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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U) 1

ANNEX A to APPENDIX C 2

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 3

PART I. BACKGROUND (U) Page 4

A. (TS) INTRODUCTION C-a-1 5

B. (TS) POLICY GUIDANCE C-a-1 6

1. (TS) OPLAN 3⁴A C-a-1 7

2. (TS) Reorientation of Program C-a-2 8

3. (TS) Second Reorientation C-a-4 9

4. (TS) CINCPAC OP-ORDER C-a-5 10

5. (TS) Brownfield Report C-a-5 11

6. (TS) Mission - 1968 C-a-6 12

7. (TS) Bombing Halt Limitations C-a-6 13

C. (TS) RESISTANCE MOVEMENT C-a-7 14

1. (TS) Tempo and Scope Proposals - 1965 C-a-7 15

2. (TS) Front Organization Proposal - 1966 C-a-9 16

3. (TS) Final Proposal for Resistance Group - 1968 C-a-13 17

D. (TS) SACRED SWORD PATRIOTS LEAGUE (SSPL) C-a-14 18

1. (TS) History and Philosophy C-a-14 19

2. (TS) New Emphasis C-a-15 20

3. (TS) SSPL Proposals C-a-16 21

4. (TS) Summary C-a-20 22

PART II. RESOURCES (U) 23

A. (TS) ORGANIZATION AND FACILITIES C-a-21 24

1. (TS) Early Organization C-a-21 25

2. (TS) Later Reorganization C-a-26 26

3. (TS) Present Organization C-a-26 27

4. (TS) Command and Control C-a-34 28

5. (TS) Facilities C-a-36 29

B. (TS) PERSONNEL/TRAINING C-a-42 30

1. (TS) Headquarters, Radio and Leaflet Personnel -- 31

1964 C-a-42 31 1/2

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION
Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

C-a-1

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TS-105 (J3-278)

DOC 16

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

	Page
2. (TS) Regent Training/Personnel	C-a-44 <u>1</u>
3. (TS) Paradise Island Personnel	C-a-50 <u>2</u>
PART III OPERATIONS (U)	<u>3</u>
A. (TS) <u>GENERAL</u>	C-a-54 <u>4</u>
B. (TS) <u>EARLY OPERATIONS AND PROBLEMS</u>	C-a-54 <u>5</u>
1. (TS) R and A Section	C-a-54 <u>6</u>
2. (TS) Radio Operations	C-a-55 <u>7</u>
3. (TS) Early Leaflet and Letter Operation	C-a-57 <u>8</u>
C. (TS) <u>LATER OPERATIONS 1965-1967</u>	C-a-59 <u>9</u>
1. (TS) General	C-a-59 <u>10</u>
2. (TS) Concepts of Operations	C-a-59 <u>11</u>
3. (TS) White Radio 1965-1967	C-a-63 <u>12</u>
4. (TS) Black Radio 1965-1967	C-a-65 <u>13</u>
5. (TS) Leaflet and Mail Operations 1965-1967	C-a-68 <u>14</u>
D. (TS) <u>PARADISE ISLAND OPERATIONS</u>	C-a-72 <u>15</u>
1. (TS) General History	C-a-72 <u>16</u>
2. (TS) Operations	C-a-73 <u>17</u>
3. (TS) Special Operations	C-a-74 <u>18</u>
4. (TS) Defection Operations	C-a-75 <u>19</u>
5. (TS) Deception Methods at Paradise	C-a-77 <u>20</u>
6. (TS) Interrogation Methods	C-a-77 <u>21</u>
7. (TS) Indoctrinations	C-a-78 <u>22</u>
E. (TS) <u>1968-69 OPERATIONS</u>	C-a-81 <u>23</u>
1. (TS) Printed Media	C-a-81 <u>24</u>
2. (TS) VOF	C-a-81 <u>25</u>
3. (TS) Black Radio	C-a-81 <u>26</u>
4. (TS) Black Letter Operations	C-a-86 <u>27</u>
5. (TS) Other Operations and Proposals	C-a-86 <u>28</u>
F. (TS) <u>POLE BEAN</u>	C-a-91 <u>29</u>
1. (TS) General	C-a-91 <u>30</u>
2. (TS) Background	C-a-91 <u>31</u>

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

C-a-11

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

	<u>Page</u>
3. (TS) Policy	C-a-91 <u>1</u>
4. (TS) PSYOPS in Support of Pole Bean	C-a-93 <u>2</u>
5. (TS) Operations	C-a-94 <u>3</u>
G. (TS) <u>TREAT</u>	C-a-95 <u>4</u>
1. (TS) [REDACTED]	C-a-95 <u>5</u>
2. (TS) [REDACTED]	C-a-96 <u>6</u>
3. (TS) Printed Media	C-a-96 <u>7</u>
<u>PART IV. REACTION AND EVALUATION (U)</u>	
A. (TS) <u>GENERAL</u>	C-a-97 <u>9</u>
B. (TS) <u>REACTIONS</u>	C-a-97 <u>10</u>
1. (C) VOF/BBC Listeners	C-a-97 <u>11</u>
2. (TS) Request for Reaction Information	C-a-98 <u>12</u>
3. (TS) SACSA Memo	C-a-99 <u>13</u>
4. (TS) Recent Report	C-a-102 <u>14</u>
C. (TS) <u>EVALUATIONS</u>	C-a-112 <u>15</u>
1. (TS) CINCPAC and COMUSMACV AD HOC Reports	C-a-112 <u>16</u>
2. (TS) [REDACTED]	C-a-119 <u>17</u>
3. (TS) Paradise Island Evaluation	C-a-125 <u>18</u>
4. (TS) SACSA Evaluation	C-a-129 <u>19</u>
5. (TS) Recent SACSA Evaluation	C-a-133 <u>20</u>
<u>TABS</u>	<u>21</u>
1. General Concept for the Organization of the North Vietnamese Freedom Front	C-a-137 <u>22</u>
2. Current VOF Programming	C-a-150 <u>23</u>
3. Indications of Hanoi Reactions	C-a-160 <u>24</u>
4. Results of Prisoner Interrogations.	C-a-164 <u>25</u>
5. Indications of Reactions by the Enemy	C-a-174 <u>26</u>
	<u>27</u>
	<u>28</u>
	<u>29</u>
	<u>30</u>
	<u>31</u>

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C-a-iii

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX C
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
PART I. BACKGROUND (U)

A. (TS) INTRODUCTION

This Appendix discusses the psychological operations directed by MACSOG from January 1964 to mid-1969. These operations were referred to simply as "Psychological Operations" until the code name "HUMIDOR" was assigned in 1967 to those activities of the Psychological Group directed against North Vietnam (NVN). Included under HUMIDOR were black and white (gray) radio operations, leaflet and gift kit operations, black letter operations, and Paradise Island (ostensibly the headquarters of the Sacred Sword Patriots' League (SSPL)) operations. The meanings of code words appearing in this Annex can be found in Tab A to Appendix C.

B. (TS) POLICY GUIDANCE

1. (TS) OPLAN 34A. The overall objective of OPLAN 34A-64 was psychological in nature. As expressed in the plan, its aim was "to convince the DRV leadership that its current support and directions of war in the Republic of Vietnam and its aggression in Laos should be reexamined and stopped."*

Strategic and tactical psychological operations were to be targeted against the DRV leadership and populace, using all available media (leaflets, radio and mail) techniques and tactics to help achieve maximum harassment, division, and resistance within the DRV. An appeal was to be made to the people of NVN to press forward with alternatives of their own which might lead the DRV leadership toward a more moderate overall policy posture.**

* (TS) OPLAN 34A-64, MACV, 15 Dec 1963, page 1. (SACSA)
** (TS) Ibid., page B-2.

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a. Objectives. The objectives as expressed in the OPLAN 34A
were:

"(1) To develop special psychological operations designed to assure that the DRV correctly evaluates operations carried out under this plan as being primarily retributational in nature and not as an attempt by the United States or RVN to invade or conquer the DRV, but to serve notice upon the DRV that the United States and RVN are prepared, if necessary.

"(a) To accept the risks involved in taking the initiative and expanding the scope and size and increasing the pace of such operations in NVN.

"(b) To retaliate against NVN. This would initially be on a modest scale with more decisive actions being taken at a later time.

"(c) To increase the scope of these operations in NVN.

"(2) To develop strategic and tactical psychological operations to directly support any and all operations in and against the DRV considered for implementation under this plan.

"(3) To support development of resistance movements which could be used as plausible denial mechanism by the United States and RVN in disclaiming responsibility for small scale operations in and/or against NVN."*

b. MACSOG PSYOPS Plan. The Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) Section of ^{the} MACSOG Staff published a PSYOPS Plan** in June of 1964 outlining in some detail the psychological program to support OPLAN 34A. The plan set up a PSYOPS Programming Board which was to meet periodically and provide guidance for future operations. The operations were to utilize "all available media and practical means, to include: overt radio, clandestine radio, mail operations, deceptions, strategic and tactical leaflets and gift deliveries, psychological operators on agent teams, phantom resistance movements, and psychological development of actual resistance."*** The plan then described the responsibilities and duties of each section of the MACSOG PSYOPS group in carrying out the various programs mentioned above.

2. (TS) Reorientation of Program

a. Background. The concept proposed in OPLAN 34A of developing a resistance movement in NVN was not approved at the Washington level. (A later section covers this subject in detail.) In 1965,

* (TS) Ibid., p. B-1.

** (TS) Plan, MACSOG, "PSYOPS Plan to MACV OPLAN 34A-64," 22 Jun 64. (SACSA)

*** (TS) Ibid., p.3.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-2

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

34A was reviewed/^{at the Washington level}with the aim of reorienting and revitalizing 1
 its programs in order to provide clear-cut objectives related 2
 to strategy of the war in Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and Laos. 3
 The result of this evaluation was that intelligence collection 4
 was given first priority with secondary emphasis being placed 5
 on psychological operations. 6

b. OP-ORDER and Program. CINCPAC's follow-on op-order to 34A 7
 was promulgated in October of 1965.* The section dealing with 8
 psychological operations was essentially a rewording of the tasks 9
 set forth in OPLAN 34A with the exception of any mention of 10
 developing a resistance movement. In early 1966, MACSOG published 11
 an extensive review of missions, objectives and programs for the 12
 ensuing 15 months.** The mission statement, quoted below, from 13
 this document is interesting on two counts: (1) it avoids mention 14
 of a resistance movement, and (2) it points up the advisory nature 15
 of the relation between SOG and Strategic Technical Service (STS), 16
 the Vietnamese counterpart organization. 17

(1) "Mission. The mission of the Psychological Operations 18
 Group is to advise, assist and control psychological opera- 19
 tions by the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Service (STS) for 20
 the purpose of establishing a climate of opinion in NVN 21
 favorable to SOG/STS physical destruction operations, and 22
 for the purpose of exerting psychological pressure on the 23
 NVN to cease support of enemy activity in RVN."24

(2) Tasks. Two tasks to accomplish the mission were 18
 established: 19

(a) Increase the radio listening audience by: 20

1. Increasing the number of hours of broadcast 21
 per day and increasing the number of broadcast channels 22
 and the type of broadcast operation. 22

2. Increasing the delivery of radios to NVN. 23

(b) Increase the black propaganda operations to include. 24

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 300241Z Oct 65. (SACSA)

** (TS) Plan, MACSOG, "Missions, Objectives, Programs FY 4/66-FY 4/67," Apr 66, p.7. (SACSA)

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C-a-3

Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-3

Appendix C

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1. Increase black letter operations. 1
 2. Increase leaflet production and delivery. 2
 3. Increase gift kit deliveries. 3
 4. Improve the psychological indoctrination of 4
detainees.* 5
3. (TS) Second Reorientation. In 1967, the program commenced 6
another gradual reorientation. 7

"The reorientation involved the continuation of efforts to collect the best intelligence information possible within the limitations imposed by the resources available and the environment in NVN while, at the same time, emphasizing efforts to exploit psychological vulnerabilities. The latter efforts included a fuller integration of all operations around the central theme provided by the existence of the notional Sacred Sword Patriot League (SSPL), increased use of deceptive operations to induce in Hanoi, a belief that extensive agent operations are being conducted in NVN, and the gradual inducement of the North Vietnamese population to adopt a posture of non-cooperation with the regime and particularly with the middle and low-level cadres. The ultimate objective of the reorientation was to employ psychological impact on both the regime itself and on the population to create a situation in which the regime perceived a significant threat to its control of the NVN population as a result of its war policies."**

SOG's missions, objectives and programs published in 1967 for fiscal 8
Year 1968, quoted below, reflect this change in emphasis to 9
psychological operations centered around the notional SSPL. 10

a. Objectives. The objectives/tasks of the program as seen at 11
this time were "to establish a climate of opinion in NVN favorable 12
to SOG/STS operations and to exert psychological pressure on 13
the NVN Government to cease its sponsorship of the insurgency 14
in RVN."*** 15

b. Tasks. The tasks assigned to carry out the mission were: 16

(a) "Increase the credibility of the SSPL as a resistance movement in NVN and as a denial mechanism for the US/RVN covert/ clandestine operations in NVN.

(b) "Increase the membership of the SSPL in NVN through the recruiting of PLOWMAN(G) detainees and/or defectors and establish SSPL cells in the existing dissident elements in NVN.

* (TS) Ibid., p.12.

** (TS) Background paper, SACSA, "FOOTBOY (C) - Covert Operations Against NVN (TS)," 9 May 1968. (SACSA)

*** (TS) Plan, MACSOG, "FOOTBOY (C) FY 68 Program (C)", 10 May 67, p.12. (SACSA)

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C-a-4

Annex A to
Appendix C

p.12. (SACSA)

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(c) "Train selected defectors and other selected personnel as political cadre and return them to NVN to conduct political and psychological operations in support of FOOTBOY (C) forces."*

4. (TS) CINCPAC OP-ORDER-1967. As can be seen in the MACSOG mission 1
 quoted in the above paragraph, the term "resistance movement" was 2
 used in one of the tasks to be performed in the plan. This could 3
 have been a matter of definition of the term "resistance movement" 4
 or a manifestation of the continued hope at the MACV/MACSOG level 5
 that clearance to develop the resistance idea would be forthcoming 6
 from the CINCPAC/Washington level. (See a later section for more 7
 detail.) This was not to be the case and the many proposals for 8
 invigorating the SSPL had to exclude the concept of developing a 9
 movement in the north to challenge the authority of the established 10
 DRV Government. The CINCPAC FOOTBOY basic operation order issued 11
 in April 1967, expressed the psychological objectives in very broad 12
 terms: "Increase psychological pressure on NVN by creating the 13
 impression that internal opposition exists in NVN."** (This op- 14
 order has not been superseded and is, therefore, the effective directive 15
 for FOOTBOY(C).) 16

5. (TS) Brownfield Report. The Brownfield survey, conducted in 17
 late 1967 and early 1968, pointed out that productive PSYOPS were 17
 severely hampered by the lack of an ultimate goal toward which all black 18
 PSYOPS could be directed.*** The report refers to the original 34A 19
 objective to achieve maximum harassment, division, and to establish 20
 resistance in NVN, but states that the problem of how much division or 21
 resistance had remained an open question under the guidelines established 22
 at the Washington level.*** (For further discussion on the problems 23
 of developing goals for the SSPL, see a later section of this part.) 24

* (TS) Plan, MACSOG, "FOOTBOY(C)," 10 May 67, p.12. (SACSA)
 ** (TS) Lsg, CINCPAC, "FOOTBOY(C) Basic Op-Order," DTG 252340
 Apr 67. (SACSA)
 *** (TS) Report, MACJ-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 68,
 HUMIDOR, p. 9-10. (SACSA)

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C-a-5

Annex A to
Appendix C

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6. (TS) Mission-1968. The 1968 MACSOG Command History defines the mission of the Psychological Operations Group (POG) in the same vein as earlier directives. The introduction of POG in the mission statement reflects the change of organization in the summer of 1968, which placed all black operations under POG and gray/white operations under Voice of Freedom (VOF).

"The mission of MACSOG Psychological Operations Group (POG) is to conduct black psychological operations directed against NVN ... identified by the code word HUMIDOR (C). The primary target of HUMIDOR (C) operations is the civilian population of NVN. These operations are conducted to: establish attitudes within NVN contrary to present policies of the Lao Dong Party (LDP), create a feeling of distrust for the leadership of the DRV, promote war weariness and engender an attitude which indicates that continuation of the war is contrary to DRV national welfare."

7. (TS) Bombing Halt Limitations. Psychological operations were restricted twice during 1968 as a result of the limitation on and subsequent cessation of bombing against NVN. On 3 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discontinued the detention of NVN fishermen at Paradise Island, and restricted the distribution of leaflets above 20°N latitude.**

[REDACTED]

On 5 April**** and 10 April# CINCPAC further restricted leaflet and gift kit distribution above 19°N. In July 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff## eased the restrictions on NVN fishermen by permitting not more than 10 detainees per week for a maximum period of detention per fisherman of 14 days. The message also restricted interrogation/detention of fishermen to below 19°N latitude and maritime delivery of PSYOPS material to NVN to below 19°N.

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* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV 1968 Command History," p. E-III-3-2. (SACSA)
** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 031742Z Apr 68.
*** (TS) Msg, CAS, DTG 052346Z Apr 68
**** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 060230Z Apr 68.
(TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 102038Z Apr 68.
(TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 011351Z Jul 68.

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Search of NVN watercraft and interrogation of crews was permitted 1
 to 20°N as was sea, balloon or wind-drift of leaflets. On 1 November, 2
 JCS and CINCPAC messages* discontinued all interrogation/detention 3
 of fishermen and all sea and air delivery of PSYOPS material Radio 4
 and black letter programs were continued. 5

C. (TS) RESISTANCE MOVEMENT 6

The authors of OPLAN 34A intended that the formation of 7
 resistance groups in NVN would be fundamental to the success of the 8
 program. As pointed out earlier in this Appendix, the lack of 9
 meaningful goals and objectives for the agent teams, maritime 10
 operations, and psychological operations was attributed in large 11
 measure to the refusal, at the Washington level, to sanction the 12
 resistance movement concept. COMUSMACV (MACSOG) made three concerted 13
 efforts in the years following the promulgation of 34A to gain 14
 acceptance of the resistance concept. A brief summary of each proposal 15
 and its outcome follows. 16

1. (TS) Tempo and Scope Proposal - 1965. The President approved, 17
 upon the recommendation of the Army Chief of Staff in the spring of 18
 1965, the increase in tempo and scope of OPLAN 34A operations. 19
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, on 29 March 1965,** among other 20
 concepts, the proposal of COMUSMACV/CINCPAC to recruit and support 21
 assets in the DRV for resistance, guerrilla warfare, evasion and 22
 escape, and intelligence collection. 23

a. CINCPAC Resistance Proposal. CINCPAC in his proposal message***2- 24
 was careful to circumvent the use of such words as "with a long term 25
 objective to overthrow the Government of the Democratic Republic 26
 of Vietnam(DRV)**** which had appeared in a COMUSMACV plan in 27
 January 1965. The essential points in the CINCPAC proposal are 28
 summarized below: 29

- * 1. (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 010219Z Nov 68.
 2. (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 010810Z Nov 68.
 ** (TS) JCS 2343/555, "Increase Tempo and Scope 34A," 29 Mar 64,
 (SACSA).
 *** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, 270317Z Mar 65. (SACSA)
 **** (TS) Memo, SACSA Draft, "Resistance Organization in DRV,"
 29 Jan 65. (SACSA)


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Appendix C

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(1) COMUSMACV had estimated that approximately 5,000 Meos, 4,000 Thais, 2,000 Nungs, and 3,300 Muongs lived in the DRV. He believed that these groups were the best resources for developing an unconventional warfare asset. The initiation and support of organized resistance among these groups was essential to successful sabotage and future unconventional warfare in the event that the Chinese communist ground units were committed to the area. Organized resistance movements would also provide the base for the establishment of a DRV-wide intelligence observation and reporting net.

(2) Basic to the acceptance of the proposal was the understanding that the logical outgrowth of such a course of action would be the creation and support of an actual resistance movement in the DRV, which the US Government would be morally committed to support. This support would require personnel, material, and funds to an amount not determined. Once undertaken, the project and people involved could not be abandoned without sever penalties in Southeast Asian trust and confidence in the US Government.

(3) Since the groups most readily amenable to this activity were primarily country and hill tribal groups, the resistance movement would be initially constrained to these groups. Advanced establishment of unconventional warfare assets in the DRV would be highly valuable for the collection of timely intelligence and the initiation of resistance actions in the event CHICOM units were deployed there.



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b. Action Taken on Proposal The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff signed a memorandum* to the Secretary of Defense on 2 April 1965, which included the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Secretary approve the CINCPAC resistance concept Between 2 April and 24 September 1965, when the resistance proposal was disapproved, Secretary Vance presented the proposal to the State Department and CIA for comment. Because of the involvement of Laos in the plan, the comments of Ambassador Sullivan were requested. In his reply by letter to Mr. Vance, the Ambassador was concerned on two counts. (1) that this kind of an operation might be outside the power of our government to control, and (2) that if they got into trouble, there would be no way to help them and they would be left to be slaughtered.** These comments from Ambassador Sullivan along with serious doubts from State and CIA culminated in the disapproval message in September.***

2. (TS) Front Organization Proposal - 1966. In April 1966, COMUSMACV**** revived the resistance proposal by advocating in some detail the establishment of a front organization in SVN to support alleged resistance in NVN. The message stated that the essential element in increasing the effectiveness of the OPLAN 34A program was the creation of a front organization.

a. Specific Proposals. Specifically, COMUSMACV stated the front would:

- (1) Facilitate the broadening and intensifying OPLAN 34A psychological operations.
- (2) Provide an overt outlet for black propaganda.
- (3) Provide the United States and GVN a mechanism for plausible denial of OPLAN 34A operations in NVN.

* (TS) Memo, CJCS to SECDEF, "Increase Tempo and Scope of Operational Plan 34A," 2 Apr 65. (SACSA)
 ** (TS) Memo for the Record, SACSA, "Infiltration and Resistance Movements - Discussion with General Wheeler," 26 Aug 65. (SACSA)
 *** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 241352Z Sep 65. (SACSA)
 **** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 071200Z Apr 66.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-9

Annex A to
Appendix C

**** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 071200Z Apr 66.

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(4) Provide motivation and incentive for OPLAN 34A airborne and maritime personnel operations in NVN. 1
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(5) Provide credibility for the current notional front, the SSPL. 3
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(6) Provide an outlet for RVN pressure to develop a GVN sponsored counter organization for the National Liberation Front. 5
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b. Phases. COMUSMACV proposed that the front would advocate policies phased to three increasing levels of intensity as follows: 8
9

(1) Phase I. Urge the present government of NVN to stop support of the war in the RVN and negotiate a settlement. 10
11

(2) Phase II. If the present government of NVN does not seek a peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam, then advocate that the leadership must be changed. 13
14
15

(3) Phase III. When the other policies fail, if politically advisable, and if we are absolutely sure that we are not sending people to a hopeless death, advocate overt armed resistance to overthrow the communist government of NVN. 16
17
18
19

c. Stages. COMUSMACV further proposed in his initial request, that the front be established in three stages. 20
21

(1) Stage I 22

(a) The formation of a covert committee of SOG personnel to plan and guide the front's activities. 23
24

(b) The recruitment of and training of necessary administrative personnel. 25
26

(2) Stage II 27

(a) The official announcement of the establishment of the front. 28
29

(b) The opening of an overt office of the front in the RVN. 30
31

(3) Stage III 32

(a) The establishment of the front newspaper. 33

(b) The release of information to legitimate news media. 34
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(c) The conduct of minor front activities such as small rallies, meetings, fund raising campaigns, etc.

d. CINCPAC/JCS Reaction. CINCPAC recommended approval* of MACV's plan with Phase I to be implemented and Phases II and III to await the results of Phase I action. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff had reservations about presenting the plan, as presented, for Washington approval and requested in a memorandum to CINCPAC that more detail be provided in various areas. The Chairman also reminded CINCPAC that current national policy did not advocate the overthrow or change the government in NVN and that any plan must permit plausible deniability of the United States.**

e. Revised Concept. COMUSMACV responded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff with a revised concept*** (see Tab 1 for complete plan) which added two additional missions:

(1) "Develop and build up in NVN, and third countries, a psychological atmosphere which will force a change in the current policies of the government of NVN."

(2) "Deny assets of overseas Vietnamese to the government of NVN by gathering their support for the Front."***

f. COMUSMACV Caveat. MACV noted that risks were involved in organizing such a front in view of the fact that numerous Vietnamese personnel would be involved and that the Front would eventually be attributed to the United States.

g. CINCPAC Comments. Although he supported the initial plan submitted in April, CINCPAC expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of implementing the revised proposal. He listed the following disadvantage and advantages.****

* (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 122222 Apr 66.

** (TS) Memo, CJCS to CINCPAC, "Establishment of a Front Organization in Support of OPLAN 34A," CM 1366-66, 21 Apr 66, (SACSA).

*** (TS) Ltr, COMUSMACV, "General Concept for Organizations of the North Vietnamese Freedom Front (TS)," Ser 0008767, 13 Jul 66 (Tab A).

**** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 132011Z Aug 66.

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C-a-11

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~(1) Disadvantages

(a) The organization of a political front in the RVN has great political risks. 1
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(b) It is extremely difficult to imagine the Buddhists, Catholics or any other organized groups in the RVN remaining submissive to US control for any extended period of time. A more likely reaction would be the use of the Front, and related US funds, by these groups to achieve their own political ends in SVN. 3
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(c) The organization of the Front would require a large amount of US funds and since the United States is the principal source of funds in the RVN, it is difficult to see how US involvement could be concealed for long. 9
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(2) Advantage. From the military point of view, the formation of the Front would add credibility to the OPLAN 34A program by establishing an overt organization which ostensibly controls and coordinated the OPLAN 34A PSYOPS program aimed at NVN. 13
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h. Joint Staff Summary. The Joint Staff paper summarized the pertinent points brought out by its review in the following words: 17
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(1) "The formation of the front would almost inevitably be attributed to the US and because its aims are contrary to US policy, would result in embarrassment to the US government."

(2) "While the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN) is controlled by the Government of NVN, to this date the NFLSVN only claims to maintain a delegation from the Front in Hanoi. In so doing it can continue to state the premise that it is completely divorced from the government of NVN government. If the NFLSVN had established a Front headquarters in NVN, there would be less problems for the US in convincing other nations and individuals that the NFLSVN is an 'arm' of government of NVN. If a 'Liberation Front for NVN' was established in Saigon it would be directly attributed to the GVN and US."

(3) "CINCPAC states that, from a military point of view, the formation of the Front would add credibility to OPLAN 34A by the establishment of an overt organization which ostensibly controls and coordinates the OPLAN 34A PSYOPS program."

~~TOP SECRET~~C-10
C-12Annex A to
Appendix C
Appendix C

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This premise is doubted in view of the fact that the objective of the black PSYOPS program is to influence target audiences in NVN in the name of an ostensible dissident element (the SSPL) located in NVN. By declaring that the SSPL has a Saigon connection, it might defeat the purpose of this aspect of the program. If a Saigon connection is considered appropriate the very nature of the propaganda (black) makes it possible for such announcements to be made without ever actually forming a Front Organization. In addition, the establishment of an SSPL action group in Saigon might degrade the credibility of the current Voice of the SSPL when heard in SVN, and jeopardize the US/GVN's current ability of being able to deny knowledge of this 'Voice'.

(4) "If authority is obtained to initiate the activation of an actual resistance movement within NVN based upon a change in National Policy, the formation of a Front Organization in SVN might take on a new meaning and be more appropriate at that time."*

1. Disapproval. All of the Services concurred in the conclusions of the JCS paper* which recommended disapproval. On 3 February 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed CINCPAC/COMUSMACV that the proposal was disapproved, citing in particular the risks brought out by CINCPAC in his earlier message and the fact that the ultimate objective of the front (overthrow of the NVN Government) was counter to the current US national policy.**

3. (TS) Final Proposal for Resistance Group - 1968 . Following the CINCPAC/JCS and Brownfield surveys of MACSOG in late 1967, it was the consensus of opinion that MACSOG's programs should be reoriented toward psychological operations with the goal of making the SSPL more credible and viable. The proposals toward this end were submitted by COMUSMACV in December 1967 and February 1968. Almost inevitably these recommendations advocated an eventual move toward the resistance concept as the logical method of making the SSPL credible.*** After receiving an adverse comment on "resistance" from a CIA review of MACV's proposals, SACSAs deleted or revised those sections that advocated the resistance movement***Because of the bombing halts and Paris negotiations, no further action has been taken on the reorientation proposals discussed in this paragraph.

* (TS) JCS 2471-1, "Operations Plan 34A-Freedom Front (TS)," 26 Jan 67. (SACSA)
 ** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 031951Z Feb 67. (SACSA)
 *** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 161213Z Feb 68. (SACSA)
 **** (TS) Memo, SACSA, "Proposed Reorientation of Covert Operations Against NVN," 9 May 68. (SACSA)

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C-a-13

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~D. (TS) SACRED SWORD PATRIOTS LEAGUE (SSPL)1. (TS) History and Philosophy

a. "General. The Sacred Sword Patriots League (Guom Thieng 4i Quoc) is a national organization, utilized as a cover for US/GVN Maritime and Psychological Operations against North Vietnam. Supposedly, The Sacred Sword Patriots League is a group of dissident, nationalistic Vietnamese striving to free their beleaguered country from the grip of all who oppress her. The present membership is approximately 10,000 people, both active and passive, and includes almost 1,600 regular militia. The membership is located mostly in North Vietnam and is organized into activity zones. At present, the major actions of the SSPL have taken place in areas of the North Vietnamese 'Panhandle', close to the League's safe zones located below the 19th parallel. Its present actions consist of radio broadcasts (VOSSPL) from a station in one of these safe zones, maritime operations conducted by CSS/NAD, detention of fishermen at PARADISE, and psychological operations involving leaflets and letters.

b. "Evolution of the SSPL.

"(1) The roots of the SSPL can be traced back to the anti-French, nationalistic movement of the 1930's and '40's. Many present members of the SSPL were formerly with the Viet Minh, the Vietnam Quoc Dan Dong (VNQDD), and the Dai Viet nationalistic parties. Towards the late 1940's the power of the Communists began to grow in the nationalistic movement, and, by the early 1950's, their strength became all too obvious.

"(2) In February, 1953, a terror wave, designed to eliminate all the non-communist resistance leaders, forced many of the true nationalists to flee for their lives. Le Quoc Hung and many others sought sanctuary in the remote highlands of Nghe An and Ha Tinh provinces. Here, on 17 April 1953, in one of these hidden areas, seven nationalistic leaders met and formed the Sacred Sword Patriots League. This historic meeting later became known as 'The Soldier's Conference'.

"(3) Following Dien Bien Phu in late May, 1954, Le Quoc Hung and his followers attempted to raise support for their nationalistic movement. The horror of the Land Rent Reduction and Land Reform Campaigns rallied many people to their side. A revolt was staged in Nghe An Province, but was ruthlessly squashed by the Lao Dong Party's troops. The battered new organization was forced underground. Secret cells were formed in many villages and hamlets and secret training areas were set up. These later became the League's safe zones.

"(4) In December, 1961, the League held its first National Congress at which Le Quoc Hung was named President and under the hand of Hoang Chinh Nghia, the SSPL Manifesto was drafted. In July, 1962, the League's militia was unified under Nguyen Thanh Le and in early 1964, the League's first printing plant became operational. At the second National Congress, Le Quoc Hung retired in favor of Hoang Chinh Nghia. The membership of the SSPL in 1965 had risen to 7,000. In April 1965, the Voice of the SSPL began broadcasting words of hope and freedom from its secure location in Ha Tinh Province and indoctrination of selected people throughout NVN in the precepts of the SSPL was begun at PARADISE.

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"(5) The Third National Congress in December 1967, re-elected Hoang Chinh Nghia as President. The SSPL militia had grown to 1,600 with a total membership in the SSPL of 10,000.

c. "Support of the SSPL. The SSPL is supported by patriots from many different countries, and is, in fact, anti-US. The League has friends in the Vietnamese communities in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Taiwan, France, and many other locations. The SSPL is willing to accept help from anyone who is against the type of exploitation of free people that the United States, Red China, and the Soviet Union are currently perpetrating in Vietnam.

d. "Policies and Goals of the SSPL. In the eyes of the SSPL, the Vietnamese War has turned into a struggle between the Communist world powers (The Lao Dong Party) and the Capitalist world powers (the Thieu/Ky regime). The Vietnamese people are caught in the middle. It is the purpose of the League to work for the people, and against those who bring harm to Vietnam. The SSPL supports two 'Pillars for Peace'; Removal and Reparation. They seek a halt in the US bombing of the Vietnamese people, a removal of all the NVN forces from South Vietnam, and of all foreign troops from Vietnam. In addition, they seek payment from the major powers to rebuild their war-torn country. The SSPL blames the Lao Dong Party for the continuing Vietnamese hardships and the unfavorable status of the Vietnamese nation. These conditions are a direct result of the LDP's close ties with Peking and the war policies being demanded by Peking in return for support of the LDP. In general, its views are nationalistic, in favor of unification, against the fratricidal fighting, and against any attempts at exploiting the Vietnamese people."*

2. (TS) New Emphasis. At the time of the Brownfield survey


 programs for approximately four years. Its major propoganda line
 had been restricted to an attempt to force the Government of Hanoi
 to change its policies and cease support of the war in South Vietnam
 It appeared to the survey team and the MACSOG Staff that this line
 had reached a stage where either it had to become more dynamic and
 a growing force within NVN or its effectiveness would deteriorate.
 It needed to challenge the NVN Government by offering the people an
 alternative to the regime. What appeared to be lacking was a
 long range time phased plan with a definite long range goal for the
 growth of the SSPL. As discussed at some length in a previous
 section of this report, the major obstacle to developing a long-range
 development plan was the current restriction on advocating the

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* () Report, MACSOG, "Paradise History and Analysis," 9 Feb 69,
 Tab B. (SAGSA)

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Tab B. (SAGSA)

C-a-15

Annex A to
 Appendix C

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overthrow of the Hanoi regime. The proposed, time phased plan 1
 advocated by the Brownfield Report was in essence the proposal 2
 submitted by MACSOG in 1966. (The disapproval of this plan was 3
 outlined earlier.) The report concluded with the recommendation that 4
 SOG should further develop a revitalized program for the SSPL for 5
 submission to CINCPAC/JCS and that all SOG programs directed 6
 against NVN should be coordinated to support the growth of the SSPL.* 7

3. (TS) SSPL Proposals. Before the bombing limitation of 1 April, 8
 COMUSMACV forwarded two rather lengthy messages on proposals to 9
 strengthen the SSPL image and viability. The essential paragraphs 10
 of these messages are quoted below: 11

a. Message of 8 December 1967 12

(1) "(TS) The Sacred Sword Patriot's League (SSPL) is approximately four years old. An underground resistance movement, even notional ones, must have clear-cut goals and make progress toward that goal or be abandoned. For SSPL's lifetime, it has warned ruling party of NVN if policies of 'protracted warfare and subordination of national interest to party interests' did not change, SSPL would urge people to 'take more direct action against government and reassert people's power'. Such changes have not taken place in four years. Time appears propitious to change SSPL's goals in view of this lack of progress.

