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
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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

ANNEXES A-H

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Annex H		Analysis and Recommendations Regarding the Present System of Out-of-Country Operations from South Vietnam

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
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ANNEX A




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Annex C



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
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
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
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
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
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OPERATIONAL PLAN



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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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Annex H

SUBJECT:

Analysis and recommendations regarding the present system of out-of-country operations from South Vietnam (TS)

. Col, J-3 MACV

Chief, SOG
CO, 5th SFGp7 June 1966
jlf1. ~~(TS)~~ References:

a. Memorandum for: Commanding Officer, 5th SFG and Chief, Studies and Observations Group, Headquarters United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3, dtd 30 May 1966 (TAB A)

b. Position Paper, Subject: Analysis and recommendations regarding the present system of out-of-country operations from South Vietnam (TS), Headquarters, Studies and Observations Group, dtd 7 June 1966 (TAB B).

c. DP, Subject: Joint report of Investigations to Determine Whether there is Duplication by 5th SFGp and SOG (TS), CO, 5th SFGp, dtd 4 June 1966 (TAB C).

2. In compliance with reference a, the undersigned, at a meeting on 7 June, have agreed essentially to the contents of TAB B up to the recommendations in paragraph 5. However, the undersigned maintain their individual position as stated at TABs B and C insofar as the respective recommendations are concerned.

3. Request that the resolution of who should have responsibility where duplication of effort exists, be the decision of the Commander.

WILLIAM A. MC KEAN
Colonel, Inf
CO, 5th SFGp (Abn), 1st SF

JOHN L. FINGLAUB
Colonel GC
Chief, SOG

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HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 APO San Francisco 96243

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, J-3

MACJ3

30 May 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMANDING OFFICER, 5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
 CHIEF, STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP

1. The observation has been made that there is duplication of effort on the part of the 5th Special Forces Group and SOG. It is, therefore, requested that the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group, and Chief, SOG, together prepare a report including, but not limited to, the followings:

- a. List the advantages and disadvantages of the present system of operations.
- b. Outline the duplications that exist.
- c. Recommend which agency should assume functions wherein duplication of effort is involved.
- d. Recommendations for future operations.

2. This report will be submitted prior to Colonel McKean's departure from the theater to ACofS, J-3, MACV.

JOHN C. F. TILLSON, III
 Major General, USA
 ACofS, J-3

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HEADQUARTERS
 UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
 STUDIES AND CULTIVATION GROUP
 APO 96243

MACSOC

7 June 1966

POSITION PAPER

Subject: Analysis and recommendations regarding the present system of out-of-country operations from South Vietnam (TS)

1. (U) References:

- ✓ a. Memo, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, J3 MACV, dtd 30 May 66, to CO 5th SFGp and Chief, SOG
- b. CINCPAC 290123Z Sep 65 *No record in file*
- ✓ c. MACV 010340Z Feb 66 *Approved*
- ✓ d. MACV 190921Z Feb 66 *See Alpha 5 folder*
- ✓ e. Draft Annex X, to OPLAN 37-65, dtd 31 May 1966
- ✓ f. JCS 282014Z Feb 66

2. This paper will concern itself with operational aspects of out-of-country operations. Administrative details as to where personnel are attached and their records are kept have not been a problem in duplication of effort.

3. (TS) The following facts bear on the question of out-of-country operations:

a. MACV's mission as approved by CINCPAC in November 1965, as directed by COMUSMACV and with the concurrence of AUSAID, Saigon:

(1) To advise, train and support counter-part forces in out-of-country UW and Psy War operations.

(2) Conduct unilateral planning as JMWTF designate for COMUSSEASIA.

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b. Since SOG's mission is out-of-country operations and since the JMWTF concept calls for 5th SFGp [redacted] to be under JMWTF Command, it appears that a policy has already been formulated by higher authority.

