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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

Reply To:
USSTRATCOM/J0CS
901 SAC BLVD STE 2A5
OFFUTT AFB NE 68113

16 Feb 16
SM# 3022-16

John Greenewald
[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Greenewald

Thank you for your 18 December 2014 Freedom of Information Act request. The National Security Agency (NSA) searched the systems you requested be searched and determined the attached documents to be responsive to your request. You will notice there are two copies of the contents of CONPLAN 8888-11. This is due to the fact that entries related to your request were located on both TOP SECRET and SECRET systems. Further, NSA determined USSTRATCOM owned the documents and therefore referred them to us for final action and direct response to you. We received their referral on 25 January 2016.

After carefully reviewing the enclosed documents, I have determined certain portions are releasable. However, there are portions I am withholding. As the Initial Denial Authority, I am denying access to names and contact information of individuals associated with the Intellipedia entries. Releasing this information would clearly result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and would be in violation of the Privacy Act of 1974.

In accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552, *Freedom of Information Act*, Exemption 6 is hereby invoked, and requires this information be withheld. If you are not satisfied with this action, you may petition to the Appellate Authority, the Director of Administration and Management, Office of the Secretary of Defense, by writing directly to the OSD/Joint Staff Freedom of Information, ATTN: Appeals Office, 1155 Defense Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301-1155. You may also submit an appeal electronically at the following link: <http://pal.whs.mil/palMain.aspx>. Your appeal should be submitted within 60 calendar days of this letter and should cite case number 16-041, and be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

Further, at the request of NSA, there are portions they have identified that meet NSA withholding criteria. The URLs for Intelink pages and the names of NSA affiliates have been protected by NSA pursuant to Exemption 3, specifically 50 U.S.C. § 3605 (Section 6, Public Law 86-36), *NSA Functions and Information*. If you are not satisfied with NSA's action, you may petition to the NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal Authority. The appeal must be postmarked no

later than 60 calendar days of this letter and should cite NSA case number 79960-R1. The appeal must be in writing to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority (DJ40), National Security Agency, 9800 Savage Road STE 6248, Ft. George G. Meade, MD 20755-6248. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds under which you believe release of information is required. There are no fees associated with processing this request.

Sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A W Batschelet', written over the printed name.


16 Feb
2016

ALLEN W. BATSCHELET
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

(U) Template:Zombie-Free

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```
[[Generic Merit Badge
color1= red color2= white fontcolor= white bordercolor= black
image= zombie.jpg image size=43px
text-align= center
text= <div align=center>'''PLACE: Certified as [[:CONPLAN 8889 :]]fontcolor:white Zombie-free''' since TIME!'''
category= Zombie-Free Users
sortkey= [[PAGE:NAME]]
include text=
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```

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Impedweb2,

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(U) Talk:CONPLAN 8888

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From Intellipedia

Accidentally overwrote the graphics previously provided. My apologies....please upload again if you can

No problem. Thank you for clarifying the purpose of this article. Instead of "Humor", perhaps the category "Exercise" would be more appropriate.

Foreign Policy Magazine

Readers,

I was contacted a few weeks ago by USSTRATCOM Public Affairs about this plan since I was the one who hung our local JOPP training tool on SIPRnet. It appears that a reporter somehow learned of this plan and asked Omaha about it. STRAT agreed to release the plan to the reporter. Today, an article appeared in the 13 May Online edition of Foreign Policy Magazine by a writer named Gordon Lubold about this plan. I'd like to thank STRATCOM PA for doing a very good job discussing this training tool with the reporter and keeping an open mind about the value of non-traditional training tools like this. JOPP doesn't have to be boring-it's useful and you really can use it to solve complex problems. I've been asked about this plan by fellow planners a number of times since we hung the plan back in 2011-I'm happy to know other people are trying to make planning interesting and practical.

(b)(6) USSC

(b)(6) USSC I loved the idea of this from the beginning. The Center for Disease Control used a similar campaign a few years back tying the zombie apocalypse to disaster preparedness. I'm glad to hear it wasn't a leak but rather a PA release. Any chance of getting this page actually MOVED to Intellipedia-U? I might want to borrow the idea for some of our training events that are held at the unclassified level? "Chief" 12:06, 10 June 2014 (UTC)

Thinking outside the box

Thank you for this article. As a "Lifer" I have always wondered why we continuously grind away at boring scenarios that numb the mind. Also, as a "nerd" I enjoyed the scenario very much, you could say I'm a SME regarding EMZ's (35 years of D&D experience, LOL). Again, thanks for the ideas and making the JOPP more interesting. We can apply this concept to the MCPP (Marine Corps Planning Process) and liven up some otherwise zombifying planning process training. ~ CWO (b)(6) USSC

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Intellipedia

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(U) Counter-Zombie Dominance Flexible Deterrent Option

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From Intellipedia

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTION (U) CONCEPT TO RESPOND AGAINST A ZOMBIE ATTACK AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS (U)

(U) References. a. (U) CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 "COUNTER-ZOMBIE DOMINANCE" 30 APR 2011

1. (U) Situation.

- a. (U) General.
 - (1) (U) This concept is designed to address the potential scenarios a zombie attack would present to United States or its interests worldwide. This Flexible Response Option (FRO) is intended to provide the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) pre-crisis options to respond in the event of a zombie attack against U.S. interests. During Time Sensitive Planning (TSP) options identified will be refined down to the tactical level and executed by the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). Pre-crisis options and options developed during the TSP process are designed to be flexible, scalable, and should not be hindered or limited by the current political situation.
 - (2) (U) U.S. Desired End State (Long Term). The threat of a Zombie Apocalypse is eliminated. Zombies are no longer a threat to U.S. interests or partners worldwide

(U) References

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(U) File:8888 Pahse Table.doc

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- File
- File history
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8888_Pahse_Table.doc (file size: 29 KB, MIME type: application/msword)
Warning: This file type may contain malicious code. By executing it, your system may be compromised.

CONPLAN 8888 Phase Table

File history

Click on a date/time to view the file as it appeared at that time.

Date/Time	Dimensions	User	Comment
current: 23:28, 7 April 2011	(29 KB)	(b)(6) USSC	(Talk contribs) (CONPLAN 8888 Phase Table)

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File usage

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(U) CONPLAN 8888

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Location: Map | Coordinates | About

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 "COUNTER-ZOMBIE DOMINANCE" 30 APR 2011

Classified by: N/A

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 - 5.5.6 DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS(CR)
 - 5.5.7 DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES(CV)

(U) DISCLAIMER

(U) CONPLAN 8888 DISCLAIMER: This plan was not actually designed as a joke. During the summers of 2009 and 2010, while training augmentees from a local training squadron about the JOPP, members of a USSTRATCOM component found out (by accident) that the hyperbole involved in writing a “zombie survival plan” actually provided a very useful and effective training tool. Planners who attended JPME II at the Joint Combined Warfighting School also realized that training examples for plans must accommodate the political fallout that occurs if the general public mistakenly believes that a fictional training scenario is actually a real plan. Rather than risk such an outcome by teaching our augmentees using the fictional “Tunisia” or “Nigeria” scenarios used at JCWS, we elected to use a completely-impossible scenario that could never be mistaken as a real plan.

Because the plan was so ridiculous, our students not only enjoyed the lessons; they actually were able to explore the basic concepts of plan and order development (fact, assumptions, specified and implied tasks, references etc) very effectively.

We posted this plan because we feel it is a very enjoyable way to train new planners and boost retention of critical knowledge. We posted this to Intellipedia after reading about the benefits of crowd sourcing phenomena in the business management book “The Starfish and the Spider”. Our intent was to place this training tool “in the wild” so that others who were interested in finding new and innovative ways to train planners could have an alternative and admittedly unconventional tool at their disposal that could be modified and updated over time. We also hoped that this type of non-traditional training approach would provide inspiration for other personnel trying to teach topics that can be very boring. Finally we figured that an entry like this would not only be instructive, but possibly entertaining for personnel deployed away from their families supporting military ops abroad. If this plan helps illustrate how JOPP works and brings a smile or a brief laugh in the process, so much the better,

If you suspend reality for a few minutes, this type of training scenario can actually take a very dry, monotonous topic and turn it into something rather enjoyable.

(U) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 (U) (U) OPR: USSTRATCOM/J53

Letter of Transmittal SUBJECT: CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 (U) SEE DISTRIBUTION (Annex Z)

1. (U) CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11, which provides for Counter-Zombie dominance Operations is attached.
2. (U) This Document utilizes the format commonly found in USSTRATCOM Concept Plans, but it is intended for use only during JOPP-related training.
3. (U) File this letter in front of the plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

NAME N. RANK Brigadier General , USAF Director, Plans and Policy

(U) SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

Security Instructions CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 (U) OPR: USSTRATCOM J53 SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U) (U) Plan Title:

1. (U) The long title of this plan is CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 COUNTER-ZOMBIE DOMINANCE OPERATIONS (U).
2. (U) The short title of this plan is CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 (U).
3. (U) This document is unclassified to ensure maximum utility during times of crisis. Classified capabilities used to counter zombies will be addressed in appropriate orders and annexes adapted during crisis action planning to adapt the actions in this plan to current operational conditions.
4. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, title 18, United States Code, sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
5. (U) Reproduction of this document is authorized for general training purposes; reproduce only in accordance with guidelines for reproduction of classified material outlined in DoD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. If this were a real plan, the following language would be included "Do not reproduce this document without the expressed written permission of CDRUSSTRATCOM or one of his specified subordinate commanders."

(U) PLAN SUMMARY

Plan Summary CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 (U) PLAN SUMMARY

'1. (U) **Statement:**' (U) This CONPLAN is a contingency oriented plan designed to be used as a basis/point of departure for Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

(U) PURPOSE

'2. **(U) Purpose:** This plan fulfills fictional Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) tasking for USSTRATCOM to develop a comprehensive JOPES Level 3 plan to undertake military operations to preserve "non-zombie" humans from the threats posed by a zombie horde. Because zombies pose a threat to all "non-zombie" human life (hereafter referred to as "humans"), USSTRATCOM will be prepared to preserve the sanctity of human life and conduct operations in support of any human population-including traditional adversaries. The objective of this plan is threefold:

- a. (U) Establish and maintain a vigilant defensive condition aimed at protecting humankind from zombies
- b. (U) If necessary, conduct operations that will, if directed, eradicate zombie threats to human safety
- c. (U) Aid civil authorities in maintaining law and order and restoring basic services during and after a zombie attack

(U) DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3. **(U) Defensive operations.** Those operations aimed at monitoring the environment for zombie-related threats and preparing capabilities to respond to the same. This plan's defensive branch (within Annex C) details protective and preventive measures for humans in response to the threat scenarios identified in paragraph 6 below. The system of Zombie Conditions (Z-CONS or ZOMBIECONS) will provide predetermined actions to proactively position the USSTRATCOM enterprise in response to threat indications and warning.

(U) OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

'4. **(U) Offensive Operations.** Those operations where USSTRATCOM has been directed to eradicate zombie threats to human safety using military capabilities as authorized by POTUS and SECDEF. This plan's "offensive" branch (within Annex C) and Annex S (STO) details the neutralization (to render ineffective) of Zombie capabilities through denial, deception, disruption, degradation or destruction. The system of ZOMBIECONS will proactively anticipate and respond to increased GCC space capability requirements including offensive space control capabilities.

(U) CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

5. (U) Conditions for Implementation

a. **(U) Politico-Military Situation.** Zombies are horribly dangerous to all human life and zombie infections have the potential to seriously undermine national security and economic activities that sustain our way of life. Therefore having a population that is not composed of zombies or at risk from their malign influence is vital to U.S. and Allied national interests. While the U.S. currently enjoys several asymmetric advantages in against zombie infections originating in the Eurasian landmass, these advantages can easily be negated by air and sea traffic that could transport the source of a zombie infection to North and South America. Further, asteroids and nuclear space radiation that can convert people into zombies can affect any landmass or population on earth. Given the rapidity at which zombie outbreaks spread, decisive, overwhelming, and possibly unilateral military force may be required to negate the zombie threat.

(U) PLAN EXECUTION

b. **(U) Plan Execution.** CONPLAN 8888 is designed to be implemented across all 6 phases of military operations.

When directed by POTUS or SECDEF, CDRUSSTRATCOM will issue mission type orders (ALERTORD, WARNORD, DEPOD, OPORD, EXORD, TERMORD) to execute specific actions from this plan. This plan is only designed to be implemented if zombie threats arise which cannot be handled within the scope of the USSTRATCOM Campaign Plan (OPLAN 8000) and the current Fiscal Year OPORDS (FY XX OPORD, SPACE OPORD, DSCA OPORD etc) that direct the execution of actions from OPLAN 8000.

(U) ZOMBIE THREAT SUMMARY

6. (U) Zombie threat summary:

a. (U) CONPLAN 8888 is designed to address the following types of zombie threats:

i. (U) Pathogenic Zombies (PZ):

1. (U) PZ's are zombie life forms created after an organism is infected by a virus or bacteria or some other form of contagion

ii. (U) Radiation Zombies (RZ):

1. (U) RZ's are zombie life forms created after an organism is infected by an extreme dosage of electromagnetic and/or particle radiation

iii. (U) Evil Magic Zombies (EMZ):

1. (U) EMZ's are zombie life forms created via some form of occult experimentation in what might otherwise be referred to as "evil magic"

iv. (U) Space Zombies (SZ):

1. (U) SZ's are zombie life forms originating from space or created by toxic contamination of the earth environment via some form of extra-terrestrial toxin or radiation

2. (U) "Zombie satellites" can be classified as SZ's, however they pose no danger to humans (unless they conduct an unplanned de-orbit). Typically, zombie satellites only pose a threat to SATCOM services like DirectTV (Refer to Galaxy 15 incident-May 2010)

v. (U) Weaponized Zombies (WZ):

1. (U) WZ's are zombie life forms deliberately created via bio/bio-mechanical engineering for the purpose of being employed as weapons. Zombie weaponization programs and supporting infrastructures are included in COAs to deal with these threats.

2. (U) The movie "The Crazies" exemplifies the most common type of WZ (humans turned into zombies via exposure to toxic chemicals/gasses)

vi. (U) Symbiant-Induced Zombies (SIZ):

1. (U) SIZ's are zombie life forms originating from the introduction of a symbiant life form into an otherwise healthy

host. Although the symptoms of symbiant zombieism is similar in most regards to pathogenic zombieism, the symbiant does not kill the host organism quickly, or at all. However, there is no known way to save an organism after zombieism has occurred-even if the symbiant is removed.

vii. (U) Vegetarian Zombies (VZ):

1. (U) VZ's are zombie life forms originating from any cause but pose no direct threat to humans because they only eat plant life (as indicated in the popular game "Plants Vs. Zombies"). Although VZ's do not attack humans or other animal life, they will consume all plant life in front of them. They can cause massive de-forestation or elimination of basic food crops essential to humans (rice, corn, soybeans).

2. (U) Of note, where normal carnivorous zombie commonly groan the word "brains" semi-comprehensibly, VZ's can be identified by their aversion to humans, affinity for plants and their tendency to semi-comprehensibly groan the word "grains".

viii. (U) Chicken Zombies (CZ)

1. (U) Although it sounds ridiculous, this is actually the only proven class of zombie that actually exists.

2. (U) CZ's were first documented in Jonathan M. Forrester's 4 Dec 2006 online article "Zombie Chickens Taking Over California" (<http://www.slashfood.com/2006/12/04/Zombie-Chickens-Taking-Over-California/>).

3. (U) CZ's occur when old hens that can no longer lay eggs are incorrectly euthanized by poultry farmers using carbon monoxide. The hens are then deposited in large piles to decompose. The hens appear to be dead when buried, but inexplicably come back to life and dig themselves out from the piles of dead chickens. After reaching the surface, CZ's stagger about for a period of time before ultimately expiring due to internal organ failure.

4. (U) CZ's are simply terrifying to behold and are likely only to make people become vegetarians in protest to animal cruelty. They appear to be no direct threat to humans. They are different from WZ's because they are the result of actions taken to kill a living organism vice actions taken to deliberately re-animate dead organisms or impair life functions to a minimal function.

(U) ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

b. (U) Environmental Effects. Causes of zombie infection are generally resistant to most environmental effects.

i. (U) The following environmental factors apply to zombies in this plan:

1. (U) The viral pathogens that cause PZ's have some vulnerability to ultraviolet light. UV light impairs the functions of ribo-nucleic acids (RNA) that comprise most viral life forms. At best, UV light can disrupt virus reproduction in healthy cells. It should be noted that PZ's may experience painful photo-sensitivity as a result of sunlight exposure. For this reason, PZ activity is not expected to be as high during bright sunny conditions as it is during the hours of darkness.

2. (U) EMZ, SZ, VZ, WZ's are all likely immune to any extreme meteorological phenomena except fires, floods,

tornados or tsunamis.

ii. (U) The following environmental factors apply to humans in this plan:

1. (U) Rain will be vitally important to human survival. If civil water supplies are cut off, humans will have to rely on other means to obtain water. Ground water from streams and rivers will be unreliable since it will be difficult to determine if ground water is a vector for zombie infection.

2. (U) Humans who do not shelter-in-place within a sturdy structure that protects them from the direct effects of air currents that could carry pathogens or toxins or direct exposure to radiation will be at increased risk of contamination, death and injury.

c. (U) Although these threat scenarios aren't meant to be all-inclusive (USSTRATCOM must be postured and flexible enough to respond to any emerging threat due to different zombie disaster scenarios.) Annex C Appendix 1- Defensive Operations and Annex C-Appendix 2 – Offensive Operations provide a solid foundations for full spectrum operations against most postulated zombie threats.

