This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault

The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com
John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Suite #1203
Castaic, CA 91384

Subject: OSD MDR Case 18-M-0747

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

We have previously reviewed document 47 under OSD MDR Case No. 13-M-4338 and it was declassified in part. Executive Order 13526, section 3.5(d), states, “If an agency has reviewed the requested information for declassification within the past two years, the agency need not conduct another review.” Therefore, we have administratively closed the above referenced case. We have enclosed a copy of our previous response for your records.

OSD stands as the appellate authority and will coordinate any appeals regarding this case. A written appeal must be filed within 60 days explaining the rationale for reversal of the decision. Reference should be made to OSD MDR Case 18-M-0747. Letters of appeal should be sent to the following address:

WHS/ESD Records, Privacy, and Declassification Division
Attention: Luz D. Ortiz
4800 Mark Center Drive
Suite 02F09-02
Alexandria, VA 22350-3100

If you have any questions please contact Mr. John D. Smith by email at whs.mc-alex.esd.mbx.records-and-declassification@mail.mil.

Sincerely,

George R. Sturgis
Deputy Chief, WHS, Records, Privacy, and Declassification Division, ESD

Enclosures:
1. MDR request
2. Previous OSD response
To whom it may concern,

This is a request for a mandatory declassification review (MDR), under the terms of Executive Order 12958, as amended, of the following document(s):

Memorandum, William T. Pendley to the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: North Korea Nuclear Issue - Where are We Now?, dated October 27, 1992.

If you regard these documents as potentially exempt from disclosure requirements, I request that you nonetheless exercise your discretion to disclose them. Please release all reasonably segregable nonexempt portions of documents.

Thank you for your time, and I look forward to your response!

Sincerely,

John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 W. Live Oak Rd.
Suite #1203
Castaic, Ca. 91384
FAX 1-818-659-7688
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

THROUGH: ASD (ISP) 27 OCT 1992

SUBJECT: North Korea Nuclear Issue—Where Are We Now? (U)

The IAEA now has visited Yongbyon three times, and it is currently in there again to look at some facilities. What is becoming clear is that North Korean non-cooperation is more evident as IAEA becomes more aggressive in its inspections. Compounding the problem is that there is a sense that, after several fruitless U.N.C.C meetings, the ROKs may be on the verge of adopting quickly a bilateral inspection regime which either falls short of satisfying our concerns or may not be implemented rigorously by the ROKs. Given these two developments, it is time to review where we are and what steps to take next on the North Korea nuclear issue.

Therefore, unless IAEA becomes even more intrusive, and unless better and more properly trained experts appear on IAEA teams, we must have the bilateral inspection regime to provide a credible determination, with higher confidence, of whether the North Korean program is non-proliferative. Just as worrisome, however, is the assessment from embassy Seoul that perhaps as early as the end of this year, the ROKs may hurriedly conclude a bilateral agreement before Roh Tae Woo steps down. And it could very well be an agreement which not only lacks credibility but in fact may be difficult to be implemented in the future for political reasons.
It is in this environment recently that I met with several people from State/IA, FM, ADB, and NAC. Everyone present at this small group meeting agreed with the concern that a very diluted bilateral inspection regime may be signed which does not satisfy our concerns and which may provide unsolved respectability to the issue on this list. I suggested that the inclusion of any "challenge inspection", may be difficult to invoke if the South does not have the political will to do so. A decision to perform a challenge inspection may, for the South, be as difficult a decision as doing TEAM SPIRIT. State/IA, as usual, is not as alarmed over the intentions of either the North or the South. However, the following steps were agreed to by this small group:

-- We need to define for the ROMs some essential principles in the bilateral inspection proposal now on the table that must not be compromised. They range from the necessity for adequate number of challenge inspections, to access to any site--military or civilian, to commitment to conduct a minimum number of inspections each year. These have now been presented to the ROMs to prevent the principles from being excluded from whatever final bilateral inspection regime is negotiated.

-- Examine potential alternatives to incorporate these principles in some sort of "new" or "hybrid" inspection regime so that perhaps IAMA, with more credible or even American inspectors, can initiate and administer intrusive challenge inspections mandated by this new regime. This has the advantage of insulating these inspections from the domestic political pressures within the ROK during implementation. Results of such negotiations would be provided to all parties. ACDA is writing a paper on the feasibility of this thinking.

-- A PCC will be convened this week to discuss this approach, the timing and the ways to carefully raise the idea with the South and the IAMA if a new bilateral regime involves IAMA. This PCC will also start looking at what our policy should be if the nuclear issue is "resolved"—beginning with a definition of what "resolved" means.

-- Everyone agrees that we should be very careful not to compromise our critical requirements in any new approach. Furthermore, we cannot have either the ROMs or DPRK perceive us as weakening on our basic objective to stop any DPRK weapons program with a credible challenge inspection regime.

-- If there is agreement on a new approach, then we would have to convince the ROMs—who may not agree with the possibility of including third parties such as the IAMA in its bilateral inspection agreement with the North.

-- Whatever the ROM proposes to break the current impasse with the DPRK, it should be clear that no movement in diplomatic dialogue

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET
and no economic assistance from Japan would occur without acceptance of a challenge inspection regime which contains our critical principles.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

USQP 5 USC §552(b)(1); E.O. 13526 1.4(d)

William T. Pendley

DECLASSIFIED
Purpose: To provide USD(P) with thoughts on the status of the North Korea nuclear issue

Recommendation: That ASD (ISA) initial attached memorandum