, and secrets and the official admission of certain activities which, in international relations, cannot be officially admitted by a government, that it conducts in some other area, or you create enormous diplomatic problems around the world. So we object to that kind of a disclosure.

But lastly, of course, we felt that the report was biased and tendentious. That we could answer by our own statements against those points, but that would be something we would answer. I thought the report was highly unfair and gave a very biased picture of American intelligence as a whole, at least the draft I saw. And I think that is a disservice...

POVICH: It criticized not necessarily your activities, but the way you carried them out. I mean it was highly critical, was it not, of many of the intelligence activities that were quite proper? I mean it went back -- that report went back and criticized you for the '73 Israeli war, the Cyprus problem, many of the crucial trouble spots of the world and our intelligence response to it.

Is that what you're talking [about] when you said it was unfair?

COLBY: Well, almost everything included in that report, and in the investigations of this year, for that matter, have not been found by some brilliant investigation. They have been the repetition of some internal reports, internal self-criticism that intelligence made of itself.

POVICH: Are you saying that the investigations in the Congress have turned up nothing that the CIA did not give to the committees?

COLBY: Practically nothing. I think if you will read the report I gave to the President a little over a year ago, compare that with the Rockefeller Report, compare it with any other evidence that's come to light in any of the other committees, you don't find anything very different; you find a few additional cases

of one report of activity or another, but you don't find any new activity

The criticism of the Arab-Israeli war, the criticism of the Vietnam reporting, things of that nature, they all came out of our own reporting and our own criticisms.

POVICH: Would you have been that candid and honest with the President if the Congress had not been a prod in this matter?

COLBY: With the President? Certainly. He has access to everything.

POVICH: Could you have said -- could you have been honest and candid about the performance of the CIA during the Arab-Israeli war and Cyprus and Vietnam and other places?

COLBY: We had been. We had written the examinations and the critiques and we had distributed those critiques to the National Security Council Intelligence Committee. We had already provided those to the proper channels for criticism.

POVICH: We're going to pause and come back and continue our discussion with William Colby.

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POVICH: We're talking with William Colby, who has resigned as CIA Director after 25 years of intelligence work at the CIA, and before that, the World War II OS -- the quite famous OSS intelligence group.

There are many issues I want to cover, but I want to see if I can get through some of them.

A fellow named Tim Butz has sat in your seat and talked about publishing lists of CIA agents. He feels he is doing no harm, but a service to the American people by publishing the names and addresses of station chiefs and other CIA employees. There are many, some from the CIA in the past, who have said that that was responsible for the death of one Richard Welch and, who knows, of the harassment and problems for other agents.

What's your view of that and what's your view of Tim Butz and the other people of this magazine called Counter-Spy and other publications around the world that are publishing names?

COLBY: Well, I don't think you can say that any one particular publication was the source of, for instance, Mr. Welch's death. But certainly the campaign of exposing CIA people has been one which has been carried on by foreigners, [unintelligible] understanding. There have been books published abroad by -- which we

believe were supported by hostile intelligence services. We have had articles about our people in the foreign press. This is part of the risk of the game. When intelligence officers serve overseas, they do things which are dangerous, which call them -- cause them to attract attention, perhaps; and they have to keep as low a profile as possible and not identify themselves as intelligence personnel, or they'll be followed and they'll be watched for every step they take and everybody they see, and they won't be able to do their job very well.

So, that is part of it, with respect to foreigners.

I can't conceive why an American would do that. An American -- I can understand an American objecting to CIA -- fine. Go up to Congress, appeal, complain about it, and all the rest. That's no problem. But to have an American exposing a fellow American to death or danger, I really don't understand this. And to say that, "Well, it can be found out anyway by careful looking at the records and so forth," that's not a justification. I sure I could find out something about a fellow American, but I would think it quite reprehensible for me to expose him to potential death by republishing what could be found out somewhere else and thereby assisting some terrorist to locate, to identify, and to stimulate the terrorists to take action against him.

POVICH: What have you done -- you, meaning the agency -- in recent months, when various lists were published in various publications, both foreign and domestic? I mean what have the orders been from your agency?