(U) LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

d. (U) **Legal Considerations.** U.S. and international law regulate military operations only insofar as human and animal life are concerned. There are almost no restrictions on hostile actions that may be taken either defensively or offensively against pathogenic life forms, organic-robotic entities, or "traditional" zombies. Given the likelihood of an all out threat to "human survival", it is likely that this plan will be executed concurrently with a declaration of martial law within CONUS and US territories. Additional legal considerations taken into account when preparing this plan include: applicable U.S. statutes, the United Nations Charter, international treaties and agreements to which the U.S. is a party, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), customary international law, and applicable Rules of Engagement (ROE) and policies.

e. (U) **Operations To Be Conducted:** (See 8088 Annex C)

f. (U) **Deployment.** USSTRATCOM forces specified in the "forces" table of the current fiscal year OPORD are deployed around the globe. This CONPLAN has no pre-identified primary adversaries; therefore, it does not direct forward deployment of forces into any particular region. When USSTRATCOM is the "supported" CCDR, USSTRATCOM will develop during crisis, a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) in collaboration with USTRANSCOM, for those situations when offensive or defensive operations require movement of forces or assets. However, when USSTRATCOM deploys forces as a "supporting" commander, those forces will normally be tied to the "supported" theater commander's TPFDD.

g. (U) **Employment.** CONPLAN 8888 is situationally dependent-it is designed to allow CDRUSSTRATCOM execute military operations in support of national OR theater objectives in either a supporting OR supported role. Operational phases within this plan may be sequential, non-sequential, or modified depending on the global situation. However, given the global threat to humanity posed by zombies, once CDRUSSTRATCOM issues orders to transition to a specific phase of operations, that phase will apply to the entire globe.

(U) CONPLAN PHASES

h. (U) CONPLAN Phases.

CONPLAN 8888 Operational Phasing

Plan Branches	Phase 0 - Shape	Phase 1 - Deter	Phase 2 - Seize Initiative	Phase 3 - Dominate	Phase 4 - Stabilize	Phase 5 - Restore Civil Authority
(U) Defensive Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct general zombie awareness training - Ensure readiness of CBRNE protective equipment - Monitor vectors of zombie contamination for increased threat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Zombies cannot be deterred themselves - Conduct large scale training to demonstrate USSTRATCOM ability to survive and operate in a toxic/contaminated environment IOT deter nations states from pursuing development or deployment of zombie - creating pathogens, toxins or similar capabilities developed by nations states, large corporations to terrorist/criminal groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recall all USSTRATCOM personnel to duty stations - Begin fortification of all USSTRATCOM operating locations - Initiate distribution of CBRNE protection equipment - Activate COOP Plans - Place deployable command and control capabilities on alert 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lock down all USSTRATCOM operating locations for 30 days - Assume Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) 2 inside all workstations and direct MOPP-4 for all personnel who venture outside fortified positions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deploy recon teams after D+30 to ascertain general safety of environment near USSTRATCOM locations for human habitation. - Execute a counter-zombie ISR plan to ID holdout pockets of zombie resistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deploy USSTRATCOM personnel to to aid any surviving civil authorities in disaster zones
(U) Offensive Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct normal combat operations training - Ensure forces conduct annual HAZMAT and COOP training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct large scale training to demonstrate USSTRATCOM ability to decisively target and negate zombie-creating pathogens, toxins or similar capabilities developed by nations states, large corporations to terrorist/criminal groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If necessary begin limited scale military operations to negate zombie threat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Issue orders for defensive forces to kill all non-human life on sight - Initiate bomber and missile strikes against targeted sources of zombie infection, zombie support infrastructure using all available forces - Ensure all 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Target all main body and holdout vectors of zombie influence contagion using all available military capabilities. - Continue all actions from previous phase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reconstitute combat capabilities at Offutt, Whiteman, Vandenberg AFBs and Ft Meade. Prepare to re-deploy the forces to attack surviving zombie holdouts

(U) Defense Support to Civil Authorities	- Form JIACG to ensure contingency plans are synchronized with other federal, state and tribal agencies	- As authorized by POTUS and SECDEF, initiate intelligence sharing and provide technical advisory services to federal, state and tribal agencies - Provide ISR assistance to DHS to ID and curtail migration of lifeforms and/or toxic materials from areas where zombie-related disease vectors originate	- On order from POTUS or SECDEF, provide security to civilian areas, evacuation zones and assist other federal, state, and tribal agencies with the surveillance of and enforcement of quarantine areas	- BPT to participate in "render-safe" operations within CONUS, US territory, or other foreign territories as directed by POTUS and SECDEF	- Provide support to follow-on "render-safe" operations in areas contaminated by zombie-inducing pathogens, toxins, magic or other malign influence as directed by POTUS and SECDEF	- As directed by POTUS and SECDEF, provide support to federal, state, and tribal agencies' efforts to restore basic services in zombie-related disaster areas
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i. (U) **Phase 0 - Shape the Environment (Day-to-Day Operations).** USSTRATCOM will perform routine operations to include epidemiological surveillance to watch for changes in disease vectors that could cause zombieism. USSTRATCOM Center for Combatting-Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) will serve as the lead component within the command for ensure all Phase 0 shaping operations are conducted and synchronized with other federal, state and tribal agencies. SCC-WMD will ensure that necessary epidemiological ISR requirements are issued and answered by the Intelligence Community. SCC-WMD will work with USAMRIID to ensure the risks to USSTRATCOM forces are monitored and that necessary HAZMAT and CBRNE training is accomplished across the USSTRATCOM enterprise.

j. (U) **Phase 1 - Deter (Day-to-Day Operations).** Upon receipt of a CDRUSSTRATCOM WARNORD, JFCC GS will become the supported commander for Phase 1 operations in this plan. It is important to note that zombies are not cognizant life-forms. As such, they cannot be deterred or reasoned with in any way. However, there are zombie-inducing forces that can be deterred from further action. These forces include but are not limited to nation states and terrorist groups with WMD programs, un-ethical bio-research companies. To meet deterrence goals, USSTRATCOM will conduct large scale training to demonstrate USSTRATCOM ability to survive and operate in a toxic/contaminated environment IOT deter nations states from pursuing development or deployment of zombie-creating pathogens, toxins or similar capabilities developed by nations states, large corporations to terrorist/criminal groups

k. (U) **Phase 2 - Seize the Initiative (Evaluate/Mitigate/Prepare).** Upon receipt of a CDRUSSTRATCOM WARNORD or ALERTORD, all components will initiate a force-wide recall of all assigned personnel and activate COOP Plans. All airborne and ground-based survivable C2 nodes will make ready to deploy for at least 35 days. To avoid ambiguity with nuclear armed peers such as Russia and the PRC, USSTRATCOM will conduct confidence-building measures to ensure leaders within these nations do not construe USSTRATCOM preparations to counter zombie-dominance as preparations for war. If necessary, JFCC GS will generate forces to conduct prompt global strike against initial concentrations of zombies. Other USSTRATCOM forces will provide security assistance to federal, state and tribal authorities to negate zombie threats, provide ISR and security for protected civilian areas and will aid in the enforcement of quarantine zones.

l. (U) Phase 3 - Dominate (Respond/Counter). Upon receipt of a CDRUSSTRATCOM order (ALERTORD, WARNORD, OPORD, EXORD), all USSTRATCOM forces will begin preparations to conduct combat operations against zombie threats. USSTRATCOM strategic task forces (Task Forces (TF) 124, 134, 144, 204, 214, 294, and/or other TF's formed to support strategic ops) will make combat preparations IAW applicable EAP-STRAT volumes. USSTRATCOM forces will activate COOP plans, emergency disaster support plans and will shelter all mission essential personnel in place for at least 40 days.

m. (U) Phase 4/5 - (Stabilize Environment). No earlier than 40 days after the initiation of Phase 3 operations, USSTRATCOM forces will initiate local reconnaissance ops to determine the severity of the remaining zombie threat, assess the physical and epidemiological security of the local environment, and survey the status of basic services (water, power, sewage infrastructure and water, air, land lines of communications). All reports back to HQ USSTRATCOM will be broadcast in clear text using unsecured comms so that if any isolated survivors intercept those comms, link-up between these survivors and USSTRATCOM forces will be facilitated. USSTRATCOM forces will remain "combat ready" to re-engage any remaining pockets of zombie forces or contamination vectors.

n. (U) Enable Civil Authority (Normalization). USSTRATCOM, its components, other applicable CCDRs, and industry partners will collaboratively replace, recover, rebuild, and reconstitute, U.S./civil/commercial/Allied civil infrastructure and services, as needed. USSTRATCOM will continue to provide support to theater warfighters and USG agencies, as required. Lessons Learned and After Action Reports IAW (See Enclosure D to CJCSI 3150.25B) will be produced and fed back into this CONPLAN for process improvement and inclusion in future exercises.

(U) SUPPORTING PLANS

7. (U) Supporting Plans. Due to the fact that an outbreak of zombieism will likely spread rapidly across CCMD AOR boundaries, CDRUSSTRATCOM has been tasked by SECDEF to develop a Level 3 plan that can serve as the model for all other CCMD counter-zombie dominance planning. CONPLAN 8888 planning guidance from the SECDEF assumes a worst case scenario in which all normal C2 capabilities are impaired or overrun by zombie forces. As such, this plan relies heavily on hardened C2 capabilities normally reserved for nuclear or full scale global conventional warfare. Supporting Combatant Commands, and functional components will update their contingency plans related to counter-zombie operations using this plan.

(U) COLLATERAL PLANS

8. (U) Collateral Plans. The following USSTRATCOM plans may be implemented collaterally with CONPLAN 8888

a. CDRUSSTRATCOM

- i. CONPLAN 8035 "Space Operations"
- ii. CONPLAN 8531 "Pandemic Influenza"
- iii. CONPLAN 8099 "Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction"
- iv. OPLAN 8010 "Deterrence and Global Strike"
- v. OPLAN 8001 "Omnibus Support Plan"

b. (U) Geographic Combatant Command OPLANs or CONPLANs.

- i. Refer to OPLAN 8001 "Omnibus Support Plan"

(U) ASSUMPTIONS

9. (U) Assumptions.

- a. (U) U.S. and Allies will have the situational awareness necessary to conduct all counter-zombie dominance operations in this plan.
- b. (U) Zombie forces will become stronger with each human casualty (because each human casualty will become a zombie)
- c. (U) U.S. and Allied forces may be degraded as a conflict emerges and progresses.
- d. (U) LOAC will not apply to zombies.
- e. (U) Domestic law enforcement agencies will address any CONUS-based attacks involving zombies until martial law is declared
- f. (U) There is no known medical cure for a zombie pathogen. At this time it can be assumed that once a human turns, they cannot be cured or reverted to human status. Seek out the nearest CDC for any hopes of medical breakthroughs during a time of a pandemic.
- g. (U) The only assumed way to effectively cause casualties to the zombie ranks by tactical force is the concentration of all firepower to the head, specifically the brain. The human brain will still be functioning in the zombie state, but it is universally agreed that the only part actually active will be the brain stem.
- h. (U) The only way to ensure a zombie is "dead" is to burn the zombie corpse. EMZ's are the only class of zombie that may not be vulnerable to this measure.
- i. (U) The Chaplain Corps may provide the only viable means of combating EMZs. As such, atheists could be particularly vulnerable to EMZ threats.
- j. (U) Because accurate intelligence related to zombies will be hard to obtain using traditional methods, planners will have to assume worst-case scenarios derived from popular culture references (books, movies, comic books) to adequately model zombie threats.
- k. (U) Even if infected by a zombie contaminant or pathogen, human biology requires a regular intake of water and food. Absent proper hydration to offset the affects of progressing zombieism, zombie-infected humans will experience organ failure that will immobilize or kill the host within 30-40 days.
- l. (U) Marketing materials for most hand sanitizer products indicate the product kills 99% of all germs. Although none of these products has ever indicated any efficacy against biohazard level 4 pathogens like ebola, it is entirely possible that such products could limit or delay the spread of pathogen based zombieism if properly employed.
- m. (U) Zombies are undead and thus feel no pain or fear of death. Riot control counter-measures would be completely ineffective.

n. (U) The human instinct for self preservation can cause newly infected zombie hosts to deny their imminent zombification to nearby humans.

(U) OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

1. (U) Operational Limitations consist of actions or conditions that USSTRATCOM and its supporting forces must take or ensure happen (constraints) and those actions or conditions that USSTRATCOM and its supporting forces must not take allow to happen (restraint). Other limitations contained in this section pertain to resource or procedural shortfalls that planners must consider which could undermine USSTRATCOM's ability to achieve the missions outlined in this plan.

(U) CONSTRAINTS

(U) USSTRATCOM forces must-

- i. (U) Remain postured to deter adversaries from attacking the U.S. or its allies with WMD
- ii. (U) Continue to conduct assigned missions throughout all phases of a zombie apocalypse
- iii. (U) Remain postured to conduct military operations to repel zombies and eradicate their safe havens
- iv. (U) Be prepared to conduct combat operations within CONUS against zombie populations that were previously US citizens
- v. (U) Maintain viable, up to date continuity of operations plans
- vi. (U) Maintain emergency plans to employ nuclear weapons within CONUS to eradicate zombie hordes

(U) RESTRAINTS

m. (U) Operational Restraints.

(U) USSTRATCOM forces must not-

- i. (U) Allow nuclear weapon storage areas to be compromised by zombie forces
- ii. (U) Allow airfields or POL facilities critical to combat aircraft capabilities to be overrun by zombie forces
- iii. (U) Allow maritime facilities that support SSBN operations to be compromised by zombie forces

(U) SHORTFALLS AND LIMITING FACTORS

n. (U) Shortfalls and Limiting Factors.

- i. (U) Adequate Zombie defenses require sandbags, sand, barbed wire, anti-personnel mines, riot control chemical agents, MOPP-gear and petroleum (to create flame barriers). These supplies may not be present in sufficient volume to allow desired levels of defense against zombie incursion and could severely tax available logistical support infrastructure
- ii. (U) USSTRATCOM forces do not currently hold enough contingency stores (food, water) to support 30 days of barricaded counter-zombie operations
- iii. (U) USSTRATCOM has no ground combat forces capable of repelling a zombie assault.
- iv. (U) USSTRATCOM can only deliver synchronized fires against a zombie threat via strategic air, space and maritime

forces

v. (U) Offutt AFB provides the only semi-hardened location capable of sheltering personnel responsible for commanding and controlling a coordinated combat action against zombie forces. JFCC SPACE and USCYBERCOM operations centers are located within protected military facilities-however zombie forces will likely overrun those installations within the first days of a zombie invasion.

vi. (U) USSTRATCOM Component level continuity of operations plans (COOP) do not currently address zombie threats. Further, since component COOP(s) utilize facilities provided by other USSTRATCOM components or non-hardened temporary facilities, zombie threats will likely render COOP(s) ineffective. COOP(s) should be revised to include in-extremis carpentry, welding and lumber stockpiling and training in metal work in order to facilitate shelter-in-place ops and barricading of unhardened facilities against zombies

vii. (U) Airborne Command Centers are unlikely to be viable after the first week of a zombie invasion. Although refueling in air will extend mission capabilities, the support bases that refuelers operate from will likely be overrun by zombies. It is possible that islands like Hawaii, Guam and Diego Garcia might remain viable relocation bases if airborne C2 assets can make it to these locations.

o. (U) Time to Commence Effective Operations. Because of the unique situation surrounding zombie threats and the level of USG interests at stake, it is unlikely there will be a time-phased, incremental buildup of forces. It is more likely that during COA development, USSTRATCOM will coordinate joint and combined military efforts, options, levels of forces and objectives with other affected CCMDs, based on worldwide situational awareness and guidance from OSD, Joint Staff and other Combatant Commands.

(U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

10. (U) Command Relationships. (See 8888 Annex J and current operational orders)

a. (U) Command Relationships. USSTRATCOM forces may be fixed or deployed, and may support theater and/or national objectives simultaneously. USSTRATCOM exercises COCOM over assigned forces and utilizes support relationships to support other commands. USSTRATCOM will tailor command relations to best match the situation, taking into account the global perspective and other ongoing space missions. Therefore, there is no "one size fits all" for counter-zombie operations command relationships.

b. (U) CDRUSSTRATCOM has COCOM of all forces as assigned in the Forces for Unified Commands section of the SECDEF's Global Force management Implementation Guidance. Commanders of USSTRATCOM Sub-Unified Commands and Components normally retain OPCON of fixed and deployed forces. These command relationships will be utilized during counter-zombie operations unless otherwise directed by SECDEF.

(U) LOGISTICS APPRAISAL

11. (U) Logistic Appraisal. Forces utilized in this CONPLAN include deployable or fixed assets operating in CONUS or from sites located throughout the world and are controlled as separate forces. During a contingency, USSTRATCOM service components will ensure all mission-critical forces (fixed and mobile), are fully supported and capable of performing their mission. Forces fixed in another CCMD AOR are authorized DIRLAUTH with the CCMDs responsible for their AORs for the purpose of coordinating their support requirements. These forces will keep USSTRATCOM and their owning component informed. CCMDs will work with USSTRATCOM J4 and J8 for reimbursement for support requested by USSTRATCOM forces (See Annex D).

(U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

Classification Guidance

USSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 (U)

OPR: USSTRATCOM J53

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)

1. (U) This classification guidance provides users with general categories of subjects and levels of protection. The level of protection listed represents the highest probable level of protection required by these subjects during specific plan phases. If a document derived from this plan contains particular portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions shall be marked as unclassified and the page shall be marked with the highest classification of any information on or revealed by the page. An explanation will be added to the page or document identifying the combination or association of information that necessitated the higher classification.

