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IV. C. 7 (a)

Volume I

THE AIR WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

#298



UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 - 1967

IV. C. 7.(a)

volume I

THE AIR WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. Draft memorandum, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," 7/13/65, TOP SECRET, filed with compilation of data assembled by Secretary McNamara for his 14-21 July 1965 trip to Vietnam.
2. Memorandum for Rusk, McNamara, McG. Bundy, W. Bundy, McNaughton, Unger, "Cutting Our Losses in South Viet-Nam," TOP SECRET. Ball distributed this paper in two parts, a summary on 28 June 1965 and the paper itself on the 29th.
3. Memorandum for the President, "A Compromise Solution for South Viet-Nam," 1 July 1965, TOP SECRET. (Underlining in original.)
4. Draft, "Plan of Action for South Vietnam," 24 March 1965, TOP SECRET.
5. From Ball's summary, 28 June 1965, of his memorandum of the 29th, cited above, n. 2.
6. Memorandum, "Viet-Nam," 1 July 1965, TOP SECRET. (Emphasis added.) Rusk's name is typed as drafter at the foot of the memorandum.
7. Bundy's memorandum, 1 July 1965 (TOP SECRET), summarized points Bundy made in a longer paper, "Holding on in South Vietnam," 30 June 1965 (TOP SECRET).
8. Memorandum for the President, "Recommendations of additional deployments to Vietnam," 20 July 1965, TOP SECRET.
9. Memorandum for the President, "Program of expanded military and political moves with respect to Vietnam," first draft 26 June 1965, revised 1 July, TOP SECRET. The copy used here is the typed draft of 26 June with extensive pencilled revisions in McNamara's own hand and his signature.
10. JCSM 515-65, 2 July 1965, "Deployments to South Vietnam," TS; Fact Sheet, "Military Pressures Against NVN," in Cable File 34, SecDef Saigon Trip, 14-21 July 1965.
11. SNIE 10-9-65, 23 July 1965, "Communist and Free World Reactions to a Possible US Course of Action," TOP SECRET.
- 11a. Ibid.
12. Draft Memorandum, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," 7/13/65, TS.
13. Footnote on p. 4 of McNamara's memorandum of 20 July 1965, cited above, n. 8.

14. Memorandum for the President, 28 July 1965, UNCLASSIFIED, commenting on 18 points made by Senator Mansfield to the President on the Vietnam situation.
15. Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of the Program of Bombing North Vietnam," 30 July 1965, TOP SECRET.
16. Even as early as 7 July the SecDef apparently planned to take up the idea of a 6-8 week bombing pause with Ambassador Taylor and General Westmoreland. See OSD 5319 to Saigon, 07/2352 Z July 1965, TS, NODIS.
17. JCSM 652-65, 27 Aug 1965, "Concept for Vietnam," TS; Memorandum for the SecDef from ASD/ISA, I-3614/65, "Concept for Vietnam," 9/8/65, TS; and Memorandum for the CJCS from the SecDef, "Concept for Vietnam," 9/11/65, TS.
18. JCSM 670-65, 9/2/65; JCSM 686-65, 9/11/65; SecDef Memorandum for CJCS, "Air Strikes on North Vietnam," 9/15/65, TS. JCS recommendations along these lines continued to be submitted throughout 1965. See JCSM 810-65, 11/10/65, and JCSM 811-65, 11/11/65, both TS.
19. The Hanoi and Haiphong circles and the Chinese buffer zones developed into sanctuaries during 1965 from a decision in August to exclude them from an authorization to strike SAM sites at will, provided photography had shown them to be occupied. See JCSM 238-66, 14 April 1966, "ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report -- Air Operations Against North Vietnam," Annex B to Appendix A to Section II, "Chronology, TS.
20. JCSM 238-66, 14 April 1966, op. cit., contains a chronological account of ROLLING THUNDER missions to March 1966. See also CINCPAC Command History, 1965, Vol. II, pp. 324-389, TS.
21. The statistics are taken from CIA SC No. 04442/67, Jan. 1967, "The ROLLING THUNDER Program."
22. Memorandum for the President, 30 July 1965, op. cit.
23. CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objectives in North Vietnam."
24. Testimony before Senate committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, 4 August 1965, SECRET.
25. Testimony, House Committee on Armed Services, 6 August 1965, SECRET.