COLBY: Well, in some circumstances we have changed people, we have moved people out of parts of the world where they were exposed. In other situations we have arranged for special protection for some of our people when they've had to stay in order to do their job in a certain area.

POVICH: Have you taken the matter to the embassies, as I think you said...

COLBY: In certain situations, yes, we have. We've taken them out of certain places because they were exposed in that area. We also have, in some cases, asked them to stand down on their contacts and their relationships, so that we're not collecting the intelligence that we were previously collecting. There are various ways in which we try to protect our people and our operations and the people they deal with, following one of these exposures. And I just don't understand why an American would want to do this to his own government, to his own fellow Americans. I can understand a foreigner doing it, who is hostile to our country and to our government. But if an American wants to change CIA and the intelligence business, there are lots of vehicles for him to do so without endangering a fellow American.

POVICH: When you -- there was another gentleman who sat here not too long ago named Sam Jaffe, a former AEC/CBS's correspondent. With him was a huge file that he procured from the Freedom of Information Act about his relationship between the FBI and the CIA. And he said that he was an unattached informant to the CIA and FBI of his activities and contacts with people in foreign countries. He said there was a list of between 40 and 200 names of journalists who had similar contacts, which he said, both paid and unpaid. The names he named were the biggest in my business.

What relationship has there been between the CIA and journalists? Because you yourself admitted that you were a source, way back in 1973, of a story about contacts between journalists and the CIA. What is the truth?

COLBY: Well, the fact of CIA's relationship with journalism is very easy to explain. Journalists live in foreign countries; CIA officers live in foreign countries. There's a certain amount of informal contact between them. A patriotic journalist may say something to an ambassador, he may say something to a CIA man. No operational relationship, no money passes; just the relationship of two Americans in a foreign country. That's one situation.

The other situation is that CIA may have some people abroad pretending to be something else and actually doing some intelligence work for us.

POVICH: Posing as journalists.

COLBY: Now, in the past, as I think I've testified, there were some who were fulltime staff members of general circulation media. In 1973 I said that those would be phased out, and they have been phased out since that time. So there are no full-time staff members of general circulation media. There are still stringers, free-lancers, people of this nature who deal with a people as independent contractors. And when an editor receives the copy from such a stringer, he knows he's getting something submitted from the outside, and he can judge the copy on its own value, as to what it amounts to. He knows that the man may be working for someone else, some other news outfit, somebody else, anyone else. And so, consequently, I feel that that's an area that we can continue to use.

We do, however, take particular pains to insure that no copy which is submitted to an American journal is directed by CIA. The individual writes his own copy with his own views and submits them as himself. We have very strong rules against any attempt to determine what should appear in the American press.

POVICH: You of course could understand that any jour-

nalist who is worth anything would see a situation like that in tones of something that is absolutely reprehensible, abhorrent to our ethics, that anyone who is a journalist, who is observing a situation, who is doing his job, to be a contact, then, with a government agency defeats all the purpose of being a journalist.

COLBY: No, I don't think so at all. I don't think so at all. I think that -- certainly, that's certainly not true of most of the countries of the world, and the journalists in most other countries...

POVICH: But we're not -- you know as well as I do, Mr. Colby, in most countries in the world you wouldn't be sitting here, you wouldn't have been testifying for the last year-and-a-half. I mean if we are the best of the democracies in the world...

COLBY: Yes, but we're talking about journalism; we're talking about the business of journalism and whether journalism...

POVICH: Which is the pillar and fiber of this country, wouldn't you not say? A free journalism in this country...

COLBY: There are lots of pillars and fibers...

POVICH: Well, it's got to be...

COLBY: ...and I'd just put journalism as one of them, but I wouldn't put it as the only one or even the main one.

POVICH: It could be top priority among some.

COLBY: Well, I think the secret ballot is about as important as any other.

But the fact is that the journalist can indeed submit copy to a journal and can submit copy to another journals. He doesn't have any problem in submitting copy to two or three different journals. And if he submits copy to CIA and submits copy to another journal, provided he's not a staff member -- I agree on that. I do not believe that an editor should be receiving material from a man that he thinks is working for him and to have that man have another relationship, and that's why we terminated those.