(2) "(TS) Following rationale of paragraph (1) above ... MACV (SOG) had already embarked upon program to broaden base and increase viability, as well as credibility, of notional resistance group (SSPL). For example, following steps have been taken:

(a)"Support by SSPL of overt defection to SVN of detainee. Subject is presently in Danang Chieu Hoi Center. Initial reports of his answers to public media (VN TV and radio) are most favorable and should receive good coverage in broaden based media shortly.

(b)"Personal letters to relatives in South have been written by detainees at SSPL secret zone. Letters explain detainees's status and present location as well as basic aims of SSPL.

(c)"Morale messages are being dispatched over SSPL radio to actual and notional teams in North Vietnam. Such messages have great credibility as some teams are suspected to have been doubled and accurate messages, from families in these cases add credence to notional teams. For example, during Sept radio voice messages were broadcast to substantiate existence of five notional teams.

* (TS) Report, MACJ3, AHG, "Report of Ad Hoc Evaluation Group," 14 Feb 68, HUMIDOR(C), p. 12-14. (SACSA)

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C-a-16

Annex A to
Appendix C

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(d) "Two different types of letters from SSPL Central Committees at various levels have been posted. One is a corrupt/abusive cadre to reform and second type welcomes addressee as SSPL member. Both types whether delivered or seized by security officers have divisive effects.

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(f) "Trial of armed junk crewmen who attacked MAROPS boat was held on island on 23 Nov. Trial has been publicized by SSPL radio, letters from accused to their families delivered by other detainees as they returned. Result was acquittal of defendants based on their confessions of being misled by communists, etc. These confessions are now being aired prior to return of militia men to tender mercies of DRV.

(g) "Diversionary resupply bundles have been dropped to support notional team and nations.

(h) "Hand labor has been introduced for detainees for SSPL secret zone to occupy detainee's time to support normal guerrilla concept that all contribute. Detainees are making chopsticks which then are distributed with hand-printed SSPL covers with rice bowls by MAROPS boats.

(i) "SSPL marching song has been produced 'Let Us Rise Up Ardently and Liberate our Nation' which is now being tested by the island choral group, the singing fishermen (detainees who record songs for SSPL radio).

(3) "(TS) Additional programs awaiting approval from JCS/CINCPAC/CAS Washington include

(a) "Issue of SSPL originated postage stamp modeled after valid NVN stamp, initial distribution to be covert. Awaiting CAS Washington approval since Sep (Target date: 7 Dec).

(b) "Dual defection of detainees, ref COMUSMACV 222246Z Nov 67 (Target date: 15 Dec).

(c) "Dual defection II not yet submitted (Target date: 28 Dec).

(4) "(TS) Following are actions within present guidelines programmed at present.

(a) "Expansion of SSPL radio coverage and institution of SSPL school of air to exploit general close-down of NVN schools (Target date 7 Dec).

(b) "Announcement of central committee meeting and notional membership. STD and advisors will actually conduct meetings to assist in coordination of SSPL activities. (Target Date: 9 Dec).

(c) "Convening of SSPL Congress which will develop programs for coming year (Target date: 10 Dec).

(d) "Diversionary resupply bundledrops in Son La and Nghe An Provinces (Target date: Dec).

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(e) "SSPL program for year will be announced by provincial leader, Huong Thanh Nghia, who was elected by Congress (Target date 26 Dec.)

(f) "Selective assassination of hated NVN official (Target date: 15 Jan).

(g) "Three new notional teams activated, total now eight (Target date Jan-Mar 68).

(h) "Six additional notional teams activated (April-Jun 68).

(i) "Four new notional teams activated, total now eighteen (July-Sep 68).

(5) "(TS) Despite additional credibility lent by these largely notional acts, SSPL will remain merely irritant (Hanoi's responses prove SSPL is irritating) unless progress is made in overtly giving evidence of its viability and power.

(6) "(TS) MACSOG is currently studying additional program for both desirability and practicability which would add materially to both pervasiveness and overtness of FOOTBOY(C) operations. When concurred in by Saigon agency representatives, such proposals will be forwarded to CINCPAC for approval.

(7) "(TS) Present feeling by all Saigon agencies is that current policies and goals guiding posture of SSPL vis-a-vis NVN regime should be re-examined. This re-examination should.

(a) "Provide a more precise definition of U.S. Govt goals to be pursued via SSPL during upcoming period.

(b) "Design goals which are realistic but which also effectively exploit increasing SSPL potential for engineering dissidence and eventual resistance to regime.

(c) "Permit SSPL to pursue policies more consistent with inherent characteristics of resistance group in police state."*

b. Message of 16 February 1968

(1) "(TS) The ultimate (or maximum) goal of the SSPL is to cause the Hanoi Regime to cease all support of subversion/aggression in SVN. Since the SSPL does not have actual assets either with the capacity physically to disrupt this support en route to the south or to stop it at the source, the SSPL must employ its assets in a psychological effort to induce ruling circles in Hanoi to re-evaluate their unremitting nourishment of the insurgency. This re-evaluation is, however, not likely to occur unless those in command in Hanoi believe (fear) that their political leadership is in some real danger. This is the specific operational task which should infuse the entire FOOTBOY(C) program: implant the fear with the ruling hierarchy that their control of the population of NVN is decreasing, is likely to decrease further unless policy changes are made; finally, that insofar as prosecution of the war is concerned their ability to mobilize the physical and human resources of NVN without effective opposition is dissipating.

* (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 082330Z Dec 67 (SACSA)

(TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 082330Z Dec 67 (SACSA)

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(2) "(TS) We believe that this task cannot be accomplished without hardening the present SSPL line which advocates only policy changes, while verbally deploring existing policies. Such a hardening would not call for immediate revolt in the streets. It would, however, call for 'resolute opposition to,' 'standing without fear against', and 'not tolerating' the hatred policies of the regime. This hardening would not call for actions beyond SSPL capability nor urge foolhardy violence which would be certain to incur regime retaliation, but would go beyond the present simple criticism and condemnation of such policies. This hardening of the SSPL policy line must also be given credibility. Credibility will only come through actions visible to the regime. These supporting actions can be categorized as internal and external.

(3) "(TS) Under the external grouping are included the actions taken to extend the image of the organization's size and power abroad. For example, additional notional and real cells of the SSPL should be established wherever a group of North Vietnamese can be found to support such operations (Thailand is the first, ref: COMUSMACV's msg 082330Z Dec and 260735Z Dec).

(4) "(TS) Other programs, while organized externally, would be designed for internal consumption. For example, the SSPL radio would broadcast lessons in successful resistance: how the fishermen in Long Qua refused to work unless the village cadre chief was dismissed and how the villagers in Phouc Song demanded a larger rice ration and received it when they refused to work until it was granted.

(5) "(TS) Internal progress toward achievement of a viable, controllable, actual SSPL membership within NVN would be continued. For example, cover contact would be established with dissident population elements in NVN as they are identified and located. Assessment of their sincerity and motivation and their willingness to follow SSPL guidance would follow (SSPL contact with one already identified Catholic group is available via returning detainees from Paradise).

(6) "(TS) From the experience gained from activities in each of these categories and the enlarged reputation of the SSPL and its aims, a base could be created which could be converted later to more aggressive actions should these actions prove desirable and be endorsed by policy. Each successive SSPL-sponsored incident is a signal to the regime that popular discontent and the potential for internal dissidence is growing. The Saigon agencies do not recommend at this time that the SSPL be permitted to advocate the overthrow of the Hanoi regime. However, implementation of this more active line would allow a logical and more convincing switch to that position if desired at a later date. A steady increase in the number and frequency of incidents reflecting internal opposition to the war would bring added psychological pressure to bear on Hanoi and raise the possibility that active internal resistance to the regime might develop in the future. How rapidly the internal and external portions of this effort can be implemented is difficult if not impossible to predict. As noted, steps have already been taken to institute some of these actions; others may require only intensification of efforts presently underway.

(7) "(C) Recommend that the philosophy outlined above be adopted as the framework for further development of the SSPL. Specific programs/projects supporting this conceptual framework for which authority does not current exist will be requested in response to CINCPAC/JCS survey report."*

* (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 161213Z Feb 68 (SACSA)

response to CINCPAC/JCS survey report."*

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C-a-19

Annex A to
Appendix C

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Summary.

4. (TS) The reader who has followed the preceding paragraphs of the resistance movement and the SSPL will be aware that by early 1968, the MACSOG policy makers had reached an impasse. On one hand they were urged to invigorate the SSPL concept and organization and on the other hand, they were told repeatedly that the one development fundamental to a viable SSPL organization - the resistance movement concept - could not be approved at the Washington level. The bombing halts and negotiations commencing 1 April 1968, brought all serious proposals for increased action against the North to a standstill.

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PART II. RESOURCES (U)

A. (TS) ORGANIZATION AND FACILITIES

1. (TS) Early Organization The Psychological Operations Group of SOG was activated on 24 January 1964, [REDACTED] and one officer from MACV Headquarters. Additional personnel were requested on temporary duty from the US Broadcasting and Visual Activity, Pacific (USABVAPAC). Indigenous personnel were recruited through the Vietnamese counterpart organization, with formal training of personnel for Voice of Freedom (VOF) commencing on 1 April. At the end of CY 1964, the strength of the group was 23 personnel organized as shown in Figure CA 1.

a. PSYOPS Group Responsibilities. Based on the general guidance contained in OPLAN-34A, MACSOG developed a more detailed plan for psychological operations. A PSYOPS programming board was established to "periodically review the psychological situation in the light of opportunities, vulnerabilities, and past psychological actions, to determine validity of the objectives, tasks and themes, and to develop guidance for future operations."* The responsibilities of the four organizational sections to put the guidance into effect are outlined in the following paragraphs.

(1) Research and Analysis Section. The mission of the section was to collect and evaluate information from DRV and RVN on the impact of the program, feasibility of proposed operations, conduct pre-testing of output, and maintain research files and a reference library.**

(2) Radio Section

(a) The radio section was charged with the operation of both overt and covert radio. The VOF (overt) was initially on the air for only six hours a day, with typical themes being as follows.

* (TS) "PSYOPS Plan to MACV OPLAN-34A," MACSOG, 22 June 1964, p 2, SAGSA.
 ** (TS) Ibid., p 3.


* (TS) "PSYOPS Plan to MACV OPLAN-34A," MACSOG, 22 June 1964, Annex A to

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FIGURE CA 1 ()
 ORGANIZATION OF PSYOPS GROUP^{a/} ()



^{a/} (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV 1964-Command History," p V-1 (SACSA).

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C-a-22

Annex A to

Appendix C

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1. Confusion reigns among communist leaders and the futility of the search for utopia under socialism. 1
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2. Programs directed toward NVN troops in an effort to create a split between leadership and troops. 4
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3. A profile of a GVN citizen emphasizing the personal advantage to be enjoyed in a life under freedom.* 7
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- (b) Clandestine radio (black) was charged with the operation of two channels. Channel A, "Red Flag Radio" represented a nationalistic marxist group in NVN. It was broadcasting two and one-half hours per day with primary emphasis on the Sino-Soviet split and the errors in following the policies of Communist China. Channel B, "The Voice of the Sacred Sword Patriots League" did not become operational during 1964.** 10
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- (3) Plans and Operations Section. The functions of this section were to prepare studies and plans in the operations area and to coordinate the air and maritime operations concerned with disseminating leaflets and gift kits into NVN.** 18
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- (4) Special Operations Section. During the first year of operations, this section was charged with training the infiltration teams and directing the black letter campaign. 23
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- b. Capabilities, Facilities, Backup Support. The task organization, strength, facilities and capabilities as of October 1964 are shown in Figure CA 2. 26
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- (1) Psychological operations were conducted with the following task organization, capabilities, facilities and backup support. 29
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* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Psychological Operations in Support of OPLAN-34A," 10 Oct 64 (SACSA).

** (TS) Ibid., Annex D, p 1 and Annex E, p 2.

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Element	TD Strength	Facilities	Capabilities
<u>Organic SOG PSYOPS Group</u>			
		Office MACV-2	Providing advice, assistance and training to RVN counterpart organization to make it capable of accomplishing its psychological warfare mission.
Group Headquarters	3		
Research Analysis	6		
Radio	5		
Radio Support	11		
Operations	8		
Special Operations	3		
<u>RVN Counterpart Organization</u>			
Headquarters	14	Office	Command and control Research analysis and planning of PSYWAR activities 59 broadcasting hours per week.
Research Section	12		
Broadcasting	106		
White Radio (VOF) Channel A		20 KW Transmitter mobile studio vans.	
Black Radio Channel B (Voice of SSFL)		None - must use white radio transmitter	Preparation for broadcasting
<u>Operations</u>	33		
Printed Media		Printing plant and warehouse w/Harris high- speed press	200,000 3" x 6" leaflets per 8-hour shift
SSFL Training and Operation		Training Facility at Long Thanh	PSYOPS Training to one team (15 men) every 60 days
Deception Operation (Mail Operation)		(Letters re- turned to SOG for final check and mailing)	Produce 200 letters per month of various types

a/ (TS) Ibid., Annex D p 1, Annex E p 2.

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C-a-24

Annex A to
Appendix C

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(a) Local



2. Twenty-two (22) man TDY augmentation from USABVAPAC.

3. Webendorf Press, located as PSYWAR Directorate, was allocated to SOG for 1600-2400 hour shift. Capability. 500,000 3" x 6" leaflets per shift.

(b) Okinawa. USABVAPAC, Okinawa, for general backup support in all aspects of PSYOPS.



(2) PSYOPS draw on the cooperation of other agencies as follows.

Agency	Type of Support Obtained
RVN Ministry of Defense)	750 W transmitter and personnel for seven broadcast hours per week for radio "Red Flag" (Channel A, Black Radio).
USIS	Program materials (music, recorded interviews, etc.), for White Radio (VOF).

(3) Programmed expansions are as follows.

Activity	Programmed	Target Date
Black Radio, Channel B (Voice of SSPL)	20 KW transmitter and studio.	January 1965
Black Radio, Channel B (Voice of SSPL)	Limited operation (5 hrs/wk) using White Radio transmitter.	November 1964
White Radio (VOF)	New Broadcasting Studio.	Early 1965
White Radio (VOF)	Short-wave capability.	Early 1965 ^{a/}

a/ (TS) Ibid., Annex A (SACSA).

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~~TOP SECRET~~2. ~~(TS)~~ Later Reorganization

a. During 1965, the responsibility for training infiltration teams was transferred to the airborne operations section of SOG, later referred to by the code word TIMBERWORK(C). The PSYOPS group grew from a relatively small organization at the beginning of 1965 to a relatively large, complex organization by the end of 1965. Generally, the group was organized to correspond to a similar counterpart organization of STS. The four sections of the group as shown in Figure CA 3. They were: Research and Analysis, Radio Section, Printed Media Section, and a Special Operations Section. Along with the black letter operations, the Special Operations Section was charged with the control of both Black Radio, Channel A (Radio "Red Flag") and Black Radio, Channel B (Voice of SSPL). The latter was put in operation in April 1965, as the voice of dissident nationalistic organization in NVN.*

b. The organization in 1967 was essentially the same as that described for 1965. The authorized US strength was: 12 officers, 11 enlisted men, and nine civilians. The Vietnamese authorization included 26 officers, 19 enlisted men and 720 civilians.**

3. ~~(TS)~~ Present Organization. As part of the reorganization of SOG in the fall of 1968, Chief, SOG directed that the operational functions of the PSYOPS group be delegated to two command units: Radio Studies Group (RSG), VOF, and PSYOPS Group (POG), black psychological operations. OP-33, Psychological Studies Branch became a pure staff section under the Operations and Training Division, OP-30.***

a. Relation to Chief, SOG. Figure CA 4 illustrates the current organization.

* ~~(TS)~~ History, MACSOG, "Annex N, 1965 MACV Command History," 2 June 1966, p II-E-1 (SACSA).

** ~~(TS)~~ History, MACSOG, "Annex G, 1967 MACV Command History," p G-III-3-3 (SACSA).


*** ~~(TS)~~ Memorandum, Chief, SOG, "Concept for Reorganization of SOG Psychological Operations," 23 Oct 68 (SACSA)

** ~~(TS)~~ History, MACSOG, "Annex G, 1967 MACV Command History,"

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FIGURE C-3 ()

ORGANIZATION OF PSYOPS, 1965 ()



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
NOTE: During 1965, only three civilians personnel were permanently a part of the Group -- one in Headquarters and two in the Radio Section. However, the Special Operations Section was augmented by two officers TDY from the 7th PSYOPS Group, Okinawa, formerly USAB/APAC.^{a/}

a/ Ibid., p II-E-A-1.

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FIGURE CA 4 ()
CURRENT SOG ORGANIZATION (U)



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b. Functions of Psychological Studies Branch, OP-33

(1) Advises and assists the Director, Operations and Training on all matters pertaining to covert PSYOPS.

(2) Advises the Director, Operations and Training on unilateral, combined and joint operational activities, and the control, analysis and recording of data pertaining to the HUMIDOR(C), TREAT Programs.

(3) Develops, coordinates and recommends operational concepts, studies, plans and position papers in response to Director, Operations and Training requirements.

(4) Provides conceptual guidance to the HUMIDOR(C), TREAT Programs.

(5) Coordinates and provides liaison with the US Embassy and Headquarters, MACV on all matters pertaining to covert PSYOPS.

(6) Provides staff supervision to Radio Studies Group and the Psychological Studies Group.*

c. Psychological Operations Group (POG), OP-39. Figure CA 5 shows the current organization of POG and gives the authorized JTD for each section. The US personnel advise over 200 Vietnamese.**

(1) POG Mission. To plan, develop and conduct covert PSYOPS: (a) against North Vietnam, and (b) in support of MACSOG/STD activities in SVN, Laos and Cambodia.

(2) Functions of POG Branches


(a) Research and Analysis Branch. Furnishes necessary background, vulnerability and susceptibility information with recommended themes to operating units. Advisors assist and guide Vietnamese counterparts as necessary.

* (TS) Notes, MACSOG, "Revised Standard Operating Procedures," July 1969 (SACSA)
** (TS) Briefing, MACSOG (POG), July 1969 (SACSA)

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FIGURE CA 5 ()
 PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES GROUP^{a/} (U)
 (Joint Table of Distribution)



^{a/} (TS) Briefing, MACSOG (POG), July 1969.

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(b) Printed Media and Mail Order Branch. Uses
 leaflets, gift kits, radios and black letters to
 deliver propaganda messages. Advisors monitor,
 assist, and guide counterparts as necessary.

(c) Radio Branch. Black radio serves as the con-
 stant media to perpetuate and support themes delivered
 by other media. Advisors monitor context of programs
 as well as assist and guide.

(d) Exploitation Branch Advise, coordinate, and
 monitor Paradise Island SSPL indoctrination program
 (discontinued in November 1968).

(e) TREAT. Advise and coordinate the use of radio
 and printed media operations directed against VC-
 controlled areas in South Vietnam *

d. Radio Studies Group (RSG), OP-70. Figure CA6 shows the
 current organization of RSG and gives the current level of US
 advisors on the VOF Staff. The Vietnamese staff of VOF is
 comprised of 242 production, administrative and engineering
 personnel working under the immediate supervision of the
 Deputy Director, an ARVN major.**

(1) US Personnel Assigned. Serving under the Director
 is a staff of seven military and one civilian, all referred
 to as "advisors," who serve the following functions.

(a) Saigon

- 1 Agent officer (captain) responsible for
 Fiscal and Supply
- 2 Assistants to the agent officer (EM), 1
 accountant, 1 supply cdr.
- 1 Engineering advisor (CN), responsible for
 transmitter operation.
- 1 Radio officer (captain), assistant
 Engineering advisor
- 1 Production assistant (captain), specialist
 in program production techniques.

(b) Hue


- 1. Thanh Lam - 1 Fixed Station Attendant (E8)
 to supervise the two 20 KW
 transmitters.
- 2. Conte - 1 Fixed Station Attendant (E8) to
 supervise the 200 KW installation.***

* (TS) SOP, MACSOG, "OP-33 Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)," 4 Jul 67
 ** (TS) Memorandum, Director VOF, "Current Operations and Facilities,"

2. Conte - 1 Fixed Station Attendant (E8) to
 1 Aug 69 (SACSA).
 *** (TS) Notes, MACSOG, "Revised SOP," July 1969

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FIGURE CA 6 ()
MACSOG-70 (U)



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(2) Mission and Tasks. The mission of VOF is to present the policies of the US Government and the Republic of Vietnam to North Vietnamese audiences in as favorable a light as possible. It also attempts to inform the North Vietnamese people of a variety of developments in the Free World, to develop better understanding between the people of North and South Vietnam. The VOF is a "gray" radio operation in the sense that the source of origin is not specifically identified. However, unwavering support for GVN/VGS policies leaves little doubt in the minds of the audience that VOF is sponsored and supported by the RNV/VGS. It also serves as a cover organization for several other phases of both US and Vietnamese activities.* The tasks of RSG were as follows:

(a) To advise and assist Chief, SOG in all matters pertaining to radio operations, including operational policies, program content, fiscal support, logistical support and engineering and technical support of both short and medium wave radio operations.

(b) To advise and assist the Vietnamese staff of the VOF in all aspects of radio operations including operating policies, program content, fiscal support, logistical support and technical and engineering support.

(c) To provide fiscal and logistical support to the VOF radio station.**

(3) VOF Standard Operating Procedures. For more details on the internal organization of VOF, personnel responsibilities, duties of technicians, fiscal and supply procedures, etc., reference is made to the SOP on file in SACSA.***

* (C) Letter, JUSPAO, "General Background Report on VOF," 17 Aug 66 (SACSA).

** (TS) Notes, MACSOG, "Revised SOP," July 1969.

*** (TS) SOP, MACSOG, "OP-33 Standing Operating Procedures (U)," 4 Jul 67 (SACSA).

< 17 Aug 66 (SACSA).

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

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4. (TS) Command and Control

a. General. A complete discussion of command and control procedures for FOOTBOY(C) Programs is contained in



Appendix C. To review, the HUMIDOR(C) procedure briefly, approval for individual operations within already approved concepts was delegated to CINCPAC. Approval of an entirely new concept required formal JCS action and, in most cases, approval by State, CIA and SecDef.


b. CAS, MACSOG, USIA Relationship. Command and control of PSYOPS was somewhat complex because of the divisions of responsibility among CAS, MACSOG and USIA. There was a sharp division between the control procedures for white/gray (VOF) operations and black operations (SSPL and TREAT). In the first instance, funding was through DOD/MACSOG and policy guidance, on a broad level, was provided by JUSPAO through MACV/SOG.



 In both the white/gray and black programs, the director of VOP (USIA representative) and POG (CAS representative) were under the operational control of and responsible to Chief, MACSOG. Figure CA 7 illustrates these relationships.

c. Chain of Command Problems. The complex relationships indicated in Figure CA 7 have caused some problems. The "Brownfield" study described one of these.

"Within SOG, OP-33 is charged with the conduct and supervision of Black and Gray propagnada in coordination with its counterpart elements of STD. The organization is functional and appears to be adequate for the conduct of present operations.

 Some further detail on the TREAT Program will be provided elsewhere in this study.

~~(TS) Report, MACJ-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 10 Feb 68
(TS) Report, MACJ-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 19 Feb 68, HUMIDOR, p 10 (SACSA).~~


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FIGURE CA 7 ()
COMMAND AND CONTROL, 1968 (u)



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5. (TS) Facilities

a. Initial. Prior to 1 February 1964, the total black radio facility consisted of one 750 watt radio station located at Dong Ha, 70 km northwest of Hue. See Figure CA 8. The station was inactive following the coup of 1 November 1963 until 13 April 1964, when black radio broadcasts were resumed through the cooperative efforts of MACSOG and GVN Psychological Warfare Directorate. This program, radio "Red Flag", purported to be a dissident communist group in North Vietnam.*

(1) It was intended that a second black radio program, "Voice of Sacred Sword Patriots League (VOSSPL)", would commence transmitting in August of 1964. It was to be April 1965 before this program was on the air.

(2) Two additional 20 kw transmitters were erected in 1964 for black radio programs (see Figure CA 8).

(3) White radio, VOF, commenced broadcasting in May 1964, utilizing a 20 kw medium wave transmitter located at Hue, with the studio located in Saigon. (See Figure CA 8)

(4) Printed media (leaflets) were produced by a Harris high-speed press at the rate of 200,000 leaflets per eight-hour shift. In addition, a small press at Psychological Warfare Directorate produced one million leaflets per month

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. Improved facilities. Technical problems in the PSYOPS section of SOG in the early years centered around the inadequate facilities for transmitting black and white broadcasts.

(1) The PSYOPS group and the Psychological Warfare office of STD were able to occupy the newly renovated facilities at Number 7, Hong Thap Tu, Saigon in July 1965.

* (TS) Report, SACSA to SECDEF, "Report on Black and White Radio Programs -- OPLAN 34A," 20 April 1964. (SACSA)
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A, 1964 MACV History," p. V-1 to V-3. (SACSA)


Programs -- OPLAN 34A," 20 April 1964. (SACSA)

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FIGURE CA 8 (TS)

1964 FACILITIES ()



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(2) In April 1965, Black Radio, channel B (SSPL) was instituted using the recording facilities of STS/SOG in Saigon and the VOF shortwave transmitter in Hue. In late 1965, construction was commenced on a short wave transmitter for SSPL at Thu Duc, near Saigon.*

(3) The Thu Duc transmitter site for Black Radio (SSPL) became operational on 20 September 1966. Figure CA 9 shows the location of proposed and established facilities in 1966.**

(b)(1)
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(4) The Thu Duc transmitters, two 20 kw short wave, were used primarily for SSPL broadcasts and also for some VOF short wave transmissions.

(5) Radio Red Flag continued to be transmitted from the 750 watt transmitter in Dong Ha.

(6) The 20 kw short wave and 20 kw medium wave transmitter located at Thanh Lam (10 km south of Hue) broadcasted VOF programs simultaneously.****

(7) A limiting factor in VOF effectiveness was the inadequate power of the 20 kw transmitter to reach Hanoi during daylight hours. Plans were developed to construct a 200 kw transmitter at one of three locations near Hue****(See Figure CA 9.) Two letters are on file that justify the expense and operational need for the 200 kw transmitter.#

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N, 1965 MACV Command History," p. IX-E-7 and p. II-E-9. (SACSA)

** (TS) Report, MACSOG, Annex A to "SOG Radio Broadcast Facilities," 2 July 1966. (SACSA)

*** [Redacted]
**** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "SOG Radio Broadcasting Facilities (C)," 2 July 1966. (SACSA)

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(b)(3)

(1) Ltr, CINCPAC to JCS, "Requirement for a High-Powered Medium Wave Transmitter for Voice of Freedom Radio (S)", 22 April 1966. (SACSA)

(2) Ltr, MACSOG to CINCPAC, 'Same Subject,' 25 July 1966. (SACSA)


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(2) Ltr, MACSOG to CINCPAC, 'Same Subject,' 25 July 1966. (SACSA)

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FIGURE A- (TS)

1966 FACILITIES ()



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(8) Construction was begun during 1967 at the Con Te Island site on the 200 kw VOF transmitter. Construction delays in 1968 were caused by the Tet offensive and Typhoon Bess. The complex was nearing completion in the summer of 1969.

(9) On 1 June 1967, Project JENNY flights commenced over the Gulf of Tonkin, broadcasting SSPL, Radio Red Flag and MIMIC.* The flights were flown by Navy EC-121 aircraft operating from Danang airbase, RVN. (More detail on JENNY flights is included in the Air Operations Annex).

c. Paradise Island Facilities. Located off the coast southeast of Danang, operations commenced in May 1964, as a detention center for captured fishermen to indoctrinate them in the precepts of the SSPL and then return them to NVN. The code name for the US complex constructed in 1965 on Paradise Island was DODO (C). It included the US and Vietnamese Command Posts, Nung Security Force Camp, and medical, supply and administration facilities. For a more complete description of Paradise Island facilities, reference is made to the MACSOG report of February 1969.**

d. Latest Facilities

(1) Black PSYOPS (POG). Most of the production facilities were located at #7 Hong Thap Tu Street, Saigon. This included the studios, print shop, library and secure storage vault, and the Vietnamese counterpart organization. Transmissions of Black Radio programs were from the two 20 kw and one 10 kw transmitters at Thu Duc and from BLUE EAGLE I and BLUE EAGLE II as follows:

(a) Thu Duc. VOSSPL, Red Flag, VOF Chinese Language Programs into NVN.

(b) BLUE EAGLE I. VOSSPL, Red Flag, MIMIC.

(c) BLUE EAGLE II. Red Star, MIMIC.***

* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to 1968 MACV Command History," p. F III-3-7. (SACSA)

** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Paradise Island and Analysis," 9 February 1969, p. 2-3. (SACSA)

*** (TS) Briefing, SOG, "Standard PSG Briefing," July 1969. (SACSA)

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Annex A to
Appendix C

*** 7663' 851-852' 853' "Standard PSG Briefing" July 1969 (SACSA)

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(2) Voice of Freedom (RSG). VOF was broadcasting 45 transmitter 1
 hours daily from four transmitters located at Thu Duc and 2
 Hue (Thanh Lam) areas. Transmitter location, hours programmed 3
 and languages are as follows 4

Thanh Lam (Hue) 5

20 KW MW (655 KHZ)	Vietnamese	20 Hr
	English	1/2 Hr
	French	1/2 Hr
20 KW SW (9670 KHZ)	Vietnamese	16 Hr

Thu Duc (Saigon)

20 KW SW (9580 KHZ)	Cantonese	6 Hr
20 KW SW (7235 KHZ)	Mandarin	2 Hr

TOTAL	45 Hr
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(a) Studios. Production facilities were located at #7 6
 Hong Thap Tu Street, Saigon. Programs were taped and 7
 newscasts were aired live from a complex of five studios. 8
 Program support facilities included one of the largest 9
 music libraries in Southeast Asia and an extensive political 10
 research library. Latest news releases from five news 11
 services were available from the station monitor section and 12
 additional reference materials were recorded by this section 13
 from Radio Hanoi and Radio Liberation and the Vietnamese 14
 Services of Radio Moscow and Radio Peking. 15

(b) 200 KW Transmitter. By the summer of 1969, the 200 KW 16
 transmitter, started in 1966, was nearing completion. Located 17
 on Con Te island near Hue, the transmitter will provide 17
 a significant increase in day time coverage of the target 18
 area and, operated at half power, will provide excellent 19
 coverage at night. The island complex will be substantially 20
 self-sustaining, with its own quarters, water supply and 21
 power plant. Power will be provided by four 500 KW generators 22
 which will be capable of independent or synchronous operation 23
 in manual or automatic modes. The security for the complex will 24
 be provided by a guard force, perimeter chain link fence, guard 25
 towers and perimeter lights. When operational, the 200 KW 26

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Annex A to
Appendix C,
Appendix C

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transmitter will supplant only the 20 KW medium wave 1
 transmitter at Thanh Lam. Programming will continue to 2
 be aired from the 20 KW short wave transmitter.* 3

(3) Figure CA 10 is a chart of the locations of black and 4
 white PSYOPS facilities in the summer of 1969. 5

B. (TS) PERSONNEL/TRAINING 6

Information on personnel and training was well documented 7
 for the first year of MACSOG's existence. In early 1965, the 8
 PSYOPS special report was eliminated and the source of detail 9
 on training was terminated. 10

1. (TS) Headquarters, Radio and Leaflet Personnel - 1964 11

a. The Research and Analysis section Vietnamese counterparts 12
 initially consisted of two officers, a captain and a lieutenant, 13
 a noncommissioned officer, a writer, and three clerks. The two 14
 officers had attended school in the United States; the former 15
 attended Information School at Fort Slocum, New York and the 16
 Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon; the latter had attended 17
 the PSYOPS Course at Fort Bragg, N.C. Training for these officers, 18
 other than on-the-job training, was not required.** 19

b. Radio Personnel 20

"The early recruitment and training of indigenous personnel
 posed many problems. The near total absence of available qualified
 broadcast personnel made it necessary in many cases to recruit
 individuals who had little more to offer than a stated interest in
 working for a radio station. Because of any early agreement with
 existing broadcast stations in the area not to raid their staffs,
 the VOF staff was for the most part made up of people who had been
 employed in related industries but had to be trained in the bare
 essentials of radio broadcast techniques. Newsroom personnel were
 recruited from the ranks of newspapers and magazine writers;
 amateur and semi-professional fiction writers were recruited for the
 feature program section; unemployed actors were hired as announcers
 and producers; and radio repairmen, who expressed an interest and
 displayed an aptitude, were employed as studio engineers. However,
 with the tireless efforts of the USAB&VAPAC augmentation team
 which was assigned the task of conducting the training program, a
 training schedule was devised and the program was carried out to
 as successful a conclusion as could be expected under such handi-
 capping conditions."**

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "RSG Input, MACSOG Documentation," Aug 1969.
 (SACSA)

** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "OPLAN 34A Phase I PsyOps Report," 2 July
 1964. (SACSA)

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
Annex A to

** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "OPLAN 34A Phase I PsyOps Report," 2 July
 Appendix C

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FIGURE CA 10 (TS)

1969 FACILITIES ()



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(1) The augmentation team set up a two-month training program which included general information, specific instruction to writers, producers, news editor, etc., and a period of on-the-job training.*

(2) The first broadcast (VOF) was beamed from the Hue transmitter on 27 May 1964.

(3) During the remainder of 1964, US and USAB&VAPAC personnel were in the process of withdrawing from their direct supervision roles. By the end of the year, it was determined that the US personnel could be reduced to the four permanent white radio officers authorized in the SOG Table of Distribution.**

c. Leaflet Operations Personnel

"During Phase I /Feb - May 1964/, a major effort has been devoted toward building up the Vietnamese capability which was necessary to conduct operations. This buildup required the hiring and training of artists, printers, and translators. In addition, the one Vietnamese officer devoting full time to leaflet operations since 1 April /1964/ has been extremely receptive to training and guidance. As of 31 May 1964, the counterpart capability has been developed sufficiently to really contribute to the tactical leaflet program. The major deficiency at present is a lack of sufficient current information to exploit psychological operations targets. US and Vietnamese research capabilities are being developed and will be of more and more value as the program develops. Attempts are being made to hire qualified writers."***

"During the early part of this reporting period /1 June-30 Sept/, the Vietnamese counterpart organization was fully staffed with both military and civilian personnel. This organization has contributed much to the printed media program. They have been extremely receptive to advice and have worked dilligently to improve their knowledge of psyops and to improve their overall job performance."****

2. (TS) Recent Training/Personnel

a. VOF

(1) "While VOF, in general, has been able to attract the most qualified personnel SVN has to offer, the number of fully qualified men has not been sufficient to meet the demand. Total mobilization, perhaps a boon to the military side of prosecuting the war, is a bane to VOF. Too much of the man and brain power sponged up throughout the country has been misplaced. Our basic problem is bi-spronged VOF was organized

* (TS) Ibid.

** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Psychological Operations in Support of OPLAN 34A, 10 Oct 64 - 31 Dec 64." ANNEX C. (SACSA)

*** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "OPLAN 34A Phase I PSYOPS Report," 2 July 1964. (SACSA)

**** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "PSYCHO OPS in Support of OPLAN 34A, 1 June - 30 Sept" 10 Oct 1964. Annex E, p. 1. (SACSA)

** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Psychological Operations in Support of

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to produce and broadcast, not to train, and the key positions -- writers, political research and production specialists, bilingual translators -- cannot be filled from formal training programs in broadcasting techniques. While we can offer apprenticeship to young staff announcers and newscasters, we rely heavily on part-time contract personnel to fill some of our key writing and production slots.