26. SecDef Background briefing for the press, 21 October 1965, OJO.
27. The circumstances and the diplomacy of the May pause are treated in detail in another paper in this project.
28. Memorandum for the President, 30 November 1965, TOP SECRET. This paper, written immediately following a visit to Vietnam by McNamara and General Wheeler on 28 and 29 November, was intended as a supplement to the Secretary's memorandum of 3 November, cited below.
29. Memorandum for the President, "Courses of Action in Vietnam," 3 November 1965, TOP SECRET. This paper is headed "1st Rough Draft," but a note in McNamara's handwriting states: "A copy of this was sent to the Pres. by courier thru Mac's office on 11/7 & discussed with him by me, George, & Mac on 11/7. RMcN."
30. McNaughton draft, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," 13 July 1965, TOP SECRET.
31. Memorandum, "Courses of Action in Viet-Nam," 9 November 1965, TOP SECRET. A pencilled note by McNaughton on the copy used here indicates that Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson was the author of the paper.
32. Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, "State's Memo to the President (Courses of Action in Viet-Nam)," 9 November 1965, TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY.
33. Draft Memorandum for the President, "A Pause," 1 December 1965, TOP SECRET. A cover note indicates that this is an up-dating of a paper originally circulated on 16 November.
34. Memorandum, "Possible Political Actions, Specifically a 'Pause'," TOP SECRET. A pencilled note indicates the paper was by Johnson and Bundy, on 6 December 1965.
35. McNamara's memorandum of 3 November 1965, op. cit.
36. McNamara's memorandum, 3 December 1965, TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY.
37. Ibid.
38. Bundy draft, "Scenario for Possible Resumption of Bombing," 15 January 1966, SECRET.
39. State 1786 to Lodge, MACV, and CINCPAC, 24 Dec 1965, CF 44.
40. MACV 45265, 27 Dec 65, Ibid.
41. CINCPAC 262159Z Dec 1965, CF 44; CINCPAC 271955Z Dec 1965, Ibid.

42. State 1805 to Lodge and Porter, 28 Dec 1965, Ibid. (This cable is misfiled under 23 Dec 1965.)
43. CINCPAC 120205Z Jan 1966, Ibid.
44. JCSM 41-66, 18 Jan 1966.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid. (emphasis added)
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. McNaughton 2nd Draft, "Some Observations about Bombing North Vietnam," 18 January 1966. (TS-SENSITIVE) in McNaughton Book II, Tab DD.
51. McNaughton 3rd Draft, "Some Paragraphs on Vietnam," 19 Jan 1966 (TS-Sensitive), in McNaughton Book, Tab BB.
52. SNIE 10-12-65, 10 Dec 1965, p. 9 (TS).
53. McNaughton Draft "Some Paragraphs...", op. cit.
54. Memorandum for the President, "The Military Outlook in South Vietnam," 24 January 1966, TOP SECRET.
55. These were: Memorandum for the President (no title), 30 November 1965, TOP SECRET, and Memorandum for the President, "Military and Political Actions Recommended for South Vietnam," 7 December 1965, TOP SECRET.
56. In the 7 December version, this parenthetical sentence was a footnote.
57. The following footnote, expressing the reservations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was appended to the 24 January 1966 version of McNamara's memorandum:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the evaluation set forth in paragraph 7 is on the pessimistic side in view of the constant and heavy military pressure which our forces in Southeast Asia will be capable of applying. While admittedly the following factors are to a degree imponderables, they believe that greater weight should be given to the following:

- a. The cumulative effect of our air campaign against the

DRV on morale and DRV capabilities to provide and move men and material from the DRV to South Vietnam.