But as for the independent American living abroad, I don't see why there's anything reprehensible about him submitting an article to a journal and submitting that information to CIA. There's nothing inconsistent with that at all, that he's selling his copy to two different places.

POVICH: I would say that it would be highly inconsistent,

and most people in my profession, I think, would agree with me, although I can understand the case.

COLBY: You're limiting it to the American journalist profession, because in every other country of the world, including some of the great democracies, I know very well that they don't even use the limit that I use. They have fulltime staff members of some of their most prestigious journals acting for their intelligence services.

POVICH: I would say to you that if that was the truth, if that was the case, and I'm sure it is, that they have no respect from the journalists in this country.

COLBY: I beg your pardon. A lot of them -- and I happen to know a few of them -- are respected by the journalists in this country for the quality of their reporting and the quality of their information.

POVICH: Even though they are in fact informants to their own countries' intelligence agencies?

COLBY: Yes. And the quality of their product is such that they do get a great deal of respect.

POVICH: On this supposed list, which I don't even know if you've ever heard of it...

COLBY: I've never heard of the list.

POVICH: You've never heard of the list.

COLBY: I can't identify that at...

POVICH: Do you know of any national stature journalists, journalists of national stature...

COLBY: No.

POVICH: ...who have helped you?

COLBY: No, no. Other than the first category I mentioned, which is the journalist who talks in the embassy with the members of the official family.

POVICH: In the course of his job.

COLBY: In the course of his job, not in any way responding to the government's position...

POVICH: But you don't know of any names that might be household names in this country of people.

COLBY: No, I do not.

POVICH: Let me move on to some other areas. There are -- and we mentioned before the question of leaks coming out of congressional committees. You have admitted that you were in fact the source of one story about the CIA involving journalists in '73.

COLBY: Well, I think what I was doing on that -- I don't think that was a leak.

POVICH: You leaked a story.

COLBY: No. A pitcher pours water out the top. You can refill the pitcher. You're conscious of what you're letting go and you're letting go what can be let go. A leak is something that pulls the content out of the pitcher and it can't be refilled. That's a different subject. Pouring information out the top we do all the time. We do have a number of journalists who come to CIA regularly to get briefings on the world and what it looks like and what the situation in various parts of the world are, and I feel that that is important, and we do use information and provide that to them. We don't put the CIA stamp on it, but on the other hand, we provide the information because we think that it's important in our society that our people and our journalists be as well informed as possible, while we protect the sources from which we get the information.

That particular situation came as a result of a question as to whether we ever had any relationships with journalists, in a discussion with the editorial board of a couple of journals. And I felt it important to clarify to them exactly the extent of what our relationships were, in order to retain a relationship of good faith with the journals. I didn't leak anything. I didn't expose anything. I didn't expose any names in the process. I merely told a little bit about the intelligence business and the limits of what it does and should do and should not do, as I think I've been trying to do in my public speeches and in my public testimony, of similarly explaining the true nature of modern American intelligence, that it's not like the old intelligence, that it's technological, that it's analytical, and so forth.

POVICH: And these leaks...

COLBY: That's not a leak.

POVICH: These leaks that have come out of the committee, some are saying, are a smokescreen, the criticism of the committee because of the leaks are a smokescreen -- this is a smokescreen for, indeed the most important matter at hand, and that is the question of covert activities by the intelligence community.

COLBY: Well, I don't think it's a smokescreen. I think...

POVICH: It's not an attempt to besmirch the reputation of the congressional committees.

COLBY: No, I flatly deny that. No. Of all the people that would be leaking, I don't think you can say that we in CIA want to. We're trying to protect these secrets. That's the whole function that we're engaged in, is trying to protect them. And, no, I can guaranty you that the leaks didn't come out of any plan like that, to denounce the committees for exposure.

POVICH: We're going to pause and come back and continue with William Colby in a moment.

* * *

POVICH: For those of you who do not know the background of William Colby, he is a graduate of Princeton University. In the OSS in World War II -- and his fellow intelligence agents at the time have told me that no one had more courage than William Colby, and Bill Colby, and what he did behind the lines, parachuting in France and in Norway during World War II is unequalled in the annals of the OSS. He would modestly deny all that, of course. I'm sure you would feel that...

