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SUMMARY OF JCS POSITIONS AND STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR
TESTING, PROLIFERATION, WEAPONS AND MATERIALS
JANUARY 1961-JANUARY 1977

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59

Copy No. R-1
Case No. 88-FOI- 906
T.S. No. 88-75-156
Document No. 1

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Historical Division
Joint Secretariat
Joint Chiefs of Staff
31 May 1978

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1961

✓ 21 Feb 61

Test Ban
Treaty (TBT)
Verification
Moratorium

Because of a study being conducted to reevaluate the requirements for resumption of nuclear testing, the JCS reaffirmed to SecDef their previous views on this subject. They stated that the health hazard of nuclear testing, if it existed, had assumed importance far in excess of its significance in relation to the primary issue, the security of the United States. Because of the grave implications should the USSR achieve the next major breakthrough ahead of the United States, it was mandatory that the US again review the restrictions on technological progress in nuclear weaponry. After listing the military developments and requirements that were attainable only through testing, the JCS recommended that, until such a time as a reliable system of verification was developed and operational, nuclear testing be resumed without delay in environments in which the release of radioactive material to the atmosphere could be controlled. In the JCS view, the most important problem requiring solution prior to the resumption of the Geneva Conference was an immediate Presidential decision on the following policies:

1) A continued voluntary moratorium on testing was not in the best interest of the United States in the absence of demonstrated Soviet sincerity regarding the reaching of agreement.

2) If agreement was not reached by the end of the first 60 days of the resumed negotiations, the US would announce that it could no longer continue its voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons tests and that it would resume such tests under condition that would preclude the introduction of harmful matter into the atmosphere. The US would either continue its participation in the Geneva talks in a further effort to resolve the outstanding differences or terminate the talks and propose that future negotiations be resumed in the context of general disarmament discussions.

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3) The US would initiate at once a seismic research program in an effort to improve the capabilities of the system for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions. The JCS recommended that "concurrency with any modifications of current US proposals be conditioned upon the taking of the above decision by the President prior to the resumption of negotiations." They asked that the President be informed of their views.

(TS) JCSM-99-61 to SecDef, 21 Feb 61,
JMF 4613 (3 Feb 61).

✓ 4 Mar 61

TBT

The Fisk Report was a compilation of technical material bearing on the subject before the Geneva Conference on Cessation of Nuclear Tests. Section VII evaluated the impact of a test ban on US and USSR nuclear weapons systems. The Assistant to SecDef for Atomic Energy had criticized it for its assumption that increased numbers of weapons could substitute for higher quality and for treating limited war too summarily. He said that any US action that would deny the scientific and engineering community the opportunity to apply its maximum capabilities to defense could not result in a military advantage.

JCS commented on Section VII of the Fisk Panel Report. They noted that this section contained no conclusions, and that various interpretations and courses of action could be rationalized from it. In the short time available, they had reviewed the non-concurrence submitted by the Assistant to SecDef for Atomic Energy (made as a member of the Fisk Panel) and generally agreed with his expressed views. Noting the serious implications of any trend toward Case 3 assumed by the Panel (i.e., a total ban with no testing by US and possible clandestine testing by USSR), JCS recommended that their views, as expressed in JCSM-99-61 of 21 Feb 61, be carefully considered. Specifically, they viewed "with concern" the failure of Section VII to give

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sufficient emphasis to consequences of a major breakthrough in the nuclear field, to emphasize the need for testing to insure safety of nuclear weapons, to consider the urgent need for weapons effects data in various environments, or to recognize that testing was necessary to provide assurance that future weapons would function properly.

(TS) JCSM-133-61 to SecDef, 4 Mar 61,
JMF 3050 (2 Mar 61).

11 Mar 61

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

Moratorium

JCS gave their views on cessation of production of fissionable materials. They noted that the US proposal of 27 June 1960 conditioned this cessation upon an effective method of verification and upon the numerical limitation of Sino-Soviet armed forces and armaments. They stressed that cessation of the production of these materials must not be separated from other related proposals, citing the position they had expressed on 28 October 1960 (JCSM-487-60). The JCS views were: (1) The US proposals of 27 June 1960, if fulfilled, would safeguard US interests, but developing an effective verification capability presented great problems.

(3) It would be premature to try to implement this one measure unless the Sino-Soviet bloc gave concrete examples of good faith. (4) Continued production of tritium (a "fusionable," not a "fissionable," material) was essential to US security; its cessation should be addressed only at the last stage in arms control negotiations. (5) The current test ban was restricting research and development of nuclear weapons; this accentuated the need to produce material to maintain and modernize the stockpile of existing weapons. (6) In the absence of the safeguards set forth in the US proposal of 27 June 1960, a cessation of production of

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*Assumption 1:
Intelligence activity*

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fissionable material would be to the
advantage of the Sino-Soviet bloc.
(TS-RD) JCSM-148-61 to SecDef, 11 Mar
61, JMF 3050 (1 Jan 60) sec 19.

17 Mar 61

TBT

Communist
China

*Ex 1: Reason
of foreign
relations of US.*

(S) JCSM-169-61 to SecDef, 17 Mar 61,
JMF 3050 (16 Feb 61).

23 Mar 61

JCS set forth their views concerning
certain basic policy issues on which
decision were likely to be needed in the
near future. On many of these issues they
had already expressed views, which they
here repeated. The issues, and the JCS
recommendations (briefly summarized), were:

TBT

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

(1) Cessation of Nuclear Weapons Test-
ing: The US should seek an agreement by
1 June 1961. If none was reached, testing
should be resumed as soon as possible.
The US should agree to cease only those
tests for which an effective international
detection system was feasible.

(2) Cessation of production of fission-
able materials for use in weapons: The

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US should not implement any such agreement unless it was accompanied by other agreements and involved a system of verification.

Moratorium

(3) Transfer of fissionable materials from past production to non-weapons uses: This should be internationally controlled, and US transfers should be matched by those of the Soviets.

(4)

(5) Suitability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for monitoring the restriction of fissionable materials to peaceful uses: The US could agree that IAEA be used to police the diversion of fissionable material if the IAEA statute were strengthened and an adequate inspection system set up. (TS-RD) JCSM-182-61 to SecDef, 23 Mar 61, JMF 3050 (14 Mar 61).

8 Apr 61

TBT

Moratorium

JCS noted a cable from Acting SecState to US Delegation to the Geneva Conference on a Test Ban Treaty, which indicated that the US was prepared to continue its voluntary moratorium on all underground nuclear testing (including tests producing a seismic signal less than that agreed on as enforceable) for three years after a treaty was signed. JCS believed that this moratorium would seriously hinder vital research on the pure fusion or "neutron" bomb (OWL) and on certain radiation phenomena outside the atmosphere. They desired the matter brought to the attention of the President.

(TS-RD) JCSM-221-61 to SecDef, 8 Apr 61, JMF 3050 (29 Mar 61).

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26 Apr 61

TBT

Moratorium

JCS forwarded comments on a paper by Mr. John J. McCloy, Adviser to President Kennedy on Disarmament, relating to test ban negotiations. They agreed with him that the Soviets were dragging out these negotiations on disarmament, probably, to inhibit development of US capability. The JCS pointed out that on numerous occasions, they had indicated a pressing need for the US to resume testing.

(S) JCSM-275-61 to SecDef, 26 Apr 61, JMF 3050 (22 Apr 61).

26 Jun 61

Moratorium

JCS commented on a draft letter from SecDef to the President, which recommended that the US complete preparations to resume nuclear weapons testing and collaterally prepared for a VELA program of underground shots for seismic research. They generally concurred, but suggested that the letter be amended to recommend that the President make the decision to resume testing "at an early date" and initiate preparations at once.

(S) JCSM-435-61 to SecDef, 26 Jun 61, JMF 4613 (22 Jun 61).

6 Jul 61

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

JCS commented on a recommendation by the Perkins Panel that a study be conducted of the net effects of a cessation of production of fissionable material. JCS informed SecDef that such a study was already under way. Preliminary results seemed to support the JCS position expressed on 28 Oct 1960, reaffirmed on 23 Mar 1961 and 10 Jun 1961. Pending completion of the study, JCS continued to hold that, as an isolated measure, the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons was militarily unacceptable.

(TS) JCSM-461-61 to SecDef, 6 Jul 61, JMF 4230 (1 Apr 61) sec 2.