"b. The effects of constant attack and harassment on the ground and from the air upon the growth of Viet Cong forces and on the morale and combat effectiveness of Viet Cong/PAVN forces.

"c. The effect of destruction of Viet Cong base areas on the capabilities of VC/PAVN forces to sustain combat operations over an extended period of time.

"d. The constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue a struggle which they realize they cannot win in the face of progressively greater destruction of their country."

58. Memorandum for the President, "The Resumption of Bombing Poses Grave Danger of Precipitating a War with China," 25 January 1966, SECRET-NODIS. Ball noted in a covering letter that he sent copies only to the President and to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.
59. Letter; Ball to Raborn, 16 January 1966, SECRET.
60. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, 12 October 1965, SECRET, forwarding a study of ROLLING THUNDER options. The study, Thompson wrote, "was largely prepared in State and was reviewed by General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Unger, and myself.
61. Memorandum for the President, 30 July 1965, op. cit.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. Although this was written at the end of July, the basic situation continued essentially as Secretary McNamara described it and there is no reason to believe his comments would have been different at the end of the year.
64. CIA/DIA, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam," SC No. 08437/66, 1 June 1966. A 1967 CIA publication, "The Rolling Thunder Program -- Present and Potential Target Systems," SC No. 04442/67, January 1967, upped the value of military damage in 1965 to \$33.6 million and the total to \$69.8 million.
65. CIA/DIA, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North Vietnam," op. cit.
66. Memorandum for the SecDef from Gen. J. F. Carroll, DIA, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam," 17 November 1965.
67. Ibid.
68. JCSM 16-66, 10 Jan 1966 (TS).
69. CIA/DIA, "An Appraisal...", op. cit.

FOOTNOTES

1. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, 12 October 1965, op. cit.
2. JCSS Armed Reconnaissance Study Group Report, "An Analysis of the Armed Reconnaissance Program in North Vietnam," 15 November 1965, Appendix 1 to Annex C.
3. JCSM 238-66, ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report, "Air Operations Against North Vietnam," 14 April 1966, Tab B to Annex C to Appendix A to Section II, and Appendix B to Section II.
4. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn E. Thompson, 12 October 1965, op. cit.
5. JCSM 811-65, 10 November 1965, "Future Operations and Force Deployments with Respect to the War in Vietnam."
6. Memorandum for the DepSecDef from McNaughton, 9 November 1965, summarizing the JCS position.
7. JCSM 810-65, "Air Operations Against the North Vietnam POL System," 10 November 1965.
8. "Attack on the North Vietnam Petroleum Storage System -- A Study," prepared by J-3 in collaboration with DIA, 23 April 1965, revised 22 December 1965.
9. JCSM 810-65, 10 November 1965, op. cit.
10. Ibid., Appendix, Annex D.
11. Ibid.
12. Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, for the Board of National Estimates, "Probable Reactions of the DRV, Communist China, and the USSR to US Air Attacks on Petroleum Storage Facilities in North Vietnam," 27 November 1965; and Memorandum for the SecDef from Admiral W. F. Raborn, 3 December 1965, forwarding Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, for the Board of National Estimates, "Reactions to a US Course of Action in Vietnam," 2 December 1965.
13. Memorandum for Director, CIA from Sherman Kent, 27 November 1965, op. cit.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.

16. Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, 2 December 1965, op. cit.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Memorandum for the CJCS from the SecDef, 8 December 1965, "Military Operations in North and South Vietnam."
22. Memorandum for the DepSecDef from the Acting Director, CIA, 28 December 1965, "Probable Reactions to US Bombing Attacks on POL Targets in North Vietnam."
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. SNIE 10-2-65, 10 December 1965, "Probable Communist Reactions to a US Course of Action."
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. CM-1006-65, Memorandum for the SecDef, "Probable Reactions of the DRV, Communist China, and the USSR to US Air Attacks on the Petroleum Storage Facilities in North Vietnam," 2 December 1965.
32. CM 1071-65, Memorandum for ASD/ISA, 28 December 1965.
33. "Attack on the North Vietnam Petroleum Storage System--A Study" prepared by J-3 in collaboration with DIA, 23 April 1965, revised 22 December 1965.
34. Ibid.
35. JCSM 41-66, 18 January 1966.