(2) "VOF is further fettered in that it cannot offer salaries equivalent to the US mission scale.

(3) "The development of the 200 KW transmitter complex at Con Te has placed a heavy demand on VOF for qualified radio engineers, electrical maintenance and generator personnel. Since the demand could not be met through normal recruiting procedures, a training program was conducted in January of this year. Results were less than exciting, but with experience the assembled Con Te staff should prove adequate."*

b. POG

(1) Radio Operations Training, 1968-69

(a) Workshop I

1. "Conducted from 26 February 1968 to 24 May 1968. Its purpose was to improve the writing techniques of radio script and letter writers, and to assist them to better understand their jobs and the image projected on radio.

2. "Eleven Vietnamese personnel attended the Workshop which met three times a week. Five were staffers of Channel B, two from R&A, two from Special Operations, one from Printed Media and one from Mail Operations.

3. "Subjects covered included:

- a. "The nature and organization of the SSFL
- b. "Organization and purpose of sections at House Seven
- c. "Essential considerations of propaganda
- d. "Steps toward better writing
- e. "Radio News writing
- f. "Writing commentaries

4. "The class was tested and assessed at the end of the Workshop. Ten successfully completed the course and were given certificates. The eleventh man dropped out because his duties prevented him from attending a considerable number of meetings. While the writers did not equal the quality or caliber of US radio news and script writers, they demonstrated a competency which reflected the state of Vietnam's audio and visual journalism.

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "RSG Input, MACSOG Documentation," Aug 1969.
(SACSA)

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Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

Annex A to

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5. "The course was taught by the American Senior Radio Advisor, who did not speak Vietnamese. More than two-thirds of the class could understand only elementary English. As a result, the teaching was done through interpreter and translator.

6. "Training should be continued, at all levels, and qualified professional Vietnamese writers should be attracted to the organization to assist in the training. While the course was judged successful by the Vietnamese, much more might have been accomplished if language were not a barrier."

(b) Workshop II

1. "Conducted from 31 March to 25 July 1969. Its purpose: To assist in preparing selected Vietnamese military and civilian personnel for black radio operations by teaching propaganda techniques and the art of radio writing and production and how radio can be used for propaganda purposes most effectively.

2. "Nine Vietnamese personnel attended, including five from the Operations Section, two from Mail Operations and two from R&A. Classes met three days per week for two hours each. A Vietnamese producer (VOF) conducted the radio production training, and the Senior American Radio Advisor conducted the writing training. In addition, six other Vietnamese presented specialized lectures and/or demonstrations.

3. "Subjects covered included:

a. "Organization and functions of a Radio Station Staff

(1) "News

(2) "Production

(3) "Research

(4) "Transmitters

b. "Writing and production of special features

c. "Essential considerations of propaganda

d. "Steps toward better writing

e. "Radio news writing

f. "Writing commentaries

4. "NOTE: Sections a and b were conducted as planned. Sections c, d, e, and f were continued, but with a reduced class. The change was made in an effort to conduct an intense workshop to upgrade four writers from the Operations Section who had been assigned to Channel C.

5. "The results were good despite the fact that operational considerations forced a change in the planned syllabus. Testing was not conducted and students will be assessed on the basis of assignments, and class participation.

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C-a-46

Annex A to
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6. "There is no doubt that training should be continued, providing teachers are available and have sufficient time to devote to the effort. In this case, the Senior Radio Advisor's responsibilities increased and application was somewhat less than in Workshop I. Formalized training is difficult to establish and maintain with teachers whose primary duties lie in other responsibilities. The organization of a Training Section would help alleviate this problem.

(c) "DAY TO DAY CRITIQUES"

"In addition to the formalized workshops, advisors in Radio, Printed Media and Mail Operations carried on a continuous effort to demonstrate to writers how to improve their writing and to single out outstanding writing to be emulated. It is estimated that 15 - 20 Vietnamese were assisted in this manner over a period of years, in varying degrees of intensity, depending on other demands on advisors' time and the level of interest in training."*

(2) Printed Media Training

(a) "Subjects included imparting the basic knowledge of operating the following apparatus for the below listed personnel:

1. "11 employees received basic operations, operators maintenance and PM indicators of the Harris Offset Press. They were instructed in the most feasible and economical methods in the production of lithograph plates, ink control, and water control. They were taught how to use the various pressure and air gauges in accordance with the applicable technical manual.

2. "4 employees received instructions on the proper utilization of the Harris Power Cutter. The instructions included operations, operator maintenance, PM indicators, and replacement procedures for the cutter blade. They were taught lubrication and electrical procedures and instructions in accordance with the manufacturer's operator manual.

3. "2 camera operators received basic instructions in platemaking and layout. When they were hired, they were experienced cameramen. They were taught masking procedures primarily, since this is the bulk of layout and platemaking.

4. "6 packers were instructed on the basic principles of packaging and crating gift kits, leaflets and food for air shipment. They were taught folding procedures and space utilization. They were instructed in the most feasible methods of packing to insure that material, undergoing the most turbulent shipment would arrive at its destination in a usable condition. They were also taught waterproofing procedures for maritime operations. All instructions were given in accordance with the Joint Military packing and crating manual.

(b) "Time involved - since no specific time requirement was imposed, the extensive training was conducted on a continuing basis and took 2 1/2 years to complete.

* (TS) Memo, Senior Radio Advisor, "Training Conducted in Radio Operations, 1968-69," 22 July 1969. (SACSA)

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C-8-47

Annex A to
Appendix C

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(c) "Results - as a direct result of this massive on-the-job training program, the printed media section has enjoyed the wonderful reputation of accomplishing each assigned mission with maximum efficiency. Personnel were motivated to the degree that they expressed their sincere gratitude to the advisors that had taken so much personal interest in their improvements. Results so intangible, yet so apparent cannot be measured in the percentage of efficiency that was reached.

(d) "Recommendations - that every effort be made to insure that additional training be conducted during periods of reduced activity."*

(3) R and A Training

(a) "Due to the immediate nature of R&A's role, most training of the Vietnamese personnel is informal and continuing, consisting primarily of constructive criticism and suggestions made on specific tasks. The following are the only training sessions which could be considered to have an element of formality:

1. "SUBJECT: Interrogation
NUMBER OF PERSONS: 10
WHEN: Conducted by SFC Ihara sometime in late 1967, over a two week period.
RESULTS: Unimpressive
RECOMMENDATIONS: That new interrogators be hired.
2. "SUBJECT: Interrogation.
NUMBER OF PERSONS: 10
WHEN: February 1969 for 7 days.
RESULTS: An upgrading in the reporting of interrogation reports by the students.
RECOMMENDATIONS: Close supervision until such time that the students skill become second nature, and any new interrogators should be trained by the same course by the students.
3. "SUBJECT: Use of the Reader/Printer.
NUMBER OF PERSONS: 2
WHEN: Late February and early March 1969.
RESULTS: Students can now operate when needed.
RECOMMENDATIONS: When available, these two students should be allowed any new microfilm we obtain, in order to maintain familiarity with the equipment.
4. "SUBJECT: Indexing and Photographing of documents.
NUMBER OF PERSONS: 4
WHEN: May 1969, for approximately 8 hours with followup checks.
RESULTS: Those documents in the library are now indexed and ready for filming.
RECOMMENDATIONS: A micro-film camera should be obtained and the documents filmed, and all documents received after the initial filming should be indexed."**

* (TS) Memo, Printing Advisor, "Training Conducted in Printed Media," 23 July 1969. (SACSA)

** (TS) Memo, R&A Supervisor, "Training of R&A Personnel," 23 July 1969. (SACSA)

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C-a-46

Annex A to

** (TS) Memo, R&A Supervisor, "Training of R&A Personnel," 23 July 1969. Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~(4) Training at Thu Duc Radio Station

(a) "My records show no training for the guard force, but the Security Officer provided the following information:

1. "In 1967 and 1968, 44 guards fired the BAR, shotgun and Carbine at the Infantry School firing range.

2. "On 14 Feb 69, 12 guards fired the following weapons at the same range:

30 cal machine gun	500 rds
Carbine	750 rds
M-79 grenade launcher	10 rds
Hand Grenade	12 ea

3. "On the same date an EOD Team demonstrated the use of the Claymore and detonated 2 ea. of the same.

4. "Results. We haven't been overrun yet.

5. "Recommendations: All guards should fire at least once per year. Care and cleaning should be emphasized at all times. Familiarization firing with the M-16 should be conducted ASAP. All the guards should be qualified with the 30 caliber machine gun. Periodic drills should be conducted to ascertain that all guards are familiar with, and carry out, proper alert procedures.

(b) "Technical Training: OJT was conducted during the period of 15 Mar 69 to 15 May 69 for nine new broadcast technicians. These men had already completed a 4 1/2 month basic electronics course. After scrutinizing the lesson plan for this course I would compare it to the U.S. Govt. Field Radio Repair Course (31E20) offered at Ft. Gordon, Ga.

1. "The training consisted of basically on the job training conducted by station chief, supervised by the U.S. Advisor. Thos OJT was designed to prepare these men to man this particular station. The OJT covered those subjects necessary to attain the degree of efficiency required for the operation of a broadcast station.

2. "The actual time spent on each subject was determined by the station chief and/or the U. S. Advisor. I can only estimate the amount of time spent on each subject. Total time was 356 hours per man.

3. "The following is an estimated breakdown:

a. "Broadcast Transmitter, 20 kw, (Gates HF20B)

(1) "Schematic diagrams with reference to physical component location.	89 hrs
(2) "Location of controls and proper sequence of tuning (Frequency change).	44 1/2 hrs
(3) "Operation and adjustment of high voltage, low voltage and bias power supplies.	44 1/2 hrs
(4) "Troubleshooting and repair	44 1/2 hrs
(5) "Modulator Transmission lines and antennae	44 1/2 hrs 16 hrs

TOTAL 283 hrs

(5) "Modulator

44 1/2 hrs
Annex A to
Appendix C

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b. "Associated Audio and Control Equipment		<u>1</u>
(1) "Variable Master Oscillator (Frequency determining source for HF20B)	8 hrs	<u>2</u>
(2) "Audio Control Console	16 hrs	<u>3</u>
(3) "Tape Recorder	8 hrs	<u>5</u>
(4) "FM Receivers	8 hrs	<u>6</u>
(5) "Audio Distortion Analyzer	4 hrs	<u>7</u>
(6) "Electronic Frequency Counter	4 hrs	<u>8</u>
(7) "Audio Patch Panel	1 hr	<u>9</u>
	<hr/>	
	Total	49 hrs <u>10</u>
c. "General Subjects		<u>11</u>
(1) "Daily, Weekly and Monthly Maintenance	16 hrs	<u>12</u> <u>13</u>
(2) "Station Log (Entries in English)	2 hrs	<u>14</u>
(3) "Safety Precautions and First Aid	6 hrs	<u>15</u>
	<hr/>	
	Total	24 hrs <u>16</u>
	<hr/>	
	Grand Total	356 hrs <u>17</u>

4. "On 30 June 1969, an examination was conducted to determine the results of this training. The examination, with the exception of the FCC regulation portion, very closely compared to the FCC 2nd Class Radio Telephone license examination. The final test scores ranged from 71.25% to 83.5% for an average score of 77.75%. On 9 July 1969 a graduation ceremony was held, at the Thu Duc station, and each man was given a diploma/certificate as a Broadcast Technician by VOF.

(c) "I recommend that every effort possible be made to further enhance the ability of these men. This can be and is being accomplished by the close observance and immediate assistance of the station chief and/or the U.S. Advisor. At all times they should be encouraged to increase their knowledge of electronics. Much practical experience is necessary to make a well rounded technician. These men have already expressed a desire to me to learn as much as possible. I feel with proper guidance most of them can become professional broadcast technicians."*

3. (TS) Paradise Island Personnel

a. Personnel, US and VN, were organized as shown in Figure
CA 11.

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* ~~(TS)~~ Memo, Thu Duc Radio Station Advisor, "Summation of Training at THu Duc Radio Station," 29 July 69. (SACSA)

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C-a-50

Annex A to
Appendix C* ~~(TS)~~ Memo, Thu Duc Radio Station Advisor, "Summation of Training at THu Duc Radio Station," 29 July 69. (SACSA)

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FIGURE CA 11 (TS)
PARADISE ISLAND PERSONNEL ()

<u>US PERSONNEL</u>				
<u>Position</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Remarks^{e/}</u>
Chief	Maj	01542	A	
Psy Off	Cpt	09305	A	
Intel Off	Cpt	9301	A	Augmentation from Intel Section
Opns NCO	E-8	96B5L	A	
LN NCO	E-7	00141	MC	
Translator	E-7	04B3L	A	
Intel NCO	E-5	96B20	A	Augmentation from Intel Section
Medic	E-5	91B40	A	
Storekeeper	E-6	00000	N	
RIT Operator	E-5	02346	N	
<u>VN PERSONNEL</u>				
<u>Military (STD)</u>		<u>Number</u>		
Commander	Maj		1	
Psy Off, Asst CO	Cpt		1	
1st SGT	1ST		1	
Opns NCO	E-7		1	
Indoctrination NCO	E-5		3	
Supply NCO	E-5		1	
LN NCO	E-5		1	
Driver	E-4		1	
<u>Hung CIDG Security Force (DODO)</u>				
Security Chief	VGS 5		1	
Security SQG LDR	VGS 4		4	
Security Guard	VGS 3		50	

^{e/} (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Paradise History and Analysis," 9 Feb 69, Tab C.

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C-a-51

Annex A to Appendix C

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C-a-51

Annex A to Appendix C

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FIGURE CA 11 (TS) (Cont'd)


<u>VN PERSONNEL (Cont'd)</u>		
<u>VN CIDG Security Section (Subgroups)</u>		
<u>Position</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Number</u>
Security Chief	VGS 5	1
Security SQD LDR	VGS 4	4
Security Guard	VGS 3	37
Chief Indoctrina- tor	VGS 11	2
Indoctrinator	VGS 9	6
Translator	VGS 9	2
<u>Civilian Employees</u>		
Chief	R 6	1
Cook	V 5	3
Supply Asst	V 4	1
Gen Repairman	V 5	2
Carpenter	V 6	1
Clerk Typist	V 4	1

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C-a-52

Annex A to
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(b)(3)

* Ibid., p. 27.

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C-a-53

Annex A to
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PART III. OPERATIONS (U)

A. (TS) GENERAL. Psychological operations will be covered chronologically in Part III. The objective, implementation, and results of significant operations will be described. Evaluation material, as available, will be included in Part IV.

B. (TS) EARLY OPERATIONS AND PROBLEMS

1. (TS) R&A Section. The Research and Analysis section of psyops/ was initially assigned the mission of supporting white radio operations (VOF). During the first year of operation and expansion of SOG, R&A activities also expanded to include support for all sections of SOG.

a. An immediate problem was to build an intelligence library to support SOG operations. Source materials included SIC reports, NIS 43C series intelligence reports, information reports from ICC members, and certain studies from the State Dept and CAS.*

b. Additional information was obtained from tactical operations such as LOKI (maritime ops) and interviews with prisoner and ralliers as conducted by SOG counterparts through liaison with the National Interrogation Center.

c. All information was channeled primarily to support white and black radio operations, special operations and leaflets operations. Propaganda vulnerabilities were directed toward two groups in NVN: (1) the power group (Lao Dong Party, the military, administrators, cadres), and (2) the groups that must live under the power group (peasants, farmers, and laboring class).

d. The R&A section developed a pre-test system of submitting proposed leaflet designs to captured NVN to gain an insight into DRV reaction to printed propaganda material.**

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "OPLAN 34A Phase I PSYOPS Report," 2 July 1964.
 ** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV 1964 Command History," p. V-7.

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e. "Psychological and operational intelligence and information were obtained first hand by the SOG counterparts' interrogation of captured North Vietnamese fishermen. Captured DRV fishermen were interrogated for their knowledge of the socio-politico-military situation of the immediate area in which they lived and for their knowledge of the general status of these factors throughout North Vietnam. ... Prior to being released and returned to NVN, the fishermen were presented gifts having a psychological bearing on the conditions under which they lived. For example, they were given enough cloth to represent a year's ration in the North (woolen yarn is difficult to obtain under the DRV regime), and a radio which was equipped with both standard and short wave broadcast bands."* 1
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2. (PS) Radio Operations. Both black and white radio operations were initiated in the Spring of 1964. 14
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a. White Radio (VOF) commenced on 27 May 1964, utilizing the Vietnamese transmitting facilities in Hue. The initial VOF programming was direct and simple because of the relative inexperience of the staff. The objective was to attract a large audience with attractive programs rather than alienate listeners with an over dose of anti-Communist themes. The schedule was 36 percent music, 35 percent news, 21 percent feature commentary, and 8 percent comedy and drama. The schedule was three hours in length and then repeated, for six hours per day of broadcasting (1800-2400). The inauguration of VOF was widely reported in the international and local press.** 16
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(1) On 1 September 1964 programming was increased from 6 hours per day to 8 1/2 hours per day. The following topics were used as major themes in VOF broadcasting during 1964. 28
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* Ibid, p. V-8.

** Report, MACSOG, OPLAN 34A Phase I Psyops Report," 2 July 1964

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- (a) VC continuing infiltration from the DRV. 1
- (b) Religious persecution in the DRV. 2
- (c) The DRV sinks deeper under the aggressive
heels of Communist China 3
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- (d) DRV agricultural failures. 5
- (e) SVN economic and social progress among workers,
students, businessmen, intellectuals, artists, etc. 6
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- (f) Continuing VC harassment of SVN compatriots. 8
- (g) VC harassment of SVN flood relief workers. 9
- (h) Many free world nations aid SVN. 10
- (i) SVN agricultural system results in plenty for all. 11
- (j) Sino-Soviet conflicts bring added hardships to
northern compatriots.* 12
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- (2) Early White Radio Problems. Two basic problems beset
VOF operations during the first year. The first was the
lack of a suitable studio in the Saigon area. Early pro-
grams were being written in a large villa and produced
in mobile studio vans. By year's end, plans were being
made to occupy the new facilities at #7 Hong Thap Tu in
Saigon. The second problem was technical. Because the
transmitter was in Hue, programs had to be taped in Saigon
and shipped to Hue for transmission. Plans were underway
for an improved relay system at year's end.** 14
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- b. Black Radio. Black radio operations commenced on 13
April 1964, using the ARVN PsyWar Directorate transmitter at
Dong Ha. 24
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- (1) Channel A (Radio Red Flag). This represented a
dissident communist group in North Vietnam which opposes
Lao Dong party policy when it veered from a middle-of-the-
road nationalistic position or when any actions were
taken by the party which were deemed by the dissident
groups to be detrimental to the best interests of the people. 27
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* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "PSYSOPS in Support of OPLAN 34A, 1 Oct -
31 Dec 1964," Annex C, p.2.

** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "OPLAN 34A Phase I PSYOPS Report," 2 July 1964.

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The U.S. PsyOps case officer responsible met weekly with 1
 his PsyWar Directorate counterpart to outline program 2
 content for the next seven-day period. Early emphasis was 3
 on the Sino-Soviet split and the harm that could come to 4
 the DRV government, party and people if the party aligned 5
 itself with either the Soviets or the Chinese communists. 6
 Radio Red Flag was on the air for two half hour broadcasts 7
 daily.* 8

(2) Channel B (Voice of the Sacred Sword Patriots League). 9

This was scheduled for activation in the summer of 1964. 10
 (In fact, its first broadcast was delayed until April 1965.) 11
 The concept of Channel B broadcasts was to support all 12
 aspects of the SSPL resistance movement by broadcasting news 13
 and instructions to provincial resistance committees, appeals 14
 and instructions in resistance techniques to the general 15
 population, and harassment messages to DRV security force 16
 elements.* 17

3. (TS) Early Leaflet and Letter Operations 18

a. With the inception of SOG, leaflet operations were divided 19
 into two sections, strategic and tactical. The symbol of the 20
 former was the "Freedom Arrow" and the latter the "Sword." 21

(1) Strategic Leaflets. These leaflets were designed to 22
 stress the better life without communism. Shortages were 23
 played up and comparison was made with the abundance of 24
 consumer goods in the free world societies. Gift kits 25
 dropped with leaflets contained items known to be scarce 26
 in the DRV. 27

(2) Tactical Leaflets. These operations were slow in 29
 commencing because of the need to train counterpart artists, 30
 painters, and translators. There was, additionally, a lack 31
 of sufficient current information to exploit psychological 32
 targets. Early targets for these operation were: 33

* (TS) Ibid, p.3.

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(a) Slogan type messages directed toward the agricultural workers of the delta, the industrial workers, housewives, students and the intelligence. 1
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(b) Peasant farmers of Thanh Hoa, Hung Yen, and Thai Binh provinces where the governments "Land Reclamation Movement" had received great emphasis. The theme was "passive resistance to government attempts to move lowlanders to the highlands for land clearing." 4
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(c) The Catholics located in the urban areas near the coast. The themes were generally to keep faith and resist government attempts to deemphasize their religious beliefs.* 9
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b. Distribution. Over 31,000,000 leaflets and 33,000 gift kits were introduced in DRV in 1964 Leaflets were normally delivered by C 123 aircraft flying VOR (omni-range) tracks at 500 feet. However, during December 14.5 million (SSPL) leaflets were dropped along the coastal strip using auto-rotation leaflets designed to drift from off shore release points from an altitude of 5,000-9,000 feet.** 13
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c. Letter Operations. Letter operations commenced in April 1964. A total of 20 regular and five special form letters were hand copied and mailed to addresses in North Vietnam. Numbers of copies varied from 10 to 250 copies each. The propaganda paragraph was varied from letter to letter; other letters had the censor himself as the target.*** 21
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* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "OPLAN 34A Phase I. Psyops Report" 2 July 1964.(SACSA)
 ** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex A to MACV 1964 Command History," p. V-4 (SACSA)
 *** (TS) Ibid. p. V-2

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C-a-58

Annex A to

~~** (TS) History MACSOG "Annex A to MACV 1964 Command History" Appendix C~~

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d Transistor Radios. In August 1964, MACV requested authority to purchase transistor radios for disbursal over RVN at the rate of 1000 per month. Radios cost was between \$10-\$15 including an extra battery strapped to the pack. Thousands of these radios were to be supplied to North Vietnam through air operations (AIROPS) and maritime operations (MAROPS).*

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C. (TS) LATER OPERATIONS, 1965-1967

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1. (U) General. This section will summarize psychological operations during the middle years 1965-1967. It was in the period that the general concept of operations was evolved that continued until the bombing halt, and in some cases after that. A description of these concepts follows:

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2. (TS) Concept of Operations

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a. VOF. The PSYOP grey/white radio activity, Voice of Freedom, was an activity sponsored by RVN Ministry of Defense. It served as cover for the covert operations of the Psyop Group and the ARVN counterparts. The cover name for the covert facilities was RVN Ministry of Defense Special Information Office.**

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(1) Policy. VOF programming was a reflection of GVN and U.S. policy. The former was handed down to the Vietnamese Deputy Director of the station, the latter was received by the American director of RSG from JUSPAO, and the two men coordinated at the station level. The combined policy guidance was then transmitted to the Chief of the Political Analysis and Research Section, who worked out daily, weekly, and monthly themes. The themes were then translated into programs under the guidance of the programming and production sections.***

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* (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 311013A Aug 64.
** (TS) SOP, MACSOC, "OP-33 Standing Operating Procedures (U)," 4 July 1967 (SACSA)
*** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "RSG Input, MACSOG Documentation "1 Aug 1969 (SACSA)

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C-a-59

Annex A to Appendix C

*** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "RSG Input, MACSOG Documentation "1 Aug 1969 (SACSA)

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(2) Programming. The three categories of programs shown in Figure CA 12 were not mutually exclusive. An entertainment program for example, may have been at the same time informative and persuasive.*

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b. Black Psyop Concept. Black PSYOPS were designed to create dissent, disaffection, and distrust of the government of NVN, and war weariness and a feeling of futility among the population of North Vietnam. Through the accomplishment of these objectives the NVN resolve to support the VC, subvert the government of SVN, or the take over of SVN should be seriously degraded. Increasingly, the major vehicle upon which Black PSYOP was built was the notional, SACRED SWORD PATRIOT'S LEAGUE (SSPL). Black PSYOP was conducted to create the impression that a clandestine, dissident group (the SSPL), well organized and supported, was conducting operations within NVN. The SSPL was presented as a nationalistic movement that leaned toward Russia but is not in favor of any foreign government. It was anti-PEKING and anti-AMERICAN. Its program called for a cessation of the war since it was destroying the economy and the future of North Vietnam. Its organization divided NVN into five zones, with its headquarters located in Zone Four which consists of the four southern provinces of NVN.**

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(1) Paradise Island and SSPL. Headquarters of the notional organization, SSPL, was located on an island purportedly in North Vietnam. Actually an island off the coast of SVN, near Danang, was used by SOG PSYOP (operation terminated 2 Dec 1968). The island, called Paradise, consists of three camps. A small camp called DODO was the base for the US personnel (three officers and four enlisted men). The camp was well separated from the other camps and was principally a support base where the US Advisors could communicate with and assist

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* (TS) Ibid
** (TS) Report, MACJ3, AHEG, "Report of AD HOC Evaluation Group," 14 Feb 1968, Humidor (C) P 1-2 (SACSA).

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C-a-60

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

FIGURE CA 12 ()
VOICE OF FREEDOM - 21 HOUR PER DAY SCHEDULE (1969) ()

Entertainment


Music
Drama
Literature

Information

News
Special Events
Almanac
Panel Discussions
Profiles

Persuasion

Commentaries
News Analyses
Special Features



~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-61

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

the Vietnamese camp commander. The second camp, PHOENIX, 1
 was the delivery point for prisoners captured through 2
 MAROPS. Its capacity was 90 to 150. It was operated by 3
 Vietnamese who represent the SSPL and who both interrogated 4
 the POW's for intelligence for SOC intelligence and in- 5
 doctrinated them with the program of the SSPL. The third 6
 camp, separated by heavy foliage and several kilometers, 7
 was D-36 where more thorough indoctrination was conducted. 8
 The camp, with a capacity of 50, was reserved for those 9
 selected prisoners who had shown a desire to join the SSPL 10
 and were to be tasked to perform an intelligence or PSYOP 11
 function upon return to NVN. In addition to being interro- 12
 gated and indoctrinated, the prisoners were also employed 13
 in making chopsticks along with other small items such as 14
 thread, needles, and twine, were used in gift parcels 15
 containing propaganda material that were handed to the boats 16
 detained by MAROPS, and also given to prisoners when they 17
 were returned to their homes. All POW's were returned to 18
 NVN with the exception of those who requested assistance in 19
 defecting to South Vietnam. With the exception of the small 20
 advisory staff, on the island, all operations were conducted 21
 by members of the STD who were specially trained Vietnamese 22
 intelligence and psychological operators. The primary 23
 objective of capturing prisoners and leading them to believe 24
 that they were captives of the SSPL was to establish 25
 credibility for the organization and convince elements of 26
 the populace of NVN that an opposition organization does 27
 exist in NVN. A secondary objective was to gain intelli- 28
 gence for SOG intelligence on conditions in the North and 29
 on actions being taken by the government to counteract to 30
 SSPL.* 31

(2) Other Concepts. In addition to the Paradise Island
 Operations Black PSYOPS was supported by four black radio

~~(TS)~~ Ibid.

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C-a-62

Annex A to

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stations leaflets, and gift kit distribution and the black letter program.

(3) Development of Policy. The information base for black psyops was the Research and Analysis section of POG, which gathered, screened, and analyzed data from the intelligence community and from overt news media. Special emphasis was placed on NVN papers, periodicals, radio monitoring, and interrogations of selected NVN POW's. The information obtained was processed and adapted into feasible programs, primarily through a weekly conference where ideas and vulnerabilities were presented for critical analysis and possible exploitation. The psyops group (US Advisors) prepared an operation plan for each concept upon which action was to be taken. Guidelines were then passed to the counterpart organization where a RVN OPLAN was developed for actual implementation of the proposal.* This procedure is diagrammed in Figure CA 13.

3. (TS) White Radio 1965-1967. VOF broadcast time increased from 8 1/2 hours per day in 1965 to 18 hours per day in 1967. In July 1965 the new office space and studio was opened at #7, Hong TU Saigon.

a. Cover Story. The cover story for VOF was that it was operated by the GVN Ministry of Defense. Programming consisted of news, news commentators, music, drama features on activities in RVN and interviews of NVN army and VC defectors. All material used, while truthful, was presented in a manner designed to enhance its propaganda impact.**

b. Cantonese Program. In 1966 Cantonese language broadcasts were introduced. By 1967 Cantonese programming time had increased to four hours per day. The problem continued

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Standard PSG Briefing," July 1969 (SACSA)
 ** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "SOG Radio Broadcasting Facilities," 2 July 66.

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
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Annex A to

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 "SOG Radio Broadcasting Facilities."

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FIGURE CA 13 ()
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT ()



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Annex A to
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in this period of finding adequate talent to staff the VOF effort. For example, 300 persons had to be interviewed to find one satisfactory announcer.

c. High Power Transmitter. The need for a high power transmitter was much discussed but progress toward its erection was very slow. With the 20 KW transmitter available and in use a Hue, Hanoi was out of range during daylight hours. Construction was commenced in 1967 at a site near Hue for the 200 KW station.*

4. (TS) Black Radio 1965-67

a. Radio Red Flag (Channel A) It continued to broadcast 4 hours per day from the 750 watt ARVN Psywar transmitter at Dong Ha until December 1966, when the station was shifted to the 20-KW transmitter at the Thu Duc. The station purported to be a clandestine station operating in NVN. The policy of the station was to advocate a pro-Moscow, anti-Peking brand of communism. The themes were highly critical of the CHICOMs and were designed to drive a wedge between Communist China and NVN. Its major programming, accomplished by STS, blamed the problems of NVN on the pro-Peking policies of the government of NVN. In one instance the station indicated that it was located in the vicinity of Mu Gia Pass. On this occasion, it blamed the failure to broadcast for approximately one week on the US B-52 bombing of the Pass.*

b. Voice Sacred Sword Patriots League (Channel B). It commenced operating in April 1965 using the VOF short wave transmitter in Hue. The radio represented the voice of a dissident nationalistic organization in NVN. The general themes of the scripts were anti-Peking, anti-present NVN policies, and pro-negotiations. In November 1966 the VOSSPL broadcasting commenced from the new transmitters at Thu Duc outside of Saigon.* The emphasis within VOSSPL coincided with

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "SOG Radio Broadcast Facilities," 2 July 1966.

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the effort throughout 1966-1967 to broaden the base of the 1
 SSPL to make it more credible and dynamic and, therefore, of 2
 greater concern to the Hanoi government. A brief description 3
 of the object of VOSSPL was given in a 1966 letter from MACSOG: 4
 "The Sacred Sword Patriots' League (SSPL) purports to be a 5
 resistance organization operating in NVN. Purely notional, it 6
 is the mechanism used to support US/GVN deniability for OPLAN 7
 34A activities. That is, covert agent team, maritime and 8
 psychological operations are all attributed to the SSPL. In 9
 doctrine the SSPL is nationalistic and anti-Communist. Current 10
 themes are critical of the policies of the government of NVN 11
 and call for a change of these policies. The SSPL takes the 12
 position that the current leadership of NVN are puppets of the 13
 CHICOMs. The VOSSPL is the main means by which the SSPL's 14
 policies are communicated to NVN Although the scripts are 15
 written to sound as if the broadcasts originate in NVN, the 16
 station has never definitely committed itself as to its actual 17
 or purported location."* Some examples of VOSSPL scripts from 18
 1966 operations are on file. 19



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* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "SOG Radio Broadcast Facilities, "2 July 1966.
 ** (TS) Report, MACJ3, AHEG "Report of AD HOC Evaluation Group,"
 14 Feb 68, Humidor(C), p.4. (SACSA).


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C-a-66

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~*** (TS) Report, MACSOG, AHEG "Report of AD HOC Evaluation Group,"~~

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
* (TS) History, MACSOG, Annex G to MACV 1967 C. H. p G-III-3-3.

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Annex A to
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e. Project JENNY. On 1 June 1967 Project Jenny Flights commenced broadcasting from the Gulf of Tonkin.*

5. (TS) Leaflet and Mail Operation 1965-1967

a. Leaflet Operations. The completion of new facilities at Number 7 Hong Thap Tu for the printed media section and the improvement in performance of personnel and techniques provided a steady increase in quantity and quality of leaflet and gift kit operations. The greatest problem was the delivery of printed material. Initially only C-123 aircraft and 81mm mortar shells were available for delivery. In Oct 1965 the authority was given to use Vietnamese A1G aircraft for leaflet and gift kit drops.* The C130 also became available in 1966. A summary of leaflet, gift kit, and radios dropped over the three year span is shown in the following table:

	1965	1966	1967
Leaflets	67 million	142 million	271 million
Gift Kits	24,000	80,000	21,000
Radios	949	5,000	11,000

**

b. Black Mail Operations. The output of letters steadily rose over the three year period. The purpose of the operation remained to propagandize residents of NVN through the media

* (TS) Ibid p.4

** (TS) History, MACSOG, 1965-1966-1967 MACV Command History

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Annex A to
Appendix C

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of personal letters, ostensibly mailed by NVN now living outside NVN, to friends, relatives and acquaintances in NVN. In 1966 Singapore was lost as a mailing point which left Paris, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Tokyo.*

(1) Significant developments during this period included

(a) The movement of American advisors into the same building occupied by the Vietnamese operators substantially increased cooperation, coordination and advisory relationships.

(b) The following recommendations were made to CAS to enhance the campaign:

1. To increase letter output.
2. To increase the number of third country mailing stations.
3. Initiate a poison-pen campaign against selected NVN personalities.
4. Initiate mail operations to NVN students living in third countries, so that content would be forwarded to NVN.
5. Establish a mailbox for actual two-way correspondence.**

(c) Major themes developed for the letter campaign were:

1. Communist ideology weaknesses.
2. NVN Revision
3. CHICOM imperialistic domination
4. NVN mis-government
5. Peace
6. Free enterprise
7. Free society
8. Resistance movements
9. RVN open arms policy.***

* (TS) History, MACSOG, 1966 MACV Command History, p.56.

** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex N to MACV Command History," 1965, p. II E-8.

*** (TS) Ibid. p.II E-9.

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C-a-69

Annex A to
Appendix C


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(2) Summary. A summary of the various types of Black Letter developed during this period is shown below: 1

(a) Special. This letter is high level, hard sell product with direct propaganda messages. Two special letters are produced monthly and are dispatched in 100 copies each. (400 per month). 2

(b) Vulcan. This letter is a high and medium level, medium sell letter, slanted from a "revisionist" point of view. Each Vulcan letter is produced in from 8 to 12 copies. Approximately 5 Vulcan letters are produced each week. (50 - 60 per week) 3

(c) Thor. This letter is a very personal nature and us usually lower level and soft sell in character. Much of the propaganda content is of the implied type. This letter is steeped in basic human interest areas and is produced in single copy. Approximately 15 letters are produced weekly. 4



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
Annex A to Appendix C

C-A-70

Appendix C

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(f) Mars. This series of letters is designed to advise next-of-kin in U.S. of NVA battlefield casualties in SVN. The letters, purporting to have been written by comrades of the deceased (rallies to the South), describe the hardships of the NVA training, the infiltration into SV., and the combat against superior forces. The letters also rebut the lies of the cadres about the state of "liberation" of SVN, and deplore the senselessness of aggressive warfare. (The casualty data are obtained from GVN sources and from captured documents). Approximately 10 Mars letters are produced weekly.