21 Jul 61

As requested by ASD (ISA), the JCS forwarded an evaluation of military considerations involved in a cessation of production of fissionable material

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Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

for use in weapons. The Perkins Panel had suggested that the impact of such a cessation on the relative military positions of the US and the USSR be evaluated [see item 6 July 1961]. The JCS noted that a complete evaluation would require detailed knowledge of Soviet strength--precisely the information "being sought by the entire military establishment on a continuing basis." However, making due allowance for lack of information on the Soviets' nuclear weapons stockpile and supply of fissionable materials, the JCS stated that (1) to end the production of fissionable materials would reduce or eliminate important new weapon systems then in development, and (2) relative military strength would be significantly affected if the US stockpile were frozen at the 1963 level and the USSR managed to continue production. The issue of producing fissionable materials was closely related to other arms control measures, and the JCS recommended that it be considered in conjunction with their report, being forwarded, on the impact of reducing US military forces to 1.8 million men [see JCSM-497-61, 21 July 1961]. If the US offered to consider separately the question of production of fissionable materials, the Soviets would probably demand that the negotiations include elimination of all nuclear weapons and material stockpiles; the US would then have to acquiesce or else suffer a propaganda defeat.

(TS-RD) JCSM-487-61 to SecDef, 21 Jul 61,
JMF 4230 (1 Apr 61) sec 3.

2 Aug 61

Moratorium

JCS commented on Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Nuclear Testing (Panofsky Panel). They agreed with the statement of the Panel itself that its report was "essentially an updated Fisk Panel Report"; hence their comments on the latter (JCSM-133-61, 4 March 1961) remained valid. JCS concluded that there were many points in the report that were inaccurate or expressed judgments with which they could not agree; [

They believed

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that the report underestimated the prospect of major new developments in connection with tactical nuclear weapons. The JCS disputed the conclusion that there was little urgency in resuming nuclear tests. Regarding the psychological consequences associated with world-wide fallout that would be produced by new testing, they reemphasized the conclusion by DASA, cited in their memo of 29 July 1961, that "world-wide fallout from past tests has not produced a biologic hazard." They reaffirmed their earlier views on resumption of nuclear testing.

(TS) JCSM-517-61 to SecDef, 2 Aug 61, JMF 4613 (28 Jul 61) sec 1.

12 Aug 61

TBT

JCS submitted additional comments on the Panofsky Panel Report, having reconsidered it at the request of the President. [

with which they disagreed. They reaffirmed their disagreement with the Panel's conclusion regarding the urgency of nuclear testing and recommended that nuclear testing "be resumed within a reasonable time, i.e., several months at the latest."

(TS) JCSM-546-61 to Military Representative of the President, et al., 12 Aug 61, JMF 4613 (28 Jul 61) sec 1.

20 Sep 61

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

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1
(S) JCSM-564-61 to SecDef, 20 Sep 61,
JMF 3050 (18 Sep 61).

27 Dec 61

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

As requested by ASD (ISA), JCS commented on three background papers for the Declaration on Disarmament. While considering all of them "useful . . . in developing future US positions to assist representatives at multilateral negotiations and at the United Nations," the JCS expressed some reservations, as follows:

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International
Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA)

Verification

(1) "Cutoff of the Production of Fissionable Materials and Reduction of Nuclear Stockpiles". The JCS believed that any such cutoff should be linked to progress on other measures. The background paper on this subject was vague on this point; it apparently accepted, as a final US position, a mere negotiating proposal put forth by the US on 25 Sep 61, which did not specify the need for such a link.

(2) "Application of IAEA Safeguards to Transfer of Fissionable Materials for Peaceful Purposes". This paper should make it clear that there must be effective verification and inspection systems, and that the statute of the IAEA must be revised to insure against a veto of inspection by any possible evader, before the IAEA could be relied upon to insure that fissionable materials made available for peaceful purposes were not diverted to military uses.

(S) JCSM-883-61 to SecDef, 27 Dec 61, JMF. 3050 (30 Sep 61) sec 3.

1962

23 Jan 62

Non-
proliferation
Treaty (NPT)

JCS accepted as useful," subject to certain comments, background papers for the Declaration on Disarmament relating to the following subject:

"Prohibition of the Further Diffusion of Nuclear Weapons" - The JCS took exception

OK
d. [unclear]
[unclear]

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to a section of this paper that argued in favor of a "no-transfer" agreement without adequate controls. At the least, there should be reference to the need to examine the feasibility of verifying the reduction of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

(S) JCSM-53-62 to SecDef, 23 Jan 62,
JMF 3050 (30 Sep 61) sec 4.

24 Feb 62

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials
(also Trans-
fer)

JCS reviewed an ACDA proposal to repeat an offer made on 16 Aug 1960, in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee, (1) to end the production of fissionable materials for weapons use, (2) to make reciprocal transfers of such materials to non-weapons purposes, starting with 30,000 kilograms of U-235 to be transferred by each country. JCS believed ☒

Excluded activities

that proposals such as these should not be negotiated or implemented in isolation and should be offered for negotiation only in the context of an overall disarmament program. Implementation should be linked to progress in other areas of disarmament and should be preceded by a test program to verify research and development information accumulated during the four-year period of "no testing."

(C) JCSM-137-62 to SecDef, 24 Feb 62,
JMF 3050 (18 Jan 62) sec 1.

14 Jul 62

Limited Test
Ban Treaty
(LTBT)

Verification

JCS commented on a draft treaty, prepared by ACDA, banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. They noted that it did not provide for an effective verification system. Full reliance for detection was placed on national systems; no mandatory criteria or procedures for on-site inspection were laid down. It was not responsive to the President's desire that provision be made for inspections to detect preparations for testing. The JCS favored a

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comprehensive treaty covering all environments, with appropriate thresholds to avoid banning tests that could not be detected.

(C) JCSM-514-62 to SecDef, 14 Jul 62, JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62) sec 1.

19 Jul 62

Comprehensive
Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT)

Verification

In reply to a request from ASD (ISA) JCS commented on a revised draft (dated 11 July 1962) of a comprehensive test ban treaty prepared by ACDA. They considered that the provisions for verification and detection were excessively vague and reaffirmed their view that effective measures were essential. The JCS recommended insertion of a provision covering inspection of preparations for nuclear testing.

(C) JCSM-530-62 to SecDef, 19 Jul 62, JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62) sec 1.

26 Jul 62

TBT

Verification

JCS commented upon a DOD news release of 7 July 1962, which had been widely interpreted to mean that a scientific breakthrough in underground nuclear test detection techniques had occurred, which permitted a major shift by the US at Geneva. However, JCS felt this was counterbalanced by other technical considerations, to the extent that no change in the US position regarding number and location of control posts was warranted.

(S) JCSM-558-62 to SecDef, 26 Jul 62, JMF 4613 (21 Jul 62).

9 Aug 62

CTBT

Verification

JCS commented on a revised draft (dated 24 July 1962) of a comprehensive test ban treaty prepared by ACDA. They criticized it for its inclusion of weapons tests that could not be detected ("prohibition of undetectable tests constitutes an unpoliced moratorium"), for its vagueness concerning the detection system and on-site inspections, for leaving too much to be decided later by an international commission, and for excessively involved withdrawal procedures. The JCS noted that the US

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seemed to be relaxing its position regarding the need for an international system of verification and inspection, and they believed any such relaxation was unjustified. The comments they had made on the earlier draft of the treaty (JCSM-530-62, 19 July 1962) were still pertinent and were reaffirmed.

(TS) JCSM-614-62 to SecDef, 9 Aug 62,
JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62).

15 Aug 62

LTBT

JCS commented on a revised draft treaty governing tests in the atmosphere, above the atmosphere, and in the oceans. They noted that it had the same defects as an earlier draft on which they had commented on 14 July 1962 (JCSM-514-62).

(S) JCSM-625-62 to SecDef, 15 Aug 62,
JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62) sec 2.

22 Aug 62

LTBT

CTBT

ASD (ISA) requested comments upon the latest ACDA drafts of the atmospheric and comprehensive test ban treaties. Concerning the latter draft, dated 14 Aug 62, the JCS repeated their comments concerning the ACDA 24 July draft (JCSM-614-62 to SecDef, 9 August 1962). Additionally, they believed that the requirement that control stations be manned by nationals of the country in which they were located could not be met by underdeveloped states. Also, they doubted that seismic stations and communications networks could be constructed within the short time specified. As to the limited test ban treaty dated 17 Aug, JCS compared it with the 7 Aug draft (critiqued in JCSM-625-62 of 15 Aug) and urged reconsideration of the decision to delete the provision retaining the right to test underground. The JCS again objected to the complicated and inhibiting withdrawal procedures.

(C) JCSM-645-62 to SecDef, 22 Aug 62,
JMF 3050 (6 Jul 62) sec 3.

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18 Sep 62

JCS commented on a memo by ACDA concerning non-diffusion of nuclear weapons. [

NPT

*1-2-62
JCS
ACDA*

(S) JCSM-727-62 to SecDef, 18 Sep 62,
JMF 3050 (23 Aug 62).

