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J3M-1242-70
16 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution List

Subject: Draft MACSOG Documentation Study (U)

1. (U) The enclosed draft MACSOG Documentation Study (U), dated 10 July 1970, is being distributed to afford COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the Services, the Joint Staff and DIA an opportunity for informal review and comment prior to final publication and formal review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Central Intelligence Agency will also be afforded an opportunity to comment after informal comments have been received from military agencies and before formal review.

2. (U) This study is to be handled on a CLOSE HOLD basis with access limited to personnel authorized access to MACSOG information.

3. (TS) The purpose of this study is to produce a documentation/data base for future analysis of MACSOG and related programs. Analysis of this documentation/data base would facilitate future Joint Staff planning and would provide a basis for Joint Staff recommendations to improve the military capability to support Unconventional Warfare operations. JCS Point of Contact is Special Operations Division, J-3 (SACSA), OX 55805.

4. (U) The enclosed draft Study includes a Table of Contents ten Appendices (A-J) each bound separately to facilitate handling. Appendix B is bound in two parts and twenty-one Annexes (A-U) bound singly or in groups. Appendix C has four Annexes bound singly. Appendix A is a 58-page summary of the entire draft Study.

5. (U) The cut-off date for information in this study was 30 June 1969 and comments should be based accordingly. The documentation/data base for the subsequent period is being compiled by MACV as a separate and continuing action.

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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

CONTENTS

Appendix		Page
	A. Summary of MACSOG Documentation Study	A-1
	Part I. Introduction	A-1
	A. Basic Directive	A-1
	B. Background	A-1
	C. Approach	A-4
	Part II. Summaries of Appendices	
	A. Summary of Appendix B: MACSOG and the SID: Inception, Organization, Evolution.	A-6
	1. Basic Policy Documents/Decisions Concerning Covert/PM Activities During the Pre-MACSOG Period	A-6
	2. Basic Agreements Between DOD and CIA.	A-11
	3. DOD Support of CIA (Covert/PM Operations,	A-11
	4. DOD Organization for Covert/PM Actions	A-11
	5. [REDACTED]	A-13
	6. OPLAN 34A	A-14
	7. MACSOG: Inception, Evolution, External Relationships.	A-18
	a. Activation of MACSOG	A-18
	b. Mission and Objectives.	A-18
	c. MACSOG Organizational Development	A-21
	d. [REDACTED]	A-25
	e. Command and Control	A-28
	f. MACSOG Operations and Intelligence	A-34
	g. Contingency Planning.	A-30
	h. Personnel and Training.	A-40
	i. Counterpart Relationships--The Strategic Technical Directorate.	A-45
	B. Summary of Appendix C: MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam.	A-46
	C. Summary of Appendix D: Cross-Border Operations in Laos.	A-47
	D. Summary of Appendix E: Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia.	A-49
	E. Summary of Appendix F: Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JFRC).	A-51
	F. Summary of Appendix G: MACSOG Communications.	A-53
	G. Summary of Appendix H: Security, Cover, and Deception.	A-55
	H. Summary of Appendix I: MACSOG Intelligence.	A-56
	I. Summary of Appendix J: Logistics.	A-57

(b)(1)

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SECRET~~

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EXCLUDED FROM AUTO-DOWN
CLASSIFICATION AND DECLASSIFICATION

DOC#1

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

JS 790 (13-263)

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

	Page
B. Military Assistance Command Studies	B-1
Observation Group and the	
Strategic Technical Directorate	
Inception, Organization, Evolution	
Part I. General	B-1
Part II. Covert/Paramilitary Activities	B-3
Part III. [REDACTED]	B-57
Part IV. OPLAN 34A	B-80
Part V. MACSOG Inception, Evolution,	B-175
External Relationships	
A. [REDACTED]	B-175
B. [REDACTED]	B-175
C. [REDACTED]	B-177
D. [REDACTED]	B-16-
E. [REDACTED]	B-227
F. [REDACTED]	B-275
G. [REDACTED]	B-255
H. Contingency Planning	B-337
I. Personnel and Training	B-346
J. Logistics	B-400
K. Counterpart Relationships -	B-409
The Strategic Technical Directorate	
Annex A. List of CAS NVN Operations	B-a-1
Annex B. Example of CAS Long-Term Team	B-b-1
Targetted Against Railroad	
Annex C. Examples of two CAS Maritime	B-c-1
Hit-and-Run Operational Plans	
Annex D. Example of CAS PsyOps Plan	B-d-1
Annex E. CIA Memorandum, Subject:	B-e-1
Two Maritime Operations	
Against North Vietnam,	
dated 16 January 1964	
Annex F. Operational Plan-CAS Marops-1 (Quang Kne)	B-f-1
Annex G. Operational Plan-	B-g-1
CAS Marops-11 (Yen Phy)	
Annex H. Analysis and Recommendations	B-h-1
Regarding the Present System	
of Out-of-Country Operations	
from South Vietnam	
Annex I. Comments on MACSOG's Mission	B-i-1
Annex J. Organization & Functions Manual	B-j-1
Annex K. Comments on MACSOG's Organizational	B-k-1
Development	
Annex L. [REDACTED]	B-l-1
Annex M. Comments on Command and Control	B-m-1
Annex N. Comments on MACSOG's Operations	B-n-1
and Intelligence	
Annex O. Documentaries	B-o-1
Annex P. Comments on Contingency Planning	B-p-1
Annex Q. Comments on Personnel and Training	B-q-1
Annex R. Illustrative Indigenous Civilian	B-r-1
Personnel Regulations	
Annex S. Comments on Logistics	B-s-1
Annex T. Counterpart Relationships	B-t-1
Strategic Technical Directorate (STD)	
Annex U. Comments on Counterpart	B-u-1
Relationships - The STD	

(b)(1)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY~~

Appendix

C. MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam

72 72

Part I.	Introduction	1
A.	Scope	1
B.	Background	1
Part II.	FOOTBOY (C) Program	1
A.	Introduction	1
B.	Background	1
C.	Organization	1
D.	Operational Procedures	1
Part III.	Background	1
A.	Introduction	1
B.	Background	1
C.	Organization	1
D.	Operational Procedures	1
Part IV.	Operational Procedures	1
A.	Introduction	1
B.	Background	1
C.	Organization	1
D.	Operational Procedures	1
E.	Operational Procedures	1
F.	Operational Procedures	1
G.	Operational Procedures	1
H.	Operational Procedures	1
Part V.	Operational Procedures	1
A.	Introduction	1
B.	Background	1
C.	Organization	1
D.	Operational Procedures	1
E.	Operational Procedures	1
F.	Operational Procedures	1
G.	Operational Procedures	1
Annex	Background	1
Part I.	Introduction	1
B.	Background	1
C.	Organization	1
D.	Operational Procedures	1
Part II.	Introduction	1
B.	Background	1
C.	Organization	1
D.	Operational Procedures	1

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY~~

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Appendix C (Cont)

Annex A, Part II (Cont)

	Page
B. Personnel/Training	C-a-42
1. Headquarters, Radio and Leaflet Personnel - 1964	C-a-42
2. Recent Training/Personnel	C-a-44
3. PARADISE ISLAND Personnel	C-a-50
Part III. Operations	
A. General	C-a-54
B. Early Operations and Problems	C-a-54
1. R and A Section	C-a-54
2. Radio Operations	C-a-55
3. Early Leaflet and Letter Operation	C-a-57
C. Later Operations 1965-1967	C-a-53
1. General	C-a-59
2. Concepts of Operations	C-a-59
3. White Radio 1965-1967	C-a-63
4. Black Radio 1965-1967	C-a-65
5. Leaflet and Mail Operations 1965-1967	C-a-68
D. PARADISE ISLAND Operations	C-a-72
1. General History	C-a-72
2. Operations	C-a-73
3. Special Operations	C-a-74
4. Defection Operations	C-a-75
5. Deception Methods at PARADISE	C-a-77
6. Interrogation Methods	C-a-77
7. Indoctrination	C-a-78
E. 1968-69 Operations	C-a-81
1. Printed Media	C-a-81
2. VOF	C-a-81
3. Black Radio	C-a-81
4. Black Letter Operations	C-a-86
5. Other Operations and Proposals	C-a-86
F. POLE BEAN	C-a-91
1. General	C-a-91
2. Background	C-a-91
3. Policy	C-a-91
4. Psychological Operations in Support of POLE BEAN	C-a-93
5. Operations	C-a-94
G. [REDACTED]	C-a-95
[REDACTED]	C-a-95
[REDACTED]	C-a-96
3. Printed Media	C-a-96
Part IV. Reaction and Evaluation	
A. General	C-a-97
B. Reactions	C-a-97
1. VOF/BBC Listeners	C-a-97
2. Request for Reaction Information	C-a-98
3. SACS/ Memo	C-a-99
4. Recent Report	C-a-102
C. Evaluations	C-a-112
1. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV AD HOC Reports	C-a-112
2. Burroughs Report	C-a-119
3. PARADISE ISLAND Evaluation	C-a-125
4. SACS/ Evaluation	C-a-129
5. Recent SACS/ Evaluation	C-a-133
Annex B. Airborne Operations	
Part I. Background	C-b-1
A. Introduction	C-b-1
B. Initial Policy	C-b-1
1. [REDACTED]	C-b-1
2. MISSION	C-b-1
3. [REDACTED]	C-b-1

11/13/68

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~
 Appendix C (Cont)
 Annex B, Part I (Cont)

	Page
C. Evolution of Mission and Objectives	C-b-2
1. General	C-c-2
2. 1965 Developments	C-c-2
3. 1966 Policy	C-b-3
4. 1967 Developments	C-b-5
5. 1968 Mission and Restrictions	C-b-7
Part II. Resources	C-b-9
A. General	C-b-9
B. Organization	C-c-9
1. Diagram	C-b-9
2. Counterpart Organization	C-b-10
3. Function of the Organization	C-c-10
4. Reorganization - 1968	C-b-10
C. Resources Available	C-b-11
1. Personnel	C-b-11
2. Physical	C-b-11
3. Major Items of Equipment	C-b-12
4. Vehicles	C-b-12
D. Agent Clearances	C-b-12
E. Agent Pay and Allowances	C-b-12
1. General	C-b-12
2. Method of Payment	C-b-12
3. Pay Scales	C-b-13
F. Training	C-b-14
1. General	C-b-14
2. Recruiting	C-b-14
3. Training - Camp Long Thanh	C-b-17a
4. STRATA Team Training - 1968	C-c-33
G. Communications	C-b-33
1. [REDACTED]	C-b-33
2. Resupply Communications	C-b-34
Part III. Operations	C-b-35
A. Introduction	C-b-35
B. Background	C-b-35
C. General Conduct of Operations	C-b-35
1. Mission	C-b-37
2. Exfiltration	C-b-37
3. Resupply	C-c-37
D. Long-Term Agent Team Operations	C-b-38
1. Operations - 1964	C-b-38
2. Operations 1965 - 1967	C-b-41
3. Operations 1968 - 1969	C-b-49
4. Long-Term Agent Team Chronology	C-b-52
E. STRATA Team Operations	C-b-62
1. General Conduct of Operations	C-b-62
2. Mission Narratives 1967 - 1968	C-b-67
3. Mission Summary	C-b-76
4. STRATA Targets	C-b-76
5. Target Locations	C-b-76
F. Singleton Operations	C-b-83
1. Policy	C-b-83
2. GOLDFISH and PERGOLA	C-b-83
3. Gra. Singleton Operations	C-b-83
G. Diversionary Operations	C-b-83
1. Project OODLES (C)	C-b-83
2. Project URGENCY (C)	C-b-83
3. Project BORDEL (C)	C-b-83
H. EARTH ANGEL	C-b-83

(b)(1)
 (b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Appendix C (Cont)

Annex B (Cont)

	Page
Part IV. Problem Area	C-b-90
A. Problem Areas - Airborne Operations	C-b-90
B. Chronology	C-b-95
Part V. Evaluation	C-b-96
A. SACSA Evaluation - 1964	C-b-96
B. COMUSMACV Evaluation - 1966	C-b-97
C. Brownfield Report 1967 - 1968	C-b-101
D. Security Reviews	C-b-103
E. CINCPAC STRATA Team Evaluation	C-b-106

Annex C. Air Operations	C-c-1
Part I. Background	C-c-1
A. Introduction	C-c-1
B. Mission and Objectives	C-c-1
Part II. Resources	C-c-10
A. Organization and Procedures	C-c-10
Part III. Operations	C-c-42
A. General	C-c-42
B. Air Operations - 1964	C-c-46
C. 1965 Operations	C-c-47
D. 1966 Operations	C-c-53
E. Operations - 1967	C-c-61
F. Air Operations - 1968-1969	C-c-67
G. Cover Stories	C-c-68
Part V. Evaluation	C-c-89
A. General	C-c-89
B. Ad Hoc Evaluation Group Report	C-c-89
C. Cover Story Study	C-c-91

Annex D. Maritime Operations	C-d-1
Part I. General	C-d-1
A. [REDACTED]	C-d-1
B. Implementation of OPLAN-34A	C-d-2
C. KAROPS - Tasks	C-d-6
D. Command and Control	C-d-7
E. Concept of Operations	C-d-13
Part II. Resources	C-d-20
A. Organization	C-d-20
B. Facilities	C-d-28
C. Training	C-d-32
Part III. Operations	C-d-35
A. Operations - 1964	C-d-35
B. Operations - 1965	C-d-38
C. Operations - 1966	C-d-43
D. Operations - 1967	C-d-47
E. Operations - 1968	C-d-52
F. Operations - 1969	C-d-59
G. Enemy Coastal Defense	C-d-64
Part IV. Evaluations	C-d-68
A. General	C-d-68
B. Ad Hoc Evaluation Group	C-d-68

D. Cross-Border Operations in Laos	D-1
Part I. Introduction	D-1
A. Background	D-1
B. Scope	D-1
Part II. Initial Planning and Operations	D-2
A. [REDACTED]	D-2
B. Transfer of Responsibility	D-3
C. Removal of Restrictions	D-6
D. Operation LEAF & LEPA	D-7
E. SAILING BRASS Planning	D-10
F. COMUS Relationships	D-13
G. Training	D-14
H. Facilities	D-14
I. Operations	D-15

F. COMUS Relationships	D-15
----------------------------------	------

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Appendix D (Cont)

	Page
Part III. 1966 History	D-17
A. Mission and Objectives	D-17
B. Resources	D-21
C. Operational Procedures	D-23
D. Operations	D-23
Part IV. 1967 History	D-26
A. Mission and Objectives	D-26
B. Resources	D-32
C. Operations	D-32
D. PRAIRIE FIRE Evaluation	D-33
Part V. 1968 History	D-37
A. Mission and Objectives	D-37
B. Resources	D-38
C. Operations	D-38
D. Evaluation	D-33
Part VI. 1969 History	D-54
A. Mission and Objectives	D-54
B. Resources	D-54
C. Operations	D-57
E. Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia	E-1
Part I. Introduction	E-1
A. Background	E-1
B. Scope	E-1
Part II. Initial Planning	E-2
A. COMUSMACV Operational Proposals	E-2
B. JCS Planning	E-4
Part III. 1967 History	E-8
A. Mission and Objectives	E-8
B. Resources	E-14
C. Operations	E-15
D. DANIEL BOONE Evaluation	E-15
Part IV. 1968 History	E-20
A. Mission and Objectives	E-20
B. Resources	E-23
C. Operations	E-24
Part V. 1969 History	E-28
A. Nickname Change	E-28
B. Mission and Objectives	E-28
C. Resources	E-30
D. Operations	E-30
F. Joint Personnel Recovery Center	F-1
Part I. Introduction	F-1
Part II. Inception of JPRC	F-2
A. Committee on Prisoners and Detainees	F-2
B. Joint Recovery Center	F-2
C. Joint Personnel Recovery Center	F-3
D. JPRC Activation	F-8
Part III. JPRC History - 1966	F-10
A. JPRC Activation	F-10
B. Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities	F-11
C. Collection of Intelligence	F-12
D. Evasion and Escape Procedures	F-14
E. Safe Area Activation Teams	F-17
E. Political Restrictions and Recovery	F-18
F. Operations 1966	F-20
Part IV. JPRC History - 1967	F-21
A. JPRC Organization	F-21
B. Evasion and Escape Program	F-21
C. Safe Area Program	F-23
D. Prisoner Recovery Center	F-23
E. Recovery Procedures in Laos	F-23
F. Operations - 1967	F-23
G. JPRC Evaluation - 1967	F-23
Part V. JPRC Operations in Laos	F-23

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Appendix F (Cont)

Part V

G

15517

Part V. JPRC History - 1968	Face F-130
A. Organization	F-130
B. Evasion and Escape	F-130
C. Reward Program	F-131
D. Intelligence	F-133
E. Laos Joint Memorandum of Agreement	F-134
F. Operations - 1958	F-136
Part VI. JPRC History - 1969	F-187
A. Organization	F-187
B. Evasion and Escape	F-187
C. Reward Program	F-168
D. Operations - 1969	F-189
G. MACSOG Communications	G-1
Part I. Introduction	G-1
A. Background	G-1
B. Scope	G-1
Part II. 1964 History	G-2
A. Operations	G-2
B. Circuitry	G-3
C. Signal Plans	G-3
D. Cryptography	G-4
E. Personnel	G-4
Part III. 1965 History	G-5
A. Operations	G-5
B. Circuitry	G-7
C. Facilities	G-7
D. Maintenance	G-8
E. Signal Plans	G-8
F. Cryptography	G-9
G. Personnel	G-9
Part IV. 1966 History	G-11
A. Operations	G-11
B. Facilities and Circuitry	G-11
C. Equipment	G-12
D. Signal Plans	G-12
E. Cryptography	G-13
F. Training	G-13
Part V. 1967 History	G-14
A. Operations	G-14
B. Facilities and Circuitry	G-14
C. Equipment	G-14
D. Signal Plans	G-15
E. Cryptography	G-15
F. Communications Security	G-16
Part VI. 1968 History	G-17
A. Operations	G-17
B. Facilities and Circuitry	G-17
C. Equipment	G-18
D. Signal Plans	G-18
E. Cryptography	G-18
F. Wire Tapping	G-19
Part VII. 1969 History	G-20
A. General	G-20
B. Communications Concept	G-20
C. Personnel	G-21
D. Codes	G-23
E. Telecommunications Systems	G-23
F. Secure Voice Systems	G-24
G. Frequency Allocation	G-24
H. Code Books	G-25
I. Call Signs	G-26
J. Logistics	G-26
K. Special Training	G-27
L. Counterpart Communications	G-27
M. Communications Study	G-29
N. Tactical Radio Equipment	G-29
J. Logistics	G-29
K. Special Training	G-29

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Appendix		Page
H.	Security, Cover and Deception	
I.	Background	H-1
A.	General	H-1
B.	Definition of Terms	H-1
II.	Security	H-4
A.	Directives	H-4
B.	Responsibility	H-4
C.	Clearances	H-4
D.	Access	H-7
E.	Briefings and Debriefings	H-7
F.	Operational Security Surveys	H-8
G.	Physical Security	H-9
III.	Deception (Cover) Stories and Documentation	H-10
A.	See Definition of Terms	H-10
B.	MACSOG Directive 38C-11	H-10
C.	Cover Stories	H-12
IV.	Equipment	H-19
A.	Non-Attricability	H-19
B.	Communications	H-19
C.	Aircraft Mounted Electronic Counter Measure (ECM) Equipment	H-21
D.	The NIGHTINCARE Device	H-21
V.	Codes and Code Words	H-22
A.	Coding Systems	H-22
B.	Code words, Nicknames and SOG Words	H-22
VI.	Techniques	H-24
A.	Techniques	H-24
B.	Ground Elements	H-24
C.	Helicopter Insertion/Extraction Techniques	H-29
I.	MACSOG Intelligence	
I.	Introduction	I-1
A.	Background	I-1
B.	Scope	I-1
II.	1964 History	I-2
A.	Intelligence Organization	I-2
III.	1965 History	I-3
A.	PLOWMAN (C) Operations	I-3
B.	CPDA 3- Operations	I-3
C.	SHINING EPASS Operations	I-4
D.	Aerial Photography	I-4
IV.	1966 History	I-5
A.	Intelligence Organization	I-5
B.	PLOWMAN (C) Operations	I-5
C.	SHINING EPASS Operations	I-5
D.	Airborne Operations	I-7
E.	Daniel Boone Operations	I-7
F.	Air/Aerial Intelligence	I-7
V.	1967 History	I-8
A.	PRAIRIE FIRE Operations	I-8
B.	DANIEL BOONE Operations	I-8
C.	MACSOG Intelligence Evaluation	I-9
VI.	1968 History	I-24
A.	Organization	I-24
B.	MACSOG-ACFT Intelligence Relationships	I-26
C.	Intelligence Targeting Panel	I-27
D.	Intelligence Activities	I-27
VII.	1969 History	I-29
A.	Intelligence Procedures	I-29
B.	Operational Case	I-32
C.	EPASS Evaluation	I-33

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

Appendix

Page

J. Logistics

Part I. Background	J-1
A. General	J-1
B. Overview of Logistics	J-4
Part II. Chronological Summary	J-15
A. General	J-15
B. Calendar Year 1964	J-15
C. Calendar Year 1965	J-27
D. Calendar Year 1966	J-36
E. Calendar Year 1967	J-41
F. Calendar Year 1968	J-48

~~Downgraded to~~
~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~
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MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY (U)

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY

Part I. Introduction	A-1
A. Basic Directive	A-1
B. Background	A-1
C. Approach	A-4
Part II. Summaries of Appendices	
A. Summary of Appendix B: MACSOG and the	
STD: Inception, Organization, Evolution.	A-6
1. Basic Policy Documents/Decisions	
Concerning Covert P. Activities	
During the Pre-MACSOG Period	A-6
2. [Basic Agreements Between DOD and CIA.]	A-11
3. [DOD Support of CIA (Covert/PI	
Operators)]	A-11
4. DOD Organization for Covert/PI Actions	A-11
5. [REDACTED]	A-13
6. OPLAN 34A	A-14
7. MACSOG: Inception, Evolution,	
External Relationships.	A-18
a. Activation of MACSOG	A-18
b. Mission and Objectives.	A-18
c. MACSOG Organizational Development	A-21
d. [REDACTED]	A-25
e. Command and Control	A-28
f. MACSOG Operations and Intelligence	A-34
g. Contingency Planning.	A-30
h. Personnel and Training	A-40
i. Counterpart Relationships--The	
Strategic Technical Directorate	A-45
B. Summary of Appendix C: MACSOG Operations	
Against North Vietnam	A-46
C. Summary of Appendix D. Cross-Border	
Operations in Laos.	A-47
D. Summary of Appendix E. Cross-Border	
Operations in Cambodia	A-49
E. Summary of Appendix F. Joint Personnel	
Recovery Center (JPRC).	A-51
F. Summary of Appendix G. MACSOG	
Communications.	A-53
G. Summary of Appendix H: Security, Cover,	
and Deception	A-55
H. Summary of Appendix I: MACSOG	
Intelligence.	A-56
I. Summary of Appendix J. Logistics	A-57

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APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF MACSOG DOCUMENTATION STUDY

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

A. ~~(S)~~ BASIC DIRECTIVE

This study:

1. ~~(TS)~~ Embodies a comprehensive history of the Studies and Observations Group (SOG), a subordinate organization of the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV). That designation, hereafter abbreviated as SOG or MACSOG, is a cover for an organization established to conduct unconventional warfare (UW) operations in Southeast Asia.