(i) Luna. Luna letters exploit captured NVN letters with writers posing as the addressees of the NVN letters, or as friends of the addressee.*

(3) Deliveries. The total Black letters delivered cy year was:

	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>
Letters	3,993	6,000	7,550 **

* (TS) Report, SOG "Third country Letter Program" Undated (Estimated to have been prepared in 1967)
 ** (TS) History, MACSOG, SOG Annex to MACV Command Histories 1965-67. (SACSA).

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D. (TS) PARADISE ISLAND OPERATIONS

A report of operations on Paradise Island from 1964 through 1
1968 was prepared by MACSOG in early 1969.* A summary of signifi- 2
cant operations from this report are included in the paragraphs 3
below. The report is available in the SACSA file. 4

1. (TS) General History. "Operations were initiated on PARADISE 5
in May 1964 under control of the Vietnamese Coastal Security 6
Service (CSS) [REDACTED] After capture, detainees were 7
landed at PHOENIX, where they were detained and interrogated for 8
military intelligence and low-level political, social, and 9
economic information. The detainees were led to believe that 10
they had been captured by a group of NVN patriots (SSPL) dissatis- 11
fied with the policies of the Lao Dong Party. Following inter- 12
rogation, they were indoctrinated in the precepts of the SSPL. 13
In May 1965, a US advisory team from OP-33 was installed at DODO 14
to assist Strategic Technical Service (STS) Psywar personnel in 15
processing detainee information and improving interrogation and 16
indoctrination procedures. During 1965, temporary structures 17
were built at DODO to house US/Vietnamese operations and fifty- 18
five man Nung force hired to provide security for operations. 19
Three subgroups, consisting of three or four bamboo huts each 20
resembling types found in the hills of NVN, were constructed 21
high in the hills behind PHOENIX and DODO. The purpose of these 22
new locations was to separate detainees during the indoctrination 23
stage and lend credibility to the guise that the SSPL secret zone 24
was located in the highlands of NVN. In 1966 and 1967, DODO 25
facilities were expanded and three additional subgroups were added. 26
Also, a Base Camp was constructed between DODO and the subgroups to 27
alleviate supply and administration problems and to provide an 28
operational area for use of the interrogators and indoctrinators 29
in preparation of reports. There were no major changes in 30

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* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Paradise History and Analysis," 9 Feb 1969,
p. 2.

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C-2-70

Annex A to

Appendix C

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operational methods until 1 July 1968, when JCS direction limited the number of detainees captured in one week to ten and the detention period to fourteen days. At this time, the PHOENIX site was abandoned as a detention site and detainees were landed at an isolated beach, Bai Xep, and taken directly to the subgroups where interrogation and indoctrination were accomplished. From August 1968 until termination of activities in October 1968, additional facilities were constructed at PARADISE to include a new command post, dispensary, supply building, defensive structures, and a new Subgroup. On 21 October 1968, the last detainee was returned to North Vietnam as directed by CINCPAC. On 10 December 1968, all US personnel were removed from PARADISE by direction of Chief, SOG. PARADISE was placed in a caretaker status under control of the senior Vietnamese representative from the Strategic Technical Directorate (formerly STS) Psywar Branch.**

2. (TS) Operations. From the beginning of operations in 1964 until 1 July 1968, all detainees were landed at Phoenix and detained for a period of time in bamboo huts located 50-200 meters from the ocean. Detainees were blindfolded, and moved to the detention area where extensive interrogations were conducted. An indoctrination phase followed in which the detainees were taught the history goals and activities of the SSPL. Detainees indicating a desire to assist or join the SSPL were given low level missions in NVN in support of SSPL activities or to collect intelligence. The period of detention varied but was generally a matter of a few months. As many as 120 fishermen were in the camp in 1966 and 1967. Additional subgroups were constructed in the mountains starting in 1965, and the indoctrination phase was moved there. Between 1 July 1968 and 21 October 1968 (when all operations ceased) detainees were moved directly to the subgroup areas bypassing the Phoenix site. During this period the number of detainees captured per week was limited by Washington directive to ten and the detention period to fourteen days.**

* (TS) Ibid. p.2.

** (TS) Ibid. p.6,7.

period to fourteen days.**

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~~TOP SECRET~~3. (TS) Special Operations

a. Prior to July 1968, only two major special operations supported by PARADISE were planned and executed (Agent Recruiting and Trial of Military Detainees, Nov 67). From July 68 until close out of operations, attempts were made to more fully utilize PARADISE detainees in special operations designed to enhance the credibility of the SSPL. A brief synopsis of these operations is given below.

(1) HATTORI/PARFAIT (C) -- Creation of an SSPL pseudo-organization along the coast of NVN. Organization would be composed of three-man cells made up of SSPL detainees and oriented toward passive support of SSPL psychological and agent operations. Approved for execution through JCS.*

(2) TROY (C) -- Provision of a fishing craft to a fishing cooperative in need of equipment to meet harsh Communist production norms. Local Communist officials had promised a boat and had been unable to deliver it. Approved for feasibility study by Chief, SOG, but not executed.

(3) YELLOW JACKET (C) -- Insertion of an NVN fisherman, under controlled narcosis, into the mountainous area of North Vietnam near the Lao border. This operation would create the illusion of SSPL secret zones existing in regions away from the coast. Not approved for execution prior to 1 Nov 68.

(4) Trial of Military Detainees, MSN #320. In Aug 68, nine military detainees were taken in an encounter between the PTFs and an armed suicide junk. Similar to a trial of military detainees in 1967, MSN #320 detainees were tried by an SSPL court, found guilty of crimes against their country, and sentenced to death. Clemency was then granted under the pretext that the SSPL was an organization devoted to peace, not death, and that the subjects had been forced to join the armed junk squad against their desires. The indoctrination period was extended for these detainees with JCS approval and prior

* (TS) Msg CINCPCAC, DTG 080033Z Sep 68 (SACSA)

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C-a-74

Annex A to
Appendix C

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to their return, they made statements condemning their actions and took the SSPL oath of allegiance 1
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(5) Agent Recruiting. Since initiation of operations, detainees who appeared to be sincere in their desires to assist the SSPL cause were recruited as SSPL agents. 3
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Primarily during the indoctrination stages, these persons were trained in making crude leaflets and methods of spreading the word of the SSPL. In addition, they were 5
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assigned low-level missions to collect military intelligence and data concerning psychological vulnerabilities of NVN. Occasionally, agents were recruited to return and 7
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organize a defection to SVN among friends.* 9
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4. (TS) Defection Operations. 13

a. "General. Defection operations were conceived to attract the attention of the world press to existence of a resistance organization within North Vietnam and to provide overt psywar activities with material for exploitation. In all, eight detainees were defected to South Vietnam.

b. "Selection of defectors. Defectors were identified by their own desire to leave NVN. Volunteers were screened on the basis of indoctrinators' evaluation of sincerity. Consideration was given to those with relatives in the South. All eight of the defectors finally selected were Catholics. This may have been due to bias on the part of the STD Psywar personnel who are mostly displaced North Vietnamese Catholics. Again, most of the detainees who had relatives in the South were Catholics.

c. "Defectors

(1) "The first defector was Nguyen Van Truong, detainee number 1159. He was captured off the coast of North Vietnam on 6 June 1967. Approval from JCS for defection was received ** and 1159 was placed in a native craft off the Hue inlet at first light on 26 October 1967. He was picked up by a civilian fisherman. Before reaching shore, 1159 was apprehended by "Marketime" forces VTVN television featured Truong's story and an article appeared in the Saigon Daily News. Truong, after a short stay in the Danang Chieu Hoi Center, moved to Binh Tuy Province where he was united with his father and two sisters.

(2) "The second defection operation was launched on 23 January 1968. *** Three detainees, 1249, 1256 and 1306 were released in a basket boat near the Hue inlet. For reasons unknown, Marketime forces failed to intercept the detainees. On reaching land, they were captured by the Viet Cong. Through COSVN, Hanoi indicated that the three were to be returned to North Vietnam for detailed interrogation. Before they could be returned, the three escaped and managed to move to an RVN controlled area. They entered the Danang Chieu Hoi Center.

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Paradise History and Analysis," 9 Feb 1969, p. 16, 17.

** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 291921Z Sept 67

*** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 091429 2 Jan 68.

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(3) "The next defection operation conducted by SOG was on 28 May 68. Detainees 8068, 8087 and 8088 were released at 17-00N, about 8 miles off shore of the DMZ. They were picked up by a patrol of the US Navy "Marvetine" force and brought to the III MAF PW detention facility, Danang. After classification as ralliers, they were placed in the Danang. Chieu Hoi Center. Subsequently, all three detainees were released and sent to Phan Thiet, SVN. (In an interesting sidelight, a BORDEN (C) trainee during indoctrination, asked the STD indoctrinator about the SSPL. When the indoctrinator asked where the trainee had heard of the SSPL, he received the answer, "When the Marines captured me, I was in prison with a man who told me that he had lived in North Vietnam until a resistance organization known as the SSPL helped him and some friends to escape to the South". The dates that the three defectors and the BORDEN (C) trainee spent in III MAF facility coincided.

(4) "Detainee 1179 was detained by the SSPL on 12 June 1967. At that time, no limitations existed as to the maximum length of detention. Subsequent actions of the source, i.e., denouncing of other detainees as Lao Dong sympathizers, and continual pleas to be allowed to stay on PARADISE to become an SSPL cadre, ingratiated 1179 with the STD Psywar contingent. These same actions aroused the suspicions of the US advisors. These suspicions hardened into a belief that 1179 was an agent of NVN intelligence. STD vacillated between proposals to keep 1179 on the island as an SSPL member, through sending him back to NVN on a proselyting mission, to defecting him to SVN. SOG objected to any of these courses of action, doctrinators, who had become overly familiar with the detainee. CINCPAC suggested that a polygraph test be given on PARADISE. SOG did not concur, stating that a polygraph test was too well connected with American methods of operation. CINCPAC then suggested that 1179 be kept on the island for the duration of hostilities. Chief, SOG, in early June 1968, then directed that 1179 would be defected to South Vietnam, but that he was to remain under SOG control at all times. He was to be administered a polygraph test upon reaching shore in SVN. If he proved to be an agent, he would be turned over to the Vietnamese Military Security Service for disposition. If he was cleared by the examination, he would be placed into Chieu Hoi channels. The source was defected on 12 June 1968, one year after his capture by the SSPL. The polygraph test gave definite indications of deception in some areas, indicating that 1179 had worked for NVA security. He was transported under guard by SOG aircraft where he was placed in the National Interrogation Center. Interrogation there revealed that although 1179 had performed low-level missions for the DRV, he had not been assigned the task of penetrating the SSPL. Detainee 1179, after remaining in isolation for approximately seven () months, was placed in the National Chieu Hoi Center, Saigon, on 2 January 1969." *

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Paradise History and Analysis," 9 Feb 1969, p 19-21 (SACSA).

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C-a-76

Annex A to
Appendix C

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5. (TS) "Deception Methods at PARADISE. A number of daily routines and special supplies were used at PARADISE for the express purpose of leading the detainees to believe that they were located in North Vietnam. Any activity in the subgroups or curing movement of the detainees to and from the subgroups has to conform to the notional North Vietnamese atmosphere. Accordingly, the following actions were part of the standard procedures followed in detainee processing.

a. "No Americans, Nung Security guards, or any Vietnamese not speaking a Northern or Central Vietnamese dialect were allowed above the Base Camp area or to have contact with the detainees at any time.

b. "Only equipment and supplies non-attributable to SVN were used by cadre personnel above the Base Camp area. Examples of items used were Cambodian cigarettes, captured NVN weapons, parts of NVN uniforms, and unmarked expendable supplies.

c. "Detainees were moved over circuitous trails for a period of six to eight hours in movement from the pickup and release point on the beach to subgroup locations in an attempt to create the illusion of being far inland in NVN. At points in the trail where the ocean was possibly visible or terrain features would identify the fact that many trails were being used more than once, the detainees were blindfolded.

d. "The time frame actually used in North Vietnam (one hour later than the Danang area) was used by all personnel operating at Base Camp and having contact with the detainees.

e. "Personal items belonging to cadre having contact with the detainees were carefully screened and all items such as money, SVN marked items, letters, etc. were retained at DODO.

f. "The style of hut construction and materials used in construction were crude and of items commonly found in the hills of North Vietnam.

g. "JUSPAO leaflets commonly found throughout NVN were periodically salted throughout the subgroup and trail areas or brought to camps by cadre who have just found them.

h. "Overflight of Cu Lao Cham and neighboring islands by US and GVN aircraft was restricted to operation above 4000 feet."*

6. (TS) Interrogation Methods. Interrogation of detainees was conducted by the STD and CSS using a format and EEI developed by SOG intelligence and PSYOPS Group. Four reports were prepared and forwarded to SOG Intelligence/POG and others, as appropriate.

a. Arrival Report. Consisted of biographical data on detainee which might identify him as a previous detainee or as a member of the NVN official cadre. This report was forwarded within 24 hours by TTY to POG for a record check.

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* (TS) Ibid. p. 9-10

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C-a-77

Annex A to
Appendix C

- (TS) Ibid. p. 9-10

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b. Personal History Report. A more detailed report including information on relatives, officials, etc. Forwarded to SOG intelligence and other SOG sections two or three days after detainees arrival.

c. Intelligence Report. A report on hard military intelligence, such as coastal gun locations, and general questions of static importance such as the Paris peace talks. Report was forwarded to SOG intelligence and other SOG sections three or four days after the detainee arrived.

d. Mission Report. A detailed report concerning psychological vulnerabilities with NVN. The report was forwarded to SOG intelligence and other SOG sections seven to ten days after detainees arrival.*

7. (TS) Indoctrinations. Indoctrination of detainees was divided into three phases: group indoctrination, individual indoctrination, and group discussion. In the indoctrination phase the detainee group was lectured thoroughly on the history, organization and precepts of the SSPL. Both the Lao Dong party (NVN) and the Chinese Communist party were heavily criticized. A firm stand was taken against the US role in SVN coupled with the proposal that all Vietnam be united without outside influence. Current policies of both sides in the war were reviewed and contrasted to a platform of peace, unity, and prosperity for the Vietnamese people. The second phase, individual indoctrination, was a continuation of the above process with the individual detainees though brought out in the discussions. The final phase, group, discussions, resembled the Communist cell technique of using members of the group to criticize NVN policies. Figure CA 14 illustrates the number of Paradise Island detainees from 1964 - 1968 and Figure CA 15 breaks down the detainees by province for 1967 and 1968.

* (TS) Ibid. p 23


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C-a-78

Annex A to
Appendix C

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FIGURE CA 14 (TS)
 DETAINEES INTERROGATED (BY YEAR)



INTERROGATION BEGAN MAY 1964
 INTERROGATION HALT JULY 1964 TO 1 MAY 1965
 INTERROGATION HALT 24 NOVEMBER 1965 TO 17 FEBRUARY 1966
 INTERROGATION HALT 21 DECEMBER 1966 TO 21 JANUARY 1967
 INTERROGATION HALT 18 DECEMBER 1967 TO 6 JANUARY 1968
 INTERROGATION HALT 15 APRIL 1968 TO 9 JULY 1968
 LAST CAPTURE MADE ON 3 OCTOBER 1968

TOTAL SOURCES INTERROGATED 1964 THRU 1968
 1003


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C-a-79

Annex A to
 Appendix C

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FIGURE CA 15 (TS)
PLOWMAN (C) DETAINEES BY PROVINCE



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E. (TS) 1968-69 OPERATIONS

Operations were restricted on 1 April 1968 to below 20° N, and later that month most psychological activities were further restricted to below 19°. On 1 November all activities except radio and black letter operations were terminated

1. (TS) Printed Media. Leaflet distribution was limited to the panhandle area of NVN for much of the year. Special newsletters were published for delivery by the CSS to NVN fisherman. Special purpose leaflets, also designed for maritime delivery were printed describing the danger of serving on armed junks.* Figure CA 16 compares the leaflet delivery in 1967 with 1968.

2. (TS) VOF

a. Objective. The Voice of Freedom was described as a "gray" facility because the source of origin was not specifically identified. Programming in Vietnamese, English, French, Mandarin, Chinese, and Contonese was transmitted from the ZOKW stations near Hue (Thanh Lam) and Saigon (Thu Duc). The objectives of the station at this time were:

- (1) Counter-propaganda of radio Humor.
- (2) Inform NVN listening audiences of life in the free world, particularly RVN.
- (3) Improve the relationship of the people in North and South Vietnam.
- (4) Present factual information on the Vietnam conflict.**

b. Programming. A complete schedule of VOF programming, as of July 1969, can be seen at TAB 2. Figure CA 17 gives a breakdown of VOF broadcast hours per year by Language.

3. Black Radio. Radio operations represented the major effort of the PSYOPS group following 1 November 1968.

[REDACTED] A summary of this guidance and the operations of the four black stations is given below:

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* (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to MACV Command History 1968" p F-III-3-1 (SACSA)


** (TS) Ibid. p F-III-3-7.

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FIGURE CA 16 (TS)
HUMIDOR (C) LEAFLET DELIVERY

1967 [Solid Bar] 1968 [Hatched Bar]



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C-a-82

Annex A to
Appendix C

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


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FIGURE CA 17 (TS)

VOICE OF FREEDOM BROADCAST HOURS

1964-1968

1964	VIETNAMESE	 2,107 HRS
1965	VIETNAMESE	 3,102.5 HRS
1966	VIETNAMESE	 3,706 HRS
	CANTONESE	 54 HRS
1967	VIETNAMESE	 5,711 HRS
	CANTONESE	 1,164 HRS
1968	VIETNAMESE	 7,144 HRS
	CANTONESE	 2,196 HRS
	MANDARIN	 122 HRS
	ENGLISH	 23.5 HRS
	FRENCH	 23.5 HRS

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a. VOSSPL

(1) Guidance. "VOSSPL will applaud development and take credit for this initial indication of success in its long campaign to end fratricidal war. VOSSPL will express deep regret that LDP failed heed SSPL'S advice months ago. While applauding the development, SSPL will warn the LDP that it will not tolerate negotiations which give away the NVN people's political and economic rights. SSPL will call on LDP to abandon all imperialist designs southeast Asia and reject international communism in favor of National Socialism which will regard welfare and integrity of nation as prime concern. SSPL will demand steps be taken to bring troops home, return women to family, and set reconstruction of nation as top priority. SSPL will encourage capital and aid from non-aligned nations to further minimize dependence on Russia and China. SSPL, however, will warn the LDP and all of its followers in the north to be watchful of tricks by the American Imperialists."*

(2) Operations. Supposedly broadcasted from a secret zone on NVN, six original on-hour programs produced weekly which were broadcast six times daily using two short wave and one medium wave transmitter to give a total of 108 hours weekly.**

b. Red Flag

(1) Guidance. "Red Flag will hail bombing halt as smashing defeat for War Mongering CHICOMS and victory for Moscow's co-existence policy. Red Flag will insist LDP purge itself of all pro-chinese elements whose counsel has now been shown to be not only wrong but treasonous. Red Flag will demand widespread political indoctrination to purge all thoughts of protracted wars of liberation and will campaign for casting all chinese troops, advisors and labor battalions. Red Flag will lay equal emphasis on both the political and economic reconstruction of NVN. Red Flag will warn both the LDP and Peking not to violate the cease fire agreement.*

* [REDACTED]
 ** (TS) Report, SOG, "Standard PSG Briefing," July 1969

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C-a-84

Annex A to Appendix C


** (TS) Report SOG "Standard PSG Briefing," July 1969

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(2) Operations. While VOSSPL represent an anti-Lao Deng Party Group, Red Flag represented a dissident faction within the party. It followed a pro-soviet anti-perking line. There were six original one hour programs produced for Red Flag weekly which were transmittted from thru Duc and Blue Eagle I for a total of 33-38 hours weekly.*



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
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** (25) Report, SOG, "Standard PSG Briefing," July 1969

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4. (TS) Black Letter Operations. This program continued in operation following the 1 November stand down. Letters were dispatched through mail drops in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Paris, and Bangkok written stationery purchased at the insertion points. Emphasis was placed on discrediting selected NVN officials by creating doubt as to their loyalty, inserting facts concerning the hardships of NVN troops in the south, and tying up NVN mail censors. About 70 letters a week were sent out with approximately 35% of the letters originating from NVN POW's and Hoi and the remainder written by the Psyops Group indigenous mail operations staff. *

5. (TS) Other Operations and Proposals

a. Broadcast Ship. In January 1968 MACV/SOG proposed** the acquisition of a 163 boat commercially owned communications ship "Laissez Faire" to be stationed off the NVN coast to increase the broadcast of Radio Red Flag and VOSSPL. In his review of the proposal CINCPAC concluded that although the project was technically feasible, he was concerned about cast and problems of maintaining the nature of the Black radio transmissions. No further action was taken on the proposal.***

* (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Standard PSG Briefing, July 1969.
 ** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 290413Z Jan 68.
 *** (TS) MSG, CINCPAC, DTG 130310Z Apr 68.

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C-a-86

Annex A to
Appendix C

** (TS) MSG, COMUSMACV, DTG 290413Z Jan 68.
 *** (TS) MSG, CINCPAC, DTG 130310Z Apr 68.

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FIGURECA 18(PS)

RADIO BROADCAST DATE ()

PROGRAM	TRANSMITTER SITE	HOURS DAILY	HOURS WEEKLY	POWER
VOSSPL	THU DUC	14.5	99	20 KW
	BLUE EAGLE	2.5	15a/	10 KW
RED FLAG	THU DUC	3.0	21	20 KW
	BLUE EAGLE ONE	1.0	6a/	10 KW
VOF	THU DUC	6.0	42b/	20 KW
	HUE (THANH LAM)	29.0	203	20 KW

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a/BLUE EAGLE ONE does not broadcast one day each week.

b/This program transmitted in Chinese.

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C-a-87

Annex A
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b Balloon Proposals. Delivery of leaflets by balloons in NVN was proposed* in September 1967 using seaborne launch platforms. In October 1967 a similar proposal** was forwarded utilizing land launch sites. Both of these proposals were disapproved by CINCPAC with the recommendation that aircraft delivery be used *** The CINCPAC survey of SOG activities in November 1967 and the MACV AD HOC report of February 1968 both recommended that new delivery methods for leaflet operations needed to be developed and specifically recommended development of balloon delivery methods. Although SOG conducted considerable research**** through the office of the MACV science advisor. Further action was stopped by Chief SOG's disapproval of a Southeast Asia operational requirement (SFACR) request for the project.

c. Gift Kits. SSPL gift kits, including radio, fishing lines and hooks, cloth, chopsticks, and other personal items were distributed to Paradise Island detainees. Also, to exploit the shortage of rice in southern NVN, rice was distributed in one kilo containers. All of the items were delivered by maritime operations.# Figure CA 19 enumerates the various categories of gifts for 1967 and 1968.

d. Special Operations. The divisionary program FOR-EE(C), was developed in 1967. Three of the projects envisaged were assigned for implementation to the Humidor(O) program. The bombing halt stopped the action on these proposals just as they were being implemented. The concept## of each project is given below.

- * (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 340148Z Sep 67
 ** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 271346Z Oct 67
 *** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 070131Z Nov 67
 **** (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 021143Z Apr 68
 # (TS) History, MACSOG, Annex F to MACV command History 1968
 p F-III -3-4.
 ## (TS) Msg, MACSOG, DTG 166352Z Sep 68

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C-a-88

Annex A to
Appendix C

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FIGURE CA 19(TS)

PSYOPS MATERIAL DISTRIBUTION ()

	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>
Radios	12,150	2,970
Gift Kits	24,948	191
Rice Bowls	420	1,028
Chopsticks	0	619
Rice (1-Kilo Bags)	0	170
Newsletters	43,840	3,049

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Annex A to
Appendix 2

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(1) Project URANOLITE (C). Was to be the "infiltration
of agent alluding and harassing devices into NVN to divert
NVN security to locate and examine the devices, search
for the using agents, expand the apparent range of
activities, and strain the population controls. Boxes
with characteristic imprints of agent equipment such as
assassination weapons or explosives, with actual electronic
"Rube Goldberg's (low powered obsolete beacons, weather
sensors, cheap radio receivers, or devices with no other
purpose than to require technical analysis), with gift
kits for popular appeal, and empty boxes will be distributed
in small numbers by air in many selected areas where
there is no actual friendly clandestine activity. It
is expected that NVN intelligence analysts will conclude
that these devices are decoys but that they cannot afford
to ignore them."* This project was ready for initiation
when the bombing halt stopped all such action against NVN.

(2) "Project POLLACK (C). Was to be the incrim-
ination of NVN officials as anti-NVN agents with the
specific objectives of diverting NVN security to
apprehend, detain, interrogate, and investigate
innocent officials and their agencies. Further,
it will strain the tight security controls and pro-
vide psychological opportunities to exploit per-
secution. Selected innocent officials will be im-
plicated by HUMIDOR (C) operations as agents or at
least security risks through letters with easily
discovered secret writing, messages sent through
doubled contacts in NVN, or through pseudo agents
inserted into NVN."**The black letter phase of this
project was initiated.

(3) "Project SANITARIES (C). Was to be an
expansion of HUMIDOR (C) SSPL activities through
the use of a redemption coupon leaflet. The
leaflets were distributed in small numbers in or
near selected villages by pinpoint air drops, by
fishermen couriers, or by STRATA teams. They were
designed to convince the NVN security elements and
people that the SSPL efforts were extensive, have
popular support and to entice the people to conceal
the coupon for possible reward."** Prior to 1 November
1968 there were 18 missions. 14 by STRATA, two by air,
and two by fishermen. Gp 1.

* (TS) Ibid.
** (TS) Ibid.

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Annex A to
Appendix C

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F. (TS) ~~POLE BEAN~~

1. (TS) General. Because of being a unilateral program and because of the nature of its activities, information concerning the POLE BEAN program was very closely held within SOG and higher need-to-know organizations. For this reason, the coverage in this report is limited in depth and confined to the paragraphs that follow in this Annex. The program was psychological in nature and, therefore, is included as part of the psychological operations annex.

2. (TS) Background. Authorization to implement a program that involved contamination and insertion of CHICOM 7.62mm small arms, 12.7mm machine gun, and 82mm mortar ammunition into the VC/CN logistical system was given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1967.* The nickname assigned to the project at that time was ELDEST SON (U). Because of the sensitive nature of the project, the nickname was first changed to ITALIAN GREEN (U)** and later to POLE BEAN (U).*** The object of the program was to cause incidents and casualties among the enemy, thus instigating doubt, fear and lack of confidence in the reliability of Soviet and CHICOM weaponry. The ammunition was controlled and inserted by US personnel only and in a manner to prevent detection of US involvement.****

3. (TS) Policy. The original message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized operations in the PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations only.



COMUSMACV attempted to have the four MACSOG personnel

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 121610Z August 1967.
 ** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 150923Z November 1968.
 *** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 221708Z May 1969.
 **** (TS) Fact Sheet, MACSOG, "ITALIAN GREEN," February 1969.

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assigned to Okinawa replaced by non-combat personnel, but CINCPAC did not furnish the desired replacements.* MACV concluded in January 1969, with CINCPAC concurrence, that sufficient contaminated ammunition was on hand and, therefore, the contamination phase could be terminated.**

a. Expansion of Program. In October 1967, MACV proposed to expand ELDEST SON into Cambodia and RVN.*** The approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the operations in RVN but held the expansion into Cambodia in abeyance.**** It was to be nearly a year, October 1968, before the DANIEL BOONE teams were authorized to insert ELDEST SON into Cambodia.# In his message requesting the expansion into Cambodia, MACV pointed out the following operational benefits:

"Insertion of ELDEST SON in Cambodia would enhance the overall effectiveness of the program by contaminating enemy caches discovered; spreading the geographical area of insertions; increasing the chance of usage by a greater number of enemy units; and reinforcing the notion that faulty ammunition is originating in the enemy supply system from NVN."##

b. Additional Expansion Proposal. In May 1969, a news item in the New York Times, among other sources, indicated that the contaminated ammunition program was having considerable success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that CINCPAC and MACV investigate the possibility of undertaking an expanded program.=== In his reply, MACV indicated that the desired psychological objectives of the ITALIAN GREEN program were being achieved, approximately 50 percent of the contaminated ammunition had been inserted, and the remaining quantities on hand, when

* (TS) Msg, COMUSMACV, DTG 211047Z October 1968.
 ** (TS) Msg, CINCPAC, DTG 012207Z January 1969.
 *** (TS) Msg, MACV, DTG 270650Z October 1967.
 **** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 272147Z December 1967.
 # (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 261638Z October 1968.
 ## (TS) Msg, MACV, DTG 250430Z September 1968.
 ### (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 051922Z May 1969.

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C-a-92

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

inserted, would be sufficient to accomplish the overall objective of the program. MACV recommended that expansion of the program not be undertaken at that time.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred and requested that the program be reviewed in September 1969, with recommendations forwarded to them not later than 1 October 1969.**

4. (TS) Psychological Operations in Support of POLE BEAN

a. The objectives of psychological operations in support of POLE BEAN were as follows:

(1) Create distrust of Chinese support among the higher levels of leadership in the National Liberation Front and Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

(2) Inculcate in the lower ranks of the NVA/VC armed forces a feeling of distrust in their individual and crew-served weapons.

(3) Provide a possible means of further widening the Sino-Soviet rift by furnishing the USSR with proof of inadequacy of CHICOM support of DRV efforts.

b. The above objectives are to be achieved by use of psychological program utilizing both overt Free World media and SOG black operations as follows:

(1) HQ, MACV has warned commanders of US and allied units that due to lax manufacturing standards, use of captured weapons could and already has resulted in injury to friendly personnel. Such warnings were carried by programming originated by the MACV Information Office and by command warnings from COMUSMACV. This overt "safety" campaign began on approximately 10 July 1968.

* (TS) Msg, MACV, DTG 110125Z May 1969.

** (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 221707Z May 1969.

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(2) SOG covert operations began by planting an unclassified (TIB) Technical Intelligence Brief/in a Saigon bar. Later, this TIB was distributed officially to FAR in Laos. In early July 1968, SOG STRATA teams were warned prior to infiltration that some AK-47s in use by NVA were defective and were to be used in the event of emergency only. On or about 1 August 1968, black radio and printed media began coverage of defective weapons, decrying the inferior quality of material furnished NVA/VC personnel.*

5. (TS) Operations

a. Status of Ammunition. On 1 July 1969, the status of POLE BEAN ammunition was as follows:**

TYPE	CONTAMINATED	INSEPTED	ON HAND
7.62mm ^{a/}	11,565	3,638	7,693
12.7mm	556	167	389
82mm	1,968	821	1,147

a/ 234 rounds of 7.62mm destroyed.

b. Report of Incidents. POLE BEAN was inserted by US personnel only of MACSOG teams, A Detachments, 5 SFGA; Navy SEAL teams; 7/1 Cavalry; and IPFV LRRP Company. The following incidents were reported as confirmation of the fact that the enemy was recovering and using contaminated ammunition.

(1) "On 3 or 4 July 1968, during an enemy ABF on the Ban Me Thuot airstrip an explosion occurred at an enemy portar position. Upon investigation by National Police, nine VC personnel were found dead at the position, plus evidence that the mortar tube had exploded from internal causes. Further investigation of the area by CMEC uncovered two small metal fragments of the tube. No other parts of the mortar could be found.

* (TS) Fact Sheet, MACSOG, "HUMIDOR," February 1969, p. 12.
 ** (TS) Fact Sheet, MACSOG, "POLE BEAN," 1 July 1969.

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Annex A to Appendix C


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(2) "On 3 September 1968 a patrol from Company C, 1st Infantry found a destroyed ChiCom 82mm mortar in the vicinity of Thu Duc (XS 930980). The tube had been blown apart from the base plate and imbedded in the base cap was the tail fin assembly of an 82mm mortar round. Three pools of blood were found nearby, and blood trails led to a nearby stream where it appeared the bodies were evacuated by sampan. A technical analysis by CMEC confirmed that the mortar has been damaged by an Italian Greer round.

(3) "Information was received on 29 November 1968 relative to a possible incident in the vicinity of Rach Gia (WS 11000). An enemy cache was discovered on a sweep by the 162d RF Company on 27 November 1968. Found in the cache was a ChiCom 82mm mortar with a severely damaged tube. The base of the tube had been peeled back, in a banana like fashion with approximately 8 to 10 inches blown away. MACV artillery advisors, unaware of Italian Green, suggested that the weapon may have been overcharged. Based upon a comparison of this report and the technical analysis of confirmed incidents and tests it is highly probable that the damage resulted from an Italian Green round. Attempts to obtain the mortar from ARVN for examination by CMEC have met with negative results.

(4) "In late December a cache, containing damaged barrels of a ChiCom type 56 assault rifle and an SKS type 56 carbine along with assorted weapons parts, was discovered by an RF/PF unit in IV CTZ. Due to RF/PF advisors being unaware of Italian Green, the barrels were not evacuated for examination by CMEC until late January. Analysis revealed that the damaged barrels were the result of Italian Green.

(5) "On 31 January 1969, a damaged AK-47 assault rifle was discovered in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot by local villagers. The bolt and receiver of the weapon were blown apart and the internal parts severely damaged. Upon examination by CMEC the damaged weapon was determined to be the result of Italian Green."*



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
* (PS) Msg, MACV, DTG 101151Z February 1969.
** (TS) History, MACSOG, "Annex F to 1968 MACV Command History," p. F-III-3-6.

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Annex A to
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3. (TS) Printed Media. Black documents and leaflets supposedly of VC/NVA origin were distributed in VC contested and controlled areas by Vietnamese posing as VC. Example were imitations of VC training manuals, directives, leaflets, pamphlets, and posters.*

* (TS) Briefing, MACSOG, "Standard PSG Briefing," July 1969.

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Annex A to
Appendix C

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PART IV. REACTION AND EVALUATION (U)

A. (TS) GENERAL

From the inception of SOG, February 1964, there was continued interest from the highest level of government on the impact of the psyops program on the people of North Vietnam. Despite this, a comprehensive and accurate evaluation was not possible because the sources of information, the data base, were restricted primarily to articles and broadcasts from Hanoi media and intelligence reports from detainees of the MAROPS program. The evaluations, then, suffered from not having a foundation of source material that covered the entire geographical and intellectual spectrum of North Vietnam. Neither CIA nor DIA was able to provide substantial additional sources of intelligence from NVN. Notwithstanding the obstacles enumerated above, evaluations were attempted and are summarized and/or referenced in the paragraphs that follow. To help prepare the reader for the evaluation and study material to follow, some representative reactions from Hanoi over the years will first be presented in the text, or referred to as available in the files.

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B. (TS) REACTIONS

1. (C) VOF/BBC LISTENERS. In a message sent in September 1964, the American Embassy Saigon reported, inter alia, on the number of North Vietnamese who listen to VOF/BBC.

"According to one of the British Consulate General's reports, a number of North Vietnamese listen to the VOA and/or the BBC. The Consulate General reports that about ten percent of all persons living in North Vietnam possess radio sets which can receive the VOA or the BBC, and that most of them listen to one or both stations regularly in the morning or evening. It is reported that they prefer the BBC because the news broadcasts and commentary are more objective. (Comment: If the above report is true, it would indicate that well over a million North Vietnamese listen to Western news broadcasts regularly.)"

* (C) Msg, AMEMBASSY SAIGON, No. A-229 Sept 28, 1964.