3 Oct 62

NPT

*OK to
22-12*

Commenting further on the question of a non-diffusion agreement, the Chairman reaffirmed the JCS views expressed on 18 Sep 62 (JCSM-727-62) and amplified them. The JCS believed, he said, that even the discussion of such an agreement would be inadvisable, because of its effect on the Western Allies. They also believed that the dangers of proliferation were overdrawn, and doubted that an agreement on non-transfer could in any way affect the Chinese Communists' nuclear development program. The proposed declaration might have an adverse effect on multilateral control of nuclear weapons.

(S) CM-1-62 to SecDef, 3 Oct 62, JMF 3050
(23 Aug 62)

26 Oct 62

Nuclear-free
Zones (NFZ)

*OK to
22-12*

JCS commented on a suggestion that the US take the initiative in proposing "nuclear-free" or "missile-free" zones in Latin America. As the Chairman had already told SecDef orally, the JCS believed that the US should neither propose nor accept such a plan, because (1) there was no assurance that it would lead to prompt

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removal of missiles from Cuba, (2) it would degrade US military flexibility "in our own backyard" while having no comparable effect on the USSR, and (3) the Soviets, having nothing to lose, would welcome discussion of the proposal. The US should focus on the current issue--the need to remove the missiles from Cuba--and not allow itself to be involved in endless arguments with other countries. If forced to negotiate, the US should agree to discuss a "nuclear-free" zone only after the Cuban missiles were removed. (S) JCSM-823-62 to SecDef, 26 Oct 62, JMF 3050 (25 Oct 62).

10 Nov 62

In response to a request by ASD (ISA), the JCS assessed the military impact of proposals to create nuclear-free or missile-free zones. they believed that such zones would work to the detriment of the United States, which, as a "world-wide" rather than a "continental" power, had deployed its strategic striking forces throughout the world. **L**

NFZ

EX 1
MILITARY
VUE IN
BY

L However, the US should oppose, and certainly should not initiate, proposals of either type. (S) JCSM-877-62 to SecDef, 10 Nov 62, JMF 3050 (25 Oct 62).

1963

16 Feb 63

In response to an ASD (ISA) request for comments on an ACDA position paper regarding a test ban treaty, JCS recommended extensive modification. They believed three cardinal principles must govern any test ban treaty. First, it must incorporate a detection,

TBT

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Moratorium

Verification

identification, and inspection system adequate to insure "the highest feasible probability" of discovering violations. Second, testing that could not be detected should not be prohibited. Third, withdrawal procedures should be simple. It had not been demonstrated that the ACDA system provided a "reasonable chance" for detecting evasions; this system would allow an unpoliced moratorium below the detection threshold. Also, it would prohibit withdrawal from the treaty from three years, which would be counter to US interest if the treaty was found unsatisfactory.

(TS) JCSM-136-63 to SecDef, 16 Feb 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 2.

22 Feb 63

TBT

In response to a request from ASD (ISA), JCS reviewed an ACDA draft test ban treaty and recommended the following changes: (1) laboratory and propulsion tests should be permitted; (2) requirement for an international commission should be eliminated; (3) means of inspection should be given further study; (4) inspection should be allowed without submission by the requesting party of substantiating seismic data; (5) the US/UK and USSR each should have a quota of inspections on the territory of the other; (6) withdrawal should require only 60 days rather than six months.

(S) JCSM-160-63 to SecDef, 22 Feb 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 4.

19 Mar 63

TBT

In response to a request by ASD (ISA), JCS commented upon the most recent ACDA draft test ban treaty dated 11 Mar 63, in light of the principles they had stated in JCSM-136-63 (16 Feb 63) and JCSM-160-63 (22 Feb 63). As previously stated, JCS felt that a primary deficiency lay in the prohibition of tests that were undetectable. Also, the requirement for detection of an event by four seismic stations in order to justify on-site inspection seemed unduly restrictive. Further, power of the

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Inspection Commission to visit territory of a nonpermanent member (i.e., other than US, UK and USSR) should be assigned by quota since any requirement for a majority vote might allow establishment of a sanctuary country. Finally, withdrawal procedures still were unduly restrictive. In sum, JCS believed there was "insufficient reliability" in the proposed treaty to give the US "adequate assurance" of detecting and fixing responsibility for treaty evasions.

(C) JCSM-234-63 to SecDef, 19 Mar 63,
JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 5.

21 Mar 63

JCS commented on an AEC paper **C**

TBT

*EX 1:
intelligence utility
vulnerability or
capabilities*

In view of the gravity of the test ban issue, JCS recommended a more comprehensive examination before the US made any further commitments with respect to a test ban treaty.

(TS) JCSM-241-63 to SecDef, 21 Mar 63,
JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 3.

20 Apr 63

TBT

*OK
Mittelman
10/10/63
11/1/63*

On their own initiative, JCS addressed the issue of whether or not a test ban was in the national interest. The US was on the verge of developing "clean" warheads and was progressing toward pure fusion warheads. These components, particularly important for tactical uses and effective ABMs, could be developed through underground tests. While the US observed a moratorium, however, the USSR might test clandestinely below the US detection threshold. If the Soviets did make technological advances and gained sole possession of an ABM, they could "increase substantially" their military pressure upon the Free World. It was

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apparent that the Soviets would not agree to any test ban providing essential guarantees of verification and inspection. Therefore, JCS considered that a treaty without a detection threshold under which the US could legally test would not now be in the national interest.

(S-RD) JCSM-327-63 to SecDef, 20 Apr 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 7.

13 Jun 63

TBT

ASD (ISA) requested comments on an ACDA draft test ban treaty, dated 24 May 63. JCS noted there were no significant changes from the drafts of 11 and 23 March; all three contained no provision for allowing tests below the threshold of detection. JCS argued that this treaty could allow the Soviets to conduct "highly significant and valuable" clandestine tests, which might easily enable them to move ahead of the US in area of military importance. Accordingly, JCS stated that adoption of the treaty in its present form would be contrary to US security interests.

(C) JCSM-449-63 to SecDef, 13 Jun 63, JMF 3050 (11 Feb 63) sec 8.

17 Jun 63

TBT

Disarmament
(General)

JCS commented on a draft statement to be used by Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) before the Stennis Subcommittee. They suggested modifications and warned that, even with these changes the statement should not be considered as an expression of JCS views on the subject of US/USSR military balance, which would be furnished later. They made the following comments on the paper:

(1) Its analysis of the possible gains to be achieved through "cheating," by clandestine tests, was incomplete.

(2) It underestimated the probable future effect of advances in nuclear technology on weapons systems.

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(3) It failed to reflect the close relationship between offensive and defensive capabilities, that is, strategic delivery vehicles and ABM systems.

(4) It appeared to be contradictory, in that it assumed a condition of mutual strategic deterrence but at the same time postulated that tactical weapons would not be decisive in a limited war because escalation would be likely to occur.

(5)

EX 1
PROPERLY
CLASSIFIED

In summary, the JCS disagreed "basically" with what the draft statement said about the effect on the military balance, both of continued unrestricted testing and of clandestine Soviet testing under the proposed test ban treaty.

(TS-RD) JCSM-462-63 to SecDef, 17 Jun 63, JMF 3050 (6 Jun 63) sec 2.

22 Jun 63

TBT

JCS forwarded to SecDef a copy of the JCS comments on the nuclear test ban treaty submitted by them to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. This statement had been formally approved by the JCS on 20 June 1963, but it was still under study and subject to modification.

The statement indicated that the JCS were not opposed to a "truly effective" treaty containing "effective safeguards." However, the JCS found the following deficiencies in the draft treaty:

(1) Most significant of all, it would prohibit all tests including those having essentially no probability of detection; this would prohibit the US from testing while allowing the Soviets to test clandestinely.

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(2) The quota of seven on-site inspections was too small.

(3) The provisions governing on-site inspections were too restrictive.

(4) Withdrawal should be allowed after 60 days, not 120.

The JCS argued that, through clandestine testing, the Soviets could make great advances and relegate the US to a position of inferiority in both strategic and tactical weapons. This JCS view had been put forth during the drafting of the treaty.

(TS-RD) JCSM-463-63 to SecDef, 22 Jun 63, JMF 3050 (6 Jun 63) sec 2.

✓ 26 Jun 63

TBT

o/c TO 7/2

On behalf of the JCS, the CNO submitted to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee a statement giving JCS comments on the proposed nuclear test ban treaty. The statement was identical in substance with the version sent to Sec Def on 22 June. Giving his further views in response to questions, the CNO stressed the importance of adequate safeguards in any test ban treaty.

(U) Hearings, Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, S. Com on Armed Svcs, Preparedness Investigating Subcom, 88th Cong, 1st sess (transcripts in OJCS Hist Div).