36. Draft, W. P. Bundy, 1/15/66, "Scenario for Possible Resumption of Bombing."
37. Draft, McNaughton, 1/18/66, "Some Observations About Bombing North Vietnam."
38. JCS 2830, 292126Z January 1966, directed the resumption. This was the beginning of ROLLING THUNDER 48.
39. Memorandum for the President, "The Military Outlook in South Vietnam," 24 January 1966.
40. Ibid.
41. DIA Special Report AP-1-630-1-15-66, "Relationship Between Petroleum Storage and Distribution System and Petroleum Consumption in North Vietnam," January 1966.
42. SNIE 10-1-66, "Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam," 4 February 1966.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. CM-1147-66, 1 February 1966, "Interdiction Operations Against the DRV."
48. JCSM 238-66, 14 April 1966, "ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report," op. cit., Section I, Basic Report.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. JCSM 113-66, 19 February 1966.
53. JCSM 130-66, 1 March 1966; JCSM 153-66, 10 March 1966.
54. CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objectives in North Vietnam," March 1966.
55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Memo, SecDef to President, 24 Jan 1966, op. cit.
64. CM 1147-66: Memo, Chairman to Director, Joint Staff, 1 Feb 1966, JCS Study Group Report, Sect. I, App A, Annex B; JCSM 238-66: Memo, Director, Joint Staff to SecDef, 14 Apr 1966, states that the Study Group was formed "In furtherance of your conversation with the Chairman...."
65. JCS Study Group Report, Sect. I, App A, Annex B, and App B.
66. Ibid., Sect. II, App A, Annex D, pp. 12-13.
67. JCSM 113-66 (19 Feb 1966).
68. JCS Study Group Report, Sec. II, App A, Annex B, p. 13.
69. JCSM 130-66 (1 Mar 1966).
70. JCSM 810-65 (10 Nov 1965).
71. Memo, Sherman Kent to Director, CIA, 2 Dec 1965.
72. Memo, Sherman Kent to Director, CIA, 27 Nov 1965.
73. Ibid.
74. Memo, Acting Director, CIA, to DepSecDef, 28 Dec 1965.
75. DIA Special Report AP-1-630, 15 Jan 1966.
76. SNIE 10-1-66 (4 Feb 1966).

77. JCSM-130-66, 1 March 1966, Appendix A, p. A-3 (TS), emphasis added.
78. JCSM-153-66, 10 March 1966 (TS).
79. CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objectives in North Vietnam," March 1966.
80. JCSM 189-66, 26 Mar 1966.
81. Ibid.
82. Memo, SecDef to President (no date, but late March 1966), Subject: April Program of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam and Laos" (In McNaughton Book II, Tab V.)
83. NSAM No. 288, 17 Mar 1964.
84. State 2884 to Lodge, 30 Mar 1966, CF 49.
85. Notes on Memo, SecDef to President, "April Program...", copy in McNaughton Book VII, Tab L.)
86. JCS 7480, 010112Z April 1966.
87. Memorandum for the President, "April Program...", op. cit.
88. Testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations, 4 August 1965, SECRET.
89. JCSM 810-65, 10 November 1965, op. cit.
90. CM-1006-65, 2 December 1965, op. cit.
91. Memorandum for the President from Under SecState Ball, 25 January 1966.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. JCS Study Group Report, Section III, Appendix A, pp. 2-3; JCSM 238-66, 14 April 1966.
95. Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Viet-Nam, op. cit., p. 28.