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2. (TS) Request for Reaction Information. In reviewing 1
the first year of PSYOPS under SOG, JCS noted the lack of reaction 2
material in the MACSOG reports. In a message of 5 January 1965, 3
JCS requested that future reports include indications of target 4
reaction or present rationale for lack of such reaction.* 5
Following this, the weekly reports prepared by SACSA from SOG 6
inputs included a section on "reaction" when such information was 7
available. A typical example of DRV reaction from the 1965 period 8
is quoted below. See Tabs 3 and 4 for other examples. 9

a. Article by Lieutenant General Van Tien Dung, of 10
5 August 1965, Hanoi: 11

"...the party Central Committee has asserted that the enemy would surely provoke and sabotage the north. That is why between 1961 and 1964 we actively made preparations against and completely defeated the enemy's plot of sending rangers to sabotage the north. Before the 5 August 1964 affair, clearly realizing the enemy's new plot against the north, the Political Bureau of the party Central Committee issued in time the resolutions about 'stepping up combat readiness, thwarting the enemy's plot aimed at provoking and sabotaging the north.' and shifted part of the armed forces to a war footing..."

"...The enemy has been combining air attacks with the war of espionage and the psychological warfare designed to destroy the northern part of our country in many fields. Our party has set for the necessity of opposing the Americans comprehensively: opposing the attacks of their planes and, at the same time, struggling against the spies and local reactionaries and struggling against their accusations, threats, and slanders aimed at shaking the morale of our armed forces and people. Thus, we have not only downed many enemy planes, but also satisfactorily fulfilled the task of protecting security and order and defeating all the deceitful arguments of the enemy..."

"...While fighting against enemy planes we must not forget the task of protecting security and order and repressing counterrevolution, because it is the counter-revolutionaries in the localities and the spies--who are mingled with the people--who are helping the enemy in sabotaging us. Along with fighting enemy planes, we must pay attention to quickly exterminating the groups of rangers who have come to the north by air, boats, or roads, including the relatively large groups of rangers who may land in our territory to sabotage us. We must also know how to fight against warships with any available weapon and any appropriate method..."

* (TS) Msg, JCS, DTG 051956Z Jan 65.

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C-a-CR

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

b. The following was taken from Vientiane Dispatch 1

FOVA, 6244, dated 10 September 1965: 2

"...While in Vientiane on 13 August 1965 a secondary source stated that he had returned from Hanoi in July 1965. During a conversation he mentioned the existence in North Vietnam of an anti-D.R. front called Phong-Trao Nhan-Dan Ai-Quoc (Peoples Patriotic Movement). According to the source, this front sometimes broadcasts via radio and has on occasion attacked convoys in NVN and is known for lending assistance to the people (SIC). Source said that the Hanoi Government is worried about this front and tries to keep knowledge of it and its activities from the populace. Source was told in Hanoi that the front was supported and supplied by the United States..."

"...Another source reported that on 27 August 1965 in Vientiane he heard a broadcast made by the Phong-Trao Guom-Thien Ai Quoc which he translated as the 'Sacred Sword Patriotic Movement' and which he believes emanated from within North Vietnam..."

c. Radio HANOI on 28 June 1965:

"...The psychological warfare tricks of the U. S. aggressors are very cunning, ranging from intensification of deceitful propaganda by means of broadcasting systems, dropping tons of leaflets and 'psywar boxes' containing children's clothes and toys to tempt them, ordering spies to stealthily launch false rumors to cause confusion, using aircraft and warships to carry out indiscriminate strafings and shellings, and launching flares to create tension and arouse fear..."

"...No sooner had the U. S. aggressors dropped leaflets than these were torn by our children. When the enemy dropped 'psychological warfare' packages on certain areas, many people picked them up and deliberately handed them over to the people's police, because they considered these enemy packages bloodstained proof of the U. S. aggressors' crimes..."*

3. (TS) SACSA Memo. In a memo in December 1967 SACSA forwarded 3
to CJCS a typical article from HOC TAP which related NVN reaction 4
to psychological operations at that time. (Additional examples 5
are on file). 6

* (TS) Memo, SACSA to Director, Joint Staff, "Evaluation of Operation Plan 34A Air Operations," 27 Oct 65.

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C-a-99

Annex A to
Appendix C

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Extracts from "Let Us be Determined to Frustrate All Activities of the U.S. Imperialists and Their Lackeys Aimed at Investigating and Collecting Intelligence Information" - HONG SA, -C-1-P (1.4), September 1967

"The U.S. aggressors are very crafty. They are intensively investigating and collecting intelligence information to serve their aggressive plot against our country -- especially to serve their war of destruction against the north of our country, thus preventing the north from supporting the kin-and-kin south.

"Their intelligence activities are now serving their war of destruction, their psychological warfare, and their plot of exerting pressure to force us to negotiate on the basis of conditions advantageous to them. These intelligence activities are also aimed at making preparations for their coming escalation steps and at serving their plot of enlarging their war of aggression.

"To gather these materials, the U.S. imperialists have resorted to different tricks: using scientific and technical means; using spies and reactionaries who have been left behind in the north or who have recently sneaked into the north, scanning our newspapers and other publications; capturing and questioning fishermen, and so forth.

"Even before the signing of the 1954 Geneva Accords, the U.S. imperialists had secretly deployed their spies in the north and equipped them with all the necessary means of operation. During the past 10 years, including two years of undertaking the war of destruction, they have openly and secretly sent their spies--foreigners or Vietnamese--into the north to engage in intelligence investigations. Some of them have come to the north for a short period with the mission of fulfilling a certain concrete task. But others have been entrusted with the task of staying deep in the north, deeply infiltrating organs, and collecting more and more highly classified information. The foreign spies have come to our country disguised in many ways. They have taken advantage of their relationships with our Vietnamese cadres or with members of the diplomatic corps in our country to gather information. They have taken advantage of the credulity, trustfulness, loquacity, and boastfulness of a number of our cadres to gather intelligence information. In their spy-training program, they have taught each other that loquacious and boastful cadres are a "valuable treasure" capable of providing them with much news. They have taught each other that when meeting with cadres inclined to show off their performances, it is necessary to take advantage of this affection for flattery and praise and to manifest admiration for these achievements in conversations in order to collect information. They have often taken advantage of their visits and journeys to make direct observations and gather intelligence information. A number of Vietnamese spies have camouflaged their spying activities under their religious frock. They have taken advantage of the journeys they allegedly made to preach, celebrate masses, and conduct baptisms to gather intelligence information.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CA-100

Annex A to
Appendix C

CA-100

ANNEX A TO

~~TOP SECRET~~

"The enemy has ordered his men to infiltrate our army units, organs, factories, and colleges. On the other hand, they have endeavored to understand the situation of our cadres and personnel working in organs, factories, and army units and to bribe the morally unsteady ones or the law-breakers who want to hide their sins for fear of being punished by the law in order to turn them into their collaborators.

"During the past few years, the U.S. imperialists have sent to the north of our country more spies and commandos who were fully equipped with weapons, sabotage equipment, and means of communication. They have entrusted the latter with the tasks of carrying out sabotage and collecting intelligence information, especially conducting investigations about our communication and transport lines, the results of their shellings, and the situation of our people after the enemy attacks.

"Along with the above-mentioned tricks, the U.S. imperialists have resorted to other means, such as kidnapping fishermen in order to obtain intelligence information and on exploiting our publications--books, newspapers, news bulletins, and so forth.

"Our party has regarded the preservation of secrets as an extremely important task, which is related to the success or failure of the revolutionary struggle.

"Today, we are struggling against the U.S. imperialists, a most cruel enemy who has a large amount of modern technical equipment and clever tricks. Therefore, our party has placed the preservation of secrets in a very high position.

"The scope of the preservation of secrets is very broad. It covers matters related to strategy and tactics, internal political affairs and foreign affairs, national defense, economy and finance, culture, social welfare, public health, technology, and so forth.

"While coping with the enemy's technical intelligence activities, we must not disregard his espionage activities on land, although they are largely restricted because the American spies cannot disguise themselves and infiltrate our people's ranks. They need the help of their Vietnamese henchmen. However, as the latter are our social dregs and are hated by our people, they can deceive no one. Moreover, the U.S. imperialists' support in North Vietnam has been restricted. In the face of the U.S. imperialists' failure in both the north and south and the daily changes in the social life in the north, the spies recently dispatched to the north by the U.S. imperialists or those hidden there so far have lost confidence in their U.S. masters and have become concerned about their own fate. Secondly, the U.S. imperialists have intensified the war of aggression against our country, despite their passive and embarrassing position. They have to cope with the people's war which has developed to a high degree, because every place in our country there is an unescapable net ready to catch all spies and lackeys of the U.S. imperialists.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-101

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

"According to our experience, the spies and rangers sent to the north by the U.S. imperialists have proved to be reckless and daring on their departure but, in the face of difficulties, their morale has declined rapidly, because they have no just cause or ideals. The U.S. imperialists have resorted to psywar and propaganda maneuvers to intoxicate, purchase, and control them, to stimulate their counter-revolutionary thoughts, and to train and equip them with up-to-date means. But they have failed to achieve anything. It is for their own interests that they have joined the ranger spy organization and it is also for their own interests and out of fear of death and punishment inflicted by people that they have become bewildered and confused and have lost their morale.

"However, this is not a reason for us to relax our vigilance against the cunning schemes of the US imperialists and their henchmen. We must have an elaborate plan to readily and effectively cope with their activities under all complicated circumstances. The important condition for an effective fight against spies is to disclose them. Since we have a steadfast administration and the masses' revolutionary fervor, we can depend on these sufficient conditions to check espionage activities and to take appropriate punitive measures against the spies once they are discovered."

4. (TS) More Recent Reactions

a. The following article published in HOC TAP, September 1967, was considered, among others, to provide clear evidence that the principal leaders of the DRV, including Ho Chi Minh himself, were worried about growing dissension in their ranks and among the people.* Several of the Footboy(C) programs are mentioned by name in this article.

"RESOLUTELY DEFEAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OF THE AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS"

"The American imperialists regard psychological warfare as an important aspect of their over-all policy of aggression. Following the Second World War the American imperialists stepped into the shoes of the Hitlerite fascists and prepared to wage a war of aggression to "master" the world. In their so-called "world strategy" psychological warfare is given a great deal of attention. The more the American imperialists pursue their policy of aggression the more active their psychological warfare apparatus becomes and the more poisonous their deceptive tricks become.

In their psychological warfare activity the American imperialists employ the tricks formerly employed by Hitler. They believe that they can squash their opponents by psychological warfare. They argue that just as artillery can be used to smash the enemy's morale before military force is employed. They believe that psychological warfare can

* (TS) Briefing, CINCPAC, "Footboy(C) Program" through 1968

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-102

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

make the enemy afraid of them, then perplexed and discouraged, and eventually weaken their will to fight and cause them to surrender.

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"The American imperialists regard psychological warfare as a "strategy." In the book Strategy of Peace published in Washington 1961, an American psychological warfare promoter, wrote: "If a suicidal nuclear war does not break out of power between us and the communist bloc will be determined principally by the struggle to win world opinion."

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"By bombing brains" on a large scale the American imperialists hope to induce hundreds of millions of foreigners to believe them. They believe that if they invent and bring forth arguments beneficial to them and constantly chew and re-chew arguments, they will ultimately affect the ideology of the masses; perhaps at first the people will not believe them, but if they repeat themselves hundreds of times people will believe what they say is true.

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"The American imperialists' psychological warfare gang regard the masses as ignorant, weak people who have no minds of their own, they use any tricks to threaten, deceive, frighten, and confuse such people, and to weaken their will to fight.

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"In order to wage psychological warfare the American imperialists have created an enormous apparatus which is active both at home and abroad. That apparatus has its own directors, its own headquarters organs, and its own strategic and tactical plans of action. The American imperialists even have a plan to train specialists in psychological warfare. Each of their military organizations has a psychological warfare section.

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"The budget set aside by the American rulers for psychological warfare totals hundreds of millions of dollars. Psychological warfare activities are placed under the direct command of the highest-ranking authorities in Washington, and are closely coordinated with the activities of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

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"The American imperialists' psychological warfare apparatus comprises a great number of organizations, from organizations which engage in propaganda work in foreign countries, such as "USIS" and the "Peace Corps" to publications, publishing companies, radio stations, television stations, movie houses, churches, etc.

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"With regard to the South of our nation, the American imperialists regard psychological warfare as an activity of strategic significance, one which serves their plot to transform the South into a neo-colony and into a military base from which to attack the North and the socialist bloc. The American imperialists have created for the Saigon puppet regime a complete psychological warfare apparatus from the central level to the local level. In each Region there is a psychological warfare office; in the Army there are psywar officers serving from the company level to the division level; in the provinces there are psychological warfare services; in the districts there are psychological warfare offices; in the villages there are representatives of the psychological warfare organs, and all of the Southern puppet

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C-a-103

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

regime's abroad have psychological warfare offices. 1

"The American imperialists' psychological warfare in the South has as its goals the smashing of the will to fight of the revolutionary forces in the South, the creation of division between the people and the National Liberation Front, and the strengthening of the deteriorating morale of the puppet army and puppet regime. The American imperialists' psychological warfare is promoted alongside the cruel bombings and sweep operations, and the "pacification" effort, of the Americans and their lackeys. 2
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"With regard to the North of our nation, the American imperialists seek every way to weaken us in every way, to encourage the counter-revolutionaries still lurking in the North to create disturbances, and to create an unstable political situation, in hopes of achieving the overthrow of the people's regime in the North. Since 1966 they have, while directly pouring troops into the South, waged a war of destruction against the North in order to smash the will to fight of the soldiers and people of the North, to isolate the battleground in the South, and to force us to accept conditions for negotiations which are beneficial to them. Psychological warfare, along with espionage warfare, is an important part of the American imperialists war of destruction against the North of our country. 7
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"The American imperialists' psychological warfare tricks are intended to both deceive and brazenly threaten. 15

"Because they have no diplomatic, economic, or cultural organs in the North of our country, the American imperialists have made use of radio broadcasts, leaflet drops, letters from abroad, etc., in order to fling their propeganda into the North. In addition to increasing the Vietnamese-language broadcasting of the Voice of America, and in addition to the open broadcasts of the puppet regime and puppet army, the American imperialists have also set up many radio stations engaged in psychological warfare activities against the North, such as "Sacred Sword Radio," the "Voice of Freedom," "Red Star Radio," "Neutrality Radio," and "Liberation Radio." "Sacred Sword Radio" is the voice of the so-called "Sacred Sword Patriotic Movement." Through this station the American imperialists and their lackeys attempt to cause the listeners to believe that that "movement," which exists only in the minds of the American imperialists and their lackeys, has organized bases against the people's regime in a number of provinces and regions in the North. This station constantly speaks of a "revolution of liberation," of "national unity," etc. As regards news, this station presents news which it claims to have received from the "Sacred Sword Movement" in one province or another. The "Voice of Freedom" broadcasts daily under the headings "Friendship Bridge" and "Letter to the North." This station specializes in diserting our people's struggle to resist America and save the nation, in distorting the policies of our Party and State, in distorting the truth about the lives of our people in the North, in praising the regime of America's neo-colony in the South, and in advertising America's deceitful "peaceful intentions," "Red Star Radio," supposedly the voice of the "Southern Revolutionary Democratic Party" of "true patriots" who "resolutely struggle against imperialist aggression and resist dictatorial rule" in 16
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~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-104

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

to "quickly complete the victory of the revolution for national liberation " With this station the American imperialists and their lackeys plot to create division within the revolutionary movement in the South and to divide the peoples of the two parts of our nation. The "Liberation Radio" of the psychological warfare activists use the same wave-length and broadcasting hours as does the Liberation Radio of the National Liberation Front. The scheme of this station is to give news of both the North and the South. The first part of each news item seems to be true, but the second part is distorted. The "Red Flag" station is called the "voice of the League of Vietnamese Communists." In order to cause its listeners to believe that it is "revolutionary," this station speaks of "aggressive American imperialists," the "mad acts of aggression of the American imperialists," etc., but its content is intended to create division within our Party and to divide our country from the other nations of the socialist bloc. It distorts the patriotic emulative movement in the North. It invents stories about the losses of the liberation forces in the South and criticizes the aradicate-tyranny acitivities of the armed liberation forces in the South.

"Using airplanes and ships to fling leaflets and counterfeit money into the North is an important psychological warfare trick of the American imperialists. According to them, the American imperialists from April 1965 to the end of 1966 dropped in the North more than 400 million leaflets of all kinds, the contents of which were intended to distort our Party's struggle line of resisting America and saving the nation, to distort the "three readys" movement of our youth, to distort the policies of our Party and Government, to divide our nation from the fraternal nations, to invent stories of troop movements to the South which are based with sickness and death, to create an impression of terror in the face of the destruction by American airplanes, to boast of "American airpower," to praise the false prosperity in South Vietnam, to propagandize the deceptive "peaceful negotiation" schemes of Johnson, etc.

"The enemy has also organized elements specializing in writing letters to people in the North. They seek out the addresses of people now living in the North, pretend to be acquaintances, write letters inquiring of the recipient's health, then cleverly present the propaganda of the American imperialists and attempt to cause the recipient of the letter to be suspicious of our Party's struggle line of resisting America and saving the nation. They also scheme to bribe the recipient while pretending to be "concerned with helping" him. There have even been cases in which they have hinted in a letter that there had been some agreement between the sender and the recipient about some secret which cannot be exposed to others. When sending the letters they use many different kinds of envelopes and stamps, use many addresses, and send the letters from France, Japan, Singapore, Hong-Kong, Thailand, etc. By doing that they hope to persuade people to become their lackeys and to create division and suspicion within our ranks.

"Furthermore, the American imperialists also seek ways to direct and activate their lackeys and the other counter-revolutionaries who are furtively operating in the North of

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-105

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

our nation to endeavor to pass on their psychological warfare propaganda.

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"Although the American imperialists' psychological warfare schemes are very dangerous they have been soundly smashed. The actualities of the past two years have proven that the more our people fight the stronger they become, the more they strengthen their will to fight and win, and the more they unite into a stable bloc which nothing can shake. Such great accomplishments in the North as shooting down more than 2,300 American airplanes, assuring uninterrupted communications and transportation, promoting production, and maintaining order and security, along with the resolute and practical acts to support the revolution in the South in order to defeat the American bandits, have fully proved the complete defeat of the war of destruction in general, and of the psychological warfare specifically, of the American imperialists.

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"Why have the dangerous psychological warfare schemes of the American imperialists failed to deceive and intimidate the people of the North of our nation?"

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"The American imperialists are unjust, their activities are contrary to the interests of the Vietnamese people, of the American people, and of the people of the world, so their deceitful schemes cannot hide their aggressive, warmongering nature but, indeed, bring out even more their American imperialists have much money and many modern means of waging war, on the battlefields of the South they are the vanquished. The Vietnamese people have a strong spirit of patriotism, have rich revolutionary experience, have a will of unyielding struggle, and are determined to completely defeat the aggressive American imperialists.

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"The American imperialists have been heavily defeated, but they are still obstinate, so they still continue their war of aggression against our nation, and they will further promote their psychological warfare against our people. The requirement of our people's struggle against the American imperialists' psychological warfare is to smash their will to commit aggression. In order to achieve that requirement we must organize our forces well and have correct struggle methods. We must first of all firmly grasp the Party line.

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1. The struggle against psychological warfare is a class struggle on the ideological front, and is an important part of the Resistance to fight America and save the nation
Our struggle to fight America and save the nation is a sharp, fierce class struggle between our people and the aggressive American imperialists and their lackeys. This struggle is now taking place in the political, military, economic, and ideological spheres. Psychological warfare is a part of the American imperialists' over-all war of aggression against our nation. Therefore, the fight against psychological warfare is a keen class struggle waged on the political and ideological fronts, it is an important of the Resistance to fight America and save the nation.

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"Because this is a struggle on the ideological front, because the enemy has many means and schemes for spreading their deceitful propaganda, and because they combine their psychological warfare schemes with their attacks on the North,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-106

Annex A to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

the content and methods of the struggle against psychological warfare has many features different from those of the struggles on the military, political, and economic fronts, and the nature of that struggle is also very complicated.

"Our Party, firmly grasping the viewpoint of class struggle, gives such attention to the struggle against the enemy's psychological warfare. Our Party clearly recognizes that the greatest and most decisive force for defeating the enemy is the unyielding will to fight and the unity of our people under the leadership of the Party, so we cannot allow the enemy's psychological warfare schemes to influence our people's morale. Our Party pays constant attention to deeply educating the masses about the aggressive and warmongering nature of the American imperialists and about our line of resisting America and saving the nation, and clearly delineate the temporary strong points and basic weaknesses of the American imperialists and their bloody crimes against our people, while at the same time forging and nourishing a spirit of heroism, developing our people's tradition of unyielding, resolute struggle and of arduous sacrifice, and strengthening the people's firm belief in the ultimate victory of our revolution. Because of that our people have a high degree of political awareness, have a resolute revolutionary will, and have the status of victors when to resist the American imperialists' psychological warfare.

"Our Party also pays attention to remoulding subjective ideological tendencies to believe that the American imperialists can deceive no one because they are unjust, aggressive, and warmongering, and because they are being heavily defeated in both the North and the South of our Nation, and therefore that we do not have to stress the matter of struggling against the enemy's psychological warfare. People who have this subjective ideological tendency do not yet have a profound and complete awareness of the struggle against the American imperialists, do not fully realize the extremely reactionary, obstinate, and wily nature of the American imperialists, and do not see that it is precisely because the American imperialists are unjust, aggressive, and warmongering, and are suffering more and more defeats, that they make even greater efforts to promote their psychological warfare activities in order to deceive our people.

"Our Party often reminds cadres and Party members to be extremely vigil toward the psychological warfare activities of the reactionaries within our country who serve as lackeys of the American imperialists. This gang is surrounded by our people so it usually dares not operate openly and bravely, but usually uses psychological warfare ploys to the prison the morale of the masses and encourages the backward people within the masses to oppose our regime. We must increase our vigilance, quickly smash the reactionary propaganda flung out by the counter-revolutionaries, and quickly suppress them.

2. "The struggle against psychological warfare must be based on the revolutionary spirit of the masses. The American imperialists wage psychological warfare in order to affect the ideology of our broad masses. Therefore, if

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-107

Annex A to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

we are to oppose the enemy's psychological warfare we must increase our ideological education work among the masses. If we are to defeat the enemy we must, in the task of opposing psychological warfare as well as in the other revolutionary tasks, clearly understand the mass line of the Party. We must endeavor to raise the political level of the masses and activate the masses to struggle after the political level of the masses has been raised they can, on the basis of their understanding of the lines and policies of the Party and on the basis of their own actual experience, easily distinguish between truth and falsehood and clearly recognize the false, wily, and deceptive nature of the American imperialists.

"The struggle against psychological warfare is not the responsibility of only a few branches and cadres. It is a responsibility of the entire Party and the entire populace. Only when the entire Party and the entire populace positively participate in the struggle can we defeat the enemy's psychological warfare. Our Party has complete confidence in the revolutionary capability of the masses and constantly pays attention to developing that capability.

"According to the experiences of the localities, the propaganda and education work must be done continually and step-by-step from a low level to a high level. Many places have contrasted the political warfare ploys about the "good will" of the American imperialists with their extremely barbarous crimes, and have calculated their blood debt owed to the people of our entire nation and to the local people, in order to imbue the people with a feeling of hatred and to strengthen their determination to annihilate the aggressive American bandits.

"In the course of the propaganda and education work the localities have gained much experience in guiding the masses to distinguish between external phenomena from internal characteristics, to see through the enemy's "tiger growling" and "cruel barbarism" and realize their basically weak nature, and to see through the false tricks of "love of peace" and "desire for negotiations" and realize the characteristics of aggression and warmongering of the American imperialists. The localities have also paid attention to constantly uncovering and quickly resolving the difficulties in the lives of the people, to investigating, uncovering, and quickly correcting distortions and deficiencies in the execution of the policies of the Party and Government; and to correcting weak points of which the enemy may take advantage and create distorted propaganda.

"During the past several years the masses have brought forth a great number of initiatives in the struggle against the enemy's psychological warfare. The masses have themselves established such rules as "do not listen to enemy radio stations" and "do not spread false rumors" within the framework of regulations protecting the security of the various localities.

3. "The struggle against psychological warfare must be closely united with the task of struggling against the counter-revolutionaries and the task of educating and reforming backward people. The American imperialists and their

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-108

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

lackeys within our country cannot but rely on each other in their activities, that is an essential relationship, one that has the nature of being a law. In the North of our nation the people's regime continually grows stronger and the counter-revolutionaries are continually suppressed and eradicated, so the imperialists' base of support is gradually worn down. Therefore, the acts of destruction of the imperialists on the outside and the counter-revolutionaries on the inside encounter many difficulties and limitations. In that situation, the external imperialists must make even greater efforts to unite with the internal counter-revolutionaries and rely on this gang to carry out their destructive acts, and vice versa, the internal counter-revolutionaries must make even greater efforts to communicate with the imperialists, unite with them, and rely on them for weapons and other means for opposing the people's regime. The same is true with regard to the psychological warfare situation. Although this gang is very small it is very reactionary. They still have a deep hatred for our regime and want the imperialists to return so that they can strike back at the revolution and at the people, and recover their former positions as exploiters and rulers. They are delighted by the American imperialists' acts of destruction and acts of psychological warfare. In some places they listen to enemy radio stations in order to learn of the American imperialists' psychological warfare gambits and seek ways to spread that propaganda among backward people. The American imperialists endeavor to cause the counter-revolutionary elements remaining in the North to follow them. But in actually the psychological warfare activities of the American imperialists not only fail to cause the reactionaries to arise, but cause this gang to be quickly exposed, for in the course of tracking down rumor mongers the masses have uncovered the remaining reactionary elements in our society and have helped the government organs to investigate and punish them. Therefore, in the struggle against the enemy's psychological warfare an important method is to positively track down rumor mongers. But we must distinguish between the enemy and ourselves when tracking down such people. There have been many instances in which the reactionaries have camouflaged themselves as "backward" people who pretend not to "fully understand policies." But there are also genuinely backward people who, because they do not understand the situation or the policies, in their speech and attitudes appear to be spreading false rumors. We must, therefore, carefully investigate each person and each specific situation in order to have correct methods of resolution.

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"The stands and lines of the Party are sharp weapons in the hands of the people with which to defeat the enemy's psychological warfare. If we are to defeat the enemy's psychological warfare we must cause every cadre, every Party member, and every citizen to clearly understand, and firmly grasp, the stands and lines of the Party.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-109

Annex A to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

b On 21 March 1968, Ho Chi Minh issued a counter-revolutionary decree in which the people were warned that extreme penalties would be given to violators of 15 specific crimes * The crimes are listed below.

- (1) Treason
- (2) Conspiracy
- (3) Espionage
- (4) Violation of Security and territory
- (5) Armed rebellion
- (6) Banditry
- (7) Defection or Flight
- (8) Murder, Assault, kidnapping and Cercion
- (9) Sabotage
- (10) Undermining the People's polidarity
- (11) Opposing state policies and laws
- (12) Disrupting public order and security
- (13) Disseminating subversive progaganda
- (14) Organizing prison escapes
- (15) Harboring counter-revolutionaries

c. During the initial stages of the Paris peace talks, the representatives of Hanoi presented a "price for peace" proposal. Included in this proposal were the following demands that were a direct reaction to the FOOTBOY (C) program.

- (1) An end to dropping leaflets
- (2) An end to psychological war-commandos.
- (3) An end to kidnapping of North Vietnamese

d. The following article (Excerpts) was published in Huc Tan on 5 June 1969 under the title, "Heighten Revolutionary Vigilance and Positively Struggle Against the Vestiges of the Decayed Culture." (Further reactions from 1968-69 period are included at TAB 5).

~~* (TS) Ibid.~~~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-10

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

"In the revolutionary struggle -- our enemy has oppose us not only on the political, military, and economic fronts, but also on the cultural and ideological front --"

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"---he (the enemy) considers cultural and ideological sabotage as --- a strategic scheme --- (for) --- restoring capitalism ---"

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"Through broadcasting musical, artistic, and literary programs and special news --- they (they enemy) have plotted to "affect" our peoples spirit --- and to incite counter-revolutionary, bad elements to oppose and disturb us."

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"--- the bad elements (of the NVN polulace) --- have concocted schemes or taken actions aimed at popularizing debauched culture and disseminating counter-revolutionary propaganda. These elements form a small group comprised mostly of bourgeois elements, children of bourgeois families, and former puppet agents who have refused to reform themselves."

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"Some bad elements have clandestinely popularized "golden musical pieces" --- (and) reactionary poems---"

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"---some bad elements have gone so far as to disseminat. counterrevolutionary propaganza, distorting the lines and policies of our party and state, defaming the socialist syst. in the north. sowing disunity between our country and the fraternal countries, highly praising U.S weaponry, and disseminating the enemy's psyenological warfare themes."

"--- they (the bad elements) have taken advantage of the political irrreturity and the inexperience of a number of youths and teenagers to corrupt them --- and slacken their fighting determination."

"In the class struggle, culture, literature, and arts represent highly dangerous weapons ---."

"They (the bad elements) have been intent on carrying out sabotage acts in the cultural, literary, and artistic fields and, ultimately, in the political field."

"---we must, in the social field, apply measures to tightly control the importation and circulation of foreign cultural works, --- stop people from listening to enemy broadcasting stations, check the influences of the other enemy psychological warfare tricks --- and severely punish those who intentionally spread the poisons of decadent cultures."

C. ~~(TS)~~ EVALUATIONS

1. ~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC and COMUSMACV Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Reports.

The conclusions and recommendations of these two reports are
interwoven in the paragraphs below. The MACV group commenced
work just as the CINCPAC report was complete. In many cases the
recommendations and comments of one group are identical with the
other, where there was disagreement, this fact is noted.

a. Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Conclusions

(1) "The PSYOP mission of SOG is not clear and is too broad. Concepts and objectives have been expanded since the original charter and should be clarified.

(2) "The PSYOP activities of SCG, though not quantifiable, appear to be quite successful and worth the assets committed to OP-33.

(3) "A long range plan needs to be developed for the SSPL to assure that it continues to develop into a viable and credible organization and retains its value as a major vehicle for the black PSYOP program.

(4) "The success of HUMIDOR (C) would be enhanced if PLOWMAN (C) operations were oriented more in support of its mission."

~~TOP SECRET~~

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(5) "Approval for the SSPL to have as an ultimate planning goal the replacement of the KANCI regime by peaceful means if possible, would provide better direction to the black PSYOP effort, increase its effectiveness, and provide the US with another means of exerting political pressure on NVN.

(6) "The retention of prisoners on Paradise Island should be limited to one month except in unusual instances, such as identification and training of potential agents.

(7) "The planning and coordination of PSYOP activities between SOG and other agencies and within SOG needs improvement.

(8) "Improved and additional delivery systems are needed for black PSYOP media.

(9) "Radio coverage of NVN would be improved by the placement of a floating station in the Gulf of Tonkin.

(10) "Training of SOG PSYOP personnel is not adequate for the unique mission they are performing. Greater emphasis needs to be placed on more training in black PSYOP and SOG's mission before personnel report to Vietnam for assignment to SOG.

(11) "Ambiguity exists in the relationship of CAS personnel assigned to SOG, as to whether they are Action officers or only Advisors above the working level.

(12) "Balloon delivery of leaflets into North Vietnam from both LAOS and from PTF's in the Gulf of Tonkin should be tested.

(13) "Assistance should be requested to develop material and methods for newspaper and magazine inserts into third country periodicals and newspapers disseminated in NVN.

(14) "A review and analysis system needs to be established either within SOG or within OP-33, to assure that resources and effort are being directed towards the most effective and successful accomplishment of its mission."

b. CINCPAC Conclusions/Recommendations

(1) General

(a) "It would appear that the entire FOOTBOY (G) program would be better oriented toward two basic objectives. Creation of psychological impact and development of an intelligence capability. All SOG actions against NVN should be designed to achieve these two ends. Physical destruction, the capture of prisoners, diversion of resources, damage to the economy, and harassment should not be ends in themselves. Other overt actions now underway can better accomplish these objectives. However, as they contribute to the two basic SOG objectives, they are appropriate for inclusion in FOOTBOY (G) programs.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-113

Annex A to
Appendix C

Annex A to

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) "SOG should be tasked specifically with the following (or similar) psychological missions:

1. "Create impression of internal opposition to the government of NVN.
2. "Foment and exploit popular dissatisfaction with NVN government policy.
3. "Foster passive resistance to NVN government programs.
4. "Create impression of split within NVN government.
5. "Promote diversion of resources.
6. "Influence the relationship of NVN with Communist China and USSR.

(c) "These above missions are designed to achieve the following objectives (already identified by SOG):

1. "Establish attitudes within NVN opposing present NVN policies.
2. "Create a prevailing feeling of distrust, suspicion and uncertainty.
3. "Promote war weariness and engender a feeling that the war is futile, wasteful and contrary to national welfare.

(d) "The SSPL in order to fulfill the above missions and objectives must be vitalized and put in a more powerful position. SOG suggests that the SSPL be allowed to advocate the overthrow of the NVN government. Obviously, this is not in consonance with current US policy. An argument can be made that "black" operation should be able to circumvent such policy - the circumvention, in fact, being the basis of a "black" operation. However, short of a policy change or shift, steps are necessary to increase the viability of the SSPL. SOG is presently considering:

1. "Creation of a notional leader and central committee.
2. "Overt contact with known dissident groups in NVN.
3. "Establishment of a SSPL Junk Fleet with captured boats to be manned with defectors recruited from detainees on Paradise Island.
4. "Selective assassination of hated NVN officers.
5. "Overt contacts with peace groups, claiming to represent the "real" NVN patriots.
6. "Establishment of a Peace Front with actual SVT organizations.
7. "Issuance of a peace appeal to UN in SSPL's name.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-114

Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

Annex A to

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. "Contact with selected Americans explaining the purpose and mission of the SSPL.

9. "Creation of a SSPL Orientation program, i.e., dodge draft, join the SSPL where life is better and safer.

(e) "Additional items for consideration might include

1. "Expansion of SSPL activities within LACS and CAMBODIA.

2. "Cultivation of NVN prisoners as potential SSPL members. Some of these actions might be recognized as efforts to overthrow the NVN Government. However, by maintaining the notional character of the SSPL with real individuals supporting the movement and resisting in a disorganized passive way, the SSPL can continue to operate within bounds of current policy and at the same time expand its base and magnify its impact. At such times as a viable movement is credible, in the minds of a significant number of the NVN population, consideration might be then given to the SSPL advocacy of the overthrow of the NVN government. Consideration may later also be given to shifting the SSPL from a notional to an active movement, at least to a limited degree."

(f) "The problem of penetrating the heavily populated areas of NVN with PSYOPS material is a major obstacle to a successful psychological campaign today. Restrictions on cargo aircraft reduce the population which can be reached with this delivery system to about 20%, among which very few key opinion-formers are included. The use of high performance aircraft does not appear cost-effective nor is this means of delivery a credible system for use by a dissident group. In attempting to resolve the problem, SOG recommended the launch of low cost, short range balloons, with PSYOPS material from naval vessels operating close to the Red River Delta coastline. Alternatively, ground launch sites in LAOS were recommended. CINCPAC did not approve either method. Whether the use of balloons represents the best way of reaching the bulk of the critical population in NVN is not the point to be made in this report. What is important, however, is that to be successful, the SSPL message in all possible forms must reach as many of the opinion-formers in NVN as possible. If the SSPL is to develop its potential impact means must be found to disseminate the message.