Data Requiring Protection	Planning Subjects Requiring Protection			
	COA Development	Execution Planning	Implementation	Post Implementation
(U) Plan Short Title	U	U	U	U
(U) Plan Long Title	U	U	U	U
(U) Zombie Control Terminology	U	U	U	U
(U) Zombie Threat Information	U	U	U	U
(U) Offensive Counter-Zombie Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Defensive Counter-Zombie Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Concept of Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Geospatial Data	U	U	U	U
(U) Classification Guide	U	U	U	U
(U) Date Operation Begins	U	U	U	U
(U) Participating Units	U	U	U	U
(U) Zombie Rescue Support	U	U	U	U
(U) Residual Capabilities After Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Communications effectiveness, sustainability, and limitations	U	U	U	U
(U) Command Arrangements and agreements	U	U	U	U
(U) Rules of Engagement (ROE)	U	U	U	U
(U) Assigned Areas of Operation and boundaries	U	U	U	U
(U) Operational constraints	U	U	U	U
(U) Key planning assumptions	U	U	U	U
(U) Logistics Appraisal	U	U	U	U

2. (U) Changes to this guidance will be coordinated through USSTRATCOM J53.
3. (U) Agencies identified in Annex Z may reproduce this plan consistent with a need-to-know. Listed organizations may reproduce and distribute this plan to assigned forces as required to fulfill mission requirements, and as required for preparation of supporting plans.
4. (U) Non-DoD agencies with a need to know will be allowed to make copies of this plan or hand scribe significant portions of the plan if necessary.
5. (U) Release to U.S., Australian, Canadian and United Kingdom personnel with a valid need-to-know" is authorized. Contact USSTRATCOM/J53 to obtain permission to release or disclose this plan to other foreign personnel.

(U) BASIC PLAN (Annex A)

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE NE 68113-6500

30 APRIL 2011

BASIC PLAN

CDRUSSTRATCOM CONPLAN 8888-11 (U)

COUNTER-ZOMBIE DOMINANCE OPERATIONS, BASIC PLAN (U)

1. (U) References:
 - a. (U) "National Security Strategy of The United States," Mar 06 (U)
 - b. (U) "Unified Command Plan 2011," 6 April 2011 (FOUO)
 - c. (U) Guidance for Employment of the Force (S)
 - d. (U) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (S)
 - e. (U) USSTRATCOM Current Operational Orders and Directives (REL ACGU Versions)
 - f. (U) The Zombie Survival Guide; Complete Protection from the Living Dead, by Max Brooks (Three Rivers Press), 16 Sep 2003
 - g. (U) The Zombie Survival Guide; Recorded Attacks, by Max Brooks (Three Rivers Press), 6 Oct 2009
 - h. (U) World War Z; An Oral History of the Zombie War, by Max Brooks (Three Rivers Press), 16 Oct 2007
 - i. (U) The Zombie Combat Manual; A Guide to Fighting the Living Dead (Berkley Trade) 6 April 2010

j. (U) "Zombie Chickens Taking Over California", Jonathan M. Forrester, 4 Dec 06 (<http://www.slashfood.com/2006/12/04/Zombie-Chickens-Taking-Over-California/>)

k. (U) Zombies Vs. Unicorns, by Justine Larbastier & Holly Black (Margaret K. McElderry Books, NYC) 2010

(U) SITUATION

a. (U) General. (U) Although there are no specific Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) within the Chairman's Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) directing the creation of a counter zombie-dominance plan, there is ample specified guidance for the creation of Level-3 plans to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), Homeland Defense (HD), Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), and Pandemic Influenza (PI).

b. (U) In light of the inherent survival threat posed by zombies and absent specified guidance for detailed planning to address such a contingency, USSTRATCOM has taken the initiative to develop a JOPES Level 3 plan (CONPLAN) consistent with guidance derived from other specified planning efforts to ensure U.S. and Allied freedom of action from zombie domination. As a result, many specified tasks documented in this plan are taken from high-level strategic guidance documents. Other tasks in the plans derived from these higher level tasks or essential for their accomplishment are listed as "implied tasks". In all cases, CDRUSSTRATCOM has determined which tasks are "essential" tasks based on mission analysis (unless higher level guidance already specifies that a task is essential).

c. (U) Science provides almost no useful data about zombies. Although this presents a number of challenges when military planners design operations to counter zombies, this plan utilizes data provided by science fiction sources in addition to what little academic/scientific information is currently available. The use of science fiction sources does provide a compelling advantage for military planners however. In almost all cases, science fiction scenarios significantly enhance analyses of courses of actions, facilitate COA wargaming and adjustment, and provide insight for planners with regards to the development of facts, assumptions, risks and aversion of "groupthink" or "cognitive bias". In short, the more robust a science fiction scenario related to zombies is, the more useful it is for planning purposes regardless of how "outlandish" it might be.

(U) EXECUTION

3. (U) Execution of this plan requires a USSTRATCOM EXORD. Activation or preparation to carry out operations detailed within this plan (including but not limited to changing phases, changing Zombie-Cons, or terminating operations) will require an USSTRATCOM ALERTORD at a minimum.

(U) MISSION STATEMENT

a. (U) Mission Statement:

i. (U) On order, CDRUSSTRATCOM will execute global military operations to protect humankind from zombies and, if directed, eradicate zombie threats to human safety and aid civil authorities in maintaining law and order and restoring basic services during and after a zombie attack.

(U) COMMANDER'S INTENT

b. (U) Commander's Intent:

i. (U) Purpose: CDRUSSTRATCOM will conduct military operations unilaterally or in conjunction with Allies to

preserve the collective security of humankind

ii. (U) Method: CDRUSSTRATCOM will utilize assigned and attached military forces to maintain timely and accurate warning of zombie threats, target zombie safe havens, eliminate sources of zombieism, and provide aid to civil authorities in their efforts to protect civilians from zombie threats.

iii. (U) End State: Sources of zombieism are eradicated, zombie forces are precluded from massing and threatening human population centers and potential adversaries are deterred from developing zombie weaponization programs

(U) AREAS OF CONCERN

i. (U) Area of Responsibility (AOR). CDRUSSTRATCOM, as a Combatant Commander, is not assigned an AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with a geographic AOR. Although CDRUSSTRATCOM has no geographic AOR and has no specified combat roles against zombies, he is the only CCDR in control of nuclear weapons, which are likely to be the most effective weapons against hordes of the undead. CDRUSSTRATCOM serves as the single point of contact for all global deterrence, global strike, military space, and cyber operations as directed by the President of the United States (POTUS) or Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), for the protection of U.S. government (USG), and those civilian, commercial and Allied capabilities augmenting the USG.

ii. (U) Area of Interest (AOI). Any terrestrial, atmospheric or exo-atmospheric location where a source of zombieism or massed zombie forces are currently positioned

iii. (U) Joint Operational Area (JOA). Although USSTRATCOM has global responsibilities and no geographic AOR, orders utilized to activate any portion of this plan will designate JOAs to aid in the prioritization and synchronization of efforts. For the purposes of this plan, JOAs will not cross Geographic CCMD AOR boundaries as defined in the UCP. If threats exist in areas adjacent to CCMD AOR boundaries, then two or more JOAs will be designated and the geographic CCMD supporting USSTRATCOM whose AOR contains a JOA for counter-zombie ops will be responsible for that operational area IAW USSTRATCOM or SECDEF orders.

FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

d. (U) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). Applicable only for nation states or evil magicians who are capable of creating Weaponized Zombies (WZ) or Evil Magic Zombies (EMZ). Refer to Annex C for additional details and Counter-Zombie Dominance Flexible Deterrent Option

i. (U) Zombies cannot be deterred

ENEMY FORCES

e. (U) Enemy Forces. (See also Annex B)

i. (U) There are eight classes of Zombies addressed within this plan. Chicken Zombies pose no threat to humans and actions to counter CZ's are the responsibilities of the US Depts of Justice, Homeland Security, Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration. The Zombie threat classes are: Pathogenic Zombies (PZ); Radiation Zombies (RZ); Evil Magic Zombies (EMZ); Space Zombies (SZ); Weaponized Zombies (WZ); Symbiant-Induced Zombies (SIZ); Vegetarian Zombies (VZ)

ii. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, four are caused by "natural" phenomena that can be reliably monitored and predicted. Zombies caused by natural phenomena are: PZ, RZ, SZ, and SIZ

1. (U) RZ can also be caused by man-made phenomena

iii. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, two are caused by “man-made” or “engineered” phenomena that can be reliably monitored and predicted. Zombies caused by man-made phenomena are: RZ and WZ

1. (U) RZ can also be caused by natural phenomena

iv. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, one type is caused by “occult” phenomena that cannot be reliably monitored, predicted, or proven to exist. Zombies caused by occult phenomena are : EMZ

1. (U) Based on most science fiction sources, EMZ, despite being the hardest threats to eliminate directly (by attacking the zombie life form), can usually be eliminated if the source of evil magic is destroyed. There is evidence to suggest the Chaplain Corps may prove integral to countering these threats.

v. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, one type is created by undetermined phenomena. Zombies caused by natural phenomena are: VZ

1. (U) This class of zombie has been documented in the popular video game “Plants Vs Zombies” and the movie “Signs” starring the actor Mel Gibson. No current examples of this zombie class have ever been captured or examined by scientists.

w. (U) Planning. For planning purposes the worst case threat scenario for this CONPLAN is the emergence of a zombie phenomena high transmissibility, high attack rates, high virulence, little or no immunity, and limited effective countermeasures (only susceptible to destruction of the brain stem). This event would produce a situation in which DOD would experience significant negative impacts on readiness (e.g., personnel availability, training, unit manning, equipping and deploying the force) while being simultaneously directed to provide substantial support to civil authorities and deter and or respond to opportunistic adversarial aggression.

i. (U) The primary characteristics of a highly threatening zombie phenomena are the pathogen’s ability to invade a host without being observed (bite or other visible wounds *not* being required), the ability to successfully reproduce within a host (human, animal or plant), its ability to exploit abundant natural hosts or vectors (not just limited to humans but able to spread among a host of animals or even plants), a potential to mutate quickly (mitigating our ability to develop a vaccine or “cure”), and high transmissibility resulting in large numbers of people becoming sick or absent simultaneously (or entire herds, flocks or crops being infected or contaminated).

ii. (U) A second order effect of a zombie phenomena of operational significance is the potential for political, social, and/or economic instability and/or degradation of allied military readiness. While adversarial forces (or resources) may also be infected, their readiness, operational capability or domestic stability may not be impacted in the same manner, to the same degree, or at the same time as US and allied forces. The degree to which countries and regions can mitigate morbidity, mortality and associated effects during the zombie phenomena event and reintegrate recovering (if possible) individuals and agricultural systems into society will have a considerable impact on military force capabilities. Countries with more advanced, prepared and robust health care and agricultural systems (to include a responsive quarantine capability) will be better able to mitigate many of the zombie phenomena effects.

iii. (U) Key security concerns that would arise from a zombie phenomena event of operational significance include opportunistic aggression, opportunities for violent extremists to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) during reduced security capabilities, reduced partner capacity during and after a zombie phenomena, instability resulting from a humanitarian disaster, and decreased production and distribution of essential commodities. The prevalence of a zombie phenomena coupled with political, social and economic instability may result in reduced security capabilities, providing an opportunity for international military conflict, increased terrorist activity, internal unrest, political and or economic collapse, humanitarian crises, and dramatic civil unrest.

iv. (U) Enemy Center of Gravity (COG). Once a zombie phenomena is capable of efficient, effective, and sustained transmission, its COG will be the geographic speed at which it can spread, attack rate within the host population, and the virulence of the zombie phenomena. A zombie phenomena will produce cascading effects due to the large number

of simultaneous absences over extended periods of time or loss of significant critical infrastructure/key resources (e.g., agricultural resources) on a national, regional or international scale.

(a) (U) **Critical Capabilities.** The ability to efficiently and effectively reproduce within a host, mutate quickly, and transmit from host to host are key requisites for the realization of a worst case zombie phenomena scenario. The degree of transmissibility depends on a number of key factors such as pathogen mutation, transmissibility of a new strain among hosts or vectors, proximity and behavior of hosts or vectors (e.g., travel between population centers or processing facilities), survivability outside a host (e.g., ability to spread via fomites), and availability/effectiveness of countermeasures.

(b) (U) **Critical Requirements.** A critical requirement of the zombie phenomena is the ability to mutate and propagate among and between hosts. Efficient transmission can occur in a number of ways including respiratory/airborne spread, direct contact, food and water contamination, biological vectors (e.g., mosquitos, sandflies, ticks), and via fomites (e.g., doorknobs, desktops, vehicles, machinery) where the disease can potentially survive for hours or days. Additionally, disease impacts severe enough to incapacitate or render unusable large numbers of hosts will likely generate additional psychological impacts among a population (absenteeism due to fear and panic, hoarding, trade restrictions). Furthermore, the infected host must survive long enough to shed disease agent in sufficient quantity to infect others. Because zombies do not expire naturally as is the case with humans suffering from other diseases (such as influenza or ebola), there is no inherent break on the spread of the disease. Finally, the disease requires susceptible populations, which includes those that are immunologically naïve and inadequately trained on preventive, environmental or occupational health measures. [Note: the spread of the zombie effect via either respiratory/airborne means or through fomites is considered the most highly dangerous course of action and the least likely based on historical evidence.]

(c) (U) **Critical Vulnerabilities.** The disease agent cannot infect an immunologically protected host (should such a capability be developed) and is susceptible to non-pharmaceutical intervention measures, various forms of environmental disinfection, vector control, development of effective immune response by vaccine or natural infection, and pharmaceutical prophylaxis or treatment. Non-pharmaceutical interventions include targeted, layered containment (social distancing, use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), non-exposure, hand washing, disinfection, isolation/quarantine, culling, equipment sanitation, etc.) which can impede transmission.

FRIENDLY FORCES

b. (U) **Friendly Forces:** (Refer to References C and E for detailed listing)

DECISIVE POINTS/CENTERS OF GRAVITY(COGs)

i. (U) **COG:** Zombie forces can be expected to center their efforts against the following Centers of Gravity

1. (U) Strategic COG #1: Human population centers.

a. (U) All Zombie classes will target human population centers or create effects against human population centers that will undermine human safety, security and the delivery of basic services. VZ's will target agriculture resources that humans depend upon.

2. (U) Operational:

a. (U) Operational COG #1: Lines of Communication (LOC)

i. (U) Zombies cannot drive, climb or swim (although zombies can wade into water they cannot float or swim). Zombies will utilize surface roads to reach human population centers and to increase their numbers by attacking fleeing humans. Although waterways are likely to remain viable, humans can only use them safely if they are very wide and they are free of any means for zombies to reach down and grab at them (such as from bridges). Humans in turn depend on access to LOCs to evacuate from zones of zombie incursion and to ensure the delivery of goods necessary for survival during a zombie attack.

b. (U) Operational COG #2: Potable water sources (PWS)

i. (U) Zombies do not drink water, but humans do. Humans typically cannot survive longer than 10 days without fresh water. Zombies will likely be drawn to potable water sources by the presence of human food sources that zombies prey on. Zombies can be expected to contaminate potable water sources with various contaminants during these attacks further limiting the supply of available potable water for humans.

DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL CAPABILITIES(CC's)

3. (U) Decisive Points (DPs)/Critical Capabilities (CCs)

a. (U) The following Critical Capabilities (CC) are crucial enablers for the strategic and operational centers of gravity to function-as such they are essential to the accomplishment of this plan's objectives

i. (U) **CC #1-Medical Infrastructure:** Zombie interactions will create human casualties who will eventually become zombies depending upon the source of the zombieism. In cases where zombieism manifests slowly, injured humans will likely seek out medical care in hospital and local clinics. These locations will ultimately become sources of zombieism in and of themselves as victims mutate. Not only will this render hospitals useless, it will likely cause irreparable casualties among medical professionals and members of the chaplain corps who will be necessary to combat zombie dominance. Additionally, zombies in hospitals will deny healthy humans access to medical equipment, medicines and blood/tissue/organ banks necessary for survival. An increase in the number of zombie casualties will have a direct impact on the number of personnel flooding LOCs to evade zombies. Further, damage to medical infrastructures will likely degrade the abilities of healthy human populations to purify potable water sources.

ii. (U) **CC #2- Law Enforcement Infrastructure:** Zombie interactions will elicit call outs for law enforcement forces who will likely become casualties as a result of insufficient training/equipment for zombie threats. Law enforcement personnel will be essential to the maintenance of law, order, and security as humans evacuate from areas at risk of zombie invasion. Further, law enforcement personnel will be essential to providing security for key resources (food and water distribution points, "safe" medical care facilities, transit choke points such as bridges and bus depots, and emergency evacuation sites). Humans fearing zombies are likely to raid police stations, National Guard Armories and other sporting goods stores in an attempt to arm themselves. A resultant breakdown in law and order will create conditions that will make it impossible to keep lines of communication operable or to mount an effective, unified action to counter zombie dominance.

iii. (U) **CC #3-Power Distribution Infrastructure:** Power generation and transport infrastructures require significant maintenance and supervision performed by humans in order to remain within normal operating parameters. If humans responsible for these activities cannot perform them, then these infrastructures will begin to malfunction and their resulting failures will have a cascading effect that will quickly undermine law and order and the delivery of basic services that healthy human populations rely on. It is possible that the noises, lights or thermal emissions generated by

these facilities will attract zombies and subsequently place human personnel working inside at considerable risk. If possible, remote controlled robots should be utilized to operate and repair these infrastructure elements in lieu of humans. Further, damage to power infrastructures will likely degrade the abilities of healthy humans populations to maintain potable water sources or operate LOCs effectively.

DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS(CR)

4. Decisive Points/Critical Requirements (CR)

a. (U) The following Critical Requirements (CR) are essential conditions, resources, and means for the critical capabilities in this plan to be fully operational.

i. (U) **CR #1-Effective Emergency Triage/Quarantine Procedures:** Promptly identifying humans contaminated by a source of zombieism and subsequently isolating them from the healthy population will be essential factors with regard to keeping hospitals and medical infrastructures in operation. Casualties contaminated by zombie sources must not be allowed to interact with healthy humans. Affected humans must be quarantined and subsequently eradicated. Failure to establish these conditions will undermine all CCs listed in this plan.

ii. (U) **CR #2-Local/Tribal/State/Federal Emergency Management Integration:** Effective communications between local, tribal, state and federal law enforcement (LE) and emergency management (EM) agencies will be essential to a concerted effort to secure healthy human populations and the resources they depend upon from zombie domination. As stated in the 9-11 Commission Report, LE and EM entities at all levels require interoperable communications equipment, HAZMAT decontamination equipment, comparable training standards and coordination procedures. Gaps and Seams between these entities will create conditions that will undermine all the CCs in this plan.

iii. (U) **CR #3-Effective Infrastructure Security:** If energy, water, or sewage/sanitation infrastructures are compromised by zombies, conditions will be created that could undermine law and order and induce systematic failures in medical and water distribution capabilities. Further, in the case of sewage and sanitation infrastructure, if zombies compromise these capabilities, conditions will exist that will facilitate the spread of disease and pathogen harboring parasites. In addition, compromise to these capabilities will jeopardize food and water sources for healthy humans and other wildlife and fauna that could prove key to survival. If compromised, the capabilities in this CR could undermine all the CCs in this plan.

iv. (U) **CR #4-Safe food, water, and fuel distribution network:** Ultimately, healthy human populations and the forces protecting them will require the means to acquire, purify, and distribute foodstuffs, water and fuels for heat and machine operations. Failure to maintain security supporting the distribution networks and nodes for food, water and fuel will compromise the longevity of healthy humans; decrease the amount of time that humans can remain sheltered in place or barricaded from zombie threats and could cause competition for resources that will undermine law and order. If compromised, the capabilities in this CR could undermine all the CCs in this plan.

v. (U) **CR #5-Effective Threat Surveillance and Warning Program:** Government agencies at all levels must possess an effective means to communicate information about zombie outbreaks, potential zombie contamination vectors, and the safety/security of critical support infrastructure and LOCs within their areas of operations. Absent an effective surveillance program, zombie forces could mass before an effective response could be mounted by healthy humans to counter zombie dominance. Failure to institute an effective surveillance and warning program as outlined in this CR could undermine all the CCs in this plan.

b. (U) Friendly Elements.**(a) (U) Federal Departments and Agencies.**

1. **(U) US Department of State (DOS).** The Secretary of State (primarily through USAID/OFDA) is responsible for coordinating international preparation and response to include persuading other nations to join our efforts to contain or slow the spread of a zombie phenomena, limiting the adverse impacts on trade and commerce, and coordinating efforts to assist other nations impacted by zombie phenomena. DOS is also responsible for interaction with all American citizens overseas.

2. (U) US Department of Defense.

a. **(U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).** OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, and program evaluation responsibilities.

b. **(U) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD P&R).** USD P&R leads Force Management Policy, Reserve Affairs, Health Affairs, Readiness, and Program Integration. Force Management Policy assesses and manages the force and Health Affairs is responsible for sustaining the health of the service members and their families. Reserve Affairs is responsible for preparing reserve forces and Readiness is responsible for overall force readiness. Program Integration is responsible for integrating crosscutting functions across P&R.

c. **(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)).** ASD (HA) serves as the principal medical advisor to the SecDef providing policy and guidance for health services supporting service members during military operations. ASD (HA) establishes FHP guidelines and prioritizes distribution of vaccines and anti-viral medications by the Services in cooperation with the GCCs. ASD (HA) also develops policy for health civil-military operations, health stability operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and military health support to the interagency and NGOs. DoD components will ensure operational considerations are integrated with the FHP implementation measures directed in this CONPLAN. As a direct reporting unit to ASD (HA), the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) serves as the DOD center for comprehensive health surveillance information to include analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of information regarding the health of the US military and military-associated populations.

d. **(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA)).** The ASD (HD&ASA) is designated by zombie phenomena effort, and provides policy oversight for civil support missions.

e. **(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD (PA)).** The ASD (PA) is the principal advisor to SecDef for public affairs and the DoD focal point for zombie phenomena media queries.

f. **(U) The Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS).** The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, and communicates SecDef guidance to the Combatant Commanders, Services, and DoD Agencies.

g. (U) Other Supporting DOD Agencies.

1) **(U) Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA).** DeCA will support installation-level preparedness and zombie phenomena contingency response planning.

2) **(U) Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).** DCMA deploys contingency contract administration services (CCAS) to the Area of Operations (AO) to administer civil augmentation programs (e.g., Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and the Air Forces Civil Augmentation Program (AFCAP)) external support contracts and weapons system support contracts with place of performance in theater when authority is delegated by the appropriate service contracting agency.

3) **(U) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).** DISA will ensure commands, services, and agencies receive

timely and effective command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and other support.

4) (U) **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI).** NCMI will provide intelligence warning of diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential and provide intelligence assessments of the implications, outlook, and opportunities associated with the spread of a potentially epidemic or pandemic disease, to include zombie phenomena. NCMI will also provide intelligence warning and finished all source medical intelligence analysis regarding foreign emerging/re-emerging infectious diseases (to include zombie phenomena) of operational significance to the Combatant Commanders, the DOD, and the US government as a whole. NCMI will provide information regarding foreign medical capability to plan for, report, identify, and respond to zombie phenomena threats.

5) (U) **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).** DLA coordinates with GCCs and Service components for medical, antiviral, PPE, subsistence, clothing, individual equipment, petroleum, construction materials, personal demand items, medical materials and repair parts support. DLA provides integrated material management and supply support for all DLA managed material. DLA also provides property and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal services.

6) (U) **Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).** DTRA provides modeling, hazard prediction, technical subject matter expertise, and planning support upon request of the supported commander. DTRA leverages its Biological Threat Reduction Program to strengthen state capabilities for bio-surveillance, early detection, and rapid response to human, animal and plant diseases of operational significance. DTRA also has the capability to provide hazardous avoidance mapping and Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT) support.

7) (U) **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA).** NGA provides geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to include imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information and service products data and associated services in support of zombie phenomena contingency response operations for DoD, primary agencies, and coordinating agencies as directed. As appropriate, NGA provides GEOINT release and disclosure guidance to supporting organizations.

DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES (CV)

5. Decisive Points/Critical Vulnerabilities (CV)

a. (U) The following Critical Vulnerabilities are aspects the critical requirements in this plan which are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.

i. (U) **CV #1 – Individual Healthy Humans (IHH):** the IHH is the singlemost important factor shared by all the COGs, CCs, and CVs in this plan. A zombie outbreak can affect thousands of IHHs in the span of minutes. Ironically, given the consideration that zombie outbreaks in human hosts cannot possibly last longer than 40 days (because human hosts require food and water to continue functioning), there may be times when IHHs will be forced to abandon other IHHs who are unable to evade sources of zombie contamination. Such situations could arise while IHHs are evacuating in the face of incoming zombie forces. IHHs must not be allowed to “go back for” family, friends, or other personnel who cannot get away from zombies quickly enough. All IHHs who fall behind must be left behind. Such decisions are abhorrent to normal IHHs and military and LE personnel protecting them must rigidly enforce such restraint. Healthy humans can wait out a zombie outbreak if they are prudent-nothing can be done to cure a human if they become a zombie. Every human that becomes a zombie increases the enemy’s numbers and decreases the chances that healthy humans will survive.

REMAINDER OF PLAN UNDER WORK—I have SIPRnet access again and more will be added as time and duties permit.

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(U) Conplan 8888

~~TOP SECRET~~

From Intellipedia

You have new messages (last change).

The purpose of this page is to facilitate completion and improvement of CONPLAN 8888 and supporting intelligence products. This page is intended to be educational and collaborative in nature.

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(U) CONPLAN 8888

CZTF CONPLAN 8888-12 "COUNTER-ZOMBIE OPERATIONS" 10 OCT 2012

Classified by: N/A

Reason: N/A

Declassify on: N/A

(U) DISCLAIMER

(U) CONPLAN 8888 DISCLAIMER: Unlike the SIPRNET version of this page, the JWICS version is not associated with any specific unit or command. This page is meant to serve as a collaborative space for individuals to contribute to the IC's ability to plan and prepare for an event on the magnitude of a global zombie pandemic. This plan is compiled at the individual initiative of the authors and is currently not assigned by or endorsed by any combatant commander or JTF.

(U) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

CZTF CONPLAN 8888-12 (U) (U) OPR: Counter Zombie Task Force/CJ53

Letter of Transmittal SUBJECT: CONPLAN 8888-12 (U) SEE DISTRIBUTION (Annex Z)

1. (U) CONPLAN 8888-12, which provides for Counter-Zombie dominance Operations is attached.
2. (U) This Document utilizes the JOPES format
3. (U) File this letter in front of the plan.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

NAME N. RANK Director, Plans and Policy

(U) SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

Security Instructions Counter Zombie Task Force CONPLAN 8888-12 (U) OPR: CJ53 SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS (U) (U) Plan Title:

1. (U) The long title of this plan is CONPLAN 8888-12 COUNTER-ZOMBIE OPERATIONS (U).
2. (U) The short title of this plan is CONPLAN 8888-12 (U).
3. (U) Classified portions of this document must be marked according to community standards. Classified capabilities used to counter zombies should be included in the JWICS version of this plan, up to the classification level allowed by Intellipedia. Additional classified capabilities should be address in the appropriate annexes or appendices developed through appropriate channels.
4. (U) This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, title 18, United States Code, sections 793 and 794. The transmission or revelation of information contained herein, in any manner, to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
5. (U) Reproduction of this document is authorized for general training purposes; reproduce only in accordance with guidelines for reproduction of classified material outlined in DoD 5200.1-R, Information Security Program. If this were a real plan, the following language would be included "Do not reproduce this document without the expressed written permission of CDRUSSTRATCOM or one of his specified subordinate commanders."

(U) PLAN SUMMARY

Plan Summary CONPLAN 8888-12 (U) PLAN SUMMARY

'1. (U) *Statement:*' (U) This CONPLAN is a contingency oriented plan designed to be used as a basis or point of departure for Crisis Action Planning (CAP).

(U) PURPOSE

'2. **(U) Purpose:**' This plan fulfills fictional Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) tasking for Counter Zombie Task Force to develop a comprehensive JOPES Level 3 plan to undertake military operations to preserve "non-zombie" humans from the threats posed by a global zombie pandemic. Because zombies pose a threat to all "non-zombie" human life (hereafter referred to as "humans"), the Counter Zombie Task Force will be prepared to preserve the sanctity of human life and be prepared to conduct operations in support of any human population-including traditional adversaries. The objective of this plan is threefold:

- a. (U) Establish and maintain a vigilant defensive condition aimed at protecting humankind from zombies
- b. (U) If necessary, conduct operations that will, if directed, eradicate zombie threats to human safety
- c. (U) Aid civil authorities in maintaining law and order and restoring basic services during and after a zombie attack

(U) DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3. **(U) Defensive operations.** Those operations aimed at monitoring the environment for zombie-related threats and preparing capabilities to respond to the same. This plan's defensive branch (within Annex C) details protective and preventive measures for humans in response to the threat scenarios identified in paragraph 6 below. The system of Zombie Conditions (Z-CONS or ZOMBIECONS) will provide predetermined actions to proactively position the US Government in response to threat indications and warning.

(U) OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

'4. **(U) Offensive Operations.**' Those operations where the CZTF has been directed to eradicate zombie threats to human safety using military capabilities as authorized by POTUS or SECDEF. This plan's "offensive" branch (within Annex C) and Annex S (STO) details the neutralization (to render ineffective) of Zombie capabilities through denial, deception, disruption, degradation or destruction. The system of ZOMBIECONS will proactively anticipate and respond to increased GCC space capability requirements including offensive space control capabilities.

(U) CONDITIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

5. (U) Conditions for Implementation

a. **(U) Politico-Military Situation.** Zombies are horribly dangerous to all human life and zombie infections have the potential to seriously undermine national security and economic activities that sustain our way of

life. Therefore having a population that is not composed of zombies or at risk from their malign influence is vital to U.S. and Allied national interests. While the U.S. currently enjoys several asymmetric advantages against zombie infections originating in the Eurasian landmass, these advantages can easily be negated by air and sea traffic that could transport the source of a zombie infection to North and South America. Further, asteroids and nuclear space radiation that can convert people into zombies can affect any landmass or population on earth. Given the rapidity at which zombie outbreaks spread, decisive, overwhelming, and possibly unilateral military force may be required to negate the zombie threat.

(U) PLAN EXECUTION

b. (U) Plan Execution. CONPLAN 8888 is designed to be implemented across all 6 phases of military operations. When directed by POTUS or SECDEF, CDRCZTF will issue mission type orders (ALERTORD, WARNORD, DEPORD, OPORD, EXORD, TERMORD) to execute specific actions from this plan. This plan is only designed to be implemented if zombie threats arise which cannot be handled within the scope of the CZTF Campaign Plan (OPLAN 8000) and the current Fiscal Year OPORDS (FY XX OPORD, SPACE OPORD, DSCA OPORD etc) that direct the execution of actions from OPLAN 8000.

(U) ZOMBIE THREAT SUMMARY

6. (U) Zombie threat summary:

a. (U) CONPLAN 8888 is designed to address the following types of zombie threats:

i. (U) Pathogenic Zombies (PZ):

1. (U) PZ's are zombie life forms created after an organism is infected by a virus or bacteria or some other form of contagion

ii. (U) Radiation Zombies (RZ):

1. (U) RZ's are zombie life forms created after an organism is infected by a extreme dosage of electromagnetic and/or particle radiation

iii. (U) Space Zombies (SZ):

1. (U) SZ's are zombie life forms originating from space or created by toxic contamination of the earth environment via some form of extra-terrestrial toxin or radiation

2. (U) "Zombie satellites" can be classified as SZ's, however they pose no danger to humans (unless they conduct an unplanned de-orbit). Zombie satellites could pose a threat to SATCOM services and other space based assets (Refer to Galaxy 15 incident-May 2010)

iv. (U) Weaponized Zombies (WZ):

1. (U) WZ's are zombie life forms deliberately created via bio/bio-mechanical engineering for the purpose

of being employed as weapons. Zombie weaponization programs and supporting infrastructures are included in COAs to deal with these threats.

2. (U) The movie "The Crazies" exemplifies the most common type of WZ (humans turned into zombies via exposure to toxic chemicals/gasses)

v. (U) Symbiont-Induced Zombies (SIZ):

1. (U) SIZ's are zombie life forms originating from the introduction of a symbiont life form into an otherwise healthy host. Although the symptoms of symbiont zombieism is similar in most regards to pathogenic zombism, the symbiont does not kill the host organism quickly, or at all. However, there is no known way to save an organism after zombism has occurred-even if the symbiont is removed.

vi. (U) Vegetarian Zombies (VZ):

1. (U) VZ's are zombie life forms originating from any cause but pose no direct threat to humans because they only eat plant life (as indicated in the popular game "Plants Vs. Zombies"). Although VZ's do not attack humans or other animal life, they will consume all plant life in front of them. They can cause massive deforestation or elimination of basic food crops essential to humans (rice, corn, soybeans).

vii. (U) Chicken Zombies (CZ)

1. (U) Although it sounds ridiculous, this is actually the only proven class of zombie that actually exists.

2. (U) CZ's were first documented in Jonathan M. Forrester's 4 Dec 2006 online article "Zombie Chickens Taking Over California" (<http://www.slashfood.com/2006/12/04/Zombie-Chickens-Taking-Over-California/>) .

3. CZ's occur when old hens that can no longer lay eggs are incorrectly euthanized by poultry farmers using carbon monoxide. The hens are then deposited in large piles to decompose. The hens appear to be dead when buried, but inexplicably come back to life and dig themselves out from the piles of dead chickens. After reaching the surface, CZ's stagger about for a period of time before ultimately expiring due to internal organ failure.

4. (U) CZ's are simply terrifying to behold and are likely only to make people become vegetarians in protest to animal cruelty. They appear to be no direct threat to humans. They are different from WZ's because they are the result of actions taken to kill a living organism vice actions taken to deliberately re-animate dead organisms or impair life functions to a minimal function.

(U) ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS

b. (U) **Environmental Effects.** Causes of zombie infection are generally resistant to most environmental effects.

i. (U) The following environmental factors apply to zombies in this plan:

1. (U) The viral pathogens that cause PZ's have some vulnerability to ultraviolet light. UV light impairs the functions of rybo-nucleic acids (RNA) that comprise most viral life forms. At best, UV light can disrupt virus reproduction in healthy cells. It should be noted that PZ's may experience painful photo-sensitivity as a result of sunlight exposure. For this reason, PZ activity is not expected to be as high during bright sunny conditions as it is during the hours of darkness.

2. (U) EMZ, SZ, VZ, WZ's are all likely immune to any extreme meteorological phenomena except fires, floods, tornadoes or tsunamis.

ii. (U) The following environmental factors apply to humans in this plan:

1. (U) Rain will be vitally important to human survival. If civil water supplies are cut off, humans will have to rely on other means to obtain water. Ground water from streams and rivers will be unreliable since it will be difficult to determine if ground water is a vector for zombie infection.

2. (U) Humans who do not shelter-in-place within a sturdy structure that protects them from the direct effects of air currents that could carry pathogens or toxins or direct exposure to radiation will be at increased risk of contamination, death and injury.

c. (U) Although these threat scenarios aren't meant to be all-inclusive (CZTF must be postured and flexible enough to respond to any emerging threat due to different zombie disaster scenarios.) Annex C Appendix 1- Defensive Operations and Annex C-Appendix 2 – Offensive Operations provide a solid foundations for full spectrum operations against most postulated zombie threats.