✓ 27 Jun 63

TBT

o/c TO 7/2

Testifying before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee on the test ban treaty, the CSAF described the military disadvantages of a cessation of nuclear testing without adequate safeguards against Soviet violations.

(U) Ibid.

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~~SECRET~~

9 Jul 63

LTBT

At the NSC meeting on 9 Jul 63, CJCS commented upon the negotiating instructions written for Amb Harriman. The document authorized him to "push . . . as far as you can" for a three-environment test ban treaty (i.e., atmosphere, outer space, and under water). JCS criticized the statement that a treaty was in the national interest because it was a step toward limiting nuclear diffusion, halting the arms race, and reducing tensions as being "overdrawn"; these reputed gains were not sufficient compensation for the risk of losing nuclear superiority. Also, JCS argued that a limited treaty was not compatible with national security because [

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SAAC-T-12-63 (rev.) 9 Jul 63,
JMF 3050 (9 Jul 63) (1)

12 Aug 63

LTBT

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JCS approved a statement giving qualified approval to the treaty banning atmospheric, outer space, and underwater tests of nuclear weapons. They set forth four essential criteria for any such treaty: (1) the US should not accept limitations on testing if the USSR had or could achieve a significant advantage in nuclear weapons that could not be overcome under the treaty; (2) clandestine Soviet testing, which could be expected, must have no serious adverse effect on the military balance; (3) procedures for withdrawal in the event of treaty violation must be quick and uncomplicated; (4) if the first two criteria were not met, the treaty must convey compensatory advantages elsewhere. Evaluating the treaty

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against these criteria, the JCS recognized that some risks were present. However, these risks could be reduced by the following safeguards: (1) continuing comprehensive underground nuclear tests to improve US weapons; (2) maintaining modern laboratory facilities to insure continued progress in nuclear technology; (3) maintaining facilities and resources necessary for prompt resumption of atmospheric tests if the USSR violated the treaty; and (4) improving capability to detect violations. Moreover, the JCS concluded, the political advantages of the treaty, in restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons

EX FOREIGN RELATIONS
[] would further offset the technical disadvantages. The JCS concluded that the military disadvantages of the treaty "are not so serious as to render it unacceptable"; that it was "compatible with the security interests of the United States"; and that they supported its ratification.

(S) Encl A to JCS 1731/711-30, 13 Aug 63, JMF 3050 (26 Jul 63) sec 3.

✓ 14 Aug 63

LTBT

The CJCS presented to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services the statement of position on the limited test ban treaty adopted by the JCS on 12 August. In subsequent questioning the CJCS admitted that the treaty would prove "very dangerous" if the US did not continue underground testing and maintain readiness to resume atmospheric testing.

(U) Hearings, Military Aspects and Implications of Nuclear Test Ban Proposals and Related Matters, S. Com. on Armed Svcs, Preparedness Investigating Subcom, 88th Cong, 1st sess (transcripts in OJCS Hist Div).

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✓ 15 Aug 63

LTBT

The CSA testified before the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee that he favored ratification of the limited test ban treaty.
(U) Ibid.

✓ 15 Aug 63

LTBT

The CNO indicated to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee his general agreement with the JCS statement of position on the test ban treaty.
(U) Ibid.

✓ 16 Aug 63

LTBT

The CSAF, in testimony before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, stressed that JCS endorsement of the limited test ban treaty was conditional upon the three safeguards set forth in the JCS statement. of 12 August.
(U) Ibid.

✓ 23 Aug 63

LTBT

JCS informed Senator Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services, that they had developed criteria for testing the adequacy of plans and programs in support of the treaty safeguards included in their statements on the limited test ban treaty made to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

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The four safeguards were: (1) the conduct of continuing underground nuclear tests; (2) the maintenance of laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology; (3) the maintenance of facilities and resources necessary to resume atmospheric tests promptly, if needed; (4) the improvement of the US capability to monitor the terms of the treaty. The JCS set forth the criteria that they believed should be applicable to insure the adequacy of these safeguards.

(U) Ltr, CJCS to Sen Russell, 23 Aug 63, JMF 3050 (15 Aug 63) sec 1.

8 Oct 63

TBT

Cut-off of
Fissionable
Materials

The Special Assistant for Arms Control (SAAC) submitted a report commenting on a letter of 29 Aug 63 from Director ADCA, which had listed US proposals tabled (or authorized for tabling) at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference and still pending there. SAAC summarized the JCS position on each of these proposals, as previously expressed, and in some cases provided evaluations of the proposals in the light of the JCS views. The subjects of the proposals were as follows:

(1) Draft Treaty Banning Weapons Tests in All Environments: The ACDA version was unsatisfactory to JCS primarily because it would prohibit all tests, including those having essentially no probability of detection (thus preventing the US from testing while allowing the Soviets to test clandestinely). Also, it

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provided only seven on-site inspections which were not enough, and was too restrictive in the provisions governing these inspections.

(2) Cut-off of Production of Fissionable Material: JCS views had been expressed on 23 Mar 61 (JCSM-182-61) and reaffirmed on 30 Aug 61; also 5 Jan 63 (JCSM-9-63).

(3) Transfer of Fissionable Material: JCS views had been expressed in JCSM-137-62, 24 Feb 62, and JCSM-9-63, 5 Jan 63.

(S) JCS 1731/741-1, 8 Oct 63, and (TS) Ltr, CJCS to Dir ACDA, 27 Nov 63, JMF 3050 (29 Aug 63).

1 Nov 63

NFZ

OK
11 Nov 63
11 Nov 63
11 Nov 63

At the request of ASD (ISA), JCS had reconsidered the concept of a Latin American nuclear-free zone. They reaffirmed the views expressed on 10 Nov 62 (JCSM-877-62), that nuclear-free zone in Latin America or anywhere else would work to the detriment of the US and should be accepted only as part of a broadier arms control agreement.

(S) JCSM-849-63 to SecDef, 1 Nov 63, JMF 3050 (7 Oct 63).

10 Dec 63

NFZ

Ex 1
Foreign relations
or foreign policy

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(S) JCSM-955-63 to SecDef, 10 Dec 63,
JMF 3050 (13 Nov 63).

1964

17 Jan 64

Disarmament
(General)

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Material

NFZ

*OK
12-1-64
JMF 3050*

The JCS submitted to SeDef recommended changes in a proposed statement by the President to the Geneva Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament. They recommended deletion of a paragraph calling for a freeze on strategic nuclear weapons systems, but subsequently withdrew that recommendation in light of SecDef's proposed revision of the paragraph and subject to their other suggested changes--including a statement on safeguarding the security of all nations. JCS concurred in a paragraph treating production of fissionable material with the understanding that it in no way affected production of availability of tritium. They did not concur in a subparagraph calling for establishment of nuclear-free zones, since they believed such a proposal militarily disadvantageous to the US.
(C) JCSM-41-64 to SecDef, 17 Jan 64;
(C) JCSM-42-64 to SecDef, 18 Jan 64;
both in JMF 3050 (17 Jan 64).

11 Feb 64

NFZ

*OK
12-1-64
JMF 3050*

Commenting on an ACDA draft US position paper on nuclear-free zones (NFZs), the JCS reiterated their reservations on NFZs anywhere except in the context of a broader arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Therefore they recommended that the draft US position paper be modified to add the following two criteria: (1) US opposition to

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any NFZ agreement unless it is part of a broader arms control agreement providing for Soviet concessions sufficient to compensate for any military disadvantage to the US; (2) inclusion of preservation of US transit rights, non-restriction of movement of naval ships and military aircraft, and respect for the traditional sovereignty of a US Navy commissioned ship and US military aircraft to be exempt from inspection requirements.

(S) JCSM-108-64 to SecDef, 11 Feb 64, JMF 3050 (19 Dec 63) sec 3.

18 Mar 64

Verification

Cut-off of
Fissionable
Materials

Commenting on an ACDA paper concerning inspection of a fissionable material production cut-off, the JCS noted that the paper was essentially confined to the broad concept of verification of a limitation on production and that the detailed features were to be the subject of further technical discussions. They forwarded to SecDef extensive revisions to the paper designed to: provide additional exceptions from production limitation in the case of tritium and fissionable material for use in explosives for peaceful purposes; provide additional guidelines for inspection of shutdown production facilities; point out that frequency of inspection would be a function of the degree of access to the facility inspected; emphasize a requirement for resident inspectors at certain production facilities; and present a summary of US intelligence capabilities to detect clandestine activity.

(S) JCSM-223-64 to SecDef, 18 Mar 64, JMF 3050 (25 Feb 64).