96. The papers and notes presented at this meeting for consideration and described in detail below are all contained in McNaughton Book II, Tab W (S-Sensitive).
97. W. W. Rostow Memorandum for Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, April 9, 1966 -- 7:00 a.m., Subject: Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum (S) in McNaughton Book II, Tab S.
98. Leonard Unger, State, Far East, Planning for Viet-Nam Contingencies, April 11, 1966 (TS), in McNaughton Book II, Tab R.
99. McNaughton's handwritten notes dated "4/12/66" suggest such a meeting; they begin with a list of names (of participants?) and contain a numbered summary of probable discussion points. (McNaughton, Book II, Tab R.)
100. George A. Carver, CIA, Memorandum for the Honorable John T. McNaughton (copies to Rostow, Bundy, Moyers, Unger, Ball, Vance, Komer), 12 April 1966, with attached Memorandum entitled "Consequences of a Buddhist Political Victory in South Vietnam," 11 April 1966, (S-SENSITIVE); McNaughton Book II, Tab Q.
101. Maxwell D. Taylor, Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Current Situation in South Vietnam," April 12, 1966 (S); in McNaughton Book II, Tab P.
102. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (4th Revised edition), (Washington; GPO, March 1968), p. 28; for a good review of events at the time see Embassy Saigon msg. 4033, 16 April 1966 (S-LIMDIS).
103. W. W. Rostow, Headings for Decision and Action: Vietnam, April 14, 1966, April 14, 1966 (S), copy for Mr. McNaughton; in McNaughton Book II, Tab O.
104. JCSM-238-66, op. cit.
105. JCS ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report: Air Operations Against NVN, 6 April 1966 (TS), Section III, Annexes D, E, and F.
106. Ibid., Section III, Appendix B, p. 6.
107. Ibid.
108. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Air Operations Against North Vietnam, April 13, 1966.

109. DRAFT, FE: WPBundy;mk, 4/16/66, Basic Choices in Viet-Nam (S); in McNaughton Book II, Tab N.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid., emphasis added.
115. How We Should Move, unsigned, undated paper (TS-SENSITIVE, "By Carver, 4/16/66" pencilled in by McNaughton) in McNaughton Book II, Tab Mc.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., emphasis added.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. Politics in Vietnam: A "Worst" Outcome, 16 April 1966, unsigned paper in McNaughton Book II, Tab M (S).
121. Ibid., Tab A.
122. Scenario, FE: IUnger;hjh, 4/16 in McNaughton Book II, Tab Mc.
123. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 2, no. 16, Monday, April 25, 1966, p. 555, emphasis added.
124. Course B, Unger 4/19/66; McNaughton revision 4/20/66; Unger re-revision 4/21/66 (S-SENSITIVE) in McNaughton Book II, Tab J.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. NSAM 343, March 28, 1966 (S).
128. R. W. Komer Memorandum for Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and Administrators Bell, Marks and Raborn, April 19, 1966 (S); with attached Memorandum for the President, April 19, 1966 (S).

129. See, for instance, his Statement on Vietnam during a News Conference at the White House, June 18, 1966, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, June 27, 1966, pp. 805-7.
130. JCSM-130-66, 1 March 1966 (TS).
131. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Deployments to Southeast Asia," 10 March 1966 (TS).
132. JCSM-218-66, 4 April 1966 (TS).
133. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Deployment Program for South Vietnam," 12 April 1966 (TS).
134. JCSM-274-66, 28 April 1966 (TS).
135. See JCSM-215-66, 2 April 1966 (TS); JCSM-233-66, 15 April 1966 (TS); and JCSM-375-66, 4 June 1966 (TS) on Tac Air requirements; and JCSM-317-66, 10 May 1966 (TS) on air munitions requirements.
136. JCSM-264-66, 27 April 1966 (TS).
137. The New York Times, 28 June 1966.
138. Maxwell D. Taylor Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Assessment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips," April 27, 1966 (S); in McNaughton Book II, Tab H.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid.
142. William P. Bundy Memorandum to the Secretary [of State], Subject: "General Taylor's Memorandum of April 27 on Negotiation Blue Chips," May 4, 1966 (S-NODIS); in McNaughton Book II, Tab K.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid.
146. James Reston, "Washington: The Evaded Moral Question in Vietnam," New York Times, May 18, 1966.
147. Tabular presentation of Presidential popularity showing Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson in SecDef Cable File 52, Tab F.