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c. Per references c and d, COMUSMACV proposed assignment of responsibilities for cross-border operations into CAMBODIA to 5th SFGp utilizing the same concept of operations presently in use in LAOS by SOG.

d. Per reference e, which is presently being staffed within MACV, SOG has been tasked to prepare plans for conduct of HAROPS from SVN along the CAMBODIAN coastline. 5th SFGp has been tasked to prepare plans for conduct of cross-border operations into CAMBODIA from SVN.

e. SOG has provided training, advice, and support to RVN forces in U, and P, War operations in out-of-country operations. Limited scale operations are being successfully executed in LAOS (PHUONG DASS) and in North Vietnam (3AA).

f. Unilateral planning by SOG as JMWTF designate for COMUSMACV is well under way towards completion.

g. A revised SOG JTD was recently approved as a result of PHUONG DASS expanded operations.

h. SOG's JTD is presently being revised to conform to a JMWTF TD. Once the proposed JTD is approved, it will put SOG in a posture which will facilitate rapid assumption of JMWTF SEASIA should the implementation be directed.

i. Per reference f, JCS questions the rationale of assigning the CAMBODIAN mission to 5th SFGp, preferring that it be assigned to SOG, stating that "It appears that the separate development of a program for CAMBODIA will require an expensive duplication of training and logistical base, operational facilities to include communications, funding procedures and personnel".

j. 5th SFGp is not a covert organization. Its operations in SVN are not covert or clandestine.

k. Out-of-country operations presently being conducted by SOG are supported by NSA. These facilities are presently physically associated with SOG.

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4. (FC) Since there are three possibilities for out-of-country operations by ground forces from SVN, i.e. LAOS under SOG, CAMBODIA under 5th SFGp; both under 5th SFGp; both under SOG; it seems appropriate to examine all three:

a. LAOS UNDER SOG, CAMBODIA UNDER 5TH SFGp.

(1) Advantages accruing to MACV.

(a) The apparent advantages of having complete operational control over CAMBODIA operations held by MACV through 5th SFGp has not materialized because JCS/O.D./State have not given up the jurisdiction and controls over CAMBODIAN matters to MACV. The State Department will probably not give up control of military activities against CAMBODIA.

(b) The advantage of having SOG operate in LAOS is significant because SOG is covert organization and is operating under clandestine rules in LAOS in order to make the operation deniable by US and GVN. This was the primary condition levied by the US State Department in authorizing STURZENEGGER operations in LAOS because such operations are in violation of the Geneva Accords.

(c) By having SOG handle out-of-country operations in LAOS, MACV has been able to comply with political restrictions, and retain the deniable character of the operations.

(2) Disadvantages accruing to MACV:

(a) 5th SFGp assets and energies will be required to support the vast counter-insurgency mission within SVN while at the same time operating and supporting an increasing out-of-country effort in CAMBODIA. SOG has no in-country missions to divert its attention and resources from out-of-country operations.

(b) SOG has in being the command and control organization to accomplish all out-of-country operations, 5th SFGp does not.

(c) Under para 3.1. above it was noted that CJCS in a message to COMUSMACV and CINCPAC questions the rationale of assigning CAMBODIAN mission to 5th SFGp, preferring that it be assigned to SOG. During the recent visit of JCS representatives, it was stated that this CJCS position has not changed. It is well known that CINCPAC is generally of the same opinion.

(d) As noted in para 3.a. and b., SOG has the mission approved by CINCPAC, for out-of-country operations, and has considerable

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experience in this theatre in such operations. 5th FFG has limited to no experience in out-of-country operations in this theatre.

(e) 5CG has been assigned responsibility for CAMBODIAN IAKOPS recently. The pre-ord division of responsibility will create two agencies working in out-of-country military operations against CAMBODIA, SOG in IAKOPS and 5th FFG in cross-border.

(f) The 5th FFG will have difficulty satisfying the clandestine/covert nature of operations which will be required in CAMBODIA in order to gain political approval.

(g) There will be considerable difficulty getting political approval from State Department for reconnaissance and intelligence collection patrols in CAMBODIA unless they are of covert nature. At the present time the political atmosphere will not permit any other type operation. State Department will be most reluctant to approve a sensitive operation such as this, to be conducted by an untried overt military organization. This reluctance may delay approval to such an extent that the time for optimum action may pass. On the other hand, it seems that if State Department is assured that the same techniques and experienced organization used for 'HIMING BRASS' will be used for this new area, the chances of approval will be enhanced.

(h) There will be duplication of the recruitment, effort, staff planning, training, bases, instructors, helicopter lift and other air support required for two separate organizations to operate reconnaissance patrols and exploitation forces in LAOS and CAMBODIA. If under one command there would be economy of forces and resources. Consequently operational forces could be shifted from one area to another and training assets could be used for support of operations in both areas.

b. BOTH OPERATIONS UNDER 5TH FFG.