[Confusion of voices]

POVICH: There were many other people in the OSS who were as brave as you were. However, I wonder what happens to people who live that kind of life, romantic in a kind of grotesque way -- parachuting at night behind the lines -- how do you ever relive things like that, or do you try not to? What happens to great soldiers of -- old soldiers of fortune, etcetera, etcetera?

COLBY: Well, I think that depends on the individual. Some people have a great experience and spend the rest of their life reliving it. I have always tried to look ahead and look at the excitement of the future, rather than the excitement of the past. And I think that there is plenty of excitement on into the future ahead of all of us in these coming years, and I think that can take all your attention, and you really don't have to look to the past.

POVICH: There are some critics of CIA who would say that the only change at that agency that has occurred since the investigations have begun is the replacement of William Colby, that William Colby was the victim, William Colby was the fall guy, and that Secretary of State Kissinger and Vice President Rockefeller told the President long ago to get rid of him because he came clean, he told too much.

How do you respond to those characteristics of you?

COLBY: Well, I don't think that there's any personal feeling about this. I think that the series of investigations went on and that it would be -- as I've said for many months, that it would be quite appropriate to put a new face on the head of CIA at an appropriate time during the, -- after the investigations had essentially run their course, in order to show that a new era was starting and that the investigation period was over and that we could go on and approach and face the problems of intelligence in the future.

POVICH: Did the President know exactly what you were going to do before those committees?

COLBY: Oh, I think in general, it was clear...

POVICH: In other words, is there room for the criticism that you told too much to those committees and that you embarrassed the Administration because of it?

COLBY: I don't know whether there's room for it, but I don't think that it embarrasses this Administration, because President Ford has always been very straight about intelligence remaining within its proper boundaries. He has supported intelligence on many occasions, the importance of it, in public speeches. And I don't think that it embarrasses the Administration in any degree.

Obviously, there are some things that I told that I would have wished myself would have remained untold. But the fact is that they had to be told at the time in order to respond to the quite natural requirement of the Congress and the people for knowledge of what intelligence did over the years.

POVICH: And you don't feel badly about the role you have played in the last year-and-a-half or so.

COLBY: No, I don't feel badly. I know -- I certainly had to learn how to handle television and things like that in what might be called on-the-job training, and I'm sure I put my foot in my mouth a few times in that process. In the grand lines of it, I would do it pretty much the same way I did it before, because I think it was important to get the past out of the way and move to the future.

I'm afraid I did not quite appreciate the degree of sensationalism that would be applied to some of the few and far incidents that I mentioned. I think that this comes from a difference in approach. One newsman said that he thought that these kinds of events were the tip of an iceberg and that, consequently, there was a much bigger iceberg...

POVICH: Yes, I've heard that.

COLBY: ... underneath. But the fact is that the reports indicate that there's no iceberg at all, that the comparison is really more of the blind man and the elephant, and each blind man sees another piece of the elephant and generalizes it into the whole. But nobody -- the trouble is that nobody had a good perception of the whole picture of intelligence. And so the individual incidents were blown out of proportion and gave, in my opinion, a totally false overall picture of intelligence; and there was certainly no iceberg there.

POVICH: Over the years, I have had people on this show talking about Vietnam. And if we can go back to the Vietnam of the '60s -- so many times, critics of Vietnam would say there is a murderer in Vietnam and his name is William Colby, because he was at the top of a program called the Phoenix Program, in which no more torturous, no more nefarious, no more wicked program could there have been than the Phoenix Program, that villagers were murdered and tortured under the guise of infiltration of the Viet Cong cadres.

What's your response to that, because I've been hearing that line for many, many years?