148. State Department message 3553, May 21, 1966 (C).
149. Embassy Saigon message 4880, May 23, 1966 (C-LIMDIS).
150. Ibid.
151. Embassy Saigon message 4952 for the President from Lodge, May 25, 1966, 7:20 a.m. (S-NODIS).
152. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, April 13, 1966, op. cit.
153. JCS 9326, 261842Z April 1966.
154. W. W. Rostow Memorandum for the Secretary of State [and] the Secretary of Defense, May 6, 1966 (TS-SENSITIVE).
155. Ibid.
156. COMUSMACV message to CINCPAC 091226Z May 1966 (S).
157. CINCPAC message to JCS 100730Z May 1966 (S); emphasis in original.
158. Memorandum apparently prepared in the Air Staff, "Safeguards for Success," May 4, 1966.
159. COMUSMACV message for CINCPAC 17603, 221145Z May 1966 (S).
160. For a complete review of these political events and the U.S. reactions and involvement in them, see Task Force Vol. IV. C., "Evolution of the War: US-GVN Relations: 1963-1967, part II" (TS-SENSITIVE).
161. History of Restrictions on Attack on NVN POL System, briefing paper prepared by the JCS, 10 August 1967 for Secretary of Defense Backup Book for appearance before Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 Aug 1967, Section IV, Tab A(S).
162. State Department msg. 48 to OSLO (ToSec), 3 Jun 66, For Secretary and Ambassador Bruce, transmitting "for your eyes only" msg. received by President from P. M. Wilson (S-NODIS).
163. I-35728/66 (no date), Memorandum for the SecDef from ASD/ISA.
164. COMUSMACV msg 051201Z June 1966, personal for CINCPAC (TS).

165. CINCPAC to JCS, 060705Z June 1966.
166. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 080757Z June 1966 (TS).
167. CIA SC No. 08440/66, "The Effect of Destruction of NVN Petroleum Storage Facilities on the War in SVN," 8 June 1966.
168. Brussels msg 79 to State, Literally Eyes Only for the President from the Secretary, 7 June 1966 (TS-NODIS).
169. Brussels msg. 87 to State, Eyes Only for Secretary McNamara from the Secretary, 8 June 1966 (TS-NODIS).
170. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, "Visit of Ambassador Ronning to Hanoi, June 14-17, 1966," 21 June 1966.
171. OSD msg. to CINCPAC 3339-66, 132146Z June 1966, SECDEF to CINCPAC Eyes Only.
172. CINCPAC msg to SecDef, 140659Z June 1966, Exclusive.
173. OSD msg 3395-66, 152000Z June 1966, SecDef to CINCPAC, Eyes Only.
174. CINCPAC msg to SecDef, 160920Z June 1966, Exclusive.
175. JCS 5003 to CINCPAC, 222055Z June 1966. This execute message was drafted as an amendment to JCS 9326 of 26 April, which had extended ROLLING THUNDER 50 until further notice. The amendment simply made provision for an A, or Alpha, element to ROLLING THUNDER 50 consisting of these particular JCS fixed targets. The operation thus came to be identified as ROLLING THUNDER 50-A.
176. Ibid.
177. JCS msg 5311, to CINCPAC, 251859Z June 1966; New York Times, 1 July 1966.
178. CINCPAC msg 281015Z June 1966, SpeCat Exclusive to SecDef and CJCS.
179. JCS msg 5414 to CINCPAC, 281340Z, SpeCat Exclusive.