(U) LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS

d. (U) **Legal Considerations.** U.S. and international law regulate military operations only insofar as human and animal life are concerned. There are almost no restrictions on hostile actions that may be taken either defensively or offensively against pathogenic life forms, organic-robotic entities, or "traditional" zombies. Given the likelihood of an all out threat to "human survival", it is likely that this plan will be executed concurrently with a declaration of martial law within CONUS and US territories. Additional legal considerations taken into account when preparing this plan include: applicable U.S. statutes, the United Nations Charter, international treaties and agreements to which the U.S. is a party, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), customary international law, and applicable Rules of Engagement (ROE) and policies.

e. (U) **Operations To Be Conducted:** (See 8888 Annex C)

f. (U) **Deployment.** CZTF forces specified in the "forces" table of the current fiscal year OPORD are deployed around the globe. This CONPLAN has no pre-identified Area of Operation (AO); therefore, it does not direct forward deployment of forces into any particular region. When CDRCZTF is the

"supported" JTF, during crisis, a Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) will be developed in collaboration with USTRANSCOM, for those situations when offensive or defensive operations require movement of forces or assets. However, when CDRCZTF deploys forces as a "supporting" commander, those forces will normally be tied to the "supported" theater commander's TPFDD.

g. (U) **Employment.** CONPLAN 8888 is situationally dependent-it is designed to allow CDRCZTF to execute military operations in support of national OR theater objectives in either a supporting OR supported role. Operational phases within this plan may be sequential, non-sequential, or modified depending on the global situation. However, given the global threat to humanity posed by zombies, once CDRCZTF issues orders to transition to a specific phase of operations, that phase will apply to the entire globe.

(U) CONPLAN PHASES

h. (U) CONPLAN Phases.

CONPLAN 8888 Operational Phasing						
Plan Branches	Phase 0 - Shape	Phase 1 - Deter	Phase 2 - Seize Initiative	Phase 3 - Dominate	Phase 4 - Stabilize	Phase 5-Restore Civil Authority
(U) Defensive Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct general zombie awareness training - Ensure readiness of CBRNE protective equipment - Monitor vectors of zombie contamination for increased threat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Zombies cannot be deterred themselves - Conduct large scale training to demonstrate CZTF ability to survive and operate in a toxic/contaminated environment IOT deter nations states from pursuing development or deployment of zombie - creating pathogens, toxins or similar capabilities developed by nations states, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recall all CZTF personnel to duty stations - Begin fortification of all CZTF operating locations - Initiate distribution of CBRNE protection equipment - Activate COOP Plans - Place deployable command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lock down all CZTF operating locations for 30 days - Assume Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) 2 inside all workstations and direct MOPP-4 for all personnel who venture outside fortified positions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deploy recon teams after D+30 to ascertain general safety of environment near CZTF locations for human habitation. - Execute a counter-zombie ISR plan to ID holdout pockets of zombie resistance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Deploy CZTF personnel to to aid any surviving civil authorities in disaster zones

		large corporations and control to terrorist/criminal groups capabilities on alert				
(U) Offensive Ops	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct normal combat operations training - Ensure forces conduct annual HAZMAT and COOP training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct large scale training to demonstrate CZTF ability to decisively target and negate zombie-creating pathogens, toxins or similar capabilities developed by nations states, large corporations to terrorist/criminal groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If necessary begin limited scale military operations to negate zombie threat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Issue orders for defensive forces to kill all non-human life on sight - Initiate bomber and missile strikes against targeted sources of zombie infection, zombie support infrastructure using all available forces - Ensure all zombie corpses are immolated 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Target all main body and holdout vectors of zombie influence contagion using all available military capabilities. - Continue all actions from previous phase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reconstitute combat capabilities at Offutt, Whiteman, Vandenberg AFBs and Ft Meade. Prepare to re-deploy the forces to attack surviving zombie holdouts
(U) Defense Support to Civil Authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Form JIACG to ensure contingency plans are synchronized with other federal, state and tribal agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As authorized by POTUS and SECDEF, initiate intelligence sharing, and provide technical advisory services to federal, state and tribal agencies - Provide ISR assistance to DHS to ID and curtail migration of lifeforms and/or toxic materials 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - On order from POTUS or SECDEF, provide security to civilian areas, evacuation zones and assist other federal, state, and tribal agencies with the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - BPT to participate in "render-safe" operations within CONUS, US territory, or other foreign territories as directed by POTUS and SECDEF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Provide support to follow-on "render-safe" operations in areas contaminated by zombie-inducing pathogens, toxins, magic or other malign influence as directed by POTUS and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - As directed by POTUS and SECDEF, provide support to federal, state, and tribal agencies' efforts to restore basic services in zombie-related disaster

	from areas where zombie-related disease vectors originate	surveillance of and enforcement of quarantine areas	SECDEF	areas
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i. (U) **Phase 0 - Shape the Environment (Day-to-Day Operations).** USSTRATCOM will perform routine operations to include epidemiological surveillance to watch for changes in disease vectors that could cause zombieism. USSTRATCOM Center for Combating-Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) will serve as the lead component within the command for ensure all Phase 0 shaping operations are conducted and synchronized with other federal, state and tribal agencies. SCC-WMD will ensure that necessary epidemiological ISR requirements are issued and answered by the Intelligence Community. SCC-WMD will work with USAMRIID to ensure the risks to USSTRATCOM forces are monitored and that necessary HAZMAT and CBRNE training is accomplished across the USSTRATCOM enterprise.

j. (U) **Phase 1 – Deter (Day-to-Day Operations).** Upon receipt of a CZTF WARNORD, JFCC GS will become the supported commander for Phase 1 operations in this plan.

k. (U) **Phase 2 - Seize the Initiative (Evaluate/Mitigate/Prepare).** Upon receipt of a CZTF WARNORD or ALERTORD, all components will initiate a force-wide recall of all assigned personnel and activate COOP Plans. All airborne and ground-based survivable C2 nodes will make ready to deploy for at least 35 days. To avoid ambiguity with nuclear armed peers such as Russia and the PRC, CZTF will conduct confidence-building measures to ensure leaders within these nations do not construe CZTF preparations to counter zombie-dominance as preparations for war. If necessary, JFCC GS will sortie forces to conduct prompt global strike against initial concentrations of zombies. Other CZTF forces will provide security assistance to federal, state and tribal authorities to negate zombie threats, provide ISR and security for protected civilian areas and will aid in the enforcement of quarantine zones.

l. (U) **Phase 3 - Dominate (Respond/Counter).** Upon receipt of a CZTF order (ALERTORD, WARNORD, OPORD, EXORD), all CZTF forces will begin preparations to conduct combat operations against zombie threats. CZTF forces will activate COOP plans, emergency disaster support plans and will shelter all mission essential personnel in place for at least 40 days.

m. (U) **Phase 4/5 – (Stabilize Environment).** No earlier than 40 days after the initiation of Phase 3 operations, CZTF forces will initiate local reconnaissance ops to determine the severity of the remaining zombie threat, assess the physical and epidemiological security of the local environment, and survey the status of basic services (water, power, sewage infrastructure and water, air, land lines of communications). All reports back to HQ CZTF will be broadcast in clear text using unsecured comms so that if any isolated survivors intercept those comms, link-up between these survivors and CZTF forces will be facilitated. CZTF forces will remain “combat ready” to re-engage any remaining pockets of zombie forces or contamination vectors.

n. **Enable Civil Authority (Normalization).** CZTF, its components, other applicable CCDRs, and industry

partners will collaboratively replace, recover, rebuild, and reconstitute, U.S./civil/commercial/Allied civil infrastructure and services, as needed. CZTF will continue to provide support to theater warfighters and USG agencies, as required. Lessons Learned and After Action Reports IAW (See Enclosure D to CJCSI 3150.25B) will be produced and fed back into this CONPLAN for process improvement and inclusion in future exercises.

(U) SUPPORTING PLANS

7. (U) Supporting Plans. Due to the fact that an outbreak of zombicism will likely spread rapidly across COCOM AOR boundaries, CDRCZTF has [not] been tasked by SECDEF to develop a Level 3 plan that can serve as the model for all other COCOM counter-zombie dominance planning. CONPLAN 8888 planning guidance [not] from the SECDEF assumes a worst case scenario in which all normal C2 capabilities are impaired or overrun by zombie forces. As such, this plan relies heavily on hardened C2 capabilities normally reserved for nuclear or full scale global conventional warfare. Supporting Combatant Commands, and functional components will update their contingency plans related to counter-zombie operations using this plan.

(U) COLLATERAL PLANS

8. (U) Collateral Plans. The following USSTRATCOM plans may be implemented collaterally with CONPLAN 8888

a. CDRUSSTRATCOM

- i. CONPLAN 8035 "Space Operations"
- ii. CONPLAN 8531 "Pandemic Influenza"
- iii. CONPLAN 8099 "Combatting Weapons of Mass Destruction"
- iv. OPLAN 8010 "Deterrence and Global Strike"
- v. OPLAN 8001 "Omnibus Support Plan"

b. (U) Geographic Combatant Command OPLANs or CONPLANs.

- i. Refer to OPLAN 8001 "Omnibus Support Plan"

(U) ASSUMPTIONS

9. (U) Assumptions.

- a. (U) U.S. and Allies will have the situational awareness necessary to conduct all counter-zombie operations in this plan.

b. (U) Zombie forces will become stronger with each human casualty (because each human casualty will become a zombie)

c. (U) U.S. and Allied forces will be degraded as a conflict emerges and progresses.

d. (U) LOAC will not apply to zombies.

e. (U) Domestic law enforcement agencies will be responsible for addressing any CONUS-based attacks involving zombies until martial law is declared

f. (U) There is no known medical cure for a zombie pathogen. At this time it can be assumed that once a human turns, they cannot be cured or reverted to human status.

g. (U) The only way to effectively cause casualties to zombies by damaging the brain (including brain stem).

h. (U) The only way to ensure a zombie is "dead" is to burn the zombie corpse.

i. (U) Intelligence assets may be task to collect through non-doctrinal or non-traditional means given the nature of the adversary.

j. (U) Even if infected by a zombie contaminant or pathogen, human biology requires a regular intake of water and food. Absent proper hydration to offset the affects of progressing zombeism, zombie-infected humans will experience organ failure that will immobilize or kill the host within 30-40 days.

k. (U) Zombies are undead and thus feel no pain or fear of death.

n. (U) The human instinct for self preservation will cause some newly infected zombie hosts to deny their imminent zombification to nearby humans.

~~(TS)~~ OPERATIONAL LIMITATIONS

1. (U) Operational Limitations consist of actions or conditions that CZTF and its supporting forces must take or ensure happen (constraints) and thos actions of conditions that CZTF and its supporting forces must not take allow to happen (restraint). Other limitations contained in this section pertain to resource or procedural shortfalls that planners must consider which could undermine USSTRATCOM's ability to achieve the missions outlined in this plan.

~~(TS)~~ CONSTRAINTS

(U) CZTF forces must-

i. (U) Lead, advocate and coordinate all U.S. counter-zombie operations

- ii. (U) Continue to conduct assigned missions throughout all phases of a zombie pandemic
- iii. (U) Remain postured to conduct military operations to repel zombies and eradicate hordes
- iv. (U) Be prepared to conduct combat operations within CONUS against zombies were previously US citizens (in accordance with applicable U.S. law as amended during crisis)
- v. (U) Maintain viable, up to date continuity of operations plans
- vi. ~~(TS)~~ Maintain emergency plans to employ nuclear weapons within CONUS to eradicate zombie hordes

(U) RESTRAINTS

m. (U) Operational Restraints.

(U) CZTF forces must not-

- i. (U) Allow nuclear weapon storage areas to be compromised by zombie forces
- ii. (U) Allow airfields or POL facilities critical to combat aircraft capabilities to be overrun by zombie forces
- iii. (U) Allow maritime facilities that support SSBN operations to be compromised by zombie forces

(U) SHORTFALLS AND LIMITING FACTORS

n. (U) Shortfalls and Limiting Factors.

i. (U) Adequate Zombie defenses require sandbags, sand, barbed wire, architectural vectors, anti-personnel mines, riot control chemical agents, MOPP-gear and petroleum (to create flame barriers). These supplies may not be present in sufficient volume to allow desired levels of defense against zombie incursion and could severely tax available logistical support infrastructure

ii. (U)

iii. (U)

iv. (U)

v. (U)

vi. (U) DoD wide continuity of operations plans (COOP) do not currently address zombie threats. Further, since COOP(s) utilize facilities provided by other commands or non-hardened temporary facilities, zombie threats will likely render COOP(s) ineffective. COOP(s) should be revised to include in-extremis carpentry, welding and lumber stockpiling and training in metal work in order to facilitate shelter-in-place ops and barricading of unhardened facilities against zombies

vii. (U) Airborne Command Centers are unlikely to be viable after the first week of a zombie invasion. Although refueling in air will extend mission capabilities, the support bases that refuelers operate from will likely be overrun by zombies. It is possible that islands like Hawaii, Guam and Diego Garcia might remain

viable relocation bases if airborne C2 assets can make it to these locations.

o. (U) Time to Commence Effective Operations. Because of the unique situation surrounding zombie threats and the level of USG interests at stake, it is unlikely there will be a time-phased, incremental buildup of forces. It is more likely that during COA development, CZTF will coordinate joint and combined military efforts, options, levels of forces and objectives with other affected COCOMs, based on worldwide situational awareness and guidance from OSD, Joint Staff and other combatant commands.

(U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

10. (U) Command Relationships. (See 8888 Annex J and current operational orders)

a. (U) Command Relationships. CZTF forces may be fixed or deployed, and may support theater and/or national objectives simultaneously. CZTF exercises COCOM over assigned forces and utilizes support relationships to support other commands. CZTF will tailor command relations to best match the situation, taking into account the global perspective and other ongoing space missions. Therefore, there is no "one size fits all" for counter-zombie operations command relationships.

(U) LOGISTICS APPRAISAL

11. (U) Logistic Appraisal. Forces utilized in this CONPLAN include deployable or fixed assets operating in CONUS or from sites located throughout the world and are controlled as separate forces. During a contingency, CZTF service components will ensure all mission-critical forces (fixed and mobile), are fully supported and capable of performing their mission. Forces fixed in another COCOM AOR are authorized DIRLAUTH with the COCOMs responsible for their AORs for the purpose of coordinating their support requirements. These forces will keep CZTF and their owning component informed. COCOMS will work with CZTF J4 and J8 for reimbursement for support requested by CZTF forces (See Annex D).

(U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE

Classification Guidance

CZTF CONPLAN 8888-12 (U)

OPR: CZTF J53

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE (U)

1. (U) This classification guidance provides users with general categories of subjects and levels of protection. The level of protection listed represents the highest probable level of protection required by these subjects during specific plan phases. If a document derived from this plan contains particular portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions shall be marked as unclassified and the page shall be marked with the highest classification of any information on or revealed by the page. An explanation will be added to the page or document identifying the combination or association of information that necessitated the higher classification.

Data Requiring Protection	Planning Subjects Requiring Protection			
	COA Development	Execution Planning	Implementation	Post Implementation
(U) Plan Short Title	U	U	U	U
(U) Plan Long Title	U	U	U	U
(U) Zombie Control Terminology	U	U	U	U
(U) Zombie Threat Information	U	U	U	U
(U) Offensive Counter-Zombie Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Defensive Counter-Zombie Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Concept of Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Geospatial Data	U	U	U	U
(U) Classification Guide	U	U	U	U
(U) Date Operation Begins	U	U	U	U
(U) Participating Units	U	U	U	U
(U) Zombie Rescue Support	U	U	U	U
(U) Residual Capabilities After Operations	U	U	U	U
(U) Communications effectiveness, sustainability,	U	U	U	U

and limitations				
(U) Command Arrangements and agreements	U	U	U	U
(U) Rules of Engagement (ROE)	U	U	U	U
(U) Assigned Areas of Operation and boundaries	U	U	U	U
(U) Operational constraints	U	U	U	U
(U) Key planning assumptions	U	U	U	U
(U) Logistics Appraisal	U	U	U	U

2. (U) Changes to this guidance will be coordinated through CZTF J53.

3. (U) Agencies identified in Annex Z may reproduce this plan consistent with a need-to-know. Listed organizations may reproduce and distribute this plan to assigned forces as required to fulfill mission requirements, and as required for preparation of supporting plans.

4. (U) Non-DoD agencies with a need to know will be allowed to make copies of this plan or hand scribe significant portions of the plan if necessary.

5. (U) Release to U.S., Australian, Canadian and United Kingdom personnel with a valid need-to-know" is authorized. Contact CZTF/J53 to obtain permission to release or disclose this plan to other foreign personnel.

(U) BASIC PLAN (Annex A)

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. Counter Zombie Task Force

10 OCTOBER 2012

BASIC PLAN

CDRCZTF CONPLAN 8888-12 (U)

COUNTER-ZOMBIE OPERATIONS, BASIC PLAN (U)

1. (U) References:

- a. (U) "National Security Strategy of The United States," Mar 06 (U)
- b. (U) "Task Force Plan 2012," 10 April 2011 (FOUO)
- c. (U) Guidance for Employment of the Force (S)
- d. (U) Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (S)
- e. (U) CZTF Current Operational Orders and Directives (REL ACGU Versions)
- f. (U) The Zombie Survival Guide; Complete Protection from the Living Dead, by Max Brooks (Three Rivers Press), 16 Sep 2003
- g. (U) The Zombie Survival Guide; Recorded Attacks, by Max Brooks (Three Rivers Press), 6 Oct 2009
- h. (U) World War Z; An Oral History of the Zombie War, by Max Brooks (Three Rivers Press), 16 Oct 2007
- i. (U) The Zombie Combat Manual; A Guide to Fighting the Living Dead (Berkley Trade) 6 April 2010
- j. (U) "Zombie Chickens Taking Over California", Jonathan M. Forrester, 4 Dec 06
(<http://www.slashfood.com/2006/12/04/Zombie-Chickens-Taking-Over-California/>)
- k. (U) Zombies Vs. Unicorns, by Justine Larbastier & Holly Black (Margaret K. McElderry Books, NYC) 2010

(U) SITUATION

- a. (U) General. (U) Although there is no specific Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) within the Chairman's Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) directing the creation of a counter zombie-dominance plan, there is ample specified guidance for the creation of Level-3 plans to provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), Homeland Defense (HD), Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), and Pandemic Influenza (PI).
- b. (U) In light of the inherent survival threat posed by zombies and absent specified guidance for detailed planning to address such a contingency, CZTF has taken the initiative to develop a JOPES Level 3 plan (CONPLAN) consistent with guidance derived from other specified planning efforts to ensure U.S. and Allied freedom of action from counter zombie operations. As a result, many specified tasks documented in this plan are taken from high-level strategic guidance documents. Other tasks in the plans derived from these higher level tasks or essential for their accomplishment are listed as "implied tasks". In all cases, CZTF has determined which tasks are "essential" tasks based on mission analysis (unless higher level

guidance already specifies that a task is essential).

c. (U) Science provides almost no useful data about zombies. Although this presents a number of challenges when military planners design operations to counter zombies, this plan utilizes data provided by science fiction sources in addition to what little academic or scientific information is currently available. The use of science fictions sources does provide a compelling advantage for military planners however. In almost all cases, science fiction scenarios significantly enhance analyses of courses of actions, facilitate COA wargaming and adjustment, and provide insight for planners with regards to the development of facts, assumptions, risks and aversion of "groupthink" or "cognitive bias". In short, the more robust a science fiction scenario related to zombies is, the more useful it is for planning purposes-regardless of how "outlandish" it might be.