(g) "Coordination of all STD activities which have psychological impact requires improvement. STD is even more compartmentalized than SOG and as a consequence, elements supporting PSYOP activities often are not coordinated. Chief, OP-33 recognizes this and is making a major effort to tie together all the pieces which make up PSYOP program.

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C-a-115

Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-115

Annex A to

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(1) "The training program for personnel being assigned to SOG PSYOP positions is now considered satisfactory. However, still desirable is a thorough briefing of SOG activities for replacements prior to their arrival in-country."

(2) Recommendations. It is recommended that:

(a) "The basic objectives of the FOOTBOY (C) program be specifically identified as being the creation of psychological impact and the development of an intelligence capability.

(b) The specific psychological objectives for the FOOTBOY (C) program be detailed along the lines of those listed in para b. (1) (b), page 85.

(c) "The SSPL activity be greatly expanded and vitalized to include operations in LAOS, CAMBODIA and South Vietnam as well as North Vietnam but that, for the present, the SSPL remain a notional movement with individual passive support not advocating the overthrow of the NVN government.

(d) "The problem of reaching the major portion of the NVN population by credible SSPL associated means be given immediate attention of all echelons. Reconsideration should be given to SOG's request for balloon dissemination and the restrictions on the employment of C-130 aircraft which limits operations within 80 NM of HANOI be re-evaluated.

(e) "Continued efforts be made to coordinate PSYOP activities within SOG and STD between the two activities.

(f) "CINCPAC and/or JCS provide assistance in obtaining a letter drop in THAILAND in support of mail operations.

(g) "JCS (SACSA) and/or Services conduct briefings in SOG operations for those personnel being assigned to SOG as replacements."

c. Consideration of CINCPAC Conclusions/Recommendations

(1) "The AD HOC Evaluation Group (AHEG) concurs, in general, with the CINCPAC conclusions and recommendations. The assignment of specific PSYOP missions to SOG should be based on re-evaluation of current concepts and objectives and capabilities, and along lines outlined in the CINCPAC report (See Board recommendations).

(2) "Expansion of the SSPL and development of a more viable and dynamic program to include operations in LAOS, CAMBODIA, and THAILAND is considered essential to the increasing psychological impact of the notional organization.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-116

Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-116

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

Although the SSPL should not, at this time, advocate the overthrow of the Hanoi government, it should have this as ultimate planning objective, with peaceful replacement as the intermediate objective, and phased plans should be developed with this in mind (see AHEG discussion pages 88-89).

(3) "Leaflet operations should continue and the AHEG concurs that additional means must be found to disseminate the SSPL message and that balloon dissemination should be tested and evaluated by SOG in operations against NVN.

(4) "The AHEG concurs with CINCPAC's conclusion that SOG requires outside assistance for letter drop and other PSYOP activities outside of Vietnam and the recommendation that CINCPAC and/or JCS provide this assistance.

(5) "The AHEG does not concur with the CINCPAC conclusion that the training program for personnel being assigned to SOG PSYOP is satisfactory. Additional training in black PSYOP should be provided and personnel with previous PSYOP experience should be assigned to this complex and unusual mission. Briefing in SOG operations should be conducted, for those personnel being assigned to SOG, prior to their arrival in VN."

d. MACV AD HOC Evaluation Group Recommendations. It is recommended that:

(1) "The following mission and tasks be assigned SOG (PSYOP):

(a) "Mission: Conduct and assist and advise the Strategic Technical Directorate in conducting covert strategic and tactical psychological operations against NVN leadership and populace to achieve maximum harassment and division, and to develop resistance to the current regime. In South Vietnam, assist and advise the PSYOP section of the General Political Warfare Department to conduct covert PSYOP against the National Liberation Front creating divisiveness between NLF and the LAO DCNG Party (NVN) and among the leaders of NLF. Further work to achieve maximum discontent within the NVN Cadre and the VC.

(b) "Conduct non-attributable (gray) propaganda, principally through the Voice of Freedom, to support the US mission in Vietnam and as a cover for covert operations.

(c) "Covert tasks:

1. "Create the impression of growing internal opposition to the government of NVN.

2. "Foment and exploit popular dissatisfaction with NVN Government policies.

3. "Create dissention and distrust among the Cadre and between the people and the Cadre.

4. "Foster passive resistance to the NVN government programs.

5. "Establish a base for potential active opposition to the NVN Government.

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C-a-117

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

6. Create the impression of a split within the leadership of the RVN Government.

7. Promote the diversion of resources.

8. Create dissension and distrust between the NVN Government and the people of RVN and Communist China.

(d) "Non-attributable tasks:

1. "Maintain the credibility of VCF.

2. "Extend the coverage of VCF and the target audience through expansion of programming.

3. "Inform the people of NVN of the defeats suffered by the NVA and the VC.

4. "Emphasize the growing strength of and popular support for GVN.

(2) "A long range plan be prepared with definitive stages and phased objectives and tasks for the development and growth of the SSPL into a dynamic and viable organization with the ultimate planning objective being the overthrow of the HANOI regime, an intermediate objective being its peaceful replacement, and with overt cells in SVN, LAOS, CAMBODIA, THAILAND, and FRANCE.

(3) "Coordination between MACSOG and JUSPAO be formalized and that coordination between MACSOG and MACPD be improved by closer liaison to include SOG PSYOP representation at monthly MACPD PSYOP Conferences. White PSYOP conducted by SOG be coordinated with MACPD and that MACPD provide support and assistance.

(4) "The development of additional delivery means for PSYOP media to reach targets in NVN be expedited, to include use of drones for leaflet delivery.

(5) "The feasibility of delivering leaflets to NVN by balloons from ground locations in LAOS and from PTF's of PLOWMAN (C) be tested.

(6) "PLOWMAN (C) operations be primarily oriented in support of HUMZDOR (C) programs.

(7) "The STD (VN) be convinced that prolonged retention of detainees on Paradise Island is non-productive and should be limited to approximately one month.

(8) "The responsibilities for overt PSYOP within SOG be delegated to OP-35 and be coordinated with and supported by MACPD.

(9) "The immediate acquisition of a floating radio station for deployment in the Gulf of Tonkin be recommended.

(10) "The responsibilities of CAS personnel within SOG be clearly defined and their relationships formalized.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-118

Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-118

Annex A to

~~TOP SECRET~~

(11) "Personnel assigned to SOG for PSYOP have prior PSYOP experience and those assigned to CP-33 receive special training in black PSYOP prior to arrival in country.

(12) "SOG establish a periodic review and analysis of its PSYOP to assure that resources and effort are most effectively directed toward successful accomplishment of the PSYOP mission."⁴

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[REDACTED] This evaluation is unique in that it is directed toward investigating the Vietnamese counterpart psyops organization and effort, rather than focusing on the US advisory organization and effectiveness. The study is 46 pages in length and available for review in the file. In an effort to bring out the essential findings of his study, within a few pages, the comments of MACSOG on the study are quoted below.

[REDACTED]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

b. "Relations with Liaison Service. Paragraphs 5 and 6. To detail the shortcomings of the various departments and sections of the STD PSYOPS Section, short study is being made of each activity. The first was conducted on the SSPL Radio Operations. The study was then forwarded to the Vietnamese PSYOPS Chief for his review. It was recommended that after he and his staff had an opportunity to review the survey, a joint meeting be held to discuss the recommendations of the report. As no meeting was requested by the STD after having the report two weeks, the advisory staff requested a meeting which was held. The result is an hour's work shop each morning for the script writers and specified Research and Analysis people to correct the faults in SSPL Radio. A similar survey is now being conducted on the Research and Analysis Office, the other sections will follow.

* (TS) Report, MACJ-3, "Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report," 14 Feb 63, Humidor p. 17-24.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-119

Annex A to
Appendix C

Annex A to

~~TOP SECRET~~

This method has the advantage of giving the Vietnamese a written detailed account of the shortcomings and recommendations. After digestion of the points made in the first account, a point action to correct the shortcomings can be worked out at the conference table. A second letter outlining the Advisor's understanding of the agreed positions may be necessary for more detailed and complex agreements. The file of surveys and actions taken serve as a record of advice given, taken, and acted or not acted upon, this should improve slowly, but hopefully surely, the quality of the Vietnamese performance.

c. "The Future of the SSPL" Paragraph 1-3: Complete concurrence with the thought that the SSPL go forward or be disbanded. The image must be projected not only in a credible manner but in a widespread fashion. The following steps have been taken:

(1) "The first letter from a detainee on Paradise to a relative in SVN has been posted. See SOG/CAS Weekly Report of 14-20 Sep 67.

(2) "A concept for a detainee to defect to SVN and acknowledge assistance from the SSPL has been approved by JCS (Ref: JCS 291921Z Sep). This plan is presently being finalized and should be implemented shortly. Two additional detainees have applied for defection and are awaiting completion of the presently approved concept.

(3) "A trial of five military men (armed junk crewmen) captured by PLOWMA (C) Operations is now being publicized on SSPL Radio and will be held on Paradise on/about 20 Oct 67. As a point of interest, these prisoners will be declared as misguided by the two leaders who were killed and acquitted upon confessing the error of their ways (which will be taped and broadcast over SSPL Radio). The prisoners will then be returned to the tender mercies of the Lao Dong Party.

(4) "Deception operations are also assisting in this case-building. Each detainee when properly indoctrinated is given certain ratner common signals (scratching one's shoulder) which he is told he can identify other SSPL members. If such information is relayed to the security police, which is relatively certain, the security police will be busy arresting innocent people with itchy shoulders. Other simple harassment and deception ideas are also being studied.

"Paragraph 4: The gaming method proposed [REDACTED] is interesting; however, the misgivings he expressed as to the difficulty of obtaining Vietnamese cooperation in such an endeavor are understated. In lieu of this approach, we plan to install a command post for the SSPL when all of the impediments and information regarding the SSPL are assembled. Meetings to coordinate the projection of the SSPL image and generate additional programs will be held here, hopefully a more complete indoctrination with the spirit and goals of the SSPL can be fostered.

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C-a-120

Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-120

Annex A to

~~TOP SECRET~~

"Paragraphs 1 and 4: The involvement with political Parties in SV of a principally national group in the North is para to baseline. Further the problem of selecting a party in which to ally the SSPL would not only require the wisdom of Solomon but the concurrence of both the SV and the U.S. Government which would be extremely difficult to obtain at this time. A more productive alliance appears possible with dissident groups within NVN. For example, an alliance or at least support of groups such as described in CG 'USMAC' DTG 010731Z Oct 67 would appear most productive. A special SOG inter-dimention work group has been charged with generating means of exploiting this and similar groups."

d. "SSPL Radio"

"Paragraph 1: As outlined in 'The Future of the SSPL' steps are being taken to broaden the base and pervasiveness of the organization. As another step along this same line, the agents/agent teams which are now infiltrated into North Vietnam are briefed: 'In North Vietnam there are dissident groups who are opposing the government, from intelligence sources we know one of these groups is the SSPL, is anti-Communist, pro-religion expression and freedom, and for a free, non-dictatorial government. We are trying to contact these groups but have been unsuccessful this far. We feel if we could contact them, we could operate in conjunction with them--assisting them. So if you contact such groups, relay this fact to them and contact us soonest.' As some agents will undoubtedly be captured and interrogated, these instructions will most probably come to the attention of the NVN security agents and again promote the image of a viable group opposing the government."

"Paragraph 3: [REDACTED] criticism of the target and format is perhaps too severe, at least audience reaction from Paradise and from POWs/deserters make the SSPL Radio at least as palatable as Radio Hanoi and VOA. However, as described previously, a program to improve both the targeting and content of the SSPL Radio is underway."

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"Paragraphs 4 and 5: Two excellent recommendations (i.e. use of soap-opera type scripts and comical situations) and the SSPL radio programmers and script-writers are working to incorporate both."

"Paragraph 6: The Propaganda Officer, [REDACTED] and the Chief, STD Psywar Office now take the themes produced from both sides on each Friday and reach an agreed position on future themes. This coordination should stimulate more continuity as well as facilitate the following of a consistently productive line."

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(b)(3)

"Paragraph 7: The suggested program (i.e., comparison of what happens to the sons of different layers of cadre) has been produced and broadcast. This type program is now a continuing feature of the SSPL Radio."

"Paragraph 8: The problem of integrating the Research and Analysis output with the needs of the scriptwriters should be resolved in large part by the work shop for both script-writers and the designated R&A personnel previously discussed. An exchange system between the two sections will be considered when the capabilities are more firmly tied down."

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-121

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

"Paragraph 9: Responses to the questionnaire suggest that [redacted] have been received and as he surmised the SSPL image was not clear to the personnel contributing to the projecting of the image. All personnel now have the charter available to them for ready reference. Proposed changes to the basic SSPL charter are also under study, these changes would allow the SSPL to become more aggressive (this action requires public approval). After all, the SSPL has been saying, 'If the Lac Dong Party doesn't reform, more drastic steps will be taken'. The party has not reformed in the four years of SSPL telling them this fact. Other steps now appear to be required.

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"A system of program scheduling is now in effect which will assist writers and R&A research support to fill specific program segments. A new format will be made up in general categories (i.e., SSPL Editorial, Youth Program, Women's Program, Cultural Topics, LDP Versus the People, etc.) More specific topics within these categories will be produced at the weekly meeting and a minimum of one week lead time will be given to the writers and R&A for script and research tasks related to the topics. All programming will be assigned, rather than ad hoc, which was the case. The end result will pull R&A into a direct support role and simplify the writer's jobs. They will also contribute ideas, of course."

e. Research and Analysis. Concur in part with the observation that the R&A section is inadequate.

"Paragraph 1: R&A's filing system and cross-reference system is inadequate. To correct this situation, the American advisors have reorganized the English filing system and at present, the Vietnamese are reorganizing along parallel lines.

"Paragraphs 2,3 and 4: Presently, a program is being conducted jointly by Chief of R&A Section and [redacted] who are writing job descriptions for the Vietnamese counterparts. When completed, this will be staffed with the Vietnamese and put in effect as a directive. This should insure the product is designed to fit the needs; if it does not, the personnel assigned to R&A Section responsible for this product can be detected and dealt with. More attention is also being given to up-dating and enlarging the American reference files for assistance in the advisory role.

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"Another program which will materially increase our research capability is the use of the Combined Document Exploitation Center. A reader is being procured and series of microfilms on related topics will be processed from these master files."

f. "MAROPS (PSYOP)

"Paragraph 1: It is agreed that the potential for an exfiltration of a large number of coastal inhabitants exists, and this possibility is presently being exploited (Source 1159). However, it must be kept in mind that the JCS mission for MAROPS is four-fold; shipping interdiction, intelligence gathering, psychological operations and cross beach operations. Boats are not destroyed without cause, the criteria is whether the boat is of sufficient size to carry cargo south, i.e., a greater than seven meters long. With this in mind, Mr. Burrows' observations are not concurred with. Presently under

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-122

Annex A to
Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-122

Annex A to

~~TOP SECRET~~

development is a concept which would place selected detainees who desire to join SSPL in a captured junk for return to the fishing fleet to perform recruiting and intelligence functions.

"Paragraph 2 The forced propaganda lecture is an interesting thought however the minimum operating time for the area is thirty-six hours and may run to thirty-six hours. Of this only 5-7 hours are available in the operating area, boats are searched and crewmen interrogated all under over-increasing coastal fire. With these facts in mind, the forced propaganda lecture appears to be a casualty of our operational limitations.

"Paragraphs 3 and 4: Coordination has been made with MAROPS to more closely tie-in the Psywar operations, further all SSPL leaflets are pretested by detainees for both content and accurate targetting.

"Paragraph 5 Concur The defection of Source 1159 is the first step in this direction. As previously noted, the exploitation possibilities of dissident Catholic group would foster the basic objective [REDACTED] has outlined.

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g. "PRINTED MEDIA

Paragraph 1. There is uniformity as to leaflet size, color of paper and weight of paper and format, but to the Vietnamese they are not dreary. Further, leaflet themes are developed on vulnerabilities reported from all sources and is not restricted to MAROPS mission reports [REDACTED]. However, as our reachable audience is primarily coastal people, many are targetted to individuals similar to those captured on MAROPS missions. Along this line, the production is now oriented more toward quality as opposed to quantity, this orientation is not more credible for a clandestine organization but also much more in keeping with the nature of black operations.

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(b)(3)

"This comment brings out a major difficulty touched on in the last chapter of the report, that of distribution of all types of black ops material in a credible manner. At present, only wind drift techniques with leaflets and air drop-water float methods with floatable items are possible. Even these methods (by cargo aircraft) are restricted to areas which are not protected by AA fire. The net result is the denial of all of the principal population centers to SSPL penetration. Balloon delivery is the most promising system yet uncovered to solve this and presently we are awaiting CINCPAC approval of our concept of balloon operations against the North (Ref. COMUSMACV Msg DTG 240148Z Sep 67).

"Paragraphs 2 and 3: Concur in more experimentation in the printed media field, for example, calendars, fishing hints, tide tables, are presently being obtained. Varying paper stocks are now being used.

"Paragraph 4. The only way at present that a news sheet can be disseminated, due to its wind drift characteristics, would be during agent resupply missions which are low level flights. We are investigating the quantity of a news sheet which could be accommodated on such a mission. We are presently mimeographing a bi-monthly newsletter on crude brown paper for dissemination to MAROPS and at Paradise, it is published as a regional newspaper of the SSPL. Comics and cartoons as a novel implement of communicating ideas are also being investigated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-123

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ARE ALSO BEING INVESTIGATED.

~~TOP SECRET~~h. "AIR EPAPS

"Concur with portions of [redacted] comments. These items are available in quantity and we are pursuing the subject to determine how many of these can specifically be identified as to the owner's name and home. However, [redacted] proposals into an SSPL framework does not appear feasible. The air cross over North Vietnam are not accurate enough for the type of delivery envisions nor, to our thinking, does the attribution to the Royal Lao Air Force and an SSPL organization in Laos seem credible. If sufficiently identifiable personal effects exist, we plan to suggest that the GVN or JCV Psychological Warfare Directorate mail these personal effects from third countries to the remaining relatives or deliver them via high performance aircraft.

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(b)(3)i. "MAIL OPERATIONS

"Paragraph 1. We plan to use notional leftist organizations abroad as originators of letters, but are beginning with a true leftist Japanese fishing organization. In line with this, we are soon going to use a Paris-based Vietnamese, pro-Hanoi student organization's magazine to infiltrate subtle anti-Communist propaganda into VIV by making slight changes in some of the articles.

"Paragraph 2. [redacted] we are targetting too high is not correct, on the contrary we may be shooting too low. We are dependent upon what address material we have, Hanoi telephone books are not used, although one is available. What we obtain from overt sources, i.e., press, captured documents, etc. is frequently rather low level. The oldest address material currently in use is two years. We also plan to use the mails to distribute radios (mailed from Japan with a pre-paid bill accompanying).

(b)(1)
(b)(3)j. "TREAT OPERATIONS

"Paragraph 1-2. [redacted] two excellent checks of TREAT's distribution have been received, i.e., two of TREAT's documents were captured on VC soldiers. While a further check would be nice, it appears this type of feedback is not only the most available check, it is also the most accurate.

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"CAS and the intelligence section of SOG are both attempting to monitor TREAT's teletype circuit. A point is reached however where we should give our most competent counterparts credit for being professional and as highly motivated as is our advisory effort.

"Paragraph 3: Presently all of TREAT's material is appraised by two officer-ralliers from the North Vietnamese forces, this is felt to be more effective as well as more secure than the present use of PO's. [redacted] assumption that our main target is the PAVN soldiers is incorrect, the main target is the main force VC, however the disruption of the relationship between the two is a prime target.

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"Paragraph 4 Concur with the rumor network idea, this is being discussed with TREAT

"Paragraph 5: Efforts are being made to obtain TREAT's full-time on black operations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-124

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~k. "RANDOM BLACK OPS IN THE NORTH"

"Paragraph 1. Efforts to penetrate the Hanoi-Haiphong-Red River Delta area are underway, i.e., balloon systems.

"Paragraph 2: In the recommended form or a slightly altered form, we are using or have used the majority of these thoughts. The prime problem at the present time is a deliver means."*

3. (TS) Paradise Island Evaluation. An evaluation in some detail has been made by MACSOG of the Paradise Island operations. These comments are quoted below:

a. PHOENIX Location

"The original use of the PHOENIX detention site was one of the major factors detracting from credibility in the existence of the SSPL as a dissident organization in NVN. Detainees were told they were in the secret zone of the SSPL on the mainland of NVN, yet they were kept only a few yards from the ocean on the west side of PARADISE shielded from the surf by only a wall ten feet high constructed of thin thatch matting. It is inconceivable that some detainees did not peek through the easily movable matting at some time during the four year use of PHOENIX. Additionally, all detainees were fishermen and the smell of salt water, the amount of sand tracked throughout the detainee area, and the sound of the surf combined with the sun setting in the west where the ocean was located must have indicated to some of them that they were on an island. While the majority of detainees apparently believed they were on the mainland, several stated they thought they were on an island in South Vietnam and one detainee identified the island as Cu Lao Cham because he had previously lived and fished there. The elimination of the PHOENIX stage had previously been under consideration for the above reasons and the JCS limitations in July 68 provided an excellent opportunity to sell the concept to the Vietnamese."**

b. "Number of Detainees"

"The volume of detainees taken prior to 1 July 1968, taxed the Exploitation Branch facilities and personnel so heavily that operations became a continuous processing of volumes of intelligence information and psychological vulnerabilities data, the majority of which was highly repetitive. Little effort was directed toward improvement of interrogation and indoctrination techniques and special operations to enhance the credibility of SSPL existence. In contrast, the curtailment by JCS in July 68, reduced the accessibility to detainees so much that information processed was not adequate to meet the requirements placed on the Exploitation Branch by SOG Agencies, nor was enough time allowed to plan and conduct special operations using detainees. Experience has shown that approximately fifty (50) detainees could be detained at PARADISE and allow for proper segregation during interrogation and indoctrination. Additionally, an average detention period of five to six weeks would allow opportunity to follow-up on surfaced information which requires additional interrogation or exploitation of subjects which arise during interrogation.**

* (TS) Letter of transmittal, Chief SOG, 9 Oct 67 enclosure, "Comments on Evaluation Study."
 ** (TS) Report, MACSOG, "Paradise History and Analysis," 9 Feb 69, p.7,8.

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C-a-125

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~c. Deception Techniques

"The initial concepts of deception techniques in handling detainees were valid with the exception of the use of PHOENIX (previously discussed). However, the actual execution of the operation from 1964 to 1968 was characterized by repetitive 'slips' by SSPL cadre which must have denigrated the credibility of the SSPL. These errors, discussed below, consisted generally of using equipment and supplies in the subgroups attributable to the US/SVN and actions taken during movement of the detainees on and off of PARADISE.

(1) "During each break in operations at PARADISE, the subgroups were inspected by US advisors. No records indicate the results of these inspections from 1965 to 1967, but inspections in Dec 67, July 68, and Oct 68 revealed items such as fountain pens marked 'US government,' a US marked ammo pouch, US c-ration containers, and a crate imprinted with the word "Perishable" located either in a group or on trails used for movement of detainees. In one instance it was discovered that soy sauce containers used throughout the subgroups by SSPL cadre were old San Miguel beer bottles which are prevalent throughout SVN. STD Psywar personnel denied that the detainees used these bottles and also denied that any of the attributable items above were seen by the detainees. However, it is highly improbable that some of these errors were not detected. In 1967, for instance, one military detainee wrote a pledge to the SSPL on bond paper with clearly visible water marks showing an American eagle. On another occasion in September 1968, a detainee taking the SSPL pledge was photographed for exploitation purposes. The pictures revealed an SSPL cadre holding a flashlight to assist the detainee in reading the pledge and the words 'US Government' were clearly printed on the flashlight.

(2) "Movement from the beach landing point to the subgroups is supposedly an infiltration of the NVN coast line enroute to the secret zone of the SSPL. In fact, the transfer from the Nautilus to shore and the movement was accomplished in broad daylight (prior to Aug 68) at a leisurely pace with a pause on the beach while cadre interrogated the detainee for name, village, and age. Even though the detainee was blindfolded, there was no illusion of being afraid of NVN coastal security. In August 1968, US pressure forced a change to the effect that movement of the sources from the Nautilus to the beach and an initial part of the movement up the mountain to the subgroups would be accomplished after dark. The difficulty of trail leading to the subgroups made it impractical to make the entire movement at night. Although the Vietnamese considered the change unnecessary (they reasoned that many parts of the NVN coast were underguarded because of rough terrain and easily infiltrated), they conceded to US desires. However, it was later discovered in October that the detainees were actually moved only 150 yards off the beach to a hut where they cooked an evening meal on an open fire, spent the night and began the movement in the morning. The remainder of the journey is realistic, and it appears the actions taken in the subgroups are also realistic, although no US personnel have ever observed any part of the detention period for obvious reasons."*

* (TS) Ibid, p. 10,11.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-126

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~d. SSPL Credibility

"Perhaps the greatest opportunity which was not seized during the operations at PARADISE was to enhance the credibility of the SSPL political organization existing in North Vietnam. The credibility of the Lao Dong Party in North Vietnam is not absolute. It is a weakness which have not been exploited. It has been sufficient, however, to thwart most covert activities conducted by SSPL. The main part, these activities ignored the rice-roots political organization of the DRV's Lao Dong Party which, within itself, is the main factor that enabled the communists to dominate the population. The DRV does not have to saturate the populated areas with the masses of militia to control its citizens. Instead, it relies heavily on the population to control itself. It has been sufficient to divide neighbor against neighbor through the use of criticism sessions, denunciation campaigns and the like--all carefully orchestrated by a handful of the party faithful at hamlet level. One man is afraid to take any action, even passive, against the regime for fear that his neighbor will report him. A neighbor who becomes aware of an unacceptable action is afraid not to report the incident because a third party may turn both men in, one for committing a seditious act, the other for not reporting it. The exceptions to the cultivated 'divide and conquer' mechanism are the Catholic communities. The nature of their religion demands cohesiveness; the ecclesiastical hierarchy provides a leadership element which is generally not tainted by the Lao Dong Party. It is in these enclaves of Catholics that the SSPL should have begun its organizational operations. Execution of HATTORI/PARFAIT is necessary to establish this pseudo-organization and to further the basic goals the SSPL was created to achieve. Programs executed in the past have neglected the value of exploiting the detainees at PARADISE through special operations in an effort to expand the influence of the SSPL. Operation "HATTORI" was forwarded to JCS for approval through CINCPAC. In the process, the code name indicator was changed to "PARFAIT" (C). At the time of the 1 November 1968 halt in operations, PARFAIT (C) had been approved by JCS and turned over to the Department of State for concurrence. Only when an infrastructure is formed through an operation such as PARFAIT (C) will agent and/or cross beach operations realize the success which has so far evaded them. The infrastructure itself should be passive, its members generally suited to simple tasks which could not expose them or their organization. The passive organization would serve as an auxiliary for support of carefully trained agents. Once the infrastructure gets on its feet, the onerous problems of establishing contacts and communication can be solved,"*

e. Interrogation. "There are numerous indicators that interrogation of detainees is often carried out in a careless, perfunctory manner. The most obvious fault is a failure to follow up on an item of exploitable information. This fault was especially damaging during the 1 July-21 October 1968 period when the detention period was very short and any follow-up for additional information had to be initiated rapidly. The Mission Reports in August and September became especially poor in preparation. A detainee would be asked if he knew the peace talks were going on in Paris, but no comments of attitudes would be extracted. Similarly, a group of detainees mentioned the fact that a few poems or songs criticizing NVN were prevalent in their area, but no details were solicited. Fortunately, the comment was noticed in screening at PARADISE by the US advisors and details to include lyrics, tune and origin were obtained or taken before return of the sources. These were later incorporated or taken into Voice of SSPL broadcasts. Attempts to determine the causes in

* (S) Ibid, p. 17-18.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-127

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

Interrogation failures were hindered by not being able to listen and observe the actual indoctrination procedures. As a result, in August a request was formally submitted and approved for installation of electronic eugging equipment in the support of Vietnamese STD War personnel were told that the installation was to allow indoctrinators to monitor sources when they were alone and to determine true sincerity of expressed ideas. Also, any detainees planted by VC could possibly be detected. They were told that as a side effect, perhaps, interrogation/indoctrination methods could be improved by having specialists from Saigon (US and Vietnamese) monitor and critique an occasional session. They concurred with enthusiasm on the eugging installation. There are two probable causes of interrogation problems. First, the interrogators are actually assigned to the STD, Psywar R&A section and only at PARADISE TDY for periods of two weeks out of every six. There have been many instances in which their primary interest seemed to be getting back to Saigon on time rather than doing an outstanding job and writing their reports in the fullest detail. It is probable that significant comments by the detainee were omitted merely to save time. By the time the Mission Report is translated and screened by US advisors at PARADISE, the interrogator who prepared it has left for Saigon. Second, there is a lack of interest by the Vietnamese personnel on PARADISE to improve the quality of material being processed. Little, if any, screening of reports appears to be done by the Vietnamese at PARADISE and to the best of US advisory knowledge, no follow up requests for information originating from personnel working at DODO have ever been submitted concerning an exploitable item."

f. Indoctrination. "A similar problem arises here in that the indoctrinators also work at PARADISE TDY two weeks out of six. However, the JTD states that these indoctrinators should be a part of PARADISE. In fact, they operate out of the STD Psywar Operations Section of which PARADISE is a sub-division. An attempt was made unsuccessfully to move these personnel to PARADISE permanently, but problems of retaining skilled personnel if they are moved from Saigon and purported requirements in Saigon stalemated the attempt. A decision was made to fill the few vacant indoctrinators slots by recruiting Danang personnel who would remain permanently at PARADISE. None were hired prior to termination of operations. The indoctrination process does appear to be more effective than the interrogation, primarily because additional vulnerabilities are often brought out in these reports. However, monitoring is the only certain method of evaluating the process."*

* (CS) Ibid, p. 24, 25.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-128

Annex A to
Appendix 7~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-128

Annex A to
Appendix 7

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. (TS) SACSA Evaluation. During 1967 various indicators pointed to the fact that the covert program directed against NV¹ was achieving a significant impact. In late 1967, SACSA directed his staff to review and analyze articles and other available sources to determine the extent of this impact on North Vietnam and to identify psychological vulnerabilities. The resultant study was based on:

- Eight significant articles from Hanoi publications.
- Twenty psychological mission summaries including the summarized responses of 100 North Vietnamese personnel picked up from 10 June 1967 through 8 November 1967.



- Specific data from other intelligence information

An initial report was published on 26 January 1968 and a final documented report issued on 4 March 1968. As noted in the introductions of each, the problem was not insufficient data, but rather the difficulty in making an objective judgement from subjective material. The summary from the final report follows:

a. Summary

(1) "Hanoi interprets allied special operations in North Vietnam as a major facet in the US strategy. As such it views these operations with considerable alarm. Faced with the problem of maintaining control and developing motivation in a closed society under conditions of extreme hardship, the regime is sensitive to every perceived threat to its control and motivation of the population. Psychological operations which strike at the spirit and morale of the people are viewed with great concern. The response to this threat is heavy emphasis on and great faith in education and indoctrination. At the same time, the felt need to protect the regime coupled with an inherent and deep-seated suspicion that there are forces within seeking to destroy the regime generates suspicion of the cadres who are the operative link to the mass of population, of elements with which the regime feels it has to compete for control over the population, i.e., the institution of Catholicism, and an almost paranoid fear of "counterrevolutionary elements". In this milieu, secrecy is elevated to a central principle of government. The requirement for increased security results in increased diversion of resources to internal security. But, at the same time, the need to exert control at every level of

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government makes decentralization necessary and this very decentralization places a suspect element, the cadres, in a key position between the masses and the central authority. In this dilemma, the government tends to exaggerate every allied action which has a potential impact on these contradictory forces and the resulting frustration is manifested in a series of ad hoc measures to counter allied psychological warfare efforts

(2) "The concern evidenced by Hanoi in its various media is confirmed by physical reaction to special operations. In many cases the physical reaction is responsive to allied overt as well as covert operations and an exact measurement of cause and effect is not possible. Nonetheless, some Hanoi responses can be identified as being specifically directed at special operations. North Vietnamese efforts to counter maritime operations at sea largely have been ineffective. But increasing emphasis on internal security has made the conduct of actual covert ground operations in North Vietnam extremely difficult.

(3) "There is evidence that current psychological operations are reaching their targets to a certain extent. There is some differentiation in the media/target relationship in that radio broadcasts seem to reach a smaller more select audience, while printed media, particularly leaflets appear to reach the broadest audience.

(4) "The general population in the non-urban areas sees its situation as one of a struggle for survival in an environment in which a variety of forces beyond their control threaten survival. In such a situation, the world-view of the peasant or fisherman is increasingly pragmatic and concerned with only those physical factors that directly affect his struggle for survival. The key link with the government is the local cadre and except for his contact with the cadre, the peasant or fisherman is increasingly isolated from the central government. The cadres are resented in many cases and this resentment threatens the degree to which the cadres can control their charges without resort to increasingly repressive measures. At the same time, there are pervasive forces, some cultural and some physical, which militate against the development of any overt resistance against the regime and its representatives. Despite war-weariness and the pragmatism of the lower levels of the population, a certain ethnic nationalism that would oppose external intervention is still operative.

(5) "The key role of the cadres and local managerial personnel has already been emphasized. The evidence indicates that the commitment of such personnel to the purposes and objectives of the central government is mixed in degree. A significant number of such personnel are engaged in corrupt activities for their own self-aggrandizement. By their own venality the cadres and managerial personnel are contributing to their own isolation from the people.

(6) "Finally, religion, ethnic minorities and the treatment of returnees from South Vietnam constitute special problems for the regime".

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-130

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~b. "Vulnerabilities and Suggested Actions

(1) "Hanoi's sensitivity to perceived threats to the regime's control of the North Vietnamese population constitutes a major psychological vulnerability. It is likely that so long as the regime's present external policy appears to be achieving its objectives while at the same time reinforcing its control over the population of North Vietnam through war induced unity, the Hanoi government will not change its course. But should the regime come to feel that pursuance of the current policies is creating conditions at home that threaten its political control, it is possible that a major reorientation could take place. Therefore, allied covert psychological operations should be directed towards inducing in the Hanoi leadership a fear that there is a genuine and serious threat to their political position. (Some elaboration of this point seems advisable. It would be naive to conclude that Hanoi did not have a reasonably comprehensive and accurate picture of our special operations in NVN. The evidence suggests that Hanoi has a fairly accurate picture of all special operations now being conducted. But Hanoi also indicates a fear that there are other things going on which they do not yet know about. This is the first point of vulnerability - vulnerability to operations designed to exploit this uncertainty by making Hanoi think that a great deal is going on in their backyard. For this vulnerability Hanoi is the primary target. But Hanoi is also very sensitive to indications that the spirit of the people is being subverted. Therefore, even though Hanoi may be cognizant of the details of allied special operations, if Hanoi perceives that the people and their support of the regime are being affected, the end result is the same -- a threat, perceived in Hanoi, to Hanoi's political control is created. In this case the people are the primary target and the regime is reached through the people. In short, knowledgeability by Hanoi does not necessarily derogate and may, in some cases even enhance, the effects of special operations.) Measures towards this end should include:

(a) "Broadening the image and increasing the credibility of the SSPL as an active force in North Vietnam with close links to the population and to dissident elements.