2. ~~(S)~~ Is responsive to the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 January 1969* that such a study be prepared which would

establish a data base for future analysis of MACSOG to improve the military capability to support future UW operations.

B. ~~(TS)~~ BACKGROUND

1. ~~(TS)~~ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), beginning in 1961, conducted limited covert programs for purposes of intelligence, sabotage, and propaganda in North Vietnam (NVN) and Laos. The agent teams and singletons (single agents) were infiltrated into NVN largely by air and sea.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Following the Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, major policy decisions were made concerning Department of Defense (DOD) and CIA responsibilities for the planning and conduct of covert/paramilitary (PM) operations. Basic to these decisions

* JCS 2-72/407

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was National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 57 in June 1961.

In this NSAM, the President directed that

a. The responsibility for wholly covert or disavowable operations may be assigned to CIA provided they are within its normal capabilities.

b. The responsibility for "any large paramilitary operation wholly or partly covert which requires significant numbers of militarily trained personnel, amounts of military equipment which exceed normal CIA-controlled stocks, and/or military experience of a kind and level peculiar to the Armed Services is properly the primary responsibility of the DOD with the CIA in a supporting role."

3. (S) The above decisions, in conjunction with NVN's intensified aggression against SVN, resulted in meetings between high US officials in Saigon and Honolulu during the fall of 1963. Stemming from these meetings was a decision to prepare a combined DOD-CIA 12-month covert actions program directed against NVN. That program, in concert with other military and diplomatic actions, would be designed to influence the NVN leadership to cease their continued direction and support of insurgent activities in NVN and Laos. It would include these actions against NVN: harassment, political pressure, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisition of intelligence, generation of propaganda, all contributing to the diversion of NVN's resources.

4. (S) DOD and CIA representatives then met in Saigon and drafted a UW plan which became known as Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A^{**} in DOD and TIGER in CIA. In view of the scope and nature of the plan, DOD and CIA agreed that the executive authority for its implementation should be in DOD, with CIA in a supporting role.

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^{*} JCS 1969/217
^{**} On file in J-3, SACSA, OJCS

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5. (S) The President, in January 1964:

a. Approved certain portions of OPLAN 34A for execution starting on 1 February.

b. Authorized the activation of a joint task force to carry out the approved portions of OPLAN 34A. This task force would be manned with personnel from DOD and CIA, be under the operational control of COMUSMACV, and be commanded by a military officer.

6. (S) Accordingly, MACSOG was activated on 24 January 1964.

Its South Vietnamese counterpart organization, now known as the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD), was formed on 12 February.

7. (S) As noted in paragraph 3, above, OPLAN 34A was designed originally to cover a 12-month period. With the escalation of hostilities in SEAsia, however, operations against NVN were continued until 1 November 1968; subsequent to that date, operations have been limited to those of a psychological nature. Meanwhile, MACSOG's responsibilities were expanded to carry out cross-border operations into Laos (beginning in October 1965) and Cambodia (beginning in June 1967). Those operations are continuing. Thus, MACSOG was ultimately responsible for out-of-country operations in three countries: NVN, Laos, and Cambodia.

8. (S) Recognizing the paramount need to analyze thoroughly MACSOG's activities in order to provide a basis for improving the military capability to conduct or to support UW operations in the future, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed,** on 7 January 1969, that the above comprehensive data base be prepared. That effort would be under the sponsorship of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, with SACSA as the project monitor for the Chairman.

* Joint State-DOD-CAS message
** JCS 2472/407

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C. (S) APPROACH

1. (S) 34CSA formed a documentation team, under the immediate supervision of the Chief of his Special Operations Division, to carry out the extensive effort of compiling a data base. In effect, this effort would entail the preparation of a detailed history of MACSOG and of those relevant events and decisions, during the pre-MACSOG period, having application to MACSOG.

Ultimately, the work effort included:

a. The screening and collection of material in: OSACSA, Headquarters, Pacific Area Command; Headquarters, USMACV; Headquarters, MACSOG and its field organizations in Danang, Kontum, and Camp Long Thanh; Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Nha Trang); and 14th Special Operations Wing (Nha Trang). In addition, Headquarters, CIA provided limited material covering its program in NVN during the pre-MACSOG period.

b. Interviews of some fifty personnel formerly or then currently associated with MACSOG. These interviews, conducted both in OSACSA and the field, provide a candid insight into MACSOG's activities not necessarily presented in formalized reports.

2. (S) To facilitate the analysis of the Study, the Documentation Team has prepared it in the form of ten appendices (A-J). Each of them covers a single program or subject area except Appendix B which treats MACSOG as a whole. In preparing these appendices, both the historical, or vertical in-depth, and the functional, or horizontal across-the-board, approaches were adopted. Appendix B, e.g., details the important events and decisions leading up to the establishment of MACSOG and, upon its establishment, sets forth many of MACSOG's activities which apply to more than one of its programs. Appendix C, on the

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on the other hand, treats solely and in-depth MACSOG's operations against NVN. The functional approach is used to portray subject areas which lend themselves to an across-the-board approach, e.g., intelligence and logistics which pertain to more than one MACSOG program. A listing of the above appendices follows:

<u>Appendix</u>	<u>Title</u>	
A	Summary of MACSOG Documentation Study	<u>2</u>
B	MACSOG and the STD: Inception, Organization, Evolution	<u>2</u>
C	Operations Against NVN	<u>3</u>
D	Cross-Border Operations in Laos	<u>4</u>
E	Cross-Border Operations in Cambodia	<u>5</u>
F	Joint Personnel Recovery Center	<u>6</u>
G	MACSOG Communications	<u>7</u>
H	Security, Cover, and Deception	<u>8</u>
I	MACSOG Intelligence	<u>9</u>
J	Logistics	<u>10</u>

3. (U) Summaries of each of the Appendices B through J are

~~presented in the Appendixes B through J~~

4. (U) The reader should bear in mind that the basic job of the Documentation Team was to collect the pertinent historical data and, then, to present these data in a usable form, i.e., in a form to facilitate analysis. In the vital collection process, the Team had to depend upon the agencies it visited to make available all relevant documents on MACSOG. Should gaps exist in these historical data, they may be attributed to one or more of the following:

a. The stringent need-to-know requirements inherent in covert/PM operations, and the resultant tendency of the operators, especially in the early days of MACSOG, to

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carry out attendant administrative/historical matters on an informal, and in some cases, undocumented basis.

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b. The compartmentation involved in covert/PM operations which militates against centralized files and, thus, adds to the difficulty in collection.

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c. The disposal or destruction of records after prescribed periods of time, e.g., three years.

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d. The 12-month rotation cycle and its impact on personnel continuity.

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PART II: SUMMARIES OF APPENDICES


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A. ~~(TS)~~ SUMMARY OF APPENDIX B: MACSOG AND THE STD: INCEPTION, ORGANIZATION, EVOLUTION

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1. ~~(TS)~~ Basic Policy Documents/Decisions Concerning Covert/PM Activities During the Pre-MACSOG Period

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b. Presidential Decisions

(1) On 20 April 1961, the President asked*the Deputy SECDEF to:

(a) Appraise the status and future prospects of the communist drive to dominate South Vietnam.

(b) Recommend a series of actions which, in the opinion of the Deputy SECDEF, would prevent communist domination of South Vietnam.



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* SECDEF Memorandum for the Deputy SECDEF, 20 April 1961

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c. NSAM 55 (28 June 1961)

In this NSAM, the President outlined to the Joint Chiefs of Staff his views as to their relations to him in cold war operations. In substance, those views were:

(1) The advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as his principal military advisor, was to come to him (the President) direct and unfiltered.

(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for defense of the nation in cold war similar to that which they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the military and paramilitary forces and resources available to the DOD, verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improvement.

(3) The President looks to the Chiefs to provide dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the success of the military and FM aspects of cold war programs.

(25) Deputy SECDEF Memorandum for the Presidential Task Force, "Program of Action for Vietnam," 1 July 1961

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~~TOP SECRET~~d. NSAM 56 (22 June 1961)

In this NSAM the President:

(1) Stated the need to anticipate possible US future requirements in the field of UW and military operations; further, that a first step would be to inventory the FM assets in the US armed forces, and to consider various areas of the world where the implementation of US policy may require indigenous FM forces, and thus to arrive at a determination of the goals which the United States should set in this field.

(2) Requested that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Department of State and the CIA, make an estimate of these requirements and to recommend ways and means of meeting them.

e. NSAM 57 (28 June 1961)

(1) This directive promulgated key policy intended to maximize the effectiveness and flexibility of operations within the context of the cold war. It provided the basis for the assignment to DOD of the responsibility for conducting covert/FM operations against North Vietnam. Key prohibitions of NSAM 57 are cited in paragraph B2, above.

(2) NSAM 57 has been the subject of considerable comment, particularly by CIA, as to its application and validity. In February 1963, the Deputy SECDEF and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) "agreed that, rather than undertaking a revision of NSAM 57 to eliminate the questions that have arisen as to to the interpretation, the conduct of future paramilitary operations, as between Defense and CIA, would be considered on a case-by-case basis and approved where necessary by the Special Group."

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~~TOP SECRET~~f. NSAM 162 (19 June 1962)

Basically, this NSAM embodied a program to remedy deficiencies in the US capability to support both the training and active operations of indigenous PM forces. DOD, in collaboration with the Department of State and the CIA, shall undertake a study to determine, on a selective basis, the feasibility of the concept of increased use of third country personnel in PM operations. On a selective basis, DOD and CIA would make studies of specific groups where there was reason to believe there existed an exploitable minority PM capability.

g. NSAM 273 (26 November 1963)

This memorandum sets forth guidance from the President resulting from his review of the discussions concerning South Vietnam which took place in Honolulu on 20 November 1963. For MACSOG purposes, the essence of this guidance follows:

(1) Planning for actions directed against North Vietnam should include different levels of possible increased activity and, in each instance, there should be estimates of such factors as the plausibility of denial.

(2) A plan should be developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to 50 kilometers inside Laos. [REDACTED]

(3) The situation in Cambodia was of first importance for South Vietnam, and it was, therefore, urgent that the United States should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon Cambodia.

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
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* CJCS Memorandum, CM 567-62


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6. (TS) OPLAN 34A	<u>21</u>
a. The primary bases for OPLAN 34A lie in:	<u>22</u>
(1) The Presidential and supporting positions to	<u>23</u>
prevent the communist domination of South Vietnam and to	<u>24</u>
expand and intensify allied actions, including covert/PM	<u>25</u>
ones, against North Vietnam.	<u>26</u>
(2) The need for a concerted, joint effort against	<u>27</u>
North Vietnam in the field of covert/PM actions.	<u>28</u>
(3) The relative ineffectiveness of the CIA covert/PM	<u>29</u>
program against North Vietnam	<u>30</u>
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b. The application of military measures against North Vietnam was a subject, beginning in August 1961, of continuing importance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Numerous plans, both overt and covert, were developed in which air and maritime actions were considered. The Study covers in detail these and other events which led up to the development of OPLAN 34A. Basic to the presentation of such background information was the trip in January 1963 by a Joint Chiefs of Staff team of senior Service and Joint Staff representatives to South Vietnam and the trip report⁺ of that team. The report covered the situation in South Vietnam in terms of the military, political, and economic factors. The team recommended, among other things, that air and ground reconnaissance missions be conducted in Laos, and that South Vietnamese military forces be subjected to intensified unconventional warfare training with a view toward their execution of raids and sabotage missions in North Vietnam. [This unconventional warfare effort would be coordinated with the CIA/CAS.]

c. Meanwhile, the Department of the Army, as a contribution to implementing the recommendations of the JCS team prepared a document entitled "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam."^{**} In effect, this study became the forerunner both of OPLAN 34A and of later intensified cross-border operations into Laos and, finally, to such operations into Cambodia.

d. The special meeting on South Vietnam held in Headquarters, PACOM on 20 November 1963 was instrumental in setting the stage for the development of OPLAN 34A. [Attendance included State, Defense, and CIA representation.] Among other things, the meeting dealt with important matters concerning [CAS-MACV relationships and] operations against North Vietnam and Laos.

⁺ CS memo to CJCS, "Trip Report." 1 February 1963.

^{**} Attachment to CSMA 120-63, 19 March 1963.

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Appendix A

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It was concluded that these CAS covert programs for sabotage, propaganda, and intelligence in North Vietnam had been limited in their scope and relatively limited in their accomplishment. The principals directed that an optimum twelve months' program for intensified operations against North Vietnam, including sabotage, propaganda incursions, intelligence, and commando hit-and-run raids be developed in concert by COMUSMACV and CAS Saigon. The plan would envision utilization of South Vietnamese military and PM resources fully supported by the United States and would clearly exhibit what could be done with the means then available as well as the additional means that would be required for carrying out the optimum program.

e. Accordingly, in a joint DOD-CIA message to the field on 26 November 1963, a MACV-CAS plan would be developed for a 12-month intensified program of actions against North Vietnam and submitted to Washington by 20 December 1963. Such planning would be conducted without concern at the time as to which elements of the program would be assigned to DOD or CIA; this was intended to avoid delay due to possible jurisdictional problems.

f. Prepared jointly by the J-5 division of Headquarters, MACV and CAS, OPLAN 34A was submitted on 15 December 1963.

g. OPLAN 34A was briefed to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence during their visit to South Vietnam on 19-20 December 1963. They directed that the substance of the plan be presented to the Special Group (5-12). In addition, the Secretary of Defense directed that certain personnel and equipment needed for the support of OPLAN 34A be arranged for immediately and said that DOD would pay the cost.

*On file in J-3 SACSA, OJCS.

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h. The SECDEF and DCI discussed OPLAN 34A with the President on 21 December 1963. At their recommendation, the President created an interdepartmental committee (State, Defense, CIA) to select from the plan those operations which were most feasible and which provided the greatest return for the least risk. Meanwhile, on 21 December 1963, the Secretary of Defense directed that the personnel and equipment needed to implement OPLAN 34A be moved to Saigon.

1. In a joint message to the field on 16 January 1964, State-DOD-CAS indicated that the recommendations of the interdepartmental committee had been approved by the President; further, that the approval embodied the execution, in a four month period commencing on 1 February 1964, of specified elements of OPLAN 34A. To carry out the approved actions in the plan, a joint task force, consisting of personnel from DOD and CIA, was authorized for establishment. The chief of the task force would be a colonel-level military officer selected by COMUSMACV, the deputy chief of the task force would be a CAS officer [REDACTED] [REDACTED] COMUSMACV would exercise operational control. Other personnel for the task force would be contributed by MACV and CAS as required and agreed upon.

j. The OPLAN 34A program of actions comprised these categories of actions: intelligence collection, psychological operations, physical destruction, aerial attack. The program contained a total of 72 actions which, if implemented over a 12-month period, would produce a total of 2,062 separate operations. Out of the 72 actions proposed in OPLAN 34A, 33 were ultimately approved for implementation during Phase I (1 February - 1 June 1964).

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- k. The South Vietnamese authorities approved OPLAN 34A in concept and promised full support. 1
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7. ~~(28)~~ MACSOG: Inception, Evolution, External Relationships 3
- a. Activation of MACSOG 4
- COMUSMACV activated MACSOG on 24 January 1964, with an initial military personnel strength of six officers and two enlisted men. At that time, the Chief of Staff, MACV, exercised direct supervision over MACSOG; the J-5, MACV exercised special cognizance of actions accomplished. 5
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- b. Mission and Objectives 10
- (1) As stated in OPLAN 34A, the overall mission of MACSOG was as follows: 11
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- COMUSMACV, [REDACTED] will provide necessary advice, assistance, training and materiel support to enable the RVN to conduct a graduated and intensified program of actions against the DRV which, in conjunction with other military and diplomatic actions in Southeast Asia, will lead to a judgment on the part of the DRV leadership that the direction and support of insurgent activities in RVN and Laos should cease. 13
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- (2) From the above overall mission, MACV/MACSOG arrived at these objectives: 18
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- (a) Divert North Vietnam military resources to defense and internal security missions. 20
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- (b) Produce an adverse effect on the North Vietnamese economy. 22
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- (c) Impede the infiltration of the military resources to RVN. 24
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- (d) Foment disrespect for the government policies of the NVN. 26
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- (e) Create the impression that an active, unified, internal opposition exists in North Vietnam. 28
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- (3) In November 1965, CINCPAC/COMUSMACV changed the MACSOG mission statement to read as follows: 30
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As Directed by CC USMACV and with the concurrence of the US Embassy, SOG will advise, train, and support counterpart forces in out-of-country unconventional and psychological warfare operations.

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SOG will conduct unilateral planning for unconventional warfare activities under existing COMUSSEASIA plans, and will be prepared to activate and command the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Southeast Asia.

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(4) With the approval of the revised mission statement as reflected above, CINCPAC considered that the assignment of additional approved operations, such as SHINING BRASS and psychological warfare missions, to MACSOG by COMUSMACV was appropriate in view of the transition of SOG at a later date to the status of Joint UW Task Force, as stated in the current contingency plans.

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(5) Current publications ^{**} cite the MACSOG mission as follows:

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Exercise operational control over US forces and personnel assigned or attached to MACSOG to execute such missions as may be directed by COMUSMACV or competent higher authority.

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Advise, assist and support the GVN and RVNAF in planning, coordinating, and implementing such missions as may be mutually agreed upon between the US and GVN and as directed by COMUSMACV.

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Coordinate activities of MACSOG with other US forces and agencies in all matters of mutual concern and in consonance with policies prescribed by COMUSMACV.

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Prepare unilateral US and coordinated US/GVN plans for contingency or general emergency operations as directed by COMUSMACV; develop GVN capabilities to provide support for US forces as may be required under existing assumptions or agreements pertinent to such contingency or general emergency operations.

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Act as Commander (designate), JUWTF for SEASIA. Develop for implementation, upon order, plans for UW warfare in SEASIA

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(S) Former code word for PRAIRIE FIRE (MACSOG cross-border operations in Laos).

(S) HQ US ACV Directive 10-11 "Organization and Functions - Command Relationships and Terms of Reference for USMACV (")", 1 Nov 63

(S) HQ MACSOG Organization and Functions manual, to June 1969

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Provide intelligence and counter intelligence support to COMUSMACV. 1

Coordinate post-CAR personnel recovery matters in SEASIA. 2

(6) The scope of the MACSOG mission was expanded with the initiation of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia in 1965 and 1967, respectively. Though influenced by political restrictions and/or evolving requirements, the broad overall mission of MACSOG has continued unchanged since 1967. The current abbreviated mission of MACSOG is: 3

To plan and conduct covert/ clandestine operations in NVN, Laos, and Cambodia and special operations in SVN, as directed, in such a manner that operations can be plausibly denied by the US and RVN governments. These operations are planned and conducted in coordination with various other US agencies and with the RVNAF STD. 4

(7) Inter-Relationship of the 5th Special Forces Group and MACSOG Missions 5

The question as to whether there has been a duplication or lack of economy of effort by MACSOG, with its mission of out-of-country operations and the 5th SFG, with its mission of in-country operations, has surfaced on several occasions. These two types of operations, however, have been kept separated primarily for reason of deniability for out-of-country operations. 6

(8) Views Concerning the MACSOG Missions 7

Of the approximately 50 individuals, formerly associated with MACSOG's activities, who were interviewed in connection with this Study, many of them had definite views concerning the MACSOG mission. These views are covered specifically and in detail in the Study. Generally, however, a number of these views were not complimentary, namely the MACSOG mission was not 8

* HQ MACSOG Year-End Review Vietnam 1968, p.7.

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completely clear because it was interpreted in different ways by the various agencies that were to provide support to MACSOG; the mission should have been more specifically stated because, as stated, it led to a shotgun approach to the listing of objectives; it was not clear what MACSOG operations were expected to accomplish; the whole concept was not well thought out.

c. MACSOG Organizational Development

(1) MACSOG initially depended largely upon TDY personnel augmentations to execute the approved portions of OPLAN 34A. Since its inception, MACSOG has:

(a) Developed and operated three major programs involving operations in three countries -- North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

(b) Prepared and operated under five JTDs in order to meet the organizational and personnel needs generated by evolving missions and objectives. Personnel strengths authorized in the initial (1964) and current (1969) JTDs are:

Officers	54	128
Enlisted Men	60	265
Civilians	<u>30</u>	<u>11</u>
Total	144	404

(2) This section of the Study traces the organizational evolution of MACSOG from its initial JTD to its current one. In tracing this evolution, organizational changes are set forth in this context:

(a) MACSOG's missions, objectives, and functions, and its headquarters and field organizations needed to accomplish them.

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(b) The external relationships which influenced the MACSOG organizational setup, for example, the Headquarters, USMACV.

(c) MACSOG's counterpart relationships with the South Vietnamese STD.

(3) Basic to the conduct of cross-border operations into Laos and Cambodia, currently the PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE Programs, respectively, are the MACSOG command and control (C&C) detachments. Personnel assets for that purpose are organized into three such detachments: C&C North at Danang; C&C Center at Kontum; and C&C South at Ban Me Thuot. Each of these detachments is organized along battalion lines and consists of: a headquarters element, a reconnaissance company, two reaction or exploitation companies, and a security company. The reconnaissance company is authorized 30 teams, each generally composed of three US and nine indigenous personnel.

(4) Views Concerning the MACSOG Organizational Development:

(a) Persons interviewed in connection with their association with MACSOG expressed many diverse views on the organizational development of MACSOG. Representative of those views are the following:

1. A SOG must be tailored especially to the situation or theater in which it will be operating. No two SOGs will be the same. The organization has to be flexible and adaptable to changing situations, in order to be able to assume new missions and to operate under new concepts.

2. MACSOG should have been organized as a JUMTF. It would have operated more efficiently had it been organized along those lines.

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2. If the military is to be involved in SOG-type operations, an organization with the necessary personnel should be set up before hand. One example of an organization for this purpose is JUWTF.

4. A SOG-type organization should have been set up exactly as it was, that is, on the basis of task elements that could be added like building blocks, based upon the nature of the operations to be conducted.

5. The application of the true JUWTF operational concept to MACSOG would have enabled us to produce better results than we did.