31 Mar 64

LTBT

The JCS advised SecDef that they approved the DOD-AEC agreement on responsibilities for maintaining a readiness-to-test posture under a limited test ban treaty, as proposed

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by the Assistant to SecDef for Atomic Energy. This involved rejection of the AEC-proposed version, in which the division of functions between the two agencies was considered to be unsatisfactory.

(U) JCSM-270-64 to SecDef, 31 Mar 64, JMF 4613 (2 Aug 63) sec 3.

28 May 64

Cut-off of
Fissionable
Materials

The JCS commented on an ACDA position paper on the cut-off of fissionable material production and transfer to peaceful uses as separable measures. They advised SecDef that an agreement to cut off production of fissionable materials was advantageous to the United States if implemented before 1 July 1965. After that date the advantage would diminish rapidly as the USSR stockpiled fissionable materials. They also advised that the US had insufficient information to undertake the negotiation of the highly complex issues involved in a combined production cut-off and transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. Also, such transfer without proper safeguards could lead to a proliferation problem.

(S) JCSM-449-64 to SecDef, 28 May 64, JMF 3050 (14 May 64) sec 1.

27 Jun 64

Cut-off of
Fissionable
Materials
(and Transfer)

(TS-RD) JCSM-562-64 to SecDef, 27 Jun 64, JMF 3050 (14 May 64) sec 2.

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11 Dec 64

NPT

CTBT

The JCS commented to SecDef on an ACDA five-point program for high-level discussion with the USSR as a renewed and broad effort seeking to prevent further nuclear proliferation. The points and the JCS comments were as follows: (1) Intensified effort to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement. JCS continued their opposition (see JCSCM-726-64, 24 Aug 64) to expansion of current US efforts on nonproliferation. (2) Informal discussions to prevent spread of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The JCS saw no objection to exploratory discussions with the Soviets concerning nontransfer of SNDVs, but they stated that no firm commitment should be made at that time that might interfere with US flexibility in meeting its responsibilities for support of its friends and allies. (3) Reinstitution of negotiations looking toward the achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The JCS did not oppose the concept of a truly effective comprehensive test ban treaty, but they noted that one criterion for effectiveness was a verification system that would ensure an adequate probability of discovering violations and that would be in operation when the treaty went into effect. (4) Proposal to extend the freeze concept to include reduction of an agreed number of NDVs and launch sites. The JCS stated that, prior to any substantive discussions outside the US Government, the exact terms of the proposal should be defined and subjected to extensive evaluation. (5) An understanding to halt construction of any new land-based ICBM launch sites and ABM launch sites after 1 Jul 65, while negotiating limitations on nuclear delivery vehicles. Since this was a new measure, it required additional study by the JCS.

(TS) JCSCM-1031-64 to SecDef, 11 Dec 64, JMF 3050 (3 Dec 64).

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1965

29 Jan 65

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials
(and Transfer)

Commenting on an ACDA proposal for the transfer of fissionable materials to peaceful uses with demonstrated destruction of certain nuclear weapons, the JCS continued to have reservations (see JCSM 562-64, 27 Jun 64), considering that it offered no real advantage. [

the proposed weapons destruction inspection and verification system be spelled out in detail and thoroughly field-tested. [

(TS-RD) JCSM-66-65 to SecDef, 29 Jun 65, JMF 3050 (31 Dec 64) (1).

11 May 65

CTBT

Communist
China

The JCS forwarded to SecDef a SAAC study on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The report concluded that military disadvantages of such a test ban outweighed the possible advantages. The test ban could prevent the US from acquiring new types of nuclear weapons, from maintaining enough scientific personnel to continue study and to rapidly resume testing, and from testing the vulnerability of hardened missile sites, command and control facilities, and re-entry vehicles. At the same time it would allow the USSR to exploit its technological advantages in 10-100 MT weapons and to gain valuable information by clandestine testing with little risk of detection. The US ought not to deny itself the dynamic and unpredictable results obtainable by testing without greater compensatory returns than appeared likely in a test ban. [

(TS-RD) JCSM-348-65 to SecDef, 11 May 65, JMF 3050 (24 Feb 65) (A).

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17 May 65

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(TS-RD) JCSM-375-65 to SecDef, 17 May 65,
JMF 3050 (4 Jan 65).

5 Aug 65

CTBT

Verification

The JCS commented to SecDef on two ACDA papers on nuclear test bans. They opposed the two proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty because there was no verification system that could prevent clandestine testing. Significant gains in knowledge could be obtained by the USSR in low-yield clandestine testing, which might change the military balance. The JCS also opposed a threshold treaty because it would freeze the Soviet advantage over the US in high-yield weapons and allow the USSR to overcome US advantages in low-yield weapons. The technical

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Threshold
Test Ban
Treaty (TTBT)

problems involved in complying with a threshold treaty would severely limit the testing of a conscientious nation. Neither kind of treaty would prevent proliferation, but each would restrain US nuclear development in a period of increasing CHICOM strength.

(S) JCSM-601-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec 1.

5 Aug 65

NPT

Commenting on an ACDA proposal for a non-proliferation agreement, the JCS concluded that the US should not aggressively pursue such a treaty at that time. If political considerations dictated otherwise at the current ENDC or in subsequent international conferences, the JCS listed the following interests that must be provided for: (1) continued US nuclear flexibility to include international or multilateral sharing; (2) continued current and possible future US nuclear dispersal and delivery arrangements; (3) clearly defined, adequate safeguards. The JCS also opposed introducing into any nonproliferation treaty limitations on the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear powers. In addition, no agreement should be obtained at the risk of weakening the NATO structure and downgrading the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent.

(S) JCSM-602-65 to SecDef, 5 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65).

21 Aug 65

CTBT

The JCS, commenting by request on an OSD study on alternative test ban proposals, informed SecDef that the study did not dissuade them from their view that a comprehensive test ban would be to the military disadvantage of the United States. The study was deficient because it was unduly optimistic about US detection and verification capabilities, did not assess fully the relative nuclear positions of the US and the USSR, and was unduly optimistic regarding Soviet intentions to abide by treaty terms unless to do so was in their own interest.

(TS-RD) JCSM-645-65 to SecDef, 21 Aug 65, JMF 3050 (11 Aug 65).

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10 Sep 65

NPT

Responding to an ASD (ISA) request for elaboration of their opposition (JCSM-602-65, 5 Aug 65) to a provision in a nonproliferation treaty limiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, the JCS stated that their objection was based on the following three points: (1) the US must retain flexibility in its strategy to assure its security under all conditions; (2) such a provision could conceivably be used to advance a total prohibition against nuclear arms; (3) currently, such a provision could result in a misinterpretation of the US effort in SEA by Communist China and North Vietnam. The JCS did not believe that the proposal to limit the use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states recognized the realities of the US power position and that adoption of such a proposal would deny the US continuing political and military advantages associated with the psychological deterrent effect of US nuclear superiority. Furthermore, the provision would impinge on US nuclear deployment arrangements, encourage enemy resistance in South Vietnam, and invite aggression elsewhere. Consequently, such a proposal would be detrimental to US security interests.

(S) JCSM-677-65 to SecDef, 10 Sep 65, JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65).

1966

5 Jan 66

CTBT

Verification

The JCS approved a Joint Staff study of the national security factors in a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). The study concluded that a CTBT would have a major impact on US national security; it considered the following areas:

Military Balance. Under a CTBT, the USSR could upset the military balance without further nuclear testing through development of new weapons systems that would degrade US nuclear deterrent forces.

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Nuclear Testing. A CTBT would prevent necessary US nuclear test programs that were considered essential to ensure an adequate future US military posture. It was not possible to forecast when nuclear testing would no longer be required.

Political-Military Aspects. The US should not adhere to a CTBT unless the USSR was also a party. Continued non-adherence of Communist China would seriously jeopardize US national security.

Monitorship. The US should not adhere to a CTBT until it could, with a high degree of confidence, detect nuclear tests at the lowest yield at which significant military gains could be made.

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Further, the US should not adhere to a CTBT if its provisions did not give adequate assurance that a detected event could be verified. This would require on-site inspections.

On 16 Mar 66 the JCS forwarded the Joint Staff study to SecDef, the remaining members of the Committee of Principals, the Director of NSA, and the Director of the FBI.

(TS-RD) JCS 1731/888-1, 6 Dec 65, JMF 3050 (27 Aug 65) sec 1. (TS-RD) JCSM-163-66 to SecDef, 16 Mar 66; JCSM-164-66 to Members of the Committee of Principals, 16 Mar 66; JCSM-165-66 to Dir NSA and Dir FBI, 16 Mar 66; all in JMF 3050 (27 Aug 65) sec 2.