(b) "Developing in the disadvantaged elements of the North Vietnamese population a spirit of passive resistance to and non-compliance with the dictates of the government, particularly at the local level.

(c) "Actions designed to achieve these objectives should appear to be of genuine indigenous origin and could include the following actions:

1. "Establishment of actual and notional SSPL cells both within and external to North Vietnam;
2. "Establishment of actual links between the SSPL and dissident elements in North Vietnam,
3. "The recruitment and utilization of local leaders to train and lead the people in passive resistance to and non-compliance with the government;

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-131

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

4. Development of a mass program of appeals directly from the people to Ho Chi Minh for relief from the current hardships.

5. Maritime operations can play a key role in these actions.

(2) "Hanoi's sensitivity to special operations can further be exploited by deception operations designed to increase doubt in the minds of the leaders as to their capability of controlling the situation in North Vietnam. To this end the following actions should be taken:

(a) Conduct widespread deception operations to create the image of large numbers of in-place covert actions teams operating with at least tacit support of population elements;

(b) Backstop deception operations with short term harassments involving commitment of actual resources for minimum time periods.

(c) Increase deception operations to induce a belief in Hanoi of increased CHICOM intervention in NVN internal matters.

(3) "The mass of the population are relatively invulnerable to ideological argument at this point. But the population is vulnerable to actions which demonstrably place the blame for their present predicament on the current policies of the regime and actions attributable to entities external to the regime but of indigenous origin which assist them in their struggle for survival. The SSPL could enhance its image in the minds of the coastal fishermen by developing means to insure the welfare of the families of detained breadwinners. The development of more effective means for assisting people who wish to leave North Vietnam might achieve significant results.

(4) "The cadres are particularly significant targets for covert operations. The subversive and subsequent defection of selected cadres would greatly increase the regime's suspicion of the cadres. At the same time, many cadres have opened themselves to exploitation by their own venality. Intensified publicization of the defaults of such cadres will increase the credibility of psychological media by inclusion of information verifiable by the people. The discrediting or removal of such cadres would gain additional support from the population.

(5) "The fact that radio operations are reaching at least some cadres, military personnel and better educated elements of the population with favorable reaction suggests that these elements should be the target of intensified operations to induce doubt as to the efficacy of the current policies of the regime in achieving North Vietnamese objectives.

(6) "Some specific operations which should be intensified are suggested by the general background or by past experience. Among these are:

(a) "Increased dissemination of counterfeit money and ration certificates,

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- (b) "Increased dissemination of news on the well-being and status of North Vietnamese individuals in the South;
 - (c) "Wide use of casualty notifications to families;
 - (d) "Notification to families of the presence of specific locations in North Vietnam of personnel returned from the South;
 - (e) "Development of widespread appeals from the general population directly to Ho Chi Minh for relief from the current hardships.
- (7) "In summary, the most significant psychological vulnerabilities of the North Vietnamese regime and people seem to be related to the following factors.
- (a) "Sensitivity of the Hanoi leadership to real or perceived threats to their political leadership and control;
 - (b) "The pragmatic orientation of the peasants and farmers to matters that directly affect their struggle for survival; and
 - (c) "The contradiction between these two factors -- a contradiction that sets the results of the current policies of the regime against the welfare and survival of the general population.
 - (d) "Actions to exploit vulnerabilities are limited by the inherent ethnic/nationalistic pride that would probably reject intervention by obviously external forces."

5. (TS) Recent SACSA Evaluation. In November 1968 the SACSA staff again reviewed various sources** with the objective of identifying psychological vulnerabilities within North Vietnam. This summary report is quoted below.

a. "Prologue

The following analysis of the situation in North Vietnam was prepared in order to identify psychological vulnerabilities. Source material included inputs from SOG and CIA as well as a

* (TS) Report, SACSA, "Impact of Covert Actions Against NVN (TS)" February 1968, p. 18-23.
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b. MSG, SECSTATE, "CONDITIONS IN NVN", 19 Sept 68.
 c. Study, SOG, "Study of NVN Situation", Sept 68.
 d. Reports, FBIS, April-Oct 68.
 e. MSG Traffic, STATE & CAS, April-Oct 68.

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revis of FBIS reports and a analysis of selected CIA and State message traffic. Although objective in nature, the situation described does not differ substantially from the CIA and SOI estimates. Psychological vulnerabilities identified are presently targeted in on going psychological programs.

b. "North Vietnam Today"

"The situation in NV at the present time is bleak at best. The regime, and the country as a whole, face numerous problems which to the eyes of the Westerner seem almost insurmountable. These include economic difficulties, war weariness, some evidence of loss of control and disaffection in segments of the population, and difficulties with major allies. (It is interesting to note that a North Vietnamese analyst could underline the same difficulties in a US Situation Report). There are, however, no firm indications that concern for these difficulties or an inability to keep them within acceptable bounds will force the Hanoi regime to desist from its imperialistic plans for expansion in Southeast Asia.

"Probably of most serious concern at the present moment in this basically agrarian economy is the imminent danger of complete rice crop failure. This possibility stems from a number of causes. Exhortations in various media for more intensive efforts in farm production indicate deficiencies in management, work force - the majority of the farm workers are now women and old men - and an absence of general knowledge of proper farming techniques. Worms and a shortage of fertilizer compound the problem. Recent flooding, caused by typhoons and crop damage to the extensive dike system in addition to the aforementioned factors, has assured serious rice shortages, if not complete crop failure. Reported failures in secondary crops and deficiencies in the animal husbandry program have also been noted. All types of food are in short supply. Further reductions in the rations can be anticipated, however, famine can most likely be averted by continued and increased reliance on food imports.

"North Vietnam's fledgling industrial base has been largely destroyed. What remains, along with traditional handicraft production, is largely dispersed - dispersion in itself causing problems in the delivery of raw materials and finished products as well as social upheaval of employees. Construction of new plants has not been reported nor are damage plants fully repaired. Production and product quality are further hindered by the shortage of skilled laborers, a result of military demands as well as lack of adequate training. Although some products are being displayed at trade fairs and offered for export, serious shortages, especially in consumer goods and through official distribution channels, are reported from various parts of the country. Hardships throughout the populace are the result, however, imports of necessities continue at a high rate. Additionally, recent reports of strong interest in and plans for industrial reconstruction, utilizing foreign technical assistance will, if brought to fruition, offer hope for the future.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-134

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

"North Vietnam's near complete reliance on imports to shore up its sagging economy, not to mention the requirement for importation of foreign arms and ammunition, has created a further economic problem of growing concern for the Hanoi regime. No 'all the best is repaired' with Vietnam has noted that Russia has asked China to repay Soviet aid received prior to the Sino-Soviet split. In the event of future deteriorating relations with Socialist countries could similar demands be made on Hanoi. Further, the mass of imports has placed a continuous strain on the communications system. Despite completion of extensive repairs to railroads, bridges, roads and port facilities since the partial bombing halt in May, reports of backlogs of supplies and excessive delays - up to 50 days - in ship off loading continue to be reported from Haiphong. The country-wide manpower shortage as well as a deficiency in rolling stock are obvious contributors.

"Personal shortages in both food and industrial products are alleviated in many cases by the expediency of resorting to the "Black Market". Prices range to ten times the official rate and despite near universal subsistence wage earnings, this "free market" appears to be increasing in size and scope. Indications of increased tolerance and, in fact, cadre participation in "Black Market" activities, point towards a loss of political control in addition to the obvious conclusion of weaknesses in the socialistic economy.

"A constant regime fear, that its relationships with other Socialist countries may be endangered, is evidenced by the careful path it has tread concerning the Sino-Soviet split. Presumably this is tied to North Vietnam's dependence on both military and economic aid from these Communist giants. There have been, however, recent indications that North Vietnam's relationship with China is deteriorating. Hanoi's agreement to talk in Paris was initially ignored by the Chinese news media. Hanoi supported Russia's invasion of Czechoslovakia - an act which China soundly denounced. Chinese construction and anti-aircraft units are reportedly withdrawing from the northern provinces. There are rumors in the Diplomatic Community that a recent offer of Chinese combat troops was refused and that there are signs on the border stating that China will not abandon Vietnam to the "Revisionists". Since the Vietnamese traditionally fear the Chinese and are, for the present, economically and militarily quite dependent on them, this evident disenchantment displayed by Peking should provide a continuing problem for the regime. Prolongation of the war will probably require political concessions of some type to assure continued Chinese assistance.

"Another problem facing the regime today is maintaining the desired level of control over the populace. Several defections by groups of coastal inhabitants have been attempted. Anti-regime slogans have appeared on building walls in coastal villages. Coastal Catholics refused to sign a government sponsored petition condemning US bomb damage to their church. Draftees have refused to report for duty. One instance of militia disobedience - a case of robbing the body of a US pilot and burying him without informing their superiors - has been reported. Cadre participation in the "Black Market", continued reports of low level cadre corruption and exhortations

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-8 35

Annex A to
Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

by regime media for more effective "rice roots" management indicate possible spreading of disaffection even within the lower governmental ranks. People in Hanoi have disregarded directives to return their children to dispersed schools outside the city. Inhabitants in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An Provinces showed open hostility to soldiers moving south. These reports of dissidence, amnesia and disaffection are significant and undoubtedly cause grave concern. However, security controls are given constant regime attention which, at least at present, precludes formation of any formidable opposition groups.

"Considering the difficulties described one could conclude that the morale of the North Vietnamese should be at a low ebb. Reports to this effect have been received, however, conflicting reports of high morale and no change in the state of morale have also been received. Undoubtedly, the 1 November bombing halt has caused elation, increased hopes for peace and a general increase in morale throughout the populace. However, continuing demands for sacrifices and predictions that the war may continue for years could easily undermine this feeling. Despite these contradictory reports of war weariness, the fact that the war continues despite peace talk efforts and continued regime exhortations to strengthen the fighting spirit indicates that the general state of morale of the people is probably not much higher than in the recent past. Although this condition should cause the regime concern, it is probably minimal due to successful efforts in the past to maintain a sufficient amount of popular support through propaganda efforts and other control mechanisms.

"Despite the fact that each of the internal problems described can probably be resolved or contained within acceptable limits, their cumulative effect would normally indicate a requirement for major policy changes. Concern for such internal problems, coupled with continual heavy military losses, would most probably force a rational (western) regime to abandon its external military adventures.

"Since the Hanoi regime is not convinced, at this time, that its expansionist aims are unobtainable, the North Vietnamese people probably will be urged to continue their sacrifices and strengthen their resolve, with their will being sustained by outside aid and hopes for eventual victory, and will experience little or no improvement in their individual or collective lives in the near future.

c. "Psychological Vulnerabilities

"Identifiable psychological vulnerabilities in North Vietnam continue to be the hardships experienced by the people, war weariness, regime fear of internal dissidence, inefficient state planning, inefficient and corrupt lower level management, and fear of foreign domination. These vulnerabilities are presently targeted in on going psychological programs."*

* (TS) Report, SACSA, "NVI Situation Report, 6 November 1968.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-16

Annex A to
Appendix C

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96213

MACSOG

July 13, 1966

SUBJECT. General Concept for the Organization of the
North Vietnamese Freedom Front (TS)

TO: Commander In Chief, Pacific
Fleet Post Office
San Francisco 96601

1 (TS) REFERENCES:

a. COMUSMACV MACSOG Cite 12069, DTG 071200Z Apr 66 which requested authority to establish a Front organization.

b. CINCPAC Msg, TS-SPECAT/EXCLUSIVE, DTG 070445Z May 66 which requested additional information on the concept of organizing a Front.

2. (TS) NATIONAL POLICY:

a. Basic to the discussion of how to establish a Front organization and keep it within the bounds of applicable national policy is the question "What is the national policy?" For the purposes of this paper the following statements are assumed to outline the parameters of current U.S. national policy vis-a-vis North Vietnam (NVN).

(1) To bring increasing political and military pressure on the government of NVN to cease supporting the war in Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and to negotiate a truce.

(2) To refrain from advocating or inciting any activity which might lead to an internal uprising against the current government of NVN.

(3) To avoid activities which might give Communist China cause for open intervention in NVN.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-137

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-137

TOP SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET~~SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
North Vietnamese Freedom Front (NS)

(4) To maintain a plausible denial for Oplan 34A operations so that they can be continued during any period of peace negotiations between U.S., Republic of Vietnam and North Vietnam.

b. Current national policy is broad enough to permit the organization of a Front organization in RVN to support Oplan 34A operations in NVN. The organization of the Front, as outlined in succeeding paragraphs, will keep the Front within the bounds of U.S. national policy.

3. (TS) GENERAL: At present, SOG does not have access to any personnel assigned or attached with either training or experience in the establishment and operation of political Fronts. Therefore, the doctrine outlined in this paper is confined to a broad general concept. Before any detailed planning for a Front organization can commence a task force of experts must be formed. This task force should include as a minimum representatives of the U.S. Embassy, CAS, USMACV, together with U.S. experts on the political and sociological aspects of NVN and RVN. The principal duty of the task force will be to formulate the detailed plans for the Front organization. Furthermore, it should be recognized that because of the fluid political situation in RVN and the vast spectrum of forces at work, no plan for a Front organization can be completely developed in advance. Rather, the plans as developed must be flexible in order to shift with the changing political climate and to take advantage of unforeseen developments.

4. (TS) MISSION:

a. The mission of the Front is to

(1) Develop and build up in NVN, and in third countries, a psychological atmosphere which will force a change in the current policies of the government of NVN.

(2) Facilitate the broadening and intensifying of Oplan 34A psychological operations.

(3) Provide an overt outlet for black propaganda.

(4) Provide motivation and incentive for 34A airborne and maritime personnel operating in NVN.

(5) Provide credibility for current national Front, the Sacred Sword Patriots' League.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-138

Tab 1 to Annex
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-138

Tab 1 to Annex

MACSOG

SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
North Vietnamese Freedom Front (TS)

(6) Provide the U.S. and RVN a mechanism for plausible denial of 34A operations in NVN.

(7) Provide an outlet for RVN pressure to develop a government sponsored counter organization for the National Liberation Front.

(8) Deny assets of overseas Vietnamese to the government of NVN by gathering their support for the Front.

b An attractive by-product of the Front would possibly be a unifying effect on the people of South Vietnam. Furthermore, if the Chinese Communists were ever to take over or assume an expanded degree of control over the government of NVN, then the Front could form the nucleus of resistance activities.

5. (TS) ORGANIZATION. The Front will be developed through four phases.

a. Phase I:

(1) Organization of a Front Control Group. This group will be composed primarily of U.S. experts and will consist initially of:

- (a) An embassy representative to provide guidance on U.S. policy.
- (b) A CAS representative experienced on the organization of Fronts and similar type organizations.
- (c) A military representative.
- (d) An expert on Vietnamese political and economic affairs.
- (e) A specialist in support and financial matters.
- (f) A Vietnamese with government experience but no strong political affiliations.

(2) The Control Group will be under operational control of Chief, Studies and Observations Group. U.S. political policy guidance will be provided by the U.S. Ambassador.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-139

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~Tab 1 to Annex A

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MACSOG

SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
North Vietnamese Freedom Front (TS)

(3) The initial task for the Control Group will be to identify those target audiences in NVN and third countries which are susceptible to Front operations. These same audiences must also be in a position to influence government of NVN policy.

(4) Once the more remunerative target audiences have been selected, the Control Group will determine which type of political action group will best appeal to each target. At this point a desk officer within the Control Group will be assigned for each proposed action group for the purpose of determining if organization of such a group is feasible, and if so, how it can best be organized. The term "political action group" is used because the ultimate purpose of the group is to exert political force. These groups will resemble political parties in a sense, but they will be more in the character of religious organizations, labor groups, refugee groups, veterans organizations, etc.

(5) It is estimated that Phase I will take approximately six months from the time the Control Group is formed.

b. Phase II: Organization of action groups. (see Annex A, potential Action Groups).

(1) Once the Control Group desk officer has determined that a certain political action group is feasible and can be activated, a U.S. and a Vietnamese case officer will be designated. The U.S. case officer must be a specialist in political organization. The Vietnamese officer should have similar qualifications and may or may not be a member of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Strategic Technical Services (STS).

(2) The case officers will organize the political action group. The case officer's dealings with the action group will be through a third Vietnamese known as the action group handler. The U.S. case officer must remain unknown to the action group handler and to all members of the action group.

(3) Once a political action group has been organized it will develop its identity and political program. These programs will vary from group to group. However, all action groups will be united in their opposition to the aggressive policies of the government of NVN and in their common desire for a free Vietnam.

(4) Action groups will conduct all the activities of normal

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-140

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix CTab 1 to Annex A

1

MACSOS

SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the North Vietnamese Freedom Front (NS)

political parties: meetings, rallies, fund raising campaigns, publicity releases, etc.

(5) Action groups will each be oriented on a specific target audience in NVN, or in third countries, and profess to speak for that audience.

(6) It is estimated that Phase II will take from six months to one year. In some areas Phase II may overlap Phase I.

c. Phase III. Organization of the North Vietnamese Freedom Front.

(1) At any time after two or more political action groups have achieved viability, the Control Group may determine the time is ripe to activate the Front.

(2) The U.S. and Vietnamese case officers for the various political action groups, acting in concert, will exert effort to bring the groups together under a coalition to be known as the North Vietnamese Freedom Front.

(3) Once the Front has been organized it will develop its identity and political program.

(4) It is estimated that Phase III may take up to six months or more. Phase III may overlap Phases I and II in some areas.

d. Phase IV: Expansion of Front activities.

(1) As the Front becomes more viable it will strengthen its hold over subordinate action groups so as to strengthen the power of the Front.

(2) The Front will expand and intensify its efforts directed against the government of NVN. For example, the Front will organize demonstrations to include action groups representing the Buddhists, Catholics, refugees, veterans, etc. Sample slogans under which the action groups could unite for coordinated Front action are. "Stop the Fratricidal War," "Return Freedom of Worship to the People of North Vietnam," "End the War-like Policies of North Vietnam," etc.

6. (NS) CONTROL: Control includes those measures instituted to

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-141

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab 1 to Annex A

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IACSOG

SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
North Vietnamese Freedom Front (25)

insure that the programs and activities of the action groups and the Front remain within the guidelines of U.S. and RVN policy while at the same time supporting U.S. and RVN capability for action group and Front operations. Control will be exercised in four major areas: doctrine, operations, finance and security.

a. **Doctrinal Control** Doctrinal control includes those methods used to insure that the policies and programs of the action groups and the Front remain in consonance with U.S. and RVN policy. The proposed political doctrine of the action groups and the Front will be determined by the U.S. Embassy in coordination with the responsible individual of the government of RVN, preferably the Premier. The proposed political doctrine must also have the concurrence of the U.S. Department of State. The political doctrine as approved by the Governments of the U.S. and RVN will be relayed through Studies and Observations Group (SOG), USMACV, to the case officers for implementation. The political doctrine of the action groups and the Front will be controlled by four different mechanisms:

- (1) The input made by the various case officers into the action groups and the Front.
- (2) By close monitoring of the output of the action groups and the Front
- (3) By changing personalities and/or leadership within the action groups or the Front so as to keep the balance of opinion in the desired direction.
- (4) By adding new action groups or deactivating existing action groups so as to change the overall composition of the Front and thereby change the Front's policies

b. **Operational Control:** Operational control includes those techniques used in organizing the action groups and the Front so as to insure the U.S. maintains control. This will be accomplished primarily by compartmentalizing all aspects of the action groups and the Front so that no one element can wield too much power (see Annex B). Areas to be compartmentalized will include but are not limited to the following.

- (1) The control structure itself, i.e.: between the desk officers of the Control Group and the case officers, between the case officers and the action group handlers, and between the action group

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-142

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C

CO APPENDIX C

1 - 1

MACSOG
 SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
 North Vietnamese Freedom Front (TS)

handlers and the action groups.

(2) Activities of each action group will be so directed as to keep it separated from all other action groups in the Front. The policies and programs of each action group will vary from one another. The unifying policy which will hold the action groups together under the Front is their common desire for an end to North Vietnam's aggression, for a free Vietnam and for a return to peace.

(3) By using Vietnamese who are not members of the SOG counterpart organization, to control some of the political action groups. This will prevent STS from gaining too much influence over action group and Front activities.

(4) By restricting total knowledge of Front activities to a few very select U.S. and RVN officials.

c. Fiscal Control: Fiscal control will be implemented by controlling the funds allocated by the U.S. Government for action group and Front activities. Funds will be withdrawn from those groups which deviate from the desired policy. While this form of control will be easy to implement initially, it can be expected to lose some of its effectiveness as the action groups and the Front gain viability and begin conducting their own fund raising campaigns.

d. Security Control Security control is the term applied to those measures instituted to insure that the internal activities of the action groups and the Front are under continual surveillance. It can be anticipated that as the action groups gain viability they will be targets for penetration by other groups seeking to gain control of, or at the very least, information on the action group's activities. Furthermore, internal maneuvering for power may occur within the action group. In order that the control group be kept fully apprised of the true tenor of activities within each action group a separate informant system will be employed. One or more informants unknown to each other will be placed in each action group. The U.S. case officer will have access to the reports of these informants.

7. (TS) RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM: The action groups and the Front will have both overt and covert relations with the government of RVN

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-143

Tab 1 to Annex
 to Appendix C

Tab 1 to Annex

1

MACSOG

SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
North Vietnamese Freedom Front (NS)

a. Overt. Overtly, the government of RVN will acknowledge the presence of the action groups and the Front, but will give no indication of support other than tacit approval of their activities.

b. Covert.

(1) Covertly, top level government of RVN officials must be made aware of the true purpose of the Front and must render their official sanction. However, because of the nature Vietnamese politics, knowledge of the Front's covert activities should be restricted to a few very select RVN officials. There are certain aspects of the Front which will not be revealed even to these officials, e.g.: the system of clandestine informants within the action groups and the Front.

(2) Because of its position as the SOG counterpart organization, STS officials will have greater knowledge of the Front than any other group of Vietnamese. This could be a potential danger should any officer or group of officers attempt to subvert the Front for their own purposes. This risk can be minimized or averted by timely information received from the clandestine informants and by forming some action groups under Vietnamese who are not members of STS.

8. (TS) COVER STORIES FOR ACTION GROUPS:

a. The cover story will be different for each political action group. It is conceivable that some of the action groups will need no cover story at all as the level of activity will be so low as to require little in the way of funds. What funds are required for the operation of these groups can possibly be obtained through local fund rallies. Therefore, no explanation will be required for the source of the action group's support.

b. At present, it appears that two action groups will need extensive cover stories. One of these groups would be that based on an affiliation of tribal groups such as the Meo, Tai, and the Mongs. These people would have difficulty in explaining the source of any large amount of funds. A possible cover story is that the funds were donated by an unnamed third country, hinting at either Thailand, France or Nationalist China.

c. The other group requiring an extensive cover story is the Sacred Sword Patriots' League (SSPL):

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-144

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 1 to Annex A

4. 1

MACSOC

SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
North Vietnamese Freedom Front (NS)

(1) The SSPL is the denial mechanism for disclaiming U.S. and RVN sponsorship of Oplan 34A activities. For this reason it is among the most important groups of the Front. The SSPL action group will be comprised principally of personnel from STS, although other non-STIS personnel will also be included. The cover story for the SSPL will be that it is the action arm of the Front and that it receives its funds from the Front. While the SSPL action group will refrain from publicly claiming responsibility for Oplan 34A operations, it will acknowledge that the SSPL has active agents in North Vietnam. It will also acknowledge that it is in contact with the SSPL leadership in NVN through a system of clandestine couriers and radio. So long as the SSPL does not make any public announcement of boat and team operations in NVN, there is only a remote possibility that these activities will be connected with the SSPL. This is so since Radio Hanoi and NVN newspapers have never mentioned the SSPL per se, but blame "U.S. puppet commandos and spy rangers" for both boat and agent operations.

(2) By avoiding public announcement of responsibility for Oplan 34A operations the SSPL group will not be forced to provide answers to such questions as: Where did the boats come from?, Who paid for them?, Where are they based?, Where are the agent teams trained?, Where are the leaflets printed?, How are they disseminated?, etc. SSPL radio broadcasts, which local Saigon residents might hear, can be explained by saying the SSPL rented air time from a local station.

(3) The SSPL action group will also be used for the purpose of motivating agent teams and boat crews. The agent teams and boat crews will be told that they have been hired by the SSPL, which is a U.S. based resistance movement, to perform certain specific missions. Upon conclusion of their training the agent team and boat crew members will be sworn in as members of the SSPL. Agent teams will be further indoctrinated that it is their duty to spread the SSPL gospel in NVN, to recruit new members and to establish new SSPL cells in NVN.

(4) Essentially then, the SSPL will have two cover stories, one for general public dissemination and one for agent team and boat crew indoctrination. In order to accomplish this dual deception it will be necessary to keep these two aspects of the SSPL as separate as possible with only a few key individuals having knowledge of the total SSPL organization. For this reason it will be necessary that SSPL action group personnel be restricted principally to members of STS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-145

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 1 to Annex A

MACSOG

SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the North Viet Base Freedom Front (NS)

9 (IS) SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

a Personnel Obtaining Vietnamese personnel to provide the leadership for the Front and the action groups will certainly be a problem, although not insurmountable. Many of the personnel will be members of the SOG counterpart organization, STS. Other persons will be non-STS assets currently on hand, but being used in other assignments. Some personnel will undoubtedly be recruited from among the NVN trial group refugees living in the RVN. Many people will join the various action groups because their personal political convictions coincide with the platform of the action group. Selection of an individual to head the Front will require a great deal of deliberation. However, since the action groups must be formed well in advance of the Front, there will be sufficient time to screen personnel affiliated with these organizations for leadership for the Front.

b Financial Costs associated with the organization and operation of a Front cannot be estimated with any degree of accuracy. A large amount of money will be needed to purchase or rent office space or villas for the action groups and the Front. Funds will be needed to support the cost of printing and distributing Front publications. An unknown number of personnel must be hired at presently undetermined salaries. Furthermore, it can be expected that there will be a considerable amount of travel expenses -- including international travel. Moreover, because of the very nature of a Front operation it can be anticipated a lot of money will be spent over a long period of time before any tangible results appears.

10 (IS) DEACTIVATION OF FRONT/ACTION GROUPS:

It may become necessary to deactivate the Front and/or the action groups either because the mission has been accomplished or because the Front or action groups are not responding properly to controls. The following methods may be used for deactivation:

- a Withholding financial support.
- b. Causing action group to split into ineffective factions over policy differences.
- c. Banning of the Front and/or action groups by the Government of RVN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-146

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 2 to Annex A

LACSO3
 SUBJECT: General Concept for the Organization of the
 North Vietnamese Freedom Front. (IS)

11. (TS) RISKS.

The organization of a Front movement as proposed herein is not without its risks. The Front will eventually involve a large number of Vietnamese who are politically motivated. These are the type people needed if the front is to be effective. However, the control of people of this type temperament will be increasingly difficult as the Front develops. In addition, the organization of a Front will require a large amount of funds with only a small part forthcoming from the people. Since the U. S. is the principal source of funds in RVN, it is inevitable that the Front will eventually be attributed to the U.S. In addition, for any such organization to become active, past experience has shown that non-U.S. personnel will state the fact that the Front is U.S. backed as a major selling point. The U.S. must be prepared to accept this attribution.

12. (TS) SUMMARY:

It is reemphasized that this plan is only a general concept. Before detailed planning can begin it is necessary that authority be granted to organize the Front. Once authorization is received, the required experts can be assembled to undertake the thorough research essential for comprehensive planning. Because of the extensive time delay between the commencement of planning and the initial activities of the action groups/Front (12 to 18 months or more), authority to organize the Front should be granted as soon as possible. This authorization subsequently can be withdrawn if at any time the concept of a Front organization appears unfeasible.

FOR THE COMMANDER.

/s/RICHARD S. ABBEY
 Major General, USAF
 Deputy Chief of Staff

2. Incl
 1 Annex A - Potential Political
 Action Groups
 2 Annex B - Front Control
 Structure

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-147

Tab 1 to Annex A
 to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-147

1 - 1

ANNEX A - SEVERAL POLITICAL ACTION GROUPS

The political action groups which will be most effective are those which can communicate to a target audience in NVN or third countries having similar political, economic or ethnic backgrounds. The target audience not only must be susceptible to the action groups' propaganda, but also must be in a position to influence the policies of the government of NVN. It is believed that the political, economic and ethnic groupings which would emerge in NVN, should the communist government permit it, would generally parallel the present groupings of NVN. For this reason and the reasons listed below it is felt that political action groups, approximately organized, could appeal to the target audiences listed below. The following, however, do not represent a complete listing of all suitable target audiences located in NVN.

CATHOLICS: The Catholics of NVN, numbering approximately 300,000, have been the objects of constant harassment and intimidation by the government. There is also evidence of considerable suspicion of Catholics by the government.

HEO TRIBAL GROUP: This group has already participated in dissident activities. There are indications that the Heos resent government interference in their opium trade.

WORKERS - FARMERS - FISHERMEN - BUSINESSMEN: There remain many individuals among these groups who still refuse to join cooperatives. Many businessmen still resent the government take over of their businesses. Middle class farmers still revere the terror of the government's land reform program. Workers are exploited to a greater and greater degree. Fishermen are forced to steal fish in order for their families to survive.

BUDDHISTS: Many Buddhists resent the government's use of sacred pagodas for offices or warehouses. There is also resentment that the government cannot or will not provide food and other supplies for religious ceremonies, weddings, funerals, holidays, etc.

NATIONALIST PARTY OF VIETNAM (V.QDD) This organization formed in 1927 has fought both the communists and the Viet Minh. There are possibly many former members of this party still living in NVN who would rally to the old cause, given the opportunity.

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
C-a-143

Tab 1 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-143

to Appendix C

1.1 1



~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-149

Tab 1 to Annex A to Appendix C

Tab 1 to Annex A

1 2

CURRENT VOF PROGRAMMING

VOF currently produces 76 different programs weekly. In the following list, titles have been put into those categories which best describe the programs primary purpose. Short descriptions are included for those whose titles are not self-explanatory.

ENTERTAINMENT

1. Vietnamese Traditional Music . (20"; 7 times per week)
2. Vietnamese Selected Modern Music . (17"; 14 times per week)
3. Narrative Folk Songs : (17"; 2 times per week)
4. Evolved Folk Songs : (17"; 2 times per week)
5. Old Tunes : (17"; 2 times per week)
6. Free Songs : (17", 2 times per week)

This program consists of patriotic Vietnamese songs from the period the French Resistance. The composers of many of these songs are still living in the North. The music presented in this program is prohibited in the North, and its presentation on VOF affords the listener his only source.

7. International Classical Music (35", 7 times per week)
8. International Sweet Music . (25"; 14 times per week)

Soft and comforting music, which is presented during the early hours of the morning.

9. International Vogue Music : (17", 14 times per week)

Popular music from such countries as France, England, and the United States.

10. International Selected Music . (17"; 7 times per week)
11. Selected Modern Music : (17"; 7 times per week)

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-150

Tab 2 to Annex f
to Appendix C

Tab 2 to Annex f

Tab 2

12. Dawn Music : (15", 7 times per week)

Lively music presented at the beginning of each day, intended to start the listener's day off right.

13. Epic Song : (15", 7 times per week)

The music presented on this program is of the traditional folk type, and each song tells of an historical event in the development of Vietnam.

14. VOF Selected Music : (20", 8 times per week)15. VOF Chorus : (17"; 4 times per week)

One of the most popular programs on the VOF schedule. The VOF Chorus is composed of approximately 20 members of the VOF staff, who in addition to working as broadcasters, are well known professional singers and musicians. The material produced by the Chorus is placed in the VOF tape library, and is presently one of the most complete collections of folk music, in S. E. Asia.

16. Sound of Poetry : (17", 4 times per week)

Various forms of poetry set to music, and performed by well known Vietnamese musical groups.

17. International Folk Songs : (20"; 14 times per week)18. Returnees Songs . (17"; 2 times per week)

Features well known musicians and singers who have defected to the South. They perform the music that is currently popular in the North, and from the reports received from other returnees, draw a very large listening audience.

19. Ly Tao Band : (17", 2 times per week)

A popular group that performs the music currently popular in VN as well as other countries.

20. Thang Long Trio . (17"; 1 time per week)

One of the most famous musical groups in SVN, performing the music of the day.

21. Hoai Phuong Show : (20"; 14 times per week)~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-151

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-151

to Appendix C

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Personable and popular Hoai-Pnuong speaks intimately to the Northern troops and caeres on Current Events, Life in the South, and the progress made in the fields of politics, economy, literature and arts. Her comments are interspersed among various types of popular music.

22. Tran Quan Show . (20"; 14 times per week)

Male disc jockey format, consisting of selected songs with continuity to support the weekly feature themes.

23. Words in the Night . (40"; 14 times per week)

One of two programs featuring Thai Thanh, probably the most famous and well liked female personality in both North and South VII. As she plays soft music during the late nights hours, she speaks intimately to the Northern troops on various subjects, including life in the South and the hardships of war.

24. New Talent Program : (17"; 2 times per week)

Professional, though not yet well known performers are afforded an opportunity to gain exposure and at the same time furnish VOF with a versatile and popular program.

25. Live Neo-Classical Theater.: (50", 7 times per week.)

Neo-classical plays, performed by large theatrical groups, are now in vogue in South Vietnam. Every evening, VOF technicians attend the theater performances to record plays which are of great artistic value and uphold the free life in the South. Neo-classical plays are now also popular in the North as told to us by Communist defectors and prisoners. Each play is prepared in such a way that it can be wholly broadcast on four successive days. For the remaining three days of the week, VOF broadcasts the plays performed by three selected traditional musical groups in the VOF studios.

26. English Music Program : (15"; 7 times per week)

15 minute segment of the daily 30 minute English language program. It features English language music, but not necessarily American in origin.

27. French Music Program : (15", 7 times per week)

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-152

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-152

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 2

15 minute segment of the daily 30 minute French language program. It features music of French origin and flavor, performed by currently popular French recording artists.

28. Woman's Program : (15", 2 times per week)

Standard radio-format featuring current trends in fashion, cooking, and items of general interest to women.

29. Little Huyen's World : (15", 2 times per week)

Children's program which views life and everyday occurrences through the eyes and ears of a child. The situations and adventures facing Huyen give some insight into a child's life in the South.

30. Mr. Giao's Family : (27", 2 times per week)

Characters are fictitious but reflect real-life situations. They came to SVN as refugees in 1954, and through the program, listeners in the North can gain an insight into the possibilities to start a new and rebuild in the South. Daily situations are handled by the family, and although it aims at persuasion it is soft-sell in nature.

31. Thay Hai's Family : (27", 2 times per week)

Similar in format to Mr. Giao's Family, this program features a family that is native to the South. It attempts to show the way of life in the more affluent South.

32. Dramas Serials : (20"; 6 times per week)

Adapted from works of well-known authors now banned in North Vietnam (such as Koestler, Pasternak).

33. Vietnamese Activities in Culture and Art : (17"; 1 time per week)

Features the most recent developments in the culture and art of Vietnam.

34. Vietnamese Traditional Theater and Plays : (27"; 2 times per week)

Performed by VOF performers in the VOF studios.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a- 153

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a- 153

!
to Appendix C

35. Vietnam Night and Day . (20", 4 times per week)

Although travelogue in nature, this program goes beyond merely narrating various guests' travels around the country. The well known travelers comment on the effects of the war on the beauty of Vietnam, and how the programs of redevelopment are progressing around the country. Various national landmarks are described and historically traced, and locations of interest to the listeners are verbally pictured.