6. The JUWTF provides a command structure far more suited for special operations than that of MACSOG.

7. The JUWTF organization, as taught in our Service schools, is not necessarily the most efficient way of performing UW missions. Service components should not be retained within the JUWTF concept. UW should be conducted as a national effort, in which the Services lose their identity. There should be a task force tailored in each case for the particular area of operations. This task force should include those Service personnel of the appropriate skill but not Service components representing the concepts and doctrines of a particular Service. MACSOG is really a joint task force.

8. The JUWTF organization is an extension of conventional military organizational concepts and of Service parochialism. We should organize functionally, with resources assigned to enable the

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carrying out of functions regardless of Service. 1
 The organization should be completely integrated 2
 or, if it is compartmented, it should be compartmented 3
 along functional and not Service lines. 4

9. If MACSOG and the 5th Special Forces Group 5
 were placed under one central command, administrative 6
 and logistical systems could be streamlined, with 7
 savings in personnel and other resources. 8

10. Chief, MACSOG was responsible for so many 9
 operations of varied scopes that his span of control 10
 far exceeded his capabilities. Limiting his 11
 responsibilities to operations against North Vietnam 12
 would have been a practical approach to the span of 13
 control problem. 14

11. The proposal to create two Special Forces 15
 groups in South Vietnam -- one for in-country 16
 operations and the other for out-of-country 17
 operations -- had considerable merit. 18

12. MACSOG grew like topsy. The MACSOG-5th 19
 Special Forces Group relationship, considering the 20
 fact that the 5th Special Forces Group had a 21
 separate mission of its own and had to furnish 22
 personnel to MACSOG on an operational control basis, 23
 had built-in problems which caused some friction. 24
 The conduct of operations was along personal lines 25
 and not organizational lines. The 5th Special 26
 Forces Group should be divorced from MACSOG. 27


13. MACSOG should be provided with its own 28
 organic reconnaissance capabilities. Helicopter 29
 assets, both troop and gunships, should be 30
 organically assigned and dedicated to the MACSOG 31

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mission. The lack of dedicated aircraft resulted
in numerous aircraft accidents and losses of crew
members.

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


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


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
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e. Command and Control

(1) Due largely to political sensitivities, MACSOG operations have been subject to tight Washington controls. According to various authorities in the field, that control, especially in the early days, handicapped the effective conduct of MACSOG's operations.

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(2) MACSOG's activities have been subject to CINCPAC's review and recommendations as to approval or disapproval. With the passage of time, higher authority was granted to CINCPAC approval authorities for certain operations.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed and recommended to higher authorities disposition to be made on MACSOG's proposed concepts, plans, and operations. Within the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSACSA, in particular the Special Operations Division, has served as the action agent. Generally, the channel through which the Joint Chiefs of Staff obtain the requisite authorities for MACSOG activities has been the Deputy SECDEF. The latter is a member of the [303 Committee, the interdepartmental agency (State, DOD, CIA, and DIA) which monitors and, where appropriate, recommends to the White House the disposition to be made on proposals involving MACSOG concepts, plans, and operations.

(4) With respect to the approval of maritime operations:

(a) During Phase I (1 February - 1 June 1964), COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher authority approved each proposed individual operation.

(b) During the period 1 June to 1 October 1964, it was planned that proposed maritime operations would be approved, in principle, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the SECDEF, DIA, DCI, and the Secretary of State; then, CINCPAC would prepare a program of actions using the approved listing. This procedure continued until 4 August 1964, when all MACSOG maritime operations were halted incident to the North Vietnamese attack on US destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.

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- (c) Maritime operations were resumed in October 1964 and the above procedure for approval of MACSOG's operations was continued with the added requirement that each individual operation be approved just prior to its execution. 1
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- (5) Ultimately, these procedures governed the planning for and conduct of maritime operations. 6
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- (a) A maritime operation package would normally contain increments to cover a 30-day period of operations. Each increment might contain from three to five missions. COMUSMACV would submit to CINCPAC a package and/or increments of maritime missions in response to JCS request. 8
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- (b) CINCPAC would comment on the proposed package and/or increments to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 14
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- (c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would submit the proposed package and/or increments to higher authority for approval and would transmit to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV approval of the package and/or increments as obtained. The approval would specify missions approved for execution at the discretion of COMUSMACV and any conditions imposed by higher authority. 16
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- (d) Subsequent to receipt of the package and/or increments approved for execution, and prior to execution of the missions, COMUSMACV would transmit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINCPAC, and other such commands that CINCPAC might direct, detailed mission information. 23
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- (e) Prior to launching the maritime (and air) missions approved for execution, COMUSMACV might make minor route changes that did not substantively change 29
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the concept of a mission, and he might change
 departure times as dictated by operational conditions
 provided that he notified the proper persons by FLASH
 message.

(f) As the Maritime Operations Program against
 North Vietnam evolved, CINCPAC was given greater
 latitude in the approval and execution of such type
 missions. These missions included psychological
 operations as distribution of gifts, etc., and
 harassment/interdiction missions against designated
 targets.

(6) With regard to the approval of air operations:

(a) As already noted, prior to 14 October 1964,
 CIA handled the routing and approval of CPLAN 34A air
 operations. On that date, DOD assumed the responsibility
 and the following approval procedure became effective.

1. COMUSMACV would submit a monthly schedule.

2. This schedule, incorporating CINCPAC's
 comments, would be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs
 of Staff for approval by higher authority.

3. When obtained, this approval would
 represent final Washington authority for executing
 missions. However, COMUSMACV would obtain a
 political clearance for each mission, 24 hours
 prior to the mission, from the American Ambassador,
 Saigon and, concurrently, would provide notification
 of intent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who would
 so inform the SECDEF, DCI, and SECSTATE.

4. MACV would continue to submit launch,
 recovery, abort, and spot reports.

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(b) Later, in October 1964, approval was granted 1
 for a reduction in time from 24 to 12 hours for the 2
 notification of intent to execute individual air 3
 operations. 4

(c) As in the case of maritime operations, in 5
 January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff "codified" air 6
 operations procedures essentially as follows. 7

1. Approximately ten days prior to the 8
 estimated completion of the air operations package 9
 then approved for execution, COMUSMACV would submit 10
 to CINCPAC an air operations package planned for a 11
 30-day period of operations. 12

2. CINCPAC would comment on the proposed package 13
 and forward it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 14
 latter would review the package and handle the 15
 requisite approvals and coordination in the 16
 Washington area. 17

3. The approval message by the Joint Chiefs of 18
 Staff to the field would specify those missions 19
 approved for execution at the discretion of COMUSMACV 20
 and any conditions imposed by higher authority. 21

4. At least 12 hours prior to the intended 22
 execution of missions, COMUSMACV would obtain 23
 political clearance from the American Embassy, 24
 Saigon and would transmit to all concerned detailed 25
 mission information. 26

5. CINCPAC would retain authority for the 27
 tactical conduct of missions. 28

(d) In February 1966, CINCPAC was delegated the 29
 authority to approve and execute specific OPLAN 34A air 30
 missions which were in consonance with concepts and ob- 31
 jectives that had been approved at the Washington level. 32

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(7) As to diverse views concerning command and control expressed by persons interviewed in connection with MACSOG association, the following are representative.

(a) In the early days of MACSOG, by the time an action program had been staffed and finally approved, MACSOG had little time to implement the program and the constraints were prohibitive.

(b) The actual planning of MACSOG-type operations can be accomplished more effectively in the field. There should be a Washington-level organization consisting primarily of agencies needed to insure the requisite coordination with other operations and to obtain necessary approval for conducting a particular covert operation.

(c) The long extended chain of command for obtaining approval of small maritime operations caused extreme frustration to personnel in the Naval Advisory Detachment in Danang. It resulted in a lack of motivation and a loss of incentive to plan in detail.

(d) Tight control in Washington "hamstrung" MACSOG operations. The control affected the timeliness of the operations.



(f) There should be a completely integrated organization at the national level for handling covert actions.

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(g) The Special Secretariat (SS) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is charged with handling covert matters at the DOD level. The SS is considered to be understaffed. The staffing for covert action is extensive since it requires close coordination with the conventional Joint Staff members. As a result of the inadequate organizational machinery within DOD for handling covert matters, there is virtually no link between the Special Operations Division and the 303 Committee.

f. MACSOG Operations and Intelligence

(1) An Overview of the MACSOG Principal Programs

(a) MACSOG's principal programs and a brief description are outlined below.

1. FOOTBOY (g)

This is the code word for MACSOG's operations in North Vietnam. Initially, that program was simply referred to as the 34A Program. FOOTBOY(g) consists of these four sub-programs:

- (a) PARBOIL - maritime operations
- (b) HUMIDOR - psychological operations
- (c) TIMBERWORK - airborne operations
- (d) MIDRIFF - air operations

2. PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE

(a) These two programs involve cross-border operations and are conducted by MACSOG's three command and control detachments, namely: C&C North in Danang, C&C Center in Kontur, and C&C South in Ban Me Thuot

(b) PRAIRIE FIRE, formerly SHINING BRASS, is the code word for MACSOG cross-border operations

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in Laos. These operations are conducted by 1
 teams consisting of both American and indigenous 2
 personnel or, with indigenous agents, for the pur- 3
 pose of locating and interdicting VC/NVA con- 4
 centrations and routes of infiltration. 5

(c) SALEM HOUSE, formerly DANIEL BOONE, is 6
 the code word for MACSOG cross-border operations 7
 into Cambodia. As in the case of PRAIRIE FIRE, 8
 SALEM HOUSE operations are conducted by teams, 9
 organized as in paragraph (b) above, for the 10
 purpose of locating and interdicting VC/NVA 11
 concentration and routes of infiltration. 12

(2) Views Concerning MACSOG's Operations and Intelligence 13

(a) On the subject of MACSOG's operations and intel- 14
 ligence, representative diverse views of persons inter- 15
 viewed in connection with their MACSOG association follow: 16

1. A big mistake in OPLAN 34A was the assumption 17
that MACSOG would take over assets in being. 18
 Unfortunately, the assets did not exist in the sense 19
 we thought they existed [and as we had been briefed 20
 by CIA.] A big disappointment to MACSOG was that a 21
 resistance movement could not be started in North 22
 Vietnam. The United States fails to appreciate the 23
 value of guerrilla warfare, which constitutes one 24
 of the most effective measures that the communists 25
 have employed against us. 26

2. Had we employed maritime operations more 27
effectively than we did, we could have had complete 28
control of the North Vietnamese coastline up to a 29
depth of three or four miles. 30
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(b) JCRC-0 did not prepare a 34- Plan which
 tasked the components to support the MACSOG operation.
 Consequently, MACSOG operated from a MACV plan which
 did not provide the clear statement of responsibilities,
 functions, and missions of the components toward the
 34A operations.

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(c) Many of MACSOG's organizational problems were
 created by the haste to become operational. Had MACSOG
 been given more time to organize before initiating
 operations, it could have properly established its
 organization with the necessary trained and experienced
 personnel. This would have enabled more effective
 operations.

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(d) The full capability of our US forces was never used. For example, we could have used US reconnaissance operations to good advantage but never did.

(e) The 34A operations became unrealistic once the United States commenced overt air operations in North Vietnam. The program was then no longer covert.

(f) By curtailing MACSOG operations during the periods of bombing halts, we divulged the fact that it was the United States which was behind covert operations against North Vietnam.

(g) MACSOG's air operations were extremely limited because of the shortcomings of the C-123 aircraft. Eventually we were successful in obtaining the C-130 aircraft as a replacement for the C-123.

(h) Though the air operations were categorized as being covert in support of covert ground operations, the aircraft were not sanitized to the extent that they could be plausibly denied as being US government aircraft.

(i) There must be an acceptance at the national level that if we are going to use covert operations to influence our national policy objectives, that is, if we are going to employ covert operations in the same way that the enemy uses them against us, we must accept the idea that such operations have to be conducted in a manner that they will be denied. The policy need not necessarily conform to our publicly announced national objectives and national policies.

(j) MACSOG agent operations were inept and unproductive. The CAS operation, which MACSOG inherited in 1964, was no more successful.

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- (k) The entire agent team program was ill-conceived. 2
- (l) A lot of hardware items can, and should, be 2
developed for covert operations. In general, these 3
items should be smaller and lighter and, in the case of 4
communications equipment, have greater range and 5
reliability. 6
- (m) With respect to air operations, one of MACSCG's 7
biggest problems was that it did not own their aircraft. 8
- (n) With regard to maritime operations, the imposi- 9
tion of restrictions specifying the distance north of 10
the 17th parallel to which these operations could be 11
conducted resulted in the enemy being able to ascertain 12
our area of operations and to intercept our boats 13
relatively easily. These same sort of restrictions also 14
applied to the depth of penetration into Laos and 15
Cambodia and had the same effect on the operations of 16
our cross-border forces. 17
- (o) The PRAIRIE FIRE and SALEM HOUSE operations 18
became more of an overt combat/intelligence type of 19
exercise than perhaps had been originally intended. 20
Thus, we were inserting teams in a fashion which was 21
more overt than covert. 22
- (p) Our helicopters and/or the pilots have proven 23
to be incapable either because of design limitation or 24
of pilot training to land teams after dark in denied 25
areas. 26
- g. Contingency Planning 27
- (1) JUWTF 1-67 28
- (a) In the event of general war and/or when activated 29
by CINCPAC, COMUSMACV becomes Commander, US Forces 30
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Southeast Asia (COMUSMACV). COMUSMACV is asked to
 establish a JUVTF to conduct UW in Southeast Asia.
 MACSOG becomes the JUVTF headquarters and is augmented
 with an Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA component. The
 general mission of MACSOG in relation to the JUVTF is
 to:

1. Prepare plans for the conduct of UW operations.
2. Maintain continuing estimates of the resistance potential available in UW operational areas.
3. Plan for the operation of a personnel recovery and escape and evasion program in SEASIA.

(b) JUVTF OPLAN 1-67 provides for the conduct of UW operations in coordination with other military and political actions in the defense of SEASIA. The JUVTF is commanded by Chief, MACSOG. MACSOG would assume control over all of the Service component elements engaged in the implementation of this OPLAN.

(2) Post-Hostilities. MACSOG, pursuant to MACV directives, has planned extensively for the post-hostilities period. Basically, however, MACSOG contemplates that the functions to be carried on by a MACSOG type organization would fall into two broad categories, both of an intelligence nature: verification, and reconnaissance and surveillance. The extent of these activities will depend, of course, upon whatever cease-fire settlement, if any, and supporting agreement are arranged.

* JUVTF OPLAN 1-67 was approved by MACV in March 1968 and promulgated by MACSOG in April 1968.

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n. Personnel and Training

(1) General

(a) The 5th Special Forces Group provides MACSOG with US personnel to man the C&C detachments, which include the reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces. Assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group, these personnel are under the operational control of MACSOG and under the administrative control of the Group. This arrangement has provoked a considerable amount of unfavorable comment from both organizations.

(b) MACSOG employs a large number of civilians from different ethnic groups, including Vietnamese Montagnards, Chinese, Cambodians, and Filipinos. In this connection, MACSOG has developed a wealth of civilian personnel regulations, and pay structures for both administrative and field operation personnel.

(2) C&C Detachments

Emphasis is placed on maintaining the C&C detachments at 100 percent strength in US personnel. Of particular importance in this regard is the availability of qualified key leaders for the reconnaissance teams, which are basic to the conduct of MACSOG's cross-border operations. The continuing shortage of key leaders goes to be one of the most serious personnel difficulties in MACSOG.

(3) Recruiting of Indigenous Personnel

(a) The recruiting of indigenous personnel is accomplished through the Liaison Service STD and the Liaison Bureau of MACSOG Operations-35. The C&C detachments requisition through both ARVN and US channels for personnel to fill vacancies.

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(3) Generally, the unreliability of good recruits
has been a limiting factor in MACVOC's operations.

(4) Morale and Welfare

(a) Both US and indigenous personnel on duty with
the command and control detachments receive a wide
range of privileges and benefits, including additional
monetary compensation, for morale and welfare purposes.

(b) In the case of indigenous personnel, medical
support is provided for troops and to their families.
In addition, schools have been established to give a
basic education to the dependents. Instruction is
conducted about two hours each day. The standard Tet
bonus for all indigenous personnel is one months pay;
thus these personnel receive 13 months pay per year.

(5) Discipline, Law and Order

The STD Liaison Service provides each C&C detachment
commander with an ARVN cadre to assist him in handling
matters better concerning indigenous personnel. Matters
involving the hiring and firing of these personnel are
usually referred to the senior member of the ARVN cadre.

(6) Training

(a) Emphasis is placed on developing leadership
qualities in all personnel, especially those filling
leader/command positions.

(b) The initial training of all indigenous members
is given at Camp Long Thanh.

(c) Further training and integration into a
reconnaissance team or an exploitation force is
accomplished at the C&C detachment. US members
accompany and participate in all training. This train-
ing encompasses all of the essential combat skills.

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(7) <u>Summary of Findings</u>	<u>2</u>
(1) <u>Background views concerning personnel and</u>	<u>2</u>
<u>traffic on assets of persons interviewed in connection</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>with their ABC associations are outlined below.</u>	<u>4</u>
<u>2. The South Vietnamese Navy cooperated fully</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>in furnishing MACSOG with the required number of</u>	<u>6</u>
<u>Naval personnel. Generally, these personnel were</u>	<u>7</u>
<u>well trained and adapted to the Maritime Operations</u>	<u>8</u>
<u>Program rapidly. The South Vietnamese Army was not</u>	<u>9</u>
<u>forthcoming in providing personnel for the MAROPS</u>	<u>10</u>
<u>programs.</u>	<u>11</u>
<u>3. The South Vietnamese personnel for the</u>	<u>12</u>
<u>PSYOPS Program were recruited from the universities</u>	<u>13</u>
<u>and through ads placed in various newspapers. The</u>	<u>14</u>
<u>response was good and coming from an educational</u>	<u>15</u>
<u>standpoint, MACSOG was able to recruit all of the</u>	<u>16</u>
<u>PSYOPS personnel needed.</u>	<u>17</u>
<u>4. Depending upon the time when the various</u>	<u>18</u>
<u>comments were made, the ratings of the Chinese</u>	<u>19</u>
<u>pilots ranged from outstanding to poor. Later,</u>	<u>20</u>
<u>however, MACSOG personnel rated them as true</u>	<u>21</u>
<u>professionals.</u>	<u>22</u>
<u>5. Generally, from the beginning of MACSOG's</u>	<u>23</u>
<u>operations until 1 November 1968, the date on</u>	<u>24</u>
<u>which operations against North Vietnam stopped,</u>	<u>25</u>
<u>the agent assets were considered to be of</u>	<u>26</u>
<u>questionable capability.</u>	<u>27</u>
<u>6. Initially, the selection of US personnel for</u>	<u>28</u>
<u>assignment to MACSOG seemed to be based more on</u>	<u>29</u>
<u>their availability than qualifications for MACSOG-</u>	<u>30</u>
<u>type operations.</u>	<u>31</u>

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6 The ideal US performance test leader would be of E-6 or E-7 grade, with approximately ten years of service, and not over 30 years of age. Light weapons infantry or an operations specialist would be preferred. 1
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7 A major problem confronting MACSOG was its competition with the 5th Special Forces Group for suitable personnel. 6
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8 One of the serious problems confronting MACSOG in the MAROPS field was the decision that members of the SEAL teams responsible for training and preparing the Vietnamese in this activity would be on a six months rotational basis. The SEAL teams, therefore, were handicapped in producing results with the Vietnamese. 9
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9 MACSOG's problems have been aggravated by the continued assignment to it of US personnel whose qualifications for the particular job in MACSOG have been questionable. 16
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10 MACSOG should be exempt for short tour assignments in the case of certain key personnel. 20
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11 The training of US personnel for assignment to a MACSOG-type organization must include that of a joint specialized nature and there should be established facilities where this training could be conducted. 22
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12 The Nungs who were in the SHINING BRASS Program during its early days were much better qualified than the Chinese who followed them. The latter, "Cholon Cowboys," lacked motivation and their principal incentives for joining MACSOG 27
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seem to be receiving the equipment for it and
evading the draft in the Montagnard army.

13. The average Montagnard demonstrated more
compassion than did the Chinese, that is, the
Montagnard was more concerned as to what happened
to his teammates and would be more apt than the
Chinese to carry a wounded man under fire back to
the safety of a covered position or to a waiting
helicopter.

14. There was a glaring lack of professional
background and professional training of both the
US and South Vietnamese personnel in intelligence
operations.

15. The awards and decorations system for
MACSOG was poor. This had an adverse effect on
morale. Chief, MACSOG should be delegated the
authority for awards and decorations up to and
including the Silver Star. The entire awards and
decorations system should be streamlined.

16. The personnel who engage in cross-border
operations do not need to be Special Forces.
These operations are no more than those of a
reconnaissance or combat patrol type.

17. MACSOG personnel shortages have existed in
all the command and control detachments. The most
serious aspect of this problem, however, is not
the shortage of personnel as such but the shortage
of qualified and experienced personnel. The TCE
for a reconnaissance team calls for an E-7. In
most instances, MACSOG has had a shortage of at
least 50 percent of the proper MOS and grade.

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1. <u>General Background - The Strategic Exploitation Service</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>Directorate</u>	<u>2</u>
(1) <u>Activation of the STD</u>	<u>3</u>
(a) The PITAP, on 12 February 1964, organized a MACSOG counterpart organization known as the Strategic Exploitation Service (SES). In common with OPLAK 34A, the objectives of SES included: aerial reconnaissance, beach reconnaissance, communications and electronics intelligence, tactical unit reconnaissance probes, psychological operations and physical destruction operations.	<u>4</u> <u>5</u> <u>6</u> <u>7</u> <u>8</u> <u>9</u> <u>10</u> <u>11</u>
(b) MACSOG has prepared a history of the STD and its precursors. That history, incorporated in Annex T to this Study, presents the evolution of the organization and its tie-in with MACSOG.	<u>12</u> <u>13</u> <u>14</u> <u>15</u>
(2) <u>Views Concerning the STD</u>	<u>16</u>
On the subject of the STD, representative views of persons interviewed in connection with their MACSOG association are set forth below.	<u>17</u> <u>18</u> <u>19</u>
(a) One of the greatest assets which Col. Ho (the Commander) and his senior personnel possessed was their apolitical nature. Most of them had managed to remain aloof from any single political party or any single group of military officers and, thus, they survived the various coups. The majority of the STD personnel were patriotic in the highest meaning of that word. Their greatest limitation was their lack of experience in the covert operations field.	<u>20</u> <u>21</u> <u>22</u> <u>23</u> <u>24</u> <u>25</u> <u>26</u> <u>27</u> <u>28</u>
(b) To some extent, the MACSOG-STD relationship was complicated by feelings that the STD has been penetrated. However, we had no clear cut evidence that such was the case.	<u>29</u> <u>30</u> <u>31</u> <u>32</u>

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(c) Organizationally, MACSOG and STD did not get very well in the field. There was a great deal of cooperation in working together. At the MACSOG-STD level, the organizations did not lend themselves to close coordination in terms of staff set ups and the physical separation further complicated this problem. For example, one MACSOG staff officer might have to deal with perhaps three STD staff officers to get one job coordinated. MACSOG and STD should have been generally organized along the same lines.