(1) Advantages accruing to MACV:

(a) The operational element would be with the unit which holds their personnel records.

(b) 5th can operate from [REDACTED] Camps which they control already. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

(c) One command and control system could be used for both operations and assets could be shifted to either area for efficient utilization of forces.

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(d) Responsiveness to operational requirements of MACV may be greater in cases where additional SF personnel might be required on short notice.

(2) Disadvantages accruing to MACV:

(a) Diversion of interests and resources from counter-insurgency mission with SVN to the out-of-country mission in CAMBODIA.

(b) Lack of experience on the part of the 5th in out-of-country operations.

(c) Lack of experience in political negotiations frequently required for out-of-country operations.

(d) Less experience in performing covert missions than COG.

(e) Higher degree of risk of compromising highly sensitive operations.

(f) ^{Increases} Over-extension of span of control. It is estimated that expansion to more than six "C" detachments would be required.

c. JOINT OPERATIONS UNDER COG.

(1) Advantages accruing to MACV:

(a) All out-of-country operations under the organization designated by CINCPAC to have this mission, reference b.

(b) The operations would be under the command considered most desirable by CJCS, and CINCPAC, reference f.

(c) SOG assets in being and command and control system in use, can be used in LAOC and shifted to CAMBODIA if and when such operations are approved whereas the 5th must build teams and exploitation forces which may not be used for an indefinite period or may never be used. This is not efficient utilization of forces. COG could transition while expanding to the new mission by additional recruiting.

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(e) SOG is more likely to get early political approval for CAMBODIA cross-border operations because of its covert nature. Once approved SOG would not be subject to the same veto power held for its LAOTIAN operation by the Embassy, Vientiane because the U.S. has no embassy in CAMBODIA. Therefore SOG would be just as responsive to MACV direction as 5th SFGp would be, as MACV has OPCON of SOG.

(2) Disadvantages to MACV:

(a) SOG would require augmentation by Special Forces operations personnel to form the advisory force for additional recon teams. 5th SFGp may not require as much augmentation.

(b) SOG would stage from [REDACTED] camps which are operated by 5th SFGp. (b)(1)
(b)(3)

5. (TS) Recommendations:

a. That SOG which has an out-of-country, politically approved deniable, clandestine operation already in being, be given the additional task to prepare for CAMBODIAN recon, exploitation operations and such other UW functions as may be directed. That a similar pattern be used as was developed for LAOS for both the political negotiations with ANELU and the UW operations.

b. That 5th SFGp continue to operate in-country (SVN) unconventional warfare operations of military nature in VC war zones in SVN which offers a significant challenge.

c. That all resources, presently allocated to 5th SFGp for the preparation to conduct ground operations in CAMBODIA, be re-allocated to SOG.

d. That in the future such out-of-country operations of covert military nature as may arise be assigned to SOG, while in-country (SVN) military operations employing UW be the mission of 5th SFGp.

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AVSF-G

Joint Report of Investigation to Determine Whether
there is Duplication by 5th SFGA and SOG (TS)

A C of S, J3

CO, 5th SFGA

4 June 1966
Col McLean

1. ~~(TS)~~ This report has been prepared jointly by the Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group and the ~~Chief, Studies and Observation Group~~. The purpose of the report is to record the results of an investigation to determine whether there is significant duplication between the missions of 5th SFGA and those of SOG. Where duplication is deemed to exist appropriate recommendations for solution are offered.

2. ~~(TS)~~ The advantages and disadvantages of the present system of operations are as follows:

a. Advantages:

(1) SOG is relieved of the burden of personnel administration for those SOG personnel assigned to SHINING BRASS duties. Presently these matters are handled by the 5th Group.

(2) SOG is relieved of the task of processing supply requisitions for the Counterinsurgency Supply Office on Okinawa. This is consolidated and coordinated by the 5th Group.

(3) There is no requirement for the establishment of dual facilities for the issue of individual clothing and equipment. This is all handled by the 5th Group.

b. Disadvantages:

(1) The 5th Group is tasked with an ever growing administrative task for SOG personnel over which the 5th Group exercises no control. As such the 5th Group is responsible for administrative matters for all SHINING BRASS Personnel to include:

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(a) All personnel management to include the awarding and withdrawal of proficiency pay, assignments, reassignments, requisitioning of qualified officer and enlisted personnel and AOR processing; all personnel actions, and affairs to include reenlistment, casualty reporting, officer proficiency reports, ordinary leave, PRR, extension and curtailment of foreign service tours, security clearances, OCS, Warrant Officer, and direct commission applications, and dependent affairs; all military pay to include request for pay actions, travel and TDY; records management, awards and decorations, and obtaining of all security clearances.