COLEY: And I've been testifying publicly to the contrary for many, many years; starting in 1970, I testified for one whole week in public session to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on this subject, and I think I made it clear then and I have continued to make it clear that Phoenix was only one part of an overall pacification program which was designed to meet a nasty, mean guerrilla war at the village level, that the Communists were running a terror campaign, a campaign of repression of the villagers to force them to support the Communists, that the answer to that was not a matter of chasing the Communists away; the answer to that, basically, was a matter of encouraging and supporting the villagers. That was done through, mainly, providing the villagers with arms. And that government that the people say was so oppressive is the government that gave 500,000 weapons to its own people to use on a part-time basis, not to soldiers, not to people who were recruited and paid or anything, but to unpaid volunteers to defend their villages; 500,000 weapons they gave to those people, and they did defend their villages. They supported local elections of local village chiefs and so forth.

And as a part of this whole program, there was an effort to identify who the Communist apparatus was within the villages. This initially was a very badly managed program, and Phoenix was an attempt to put rules and structure onto such a program, to insist that there be true evidence of somebody's denunciation as a Communist, to set limits to the time they could be held without proceedings, to set limits on the way they would be interrogated, to reject the ability of the local people to chase followers instead of focusing on leaders.

POVICH: So you, in effect...

COLBY: And that was a program that essentially tried to improve the way the government, if not the Communists, conducted that war in the villages.

POVICH: And you were proud of that...

COLBY: And I think it did achieve that, in great part. I have admitted and said on a number of occasions that, yes, there were abuses; there are abuses that take place in wars. There weren't very many, and we had rules against them. We had very strict rules for the Americans there that they would not in any way engage in any of that activity and that they would report to me any activity of that sort that they found. And I received those reports and I went to the Vietnamese Government and I secured changes as a result.

So, I think that the program has been grossly misunderstood, grossly misstated, not by people who were in it, but by people who were outside of it.

POVICH: I thank you very much for coming here today, William Colby. You're going to be writing and you're going to be speaking. And now that you are free of your job, I am sure you are going to be sitting and defending yourself for a long time. You've done it eloquently, by the way, today. I thank you very much.

COLBY: Thank you very much.

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The Pacification Effort in Vietnam

Submitted by

Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

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16 January 1969

Authenticated:

James H. Doy
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

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No 114

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THE PACIFICATION EFFORT IN VIETNAM

CONCLUSIONS

A. The pacification program as a whole has made a significant contribution to the prosecution of the war and strengthened the political position of the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) vis-a-vis the Communists. Thus far the GVN's principal success has been in expanding its presence into the countryside. Providing permanent security for these gains has been more difficult. Security conditions continue to fluctuate with the intensity of combat. Low level terrorism, political agitation, and propaganda efforts by the Viet Cong (VC) continue to hamper progress, particularly since no more than a promising start has been made in reducing the effectiveness of the VC infrastructure. A large part of the countryside is still contested and subject to the continuing control of neither side.

B. As for gaining the allegiance of the people, this is almost impossible to measure. The turnout in the 1967 elections and the failure of the Communists to gain popular support at Tet suggest progress. Apprehension over the settlement of the war and the firmness of the American commitment tends to reduce popular confidence. The most common attitude among the peasants, however, continues to be one of war-weariness and apathy.

C. Saigon now seems finally to have accepted the need for a vigorous pacification effort. However, progress may still be hampered by the political situation in Saigon, continuing inefficiency, corruption, and the parochial concerns of the GVN.

D. Another major uncertainty is how much time is left to make up past deficiencies and consolidate current gains. Over the next several months, further progress in pacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able to cope with the VC, given peacetime

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conditions, than it would be today; a significant advance in this respect would probably require at least a year.

E. Finally, there is the question of how the Communists will react to the growing pressures on them. Despite improvements in the overall security situation, gains in pacification are still vulnerable to adverse military developments. The chances are good that the Communists will attempt to make an intensified effort to counter the gains in pacification and they will probably have some success. Thus, consolidation of gains is likely to continue to be a very slow and uncertain process.

DISCUSSION

I. BACKGROUND

1. Since at least 1959 a pacification program of some kind has been in existence in South Vietnam. Underlying philosophies, relative priorities, specific programs, and the allocation of resources have ebbed and flowed; the ultimate objectives, however, have remained fairly constant. As most recently defined by the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) these are: to improve security in the rural areas and protect them from enemy military activity, to engage the sympathies and loyalties of the peasant and create a viable countrywide administration, and to neutralize the effectiveness and appeal of the Communist political apparatus.