B. (TS) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX C: MACSOG OPERATIONS AGAINST NORTH VIETNAM.

1. (TS) General

a. As already noted, the raison d'etre for the activation of MACSOG was to execute the approved portions of OPLAN 34A. That OPLAN, of course, covered a period of twelve months. With the continuation of operations against North Vietnam beyond the 12-month period, such operations assumed the code name FOOTBOY (C).

b. Operations against North Vietnam were basically of five types: intelligence collection, psychological, political pressure, dissidence and physical destruction. [It should be pointed out, however, that while OPLAN 34A called for a resistance movement in North Vietnam, US national policy prohibited it.]

c. The Study treats these operations very comprehensively. In this connection, Appendix C (MACSOG Operations Against North Vietnam) is presented in five parts, namely: The Overview of These Operations and four Annexes which present in detail the four sub-programs to FOOTBOY (C). Those sub-programs are as follows:

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- (1) HUMINTOP - to include local operations. 1
- (2) REINDEER CP - air operations against rear operations. 2
- (3) MIDRIFF - air operations. 3
- (4) PARACIL - maritime operations. 4

Of the above four sub-programs, HUMINTOP is credited with 5
being the most successful; TIMBERWORK was regarded as 6
 unsuccessful. PARACIL met with considerable success but the 7
 view of many SOG personnel was that the United States did not 8
 go far enough in this program and did not employ certain means, 9
 such as submarines, which would have proved to be very 10
 effective. MIDRIFF, of course, within the context of MACSOG, 11
 was supportive of the other programs. 12

2. ~~(TS)~~ Cessation of Operations 13

Except for certain psychological operations, the FOOTBOY (C) 14
 Program was discontinued effective 1 November 1968, with the 15
 cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. 16

C. ~~(TS)~~ SUMMARY OF APPENDIX D: CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN LAOS 17

1. ~~(TS)~~ Concept of Operations 18

a. In March 1965, COMUSMACV assigned* the responsibility 19
 to MACSOG for conducting cross-border operations into Laos. 20
 Operations commenced in October 1965. The concept of opera- 21
 tions envisioned that MACSOG operations would be directed 22
 against VC/PL/NVN bases and infiltration routes associated 23
 with enemy movement from Laos into South Vietnam. The initial 24
 operations would be conducted by RVN forces with US support 25
 and would be expanded to include participation and support 26
 of Laotian military and indigenous personnel. 27

b. The Operations Plan provided for operations to be 28
 conducted in three phases beginning with short-stay tactical 29
 intelligence missions. Operations would then progress to 30
 longer-stay intelligence and sabotage missions. Finally, 31

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the operation could culminate in long-duration missions to
 develop resistance areas. Operations would be staged from
 secure bases in Laos and South Vietnam, and infiltration/
 exfiltration would be conducted via overland routes and
 air employing US, F-4E, and C-130C aircraft. Air strikes
 and ground operations, the latter by exploitation forces, would
 be conducted against targets developed by the MACSOG cross-
 border forces and in support of in-place teams.

2. (TS) Formation of Cross-Border Units

a. In carrying out the cross-border operations, MACSOG
 organized reconnaissance teams consisting of three US and up
 to nine Vietnamese personnel. Members of these teams were
 equipped and received their initial training at Camp Long
 Thanh. That training was conducted at the forward operating
 base and the teams executed in-country training missions
 from that base prior to executing cross-border operations
 into Laos.

b. The first command and control facility for conducting
 cross-border operations into Laos was established at Danang.
 Subsequently, it was designated as Command and Control North.
 Later, another detachment known as Command and Control Center
 was established at Kontum under the control and direction of
 Headquarters MACSOG. These detachments planned for and
 conducted operations under the code names of SHINING BRASS/
 PRAIRIE FIRE (for Laos) and DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE (for
 Cambodia).

3. (TS) Operations

a. The PRAIRIE FIRE Program had been subjected to
 considerable political constraints, particularly during the
 early days of the program. In particular, these constraints
 were related to the depth of penetration into Laos, the

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sure of the exploitation forces, the creation of STB as
the reconnaissance exploitation forces in Laos, and the use
of air power in support of the ground effort.

b. SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE operations have resulted
in the acquisition of considerable intelligence, mostly of
a tactical nature, of enemy activities. This intelligence,
in turn, provided a basis for employing exploitation forces
and air and artillery attacks against lucrative targets in
the SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE area of operations.

D. ~~(TS)~~ SUMMARY OF APPENDIX E CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS IN
CAMBODIA

1. ~~(TS)~~ Concept of Operations

a. [With concurrence of the State Department,] approval was
granted* in May 1967 to conduct cross-border operations into
Cambodia. These operations were conducted under the code
name of DANIEL BOONE; later, under the code name SALEM
HOUSE. Basically, these operations were oriented toward
ground troop reconnaissance and intelligence collection,
primarily, in the tri-border area. These operations were
intended to provide early warning of enemy movement toward
the isolated friendly camps in the area and to enable the
timely deployment of friendly forces to counter the enemy
movement. The constraints were many. These included.

(1) Restrictions as to area of operations.

(2) Reconnaissance teams could not exceed overall
strength of twelve men, to include not more than three
US advisors.

(3) Tactical air strikes and/or exploitation forces
were not authorized for use in Cambodia.

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(4) Infiltration and exfiltration could be by foot.	<u>1</u>
Elimination of helicopter as authorized in emergency situations only.	<u>2</u>
(5) The reconnaissance teams would take all precautions to avoid confrontation with Cambodian military forces or civilian population.	<u>3</u>
(6) The teams engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture.	<u>4</u>
(7) No more than three reconnaissance teams might be committed at any one time.	<u>5</u>
(8) The total number of missions would not exceed ten in any one 30-day period.	<u>6</u>
Actual operations were begun in June 1967.	<u>7</u>
2. (TS) <u>Formation of Cross-Border Units</u>	<u>8</u>
a. Cross-border forces for use in the DANIEL BOONE/SALEX HOUSE operation were located at the base camps in Kontum (C&C Detachment Center) and Ban Me Thuot (C&C Detachment South). The basic reconnaissance team had the same organization as that employed in the SHINING BRASS/PRAIRIE FIRE operations. Due to the cross-border mission for Cambodia, that is, reconnaissance and verification, operations were generally conducted using a split team composed of two US and four Vietnamese/Montagnard personnel on each team.	<u>9</u>
b. As already noted, exploitation forces were not authorized for deployment into Cambodia. However, these forces were used to secure the forward launch sites.	<u>10</u>
3. (TS) <u>Operations</u>	<u>11</u>
a. With the passage of time, operations instructions governing the conduct of the cross-border teams were modified to include the following	<u>12</u>
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(1) The teams were authorized to capture VC, NVA
soldiers, who would be evaluated immediately by South
Vietnam for interrogation and disposition.

(2) The use of helicopter gunships to escort
helicopter troop ships was authorized as required. The
gunships would engage the enemy only when necessary for
their own defense or that of the team.

(3) The teams were authorized to destroy significant
enemy caches found during reconnaissance operations.

(4) The restrictions on the number of US personnel
on the reconnaissance team were removed.

(5) Authority was granted for FAC type aircraft to
overfly the DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE area on minimum
duration, mission controlled flights.

b. DOD/COMUSMACV attempts to remove prohibitions on the
use of small exploitation forces and tactical air in support
of the reconnaissance team operations have been unsuccessful.
The State Department has nonconcurred in the removal of
these prohibitions because of what it considers to be
political sensitivities relating to the possible resumption
of US/Cambodian diplomatic relations.

c. In general, the military authorities have considered
the DANIEL BOONE/SALEM HOUSE operations as productive. The
State Department, however, has questioned the value of these
operations in view of the "political risks" involved.

E. (28) SUMMARY OF APPENDIX F: JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER
(JPRC)

1. Activation of the JPRC

a. The JPRC was activated on 17 September 1966. As a
separate staff element of MACSOG, the JPRC was responsible
for collation, evaluation, and dissemination of all
data concerning missing and detained personnel and
post-SAF recovery operations. Basically, the

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JPRC would ensure the... resources and capabilities... Southeast Asia upon termination of the S-F effort. In this capacity, the JPRC would be the coordination authority and focal point for all post-S-F recovery matters.

b. In furtherance of the above responsibilities, the JPRC was to establish, on a continuing basis, the flow of necessary intelligence into the Center. In addition, it would serve as the central repository for the names of detained and missing personnel.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Operations

a. Tied in to JPRC activities was the establishment of evasion and escape procedures, which were disseminated to all aircrews. These procedures further involved the establishment of Safe Areas and pick-up points. To complement the Safe Area Program plans for the recovery of air crews downed in North Vietnam, the JPRC established Safe Area Activation Teams (SAATs).

b. The JPRC recovery operations generally took one of two forms. One form was the raid-type operation against known or suspected enemy POW camps. The other form involved the search of an area where personnel who were evading, or who had escaped, were known or strongly suspected to be hiding.

c. In its actual operations, the JPRC has received an abundance of information and intelligence relating to captured, detained, missing, or evading personnel in the Southeast Asia area of operations. Based upon this information, the Center has coordinated recovery operations. The JPRC has had no forces under its operational control. Whenever possible, the forces under the operational control of MACSOG have been used in recovery operations. For that

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
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purpose, two reconnaissance teams from the forces employed 1
 in MACSOG's cross-border operations have been maintained on 2
 alert status to provide a ready reaction element. 3

d. In terms of actual recovery, the JPRC operations have 4
 not been highly productive. There are cogent reasons, not 5
 the least of which is psychological, for maintaining and 6
 improving the JPRC capability. From experience factors, the 7
 Center has developed invaluable procedures for recovery 8
 operations. The essential nature of the JPRC operations 9
 makes cost a secondary consideration. It should be pointed 10
 out, however, that the cost has been relatively small. 11

F. ~~(TS)~~ SUMMARY OF APPENDIX G: MACSOG COMMUNICATIONS 12

1. ~~(TS)~~ General 13



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2. ~~(TS)~~ Operations 15

Generally, communications support was provided to MACSOG 16
 as follows: 17

a. The military provided for: 18

(1) Operational/administrative circuits for MACSOG's 19
 use from COMUSMACV Headquarters to the Naval Advisory 20
 Detachment in Danang, the Training Center at Camp Long 21

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Thanh, the American Embassy in Saigon, and Tan Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon. 1
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(2) Maintenance of maritime operations equipment and radio operations' proficiency. 3
4

(3) Cryptographic support. 5

(4) Personnel to train and brief agent teams. 6

(5) The mission briefing of maritime operations and flight crew communicators. 7
8

[REDACTED] 9
10

(7) Communications logistics support. 11

[REDACTED] 12

[REDACTED] 13
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c. The success of the agent team operations and maritime operations depended to a large degree on the ability of those elements to communicate effectively with MACSOG Headquarters. 16
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[REDACTED] 20

d. Ultimately, MACSOG was able to install the secure circuits needed for direct communications with Clark Air Base, the command and control detachments and their forward operating bases, Camp Long Thanh, the First Flight Detachment at Nha Trang, and the Naval Advisory Detachment in Danang. 21
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e. As documented in the Study, the general feeling in MACSOG was that the agent teams and the cross-border operations teams should be equipped with lighter and more reliable communications equipment. 26
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f. As a means of enhancing the intelligence collection effort, [REDACTED] were introduced into MACSOG 30
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programs in 1968. Appendix G (MACSOG Communications) to	<u>1</u>
the Study provides information concerning the technical	<u>2</u>
procedures and the various types of equipment used by	<u>3</u>
MACSOG. In addition, in that Appendix the details	<u>4</u>
concerning personnel and communications nets are presented.	<u>5</u>
	<u>6</u>
G. (TS) <u>SUMMARY OF APPENDIX H: SECURITY, COVER, AND DECEPTION</u>	<u>7</u>
1. (S) <u>General</u>	<u>8</u>
a. The extremely sensitive nature of MACSOG's operations	<u>9</u>
necessitate stringent security procedures and policies for	<u>10</u>
the control and safeguarding of classified information.	<u>11</u>
Appendix H (Security, Cover, and Deception) sets forth the	<u>12</u>
many security considerations, passive and active, as well	<u>13</u>
as the cover and deception techniques attendant to MACSOG's	<u>14</u>
operations.	<u>15</u>
b. Pursuant to the above, CINCPAC conducts periodic	<u>16</u>
operational security surveys of MACSOG. In addition, those	<u>17</u>
surveys are conducted under the auspices of both COMUSMACV	<u>18</u>
and Chief, MACSOG.	<u>19</u>
2. <u>Operations</u>	<u>20</u>
a. In terms of physical security, each element within	<u>21</u>
or supporting MACSOG has prepared an SOP setting forth its	<u>22</u>
installation defense plans.	<u>23</u>
b. Of special importance are the cover stories pertinent	<u>24</u>
to the various MACSOG activities in North Vietnam, Laos and	<u>25</u>
Cambodia. For example, the cover story for operations in	<u>26</u>
Cambodia is that the team is conducting anti-infiltration	<u>27</u>
patrols on the South Vietnam side of the border. No	<u>28</u>
acknowledgement of conduct of cross-border operations into	<u>29</u>
Cambodia will be made.	<u>30</u>
	<u>31</u>

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c. It is difficult for the US Government to plausibly deny involvement in any air operation unless aircrews and air assets are thoroughly sterilized with respect to identity, origin and sponsorship. Accordingly, cover stories must be designed to reinforce the deniability position rather than to explain the presence of an aircraft and/or crew in a given geographical location.

H. ~~(TS)~~ SUMMARY OF APPENDIX I: MACSOG INTELLIGENCE

1. ~~(TS)~~ General

One of MACSOG's basic missions is the acquisition of intelligence. Appendix I (MACSOG Intelligence) sets forth the results obtained by MACSOG in this field and traces the development of MACSOG's internal intelligence organization.

2. ~~(TS)~~ Operations

a. The intelligence derived from the PARBOIL Program (maritime operations) provided practically the only human intelligence coming from the coastal areas of North Vietnam. For the most part, this intelligence was obtained through debriefings of the boat crews and from interrogations of prisoners captured from fishing boats and during cross-beach operations in North Vietnam.

b. The intelligence emanating from the TIMBERWORK Program (agent teams) in North Vietnam was collected by the agent teams from the local area in which the team operated. Generally, the information reported to MACSOG was limited to visual reconnaissance only. The teams might remain in their safe areas or operate far afield, depending upon the environment in which the individual team operated. In short, the agent team reports revealed no information of great significance to MACV. In view of the consensus that most of these agent teams had been compromised, the nature of

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of information produced by the TIMBERWORK Program was highly 1
questionable. 2

c. The PRAIRIE FIRE Program has been highly productive 3
These cross-border operations have provided the only ground 4
reconnaissance into Laos by MACV. And, in addition to the 5
intelligence produced, the exploitation forces in the program 6
have enabled MACV to counter enemy infiltration into South 7
Vietnam. 8

d. As in the case of PRAIRIE FIRE, the SALEM HOUSE Program, 9
has provided an important source of intelligence for MACV. 10
Through reconnaissance and verification efforts considerable 11
enemy activity has been observed in the SALEM HOUSE area of 12
operations and reported to MACV. Such intelligence includes 13
such matters as enemy installations, enemy activity of any 14
size, as well as information of the terrain. 15

e. Basically, the intelligence produced by the PRAIRIE 16
FIRE and SALEM HOUSE Programs has been of a technical nature. 17
In Laos, of course, this intelligence was subject to 18
exploitation by MACSOG forces. In Cambodia, however, the 19
use of exploitation forces has been prohibited. 20

f. MACSOG submits detailed reports of the results of each 21
reconnaissance team operation to the MACV Intelligence Data 22
handling facility. Personnel at that facility store this 23
information which, upon the development of a retrieval 24
program, can be retrieved rapidly. 25

I. ~~(TS)~~ SUMMARY OF APPENDIX J: LOGISTICS 26

1. ~~(TS)~~ General 27

Logistic support for COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A was to have 28
been derived basically from in-country resources. These 29
resources were estimated as adequate to satisfy most require- 30
ments for planned actions. Assets transferred to MACSOG in 31

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January 1964, and during the transition period following, have 1
been valued at \$5,500,000. 2

2. ~~(TS)~~ Overview of Logistics 3

a. The original 34A Program was for a 12-month period. The 4
extension of that period beyond 12 months, combined with 5
several changes and expansions to the original mission, 6
influenced changes in size, scope, equipage and funding 7
requirements of MACSOG. The annual operating budget in FY 8
1965 (excluding support provided by individual military Services 9
[redacted] was authorized by DOD at \$5,102,000; by FY 1970 due 10
to broadening of program scope the annual budget was estimated 11
at \$25,778,400 (confidential funds) and approximately \$450,000 12
(appropriated funds). 13

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b. Security precautions attendant to MACSOG operations 14
restricted much of the assistance routinely available 15
within the military Services, and caused delays in construction 16
and base development; e.g., fuel storage, piers, berthing, 17
and support facilities for PTFs; communications equipment, 18
non-attributable US weaponry; command and control facilities, 19
recruitment, training and outfitting of personnel. 20

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GROUP 1
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PARTS I - IV
OF APPENDIX A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: SECURITY OF COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
REFLECTING THE RECEPTION, TRANSMISSION, EVOLUTION

	<u>Page</u>
PART I General	B-1
PART II Covert/Paramilitary Activities	B-4
PART III [REDACTED]	B-57
PART IV CPLA 134A	B-88

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GROUP 1
B-1

Parts I - IV
OF APPENDIX A

792 (33-265)

Doc 3

Page 1

CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. Background

III. Organization and Functions

IV. Operations

V. Contingency Planning

VI. Personnel and Training

VII. Logistics

VIII. Counterpart Relationships - The Strategic Technical Directorate

IX. Analysis and Recommendations

X. Comments on MACSOG's Mission

XI. Organization & Functions Manual

XII. Comments on MACSOG's Organizational Development

XIII. Comments on Command and Control

XIV. Comments on MACSOG's Operations and Intelligence

XV. Documentaries

XVI. Comments on Contingency Planning

XVII. Comments on Personnel and Training

XVIII. Illustrative Indigenous Civilian Personnel Regulations

XIX. Comments on Logistics

XX. Counterpart Relationships - Strategic Technical Directorate (STD)

XXI. Comments on Counterpart Relationships - The STD

B-1
 B-3
 B-5
 B-88
 B-175
 E-176
 B-176
 B-177
 B-188
 B-227
 B-278
 B-295
 B-337
 B-348
 B-400
 B-409
 B-a-1
 B-b-1
 B-c-1
 B-d-1
 B-e-1
 E-f-1
 E-g-1
 B-h-1
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APPENDIX B
 MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMBAT MODELS AND OBSERVATION GROUP AND
 THE OPERATIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
 OF THE COMBAT MODEL EVOLUTION
 PART I. (CLASS)

A. ~~(TS)~~ EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

1. ~~(TS)~~ The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), beginning in 2
 1961, conducted limited covert programs for purposes of intel- 3
 ligence, sabotage, and propaganda against North Vietnam (NVN). 4
 Agent teams and singletons* were infiltrated largely by air and 5
 sea. 6

2. ~~(TS)~~ Following the Bay of Pigs, major policy decisions** 7
 were made concerning responsibilities for the planning and con- 8
 duct of covert/paramilitary (P!) operations. These decisions, 9
 in conjunction with NVN's intensified aggression against South 10
 Vietnam (SVN), resulted in meetings between high US officials 11
 in Saigon and Honolulu during the fall of 1963. Stemming from 12
 these meetings was a decision to prepare a combined Department 13
 of Defense-CIA 12-month covert program for the intensification 14
 of action against NVN. That program, in concert with other 15
 military and diplomatic actions, would be designed to convince 16
 the NVN leadership that their continued direction and support 17
 of insurgent activities in NVN and Laos should cease. It would 18
 include these actions against NVN: harassment, political 19
 pressures, capture of prisoners, physical destruction, acquisi- 20
 tion of intelligence, generation of propaganda, all contributing 21
 to the diversion of NVN's resources.*** 22

3. ~~(S)~~ Following the above decision, DOD and CIA representa- 23
 tives met in Saigon and drafted a plan which became known as 24
 Operations Plan (OPLAN) 34A in DOD and TIGER in CIA. In view 25
 of the scope and nature of the plan, DOD and CIA agreed that 26
27

* Single agents.
 ** These policy decisions were embodied in National Security
 Action Memorandums (NSAMs) 55, 56, 57, 162, 182.
 *** ~~(TS)~~ JCS .msg 3697, DTG 261-37Z Nov 63. c

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the executive authority for its implementation should be in DOD, with CIA in a supporting role. As a result, the Special Operations Group (SOG), later changed to Studies and Conservation Operations Group (SCG), a joint Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV)/CIA group, was established on 24 January 1964 to carry out OPLAN 34A. MACSOG would be under MACV and commanded by a military officer.

B. (S) SCOPE AND APPROACH

1. (S) This volume traces the organizational development and role of the Military Assistance Command Studies and Conservation Group (MACSCG) and its South Vietnamese counterpart, the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). The former is placed in historical context through the exposition of:

a. The pre-MACSCG period (July 1947-January 1964), including:

(1) Basic policy documents/decisions governing covert/PM matters.

(2) Basic matters agreements between DOD and CIA for the planning and conduct of covert/PM operations.

(3) DOD support of CIA in the field of covert/PM operations.

(4) The evolution of a DOD organization for staff cognizance of covert/PM operations.

(5) The development of OPLAN 34A (background, approval, provisions).

(6) The transition of the responsibility for the planning and conduct of covert/PM operations against NVN from CIA to DOD.

(7) Results of CIA covert/PM operations against NVN.

2. (S) Generally, a functional approach is used to depict the major documents, decisions, and events leading up to the

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B-2Appendix B
Appendix B

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establishment of MACSOG in January 1954 (Parts I - IV). These
 -s, rather than presenting each of the foregoing chronologically
 call; and as separate entities, they are grouped collectively
 under the pertinent subject heading to enable the reader to
 focus on the particular subject.

3. (C) In presenting the inception and evolution of MACSOG
 (Part V), generally a chronological approach is used. The
 reader is reminded that the MACSOG programs (FOOTBOY, PR-IRIE
 FIRE, SALEM HOUSE, etc.) are presented in detail in succeeding
 appendices.