12 Jan 66

NPT

The JCS, responding to an oral request by ASD (ISA), said that they approved recommendations in an ACDA draft position paper for safeguarding peaceful nuclear facilities. The draft position paper was for use at the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee meeting on 27 Jan 66. The proposed safeguards were as follows: urge all governments to

Verification

Nuclear
Explosions
for Peaceful
Purposes

accept IAEA or similar international safeguards on all peaceful activities; endeavor to win wide acceptance for strengthening Article III of the currently tabled US draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; and endeavor to win acceptance of an additional clause in the draft treaty for "safeguards on exports of source or fissionable material to nonnuclear states." Their support for Article III, the JCS stressed, was subject to the condition that it could not be interpreted as subjecting nonnuclear powers participating in nuclear weapons sharing arrangements to safeguards that would impair their participation in these arrangements.

(C) JCSM-23-66 to SecDef, 12 Jan 66,
JMF 3050 (8 Jan 66).

13 Jan 66

TTBT

Verification

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The JCS commented on an ACDA memo to the Committee of Principals proposing a Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), banning underground tests down to a threshold of [redacted] While recognizing possible political advantages, they believed that there were important political disadvantages which, together with military disadvantages, would be overriding. These disadvantages included: ineffective policing provisions; unreliable verification; inexactitude of seismology; preclusion of development of high-yield area defense ABM systems; prevention of rectification of serious vulnerabilities in existing US ballistic missile forces; and impairment of US ability to maintain competence in nuclear weapons technology.

(TS-RD) JCSM-28-66 to SecDef, 13 Jan 66,
JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec 1.

15 Jan 66

Verification

Commenting on an ACDA draft position paper on verification of shutdown production reactors as an adjunct to an agreement on cutoff of production of fissionable materials, the JCS reaffirmed their position that a cutoff of production of PU 239 for

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Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

weapons use would preclude the US meeting its projected weapons stockpile requirements. They provided the following comments on the ACDA paper: (1) adequate verification must be provided so that no undue advantage could accrue to the Soviet Union through clandestine production of fissionable material; (2) the AEC should determine the effectiveness of the suggested inspection method and the International AEC or some equivalent international agency should conduct the inspections if it was not feasible to do them by means of reciprocal arrangements; (3) any agreement for a plant-by-plant shutdown should provide for shutting plants having the same production capacity; (4) any international inspection of productive facilities closed down in connection with a reciprocal reduction should be applied to comparable facilities; (5) the unilateral US offer, made at the ENDC in Feb 64, to place one shutdown production reactor under international inspection could result in the acquisition of US production techniques by non-US inspectors.

(TS) JCSM-34-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66,
JMF 3050 (7 Jan 66).

15 Jan 66

Cutoff
(Transfer)
of Fission-
able
Materials

The JCS commented on an ACDA position paper on "Demonstrated Destruction of Nuclear Weapons to Obtain Fissionable Materials for Transfer to Nonweapons Uses," containing an annex to be tabled as a working paper at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. The JCS made no objection to this procedure, subject to two reservations: (1) demonstration procedures should be presented with emphasis on their tentative nature because they had never been fully tested, and (2) because of the continuing US needs for fissionable materials for weapons use, discussion of tritium should be avoided until the USSR showed a serious interest in destruction of

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nuclear weapons and transfer of fissionable material to peaceful uses.

(S) JCSM-35-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (18 Oct 65).

15 Jan 66

NPT

Commenting on a revised ACDA paper on nonproliferation, the JCS found the paper in consonance with their previously stated views (see JCSM-602-65, 5 Aug 65). They also pointed out that the problem of peaceful uses of nuclear energy had not been covered in the draft non-proliferation treaty and recommended that an article be added to cover this matter. The JCS cautioned that extreme care must be taken to prevent nonnuclear states from being allowed to frustrate the objective of the treaty under the cover of peaceful research.

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(S) JCSM-36-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (16 Jul 65) sec 2.

15 Jan 66

CTBT

LTBT

The JCS opposed an ACDA position paper favoring a CTBT. They believed that the military balance might already have been upset by important Soviet gains in nuclear technology, citing possible examples. They further believed that the Soviets might have begun to deploy an ABM, which the US must counter. The JCS pointed out that under a LTBT, but not a CTBT, the US could make the necessary advances.

(TS-RD) JCSM-37-66 to SecDef, 15 Jan 66, JMF 3050 (19 Jul 65) sec 2.

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no action*

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21 Jan 66

NPT

Cutoff
(Transfer)
of Fission-
able
Materials

Verification

Underground
Testing

The JCS forwarded to SecDef their views on a proposed Presidential message drafted by ACDA for presentation at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference. They approved the following:

1. Offer to sign a foolproof nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
2. Proposal that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes to countries not possessing nuclear weapons be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.

3. Discouragement of nonnuclear powers from entering the nuclear arms race by strengthening the UN and other international security arrangements. They objected to the following:

1. Proposal to extend the present limited nuclear test ban treaty to cover underground nuclear tests.

Ex 11
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In addition, there was no acceptable verification system.

2. Proposal for a verified halt in all production of fissionable materials for weapons use. The JCS reiterated the objections stated on 15 Jan 66 (JCSM-35-66).

3. Proposal for concurrent examination of issues involved in both a freeze of and reductions in SNDVs. The JCS believed progress should be made on a freeze proposal before taking up reductions.

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(TS-RD) JCSM-49-66 to SecDef, 21 Jan 66,
JMF 3050 (19 Jan 66)

3 Feb 66
Underground
Testing

CTBT

TTBT

The JCS informed SecDef that they had given serious consideration to arms control proposals to extend the LTBT to cover underground nuclear explosions. To evaluate the security implications of further nuclear test restraints, the JCS had designated the USAF as the Executive Agent to establish a panel to produce the desired analysis. The JCS forwarded to SecDef the report of that panel, saying that it did not alter their previously stated views. They remained firmly opposed to either a CTBT or a TTBT.

(TS) JCSM-77-66 to SecDef, 3 Feb 66,
JMF 3050 (3 Sep 65).

28 Feb 66
Nuclear
Explosions
for Peace-
ful Purposes

LTBT

The CJCS commented on an ACDA-recommended course of action for use in responding to a statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko concerning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. He referred to the JCS positions of 5 Aug 65 (JCSM-601-65) and 13 Jan 66 (JCSM-28-66) on peaceful uses of atomic explosions in conjunction with any nuclear test ban. The JCS believed that there was nothing in the current Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) to prohibit underground explosions for peaceful purposes so long as they did not cause radioactive debris outside territorial limits.

(S) CM-1224-66 to SecDef, 28 Feb 66,
JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec 2.

4 Mar 66
NPT

The JCS gave general approval to an ACDA-prepared response to Premier Kosygin's proposal to include in the nonproliferation treaty a

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provision prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, signatories to the treaty, that had no nuclear weapons on their territories. The JCS opposed the Kosygin proposal in any form, adding that the US ought to avoid the inclusion of a non-use provision in any nonproliferation treaty. If security assurances were necessary, they ought to take the form of a UN resolution, general in nature and not committing the US to a specific course of action. The inclusion of a non-use or a security assurance clause should require the US to reappraise the desirability of a nonproliferation treaty.

(S) JCSM-138-66 to SecDef, 4 Mar 66, JMF 3050 (18 Feb 66).

8 Jun 66

TTBT

LTBT

Nuclear
Explosions
for Peace-
ful
Purposes

The JCS furnished views to SecDef on an ACDA memo to Members of Committee of Principals proposing a threshold test ban (TTBT). After referring to the views already furnished on 13 Jan 66 (JCSM-28-66), the JCS added that the new developments cited by ACDA were insufficient to warrant acceptance of [] proposal and the first step for carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should be an amendment to the existing Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).

(TS-RD) JCSM-379-66 to SecDef, 8 Jun 66, JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec 3.

15 Jun 66

TTBT

LTBT

Nuclear
Explosions
for Peaceful
Purposes

The JCS commented on ACDA proposals for peaceful purpose nuclear explosions under TTBT or under amendments to the existing LTBT. They reiterated their opposition to a TTBT (see JCSM-379-66, 8 Jun 66) and opposed any extension of the LTBT at that time they would further curtail testing. They supported the ACDA proposal on LTBT provided the following changes were made: deletion

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of the veto provision from the initial US negotiating position; provision of a precise definition of the radiation debris limitation. (TS) JCSM-406-66 to SecDef, 15 Jun 66, JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec 4

15 Jun 66

TTBT

In commenting on an ACDA proposal that the threshold test ban be discussed with the President, the JCS reiterated their views of 8 Jun 66 (JCSM-379-66). If ACDA did forward the proposal to the President the JCS requested that their views be included.

(S) JCSM-407-66 to SecDef, 15 Jun 66, JMF 3050 (17 Dec 65) sec 4.