2. Until 1967, the pacification effort was overshadowed by an overall strategy which placed primary emphasis on defeating the enemy's conventional forces. GVN and Allied efforts to secure the countryside were clearly subordinate to the large-unit war; in part this necessarily followed from the character of the war, as more and larger units from North Vietnam were committed to battle. In any event, by the end of 1966 the goals of pacification were still remote.

3. In 1967, significant changes were made in the doctrinal and organizational aspects of pacification. It was finally recognized in practice that there was no single solution to pacification, and that, in fact, there was a close interdependence between all aspects of the military and political struggle. For the first time, significant numbers of specific Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) units were assigned defined roles in support of pacification. More large Allied operations were coordinated with follow-on pacification efforts. The Regional and Popular Forces (RF, PF) were expanded as a critical component of territorial defense, helping to fill an immense void. Plans were laid and implemented to expand the Revolutionary Development teams, to intensify their training, and more clearly to define their security missions. A systematic plan to attack the Viet Cong (VC) political infrastructure (i.e., leadership and organization) was worked out and eventually accepted by the Saigon authorities. Finally, a system

of evaluating various aspects of pacification was tested in practice and accepted (the Hamlet Evaluation System—HES).

4. As a result of all of these efforts, progress was made during 1967. The principal thrust was in expanding the presence of the government and making its influence felt. In terms of security, however, progress was deceptive. Overall ratings based on HES statistics indicated a rapid expansion of GVN presence throughout the country. Some of this progress, however, was the result of changes in the accounting system. More important, the detailed statistics showed that VC military and political activity in hamlets classified as "relatively secure" was actually increasing in the six months before the Tet offensive of January 1968. The highly fragile nature of GVN control was, of course, dramatically demonstrated by the Tet attacks; not only was the government presence in the countryside severely contracted for several months, but the confidence of potential government supporters there must have been badly shaken.

5. In effect, it took most of 1968 to regain lost ground, and some residue of psychological and political damage probably remains. Nevertheless, some progress was made even though Communist forces were engaged in continuing military "offensives" through August. Progress has been much more rapid during the relative lull in activity since then; this is another manifestation of the fact that pacification cannot be separated from the total military situation.

6. Since 1 November, an Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC) has been underway with the proclaimed goal of adding, by 31 January 1969, 1,200 hamlets to the 5,500 already classified as "relatively secure." Simultaneously, the attack on the VC infrastructure (the Phoenix, or Phung Hoang program) has also been accelerated, after a promising start in 1968.

7. In evaluating these programs, certain basic questions remain: what constitutes "progress," and how permanent is it? In the next section we deal with these questions in terms of the three objectives mentioned at the outset: security, the allegiance of the people, and the effectiveness of the enemy's political-administrative apparatus.

II. EFFECTIVENESS AND VULNERABILITIES

A. Security

8. It has long been recognized that pacification is first of all a question of security. Without continuing protection against Communist military and political forces, there is little chance of winning over an apathetic, war weary peasantry to the side of the GVN. Until recently, the prevailing concept had been to secure limited areas and gradually expand the perimeter of protection. Now, in the APC the GVN appears willing to spread its resources more thinly in order to extend its presence into more and more areas at an increasingly rapid pace. This is partly because the more favorable military position of the Allies has made an expanded effort more feasible. Equally important, the GVN has felt it necessary to respond to the intensified VC efforts to establish Liberation Committees

throughout the country. In effect, both sides want to be in a position to make maximum claims of control over a wide area and a high percentage of the population, should there be an early end to the fighting. The HES currently shows that 76.3 percent of the entire population falls in the "relatively secure" category, 12.3 percent under VC domination, and the remainder "contested." By way of comparison, statistics for February 1967 showed 66 percent of the total population in "relatively secure" areas and 19 percent in those controlled by the VC.

9. These statistics must be regarded with considerable reserve. For example, while the GVN claims that about 65 percent of the rural population is "relatively secure," over half of these live in hamlets where there are varying degrees of VC activity. Thus it is possible to argue that some could be considered as "contested," in which case the overall evaluation would change. Moreover, progress in security as measured by the HES system represents a sum total of reporting on a wide variety of activities related to security, including the level of VC military and political operations. If these latter indicators were considered in isolation, one could conclude that very little progress has been made in the past two years.

10. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that since the introduction of large US forces in 1965 the overall trend in security has been basically favorable to the GVN. Moreover, the Allied side is in a better position to protect pacification gains than it was a year ago. The forces involved in security (RF, PF, Police, Revolutionary Development teams) have increased in numbers and effectiveness. The balance of conventional forces is much more favorable as a result of the heavy Communist losses at Tet and in the following months. Especially since Tet, there has also been a decline in the quality of the Communist guerrillas, a principal instrument for attacking the pacification effort. At present, Communist forces are almost certainly incapable of mounting an offensive on a scale that would permanently reverse overall trends. In selected areas, however, intensified military operations will almost certainly damage the pacification program and set it back; terrorism in particular is likely to increase.

B. Revolutionary Development

11. Engaging the positive support of the peasant for the government is another matter. Many people in the rural areas have been subjected to a series of programs and false starts over the years and, no doubt, are inured to new appeals from Saigon. In any case, the political and psychological attitudes of the hamlet dwellers are not susceptible to statistical measure. There are, however, some general indicators of progress in this phase of pacification. First, there was an impressive turnout of voters in the national elections of 1967; even allowing for some coercion and dishonesty, this suggests that a large part of the rural population is at least partially responsive to the GVN. Second, the rural and urban masses conspicuously failed to rise up and support the VC during the Tet offensive. Finally, there was some popular revulsion to Communist excesses at Tet, and this was reflected in the large number of people

who have since been willing to enlist in the ARVN and in the People's Self-Defense Corps.

12. During 1968, however, new uncertainties have arisen which are bound to have an impact on Revolutionary Development. With the beginning of negotiations and the end of the bombing of North Vietnam, there is a growing belief—at least among informed Vietnamese—that the war is coming to an end, sooner rather than later. Among these people, there is growing apprehension over the shape of a final settlement and the firmness of the American commitment. To the extent that this uncertainty may be reflected in the countryside, it would tend to undermine the gains of Revolutionary Development. Moreover, any weakening of the central government, whether real or imagined, would magnify the uncertainties of officials involved in Revolutionary Development programs and thus pose a growing threat to this aspect of pacification.

13. Even leaving aside such general uncertainties, progress in the field of "nation building" or Revolutionary Development is likely to be painfully slow for several basic reasons. As noted, security is an indispensable prerequisite. In areas where there is a decline in security conditions, even temporarily, the resulting damage to confidence and respect for the government more than offsets gains from developmental projects. Even if security conditions remain good, the administrative capability of Vietnamese officials is weak; Revolutionary Development is heavily dependent on American advice, assistance, and inspiration. Pervasive corruption is a constant threat to the entire system.

C. Neutralizing the Viet Cong Infrastructure

14. Of all the aspects of pacification, the most neglected—and until quite recently the least effective—has been the effort to eliminate the pervasive political infrastructure of the VC. Until mid-1968 the GVN gave no more than lukewarm support to the effort. In part this has been the legacy of a long era of political insecurity, during which intelligence, security, and police activities were often directed against non-Communist groups rather than against the VC. Another reason was the reluctance of the army and other governmental groups, especially the police, to work effectively together. In any case, until 1968 the only organized counterefforts were the Chieu Hoi program to rally VC to the government and a small, American-sponsored guerrilla effort, now called Provincial Reconnaissance Units.

15. Because of the presence of large US forces it has become more difficult for the VC infrastructure to operate, and its effectiveness has declined. Eliminating the infrastructure itself, however, is another matter and presents a formidable long term problem. Important steps to remedy the situation were taken in 1968, with the initiation of a countrywide effort, called Phoenix, to collect information on the VC's infrastructure and to plan various operations against it. The record of the new program is fairly promising thus far. Better intelligence, funneled into district and provincial centers, has meant that both conventional and paramilitary operations can be targeted against known VC leaders.