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Appendix B

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PART II. COVERT/PI OPERATIONS DURING THE
PRE-ACCSO PERIOD (JULY 1947-JANUARY 1954)


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A. ~~(S)~~ BASIC POLICY DOCUMENTS/DECISIONS 3

The basic policy documents governing covert/P operations during the pre-ACCSO period were: 4
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1. ~~(S)~~ National Security Act of 1947 (26 July 1947) as amended. This Act established the CIA as an independent agency under the National Security Council (NSC).+ Though the Act makes no mention of covert/PI operations, the following provision thereof permits the NSC to exercise wide latitude in the assignment of responsibilities to CIA. 6
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To perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct.** 12
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
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* ~~(S)~~ Section 102(a), National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Congress, 26 July 1947. 30
** ~~(S)~~ Ibid., Section (d)(5). 31
*** ~~(S)~~ NSC 10/2 was modified by NSC 10/5 (23 Oct 51) and rescinded by NSC 5412 (19 August 1954). See paragraphs 3 and 4, respectively, below. An extract of NSC 10/2 is on file in OSACSA (Special Operations Division).

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6. ~~(TS)~~ Presidential Decisions: Plan to Prevent Communist Domination of SVN

a. On 20 April 1961, the President asked the Deputy SECDEF to.*

(1) Appraise the status and future prospects of the communist drive to dominate SVN.

(2) Recommend a series of actions (military, political and/or economic, overt and/or covert) which, in the opinion of the Deputy SECDEF, would prevent communist domination of SVN.

b. On 29 April 1961, acting on the report of the Deputy SECDEF and his task force, the President approved a "Program of Action to Prevent Communist Domination of South Vietnam."** In this program were the following:

(1) An authorization to expand positive and counter-intelligence operations against the communist forces in SVN and against NVN. These operations included dispatch of agents to NVN and use of civilian aircrews of American and other nationality, as appropriate, in addition to Vietnamese in operations against NVN. In this regard, US Army Security Agency Teams, numbering a total of 78 personnel, could be sent to Vietnam for direct operations;

* ~~(TS)~~ SECDEF Memorandum for the Deputy SECDEF, 20 April 1961.
** ~~(TS)~~ Deputy SECDEF Memorandum for the Presidential Task Force, "Program of Action for Vietnam," 1 May 1961.

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further, an additional -C personnel for the CIA station
 were authorized to support an expanded program of covert
 actions.

(2) Actions to assist the GVN in meeting the increased
 security threat along the S-V-Laos border. Among other
 things, the United States would assist the Republic of
 Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to increase the border
 patrol and insurgent suppression capabilities by estab-
 lishing an effective border intelligence and patrol
 system, by instituting regular aerial surveillance over
 the entire frontier area, and by applying modern techno-
 logical area-denial techniques to close the roads and
 trails along the border.

7. ~~(S)~~ National Security Action memorandum 55 (NSAM) (28
June 1961).* The President set forth to the Joint Chiefs of
 Staff his views as to their relations with him in cold war
 operations. In substance, those views were.

a. The advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as his prin-
 cipal military advisor, was to come to him direct and in-
 filtered.

b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility for
 defense of the nation in the cold war similar to that which
 they have in conventional hostilities. They should know the
 military and FM forces and resources available to the DOD,
 verify their readiness, report on their adequacy, and make
 appropriate recommendations for their expansion and improve-
 ment.

c. The president looked to the Chiefs to contribute
 dynamic and imaginative leadership in contributing to the
 success of the military and FM aspects of cold war programs.

* The rationale from NSAM 55, and for NSAMs 56 and 57 addressed
 in succeeding paragraphs, stemmed from experiences in the Bay
 of Pigs operation in April 1961. These three NSAM's were
 issued on the same date, 28 Jun 61.

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
8. ~~(S)~~ NSA: 56 (28 June 1961)

a. The President approved the following:

It is important that we anticipate not our possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and military operations. A first step would be to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the US Armed Forces, consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces, and thus arrive at a determination of the goals which we would set in this field. Having determined assets and the possible requirements, we would then become a matter of developing a plan to meet the deficit.

b. In addition, the President requested that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with, the Department of State and the CIA, make an estimate of the above requirements and to recommend ways and means of meeting them.

9. ~~(TS)~~ NSA: 57 (28 June 1961)



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c. NSAM 57 was the subject of considerable comment as to its application and validity during the pre-HACSOG period. Representative of that comment are the following:

(1) In several countries, problems could be solved by turning over to DOD the training of unconventional forces, with CIA providing assistance. The primary question should be, "What is the best way to do the job?" In most instances, this is a question for the Ambassador to answer. There should be two steps involved in the assignment of responsibility for training and support to indigenous paramilitary forces. First, the Ambassador should produce a country plan pointing out the problems which require action and suggesting the governmental agency best equipped to do the job. Jurisdictional responsibilities could be sorted out in Washington, bearing in mind the Ambassador's recommendation.* (Comment in DOD)

(2) In Vietnam there are three types of operations, each of which poses the question as to which governmental agency could best do the given job, namely:

* Memorandum For Record, by Lt. Col. S. V. Wilson, Office of the Assistant SECDEF (SO), "Discussion of Defense Report on Paramilitary Requirements," 20 Apr 62.


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- (a) Ranger operations along the border. 1
- (b) Military battalions crossing into Laos. 2
- (c) Infiltration operations into NV. 3

The first two operations should have been handled by DOD, 4
 the third by CIA. Further, if the expansion which has 5
 taken place in the Hec Operation could have been foreseen 6
 in the beginning, it, too, should have assigned at the 7
 outset to DOD. (Comment in DOD) 8

(3) Paramilitary operations should be assigned jointly 9
 to DOD and CIA, with DOD in charge and CIA in a support- 10
 ing role, and with the necessary funds made a part of 11
 the CIA budget.** 12

(4) CIA's covert paramilitary facility should be kept 13
 intact and this would be impossible under the concept 14
 cited in paragraph (3) above. (Comment in CIA)** 15



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 ** Memorandum for Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick, from
 BG Lansdale, "Paramilitary Operations," 8 Feb 63, p.1.

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
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4. DOD has been unable to obtain estimates of total DOD expenditures for PI activities, since many of the cost items are an integral part of the regular military establishment and not susceptible to meaningful break out. However, the DOD Comptroller estimates (mostly of personnel costs) show, in millions of dollars:

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(6) DOD has shown great skill in managing its P4 men,
money, and materiel in support of conventional operations,
just as CIA has shown skill in managing its resources for

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UW operations. It is when DOD gets into UW operations, such as Vietnam, that there is a need for considerable improvement. Neither CIA/OPAD nor MACV has the effective, flexible management control of P. operations enjoyed by the CIA station in Saigon. Some of this is a straight military management problem, such as setting a truly joint Army-Air Force effort in Vietnam and senior command understanding of the role of psychological operations in CI. Some of this is a Washington-level problem, such as flexible funding procedures, a practical chain-of-command structure, and a legal basis for UW operations in the gray areas).*

(7) NSAM 57 is basically sound (Comment in DOD):**

(a) It makes a distinction between large and small PM operations. As a result of the Bay of Pigs, it was concluded that the CIA did not have the capability to mount, manage, and support more than small covert activities, and that operations of predominantly military character are best done by the DOD. Concern over these issues arose mainly from the complex problems of transferring command responsibility from a civilian agency to a military command, in mid-stream, when such an operation began to exceed the capability of the Agency.

(b) With this area clarified, NSAM 57 adds that "a wholly covert or disavowable" activity "may be assigned to CIA, provided that it is within the normal capabilities of the agency." When NSAM 57 uses this

* Ibid.

** (S) SACSA Memorandum for the DEPSECDEF, "NSAM-57 -- Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations," 31 Jul 63. SACSA-427-63. This memo was occasioned by a DOD understanding that the DCI was concerned with the language in NSAM 57 which states: "Where such an operation is to be wholly covert or disavowable it may be assigned to the CIA." (underlining added) More specifically, it was understood that, in the DCI's view, the words "may be" rendered CIA planning difficult.

~~TOP SECRET~~ able to be assigned to the CIA." (underlining added)
 Appendix B

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language, it is following a course which has been
 pursued consistently by the US Government in
 assigning the responsibility for covert activities to
 any single organization on a permanent or full-time
 basis. Thus, the use of the term "may be assigned,"
 which the CIA finds an impediment to planning, actu-
 ally derives from the National Security Act of 1947.
 This Act spells out the intelligence mission of the
 CIA and then adds, that the Agency is also created "to
 perform such other functions and duties related to
 intelligence affecting the national security as the
 National Security Council may from time to time di-
 rect."

(c) It can be seen, therefore, that NSAM 57 de-
 rives from an evolutionary process which began with
 the National Security Act of 1947, followed by NSC
 5412/2, with which it is fully in accord in its action
 to fix responsibility for the full spectrum of CIA
 operations. Reflecting on the Bay of Pigs experience,
 the NSAM is realistic in assigning covert operations
 of large size or great complexity to DOD,
 whether wholly or partially covert. In the same vein,
 it concludes that "a wholly covert operation may be
 assigned to the CIA, provided that it is within the
 normal capabilities of the agency." The converse of
 this - that covert operations which exceed the normal
 capabilities of the Agency should be assigned to the
 DOD - would seem to be the real basis for the Agency's
 concern, although this is certainly the prime lesson
 of the Bay of Pigs.

~~TOP SECRET~~B-16
B-10Appendix B
Appendix B

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(d) NSAM 57 appears to be responsive to the
 and spirit of the National Security Act of 1947 and
 NSAM 5412/2 which derives from it. If the NSAM
 contents are cause for planning difficulties in the
 the criticism would have to be levelled not so much
 at NSAM 57 but at NSC 5412/2, which preserves freedom
 of action in task assignment to the NSC and, perhaps,
 even at the National Security Act, where the assign-
 ment of duties on a "from time to time" basis is pre-
 scribed specifically.

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(e) FI operations which are not covert have no
 place in the CIA.

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d. On 27 February 1963, the Deputy SECDEF and the DCI
 "agreed that, rather than undertaking a revision of NSAM 57
 to eliminate the questions that have arisen as to its inter-
 pretation, the conduct of future paramilitary operations,
 as between Defense and CIA, would be considered on a case-
 by-case basis and approved where necessary by the Special
 Group." The Office of the Deputy Secretary was to be in-
 formed before any FI training of foreign nationals or other
 FI operations were taken by any elements of the US military
 establishment in order that the DCI might be so advised and
 a determination made whether review by the Special Group
 (5412) was necessary.*

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e. The current status of NSAM 57 is uncertain.

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(1) Soon after taking office, the present Administra-
 tion issued a memorandum placing the NSAMS in three
 groups:**

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* Deputy SECDEF memo for Gen. Taylor, "Paramilitary Operations--
 NSAM 57," 27 Feb 63. This agreement was in response to an
 earlier proposal by CIA that NSAM 57 be rescinded; further,
 that direct quotations from NSAM 57 appearing in NSAMs 162
 (paragraph 11, below) and 182 (Annex A) be rescinded. That
 CIA proposal would have made CIA responsible for the plan-
 ning and execution of all covert FI action programs; DCI
 would have been responsible for the provision of personnel
 and logistical support, including funding, to CIA covert,
 P. action programs.

** (S) NSD: J, 3 February 1969.

planning and execution of all covert FI action programs, Appendix F

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(a) To be retained. 2

(b) To be reissued. 3

These would be done by the SC group in the department concerned to determine whether the NSAMs remained the authority for active programs and should be confirmed as written, could be considered inactive because it had been subsumed in established programs; should be updated or consolidated with other guidance and reissued. 4
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(c) To be considered inactive as of 3 February (date of the memorandum). 10
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These NSAMs would have fulfilled their initial purpose, been subsumed in subsequent programs, been overtaken by events, or been rescinded already. 12
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(2) In response to the above memorandum, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:* 16
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(a) Stated that some NSAMs on the inactive list and actually the genesis of certain existing policies and should not be relegated to inactive status without further review. 18
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(b) Recommended that NSAM 57 be reviewed, updated, and reissued. 22
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(3) Further, in response to the above memorandum, the Deputy SecDef:** 24
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(a) Concurred in the above recommendation of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. 26
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(b) Suggested that NSAM 57 be reviewed by the USC - Interdepartmental Group/Politico-Military Group. 28
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(4) Action on the above recommendation remains in abeyance. 30
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* (S) CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef, "Disposition of National Security Action Memoranda, 25 February 1969, CM-3960-69.

** (S) Deputy SecDef Memorandum for the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, "Disposition of National Security Action Memoranda," 14 March 1969.

* (S) CJCS Memorandum for the SecDef, "Disposition of National Security Action Memoranda, 14 March 1969.

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- 10. (S) NSA: 12- (12 July 1962)
 - e. This NSA established the Special Group (Counter-insurgency). In essence, that Group is a means to the best unit of effort and to use all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.
 - f. The Group consists of these members:
 - Military Representative of the President, Chairman
 - The Attorney General
 - Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 - Deputy Secretary of Defense
 - Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 - Director of Central Intelligence
 - Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 - Administrator, Agency for International Development
 - Other department and agency representatives, as deemed necessary (on invitation)
- 11. (TS) NSA: 162 (19 June 1962)
 - a. Basically, NSA: 162 reflected the President's approval on:
 - (1) A program to remedy certain deficiencies in the US capability to support both the training and active operations of indigenous paramilitary forces.
 - (2) The assignment of responsibilities to various departments and agencies for accomplishing that program.
 - b. This NSA: 162 was designed to unify and orchestrate US internal defense programs and activities in friendly countries facing a threat of subversive insurgency, and to provide strategic guidance for assisting such countries to maintain their internal security. Plans for this purpose would


(TS) NSA: 102 was forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al, by DEPSECDEF memorandum, "Development of US Military and Indigenous Police, Paramilitary, and Military Resources," 10 Jul 62.

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include military, police, intelligence and psychological
 measures comprising a well-rounded internal defense plan.
 In addition, these plans will be consistent with the mili-
 tary, economic, political and social measures constituting
 the overall country plan. The plans would be completed and
 in the hands of the Department of State by 1 September 1961,
 available for review by the Special Group (CI). From then
 on, the Special Group would keep these country internal de-
 fense plans under periodic review, and ensure prompt reso-
 lution of interdepartmental problems arising in connection
 with their implementation.

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12. (TS) NSA 273 (26 November 1963). This memorandum set
 forth guidance from the President which resulted from his re-
 view of the discussions of SVN occurring in Honolulu on 20 No-
 vember 1963. For MACSOG purposes, the essence of such guidance
 follows:

a. It remains the central object of the United States in
 SVN to assist the people and government of that country to
 win their contest against the externally directed and sup-
 ported communist conspiracy. The test of all U.S. decisions
 and actions in this area should be the effectiveness of their
 contribution to this purpose.

b. Planning should include different levels of possible
 increased activity, and in each instance there should be

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estimates of such factors as (Action as assigned to State, DOD, and CIA)

- (1) Resulting damage to VC.
- (2) The plausibility of demand.
- (3) Possible North Vietnamese retaliation.
- (4) Other international reaction.

c. With respect to Laos, a plan should be developed and submitted for approval by higher authority for military operations up to 50 kilometers inside Laos. In addition, political plans should be developed for minimizing the international hazards of such an enterprise. Since it is agreed that operational responsibility for such undertakings should pass from CAS to MACV, this plan should include a redefined method of political guidance for such operations, inasmuch as their timing and character can have a definite relation to the fluctuating situation in Laos. (Action was assigned to State, DOD, and CIA)

d. It was agreed in Honolulu that the situation in Cambodia is of the first importance for SVN, and it is therefore urgent that the United States should lose no opportunity to exercise a favorable influence upon Cambodia. In particular, a plan should be developed using all available evidence and methods of persuasion for showing the Cambodians that the recent charges against us, the U.S., are groundless. (Action was assigned to State)

e. It was desired that the United States develop as strong and persuasive a case as possible to demonstrate to the world the degree to which the VC is controlled, sustained and supplied from Hanoi, through Laos and other channels. (Action was assigned to State and to other agencies as necessary)

13. ~~(C)~~ Operations Plans (OPLAN) 34A (15 December 1963).

This OPLAN, its provisions, and the main decisions and events leading to its development and approval are set forth in Part IV, below.

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leading to its development and approval are set forth in Part

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2. ~~(S)~~ BASIC AGREEMENTS BETWEEN DOD AND CIA

The basic agreement set out between DOD and CIA for the planning and conduct of covert/T operations during the pre-ASSOC period are

1. ~~(S)~~ Logistical Support (6 October 1949)*

a. The SECDEF, referring to a DCI request of 11 Feb. 1949 for supply bases, set forth four basic principles governing DOD's support of CIA's covert operations. In essence, these principles were:

(1) DOD would expect reimbursement from CIA for the costs of supplies and of their storage and transportation when additional or extraordinary costs to DOD were involved, unless such expenses were unmistakably associated with particular operations requested or embraced by DOD in covert support of specific military missions.

(2) Operations should be consistent with US military policies and approved by DOD prior to implementation in time of peace. Support details would be arranged with the local US military commander concerned.

(3) Precautions should be taken to insure against identification of DOD operations in process.

(4) Those operations planned to be conducted in military theaters in time of war should be in accordance with war plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should have local coordination and agreement in the theater concerned.

b. In connection with the above principles, the SECDEF elaborated that:

(1) He recognized the importance of covert operations under the then present world conditions and that he intended to take measures to support such operations.

* ~~(S)~~ SECDEF memo for DCI, 6 Oct 49.

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Further, these operations, effectively conducted, substituted one of the best ways of supporting the national defence in time of peace. Since the Committee importantly to success in war, the SECDEF would outline the reasonable conditions on which DOD would cooperate in the planning and conduct of covert operations.

(2) He had great concern regarding the proper location of administrative responsibility for covert operations and, pending further study, reserved his position with respect to whether the responsibility should reside in CIA.

(3) The principles would generally apply regardless of the particular form of the organization for conducting various covert operations and were without reference to present or future organizational structures.

(4) There were two very important factors which had to be emphasized as the organization for covert operations developed. First, the organization must assume such autonomous responsibility and be so effectively obscured as to assure that neither the President nor the Secretaries of State and Defense would be placed in a position of having to answer publicly for its activities. The second factor concerned financial support of covert operations. As indicated in NSC 10/2, operational funds would be provided out of the CIA budget.

2. (2S) Logistical Support (18 October 1949).* The DCI stated that the four basic principles outlined in paragraph 1, above, were generally agreeable to CIA, and that they were accepted subject to:

a. Any deviations which might be directed by the President or the NSC.

* (18) DCI Memorandum to SECDEF, 18 Oct 49.

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Appendix E

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b. Any modifications agreed to in specific instances between DOE and CIA.



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
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(7) A Joint Inter-Service Warfare Task Force (JIWF) is a joint force composed of assigned or attached elements of CIA, the Army, the Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or of any two or more of the above, which is constituted and so designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by the commander of a specified command, by the commander of a unified command, or by the commander of an existing Joint Task Force

(8) Certain of the indigenous assets controlled by CIA would, at varying stages of their development and employment, require support from and close coordination with military forces. A JIWF with CIA participation should be established when the mission to be accomplished so required.



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3. ~~(TS)~~ Logistical Support (1955-1956) 1

a. In his memorandum of 14 January 1956 to the Secretary, 2
of Defense and the DCI stated that 3

(1) CIA had reviewed its future logistical mission 4
and that it was apparent there were many areas and tasks 5
requiring joint discussion and resolution. 6

(2) A need existed for a more complete understanding 7
of the respective logistical roles of DOD and CIA. 8

(3) In order to ensure refinement and complete under- 9
standing in the assumption of responsibilities, a joint 10
DOD/CIA logistics task force should be established to 11
accomplish these objectives. 12

(a) To make recommendations concerning the exact 13
responsibilities of DOD and CIA in the provision of 14
the necessary logistical support for wartime U² activ- 15
ities. 16

(b) To make recommendations concerning the imple- 17
mentation of the jointly agreed logistic support and 18
guidance necessary to generate logistic requirements 19
from the JCS field commanders to support wartime ac- 20
tivities. 21

(c) To make recommendations concerning the status 22
of U² logistics planning and stockpiling objectives. 23

b. On 25 January 1956, the SECDEF concurred in the DCI's 24
proposal that a joint DOD/CIA logistics task force be es- 25
tablished (paragraph 5, above).** 26

c. On 26 October 1956, the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO) 27
forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the report 28

* ~~(TS)~~ DCI memorandum for SECDEF, "Establishment of a Joint DOD/CIA Logistics Task Force," 14 Jan 56.

** Efforts to locate the SECDEF memorandum have been unsuccessful. A memorandum for the SECDEF from Gen. G. B. Erskin, USMC (Ret.), 19 Jan 56, recommended approval of the DCI proposal.

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of the Joint Defense/CIA Logistics Task Force, rendered a
 committee (S. 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6), and stated that:

(1) The objectives of the committee had been met
 logical, the inclusion of its recommendations in Ap-
 pendices D and E (Unconventional Warfare) to the Joint
 Strategic Capabilities Plan, 1 July 1956-30 June 1957.

(2) Service W logistics planning was current or under
 revision and was contained in the above appendices as
 well as in other current publications.

(3) Guidance was sufficient so that stockpiling ob-
 jectives could be determined.

(4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to review
 and comment on the logistics committee report as to
 whether DOD should publish it as a collation of DOD/CIA
 logistical responsibilities.

d. On 24 January 1957, in a memorandum to the SECDEF, the
 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff:

(1) Stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with
 the Logistics Committee report and, for reasons of clar-
 ity and coherence, recommended only minor changes in it.

(2) Recommended that the SECDEF approve the substance
 of the report and that it be disseminated in order to
 assist subordinate commanders in coordinating logistic
 support for UW activities with CIA.

e. On 16 March 1957, the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO)
 forwarded to the DCI the report of the Joint Defense/CIA
 Logistics Committee for his consideration as to the feasi-
 bility of publishing the document as a DOD/CIA UW logistics

* (18) Assistant to the SECDEF (SO) Memorandum for the Chair-
 man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Defense-CIA Logistical Responsi-
 bilities," 26 Oct 56.
 * (18) JCS Memorandum for the SECDEF, "Defense/CIA Logistical
 Responsibilities," 24 Jan 57.

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agreement. That agreement would supersede multiple and
 formal references to the reference. Further, the Assistant
 to the Secretary, indicated that the document as com-
 piled by the Assistant to the DCI for Supply and Logistics.
 On 23 April 1957, the Deputy DCI.

(1) Forwarded to the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO) the
 report of the Joint Defense/CIA Logistical Committee.

(2) Indicated that CIA concurred in the report subject
 to the acceptance of several suggested changes. Two of
 the changes were:

(a) The title of the document would read, "Defense-
 CIA Logistical Responsibilities."

(b) Paragraph 1 would read as follows:

This document is an agreement between the De-
 partment of Defense and the CIA. It has been
 compiled to provide a summary of the major
 features of CIA-Defense logistic relations,
 for use by appropriate planning agencies.

On 23 June 1957, the Assistant to the SECDEF (SO).

(1) Forwarded to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 the changes in the Defense-CIA logistical responsibilities
 as recommended by the Deputy DCI.