(U) EXECUTION

3. (U) Execution of this plan requires a CZTF EXORD. Activation or preparation to carry out operations detailed within this plan (including but not limited to changing phases, changing Zombie-Cons, or terminating operations) will require an CZTF ALERTORD at a minimum.

(U) MISSION STATEMENT

a. (U) Mission Statement:

i. (U)On order, CDRCZTF will execute global military operations to protect humankind from zombies and, if directed, eradicate zombie threats to human safety and aid civil authorities in maintaining law and order and restoring basic services during and after a zombie attack.

(U) COMMANDER'S INTENT

b. (U) Commander's Intent:

i. (U)Purpose: CDRCZTF will conduct military operations unilaterally or in conjunction with Allies to preserve U.S. national interests and the collective security of humankind

ii. (U)Method: CZTF will utilize assigned and attached military forces to maintain timely and accurate warning of zombie threats, target zombie safe havens, eliminate sources of zombeism, and provide aid to civil authorities in their efforts to protect civilians from zombie threats.

iii. (U)End State: Sources of zombieism are eradicated, zombie forces are precluded from massing and threatening human population centers and potential adversaries are deterred from developing zombie weaponization programs

(U) AREAS OF CONCERN

i. (U) Area of Responsibility (AOR). CZTF is not assigned an AOR for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with a geographic AOR unless directed. Although CZTF has no geographic AOR and has no specified combat roles against zombies.

ii. (U) Area of Interest (AOI).

iii. (U) Joint Operational Area (JOA)

FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS

d. (U) Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs):

i. Zombies cannot be deterred

ENEMY FORCES

e. (U) Enemy Forces. (See also Annex B)

i. (U) There are eight classes of Zombies addressed within this plan. Chicken Zombies pose no threat to humans and actions to counter CZ's are the responsibilities of the US Depts of Justice, Homeland Security, Agriculture and Food and Drug Administration. The Zombie threat classes are: Pathogenic Zombies (PZ); Radiation Zombies (RZ); Evil Magic Zombies (EMZ); Space Zombies (SZ); Weaponized Zombies (WZ); Symbiont-Induced Zombies (SIZ); Vegetarian Zombies (VZ)

ii. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, four are caused by "natural" phenomena that can be reliably monitored and predicted. Zombies caused by natural phenomena are : PZ, RZ, SZ, and SIZ

1. (U) RZ can also be caused by man-made phenomena

iii. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, two are caused by "man-made" or "engineered" phenomena that can be reliably monitored and predicted. Zombies caused by man-made phenomena are: RZ and WZ

1. (U) RZ can also be caused by natural phenomena

iv. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, one type is caused by "occult" phenomena that cannot be reliably monitored, predicted, or proven to exist. Zombies caused by occult phenomena are : EMZ

1. (U) Based on most science fiction sources, EMZ despite being the hardest threats to eliminate directly (by attacking the zombie life form) can usually be eliminated if the source of evil magic is destroyed. There is evidence to suggest the Chaplain Corps may prove integral to countering these threats.

v. (U) Of the eight classes of zombies, one type is created by undetermined phenomena. Zombies caused by natural phenomena are : VZ

1. (U) This class of zombie has been documented in the popular video game "Plants Vs Zombies" and the movie "Signs" starring the actor Mel Gibson. No current examples of this zombie class have ever been captured or examined by scientists.

w. (U) Planning. For planning purposes the worst case threat scenario for this CONPLAN is the emergence of a zombie phenomena high transmissibility, high attack rates, high virulence, little or no immunity, and limited effective countermeasures (only susceptible to destruction of the brain stem). This event would produce a situation in which DoD would experience significant negative impacts on readiness (e.g.,

personnel availability, training, unit manning, equipping and deploying the force) while being simultaneously directed to provide substantial support to civil authorities and deter and or respond to opportunistic adversarial aggression.

i. (U) The primary characteristics of a highly threatening zombie phenomena are the pathogen's ability to invade a host without being observed (bite or other visible wounds *not* being required), the ability to successfully reproduce within a host (human, animal or plant), its ability to exploit abundant natural hosts or vectors (not just limited to humans but able to spread among a host of animals or even plants), a potential to mutate quickly (mitigating our ability to develop a vaccine or "cure"), and high transmissibility resulting in large numbers of people becoming sick or absent simultaneously (or entire herds, flocks or crops being infected or contaminated).

ii. (U) A second order effect of a zombie phenomena of operational significance is the potential for political, social, and/or economic instability and/or degradation of allied military readiness. While adversarial forces (or resources) may also be infected, their readiness, operational capability or domestic stability may not be impacted in the same manner, to the same degree, or at the same time as US and allied forces. The degree to which countries and regions can mitigate morbidity, mortality and associated effects during the zombie phenomena event and reintegrate recovering (if possible) individuals and agricultural systems into society will have a considerable impact on military force capabilities. Countries with more advanced, prepared and robust health care and agricultural systems (to include a responsive quarantine capability) will be better able to mitigate many of the zombie phenomena effects.

iii. (U) Key security concerns that would arise from a zombie phenomena event of operational significance include opportunistic aggression, opportunities for violent extremists to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) during reduced security capabilities, reduced partner capacity during and after a zombie phenomena, instability resulting from a humanitarian disaster, and decreased production and distribution of essential commodities. The prevalence of a zombie phenomena coupled with political, social and economic instability may result in reduced security capabilities, providing an opportunity for international military conflict, increased terrorist activity, internal unrest, political and or economic collapse, humanitarian crises, and dramatic civil unrest.

iv. (U) Enemy Center of Gravity (COG). Once a zombie phenomena is capable of efficient, effective, and sustained transmission, its COG will be the geographic speed at which it can spread, attack rate within the host population, and the virulence of the zombie phenomena. A zombie phenomena will produce cascading effects due to the large number of simultaneous absences over extended periods of time or loss of significant critical infrastructure/key resources (e.g., agricultural resources) on a national, regional or international scale.

(a) (U) Critical Capabilities. The ability to efficiently and effectively reproduce within a host, mutate quickly, and effectively transmit from host to host are key requisites for the realization of a worst case zombie phenomena scenario. The degree of transmissibility depends on a number of key factors such as pathogen mutation, transmissibility of a new strain among hosts or vectors, proximity and behavior of hosts or vectors (e.g., travel between population centers or processing facilities), survivability outside a host (e.g., ability to spread via fomites), and availability/effectiveness of countermeasures.

(b) (U) Critical Requirements. A critical requirement of the zombie phenomena is the ability to mutate and propagate among and between hosts. Efficient transmission can occur in a number of ways including respiratory/airborne spread, direct contact, food and water contamination, biological vectors (e.g. mosquitoes, sandflies, ticks), and via fomites (e.g., doorknobs, desktops, vehicles, machinery) where the

disease can potentially survive for hours or days. Additionally, disease impacts severe enough to incapacitate or render unusable large numbers of hosts will likely generate additional psychological impacts among a population (absenteeism due to fear and panic, hoarding, trade restrictions). Furthermore, the infected host must survive long enough to shed disease agent in sufficient quantity to infect others. Because zombies do not expire naturally as is the case with humans suffering from other diseases (such as influenza or ebola), there is no inherent break on the spread of the disease. Finally, the disease requires susceptible populations, which includes those that are immunologically naïve and inadequately trained on preventive, environmental or occupational health measures. [Note: the spread of the zombie effect via either respiratory/airborne means or through fomites is considered the most highly dangerous course of action and the least likely based on historical evidence.]

(c) (U) Critical Vulnerabilities. The disease agent cannot infect an immunologically protected host (should such a capability be developed) and is susceptible to non-pharmaceutical intervention measures, various forms of environmental disinfection, vector control, development of effective immune response by vaccine or natural infection, and pharmaceutical prophylaxis or treatment. Non-pharmaceutical interventions include targeted, layered containment (social distancing, use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), non-exposure, hand washing, disinfection, isolation/quarantine, culling, equipment sanitation, etc) which can impede transmission.

FRIENDLY FORCES

b. (U) Friendly Forces: (Refer to References C and E for detailed listing)

DECISIVE POINTS/CENTERS OF GRAVITY (COGs)

i. (U) COG: Zombie forces can be expected to center their efforts against the following Centers of Gravity

1. (U) Strategic COG #1: Human population centers.

a. (U) All Zombie classes will target human population centers or create effects against human population centers that will undermine human safety, security and the delivery of basic services. VZ's will target agriculture resources upon which humans depend.

2. (U) Operational:

a. (U) Operational COG #1: Lines of Communication (LOC)

i. (U) Zombies cannot drive, climb or swim (although zombies can wade into water they cannot float or swim). Zombies will utilize surface roads to reach human population centers and to increase their numbers by attacking fleeing humans. Although waterways are likely to remain viable, humans can use them safely only if they are very wide and they are free of any means for zombies to reach down and grab at them (such as from bridges). Humans in turn depend on access to LOCs to evacuate from zones of zombie

incursion and to ensure the delivery of goods necessary to survive during a zombie attack.

b. (U) Operational COG #2: Potable water sources (PWS)

i. (U) Zombies do not drink water, but humans do. Humans typically cannot survive longer than 10 days without fresh water. Zombies will likely be drawn to potable water sources by the presence of human food sources upon which zombies prey. Zombies can be expected to contaminate potable water sources with various contaminants during these attacks further limiting the supply of available potable water for humans

DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL CAPABILITIES (CCs)

3. (U) Decisive Points (DPs)/Critical Capabilities (CCs)

a. (U) The following Critical Capabilities (CC) are crucial enablers for the strategic and operational centers of gravity to function -- as such they are essential to the accomplishment of this plan's objectives

i. (U) **CC #1-Medical Infrastructure:** Zombie interactions will create human casualties who will eventually become zombies depending upon the source of the zombieism. In cases where zombieism manifests slowly, injured humans will likely seek out medical care in hospital and local clinics. These locations will ultimately become sources of zombieism in and of themselves as victims mutate. Not only will this render hospitals useless, it will likely cause irreparable casualties among medical professionals and members of the chaplain corps who will be necessary to combat zombie dominance. Furthermore, zombies in hospitals, will deny healthy humans access to medical equipment, medicines and blood/tissue/organ banks necessary for survival. An increase in the number of zombie casualties will have a direct effect on the number of personnel flooding LOCs to evade zombies. In addition, damage to medical infrastructures will likely degrade the abilities of healthy human populations to maintain potable water sources.

ii. (U) **CC #2- Law Enforcement Infrastructure:** Zombie interactions will elicit call-outs for law enforcement forces who will likely become casualties as a result of insufficient training/equipment for zombie threats. Law enforcement personnel will be essential to the maintenance of law, order, and security as humans evacuate from areas at risk of zombie invasion. Further law enforcement personnel will be essential to providing security for key resources (food and water distribution points, "safe" medical care facilities, transit choke points such as bridges and bus depots, and emergency evacuation sites). Humans fearing zombies are likely to raid police stations, National Guard Armories and other sporting goods stores in an attempt to arm themselves. A resultant breakdown in law and order will create conditions that will make it impossible to keep lines of communication operable or to mount an effective, unified action to counter zombie dominance.

iii. (U) **CC #3-Power Distribution Infrastructure:** Power generation and transport infrastructures require significant maintenance and supervision performed by humans in order to remain within normal operating parameters. If humans responsible for these activities cannot perform them, then these infrastructures will begin to malfunction and their resulting failures will have a cascading effect that will quickly undermine law and order and the delivery of basic services upon which healthy human populations rely. It is possible that the noises, lights, or thermal emissions generated by these facilities will attract zombies and

subsequently place human personnel working inside at considerable risk. If possible, remote controlled robots should be employed to operate and repair these infrastructure elements in lieu of humans. Further, damage to power infrastructures will likely degrade the abilities of healthy human populations to maintain potable water sources or operate LOCs effectively.

DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS (CR)

4. Decisive Points/Critical Requirements (CR)

a. (U) The following Critical Requirements (CR) are essential conditions, resources, and means for the critical capabilities in this plan to be fully operational.

i. (U) **CR #1-Effective Emergency Triage/Quarantine Procedures:** Promptly identifying humans contaminated by a source of zombicism and subsequently isolating them from the healthy population will be essential factors with regard to keeping hospitals and medical infrastructures in operation. Casualties contaminated by zombie sources must not be allowed to interact with healthy humans. Affected humans must be quarantined and subsequently eradicated. Failure to establish these conditions will undermine all CC's listed in this plan.

ii. (U) **CR #2-Local/Tribal/State/Federal Emergency Management Integration:** Effective communications between local, tribal, state and federal law enforcement (LE) and emergency management (EM) agencies will be essential to a concerted effort to secure healthy human populations and the resources they depend on from zombie domination. As stated in the 9-11 Commission Report, LE and EM entities at all levels require interoperable communications equipment, HAZMAT decontamination equipment, comparable training standards and coordination procedures. Gaps and Seams between these entities will create conditions that will undermine all the CC's in this plan.

iii. (U) **CR #3-Effective Infrastructure Security:** If energy, water, or sewage/sanitation infrastructures are compromised by zombies, conditions will be created that could undermine law and order and induce systematic failures in medical and water distribution capabilities. Further in the case of sewage and sanitation infrastructures, if zombies compromise these capabilities, conditions will exist that will facilitate the spread of disease and pathogen harboring parasites. In addition, compromise to these capabilities will jeopardize food and water sources for healthy humans and other wildlife and fauna that could prove key to survival. If compromised, the capabilities in this CR could undermine all the CC's in this plan.

iv. (U) **CR #4-Safe food, water, and fuel distribution network:** Ultimately, healthy human populations and the forces protecting them will require the means to acquire, purify, and distribute foodstuffs, water and fuels for heat and machine operations. Failure to maintain security supporting the distribution networks and nodes for food, water and fuel will compromise the longevity of healthy humans; decrease the amount of time that humans can remain sheltered in place or barricaded from zombie threats and could cause competition for resources that will undermine law and order. If compromised, the capabilities in this CR could undermine all the CC's in this plan

v. (U) **CR #5-Effective Threat Surveillance and Warning Program:** Government agencies at all levels must possess an effective means to communicate information about zombie outbreaks, potential zombie contamination vectors, and the safety/security of critical support infrastructures and LOCs within their areas of operations. Absent an effective surveillance program, zombie forces could mass before an effective response could be mounted by healthy humans to counter zombie dominance. Failure to institute and effective surveillance and warning program as outlined in this CR could undermine all the CC's in this plan.

b. (U) Friendly Elements.

(a) (U) Federal Departments and Agencies.

1. (U) **US Department of State (DoS).** The Secretary of State (primarily through USAID/OFDA) is responsible for coordinating international preparation and response to include persuading other nations to join our efforts to contain or slow the spread of a zombie phenomena, limiting the adverse impacts on trade and commerce, and coordinating efforts to assist other nations impacted by zombie phenomena. DoS is also responsible for interaction with all American citizens overseas.

2. (U) US Department of Defense.

a. (U) **The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).** OSD is the principal staff element of the Secretary of Defense in the exercise of policy development, planning, resource management, and program evaluation responsibilities.

b. (U) **The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD P&R).** USD P&R leads Force Management Policy, Reserve Affairs, Health Affairs, Readiness, and Program Integration. Force Management Policy assesses and manages the force and Health Affairs is responsible for sustaining the health of the service members and their families. Reserve Affairs is responsible for preparing reserve forces and Readiness is responsible for overall force readiness. Program Integration is responsible for integrating crosscutting functions across P&R.

c. (U) **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)).** ASD (HA) serves as the principal medical advisor to the SecDef providing policy and guidance for health services supporting service members during military operations. ASD (HA) establishes FHP guidelines and prioritizes distribution of vaccines and anti-viral medications by the Services in cooperation with the GCCs. ASD (HA) also develops policy for health civil-military operations, health stability operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and military health support to the interagency and NGOs. DoD components will ensure operational considerations are integrated with the FHP implementation measures directed in this CONPLAN. As a direct reporting unit to ASD (HA), the Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center (AFHSC) serves as the DoD center for comprehensive health surveillance information to include analysis, interpretation, and dissemination of information regarding the health of the US military and military-associated populations.

d. (U) **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD (HD&ASA)).** The ASD (HD&ASA) is designated by zombie phenomena effort, and provides policy oversight for civil support missions.

e. (U) **The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD (PA)).** The ASD (PA) is the principal advisor to SecDef for public affairs and the DoD focal point for zombie phenomena media queries.

f. (U) The Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OCJCS). The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, and communicates SecDef guidance to the Combatant Commanders, Services, and DoD Agencies.

g. (U) Other Supporting DoD Agencies.

1) (U) **Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA)**. DeCA will support installation-level preparedness and zombie phenomena contingency response planning.

2) (U) **Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA)**. DCMA deploys contingency contract administration services (CCAS) to the Area of Operations (AO) to administer civil augmentation programs (e.g., Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and the Air Forces Civil Augmentation Program (AFCAP)) external support contracts and weapons system support contracts with place of performance in theater when authority is delegated by the appropriate service contracting agency.