29 Jun 66

NPT

Nuclear
Explosions
for Peaceful
Purposes

Verification

The JCS advised SecDef that the revised draft of the US nonproliferation treaty, approved by the Committee of Principals, was in consonance with previously expressed JCS views favoring the principle of nonproliferation, with two exceptions.

(1) There was no provision for clearly defined safeguards on peaceful nuclear facilities and programs to prevent nonnuclear states from developing nuclear weapons under the guise of peaceful research. The JCS reiterated the view expressed on 12 Jan 66 (JCSM-23-66) and 15 Jan 66 (JCSM-36-66) that clearly defined safeguards should be an integral part of a nonproliferation treaty.

(2) Proliferation was defined in terms of "physical access" rather than "control," which might lead the Soviet Union to press for abandonment of all NATO nuclear arrangements and consultative arrangements during negotiation of the nonproliferation treaty. The JCS believed that the draft treaty must insure that present nuclear arrangements or consultative arrangements were not jeopardized.

(S) JCSM-437-66 to SecDef, 29 Jun 66, JMF 3050 (24 Jun 66).

22 Aug 66

Nuclear
Explosions
for Peaceful
Purposes

LTBT

CTBT

TTBT

The JCS furnished SecDef their views on a Dept of State proposal for a possible plan for making the benefits of peaceful purpose nuclear explosions (PLOWSHARE) available to the world while at the same time paving the way to amend the existing LTBT to include provisions along this line. They believed that an acceptable international arrangement for the control of peaceful purpose nuclear explosions must provide assurance that US design information would not be compromised and that other countries would not make significant gains in nuclear weapons technology under the guise of peaceful purpose explosions. The JCS considered that the State proposal could provide these assurances and they supported the proposal provided that: (1) it not be used to further either a threshold or a comprehensive test ban; (2) "the one-for-one principle" be more precisely defined, with the aid of AEC-developed guidelines; (3) PLOWSHARE activities and experiments that were permissible under the LTBT not be subject to international supervision; (4) no veto provisions be included in the plan. The JCS also supported proceeding with the currently planned PLOWSHARE nuclear excavation program since further delay could adversely affect US national security.
(TS) JCSM-531-66 to SecDef, 22 Aug 66, JMF 3050 (9 Aug 66).

29 Sep 66

LTBT

Verification

Responding to an oral request from the Deputy ASD (Arms Control), the Director, Joint Staff, stated that the JCS had grave reservations as to the effects any extension of the Limited Test Ban Treaty would have on US security. The reasons for expressing reservations were: indications that the Soviet Union had already made important gains in nuclear weapons technology that could

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alter the military balance; prevention of US development of an optimum ABM system; and the absence of an acceptable verification system. (TS) DJSM-1261-66 to ASD(ISA), 29 Sep 66, JMF 3050 (20 Sep 66).

25 Nov 66

Tripartite
Conference
on Seismic
Effects

LTBT

EX 1
Priority
classified

(TS) JCSM-733-66 to SecDef, 25 Nov 66, JMF 3050 (8 Sep 66).

1967

27 Feb 67

LTBT

OK
to 6-22

In a memorandum to SecDef, the JCS expressed concern that the current US position supporting an extension of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) did not recognize the impact this would have on the US strategic posture. The JCS believed that a continuation of nuclear testing without further restriction was essential to the maintenance of the US deterrent posture.

(TS-RD) JCSM-109-67 to SecDef, 27 Feb 67, JMF 730 (18 Feb 67) sec 1.

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1968

15 Jul 68

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

CTBT

The Director, Joint Staff, forwarded to SecDef the views of the JCS on a proposed message by the President to the ENDC, which referred to a production cutoff of fissionable materials and a CTBT. The JCS recommended omitting statements on the cutoff and CTBT since they believed the military dangers in reiterating these previous offers outweighed the possible tactical advantages of pre-empting questions on them within ENDC. The JCS were concerned over the impact that a CTBT would have on the US strategic posture. They held that continuation of nuclear testing without further restriction was essential to the maintenance of the US deterrent posture and any further restriction would be contrary to the national interest. Efforts to achieve a CTBT, a threshold treaty, or any extension of present limitations on testing should be halted so that the US would not be confronted by a Soviet acceptance of such a proposal at a time most disadvantageous to the United States.

(S) DJSM-867-68 to SecDef, 15 Jul 68,
JMF 755 (2 Jul 68) sec 2.

1969

29 Jan 69

NPT

OK to
dis

A talking paper prepared for the use of SecDef and CJCS at the NSC meeting on 19 Jan 69 expressed the following positions: the NPT was still in the US national interest; the President should actively seek Senate approval and should follow this with immediate ratification; the US should use diplomatic pressure "where appropriate to advance the NPT" but must use discretion to avoid disrupting existing defense alliances; if it was decided that NPT was not in the

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national interest, the President should nevertheless not abruptly seek disengagement.

(S) JCS 2482/18, 29 Jan 69, JMF 760
(21 Jan 69).

✓ 27 Feb 69

NPT

The CJCS told the Senate Armed Services Committee that any nonproliferation treaty, in the judgment of the JCS, must not: (1) operate to the disadvantage of the US or its allies; (2) disrupt any US defense alliances; (3) prohibit deployment of US nuclear weapons within the territory of nonnuclear allies; (4) prohibit the US from using nuclear weapons in any situation where their use was necessary to protect US security interests; or (5) involve an obligation for automatic commitment of US military forces. In addition, an NPT must contain provisions for safeguards and for unilateral withdrawal when necessary. All these interests had been protected in the nonproliferation treaty. The JCS were in agreement with the objectives of the treaty, concluded the Chairman, and they supported its ratification.

(U) Hearings, Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, S. Com on Armed Svcs, 91st Cong, 1st sess, pp. 14-15.

6 Mar 69

CTBT

TTBT

LTBT

Verification

Exl.
Propaganda
material

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(TS-RD) JCSM-127-69 to SecDef, 6 Mar 69, JMF 752 (12 Feb 69).

12 Mar 69

CTBT

Cutoff
(Transfer
and Destruction)
of
Fissionable
Materials

OK
to
A&R

The Director, Joint Staff, and ASD(ISA) approved a talking paper for use by SecDef and CJCS at the NSC meeting on 12 Mar 69, where US positions for the forthcoming ENDC meeting would be discussed. The talking paper gave the following JCS positions, which differed from the OSD position on the same questions: (1) within the ENDC the US should not reiterate its support for a verified CTB; rather, the US should publicly state its need for continued testing; (2) a cutoff-transfer-destruction agreement would not now be in the overall US security interest, since it would preclude meeting the JSOP weapons requirements for FYs 70-71; therefore the US should not reiterate its support for such an agreement within ENDC.

The paper set forth a single OSD/JCS view on the other questions:

(1) An agreement now on a CTB would not be in the net security interest of the US; no firm answer could be given on whether CTB would be acceptable in three years, irrespective of whether or not initial operational ABM and MIRV warheads had been achieved.

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(2) Should it be found necessary to put forward a new cutoff-transfer-destruction proposal, the following modifications would be acceptable: a lessened requirement for inspection, along the lines of the NPT inspection procedures, provided the US was prepared to exercise immediately its right of withdrawal upon detection of clandestine facilities.

(TS) JCS 2482/25-7, 12 Mar 69, JMF 752 (12 Feb 69) sec 2.

2 May 69

LTBT

Cutoff of
Fissionable
Materials

The JCS reaffirmed their views (JCSM-519-68, 24 Aug 68, and JCSM-127-69, 6 Mar 69) that the LTBT should not be extended to the underground environment and that the US should avoid any agreement involving the cutoff of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

(TS-RD) JCSM-266-69 to SecDef, 2 May 69, JMF 730 (26 Feb 69).

7 Oct 69

Moratorium

The JCS recommended to SecDef the retention of the current program of readiness to resume nuclear testing in prohibited environments if necessary. They opposed suggestions that the current readiness program be sharply reduced. They pointed out that the US had suffered from the lack of preparation in 1961, when the USSR terminated the nuclear test moratorium and at once carried out a well planned and informative test program, while the US response was hurried and inadequate.

(S-RD) JCSM-617-69 to SecDef, 7 Oct 69, JMF 734 (25 Aug 69).

1970

13 Aug 70

The JCS forwarded to SecDef their 9th status report on progress made in fulfilling the safeguards of the LTBT.

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LTBT

Their conclusion was that all four safeguards were generally being met. However, they warned that the current environment of fiscal constraints and military cutbacks in the DOD and AEC would have serious consequences on programs planned to support the safeguards in the future. (TS-RD) JCSM-385-70 to SecDef, 13 Aug 70, JMF 755 (2 Mar 70).