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16. The Phoenix program is one additional pressure, and is directed against that part of the system which the VC have long considered crucial. However, it cannot yet be credited with an appreciable countrywide impact on the integrity or general effectiveness of the VC infrastructure. About 13,000 members of the VC infrastructure are claimed to have been killed, captured, or induced to defect. This total may include individuals improperly identified as members of the infrastructure; it certainly includes large numbers of low level cadres who can be replaced fairly easily. The numbers of key cadre eliminated is quite small, since they are the most difficult to find. Moreover, it is not at all clear what happens to those captured. A recent check suggests that a large number are disappearing into the quagmire of the GVN administrative-judicial system and some are probably returning to their former activities. A long, patient effort will be required before the VC infrastructure can be crippled.

III. PROSPECTS

17. Pacification is far too complex, covers too many individual programs, and is geographically too diverse to permit clear prognoses. All things considered, the program as a whole has made a significant contribution to the prosecution of the war and to the political struggle. It has been most successful in expanding the presence of the GVN in the countryside; it has been less successful in establishing permanent security or stimulating genuine loyalty and commitment to the Saigon government. And it has been laggard in coping with the political threat posed by a well-organized and disciplined Communist infrastructure. This has been a significant weakness, threatening and undermining other gains.

A. The GVN and Pacification

18. Much will depend on the attitude of the GVN. It cannot be said that the various Saigon governments have shared the American enthusiasm or dedication to pacification. Results obtained during 1966 and 1967 were largely because of constant American pressures. The skills, funds, and motivation have been overwhelmingly American; the GVN has provided manpower and occasional high level endorsements, but has been far from committed to the programs. Too often GVN officials have participated or cooperated simply to please their American counterparts, or to share in the spoils of the inevitable corruption.

19. Saigon now seems to have accepted the need for a vigorous pacification effort. Thieu's preference would probably be to move more deliberately, consolidating GVN control in selected areas rather than establishing a less firmly based presence over a broader range. However, he is increasingly concerned over how much time is left to the GVN before the fighting ends. Fear that peace will come before the GVN is in a strong position to compete with the VC has caused Thieu to support the APC. Moreover, Thieu is taking a new interest in the possibilities of using aspects of the pacification program, such as the People's Self-Defense Corps, as the basis for a countrywide political organization.

20. The GVN still does not have the skills and resources to assume a significantly greater role in the management and execution of an effective pacification effort in 1969. US assistance is still vital to success, but gaining popular acceptance will depend finally on a growing effectiveness of the GVN's performance in the program.

B. Political Conditions

21. A major uncertainty is how much time is left to make up past deficiencies and consolidate current gains. Pacification has already strengthened the GVN position vis-a-vis the Communists. Over the next several months, further progress in pacification will almost certainly not make the GVN much more able to cope with the VC in peacetime than it would be today. A significant advance in this respect would probably require at least a year. And the terms of a settlement could undo virtually all that has been accomplished, especially since progress has been minimal in reducing the political threat.

C. Communist Counterefforts

22. A second area of uncertainty is the response of the Communists. We believe the overall situation in Vietnam is such that pacification is less vulnerable to Communist counterefforts than in 1967.¹ A principal conclusion about the entire pacification program, however, is that its gains are tentative and can be adversely affected by military setbacks; this is especially true of the gains registered during the APC. It is also true, of course, that Communist military setbacks or reduced levels of operations would facilitate gains in pacification.

23. There are a number of ways the Communists could attack the pacification program. If they are willing to pay the price in casualties and capabilities, they can mount attacks large enough to inflict considerable damage on the pacification effort, at least temporarily. Similarly, they could concentrate their efforts against the pacification security forces (RF, PF, and the Revolutionary Development teams), and increase terrorism and propaganda in the hamlets. The VC launched a concerted propaganda campaign against the APC, almost immediately upon its implementation. The chances are good that they will also attempt to counter the gains in pacification in other ways and they will probably have some success; such an intensification of fighting would, in any case, set back the pacification program. Thus, consolidation of gains is likely to continue to be a very slow and uncertain process.

¹ Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, believes that the estimate does not support the conclusion that the pacification situation is less vulnerable than it was in 1967, but rather that it is essentially as vulnerable now as it was then.