3) (U) **Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA)**. DISA will ensure commands, services, and agencies receive timely and effective command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and other support.

4) (U) **Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI)**. NCMI will provide intelligence warning of diseases with epidemic or pandemic potential and provide intelligence assessments of the implications, outlook, and opportunities associated with the spread of a potentially epidemic or pandemic disease, to include zombie phenomena. NCMI will also provide intelligence warning and finished all source medical intelligence analysis regarding foreign emerging/re-emerging infectious diseases (to include zombie phenomena) of operational significance to the Combatant Commanders, the DoD, and the US government as a whole. NCMI will provide information regarding foreign medical capability to plan for, report, identify, and respond to zombie phenomena threats.

5) (U) **Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)**. DLA coordinates with GCCs and Service components for medical, antiviral, PPE, subsistence, clothing, individual equipment, petroleum, construction materials, personal demand items, medical materials and repair parts support. DLA provides integrated material management and supply support for all DLA managed material. DLA also provides property and hazardous material (HAZMAT) disposal services.

6) (U) **Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)**. DTRA provides modeling, hazard prediction, technical subject matter expertise, and planning support upon request of the supported commander. DTRA leverages its Biological Threat Reduction Program to strengthen state capabilities for bio-surveillance, early detection, and rapid response to human, animal and plant diseases of operational significance. DTRA also has the capability to provide hazardous avoidance mapping and Consequence Management Advisory Team (CMAT) support.

7) (U) **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)**. NGA provides geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) to include imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information and service products data and associated services in support of zombie phenomena contingency response operations for DoD, primary agencies, and coordinating agencies as directed. As appropriate, NGA provides GEOINT release and disclosure guidance to supporting organizations.

DECISIVE POINTS/CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES (CV)

5. Decisive Points/Critical Vulnerabilities (CV)

a. (U) The following Critical Vulnerabilities (CR) are aspects the critical requirements in this plan which are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.

i. (U) **CV #1 – Individual Healthy Humans (IHH):** the IHH is the singlemost important factor shared by all the COGs, CCs, and CVs in this plan. A zombie outbreak can affect thousands of IHH's in the span of minutes. Ironically, given the consideration that zombie outbreaks in human hosts cannot possibly last longer than 40 days (because human hosts require food and water to continue functioning), there may be times when IHH's will be forced to abandon other IHH's who are unable to evade sources of zombie contamination. Such situation could arise while IHH's are evacuating in the face of incoming zombie forces. IHH's must not be allowed to "go back for" family, friends, or other personnel who cannot get away from zombies quickly enough. All IHHs who fall behind must be left behind. Such decisions are abhorrent to normal IHHs and military and LE personnel protecting them must rigidly enforce such restraint. Healthy humans can wait out a zombie outbreak if they are prudent-nothing can be done to cure a human if they become a zombie. Every human that becomes a zombie increases the enemy's numbers and decreases the chances that healthy humans will survive.

(U) Intelligence (Annex B)

B-1. (U) Situation

a. (U) **Characteristics of the Area.** Summarize the physical, economic, political, medical, social, religious, and psychological aspects and conditions of the area of operations as they may influence the concept of the plan. Do not repeat information included in the general situation discussed in the Basic Plan. Include sufficient analysis of the area of operations to permit development of appropriate supporting plans. Include complete information or, preferably, many reference documents and reports that contain required intelligence. Refer to Annex Q, Medical Services, Appendix 8, Preventive Medicine, for assessment of disease threat.

b. (U) **Hydrographic, Amphibious, Topographic, and Weather**

(1) (U) Summarize the hydrographic data (sound, tides, wave height, and currents) and amphibious considerations (beach defenses and obstacles, slope, consistency, and routes of ingress and egress) needed to support amphibious and logistics over-the-shore operations. Reference Annex H (Environmental Services) and Annex M (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy).

(2) (U) Address topographic aspects, including trafficability, key terrain, obstacles, cover, concealment, and avenues of approach. Reference Annex M (Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy).

(3) (U) Include, as appropriate, climate and weather aspects as they pertain to the operational environment. Coordinate with the staff weather officer or oceanographer and reference Annex H (Environmental Services).

c. (U) **Estimate of Enemy Capabilities.** Describe the military threat. Provide the enemy order of battle, an evaluation of applicable enemy command and control, strategic, and tactical doctrine, and estimates of the enemy capabilities and possible COAs that could affect the execution of the plan and accomplishment of the mission. Include information or a summary of the enemy situation with reference to an enemy situation appendix to this annex or refer to documents that contain the required intelligence. Also provide the enemy's capability to collect, communicate to intelligence centers, process, disseminate through telecommunications or other methods, and make reasoned judgments from intelligence information about the planned action, and the timeliness, reliability, and vulnerability of the threat intelligence systems available to the enemy. On information about enemy capabilities, include a specific intelligence cutoff date and, when possible, identify finished intelligence products supporting these findings.

B-2. (U) Mission and Concept of Intelligence Operations

a. (U) **Mission.** State concisely the intelligence mission as it relates to the planned operation. Base the mission on the command mission statement in the Basic Plan.

3. (U) **Intelligence Activities.** Identify intelligence resources and the intelligence direction, collection, processing, reporting, production, and dissemination effort required to support the OPLAN. Include the responsibilities levied upon allied nations for support to combined operations. Identify the required intelligence by proceeding from the EEI, through intelligence operations and capabilities or resources planning, to tasking of intelligence elements, including the following specific areas:

a. (U) **Direction.** Provide guidance for determining intelligence requirements (including those of allied or subordinate component commanders), preparing a collection plan, issuing orders and requests to information collection agencies, and monitoring the performance of collection agencies.

(1) (U) **Essential Elements of Information.** List EEI that must be fulfilled to accomplish the mission. In the event publication of the annex is deferred, list the EEI and other intelligence requirements in the coordinating instructions of the Basic Plan. When the EEI and other intelligence requirements are lengthy and detailed, place them in Appendix 1 to this annex.

(2) (U) **New Requirements.** Provide specific guidance to ensure that new intelligence requirements are considered during peace, crisis, and war, both before and during execution of the OPORD.

(3) (U) **Intelligence Systems.** Intelligence systems and architectures should be tested and certified for end-to-end interoperability and compatibility as well as integration into the overall command and control (C2) structure. Standards and interoperability should be a foundation for reducing duplication of systems and effort, providing sensible and effective C3I architectures, and for improving the flexibility and responsiveness of our forces as we mix and match forces to respond to a variety of threat situations.

b. (U) **Collection.** Provide guidance for systematically collecting information and material in support of validated requirements, including the requirements of allied nations. Use the intelligence collection requirements procedures in DIAM 58 Series to establish collection requirements where applicable. Provide guidance for managing collection activities not otherwise covered by regulation or SOP, including reconnaissance operations, equipment status, reports, SIGINT, IMINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and other specialized forms of collection activity to support the plan. State OPSEC planning guidance and guidance for using tactical deceptions during the planning and conduct of intelligence collection activities. When actions by national collection assets will be required, state collection requirements explicitly and submit

them through the theater chain of command to DIA for validation. Reference any collection plan written to requirements of the OPLAN.

(1) (U) Signals Intelligence. Provide information and instructions pertaining to the assignment and coordination of COMINT and ELINT resources. Include guidance on SIGINT, interaction with IMINT, HUMINT, and MASINT. As required, develop Appendix 2 (Signals Intelligence).

(2) (U) Imagery Intelligence. Provide guidance for establishing and conducting photo, radar, electrooptical, and infrared intelligence activities. Include guidance on SIGINT, interaction with IMINT, HUMINT, and MASINT. As required, develop Appendix 7 (Imagery Intelligence).

(3) (U) Human-Resource Intelligence. Provide information pertaining to the assignment and coordination of operations using human resources. Include guidance on SIGINT, interaction with IMINT, HUMINT, and MASINT. As required, develop Appendix 5 (Human-Resource Intelligence).

(4) (U) Measurement and Signature Intelligence. Provide guidance on obtaining intelligence by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data derived from specific technical collection sensors (other than those normally associated with SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT). Include guidance on SIGINT, interaction with IMINT, HUMINT, and MASINT. As required, develop Appendix 9 (MASINT).

(5) (U) Other Collection Activities. Provide guidance for collection by other specialized means that may be required to support plan requirements; e.g., visual, amphibious, reconnaissance, and medical (Annex Q, Appendix 3). Include guidance on how these activities are expected to interact with collection efforts discussed elsewhere in this OPLAN.

c. (U) Processing. Provide appropriate guidance for converting intelligence into usable form, including required provisions for language and document translation; imagery, signals, and technical sensor processing and interpretation; and other pertinent processing activity.

d. (U) Analysis and Reporting. Provide guidance on analyzing and reporting collected intelligence information by all collection sources to be employed in support of the plan. Include guidance on multidiscipline reports that fuse information from multiple sources. Reference appropriate regulations, directives, and SOPs that specify US only and combined (multinational) reporting procedures. Include communications and interoperability requirements. Should not be confused with intelligence dissemination reporting described in subparagraph 3f below.

e. (U) Production. Identify the production effort, including any intelligence and counterintelligence products, required to support the OPLAN. Include pertinent provisions indicated below:

(1) (U) Targeting

(a) (U) Procedures. Provide guidance for analyzing, developing, and nominating targets and for accomplishing nuclear and conventional weaponing, as required. Describe how air target materials will be used in the development of positioning data for targets, offset aiming points, etc. Also, include information on promulgating target intelligence, materials, and list(s); control and maintenance of target lists; and issuance of target materials. May include all the intelligence targeting data required or may refer to materials available in other documents. When the target selection criteria reflected in Annex C of the OPLAN include categories of fixed targets, include a list of selected fixed targets, which is responsive to these criteria, in Appendix 4 to Annex B. However, it is permissible to consolidate target lists for different OPLANs, and, with appropriate references, these lists may be contained in a separate document.

(b) (U) Concept. Provide a summary of the guidelines followed in developing targets that are responsive to target selection criteria provided in Annex C. Include geographic area, target categories, and constraints.

(2) (U) Other. Establish procedures by which assigned elements can produce, or nonorganic agencies and allied nations can provide, other forms of intelligence required to support the operation. If production capabilities of other agencies and allied nations are to be exploited, complete tasking statements and formal agreement for assumption of such responsibilities.

Include in the appendixes details of production requirements, schedules, distribution, etc. Include requirements for the following categories:

(a) (U) Indications and warning intelligence.

(b) (U) Current or operational intelligence.

(c) (U) Estimative intelligence.

(d) (U) Basic intelligence.

(e) (U) Scientific and technical intelligence.

(f) (U) Medical intelligence.

f. (U) Dissemination. Provide necessary guidance for conveying intelligence in a suitable form to appropriate operational levels, including the forces of allied nations. Stipulate the requirements for providing intelligence reports. Establish procedures and criteria to satisfy expanded requirements for vertical and lateral dissemination of finished intelligence and spot reports during military operations under all conditions of warfare. Establish alternate means to ensure that required intelligence will be provided to combat units as well as headquarters during crises and combat operations. Cover any of the following in this subparagraph:

(1) () Intelligence reports required from units. (Periods covered, distribution, and time of distribution.)

(2) () Formats for intelligence reports. (Appendixes, if required.)

(3) () Distribution of intelligence studies.

(4) () Requirements for releasability to allied nations.

(5) () Requirements for secondary imagery dissemination.

4. () Assignment of Intelligence Tasks

a. () Orders to Subordinate and Attached Units. Use separate numbered subparagraphs to list detailed instructions for each unit performing intelligence functions, including the originating headquarters, component commands, and separate intelligence support units, and allied or coalition forces.

b. () Requests to Higher, Adjacent, and Cooperating Units. Provide separate numbered subparagraphs

pertaining to each unit not organic or attached and from which intelligence support is requested, including allied or coalition forces.

c. () Coordinating Instructions. Provide any instructions necessary for coordinating collection and processing, producing, and disseminating activities. Include:

(1) () Periodic or special conferences for intelligence officers.

(2) () Intelligence liaison, when indicated, with adjacent commanders, foreign government agencies or military forces, and host countries.

5. () Command, Control, and Communications. Summarize the US and non-US C3 systems and procedures to be used to carry out the intelligence function or reference the appropriate paragraphs of Annex K. Include comments on interoperability of these C3 systems.

6. () Miscellaneous Instructions. Include items not included above, such as OPSEC, E&E, deception, disclosure of intelligence, guidance releasability to coalition forces, public affairs, use of specialized intelligence personnel, PSYOP, exploitation of captured foreign material and documents and composition of the J-2 staff.

7. () Consolidated Listing and Impact Assessment of Shortfalls and Limiting Factors. Provide a consolidated listing and impact assessment of shortfalls and limiting factors that significantly impact the provision of intelligence support, based on the pertinent theater intelligence architecture plans. Identify resource problems and specify key tasks that might not be adequately accomplished.

v/

General XXXXX

Commander CZTF

Appendixes:

1--Essential Elements of Information

2--Signals Intelligence

3--Counterintelligence

4--Targeting

5--Human-Resource Intelligence

6--Intelligence Support to EW and C3CM

7--Imagery Intelligence

8--Intelligence Support for OPSEC, PSYOP, and Military

Deception

9--Measurement and Signature Intelligence

10--Captured Enemy Equipment (CEE)

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX B TO CONPAN 8888 (EELs)(U)

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION (U)

1. () General

a. () Identify requirements, including those of subordinate commanders, for essential intelligence information for preexecution and execution phases of the planned operation.

b. () Orient collection, production, and dissemination efforts toward answering the questions in paragraphs 2 and 3 below. (All organizations participating in the collection effort are requested to report information pertinent to these questions.)

2. () Before Implementation of the Plan. List questions to which answers are needed for further planning and as a basis for decision on plan implementation.

3. () Upon Implementation of the Plan. List the additional EEI and other intelligence requirements that become relevant upon decision to implement the OPLAN. (Additional paragraphs will be used if necessary to reflect differing requirements during planned phases of the operation.)

APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888 (SIGINT)(U)

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (U)

(See Supplement to JOPES, Volume II) Tabs:

A--Communications Intelligence Collection Requirements (See Supplement to JOPES, Volume II)

B--Operational Electronic Intelligence Collection Requirements (See Supplement to JOPES, Volume II)

APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888 (CI) (U)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (U)

() REFERENCES: List pertinent Executive orders; DCIDs; agreements between the Department of Defense and/or Joint Staff and the FBI and CIA; Service and command policy statements; and Status of Forces Agreements governing counterintelligence (CI) activities.

1. () Situation

a. () Enemy. Summarize the foreign intelligence activity and collection threat; foreign security and counterintelligence Service threat, and threats from sabotage, terrorism, and assassination directed by foreign elements. Reference appropriate DIA and Service CI analytical products if appropriate. Emphasize capabilities and intentions. Detailed threat data, including specific CI targets, should be provided in a DIA-Service-command CI analytical publication. Threat data should not be duplicated in the OPSEC annex.

b. () Friendly. List supporting Service CI organizations, Defense agencies, FBI, CIA, and allied or coalition organizations as appropriate. Provide their locations and strength. Provide a brief description of each CI element's role in support of the command in regards to CI investigations, operations, and collection and production of multisource CI information. Cover each Service CI element's jurisdiction and/or area of responsibility for each functional area and geographical area. Ensure all command headquarters and elements have CI elements dedicated to support them covering all intelligence disciplines and all CI functional areas.

c. () Assumptions. List any assumptions not reflected in the Basic Plan that are necessary for the development of this appendix.

2. () Mission. Describe the command's CI mission as it relates to the planned mission and/or plan. Mission description should include CI Services provided to command, scope or nature of the Services, and primary responsibilities and applicable limitations on the responsible agencies' efforts.

Example: Service CI elements conduct CI activities in support of the command to detect, assess, counter, or neutralize the enemy's intelligence collection efforts, other intelligence activities, sabotage, international terrorism, and assassination directed by foreign powers, organizations, or persons directed against the command, its personnel, information, material, and activities. CI activities do not include OPSEC or personnel, physical, document, or communications security programs. CI comprises three functional areas: (a) CI investigations whose primary goal is prosecution, which also includes the CI briefing and awareness program; (b) CI operations whose goal is to identify Foreign Intelligence Security Service (FISS) carry out double agent operations, and exploit and penetrate HOISs; and (c) collection of all-source CI information and production of all-source analytical products.

3. () Execution

a. Concept of Operations. Summarize the scope and objectives as they relate to the mission. Provide plan specific information and guidance for the conduct and control of CI operations. Discuss CI collection, production, and dissemination procedures. Address restrictions on conduct of CI activities imposed by US and foreign governments. Specify exact requirements to coordinate CI activities with the CIA and FBI and/or foreign governments. Discuss intelligence oversight provisions and restrictions regarding approval

authorities for conduct of electronic and physical surveillance, mail covers and search, and physical searches of US persons. Establish if appropriate. Discuss coordination with operations and logistics planners to determine areas of interest and targets.

B-3-2 Format,

CLASSIFICATION Appendix 3

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CLASSIFICATION

b. () Tasks

(1) () Counterintelligence

(a) () Defensive. Identify the various agency (Defense agency, component HQ, FBI, CIA, and allied or coalition elements) tasks and responsibilities for defensive CI services provided in support of this plan. The list should include, but is not limited to, interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and defectors; screening indigenous refugees, displaced persons and detained suspects; debriefing of US or other friendly personnel who evade, escape or are released from enemy control; and exploiting captured enemy documents and material.

(b) () Offensive. Identify the various agency tasks and responsibilities for defensive CI services provided under this plan. Services defined should include; but are not limited to, CI collections, CI operations, and CI liaison.