(2) Requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff review
 the proposed changes.

On 9 August 1957, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
 in a memorandum to the SECDEF, stated that.****

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the Deputy
 DCI's suggested changes.


* (18) Assistant to the SECDEF(SO) Memorandum for DCI,
 "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 16 March 1957.
 **

*** (18) Assistant to the SECDEF(SO) Memorandum for the Chair-
 man, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Defense/CIA Logistical Re-
 sponsibilities," 20 Jun 57.
 **** (18) Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for SECDEF,
 "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 9 Aug 57.

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(2) Recommended that they be incorporated in the draft statement.

1. On 11 September 1957, the Dept, SECDEF forwarded to the Deputy DCI the approved version of the statement of Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities which incorporated the changes proposed by the letter.* On this date, the Deputy SECDEF also forwarded the document to the Service Secretaries for dissemination to the subordinate commanders for their guidance.**




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- (26) DEPSECDEF Memorandum for the Deputy DCI, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 11 Sep 57.
* (26) DEPSECDEF Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, "Defense/CIA Logistical Responsibilities," 11 Sep 57.
** (26) DEPSECDEF letter to the DCI, 17 Jan 1964, with Enclosure, also dtd 17 Jan 1964. The Enclosure was a proposed "Agreement between the SECDEF and the DCI on Responsibility for Equipment on Loan."

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


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(3) The effective date of the agreement was 1 July 1963. 8

o. On 19 March 1964, the requisite staffing on it having been 9
completed, the above agreement was signed by the Deputy SECDEF 10
and forwarded to the DCI. 11

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the agreement and, in 12
a memorandum to the SECDEF, dated 11 May 1964, they commented in 13
substance as follows: 14

(1) The agreement, properly employed, was an acceptable 15
understanding of the manner in which reimbursement was to be 16
made in the event of loss of major items of equipment on loan. 17

(2) When a proposed FM operation or covert program was 18
presented by the CIA to the Special Group (5412) with a 19
request for specific DOD support, the SECDEF was urged to: 20

(a) Give the Service an opportunity to present its 21
views, particularly with respect to the impact on military 22
operations of the loan in question, before the resources 23
of the Service were committed. 24

(b) Give the Joint Chiefs of Staff an opportunity 25
to review the proposed program (or individual operation 26
if appropriate), to include the level of DOD resources 27
required, and to advise whether the operation was within 28
the parameters of NSAM 57. 29

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
* (22) JCS memorandum for the SECDEF, "Agreement on Responsibility for
Equipment on Loan (U)," 11 May 1964. JCSM-401-64.

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1. ~~(S)~~ Air Force and Green Program

a. The DCD, in his memorandum to the SECDEF on 20 April 1949, state that, to enable the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), CIA, to carry out effectively its covert operations responsibilities under NSC 10/2 (Part II, paragraph A2, above), assistance from the National Military Establishment was needed in several fields.



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
2. Memorandum for the SECDEF, 20 Apr 49. To clarify terminologies:

The OPC was formerly known as the Office of Special Projects. The latter became the repository (personnel, files, agents, etc.) of what remained of the Office of Strategic Services upon its discontinuance in 1946. The OPC was created by NSC 10/2 to handle secret operations; meanwhile, the Office of Special Operations (OSO) handled secret intelligence. The two operated as entirely separate offices until 1949 when they were put under the single direction of CIA Operations Division.

-- "National Military Establishment," as so entitled in the National Security Act of 1947, was changed to "Department of Defense" in the Amendments to the National Security Act, enacted in 1949.

Information concerning the action taken by DCD in the foregoing DCD memorandum is not available to the Documentation Team. Inquiry to the Air Force Special Operations Office (X-73797) on 17 October 1967 revealed that the Air Force has such information. According to Colonel Brown of that office, however, the Deputy Director for Plans and Policy (EG Designate James Allen) considered that the information was not germane to the terms of reference of the study effort at hand and should not be released to the Team. A number of Air Force officers, previously assigned to or otherwise associated with AOSOC, were selected for interview. The results of some of those interviews are incorporated in various parts of this study. The views of these Air Force officers are sometimes critical of the policies and procedures used by CIA in its conduct of air operations against [redacted] during the pre-AOSOC period. Since the documentation effort must include a data base for possible later analysis and since doctrine/tactics/training/equipment are all important factors to be considered, the foregoing data in the Air Force files should be included in the study effort. The views of these Air Force officers are sometimes critical of the policies and procedures used by CIA in its conduct of air operations against [redacted] during the pre-AOSOC period. Since the documentation effort must include a data base for possible later analysis and since doctrine/tactics/training/equipment are all important factors to be considered, the foregoing data in the Air Force files should be included in the study effort. If the data are relevant, they should be reflected in this study.

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


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c. The DCI further requested, in order to make minimum preparations in emergency in the near future required clandestine operations, that interim procedures based primarily on the then existing equipment be established not later than 1 July 1949. Fully perfected systems, [redacted] would be developed as soon thereafter as possible. The DCI added that the CPC and the CSO were prepared, on request, to assign one officer each to work with the National Military Establishment in connection with the foregoing.

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
2. ~~(TS)~~ Responsibilities for Covert Operations/UM. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 26 and 27 March 1952, promulgated these responsibilities for cover operations/UM:*



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- * 1. ~~(TS)~~ JCS Memorandum for the Chiefs of Services and the Commanders under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Responsibility of Armed Forces and Joint Chiefs of Staff with Respect to Covert Operations," 25 Mar 52. S.-792-52. Amended by S.-865-52, 7 April 52.
- 2. ~~(TS)~~ JCS Memorandum for DCI, "Responsibility of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Unconventional Warfare," 27 Mar 52. S.-796-52. Amended by S.-868-52, 7 April 52.
- 3. ~~(TS)~~ JCS Memorandum to Joint Strategic Plans Committee, "Preparation of Unconventional Warfare Annexes in Support of War Plans," 27 Mar 52. S.-797-52.

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
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... on 5 ... military personnel to ... In essence, ... to provide ... participation and support at appropriate levels ... Such personnel would be the best qualified and most ... available, with a well-founded understanding of their ... Service policies, programs, and requirements.

b. On 6 April 1960, the DOD, CIA, and Bureau of the Budget (BOB) reached an understanding that CIA would budget for and re-source DOD for:**

(1) All military personnel formally assigned to CIA for a normal tour of duty under the Agency's administration, command and control.

(2) The services of those military personnel who were detailed in continuing and substantially full-time support of operational requirements of CIA but who, for reasons of efficiency, were not under the command of CIA but remained under the command control of the military commander concerned.

c. In addition to the above

(1) CIA would include in its budget military personnel not under CIA command and control who, as such, were not reflected as part of its regular personnel strength.

(2) In the event of a situation wherein substantial numbers of military personnel were required by CIA as temporary expedient (less than six months), they would be made available without reimbursement for salary.

5. ~~(78)~~ Establishment of the Subjunctive Operations Division (SAD)

a. In his memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff of 23 March 1961, the SECDEF directed the establishment of a Joint Staff of a small, secure staff element ... the Assistant to the SECDEF (Brigadier General F. and J. Mansdale) in disconcerting his

Reference C-131p.3, "Political Operations and Assignment of Military Personnel to the Central Intelligence Agency," 5 Dec 57.
Reference C-131p.3, "Understanding by DOD, CIA and BOB, 'Military Personnel Support for the CIA,'" 6 Apr 60.

Reference C-131p.3, "Political Operations and Assignment of Military Personnel to the Central Intelligence Agency," 5 Dec 57.

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... operations of
to the SECDEF. [] relationships with
operations. [] requirements would be staffed,
... cooperation manual to Joint Staff
...

b. In response to the above SECDEF directive, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff established in the Joint Staff (Plans and
Policy Directorate, J-5) the SAD.** This staff element would
provide staff support to the ASD

(SC) and be responsible for the overall coordination

of requests for the support of peacetime special operations

[] of the CI Partner, this staff element would ensure that:

(1) All requirements for support were properly processed
and received secure and expeditious handling from all
Services.

(2) All such support activities had been approved by
the Office of the SECDEF and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
when required.

c. The above authority further set forth the procedures
for handling such requests for support and asked the Services to:

(1) Forward to the Joint Staff the designation of the focal
point office and the name of the individual responsible for
such matters.

(2) Review their current system for supporting CIA
operations and begin an inventory of support being furnished
to the CIA. []

* SECDEF Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, "Special Operations" 26 March
1961. Although the Joint Staff had, in a general sense, par-
ticipated in a large number of covert peacetime operations,
nearly always in support of CIA special operations, no formal
continuing plan, facility, or method of operation had been in
existence for such action, except on a case basis. []

** JCS Memorandum for the SECDEF, "Military Support of the Peacetime
Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency," 1 August 1961.
SI-318-61. []

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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff...
in support of...
...all activities...
...of the peacetime operations of CIA]

a. Further details on S-1 and other organizational matters involving Joint Staff support to both CIA and OSD are set forth in Section 2, para 7

6. ~~(TS)~~ Provision of C-123 Aircraft. On 20 November 1961, the ASD --

a. Stated that the Deputy SECDEF had favorably considered the request of CIA for augmentation of the airlift capability in support of US operations in SE Asia.***

b. Authorized the Air Force to furnish CIA with five C-123 aircraft and initial support as requested on condition that CIA have a satisfactory cover plan and sensible arrangement for the maintenance of the planes.

7. ~~(S)~~ USAF Air Operations in SE Asia An OSD memorandum for record of 16 February 1962 sets forth in general the various USAF air operations in SE Asia.*** These operations included covert support of the South Vietnamese Air Force both in its training mission and in combat operations/air strikes, and photo reconnaissance.

8. ~~(TS)~~ Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored Activities in SVN. During the Sixth SECDEF Conference, Pacific Area, 23 July 1962, the SECDEF announced that the DCD would assume responsibility for certain activities in SVN which had been developed under the auspices of the

* ~~(S)~~ JCS Memorandum, "Military Support of Peacetime Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (S)," 29 July 1961.
** ~~(TS)~~ Memorandum from the ASD (Col Lunsdale) to the Vice Chief of Staff, US Air Force, "Requirement for C-123 Aircraft," 20 November 1961.
*** ~~(TS)~~ CIA Memorandum to EG Lunsdale, "Requirement for C-123 Aircraft," 20 October 1961.
**** ~~(S)~~ OSD Memorandum for Record, "Meeting with State, Air Force, and DCD Representatives on Jungle Air Operations," 16 February 62.

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... should be in the ...
... substance of ...

... of the total military capability of the GVN to ...
... should be so coordinated ...
... of all programs which contributed directly to the ...
... general defense posture and strategy of that country be put under ...
... the control. Therefore, in conformance with national policy that ...
... military and military-type cold war operations be placed under ...
... military responsibility and control, CG US MCV should integrate ...
... into his command the training, operational assistance and logistical ...
... support responsibility for the essentially overt military and ...
... military-type elements, which had been developed in SVN under CIA ...
... sponsorship with US military assistance. This should be done as ...
... rapidly as his command could work out effective transfers.

b. This action would be taken with due regard for the ...
... sensitivity of certain matters involved and for the basic require- ...
... ment to obtain secret intelligence which resided with the CIA ...
... Such action would be accomplished promptly and in a manner which ...
... could keep in motion the operational momentum and effectiveness of ...
... the then current programs. Certain of these more highly specialized ...
... activities might have required some phasing in the transfer of polit- ...
... ical responsibility in order to preserve well established relation- ...
... ships with JVN officials in Saigon and at the provincial level. ...
... However, such delay as might have been necessary to sustain these ...
... detailed relationships would not be permitted to impede the early ...
... assumption of this over-all responsibility and the development of ...
... a closely knit total GVN military capability.

c. In considering this action, all components of CIA activities ...
... should be considered. [REDACTED]

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* (S) US Memorandum for CINCPAC, "Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored ...
... Activities in South Vietnam," 15 August 1962. SX-901-62.

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...distinguishing the ...
of each of the foregoing activities
... might be assured that he would receive the
fullest support from all elements of DCD in this endeavor,
... that required CIA resources would continue to be
available to assist him as necessary, just as his obligation
to support CIA in its continuing functions would be unchanged.
Funds, including special authorization to meet unusual re-
quirements, would be made available upon receipt of firm
requirements. Whenever possible, these requirements should
be arrived at between CC USACV, the Ambassador, the CIA
representative and the GVN. However, it was recommended
that every effort be made to integrate this new responsi-
bility into existing programs and to treat it as regular
business to be supported through the joint efforts of all
US military resources and those of the GVN. If possible
this should all be done outside of the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) in order that there would be no problem con-
cerning transfer or withdrawal from the GVN of any items
required for these activities from the regular MAP. It was
desired that these activities be supported in such a manner
that they were completely acceptable to the Ambassador and
to the GVN. In so doing, it should be made plain that,
although such activities might have embodied some element
of hazard with respect to the loyalty of the nationals
involved, this integration of all military and military-type
activities into one coordinated whole should serve to reduce
that factor, while increasing over-all effectiveness of the
total South Vietnamese military capability in the future.

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... and 57, on 25 ...




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
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D. ~~(S)~~ COVERT/PM OPERATIONS/ACTIONS

1. General

a. This section traces the evolution within DOD of the major organizational arrangements for handling covert/PM actions during the pre-WCSO3 period.

(1) Such arrangements focus on those pertinent to SE Asia in general and Vietnam in particular at the Washington level.

(2) As reflected in Part II, paragraphs B-5 and B-10 above, the two agencies comprising the interdepartmental covert/F. planning agencies at the highest level were: the Special Group (5412) established pursuant to NSC 5412/2 (28 December 1955) and subsequently redesignated the "303 Committee"; and the Special Group (CI) established pursuant to NSA 1124 (18 January 1962).

(3) Except for the formation of the Special Group (5412)/303 Committee, as set forth above, the Washington-level organizational process largely began with the advent of the Kennedy Administration (1961) and the organizational machinery it considered necessary for implementing the President's policies on Vietnam.

2. ~~(S)~~ Establishment of the Office of the Assistant to Secretary of Defense (OASD) (February-March 1961)

a. On 24 February 1961, the Deputy SECDEF in his memorandum to the CJCS, stated that:

~~(S)~~ Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al, 24 February, 1961.

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(1) Special Group (5412) matters, as approved by the SECDEF.

(2) Special Group (5412) matters. 5

(b) Special defense activities as approved by the SECDEF. 6

(c) CIA relationships of special interest to the SECDEF. 8

(3) The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff would designate officers of general/flag rank from the Joint Staff to provide military advice and support to General Lansdale in the performance of his duties. 10-13

b. (4) In amplification of the above, on 2 March 1961, the Deputy SECDEF informed the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that: 14-15

(1) General Lansdale, as ASIS, would provide staff support for all matters related to Special Group (5412) actions. 16-17

(2) Immediately following the Special Group meetings, the members of the Group would be joined by the Director, USIA, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget for an informal luncheon meeting. At this meeting, the members would discuss such subjects as they considered appropriate. 18-22

(3) General Lansdale would provide the SECDEF and the Deputy SECDEF with staff support for the luncheon meetings. In that capacity, General Lansdale would recommend appropriate items for discussion and monitor the necessary follow-through actions required as a result of the meeting. Further, he would provide details on implementation. 23-26

(4) Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Inter-Agency Coordination on Special Group Matters," 2 March 1961.

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4. ~~(S)~~ Organization and Functioning of a Small Secure Staff in the Joint Staff (Mar - 1961) 10

a. On 1 March 1961, Brigadier General Lansdale, ATSD, in 12
his memorandum for Lieutenant General Earle G. Wheeler, DJS, 13
set forth his understanding of the way the two, on 28 February 14
1961, had conceived as the most effective means of having the 15
Joint Staff render support for his mission.² General Lansdale 16
said that he and General Wheeler, if the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 17
of Staff approved, could start to work along these lines: 18

- (1) A small team in the Joint Staff would be activated 19
under Brigadier General David ... Gray, USA, Chief Subsidiary, 20
Activities Division, J-5. Members of the team, male respon- 21
sible to their superiors, would be in a position to work 22
directly and fully with General Lansdale's office. These 23
officers would be expected to function as his secure and 24
effective link for support by the appropriate Service and 25
overseas command on approved actions] 26

² ~~(S)~~ DJS Memorandum, for the Deputy SECDEF, "Joint Staff Point of 3
Contact for Brig/Gen E. G. Lansdale, USAF, Assistant to the 4
Secretary of Defense," 27 February 1961. DJS: 217-61.
- * ~~(S)~~ ATSD Memorandum for General Wheeler, "Staffing of Special 5
actions for the Secretary," 1 March 1961

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b. On 14 March 1961, in his memorandum for the SECDEF, the ...

(1) The Joint Staff, as firmly and feasibly, should assume the responsibility for processing CIA requests for peacetime military support of covert operations as set forth in General Lansdale's memorandum (paragraph a above).

(2) To implement that responsibility, an increase in the OJCS personnel authorization of two officers and one civilian stenographer would be necessary.

c. In furtherance of the above concepts for the activation of a team in the Joint Staff (paragraph a and b above)

(1) General Lansdale, in a memorandum for record on 27 March 1961, stated that -

(a) He and General Wheeler had agreed upon the concept of providing the Joint Staff staffing support for him in the discharge of his responsibilities as ASD.

(b) The following afforded guidance for some of the more sensitive work under the arrangement:

1. A small, secure staff element in the Joint Staff would be established to furnish such support. This "special operations" element would be quickly responsible to the ASD as required in connection with his responsibility for special activities and operations of interest to the SECDEF particularly DOD relationships with CIA covert operations.

* OJCS memorandum for the SECDEF, "Processing Peacetime Military Support Requirements for Covert Operations (S)" 14 March 1961. (X) See also the record by Lansdale, "Special Operations", 27 March 61.

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(b) A small, secure staff element in the Joint Staff would be established in order to provide such support. This staff would carry out its special support of CIA operations and related actions in coordination with existing counterpart staff sections then handling this work in the individual Services as well as certain elements of OSD and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Requirements staffed by this Joint Staff element were authorized for transmittal directly to appropriate Services or commands, as required, without the intra-Service coordination normal to the Joint Staff function.

(c) In accordance with the agreement that experienced personnel would man the new staff element, these two officers would be assigned to the Joint Staff: Captain Burns W. Spore, USN, and Colonel LeRoy F. Prouty, USAF.

(d) The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be authorized an increase of two officers and one civilian stenographer.

(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their memorandums of 29 July 1961, informed the SECDEF* and the DCI*** that:

(a) A Special Operations Division in the J-5 Directorate of the Joint Staff had been activated.

(b) Procedures incorporating the instructions contained in the SECDEF memorandum of 28 March 1961 (paragraph 4c(2), above), had been put into effect; further, that these procedures would be more effective if Chief, Subsidiary Activities Division, J-5, were kept informed of the matters pertaining to the subjects

under consideration by the Special Group (5412).

~~(1) SECDEF Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Processing Peace-time Military Support of Peace-time Operations (S)," 29 Jul 61.~~
~~(2) JCS Memorandum for the SECDEF, "Military Support of Peace-time Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency," 29 Jul 61.~~
~~(3) SECDEF Memorandum for the DCI, "Military Support of Peace-time Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency," 29 Jul 61.~~

() ... of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ...
... of the Joint Staff (...) ...
... the ... , stated that ...
... for the ...
... in support of the ... stated that in
that:

(a) He had no general policy responsibility for handling
the sensitive types of activity involved to the ASTD, General
Lansdale.

(b) All communications between the CIA and the DOD with
respect to special military support of CIA peacetime activity
would be handled between the CIA and the ASTD, unless the
latter specifically made an exception for the handling of a
category of CIA requests for support.

(c) He did not agree with the JCS proposal to keep the
Chief, Special Operations Division, J-5, fully informed on
Special Group (5412) actions under consideration; further,
that he did expect the ASTD to inform the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff through the Chief, Subsidiary Activities
Division, J-5 of Special Group matters as the SECDEF needed
advice upon policy matters or as military planning needs
were involved.

(5) The ASTD, on 12 September 1961, as a follow-up to the
SECDEF memorandum of 7 August 1961 (paragraph (4), above)

(a) Stated that:

1. All matters involving DOD peacetime support of CIA
operations would be monitored directly by the OASTD

2. Matters of a routine nature would be handled directly
between CIA and established points of contact within the
military Services. Other CIA peacetime support requirements
would be channeled through the OASTD directly to the
appropriate Service or to the Joint Staff point of contact,
depending upon the nature of the request.

SECDEF Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
"Military Support of Peacetime Operations of the Central
Intelligence Agency (S)," 7 Aug 61

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
... of the increased emphasis and scope of counter-
insurgency operations and subsidiary activities, the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the establishment of OS/CSA
directly responsible to the DJS effective 23 February 1962.

The transfer of the Subsidiary Activities Division of the Plans
and Policy Directorate, J-5, complete with personnel, personnel
spaces and functions, to the S/CSA.

This action stemmed from the President's desire for emphasis
in organization on counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare matters.

6. (S) Disestablishment of O STD Transfer of Functions to
DIA and OS/CS

a. In his memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
of 30 September 1963, the DEPSECDEF stated that, effective on that date,
STD was disestablished. Its functions which must be continued
would be divided between DIA and OSACSA. The OATSD files and
records would be transferred to DIA and OSACSA. Further,
pursuant to the DEPSECDEF memorandum.



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(1) SACSA shall

(a) Assume staff responsibility for the coordination level planning and execution of those special activities and special operations, not primarily intelligence in nature, in which DOD participation is required.

(b) Provide staff support, with assistance as required from other DOD components, direct to the Secretary and DEPSECDEF and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for their Special Group (CI) and Special Group (CI) responsibilities.

(c) Provide DOD representation on interdepartmental and interagency special operations and special activities committees.

b. On 2 November 1963, the DAPSECDEF, referring to the recent disestablishment of the OATSD, stated that *

(1) SACSA had been charged with providing staff support to the Secretary and the DEPSECDEF, and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their Special Group (CI) responsibilities.

(2) SACSA would supply copies of all Special Group (CI) briefing materials prepared for the Secretary and DEPSECDEF to the latter's alternate on the Group.

(3) All DOD components having responsibilities in the CI field would provide SACSA with full and timely support as required. For example, the ASD/ISA would provide SACSA appropriate political/military inputs in such form as SACSA might require.


(4) The responsibility of various DOD components for carrying out approved Special Group (CI) actions would continue unaltered.

(5) Deputy SECDEF Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, et al, 'Continuation of Special Group (CI) Operations', 2 Nov 63.

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** (b) is MEMORANDUM FOR Capt Cady, from LTC William J. Ryan, SACS-7/2 ec. Officer and Mil. Secretary, "MACSOG Documentation," 14 Nov 1968. SACSA -906-698. (This memorandum forwards CIA inputs to the Documentation Project.)