FOOTNOTES

1. DEF 5517, 291238Z, to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF.
2. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966."
3. State Circular 2568, 291300Z June 1966.
4. "Current Foreign Relations," 6 July 1966.
5. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secretaries of Defense, Subject: "Southeast Asia Deployment Plan," 2 July 1966 (S).
6. Alain Enthoven, ASD/SA, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: "Southeast Asia Deployment Plan," 30 June 1966 (TS), transmitting the recommended changes and a draft memo to the JCS, Services and ASDs.
7. McNamara's handwritten and signed changes to the draft memo submitted by Alain Enthoven, ASD/SA, ibid.
8. President Lyndon B. Johnson Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Tuesday, June 28, 1966, 5:05 p.m. (S).
9. David L. McDonald, Acting CJCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, JCSM-450-66, 8 July 1966 (TS); and Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Schedule of Deployments to South Vietnam," 15 July 1966 (TS). For a full treatment of the troop deployment issue see Task Force paper IV.C.6, "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployment, 1965-1967," (TS-Sensitive).
10. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966," op. cit.
11. CINCPAC msg. 080730Z July 1966 (TS).
12. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 242069Z July 1966 (TS).
13. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 081937Z August 1966 (TS); and CINCPAC msg. 080730Z July 1966, op. cit.
14. DIA Special Intelligence Summary, "NVN POL Status Report," 20 July 1966 (TS)
15. DIA Special Intelligence Summary, "NVN POL Status Report," 1 August 1966.

16. CINCPAC msg to CINCPACAF 042059Z September 1966 (TS-LIMDIS).
17. Ibid.
18. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966."
19. CIA SC No. 04442/67, January 1967, "The Rolling Thunder Program, Present and Potential Target Systems," Appendix A.
20. Ibid.
21. SNIE 13-66, "Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation," 4 August 1966 (S).
22. NIE 14.3-66, 7 July 1966, "North Vietnamese Potential for Fighting in South Vietnam," (TS), p. 12.
23. CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 1684/66, "North Vietnamese Intentions and Attitudes Toward the War," 25 July 1966 (S), pp. 3-4.
24. See the daily DIA Special Intelligence Summaries, "NVN POL Status Report" for July and August 1966.
25. Joint CIA/DIA Report, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam through 12 September 1966," (TS).
26. Institute for Defense Analysis Study, IDA TS/HQ66-49, "The Effects of US Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability to Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect," 29 August 1966 (TS), p. 58, emphasis added.
27. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations: The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966."
28. Quoted in the Washington Post, 15 February 1967.
29. Roger Fisher, Memorandum, A Barrier Strategy, Draft/1-30-66, in McNaughton Book II, Tab AA (S-Eyes Only).
30. Unsigned "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: 'A Barrier Strategy'," dated in pencil in McNaughton's hand 1/30/66 with additional pencil note, "copy given to RSM 3/22/66" (S-Eyes Only).
31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.
33. JCS msg. 2339/222 to CINCPAC 24 Mar 1966 (TS); and JCS msg. 252305Z Mar 1966 to CINCPAC (TS).
34. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 071925Z April 1966 (TS).
35. Program is referred to in DA msg. to COMUSMACV 774060, 161456Z July 1966 (S).
36. Adam Yarmolinsky (Principle Deputy ISA) Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 30 March 1966.
37. Robert S. McNamara letter to Jerrold Zacharias, 16 April 1966, copies to Kistiakowsky, Kaysen and Wiesner.
38. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, 26 April 1966 (S).
39. Institute for Defense Analyses Report, IDA TS/HQ66-49, "The Effects of US Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability to Support Military Operations in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect," 29 August 1966 (TS), pp. v-viii.
40. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
41. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
42. Ibid., pp. 37-38.
43. Ibid., p. 39.
44. Ibid., pp. 45-46.
45. Institute for Defense Analyses, JASON Division, Study S-255 (TS), August 1966, "Air-Supported Anti-Infiltration Barrier," pp. 2-6.
46. Ibid., p. 7.
47. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Proposal for Barrier Systems," 3 September 1966 (S).
48. JCS msg. 1975 to CINCPAC, 072155Z September 1966 (TS); JCS msg. 2160 to CINCPAC, 082307Z September 1966 (S); and CM-1732-66, 8 September 1966 (S).
49. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 130705Z September 1966 (TS).
50. CINCPAC msg. to field commands, 052050 September 1966 (TS).

51. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird, 15 September 1966 (S).
52. Defense msg. 4244, from SecDef to AmEmbassy Saigon, 021801Z October 1966 (S).
53. JCSM-646-66, 7 October 1966 (TS).
54. SecDef's Saigon Trip, October 1966, CF-54, Tab C.
55. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Actions Recommended for Vietnam," 14 October 1966 (TS). A note at the end of the memo states, "Mr. Katzenbach and I have discussed many of its (the memo's) main conclusions and recommendations -- in general, but not in particulars, it expresses his views as well as my own."
56. See Task Force paper IV.C.8 for a detailed examination of the background and decision on Program #4.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. JCSM-672-66, 14 October 1966 (TS).
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. George A. Carver, Jr., Memorandum for the Director, CIA, Subject: "Comments on Secretary McNamara's Trip Report," 15 October 1966 (TS). A pencil note in the margin in McNamara's hand says, "prepared by Dick at my request."
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. John T. McNaughton; ASD/ISA, Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, Subject: "McNaughton in Manila, October 23-25, 1966," 26 October 1966 (S-Eyes Only); with a copy of the Manila Communique annotated in McNaughton's hand attached.
67. Ibid., quoted in the McNaughton memo.
68. Ibid., quoted in the McNaughton memo.
69. Ibid.

70. JCSM-667-66, 15 October 1966 (TS); requests an increase in B-52 sorties from 600 to 800 per month beginning in February 1967. The Chief; also noted they had a proposal for forward basing the B-52s under study and would forward a recommendation later.
71. Memo to Mr. Vance, 18 October 1966, signed "ACG" (Col Abbot C. Greenleaf, military assistant to the Deputy Secretary) with a summary of McNamara's views of an attached JCS study of attrition factors.
72. CINCPAC letter to JCS 3010, Ser: 000438, 20 October 1966, Subject: "Calendar Year 1966 and 1967 Force Requirements/Capabilities Programs," in three volumes (TS).
73. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1.
74. Ibid., Vol. I, p. C-2.
75. See above, p.
76. CINCPAC letter 3010, op. cit., p. B-7.
77. JCSM-702-66, 4 November 1966 (TS) with appendices A-C, p. B-1.
78. Ibid., p. A-1.
79. Ibid.
80. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "CINCPAC Additional CY 1966 and CY 1967 Force Requirements," 6 October 1966 (TS), with appendix.
81. JCSM-702-66, op. cit., Annex C, p. 68.
82. Ibid., p. 70.
83. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Deployments to Southeast Asia," 11 November 1966 (TS).
84. For a complete treatment of the issues and background to the Program #4 decision on ground forces see Task Force paper IV.C. 8 (TS-Sensitive).
85. Chairman's Memoranda to the Secretary of Defense, CM-1770-66, 22 September 1966 (TS); CM-1794-66, 29 September 1966; and 2014-66, 22 December 1966 (S).
86. Draft Memorandum for the President (For Comment), Subject: "Recommended FY67 Southeast Asia Supplemental Appropriation," 17 Nov. 1966 (TS), pp. 13-14, in McNaughton Book VII, Tab Q.

87. Ibid.
88. Authorized in RT-52, November 12, 1966.
89. Information on both targets is in CINCPAC Command History - 1966, Vol. II, pp. 504-505 (TS).
90. Ibid., and New York Times, Dec. 13, 14, 16, 17, 1966.
91. Kraslow and Toory, The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam, (Random House, NY, 1968), p.
92. See the New York Times, December 25, 1966 - January 30, 1967.
93. New York Times, Jan. 1, 1967.
94. JCSM-727-66, 22 November 1966 (S).
95. New York Times, December 9, 1966.
96. New York Times, January 1, 1967.
97. CIA SC No. 04442/67, "The Rolling Thunder Program -- Present and Potential Target Systems," January 1967.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
106. CINCPAC Command History - 1966, op. cit., vol. II, p. 511.
107. Ibid., pp. 511-514.