36. Interesting Story : (20"; 2 times per week)

Short stories or condensed books narrated with music and sound effects. The emphasis in story selection is placed on romantic stories upholding love and sentiment of which people in the communist North are deprived.

37. Roman Catholic Program : (15"; 2 times per week)

38. Buddhist Program : (15", 2 times per week)

Buddhism and Catholicism being the two major religions of VN, each week influential Catholic Priests and Buddhist Monks well known by Northern religious followers are invited to give religious talks. Hymns are also introduced in this program format.

39. Reading and Reflections : (10", 2 times per week)

Thought provoking articles, book passages, magazines, are read and then considered in retrospect. The person at the microphone effects the program as though he were thinking aloud, rather than directing a commentary to the audience.

INFORMATION

1. Newscasts . (Vietnamese)

<u>Length</u>	<u>Number per day</u>	<u>Number per week</u>
3"	19	133
5"	6	42
8"	2	14
9"	2	14
10"	12	84

Total newscast time for one day : 240"
 Total newscast time for one week : 1,680

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-154

Tab 2 to Annex A
 to Appendix C

Tab 6 to Annex A

1 . 2 _

2. Newscasts (English) (10', 7 times per week)
Segment of the daily 30 minute English language broadcast.
3. Newscasts (French) . (10', 7 times per week)
Segment of the daily 30 minute French language broadcast.
4. This Date in History : (5', 14 times per week)
Presents daily the account of historical incidents which happened on the same day in the past.
5. Reading of Dailies . (10", 14 times per week)
Press articles, with comments on events of the day. This program is also designed to highlight the freedom of speech in SVN.
6. Daily Special Events Coverage . (15"; 14 times per week)
One of VOF's most highly regarded offerings. Special events teams under the auspices of the News Department travel around the country collecting interviews and on-the-spot coverage of important events. The teams then return to VOF where the tapes are edited and combined with music and sound effects where appropriate, to produce an accurate coverage of the important events of the day.
7. Activities Abroad (17", 2 times per week)
The latest developments in art, music, theater, literature, etc. of the countries of the world are presented and discussed.
8. Activities at Home . (17", 2 times per week)
The latest developments in art, music, theater, literature in VN.
9. Recapitulation of Weekly News . (10"; 2 times per week)
A summary of the important news stories of the past week.
10. Science and Life : (10", 2 times per week)
Current progress in the areas of science and daily living from around the world. Discoveries and breakthroughs in such areas as medicine and the latest advances in technology are discussed.
11. Program for Vietnamese Living Abroad : (27"; 2 times per week)

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-155

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-155

to Appendix C

1/ 2

For those Vietnamese citizens of the South who are residing either by choice or chance in other countries within VCT's coverage, this program presents the latest changes and developments in the homeland. New buildings in the cities, new programs of redevelopment, new enterprises are presented.

12. Youth Panel : (15"; one time per week)

Interviews or discussions with Vietnamese youths about subjects of interest to Northern youths.

13. Daily Battle Scene . (20", 2 times per week)

Coverage of military exploits, true battlefield stories, and exemplary deeds performed on the battlefield. Music and/or sound effects where appropriate.

14. The World Today : (10"; 2 times per week)

A discussion of current events both inside and outside VN. Socio-economic trends and developments are examined in depth.

15. Common Ideal : (10", 2 times per week)

The aim here is to present the Free World aid to VN. The activities of friendly countries' missions as well as the Allied Forces deeds in VN are examined in light of their good will and the common bond with SVN.

16. Our Villages and Hamlets : (15"; 4 times per week)

An examination of life in rural SVN. The current programs of redevelopment as well as new processes in agriculture and industry are discussed.

17. Profile of the Week . (10", 2 times per week)

Interviews with people who have demonstrated commendable diligence in their work or have made great contributions to the present struggle for freedom, showing the spirit and morale of the people of the South. Main interviewees on this program are workers, peasants, cadres and soldiers. We don't put them on a pedestal, but rather present the facts surrounding their performance.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-156

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-156

to Appendix C

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1. Commentaries : (Vietnamese) (7"; 28 times per week)
 (English) (5", 7 times per week)
 (French) (5"; 7 times per week)

Worthy and current news items are treated in such a way, that the listener sees the true side of the question. Fallacy of claims and accusations of the communist bloc are revealed through factual examination. The efforts of the South in the current struggle exemplify a nation under aggression.

2. News Analysis (5"; 14 times per week)

Similar in treatment to the VOF commentaries, the news analysis take a particular news story and develops it in depth, supplying additional facts and background information.

3. Family News Announcement : (7"; 35 times per week)

Announcement of news concerning the fate of infiltrated NVA troops who are killed, wounded, captured, or have defected. Names and addresses given to relatives in the North.

4. Life in the Socialist World : (10"; 8 times per week)

Based on VC prisoner interrogations, interviews with returnees, and communist press and radio broadcasts, we select news items concerning the life of people in the communist countries. We attempt to point up and analyze their way of life, and demonstrate that the misery and wretchedness endured by the people in socialist countries are the consequences of communist policy. Much exploitation is made of the increasing criticism of the communist life of leading communist party members.

5. Propaganda and Truth : (10"; 6 times per week)

The inconsistencies among communist doctrines as expressed by each member of the communist bloc are exploited. False claims of the communists and contradictions within the communist publications are examined. Twenty-four-hour-daily monitoring of Radios Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking provides much of the material.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-157

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-157

to Appendix C

_ 2 _

6. Open Arms Program . (2", 4 times per week)

Experiences of returnees in their quest for freedom. We go beyond their arrival and follow up on their life after defection. Produced with the co-operation of the Open Arms Department, we present songs, letters, and poems written by returnees themselves.

7. Chum of Men Under Arms (2", 3 times per week)

Produced for North Vietnamese troops. Famous singer personality Thai Thanh talks with and interviews VC defectors. She tries to convince the NVA soldiers of the futility of their sacrifice of lives and material. Music of the Anti-French resistance period, which has strong appeal for genuine patriotism is presented.

8. I Choose Freedom . (15"; 6 times per week)

Actual histories of defectors are recreated in dramatic format. The suspense, danger, hardships and success of the defection are presented, and the reasons for defecting are told by the individual himself.

9. Talk to the North . (10"; 6 times per week)

Problems of the war are discussed, as they affect the future of VN, including permanent effects of the struggle and the future rebuilding. Analysis of communist arguments informs the listener of the nature and purpose of communist propaganda.

10. Sentimental Letter . (4 times per week)

Letter from a Hoi Chanh to a relative in NVN (name and address of latter included in program) telling of his troubles in infiltrating into SVN, his disillusionment in fighting against the GVN, disease suffered, his reasons for rallying.

11. Think on These Things . (15"; 3 times per week)

Authoritative and influential personalities talk to the North cadre on long-range issues. Points out the errors and defects in Communist policies and theories and presents in each established theme, our contrasting point of view.

12. Joint Efforts for National Reconstruction : (10", 2 times per week)

Here we present the political life in SVN with special emphasis on the election of the National Assembly, the activities of that Assembly and various political groups and the efforts of both the SVN Government and people to build democracy. Interviews and talks of personalities may be introduced in this program, along with appropriate background music and sound effects.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-153

Tab 2 to Annex 1
to Appendix C

Tab 2 to Annex 1

13. On the Way to Liberate . (15", 2 times per week)

With a more sat sarcastic title this program relates the hardships and sacrifices the NV. troops are forced to make as they come into the South with the idea that they are on a 'liberation mission'. Actual interviews with returnees tell the troops of the North that they are misinformed by their leaders, and they in fact are the ones who need to be liberated.

14. Liberation Deeds : (10", 2 times per week)

Carrying also, a sarcastic title, this program relates the accounts of the communist sabotage and terrorist activities against the civilian population of SVN, as they purportedly attempt to "liberate them".

15. For The Northern Troops : (15'; 2 times per week)

Moderated by former VC Lt. Colonel Huynh Cu, this program carries the remarks of a militant, 22 years a member of the party before he rallied.

16. Our Problems . (15"; 2 times per week)

Produced for North Vietnamese intellectuals and students, and is chaired by Professor Phan Thanh Tai, ex-lecturer at the Hanoi comprehensive University. He presents the implications and long-range considerations of continuing the present war of aggression.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-159

Tab 2 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 2 to Annex A

" 3

INDICATIONS OF HANOI REACTIONS

Radio Hanoi, domestic service in Vietnamese, 0430 GMT, 21 Sep, broadcast an article for Tuyen Quang Journal (Journal of Tuyen Quang province, north central NVN). Article pointed out, in addition to "Special warfare and war of destruction, US imperialists were still stepping up psywar by spreading false reports & cropping spy rangers in our rear to make preparations for execution of new, adventurous military plan aimed at destruction of our secured rear." Article further stated that people must, on one hand, strengthen "People's air revolutionary vigilance and carry out "3-don'ts" slogan. "3 don'ts" is "don't know, don't speak and don't listen". They must carry out "task of defense and preservation of order; fight spy rangers everywhere". In addition, article appeals to the people to incorporate "military habits into daily way of life, dress and work". This is designed to "get people accustomed to wartime".

This appeal is not in reaction to any specific SOG operation, but is a reaction in general to SOG and other VN/US psywar programs. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 815/301107Z SEP 65)

Team debriefs and interrogations for last 3 months indicate coast is alert very night. LOKI XIX final report indicates that fishermen returning at night must anchor 100 mtrs from beach and send swimmer ashore to contact patrols before landing. Even with this procedure, fishermen have been fired upon when returning with the catch. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 655/161341Z SEP 65)

The 2 Aug 65 issue of Nhan Dan (People's Daily) received this office on 27 Aug contained an article entitled, "Lets defeat the Psychological Warfare". The article mentioned the "US imperialists" use of "Psychological Warfare" simultaneously with the "Escalation of Subversive War". As part of psychological warfare, the editorial states that the US imperialists are using "Radio, leaflets, and psywar boxes, which contain children's toys, clothes and leaflets". This portion of the article refers to radio and leaflets in general and there is no way of telling whose leaflets or radio they refer to. The "PsyWar boxes", they are referring to, are gift kits disseminated by SOG. The remainder of the article tells

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-160

Tab 3 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 3 to Annex A

4' 3

of the resoluteness and determination of the people, and how this will "defeat" the psywar as it has "defeated" the US "subversive" (air strikes) on the north (COMUSMACV MACSOG 587/021226Z SEP 65)

Description of Leaflets: The words, Sacred Sword Anti-Communist Patriotic League was printed on the front of leaflet and various unknow printing on the back of leaflet. A second leaflet showed a Vietnamese peasant wearing a battered hat and standing with his back bent. The fishermen did not know what the leaflets said. The leaflets were all confiscated by the security forces, if the people wanted to read the leaflets, they had to hide them, in defiance of government directives. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 495/201230Z AUG 65)

Excerpt from an article appearing in the newspaper, Tien Phong (Vanguard), dated 25 Jul 65, NBR 1378, Page 4, Subject "Contemptible gifts". The article contained quotation from a letter as follows: "A university student in Hanoi received a letter and gift box from a person living in the capitalist capital city. He couldn't believe receiving a letter and a gift box but it was true - his name and address were correctly posted. He finally realized that the sender was one of his uncles who lived abroad, security office claim that this is a dangerous trick played by the US psywar office. The US either intercept ones address by means of mail or use the name of ones relatives who live abroad. They also collect addresses from public newspapers and magazines to send letters or gift boxes, in an attempt to lower the morale of the people". Comment: SOG is mailing letters, but as yet no gift packages. Perhaps this particular case is legitimate mail. However, the article is an indication that recently stepped-up mail operations have been effective and pose a threat to the DRV. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 427/130925Z AUG 65)

Article entitled, "Some Features in the Spying Activities of the US Imperialists and their Lackeys in the War of Sabotage". In recent days, they resorted to many forms of psychological warfare activities, ranging from the use of radio broadcasting stations, leaflets, and anonymous letters with counter-revolutionary contents slandering us with many despicable and disgusting arguments to the spreading of false rumors and fabricating thrilling and attractive stories in the hope of creating skepticism, the fear of war and the fear of the US among our people. They used to take advantage of the poor political standards, the inquisitiveness and talkiveness

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-161

Tab 3 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 3 to Annex A

3

of a number of persons in order to use them as "Loudspeakers" to disseminate their psychological warfare work in an unconscious way" power efforts have caused Hanoi to call on the people to defeat the psychological warfare of the US".

Radio Hanoi broadcast 2 Aug 65 made following comment: "The US and its stooges are intensifying their propaganda efforts with radio broadcasts and leaflets, and using psywar tactics composed of children's clothes enclosed with leaflets. The imperialists psychological warfare aims to weaken our peoples determination to fight to win, but it will bitterly dissipate like their aggressive war. Finally concluded, "Our patriotism and determination to fight and win will never be shaken by their psywar". (COMUSMACV MACSOG 27552/06091Z AUG 65)

A Jul 65, entitled "The fate of leaflets dropped on Dong Hamlet". The end portion of the broadcast commented on gift kits received by the people. Broadcast were statements by NVN citizens as they turned the items over to security personnel. Comments were that the gifts soaked in the blood of southern compatriots...I will never touch it..This broadcast was the first time radio Hanoi has mentioned gifts as such.

In 14 Jun 65 issue of Thenhan Dan (Peoples Daily) as well known NVN poet wrote a poem entitled "Some ideas along the Road." His poem concerned gifts of radios, children's clothes, handkerchiefs, and fountain pens found in Quang Binh province. The poem commented on the broadcasts from the south which he heard on a gift radio. He said the radios, the broadcasts, and President Johnson were all "flirting" with the north and he satirically commented that maybe the gifts were part of President Johnson's aid to SE Asia plan. This considered reaction to Drift II (6 Jan 65) during which 29 radios were put ashore. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 24669/160936Z JUL 65)

Hanoi via international service in English 29 Jun: Hanoi charges that the US and Lackeys have resorted to such contemptible tricks as spreading of millions of leaflets to distort the truth about the struggle of the VN people and slander the DRV government. Also wherever the enemy dropped toys or clothing, the people immediately collected them and brought them to the local administration or fighters of the peoples security armed forces nearest them.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-162

Tab 3 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-162

to Appendix C

T 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

Hanoi in VI to SVN 4 Jul: (Excerpt from article "The Fate of US leaflets dropped on the Dong halet". There were lost of leaflets, about a ton of them the compatriots, without urging one another, were turning the leaflets which the Americans had just dropped over to the authorities and were discussing their contents the Americans intend to alienate our people from the party and the government. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 23692/090802Z JUL 65)

Interrogations of ralliers and analyses of North Vietnamese publications reveal radio "Red Flag" being listened to and is effective in confusing middle-level, and in some cases high-level, cadre of Dong Lao Don and national liberation front of South Vietnam (NLF-SVN). According ralliers cadres instructed not to listen to radio. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 4370/120149Z FEB 65)

In a 5 page article titled "Lets Struggle against the US Imperialists Psychological Warfare" in the September issue of Hoc Tap (Official organ of the Lao Dong party), the author Vu Lac, exhorted the NVN people to struggle against and defeat the US psywar. The article was concerned with all aspects of psywar, but in three instances it referred to operations of the type conducted by this organization.

"Sometimes they (NVN people) receive letters, "Friendly gifts", which are amicably presented by the US Government.."

"...The US imperialists set all their hopes on reactionary Lackies. They are spies, brigands, rangers, and reactionary elements..."

"Recently---our compatriots picked up US leaflets, but they did not want to read them; they saw "PsyWar Boxes" but they did not want to take them..."
The article concludes by stating that the north must attend to political manipulation and combine work with other work in order to block the US imperialists psywar.

This article is one of an increasing number of press and radio comments concerning defense against psywar. It indicates that the letter, operations, gift kits, and "spies" are getting through to, and having an affect on the target. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 35277/071150Z OCT 65)

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-163

Tab 3 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 3 to Annex A

7 - 4 -

RESULTS OF PRISONER INTERROGATIONS

"Source #73, once heard villagers talking with one another: "We are often told that our armed forces are powerful but, we have never seen the government (NVN) sending any aircraft up to chase SVN "birds" who everyday fly overhead.

Fearful - we can do nothing but stand by our trenches, we will die of hunger soon!" As it is impossible to work in the daylight, we have to work in the night time, but we are antagonized by SVN ships. Why doesn't the NVN government ships intervene?"

Leaflets and gift boxes:3181 - Leaflets:

Before Tet, "Year of the Serpent", 1965 - while seeking firewood, sources picked up numerous leaflets at a pine forest (Liem Bac hamlet) approximately at TBD. YD. 118,987. Leaflets were small and square pieces of white paper type-written on one side. Its content said:

- All properties of the people were concentrated into the government's hand.

- Prices were fixed by state-owned stores, thus the people had to buy goods expensively etc... On the other side of leaflet, was designed a sword with some words on the top of it: "The Sacred Sword for Liberation".

The Sources and other persons had a chance to read those leaflets, however, after reading, they put them back where they were found as they dared not to take leaflets home for fear of being criticized.

Sources said, they did not know where and how the leaflets got there, but they found the leaflet's content very suitable to their needs and their current situation. Later, militiamen and Security agents came to pick up all leaflets and brought them to an unknown place.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a- 164

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a- 164

to Appendix C

5182 - Gift boxes.

According to some Sources, on three different occasions a numerous amount of boxes were seen drifting towards shore, activities prior to Tet 65. On the 2 mornings before Tet 1965, fisherman of the Liem Lap hamlet while fishing in the early morning, saw numerous transparent plastic boxes, through which they could see items such as:

- Children clothes.
- Handkerchief.
- Lighter.
- Pencil.
- Fan and pen holder.
- Line and hook.

Most of the fishermen along with the hamlets security agents and local government officials gathered all the gift boxes. Some of them picked up as many as 5, 10 and others even 20 boxes.

Later concerning of this incident, village security agents and those of the Ngu Thuy Post immediately confiscated a number of gift boxes from the fishermen and took them back to the Post. They also warned the people. "Do not touch these dangerous things. Anyone of you who may have opened them - do not bring them home for use for they will explode. If you wear those trangs, after 3 months and 10 days, your skin will be swollen and you will be dead, you should know that the enemy has soaked those things in poison".

Upon hearing of this, they were quite afraid - However, they still opened the gift boxes carefully. Some fishermen boiled the clothing for hours, they dyed them another color and gave them to the children to wear.

A child and a nephew of the Source #73's (Tran-NGUNG) had worn this clothing for 4 or 5 months but nothing wrong happened to them.

Government officials were "good-for-nothing" and were boastful persons. In effect, their children enjoyed more gift boxes than anyone else. Every box contained a small piece of paper generally saying: "To NVN compatriots and pupils, a humble gift".

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-165

Tab 4 to Annex 1
to Appendix C

Tab 4 to Annex 1

The 3rd time it happened was on May 2, 1965 - Less than 2 weeks prior to Sources' arrest.

On the morning of 2/5/65 - while fishing, fishermen saw several large and small boxes. The small boxes, contained children clothing and handkerchiefs. The large boxes were sealed with a green tape and carefully wrapped in a nylon bag.

Inhabitants in Sources' hamlet found 8 large boxes. Source #73 picked up one himself.

Upon opening the nylon bag, they found the box inside very light and soft. If dropped in the water, it would float. While Source peeled off the green tape and opened the box, he saw a radioset, about 25cm long, 10cm high. The Source turned the knobs on but heard nothing. He saw something resembling a button with a long wire connected to one side of the radio-set. Putting the object into his ear, he heard soft music. When the button was removed from the radio-set, the voice came on loud. Full of joy, he hastily ran back home, and called his neighbors to listen to it.

Source turned a knob on the right side of radio set, and he heard many Vietnamese-spoken stations with good music however, he did not know whether they were Southern or Northern stations.

Opening a small lid underneath the radio-set, he found three batteries inside of it.

Three additional ones were contained in a white box. Like the other people, he listened to the radio-set all day long (but working hours) but two days later, Village Security agents and those from the Ngu Thuy Post went to every house, and said: "Let authorities make an investigation to see whether there is explosive material in the radio-set. If there is no explosive material it will be returned to you!" the people waited a week and still they had not given radio-sets back to the people.

They confiscated 27 radio-sets within the Tuong Lai Commune (perhaps, the people still concealed some). Source #73 kept on his a "listening button" (earphone) until the day he was arrested; then he dropped it into the sea.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-2-166

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C

Tab 4 to Annex A

4

Impressions of some sources toward Security Agents' deed:

The people were very worried and angry, because the Security agents deceived them. The gift boxes had been confiscated with the pretext that they contained explosive material but now they knew that they had been deceived. They hoped that the next time they found gift boxes, they would conceal them for their use. They were generally pleased at finding these gifts because they could never dream of ever having them of this type.

In every boxes, there was a piece of paper. The content of which they vaguely remembered as saying "This radio-set is donated to NVN people. Do not allow anyone to take it from you. Keep it to follow the situation".

In the daylight, they hide in trenches for fears of aircrafts. Because production has decreased, cadres have been begun to tell the people the following:

"Because you are afraid of aircraft, after eating - you just remain in hiding in trenches, we shall die of hunger soon. So, let's work! We'd rather die with a full stomach!"

They also encouraged fishermen to work during daylight as they did in peace-time "for aircrafts only attack important places (?), not fishermen".

Nevertheless, a majority of the fishermen did not respond to that appeal except a few persons - who might be in dire need of money." (COMUSMACV Final Report TRIDENT V)

There were rumors that, during the night at 9 July 1965 - rangers, using rubber-boat, landed on the coast. They hid their boat in a nearby shrub (tracks of the boat were seen).

They advanced 3km onto the mainland in the Yen Diem area (WF 910,450), and laid 25 radio-sets there, one of which was switched on. These radio-sets were discovered by a peasant who went to sell firewood at 0200. Local militiamen and security agents confiscated them all.

Local inhabitants tacitly acknowledged that "it was a real success for the rangers" as they advanced deeply into the mainland without being discovered.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-167

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-167

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C

T, 2

Leaflets to appeal the people:

During the last 3 months, the people at this locality, have picked up leaflets. They are as big as a hand are printed on 2 sides.

The contents of the leaflets are as follows:

- Down with HO, and the lackeys of Red Chinese.
- The reasons of the US and Vietnamese airstrikes.
- Appeal the population to keep away from the VC military locations.
- Appeal the population not to permit their sons and brothers to join the VC Army.

According to the source, the people's morale is very tense, not only because they lead a hard and insufficient life, but they are also frightened of the US and Vietnamese airstrikes. Therefore, they feel that their lives are not secure.

More or less they have lost their confidence in the VC propaganda. The source was told that hundreds of airplanes were shot down, but in reality the people have not seen the downed aircraft. On the contrary, the airplanes and airstrikes have intensified day after day.

Prior to the airstrikes, they received newspapers one day after publication now it takes 1 month. Therefore, they have to listen to the Cooperative's radio set. However, the radio set's meter bands are fixed, so that they can only listen to "the Voice of Vietnam" broadcasting from Hanoi. Other information facilities they must rely on are:

- Cadre's propaganda devices.
- Public opinion.

(COMUSMACV Final Report PSYHAR I Dtd 27 Sep 65)
(CTRL #003098-65)

PSYOPS. Gift Kits & leaflets were picked up by detainees.

Gift Kits. Sources from both areas reported seeing small plastic boxes floating in sea. Local security service informed people that boxes had explosives and/or poisonous gases that would infect the people w/ incurable disease.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-168

Tab L to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-168

to Appendix C

7 1 4

Officials confiscated most of the boxes but in Quang Khe area some of the people hid, and eventually used articles. (Note: this was done only after reading articles and testing them on their dogs). After hearing that officials were using gifts themselves, the people became suspicious and realized they had been tricked.

Leaflets. Sources from Quang Khe area reported picking up 2 types of 10cm by 20cm sized leaflets bearing words: Sacred Sword Patriot and Sacred Sword Anti-Communist Patriotic League. As in the case of the gift boxes, leaflets were confiscated by authorities.

VOA. LOKI XIV detainees reported being able to listen to VOA for short period of time while they were at sea. In comparing VOA station w/Hanoi station, sources stated that they thought VOA's info was more authentic than that of Hanoi. (Note- Radio confiscated during LOKI XIV is Japanese made National model T-66 3-band receiver. Its frequency is controlled between 950 & 1300 kilocycles. VOA is currently operating within this frequency range & therefore, it is possible to listen to VOA even on a controlled tuning radio). (COMUSMACV 161341Z SEP 65)

The 2 Aug 65 issue of Nhan Dan (People's Daily) received this office on 27 Aug contained an article entitled, "Lets defeat the psychological warfare". The article mentioned the "US imperialists" use of "Psychological Warfare" simultaneously with the "Escalation of Subversive War". As part of psychological warfare, the editorial states that the US imperialists are using "Radio, Leaflets, and psywar boxes, which contain children's toys, clothes and leaflets". This portion of the article refers to radio and leaflets in general and there is no way of telling whose leaflets or radio they refer to: The "Psywar Boxes", they are referring to, are gift kits disseminated by SOG. The remainder of the article tells of the resoluteness and determination of the people, and how this will "defeat" the psywar as it has "defeated" the US "subversive" (air strikes) on the north.

Fisherman captured on LOKI XX reported that in Apr 65, leaflets from the Sacred Sword Patriots League were being circulated by the population of Hai-Thinh village, Hai-Hau district, Nam-Dinh province. No SSPL leaflets were dropped in Nam-Dinh province during this time period, this indicates that the leaflets are being passed northward by local citizens.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-169

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C

4

Fisherman captured on PsyWar I said he had heard of a group of "Commandos" which had landed near Lem-Diem. The group left 25 transistor radios. Populace found the radios, but had them confiscated by government troops. Populace "felt that the area had fallen to hostile control" and it created a loss of confidence in the Hanoi government.

Fisherman captured on LOKI XXIV reported that a "US Naval vessel" came to Hon-No in Jun 65 and fired three to five illuminating flares and leaflets at Canh Duon village. The leaflets said that there were gifts in the sea. Cooperative members picked up the gift kits, since they contained radios, they were all confiscated by security personnel. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 587/021226Z SEP 65)

During the period July 64, while fishing in the open sea off Quang Khe, many packages were noticed floating. The fishermen immediately reported this to the cooperative management committee and security forces, who immediately went to sea to gather the kits. The fishermen were told that the boxes contained explosives.

During mid-August 1964, while fishing in the open sea off Quang Khe, the fishermen saw white plastic bags floating in the area. They picked them up, but because of fear that they might contain explosives hesitated to open them. The fishermen found notes which stated "This is gift for the DRV students" in the bags. Inside were fish hooks, plastic or nylon fishing lines, pencils, books and childrens clothing. Upon returning to shore, some of the fishermen turned in the gifts to security force while others took them home. At home, the children's clothes were boiled 2 or 3 times and put on dogs to see if the dog died. When nothing happened to the dogs, the clothings were then used for children to wear. The DRV authorities have stated that packages contained explosives and that the clothes are poisoned. The fishermen in Quang Khe area do not believe these statements, on the contrary they are eagerly awaiting more deliveries. Maritime Gift Kits were delivered in this area on July 30, 1964. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 495/201230Z AUG)

LOKI XX detainees claim SSPL leaflets appearing in Nam Dinh province, distribution means unknown. (Note: SOG leaflet delivery operations have not targetted Nam Dinh). Populace heeding fact sheet leaflet instructions to stay away from military targets in spite of cadre efforts to prevent their

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-170

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-170

to Appendix C

leaving. Inhabitants of Nam Dinh, particularly catholic elements, believe in a massive pending liberation near.
(COMUSMACV MACSOG 27552/260912 AUG 65)

Reference interrogation report SIC 261/64, dated 19 December 1964. Source conscripted into provincial force brigade 330 April 1963 and captured SVN 7 July 1964. Brief version report follows: "Leaflets dropped over barracks brigade 330 (Xuan Mai) about midnight (exact date unknown) June 1963. Alert called brigade 330 area and all members rushed into trenches defense area against air attack. Source heard aircraft flying inland coming from sea, but was unable to see aircraft in darkness. When aircraft flew over infantry regiments, the 14th air defense battalion, responsible for air defense of area, began firing at aircraft, which gained altitude and disappeared. Following morning, numerous leaflets about 6 by 12 cm found scattered throughout regimental and adjacent areas. One leaflet was drawing of wretched PAVN soldier with caption, "The life of a PAVN soldier means only shortages, and starvation, not only a pair of rubber slippers on his feet and a bamboo mat on his head." Troops ordered to pick up leaflets and turn in to superiors without reading. Brigade political cadres went into all homes in area and advised people either burn leaflets or turn them in to military officials. Contrary to superior's orders, source saw many enlisted men furtively reading leaflets. Although men made no comments, source stated his opinion, ECst men felt their lives were truly depicted on leaflets. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 2763/2611062 JAN 65)

Gift Kit - Also prior to Children's Day some children of the area picked up a plastic box containing a child's yellow T-shirt, 10 sewing needles, 1 roll of thread and many buttons. They took them home and kept them. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 827/0206212 OCT 65)

In April leaflets were dropped from aircraft over Hai-Thinh village (XH273063). These leaflets were of three types.

Two types had pictures of burned boats, gas tanks, and collapsed buildings.

A third type, blue in color and 10cm by 20cm, advised people to remain clear of troop emplacements and main bridges.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-171

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tab 4 to Annex A

~~TOP SECRET~~

Most of the populace read the leaflets but they had to be kept out of sight of the authorities, immediately after the drop officials attempted confiscation of leaflets and burned all that were found. The citizens are told that the leaflets were toxic and dangerous to pick up or carry.

After reading the leaflets, the people - especially catholics - believed the day of liberation would be coming and began moving away from troop installations. Police and officials tried to advise the people not to believe what the leaflets said but they had little success, the people stayed away from troop installations. (COMUSMACV MACSCG 559/301418Z AUG 65)

There is as of yet no public opposition to government although in their talks to friends in service, dissatisfaction with Communist regime is being voiced.

Civilian and military authorities are doing their best to "transform hatred" into anti-imperialist (US) actions. The three-readiness, three-responsibility policy. (COMUSMACV MACSOG 18683/030901Z JUN 65)

Subject stated awareness of fishing junks and fishermen from Quang Phu, Hong on fishing cooperative having been captured about one year ago, then released by "S" authorities. Personnel were treated all and, upon being released, received many gifts such as radios.

Propaganda leaflets dropped in village one month ago on which was printed a photo of President Johnson. Leaflets stated DRV authorities directed by Red China to send troops to SVN. If NVN wants peace, must negotiate with American authority and withdraw its troops.

Leaflets seized by police, due to leaflet length, individual had no time to complete reading.

People are curious, like to read leaflets, though forbidden to read them.

Children like leaflets because rewards of illustrated news and books are given if leaflet turned over to police. Children inform parents of leaflet content.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-172

Tab h to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-172

to Appendix C

4

Blue leaflet with Sword named Gacr (Sword) at Quoc (Sacred Sword Patriots) is familiar. Demand for increased pay for officers. Subject fisherman not aware of Sacred Sword organization or its purpose.

Personnel unaware of any secret meetings but aware of people's spirit being aggravated by bombing. People aware that raids aimed at killing military personnel, destroying LOC, etc, but are afraid planes will kill them by mistake. Alarm given five minutes or less before raids.

Ships observed by subject along coast from Donk Hoi to Quang Khe on 28 Jan 65, prior to start of lunar year. Many flares observed, following morning fishermen picked up plastic boxes containing tea, children's clothes, towels, fishing line, candle and cake.

Leaflets stated gifts sent to people of NVN from "SVN" authorities on occasion of TET and advised searching waters for kits floating in sea. At least 3000 containers sighted.

Authorities warned people not to open boxes because they contained explosives but rather report their location. Despite warnings, people gathered gift kits, knowing they contained only gifts from SVN to fishermen of NVN.
(COMUSMACV MACSOG CAT 205/060/30Z MAY 65)

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-173

Tab 4 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a-173

to Appendix C

5

INDICATIONS OF REACTIONS BY THE ENEMY

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2. A VC cadre, Huynh Van Lien stated that NLF chairman in the Coastal Zone instructed Lien and other cadres to locate VOSSPL broadcasting station in order to sabotage it. Lien stated "VC now hate this station as poison." Further interrogation planned.

3. Bui Thanh Hieu, a platoon leader of NVA 808 Bn, captured 17 Sep 68, said he believed Truong Tuu and Tran Dan were members of SSPL because their writings sounded like SSPL policy. Tuu listened to VOSSPL intermittently since 1966 and further stated that he believed two members of LDP were members of SSPL.

4. A Nhan Dan editorial dated 24 Jan 69 entitled "Ha-Tinh holds determined to win congress" stated: "During 1968, in order to rescue their position of defeat in the South, the American imperialists insanely utilized aircraft and war vessels to savagely attack many localities in the province, release radars, and spread many psychological warfare leaflets and gifts. The army and people of Ha Tinh set American war vessels afire three times, and captured a number of radar spies."

5. Hanoi radio broadcast a Nhan Dan editorial on 3 March 69 which stated, "The peoples armed security forces...Annihilated or neatly captured groups of spies or commandos sent to the North by U.S. imperialists and their lackeys while detecting and suppressing fomentations for disturbances by counter-revolutionary cliques in a number of border and coastal areas...They (US/GVN) are ...Continuing to dispatch ranger spies to sabotage the North, and stepping up psychological warfare."

6. An NVN source stated in a report dated 10 Mar 69 that he had first listened to SSPL radio in 1965 and on several other occasions during 1967 when he came South with the 305 NVA Division. Source speculated that SSPL was formed by dissatisfied Communist Party members.

~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a- 174

Tab 5 to Annex A
to Appendix C~~TOP SECRET~~

C-a- 174

to Appendix C

Tab 5

7. Seven Chinese youths from Red China and NVN escaped from China/NVN by boat and surrendered to RVN authorities on 23 Mar 69. The youths stated that they obtained information of free world standard of living through listening to VOF and decided to defeat because of deplorable conditions in Red China. Originally two youths escaped from China, stayed in Hai Phong from Nov 68 until 5 Mar 69, then continued South with five Chinese residents of Hai Phong. They stopped several times on NVN coast without encountering NVA troops.

8. Hanoi VNA International Service in English broadcasted congratulations to people of NVN MR IV for their great victories over U.S. imperialists, "capturing many spy commandos and foiling all PsyWar moves of the enemy."

9. Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese lauded Quang Binh Province people on their "neatly capturing all the U.S. - Puppet Spy and Commando Groups - Frustrating all of the enemy's PsyWar tricks and slanderous arguments."

10. A source named Truong Van Binh, B-16 Sapper Regt NVA, listened to SSPL broadcasts from 1964 to Feb 66 in Ha Tay Province NVN. Broadcast heard 1000-1030 and 1500-1530 Hanoi time. Broadcast generated discussions with rear service area cadre about broadcast origination and SSPL leader. Cadre believed broadcast was CHINAT and that leader was Chiang Kai Shek because remarks made against NVN, RVN, USSR, CHICOM, and USA but never Taiwan. Broadcast also monitored at Ba Thu, Cambodia Jan-24 Mar 69. Source believed broadcast effective on NVN populace because of credible comments on working conditions.

11. Reliable sources have reported that BORDEN (G) agents in covert operations in Laos and Cambodia have been captured and have divulged information that there were other agents in the area. The enemy have been alerted to a high degree of alertness because of these captures and information divulged. Comment: The information given to the agents on other teams is false with the objective to cause diversion of enemy resources to search for non-existent agents and teams.

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C-a-175

Tab 5 to Annex A
to Appendix C