(b) Problems arise in the area of disciplinary actions. A SOG soldier may be relieved of his duties and sent to the 5th Group. Reasons for the soldier's relief are not always clearly relayed to CO 5th Group, so that he may take appropriate action. Meanwhile SOG expects an immediate replacement from the 5th Group. In this manner, CO, 5th SFGA is frequently placed in the awkward position of operating a holding and house-keeping detachment for SOG. CO, 5th Group has responsibility for personnel matters but not been granted commensurate authority to control SOG personnel. A hypothetical case in point: A SOG NCO gets drunk and disorderly and causes serious trouble in a Saigon bar. Technically, Colonel McLean is responsible, yet he has no authority or daily control of the man's activities. Normally, CO, 5th SFGA sees this man only when he arrives and departs VR.

(2) Casualty reporting presents a problem in that CO, 5th Group

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has this responsibility, but SOG communications system is separate from that of the 5th Group.

(3) SOG has personnel assigned to two different headquarters. Approximately 200 are assigned to MACV and another 200 to 5th SFMA (CHINING BRASS).

(4) Promotions in the upper enlisted grades have been slowed almost to a stand still because of the large number of high ranking SOG NCO's which must be carried against 5th Group promotion allocations.

(5) SOG personnel operate from existing Special Forces camps. This places two operational units under the same roof but they work for entirely independent agencies. This is not conducive to good relations or maximum productive effort and violates elementary good management practice.

3. ~~(TS)~~ The duplications which exist are:

a. Each of the three special operational units, SOG, Det C-5, and Project Delta have their own separate Nung reaction force. These are not consolidated under one headquarters for most efficient use.

b. SOG and 5th SFMA also operate separate training centers with very similar missions. Duplication exists.

c. Because of the separate organizations and missions the skills of certain critical specialists cannot be utilized to the maximum. Additional specialists are required in order to provide the same capability to both major units.

4. ~~(TS)~~ Recommendation as to which agency should assume functions therein

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duplication of effort is involved:

a. CO, 5th SFGA should assume responsibility for the SHINING BRASS portion of the SOG mission. The personnel in SHINING BRASS are all SF prefix 3 qualified personnel and therefore must remain assigned to a Special Forces Unit. This plan is in keeping with COMUSMACV considerations of four months ago as stated in MSG from COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, (TS) 05405, 190921Z Feb 66:

"QUOTE - 5. We do not wish to transfer SHINING BRASS to the 5th Special Forces Group at this time, but we anticipate such a recommendation will be forthcoming within the next six months based to some extent upon the development within the 5th Special Forces Group of the capability for operations into Cambodia. Recognizing that present authority includes only clandestine intelligence operations, we intend for the present to use this new capability for operations just inside the border on the Vietnamese side. - UNQUOTE"

b. CO, 5th SFGA already has responsibility for the special operations of Project Delta and Det C-5. Det C-5 (Project Horse) is scheduled to expand. C-5 is operating both in VN and across the border. It is more logical to consolidate special operations under 5th Group than SOG because 5th Group already has responsibility on both sides of the border. Further Det C-5 is presently operating a clandestine agent net which is an area in which SOG is not operating.

c. To consolidate in country activities of Det C-5 and Project Delta under SOG is not feasible under present circumstances because a major revamping of SOG would be necessary in order to provide the means to coordinate missions within

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South Vietnam. This coordination is a relatively simple matter for the 5th Group because of the existing communications and camp facilities.

d. The reaction force companies would be consolidated under the 5th Group for more effective utilization and training. The force can be used to reinforce a SF camp or, alternately, to react to a contact or to intelligence gathered by any one of the special operational units.

5. (TS) For future operations it is recommended that Project Delta, Project Horse and the SHINING BRASS portion of SOG be assigned and controlled by CO, 5th SFGA, subject to the approval of Colonel Kelly, incoming Commander, 5th SFGA. This shift of SHINING BRASS will result in minimum turbulence since all the key positions, facilities, and the reconnaissance teams themselves, are manned by personnel from the 5th Special Forces Group.

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