1971

29 Oct 71

LTBT

JCS, in submitting the 10th annual status report on the Limited Test Ban Safeguards, said that all the safeguards standards were being met except for Safeguard C. Evaluation of this Safeguard, which provided for readiness to resume atmospheric nuclear tests, would have to be deferred pending revisions to the National Nuclear Test Readiness Program by the Defense Nuclear Agency and the Atomic Energy Commission. The revisions were being made to comply with a decision by the SecDef on 30 October 1969 to reduce certain categories of its associated costs (S-RD) JCSM-479-71 to SecDef, 29 Oct 71, JMF 755 (1 Sep 71).

1972

2 Feb 72

CTBT

JCS expressed their concern to Sec Def that "continued international and domestic demands, plus recently publicized but misleading information regarding the capability of the United States to detect low-yield underground nuclear tests, may create considerable pressure for early US acceptance of a

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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) without proper consideration of certain fundamental US national security interests." Continued underground testing, the JCS said, was essential to assure reliability of the stockpile and to exploit advanced nuclear weapons technology. [

[Therefore, reliance upon untested weapons "would seriously jeopardize US national survival."

To the argument that a test ban treaty would place equal constraints on all the parties thereto, the JCS replied that clandestine testing, which was impossible to detect in all instances, would destroy such constraints. [

[A further complication was the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Program granted by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There seemed to be no reasonable way to assure that a peaceful nuclear explosion was not masking or in some way serving weapons development.

The collateral relationship between a test ban and a SALT agreement must also be taken into consideration, the JCS maintained. Possible Soviet abrogation of such an agreement would make ongoing weapons research and development programs, as well as testing, increasingly important.

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Taking note of expressed fears that underground testing might cause ecological damage, the JCS maintained that there was no evidence that any adverse ecological effects had resulted from the limited testing allowed under the LTBT.

(TS-RD) JCSM-40-72 to SecDef, 2 Feb 72, JMF 730 (18 Jan 72).

14 Mar 72

CTBT

OK
to 2412

JCS withdrew and cancelled JCSM-40-72 of 2 February 1972 and submitted a new expression of views to SecDef opposing US acceptance of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This action followed the issuance of a statement by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that the current US policy position, as determined by the President, was to support "the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing within the context of an adequately verified agreement." SecDef had suggested that the JCS revise JCSM-40-72 to "reflect, or at least acknowledge" this guidance. In making this revision, the JCS also specifically identified their new expression of views as their contribution to the ongoing study of US nuclear test ban policy directed by NSSM 128.

JCS, in their new paper, reiterated their previous positions but placed even greater emphasis on the adverse consequences of a total test ban. "The strategic situation today," they wrote, "is significantly different from that which existed when US current policy . . . was formulated." The US was then in a position of strategic superiority, but now "US strategic missile superiority has disappeared, and the erosion of US technological superiority has been constrained only through the intensive efforts of its nuclear weapons designers and laboratories and through underground test programs." Uncertainty concerning future developments also

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dictated that the US not surrender its freedom to conduct nuclear testing. The JCS concluded, therefore, that "the United States will be able to meet military threats only if it continues to test and develop the weapon systems deemed essential to its national survival."

(TS-RD) JCSM-109-72 to SecDef, 14 Mar 72;
Att to (U) JCS 2482/145-4, 1 Mar 72;
JMF 730 (18 Jan 72). (S) Att to
JCS 2482/142-1, 23 Feb 72, JMF 730
(17 Nov 71).

22 Aug 72

Transfer of
Fissionable
Materials

EX 1.
Fissionable
Materials

13 Dec 72

LTBT

(S-RD) JCSM-524-72 to SecDef, 13 Dec 72,
JMF 730 (13 Sep 72).

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1974

30 Jan 74

LTBT

JCS, in forwarding the 12th status report on the LTBT safeguards to the SecDef, concluded that Safeguard C (readiness to test) was only marginally adequate owing to continuing fiscal constraints. They recommended that the safeguards be adequately funded.

JCSM-27-74 to SecDef, 30 Jan (S-RD) JFM 740 (31 Oct 73).
74, JMF 740 (31 Oct 73).

3 Jun 74

TTBT

Noting that SecState had recently discussed with the Soviet Foreign Minister a threshold test ban (TTB), the JCS presented their views to SecDef. [

A TTB would also cause a degradation of confidence in the US nuclear stockpile. With regard to a White House query as to their views on early US-Soviet technical talks related to a TTB, the JCS stated that such talks, with no commitments for follow-on negotiations, could be quite useful if directed at seismic measurement of underground explosions, definition of a nuclear test, and treatment of peaceful nuclear explosions.

JCSM-21-74 to SecDef, 3 Jun 74, (TS) JCSM-21-74 sec 3.
JMF 730 (22 Feb 74)

6 Jun 74

TTBT

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(TS) JCSM-226-74 to SecDef, 6 Jun 74,
JMF 730 (20 Feb 74) sec 4.

14 Jun 74

TTBT

EX 1:
Military Plans
w/notes on ops.

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(TS-RD) JCSM-249-74 to Pres, 14 Jun 74,
JMF 730 (20 Feb 74) sec 4.

19 Jul 74

TTBT

Peaceful
Nuclear
Explosions
(PNE)

The US and USSR had signed a Treaty on Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests (also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty) on 3 July 1974. It prohibited tests having a yield exceeding 150 KT. US officials had made it clear that the TTBT would not be finalized until a satisfactory agreement had been reached on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE). The JCS set forth for the SecDef their views on how PNE negotiations should be handled. They anticipated that the USSR would carry out an extensive PNE program to enhance their worldwide reputation for expertise in PNE and to seek political, economic and military benefits. It was essential to have verification procedures to prevent, or at least minimize, Soviet exploitation of PNEs for military benefit. Effective verification required prior notification of a PNE and presence of properly equipped US observers before, during, and after the PNE. No other type of arrangements would work. The US should also seek fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, information, and other benefits of the Soviet PNE program as required by the NPT. []

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(S) JCSM-297-74 to SecDef 19 Jul 74,
JMF 704 (9 Jul 74)

1974

28 Jan 75

[In forwarding the 11th status report
covering the period 1 July 1973 to
30 June 1974 on safeguards to the

LTBT

[
(S-RD) JCSM-37-75 to SecDef, 28 Jan
75, JMF 730 (29 Aug 74).

30 May 75 [

TTBT

PNE

[.

Ex 1:

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(S) Memo, CJCS and DepSecDef to Asst
to Pres for NSA, n.d. [30 May 75],
JMF 730 (29 May 75).

1976

3 Feb 76

JCS, in their 14th status report cover-
ing the period 1 July 1974 to 30 June
1975 on safeguards to the LTBT, stated

LTBT

*Secret - for
use only*
7 However, the President on 10
January 1976 had decided to modify
Safeguard C to eliminate the word
"promptly" and had notified Congress
of the new definition, which was: "The
maintenance of the basic capability to
resume nuclear testing in the atmos-
phere should that be deemed essential
to national security." JCS acknowl-
edged the new definition and informed
SecDef that their next status report
would take it into account.

(S-RD) JCSM-34-76 to SecDef, 3 Feb 76,
JMF 730 (28 Aug 75).

16 Jun 76

PNET

The PNET called for prompt establish-
ment of a Joint Consultative Commission
(JCC) by both parties. JCS informed the
SecDef of their views on this body, which
were as follows: (1) DOD representation
should be included on the JCC, though
not necessarily at the Senior Represent-
ative level; (2) an ERDA representative

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should serve as a principal US member on the JCC; (3) ACDA should be represented on the JCC, along with State, the Intelligence Community or "other appropriate agencies"; (4) the President should direct adequate interagency consultation, coordination, and representation for all JCC policy matters; (5) the JCS should be allowed to review and comment on the draft Presidential memorandum establishing US representation on the JCC.

(S) JCSM-227-76 to SecDef, 16 Jun 76, JMF 730 (8 Jun 76).

✓ 9 Aug 76

LTBT

Because the TTBT and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) submitted to the Senate by the President on 29 July 1976 would have a great impact on the military nuclear warhead capability of the US, the JCS proposed four new safeguards to replace the existing LTBT safeguards recommended by the JCS on 12 August 1963. The proposed new safeguards (only slightly modified from the earlier ones) were forwarded to SecDef with a request that he send them on to the President. They provided for:

- (1) The conduct, within the constraints of existing nuclear test ban treaties, of continuing underground nuclear test programs.
- (2) The maintenance of laboratory facilities to insure continued progress in nuclear technology.
- (3) The maintenance of the basic capability to resume test programs in prohibited environments and yield ranges, should they be deemed essential to US national security.
- (4) The conduct of a continuing research and development program to improve the capability to detect violations and to enhance knowledge of the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union and other nations.

(U) JCSM-288-76 to SecDef, 9 Aug 76, JMF 730 (26 Jul 76).