(2) () Specialized Services. Identify and task the specialized services available to the command and how they relate to the mission. Services listed should include, but are not limited to, criminal and fraud investigations; specialized investigative support, e.g., forensics, polygraph, technical services, computer investigations; clinical psychology; and undercover operations.

c. () Coordinating Instructions. Identify command and supporting agency coordination requirements in support of the mission. Detail the circumstances, activities, and situations requiring said coordination and the agencies with whom to coordinate.

d. () Production and Dissemination. Detail the applicable peacetime and wartime DOD and service-specific guidance governing the production and dissemination of threat information in support of the mission.

4. () Administration and Logistics. Provide a statement of the administrative and logistic arrangements or requirements to CI but not covered in the Basic Plan or another annex.

Provide a list of special reports that are required for CI operations.

5. () Command and Signal

a. () Command. Discuss the operational and administrative chain of command for all supporting Services, CIA and FBI CI elements as appropriate. Cover each discipline and functional area. Include details of conditions that would prompt change of command and procedures to implement that change during execution of this plan. Address what information and activities require the commander's knowledge and approval. Address investigative and operational case control offices that have responsibility to coordinate and control CI operations and investigations.

b. () Communications. Discuss how (i.e., spot report, agent report) CI information developed by command elements will be reported to appropriate command headquarters and Service CI action elements. Also discuss what communications channels should be used, e.g., SSO for CI information and reports developed in each functional area. (Service policy restricts operational and investigative reporting channels. Service channels should be used if possible.)

TAB A TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888(Priorities & Targets (U)

COLLECTION PRIORITIES AND TARGETS (U)

1. () Essential Elements of Friendly Information. List all command agency essential elements of friendly information.

2. () Collection Priorities and Targets. List and define the supported command's CI/SPI priorities with regard to support provided under this plan.

APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888 (Targeting) (U)

TARGETING (U)

() REFERENCES: List pertinent publications that should be consulted during target list, target nomination, and target selection. Refer only to agreements or other documents pertaining to joint and/or combined force targeting responsibilities.

1. () Purpose. To provide a listing of selected fixed targets that could require attack by nuclear, conventional, or SOF means in support of the concept of operations detailed in the operations annex to this plan.

2. () Target Concept. Provide a summary of the guidelines followed in developing the target lists, including geographic area, types of targets, limitations applied, etc. Provide the target list itself as a tab to this appendix. Provide specialized target lists in multiple tabs. Reference Annex C, Appendix 1, for Nuclear Operations. Tab A will be prepared using the Output Processor Subsystem of the Nuclear Planning System (NPS) for all nuclear OPLANs. Tab B will be prepared for all conventional targeting.

3. () Sustaining Functions

- a. () Automated Data Processing. Address hardware and software requirements for intelligence support to targeting.
- b. () Communications. Address unique communications requirements for intelligence support to targeting.
- c. () Capabilities Analysis. Address required versus existing capabilities to provide intelligence ADP and communications support to targeting.

APPENDIX 5 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888 (HUMINT)(U)

HUMAN-RESOURCE INTELLIGENCE (U)

() REFERENCES: List applicable DIA, CIA, FBI, Service, and command regulations, directives, collateral or supporting plans, studies, manuals, and estimates.

1. () General

- a. () Provide general objectives and guidance necessary for accomplishment of mission.
- b. () Provide statement of command responsibilities and chain of command for reporting channels.

2. () HUMINT Organizations. Identify the HUMINT organizations and approximate strengths of units required.

3. () Collection, Activities, Functions, and Plans. For each activity or HUMINT organization, provide discrete function applicable to the operation; identify the staff, element, or unit responsible; and the type of collection plans and approving authority required.

4. () Collection Requirements

- a. () Refer to Appendix 1 (EEI) to Annex B (Intelligence), if applicable.
- b. () Identify targets and other collection requirements to be fulfilled by HUMINT operations.

5. () Coordination

a. () Identify coordination requirements unique to HUMINT operations and refer to activities listed in paragraph 3 above, if

b. () Identify coordination requirements for support from other agencies.

(1) () Support requirements from other US Government agencies.

(2) () Counterintelligence coordination.

(a) () To obtain technical and security support.

(b) () To provide mutual support to satisfy collection requirements. (See paragraph 3 above.)

(3) () Communications support required for conduct of HUMINT operations.

c. () Coordinate HUMINT operations with UW, PSYOP, E&E, and deception operations.

6. () Miscellaneous. Include other items not mentioned above, such as intelligence contingency funds, accounting, reporting, and restrictions. Identify any special reports required and the channels for submitting them. Identify special equipment requirements if they are not provided for elsewhere in the OPLAN.

APPENDIX 6 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888 (Intel Support to EW)(U)

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO EW AND C3CM (U)

() REFERENCES: List references pertinent to the OPLAN (e.g, MJCS-123-85, 17 July 1985, "Wartime Operational Needs

for EW and C3CM ()").

1. () General

a. () Purpose. This appendix will focus on the who, what, where, when, why, and how of employing intelligence assets in support of EW and C3CM as detailed in Annex C. Annex B, Appendix 2, and Annex C, Appendix 3, of this publication should be referenced for details on SIGINT support to EW and C3CM.

b. () Relationships. Specify command or theater-unique relationships between intelligence, EW or C3CM, and user organizations. Explain specific functions, responsibilities, and data flow.

2. () Mission, Threat, and Requirements

a. () Mission. Define the mission in terms of support to EW and C3CM.

b. () Threat Estimates. Include and refer to estimates of enemy electromagnetic capabilities in Annex B. Evaluate types of threats to friendly weapon platforms and systems, critical C3 for weapons control, target acquisition, and surveillance systems.

c. () Operational Requirements. Address specific user requirements that drive intelligence support to EW and C3CM. In addition, include general narrative statements of functional user requirements (e.g., flagging of foreign radar operating parameters in support of reprogramming).

d. () EEI. List EEI required to support EW and C3CM or refer to the Basic Plan, the EEI section of Annex B, or Appendix 1 to Annex B. Specify procedures to ensure timely fulfillment of EW EEI, including real-time dissemination in the tactical situation.

3. () Collection. See Annex B.

a. () Collection Management. Address how the collection managers will support planners, analysts, and targeteers in their support of EW and C3CM. Include definition and prioritization of requirements after coordination with the operations staff.

b. () Supporting Systems.

c. () Capabilities Analysis. Address required versus current capabilities and capacities for collection in support of this OPLAN and identify shortfalls. Consider not only technical capabilities, but also actual capacities of current collectors in relation to the projected volume of information requirements.

4. () Processing, Production, Application, and Dissemination

a. () Communication With Collection Management. Explain how data receivers, correlators, and analysts will communicate with collection management people.

b. () Correlation or Fusion. Address where intelligence support EW and C3CM fit in with existing correlation programs, how the data are provided to the operator, and coordination for frequency

deconfliction.

c. () Foreign Capability or Activity Assessment. Address specific reporting, C3CM tactics and techniques studies, order of battle, and other products on the enemy that would provide intelligence to EW and C3CM. Include identification and vulnerability assessments of enemy critical electromagnetic links, nodes, sensors, and weapon systems. Identify shortfalls in intelligence support.

d. () Targeting. Explain the relationship between the target analyst and analysts performing foreign capability or activity assessment, data base management, and operations. Include targeting support to EW and C3CM in Annex B and Appendix 4 to Annex B.

e. () Data Base Management. Define applicable data bases and address command participation in data bases supporting EW and C3CM. Evaluate adequacy, accuracy, and timeliness of the data to support the OPLAN and discuss plans for updating and integrating applicable data bases.

f. () Reprogramming. Specify details of supporting reprogramming.

g. () C3 Network Analysis. Specify who will perform C3 network analysis.

h. () Capabilities Analysis. Address required versus existing capabilities and capacities in production, processing, and application of intelligence to support EW and C3CM in this OPLAN.

5. () Sustaining Functions

a. () Automated Data Processing. Address both hardware and software needed to provide intelligence support to EW and C3CM.

b. () Communications. Address communications systems unique to intelligence support to EW and C3CM. If not applicable, reference Annexes B and K and any other key documents that describe intelligence system communications.

c. () Capabilities Analysis. Address required versus existing capabilities to provide intelligence ADP and communications support to EW and C3CM.

APPENDIX 7 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888 (IMINT) (U)

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (U)

() REFERENCES: List applicable DIA, Service, and command regulations, directives, collateral or supporting plans, studies, manuals, and estimates.

1. () General

- a. () Purpose. Provide general objectives and guidance necessary for accomplishing the mission.
 - b. () Responsibilities. Provide statement of command responsibilities, applicability and scope, and chain of command for reporting. Identify IMINT roles in an all source fusion and production environment.
2. () Imagery Intelligence Organizations. Identify the IMINT organizations and approximate strengths of units required.
3. () Collection Activities, Functions, and Plans. For each activity or IMINT discrete function applicable to the operation, identify the staff, element, or unit responsible and the type of collection plans and approving authority required.
4. () Concept of Operations for Imagery Collection, Processing, and Production
- a. () Refer to Appendix 1 (EEI) and Appendix 4 (Targeting) to Annex B (Intelligence), Appendixes 1 and 9 to Annex C (Operations), and others, if applicable.
 - b. () Identify targets and other collection requirements to be fulfilled by IMINT operations.
 - c. () Identify both theater and national collection assets and supporting systems and how and when employed.
 - d. () Identify allied or coalition foreign interfaces and capabilities, as appropriate.
 - e. () Identify tasking procedures for standing and ad hoc IMINT requirements. Establish procedures, as required, for development, maintenance, and implementation of contingency collection problem sets.
 - f. () Identify unique logistics requirements or processes.
 - g. () Describe processing, exploitation, production, and dissemination operations, as well as backup procedures. Include pertinent comments on conducting imagery operations while collocated with allied or coalition forces.
 - h. () Summarize imagery communications requirements or list reference paragraph in Annex K that states requirements.
5. () Reporting
- a. () Identify reporting and dissemination needs with respect to product types, timeliness for IMINT applications, capacities, and transmission media.
 - b. () Establish reporting dissemination procedures. Include pertinent comments on releasability and dissemination to allied or coalition forces.
 - c. () In conjunction with the J-2 departments and J-3, develop a plan for IMINT management information feedback to determine whether IMINT requirements are adequately articulated and fulfilled for intelligence support in the planning and conduct of joint and combined (multinational) operations.

d. () Develop a process for the rapid implementation of corrections and improvements to the IMINT system of processes and products during the preparation and conduct of joint and combined operations.

6. () Coordination

a. () Identify coordination requirements unique to IMINT operations such as requirements identification and tasking. Refer to activities listed in paragraph 3 above, if applicable.

b. () Identify coordination requirements for support:

(1) () From and to other US Government and allied or coalition agencies.

(2) () For technical, communications, logistic or security support.

(3) () For mutual support to satisfy collection requirements.

(See paragraph 3 above).

c. () Identify and/or cross-reference other imagery collection portions of the OPLAN.

7. () Miscellaneous. Include other items not previously mentioned.

APPENDIX 8 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888(Intel Support to IO) (U)

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR OPSEC, PSYOP, AND MILITARY DECEPTION (U)

() REFERENCES: List appropriate references.

1. () General

a. () Purpose. This appendix will focus on the detailed intelligence needed to plan and supervise the coordinated implementation of OPSEC, military deception, and PSYOP in the broad context of perception management strategies.

b. () Relationships. Specify relationships between the intelligence staff on the one hand, and OPSEC, military deception, and PSYOP planners on the other, to ensure effective coordination. To prevent misinterpretation of intelligence information, provide operations information about planned operations.

2. () Mission. Ensure effective coordination between the intelligence staff and OPSEC, PSYOP, and military deception planners.

3. () Threat Estimates. Provide estimates about the following:

- a. () The underlying causes of the politico-military conflict that might cause execution of the OPLAN. Identify primary antagonists and their goals, and which initiated the threat or use of force to achieve political goals; the leaders of antagonistic factions and their psychological characteristics; the staffs, advisers, and intelligence systems that support the leaders; influential staff officers; staff factions and the doctrines or positions they espouse; and interest groups that can influence staff planning and the actions that leaders can select and execute.
- b. () Describe the apparent politico-military strategies being followed by US adversaries, and the alternate military COAs each might select (e.g., to intervene in a crisis). Estimate current knowledge about the situation generally held by adversaries, and what they will probably know if conditions causing plan execution arise.
- c. () Describe the attitudes and behaviors of the leadership and influential groups in friendly, neutral, and adversary countries toward supporting US goals in the politico-military conflict. Also, address US use of security assistance or logistic support for foreign forces US conduct of foreign internal defense operations to support allies, execution of contingency operations missions by US forces, and US conduct of armed conflict. Identify those who are likely to oppose the United States or support for US forces and the factors that motivate them.
- d. () Describe the organizational structure of adversaries from the national (or most senior in the case of rebels) to the operational (or regional) levels. State the authorities of command echelon to direct actions.
- e. () Describe alternative military intentions each adversary might select and, from their perspectives, the pros and cons of each intention. Outline capabilities available or that might be committed for each intention, and competing requirements for those capabilities.
- f. () Describe the politico-military and military doctrines and practices of adversaries that are likely to affect the CDRCZTF's planning and decisionmaking and rules of engagement (ROEs) that constrain their military actions. Describe adversary doctrine, capabilities, practices, and anticipated or current activities to maintain essential secrecy and influence US, allied and friendly, neutral, and adversary attitudes, behaviors, and official actions. Indicate the effectiveness of current adversary efforts pertinent to accomplishing its mission.
- g. () Outline the detailed organization and capabilities of adversary intelligence systems pertinent to the assigned mission and how they function, particularly abilities to acquire, process, and make judgments about data; time required to obtain, report, process, and evaluate data and provide judgments to planners and decisionmakers; and the key sources and methods upon which those who make reasoned judgments, staff planners, advisers, and leaders rely.
- h. () Describe the command centers and communications systems that support adversarial command at each pertinent level; the purpose of each communications system and the capabilities they provide the command to direct, control, and supervise the execution of actions; and time required to issue orders and ensure execution.

4. () Current Intelligence and Coordination

- a. () Structure. Establish points of contact for the secure exchange of intelligence and operational data.

- (1) () Indicate procedures and provide guidance for OPSEC, PSYOP, and military deception planners to inform intelligence planners about their implementing schedules and actions.
 - (2) () Describe procedures and clearance requirements to provide OPSEC, PSYOP, and military deception planners with detailed all-source intelligence information to support operational planning and implementation.
- b. () Feedback. Establish guidance and procedures to provide immediate feedback and evaluations, including:
- (1) () Intelligence information as obtained about adversary reactions to deception actions, and acceptance of and reaction to controlled information; target audience acceptance and reaction to PSYOP messages; and target intelligence systems' acquisition of OPSEC indicators.
 - (2) () Intelligence about current adversary acknowledgments that would answer EEFI listed in Annex L and other OPLAN annexes, and about current adversary preparations for operations and operational activities.
 - (3) () Intelligence about the attitudes and behaviors of target audiences listed in the PSYOP appendix to the Operations annex.
 - (4) () Intelligence from deserters, POWs, defectors, refugees, and diplomats about adversary morale, activities, and attitudes, including identifying opportunities that are exploitable by PSYOP.
- c. () Support for Intelligence. Establish procedures for OPSEC and military deception planners to assist intelligence systems personnel to penetrate adversary OPSEC measures and military deceptions; e.g., OPSEC measures to protect sources or deny adversaries critical information about reconnaissance and surveillance, military deceptions to elicit adversary revelation of data, or modeling of possible adversary deceptions from a deception planner's point of view.

APPENDIX 9 TO ANNEX B TO CONPLAN 8888 (MASINT) (U)

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE (U)

(U) REFERENCES: List appropriate references.

1. () Situation

- a. () Enemy. Refer to Annex B.
- b. () Friendly. Identify the MASINT organizations and approximate strengths of units required.
- c. () Assumptions. MASINT has tremendous utility in Counter-Zombie Operations. State any additional assumptions about friendly or enemy capabilities and courses of action that significantly influence the

planning of MASINT operations.

2. () Mission. State the mission to be accomplished by MASINT operations in support of the Basic Plan.

3. () Execution

a. () Concept of Operation

(1) () Reference to Appendix 1 (EEI) and Appendix 4 (Targeting) to Annex B (Intelligence), Appendixes 1 and 9 to Annex C (Operations), and others, if applicable.

(2) () Identify targets and other collection requirements to be fulfilled by MASINT operations.

(3) () Identify both theater and national collection assets and supporting systems and how and when employed.

(4) () Identify allied or coalition foreign interfaces and capabilities, as appropriate.

(5) () Identify tasking procedures for standing and ad hoc MASINT requirements. Establish procedures, as required, for development, maintenance, and implementation of contingency collection problem sets.

(6) () Describe processing, exploitation, production, and dissemination operations, as well as backup procedures. Include pertinent comments on conducting MASINT operations while collocated with allied or coalition forces. Include the probable security classification required for the user or commander.

b. () Tasks. List the specific tasks, type of collection plans and approving authority required to be performed by each subordinate command to implement the MASINT portion of this plan.

c. () Coordinating Instructions. List the MASINT instructions. Applicable to the entire command, two or more elements of the command, other US Government agencies, and allied or coalition agencies and forces.

4. () Administration and Logistics

a. () Logistics. Identify MASINT unique logistic requirements or processes.

b. () Reporting

(1) () Identify reporting and dissemination needs with respect to product types, timeliness for MASINT applications, capacities, and transmission media.

(2) () Establish reporting dissemination procedures. Include pertinent comments on releasability and dissemination to allied or coalition forces.

(3) () In conjunction with the J-2 and the J-3, develop a plan MASINT management information feedback to determine whether requirements are adequately articulated and fulfilled for the requesting unit.

(4) () Develop a process for the rapid implementation of corrections and improvements to the MASINT system of processes and products during the preparation and conduct of joint and combined operations.

5. () Command and Control. Provide statement of command responsibilities, applicability and scope, and chain of command for reporting. Identify MASINT roles in an all-source fusion and production environment.

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References

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