** A singleton is a single agent.

*** (b) The agreement on the cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam, referred to as the Geneva Accords of 1954, was attended by the delegations of Cambodia, Communist China, France, Great Britain, Laos, United States, USSR, Viet Nam, and Thailand. This agreement, effective 21 July 1954, ended the war in Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia between the French and the Viet Minh. Among other things, the agreement established a provisional military demarcation line at the 17th parallel provided that agent forces could be grouped on either side of this line, banned the introduction of troop reinforcements and additional military personnel, laid down conditions regarding the retention of military units, prohibited the establishment of new military bases. Neither the United States nor V. signed the Agreement.

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Appendix B

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
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- 1. ~~(S)~~ Memorandum for Capt. Gedy, "MACSOG Documentation,"
on cit
- 2. ~~(S)~~ MACV Special Assistant Memorandum for General Harbins,
"CAS Operations Against North Vietnam," 16 August 1962. A-591.




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10. The Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, referred to as the Geneva Accords of 1962 was attended by the delegations of fourteen nations. Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Communist China, France, Great Britain, India, Laos (3 delegations: PL, Neutralist Pro-Government), NVN, Poland, SIV, Thailand, United States, USSR. Signed on 23 July 1962, these Accords neutralized Laos by, among other things: providing for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Laos; prohibiting the introduction of foreign troops into Laos; prohibiting the introduction of armaments into Laos, except as the Royal Laotian Government might consider necessary in its national defense.

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
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APPENDIX B

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


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


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* Colonel JOHN P. Moore, USAF, Deputy Chief, MACSOG Operations Branch, Jan 1965 to Jun 1966, stated in an interview (page 2) that out of any single moon phase period there were only about four days in which aircraft could be operated during light-of-the-moon periods. Further, that if the weather forced cancellation of a mission, it would generally have to be re-scheduled in the next moon period.

** (TS) Interview of Col William P. Becker, USAF, Chief of MACSOG Air Operations from January 1964 to December 1964, pp. 4-5.

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Appendix B

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
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Appendix E

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
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... A reefer line permits the parachute to open only partially until the last moment before it reaches the ground. This line is a long cord tied around the skirt of the parachute and joined or tied together at the end with a small piece of primer cord. On the primer cord is placed a small, explosive timing device. The device is initiating a chain of events: the explosive goes off, detonating the primer cord, which, in turn, closes the reefer line in two, the reefer line departs and allows the parachute to become fully inflated. The full inflation of the parachute since it is already partially inflated occurs quickly. Thus, the drop, which up to this time has fallen rapidly to stabilize wind drift, is slow enough to protect it from hitting the ground too hard.

... p 5-10.

... is already partially inflated...

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~~-----~~ Ibid. p. 10.
~~-----~~ Ibid. pp. 7, 14, 15.
~~-----~~ ~~-----~~ Interview of Colonel John F. Singlaub, USA, Chief
of A 500 Br a, 1965 to September 1968, p. 49.
~~-----~~ Ibid. p. 10. E-73 Appendix E

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(S) Interview of LDC Ernest T. Hayes, Jr., USN, MACSOG Plans Officer from October 1965 to November 1965, MACSOG STD Liaison Officer from September 1965 to June 1969, and MACSOG Chief of Staff and STD Liaison Officer from 1969 to date of interview: JAL, 10/1/70, pp. 2-3

Ernest T. Hayes, Jr., USN, MACSOG Plans Officer from October 1965 to November 1965, MACSOG STD Liaison Officer from September 1965 to June 1969, and MACSOG Chief of Staff and STD Liaison Officer from 1969 to date of interview: JAL, 10/1/70, pp. 2-3

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


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-- ~~SECRET~~, en. cit. p. 10. J-3, "Trip Report,
Herrera, 20 April-2 May, 1964," undated, p. 3.
-- ~~SECRET~~, en. cit. p. 9.
-- ~~SECRET~~, en. cit. p. 10. Appendix B
-- ~~SECRET~~, en. cit. p. 10. "Trip Report"

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
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
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** ~~SECRET~~ Unsigned document "Cross-Border Operations into Cuba
Liaison," 12 March 1963. In OS/C3 file "Cross-Border Operations"
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


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* ~~(2)~~ according to SCSA, as of 12 July 1963, eight shallow
islets (+ a lagoon of approximately 15 kilometers) had been
made with R-1 border surveillance force. This information is
contained in SCSA report for the JCS for the SECRET-JCS
meeting of 15 Sept 1963, Military Operations in Southeast Asia
12 September 1963, SCSA T-1-63 (Part).

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
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Appendix D

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Appendix B

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
a. The need for a concerted, joint effort against DRV in the field of covert/FI actions.
 b. The relative ineffectiveness of the CIA covert/FI program against NVA.
 2. (ZS) The application of overt maritime control measures and varying degrees of interdiction of air and sea against NVN was considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in August 1961.* This action was undertaken in response to a request from the Acting Assistant SECDEF/ISA for a military evaluation of these activities. The Joint Chiefs concluded that
 a. The cost and consequences of the United States blockading the DRV greatly outweighed the profitable gains from that belligerent act at this time.
 b. SVN should be encouraged to take the initiative in air and coastal water patrols and interdiction actions against the DRV. The United States should provide SVN with all required support in such operations.
 3. (ZS) Subsequently, Senator Stuart Symington explored with President DeWalt the possibility of US air and naval bombardment of targets in NVN as a countermeasure to force NVN to desist

* (ZS) SECDEF 4774, DTG 201307Z Aug 62.
 Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "North Vietnam," 19 July 1961. I-18753/61.

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1. (S) JCS msg 4174, op cit.
 2. (S) CINCPAC msg, DTG 310230Z May 62.
 3. (S) CINCPAC memo for Comdant W. Postow, 2 November 1961. Serial 000202.


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~~(S)~~ CIV. P. D. SE LDC 2505012 April 62.

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Appendix B

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1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have been advised of the results of
 the study conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on the
 subject of the proposed operations (Paragraphs 1-3). The
 JCS has concluded that the proposed operations are of a
 nature which would require the approval of the President
 and the Secretary of Defense. The JCS has also concluded
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 and the Secretary of Defense. The JCS has also concluded
 that the proposed operations are of a nature which would
 require the approval of the President and the Secretary of
 Defense.

b. It is suggested that the initiation of all such tasks would
 have to be preceded by high level approval in Washington,
 and that the first step in obtaining such approval would
 be a reasonably detailed presentation of CINCPAC's concept
 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff based on data provided by
 CINCPAC.

c. It is requested that CINCPAC submit specific proposals,
 in outline form as a minimum, for any of the clandestine
 activities CINCPAC considers as profitable. These proposals
 should include sufficient detail for the Joint Chiefs of
 Staff to support them on higher levels, including evaluations
 of

- (1) Magnitude of the US investment. 24
- (2) Likelihood of disclosure. 25
- (3) Return to US personnel 26
- (4) Benefits to be realized. 27

~~SECRET~~, PUS Reg 4181, DTG 281050Z APR 62. 31

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
~~(S)~~ ... This plan was submitted in response to a request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. a. (TS) JCS Msg 4774, DTG 251307Z May 62, b. (TE) JCS Msg 4870, DTG 020011Z June 62. (S) JCS Msg 5159, DTG 172145Z July 62.

... 6 prior ... military ... effects as ... Chiefs of Staff, on 17 July 1962, approved the plan as an adequate basis for more detailed planning for ... operations against ...**



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** 1. (S) CI,CPAC ... DTG 300247Z Sep 63.
2. (TS) JCS Memorandum for CINCPAC, "Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored Activities in South Vietnam," 15 Aug 62, C - 11-52
3. (TS) SCSA Memorandum for the JCS, "Transfer of Certain CIA Sponsored Activities in South Vietnam," 10 Aug 62, SACSA-11 378-62.



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13.(8) At their meetings on 7-8 January 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in response to a recommendation by the Chairman, agreed that a senior officer should lead a team of senior Service and Joint Staff representatives to SVN. General Earle G. Wheeler, Chief of Staff, US Army, was designated to lead the team, and was to:

- a. Obtain information for use by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in making an assessment of the GI program in SVN.
- b. Form a military judgment as to the prospects for a successful conclusion of the conflict in a reasonable period of time.

* (8) JCS Memorandum for the JCS, "Guerrilla Activities in North Vietnam," 29 August 1962, AF-323-32.
 ** (8) JCS Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, "GI Operations in North Vietnam," 10 September 1962.
 * Memorandum submitted by General Wheeler on 14 September 1962 to reflect action of Special Liaison (S-12).
 ** Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Team to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, US Army, US Air Force, US Navy, US Marine Corps, 14 October 1963.

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This is a copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff report dated 16 March 1963, regarding the feasibility of conducting limited military operations in North Vietnam. The report is classified as a 'Secret' document.

17. In the report, dated 16 March 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in considering the above stated subject, have recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should advise on these recommendations pertaining to the recommendations of the study report dated 13 March 1963, above.

a. Both aerial and ground reconnaissance within the borders of North Vietnam are required to provide essential intelligence regarding the long capabilities of the border of the Republic of Vietnam.

c. The National Guard and other forces possess a substantial potential for the conduct of unconventional warfare in North Vietnam, and should be exploited. The Joint Staff, in collaboration with the services, should be directed to develop detailed proposals in this regard for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

18. (S) Meanwhile, the Department of the Army, as a contribution to implementing the recommendations of the JCS Team and conclusions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (paragraphs 13 and 16 above), prepared a document entitled "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam." The Chief of Staff, US Army, forwarded the study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 March 1963. Salient concepts of the study are included at

* (S) contained in a JCS memo dated 4 March 1963. The Chiefs of Staff concluded the memo on 6 March 1963 and agreed to take no action on it regarding the conduct of operations over CI (S) and CI (S) (S).
** (S) - Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam, 1963, Department of the Army, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, attached to the Chief of Staff, US Army (CS-1) 12-1, 19 March 1963.


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... (b) (1) ... (b) (3) ...
... by CI ... (b) (1), ... considered suitable
for special operations the most essential to the economy and
security of ... fell into five categories. POL storage
complexes, power plants, railroads, bridges, shipping and harbor
facilities, and selected military targets. 10

c. The use of the overland route to NVN through Laos was not
considered as a principal route of access because of the Laotian 11
settlement, and the fact that the Laotian border was coming under 12
increasing communist control. Land infiltration across the 13
17th parallel was deemed infeasible. 15



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g. It would be impossible to assess with any accuracy the effect covert military operations might have on NVN and on a war in SVN. NVN would not be crippled or perhaps even severely damaged. The psychological effects, however, might be very great. By means of these operations, NVN would be on notice that the United States and the RVN were prepared:

- (1) To accept the risks inherent in taking the initiative and in expanding the scope of operations in NVN.
- (2) To retaliate against NVN then on a modest scale and later perhaps in other more decisive ways.
- (3) To increase the scope of their operations in NVN if the communists intensified the conflict in RVN.

g. Political and military risks were evaluated as follows:

- (1) The risk of CHICOM reinforcement and escalation was acceptable. DRV authorities apparently desired to rely on subversion and guerrilla warfare in SVN and would probably be reluctant to draw more U.S. military power into the conflict. At the same time they would probably recognize these covert operations as less than an attempt to conquer NVN. The risk probability of these actions drawing CHICOM

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(3) The overall effect of the covert effort undertaken in
North Vietnam (NV) was judged to be an
acceptable result.

(4) The idea of a program of sabotage and terrorism in NV was con-
sidered impractical, and the study envisaged no effort to
promote wide-spread resistance to the DRV regime.

(28) On 5 April 1963, the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally
approved in the interest of the operations contemplated in the
Army study but expressed concern as to whether these proposed
operations would accomplish effectively the desired objective
The Chiefs referred the study to the Joint Staff for comment
and recommendations. The views of commanders and agencies concerned
were requested. Those of CIA and CINCPAC are outlined below.

a. CIA

(1) Initially, in a discussion with the Chief of Staff,
US Army on 27 March 1963, the DCI indicated general concur-
rence in the Army study.

(2) Subsequently, on 14 May 1963, the Deputy DCI, in
response to the above request, somewhat modified his views.
Those views, in essence, are presented below under the

The views of two of the principally interested parties, were
requested as follows:


1. (X) JCS Memorandum for CINCPAC, "A Study of the Feasibility
of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam",
10 April 1963. (CJCS-61-63).

2. (28) DDCI Memorandum for the DCI, same subject, 30 Apr 1963.
DTS-723-63.

The JCS Memorandum for the SECRETARY, "Military Operations in North
Vietnam (X)", 23 Apr 1963. (CJCS-59)-63.

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


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


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b. CINCPAC

(1) On 30 April 1962, in response to a request from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCSA), CINCPAC expressed these views on the Army Study:

(a) The study, complementary CINCPAC OPLAN 33-62, a plan for the unilateral overt employment of US forces in retaliatory attacks against NVN, but is sufficiently flexible to provide for either overt or covert actions employing US forces and/or ARVN special forces and ranger or other military or T. forces. Detailed supporting plans are being developed by CINCPAC's subordinate commands.

* ~~See Memorandum for C. J. C. of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Scale Operations in North Vietnam (X), 20 April 1962. JCS-1-62.~~
* ~~(X) CINCPAC Log # 100411 April 63.~~

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b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that CIA/CJAC prepare a concept for all phases, to include certain additional targets previously discussed with the President.

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in terms in "VII". The CJAC staff offered those reservations

(1) The practicability of getting President Diem to establish a major field headquarters for the direction of the operations envisaged in the Army study is dubious.

(2) The Army concept is deficient in that it does not integrate offensive air operations with the other activities involved.

(3) The targets and actions envisaged in the Army concept would not result in an adequate crippling of the DRV.

(4) In no event should a decision be made which would place the military in the covert operations area until the full CIA capability is known.

c. The last three of the above reservations were addressed by the Chief of Staff, US Army.

(1) He agreed that air operations should be contemplated as a part of the program to weaken the DRV, but pointed out that the Army concept was not intended to be all-encompassing nor to represent the full scale of measures which the United States might adopt.

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(C) With respect to the US military and covert operations, he stated that the tasks envisaged in the Army concept were not covert operations by the US military, but operations by the G.V. military, executed under US advice but not with US participation. Further, to do the task correctly, as envisaged in the Army concept, would require considerably more resources than then presently under CIA's control. It would demand both the dedication of purely military means - air, sea and ground - and the coordination with ground operations conducted by the GVN.

d. CINCPAC raised the point that it was illogical to propose that COMUSMACV be put in charge of operations such as those described in the Army concept when he was not in charge of operations in Vietnam. The Chief of Staff, US Army, responded that it was not contemplated that these operations should be directed by any authority other than the GVN, further, that COMUSMACV and his resources should only support and advise in the same manner as for operations within the confines of the GVN.

e. The CIA representative [redacted] Chief of Station, Saigon):


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
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
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26. ~~(S)~~ Relating indirectly to the development of OPLAN 34A was the Presidential approval on 25 June 1963 to expand the use of highly mobile South Vietnamese border patrols in Laos to intercept entry into SVN area to gather intelligence.* According to SACSA, efforts toward that end, as of 10 December 1963,

* Deputy JCS Memorandum for Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, Director, Joint Staff, "A Study of the Feasibility of Conducting Limited Military Operations in North Vietnam," 14 May 1963.
- 13 - 206, 25 June 1963.

patrol. In the event of a major PVA incursion, the
for future non-aided operations. The PVA, I think
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27. (S) On 6 July 1963, the SECDEF/JCS message
Laos situation, the SECDEF views are set forth in para 17.

a. There should be an increase in the size and frequency
of cross-border operations from RVN into Laos in order to

- (1) Interdict supply routes in the Laos corridor.
- (2) Acquire one-day-spot intelligence.
- (3) Exhibit strengthening of the Free World resolve to
impede communist expansion in Laos and the PVA.

b. These operations should:

- (1) Involve penetrations into Laos deeper than the current
intelligence patrols.
- (2) Be in the form of overt military incursions con-
ducted by RVN forces under USMC/CV guidance, with the
intelligence task integrated for other functions as neces-
sary.

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28. (S) On 9 July 1963, in a message to CINCPAC, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff:**

a. Outlined the SECDEF views as set forth in paragraph 17,
above.

b. Pointed out that those views, which contemplated a particu-

[REDACTED]

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* S. G. Thinking Paper for the SC Standing Group Meeting of 10 Dec.
1963, "Laos - Cross Border Operations," 10 Dec 63. SCS-1
14-63.

** (S) JCS msg 1074, JCS 002000 041, 63.



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
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
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
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
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


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
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


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
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




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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B. ~~(TS)~~ OPLAN 34A: DEVELOPMENT, MAJOR PROVISIONS, APPROVAL

1. ~~(TS)~~ General

a. The plan was jointly prepared in the J-5 Division of Headquarters MACV by MACV and CAS representatives. Three of the participating MACV officers were among those initial military personnel assigned to MACSOG. They were:

Colonel Clyde R. Ryssell	Chief, MACSOG
LTC Robert H. Bartlett	Chief, Operations Branch
Major Hans Manz	Logistics Officer

b. OPLAN 34A was completed on 15 December 1963. It fulfilled the requirement levied jointly upon COMUSMACV and the CIA Station Chief, Saigon to produce a program of actions against NVN, as set forth in Section A, paragraph 36, above, covering a twelve-month period.

c. The Program of Operations, outlined in Annex C to the OPLAN, contained 72 principal actions which, if fully implemented, would require a total of 2,062 separate

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R-147

Appendix B

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operations: 13 air strikes, 3 amphibious/airborne raids of company size or greater, 4 harassment operations by air demonstrations or naval feint and demonstration, and 2,042 operations either involving raids of less than platoon size or consisting of psychological and intelligence operations of varying degree and magnitude.* In this regard, CINCPAC considered that meaningful hard damage to the DRV could only be accomplished by either air strikes or small raids/sabotage missions involving forces of less than platoon size.

d. In paragraphs 2 and 3, below, are presented the salient features of OPLAN 34A.

2. (TS) Basic Provisions of OPLAN 34A

a. Mission

COMUSMACV/ [redacted] will provide necessary advice, assistance, training and material support to enable the RVN to conduct a graduated and intensified program of actions against the DRV which, in conjunction with other military and diplomatic action in Southeast Asia, will lead to a judgement on the part of the DRV leadership that continued direction and support of insurgent activities in RVN and Laos should cease. **

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b. Concept of Operations***

(1) Operations against the DRV would consist of selective actions in four categories or levels of activities, all of which were envisaged as special actions under conditions short of limited war:

(a) Category I - Harassing. These operations included small unspectacular demolition operations, moderate level psychological operations, small-scale intelligence collection actions, including tactical

* (TS) CINCPAC Ltr to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Combined MACV-CAS Saigon Plan for Actions Against North Vietnam," 19 Dec 1963. Serial 00465. (This letter transmitted OPLAN 34A from CINCPAC to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
 ** (TS) COMUSMACV OPLAN 34A-64, p. 3. Serial MACV TS 000806-63.
 *** (TS) Ibid., pp. 4-7.

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reconnaissance probes by small military units to
obtain visual ground intelligence, capture of
prisoners, documents and equipment, creation of
general harassment, and temporary interdiction
of lines of communication.

(b) Category II - Attritional. Included were
small-scale resistance operations, airborne and
seaborne raids by small forces on important military
and civil installations, and demolition of important
facilities.

(c) Category III - Punitive

1. This category of operations comprised
covert/overt resistance/physical destruction
actions designed to cause damage and/or destruction
to facilities or installations critical to
the enemy, to industrial development; and to
security of the DRV. They would be designed to
cause both large-scale internal redeployment of
DRV resources and the commitment of DRV forces
in reaction. Where possible, these actions
would be covert. It was recognized, however,
that the increased size of the forces required
and the duration of some operations might result
in their becoming basically overt acts. In
such cases, they would be attributable to the
RVN but not directly to the United States.

2. Included in these actions were raids by
company or battalion size military or FM forces,
airborne or seaborne, sabotage by small teams
to destroy major DRV resources and the active
organization, recruitment and employment of

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resistance within 177. The resistance movements might require more than the 12-month scope of the OPLAN to reach a stage of significant development.


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(d) Category IV - Aerial Attacks. Such attacks consisted of those conducted against critical DRV installations or facilities, industrial and/or military, such as POL storage areas, thermal power and steel plants the loss of which would result in a crippling effect on the DRV potential to maintain a stable economy and program in industrial development.

(2) In consonance with the above levels of activities, OPLAN 34A provided for these five types of operations:*

(a) Intelligence Collections Operations. Such operations would be conducted with the primary objective of intelligence collection in support of other actions in OPLAN 34A.

(b) Psychological operations.

 The latter instance would include a buildup to support the resistance movement operations (both real and notional efforts) and the physical destruction actions which, in turn, would reinforce the effect of the overall operations upon the DRV.

(c) Political Pressure Operations. Such operations were to be selective, highly specialized and sensitive actions specifically designed to impart to and impress upon the DRV leaders that the con-

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* (28) Ibid., pp. B-1 to B-3.

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tinued direction and support of aggression in RVN
and Laos would result in further and more damaging
retaliatory actions against the DRV.

(d) Resistance Operations. It was recognized
that successful development of resistance movements
in NVN as an integral part of OPLAN 34A could help
bring sufficient pressure to bear on the DRV to
cause its leadership to reevaluate and cease its
aggressive policy.

(e) Physical Destruction Operations. OPLAN 34A
embodied two types of physical destruction operations:
hit-and-run, and aerial attacks.

c. Command and Control*

(1) An implementing agency would be designated/
organized to effect US coordination, planning, control,

* (PS) Ibid., pp. E-1 to E-2

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and support of NVN operations conducted under the plan. 1
As the scope and intensity of operations increased, it 2
would be necessary either to expand the present 3
organizations or to organize and activate an organization 4
which would exercise command and control of scheduled 5
operations. 6

(2) Upon implementation of OPLAN 34A, MACV, [redacted] would 7
assist the GVN in the organization of an appropriate 8
command and control structure within the RVNAF. Estab- 9
lishment of a permanent RVN operational or joint task 10
force was considered necessary. 11

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(3) The program could be implemented in one of three 12
ways: 13

(a) Either by [redacted] or CCMUSMACV, with the second 14
party providing the required support. 15

(b) A joint MACV, [redacted] command. 16

(c) The program could be divided [redacted] 17

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3. (TS) Review and Approval of OPLAN 34A 19

a. CINCPAC, on 19 December 1963, concurred in general 20
with OPLAN 34A, and pointed out that the next step was the 21
selection and approval of the various actions proposed. 22
He commented that the United States should be prepared to 23
commit US forces in the event the reaction from NVN and 24
Communist China escalated to a magnitude beyond South 25
Vietnamese capabilities. Also, CINCPAC expressed doubt 26
that the proposed harassment and attritional actions alone 27
would have a lasting or serious effect on the North 28
Vietnamese leadership.* 29

* (TS) CINCPAC Letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, op cit. 31

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b. The SECDEF and DCI were briefed on OPLAN 34A during their visit to SVN* on 19-20 December 1963. 1
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(1) It was decided to present these matters for study by the Special Group (5412).** 3
4

(a) Whether, or to what extent, there should be cross-border operations from SVN into Laos, to include ground reconnaissance patrols, ground combat patrols, air resupply, tactical air support and air photography -- either singly or in combination. The DOD would prepare the presentation. 5
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(b) Whether, or to what extent, there should be an intensification of pressures on NVN through covert and military means. The DOD and the CIA would prepare the presentation. 11
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(c) In connection with (b) above, what should be the authorities for overflight of Laos and the transit use of Laotian territory. The DOD and the CIA would prepare the presentation. 15
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(d) A proposal for U-2 photography of the Cambodia-Laos - SVN border. 19
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(2) The SECDEF directed that the personnel and equipment listed below be arranged for immediately, and that DOD pay the costs. He wanted to achieve maximum readiness whether OPLAN 34A was approved or not and, in this regard, directed that the personnel and equipment be moved to Saigon on a priority basis.*** 21
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* (TS) Joint State-DOD-CAS Msg, [redacted] 27
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** (TS) Undated paper in OSACSA, entitled "Report on the Visit of the Secretary of Defense to South Vietnam 19-20 December 1963." 29
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*** (S) [redacted] 31

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- (a) Four new NASTY's to be procured by the Navy. 1
 In addition, check on the availability of two NASTYs 2
 under DOD control on the East Coast for transfer to 3
 VN. Any reasons to the contrary would be submitted to 4
 SECDEF by 27 December 1963. 5
- (b) Six additional C-123 aircraft with ECM, radar 6
 detection and pinpoint navigational equipment. 7
- (c) One aircraft training crew to train Vietnamese 8
 in aerial, mine laying and aerial mines. 9
- (d) Two portable navigational beacons, one boat 10
 mountable, and one both groundmobile and air trans- 11
 portable. 12
- (e) One psychological warfare augmentation 13
 detachment of 20 personnel with one Harris 17" x 20" 14
 high speed offset press, with a printing capability 15
 less photo reproduction. 16
- (f) Two radio broadcast studios and transmitter 17
 equipment for black radio operations. 18
- (g) Three radio broadcast studios complete for 19
 white radio operations. 20
- (h) Twelve aerial flare dispensers for A-1H 21
 aircraft. 22
- (3) Representative of the continuing follow-up actions 23
 on personnel and equipment needed for the execution of 24
 OPLAN 34A were these:* 25
- (a) Four NASTY's: On 23 January 1963, the Norwegian 26
 Government approved purchase from Norwegian Navy. The 27
 ship to transport them departed CONUS on 18 January, ar- 28
 rived in Bergen on 31 January, and departed there 29
 on 1 February for Subic. The NASTY's would require 30
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* (TS) Intra-OSACSA memorandum from the Chief, PD&R Division
 (Colonel H. J. Chisholm, USAF) for General Anthis (the
 SACSA), "Status of Materiel Actions for Operations in
 North Vietnam," 3 February 1964.

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B-154

Appendix B

SACSA), "Status of Materiel Actions for Operations in

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modification to include additional fuel tanks and armament and communications equipment. They will be operationally ready in May or June 1963.

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(b) Two Nasty's. These were in the Far East and were being modified at Subic. Modification should be complete by 14 - 21 February 1963, respectively. They should arrive at Danang prior to 1 March which is the anticipated readiness date of the support facilities. In the meantime, the training of crews had started.


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(c) Two PTF's. These boats were different from the NASTY's. They were World War II torpedo boats and had operational limitations. They were shipped from Norfolk on 18 January 1963, and had an ETA at Subic of 11 February. They, too, would require modification.*

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(d) Six C-123's. These aircraft were being modified by Lockheed and modification to the first aircraft would be completed by 5 March 1964. However, the first ECM "black box" would not be available until later, so that the first aircraft would not be available in an ECM configuration until 15 April. The expected ready date of all six aircraft was 15 July. It was estimated the four configured C-123's then in country could carry the program for the first two months of operations.

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(e) Aerial Mine Laying Training Team. On 21 June 1962, 1
CINCPAC ordered CINCPACFLT to assemble the team at 2
Pearl Harbor for country orientation and further prepara- 3
tion for onward travel, subject to call from COMUSMACV. 4
The mines were allocated but would remain at Subic/Guam in 5
readiness for shipment to Vietnam when required. 6

(f) [REDACTED] 7

[REDACTED] 8
[REDACTED] 9
[REDACTED] 10
[REDACTED] 11
[REDACTED] 12
[REDACTED] 13
[REDACTED] 14

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(g) Three Radios for White Operations. These were not 15
in stock. The Army contracted to have them placed in 16
Saigon by 1 March 1963. No problem was anticipated. 17

(h) Two Portable Navigational Beacons. PACAF had 18
two VOR beacons and four mobile low frequency beacons on 19
hand. In the absence of information to the contrary, it 20
was assumed that these were acceptable. 21

(i) [REDACTED] 22

[REDACTED] 23

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(j) Psychological Warfare Augmentation Detachment. 24
This detachment was ordered from Okinawa. It arrived in 25
Saigon on 13 January 1963, as requested by COMUSMACV. 26

(k) Twelve Aerial Flare Dispensers. The Navy modified 27
12 practice bomb racks and shipped them to COMUSMACV in 28
early January 1963. On 24 January, CINCPAC advised that 29
COMUSMACV reported that the Mark 5 flares, which did not 30
require special bomb racks, were better than the Mark 24 31
and that he did not foresee an additional requirement for
aerial flare dispensing equipment.

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c. The SECDEF and DCI discussed OPLAN 34A with the President 1
 on 21 December 1963. At their recommendation, the President 2
 created an interdepartmental committee (State, Defense, CIA, 3
 to select from the plan those operations which were most feasible 4
 and which promised the greatest return for the least risk. * 5
 Chaired by Major General Victor H. Krulak, the SACSA, the 6
 committee was formed on 21 December 1963 and completed its work 7
 on 2 January 1964. The substance of its report follows:** 8

(1) General 9

(a) An array of intelligence, psychological, and unconventional 10
 conventional warfare actions had been selected for phased 11
 implementation as direct retaliation for North Vietnamese 12
 participation in the VC insurgency in the RVN. The actions 13
 selected were designed to inflict increasing punishment 14
 upon NVN and to create pressures which may convince the 15
 North Vietnamese leadership, in its own self interest, to 16
 desist from its aggressive policies. 17

(b) The selection of targets was heavily influenced by 18
 Hanoi's strategy of seeking to support the VC insurgency 19
 at little cost to itself and to its industrial complex, 20
 while countering for victory upon US and South Vietnamese 21
 war weariness and the corrosive effects of time. 22

(c) The importance attached by Hanoi's leaders to the 23
 development of North Vietnam's economy suggested that pro- 24
 gressive damage of its industrial projects, attrition of 25
 its resources and dislocation of its economy might induce 26
 a decision to call off its physical support of the VC 27

* (TS) Joint State-DOD-CAS Msg, [REDACTED] 28
 ** Except for the breakout of the phases of operations and the 29
 recommendations, the committee report represented essentially 30
 a summary of OPLAN 34A and of CINCPAC's views concerning it. 31
 In OSACSA, the report is appended to OPLAN 34A.

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This reaction might be intensified by the traditional 1
 Vietnamese fear of Chinese domination, where expanded 2
 operations by our side could arouse concern in Hanoi 3
 over the likelihood of direct Chinese Communist (CHICOM) 4
 intervention in North Vietnamese affairs. 5

(d) It was desirable to gain as much information as 6
 possible regarding the enemy, and to intensify the then 7
 psychological warfare, deception and resistance operations 8
 in order to weaken Hanoi's control of the population and 9
 to involve the regime in costly countermeasures. 10

(e) It was far from clear whether even the successful 11
 conduct of these operations would induce Hanoi's leaders 12
 to cease and desist. Toughened, as they were by long 13
 years of hardship and struggle, they would not easily be 14
 persuaded by a punitive program to halt their support of 15
 the VC insurgency, unless the damage visited upon them was 16
 of great magnitude. (Both CINCPAC and MACV voiced the 17
 same opinion.) 18

(2) Limitations and Risks 19

(a) Operations against NVN were subject to the follow- 20
 ing main limitations and risks (varying according to 21
 covertness, deniability, and scope of operations): 22

1. Initially, it would be necessary to obtain 23
 the approval and cooperation of the GVN. The re- 24
 quirement for optimum use of limited South Vietnamese 25
 resources may be a factor influencing Saigon's 26
 judgment, especially with respect to any sizable 27
 operations. 28

2. The uneasy political and military balance in 29
 Laos could be upset, either by accelerated North 30
 Vietnamese military operations in Laos or adverse Lao 31
 or international reaction to South Vietnamese use of 32
 Lao territory for operations against NVN. 33
 However, conduct of the more intensive 34

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B-158

Appendix B

Lao territory for operations against NVN. 35However, conduct of the more intensive 36

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operations would be influenced by the success achieved 1
 in establishing arrangements with friendly elements in 2
 Laos and with the Thai Government for base facilities, 3
 and for the transit rights needed for maximum level 4
 operations. 5

3. NVN might retaliate by stepped-up activity 6
 against SVN. If NVN retaliated with major overt 7
 actions, SVN could suffer more damage than NVN unless 8
 the United States intervened directly. 9

4. Overt or non-deniable operations against NVN 10
 might evoke a strong international reaction, and in- 11
 crease pressures for neutralization of SVN. 12

5. The US record in covert operations against NVN 13
 forbade optimistic speculation as to what could be 14
 achieved through a limited approach. 15

(b) The above risks were outweighed by the potential 16
 benefits of the actions recommended below. In any event, 17
 until more vigorous measures were taken than then under- 18
 way, the United States would not know whether physical, 19
 propaganda, and economic pressures on Hanoi were likely 20
 to produce the desired result. The specific actions 21
 selected were chosen in the light of US general policy 22
 objectives in SE Asia, and in realization of the fact 23
 that improved military and political measures against the 24
 VC in SVN were a prerequisite to the success of the 25
 program. 26

(3) Scope of Operations. The program envisaged entailed 27
 three types of complementary operations in the fields of 28
 intelligence collection, psychological warfare, and physical 29
 destruction, all complemented by political action designed 30
 to signal to the North Vietnamese leadership the US 31
 intention to continue damaging retaliatory actions of
 increasing magnitude unless and until their
 support of the aggression in SVN was halted.

intention to continue damaging retaliatory actions of

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
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(a) Intelligence Collection Operations. These opera- 1
tions would provide intelligence support for all the other 2
actions to be taken against NVN. They would include: 3

1. Intensification of aerial reconnaissance, with 4
emphasis on targets to be attacked in the physical 5
destruction program. 6

2. Expansion of communications and other 7
electronic intelligence operations. 8

3. Expansion of tactical ground reconnaissance 9
probes by the Vietnamese Armed Forces into NVN, with 10
emphasis on the capture of prisoners, documents, and 11
equipment. 12



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(c) Physical Destruction Operations. Physical 24
destruction operations would encompass offensive commando 25
raids and harassments designed to damage or destroy 26
facilities and resources critical to the economy, industria 27
development and security of North Vietnam. In these hit- 28
and-run attacks, commando units would be introduced into 29
the target area, and withdrawn, by sea and air or overland 30
immediately after accomplishment of their mission. In the 31
final phase of maximum intensity, destruction
of targets by aerial bombardment would

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B-16C

Appendix B

of targets by aerial bombardment would

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be an available option for consideration. Of all three 1
 complementary operations, physical destruction efforts 2
 were likely to be most effective in bringing about a re- 3
 orientation of North Vietnamese policy, since they would 4
 operate directly counter to Hanoi's strategy of supporting 5
 the war in SVN at little cost to itself. 6

(4) Resources to-be Employed 7

(a) The RVN would be requested to assume responsibility 8
 for actual conduct of operations in all respects except 9
 political action, while the United States would provide 10
 advisory and logistical support. 11

(b) Existing in-country resources, both Vietnamese and 12
 US, were generally adequate for initiation of the program, 13
 although certain equipment would be required for optimum 14
 effort. Action was being taken to provide these 15
 additional resources. 16

(c) The intensified operations would involve the 17
 military and PM forces of the RVN, as well as US training 18
 assistance, operational direction, and logistical support. 19
 US personnel and forces would not engage in operations 20
 within NVN, its territorial waters, or its air space. 21
 They would continue, as at that time, to serve as air- 22
 crews on certain air reconnaissance missions. 23

(5) Operations to be Conducted 24

(a) General 25

1. The total array of feasible operations against 26
 NVN, as developed by USMACV and CAS, had been studied 27
 from the viewpoint of achieving the greatest return 28
 at the least risk, while emphasizing the concept of 29
 progressively escalating pressure as time went on 30
 and as the Vietnamese capability increased. 31

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B-161

Appendix B

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2. In order to provide for close control of the 1
 conduct of operations, as well as to ensure progress, 2
 evaluation of results obtained and risks involved, 3
 the proposed program was divided for planning purposes 4
 into three general time phases, of about four months 5
 each. 6

a. This time phasing was governed by two factors. 7
 first, the actual capability of the South Vietnamese 8
 to execute the contemplated operations in the 9
 stipulated time period; and, second, the desire to 10
 give the North Vietnamese substantial hurt in the 11
 early phases, while preserving deniability, at 12
 least in the beginning. 13

b. Thus, Phase I encompassed operations which 14
 the Vietnamese were then or would soon be capable 15
 of executing, including several destruction 16
 operations of high deniability but offering prospect 17
 of high impact. 18

c. Phases II and III were geared to a growing 19
 Vietnamese capability in the intelligence, 20
 psychological and destruction areas. The last 21
 capability moved up the scale of violence, with 22
 consequent growth in risk, as the deniability 23
 factor diminished. Discreet planning for these 24
 later phases would proceed during the execution 25
 of Phase I, but execution would be dependent upon 26
 specific Washington-level approval. 27

3. Psychological and intelligence collection 28
 operations, essentially covert in nature would continue 29
 through all three phases on a rapidly ascending scale 30
 of effort. Political actions would support all 31
 phases of the program by ensuring that NVN
 was informed correctly of US intentions.

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R-162

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

Concurrently, and to justify the actions against Hanoi, 1
 there would be an intensified effort to assemble as 2
 much evidence as possible of Hanoi's physical 3
 support of the war in SVN. 4

(b) Phases of Operations 5

1. Phase I (about four months) 6

a. Execution of Phase I could commence about 7
 1 February 1964. This phase included about 20 8
 destructive undertakings, all within current or 9
 early prospective capabilities. These operations 10
 were considered by the US representation in Saigon 11
 to be feasible within the contemplated time frame. 12
 (listings of these targets and a related map were 13
 the committee report.) For the most part, the 14
 targets were located south of Vinh in the southern 15
 part of NVN. 16

b. Meanwhile, psychological and intelligence 17
 operations would be accelerated as preparations were 18
 made to commence the intensified destruction program 19
 During Phase I, these operations would increase 20
 from 64 separate actions in the first month to about 21
 125 in the fourth month, and would cover the entire 22
 spectrum of black and white radio broadcasts, leaflets 23
 drops and propaganda kit drops. (Tab C to the report 24
 was a listing of the planned activities.) 25

c. From an intelligence viewpoint, the Office 26
 of National Estimates considered that appreciable 27
 international reaction to Phase I destruction 28
 operations was improbable, although accusations 29
 might emanate from the communist bloc. They 30
 estimated that the North Vietnamese reaction 31
 would be limited to propaganda complaints to 32
 the International Control Commission and to 33

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~~TOP SECRET~~

B-163

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

measures for improving security and defense of 1
vital installations. The Office noted, however, 2
that NVN might retaliate by intensifying VC 3
attacks against LOCs, petroleum storage facilities, 4
and other such targets in SVN. Direct involvement 5
of CHICOM forces was not likely to result from 6
Phase I operations. (A detailed assessment by the 7
Board of National Estimates of the possible re- 8
action to attack on the targets selected for Phase 9
I was appended as Tab D to the committee report.) 10

d. Responsibility for Phase I operations would 11
be plausibly deniable by the United States, but 12
not necessarily by the RVN. 13

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15 However, in the interest
of achieving a favorable psychological effect, it 16
might prove desirable for SVN to acknowledge 17
publicly its responsibility for certain of the 18
retaliatory acts taken against the aggressor, 19
accompanying such acknowledgement with publication 20
of concrete evidence of North Vietnamese in- 21
volvement in South Vietnam.* 22

2. Phase I (about four months). During this phase, 23
all operations would increase in tempo and magnitude as 24
more resources were made available, and as training and 25
other preparations for attacks against the larger or 26
more difficult targets were completed. 27

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* In this regard, the State Department representative commented 29
substantively as follows. In view of the risks and the uncertainty 30
as to whether operations against NVN will materially contribute to 31
the US objective of ending the war, such operations should, pending 32
further decision, remain within the scope of and be conducted by 33
means which are covert and deniable by both the GVN and the United 34
States. Intensification of the operations beyond these limits 35
would depend upon the future actions of NVN against SVN and/or Laos. 36

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- a. Psychological actions would increase from 1
about 132 separate efforts in the first month 2
to about 195 in the fourth month. 3
- b. Selection of specific destruction targets 4
would follow a progressive evaluation of Phase I 5
results. 6
- c. Interdiction and harassing operations could 7
continue, and additional targets identified with 8
NVN's economic and industrial well-being could be 9
destroyed. 10
- d. Intelligence evaluations of North Vietnamese 11
reactions and political gyrations would be of major 12
importance during this phase. 13
- e. The intensified effort to assemble evidence 14
of Hanoi's participation of the war would continue. 15
3. Phase III (about four months). This phase 16
would be a continuation, at still higher intensity, of 17
intelligence psychological and destruction operations 18
similar to those conducted in Phase II. 19
- a. Psychological actions would grow from about 20
202 in the first month to 244 in the final month 21
of the phase. 22
- b. Actual destruction targets would be chosen 23
based on a continuing evaluation of Phase II 24
actions while in progress. 25
- c. Planning would provide for direct aerial 26
destruction of selected targets during this phase, 27
should such a decision be reached. 28
- (6) Recommendations. That policy approval be granted for: 29
- (a) Execution of Phase I of the program, to commence 30
on or about 1 February 1964. 31
- (b) Negotiation by the Country Team in Saigon to 32
procure participation by the GVN in these operations. 33

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~~TOP SECRET~~

B-165

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

d. Meanwhile, on 21 December 1963, the SECDEF directed that the personnel and equipment needed to implement OPLAN 344 be moved to Saigon. To achieve maximum readiness, this movement would be accomplished on a priority basis whether the plan was approved or not.* In that connection, the SECDEF requested the movement of a psychological warfare augmentation detachment of 20 personnel capable of operating a Harris press.

e. On 3 January 1964, the SECDEF forwarded to the CJCS for review a Draft Memorandum for the President embodying salient views of the interdepartmental committee (paragraph c, above). As presented in the Draft Memorandum, the program would be of four months duration and would begin on 1 February 1969. The SECDEF indicated that he would like to receive the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting on the proposed program during a meeting on 6 January 1964. The substance of the Draft Memorandum follows:**

(1) The Committee had proposed the following four-month program to begin February 1.

(a) Expansion of intelligence collection operations to include:

1. Nineteen U-2 photographic missions.
2. Four aerial communications/electronics intelligence missions.

(b) Expansion of psychological operations. There was then in progress a limited leaflet and deception program as well as a small subversive radio program of six 15-minute broadcasts per week. These operations would be expanded to provide, during the four-month period, for: 56 leaflet drops, delivery of 18

* (TS) JCS Msg 4120, DTG 211951Z, December 1963.

** (TS) SECDEF Memorandum for the CJCS, 3 January 1964. Enclosed was a Draft Memorandum for the President, "Covert Operations Against North Vietnam." The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if any, as requested by the SECDEF have not been found.

~~TOP SECRET~~

B-166

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

propaganda kits, 67 harassment and deception operations 1
 (phantom resupply, phantom personnel delivery, fakes), 2
 120 15-minute black radio broadcasts, and 60 white 3
 radio broadcasts of from 6 to 12 hours duration each. 4

(c) Sabotage operations. During the past 18 months 5
 there have been five successful sabotage operations. 6
 This program would be intensified by execution, during 7
 the four-month period, of about 18 operations. (These 8
 operations along with a map, were presented in a map.) 9
 (Such information as presented in the Draft Memorandum, 10
 is contained in Annex A to this Appendix.) 11

(2) Responsibility for the program would be plausibly 12
 deniable by the United States, and SVN would be requested 13
 to assume responsibility for the entire project. The 14
 United States would provide advisory and logistical support, 15
 but US personnel and forces would not engage in operations 16
 within NVN, its territorial waters or its air space. They 17
 would continue, as at that time, to serve as air crews on 18
 certain air reconnaissance missions. 19

(3) During the four-month period of the program, the 20
 progress and the operations for the immediate future 21
 would be reviewed each week by the 5412 Group, and 22
 any changes which appeared appropriate would be brought to 23
 the President's attention. Meanwhile, planning would proceed 24
 for a further intensification of the program, should that prove 25
 desirable. 26

(4) The proposed program had been designed to help 27
 convince the North Vietnamese leadership, in its own self- 28
 interest, to desist from its aggressive policies. 29

(5) Aside from the impact of a physical destruction program 30
 on North Vietnam's economy and morale, it was desirable to 31
 gain more information regarding the enemy as well

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B-167

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

as to intensify the then current psychological warfare, 1
deception and resistance operations in order to weaken 2
Hanoi's control of the population and to involve the 3
regime in costly countermeasures. 4

(6) To assist in evaluating the effects of the program, 5
the Committee called upon the Board of National Estimates 6
for an appraisal of "probable reactions to various courses 7
of action with respect to North Vietnam." The Board stated 8
that:* 9

(a) Communist reactions to most of these operations 10
would be slight. 11

(b) Communist reactions would be sharper in the 12
cases of operations against Haiphong and the railroads 13
near the borders of China. The reactions would be felt 14
primarily in SVN and Laos, but would not be so extreme 15
as to change the character of hostilities in those 16
countries. 17

(c) The operations would not be likely to lead to 18
appreciably increased Chinese Communist involvement in 19
the area. Neither would the operations lead the Soviets 20
to believe that the United States had made a significant 21
change in its policies. 22

(d) The proposed sabotage operations, taken by 23
themselves, even if all were successful, would not 24
convince the DRV leadership that their continued 25
direction and support of insurgent activities in SVN 26
and Laos should cease. 27

(e) It was possible, however, that the North 28
Vietnamese government might see these operations as 29
representing a significant increase in the vigor of 30
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US policy, potentially dangerous to them. If so, 1
they would probably wish to halt the new developments at 2
an early date and would, therefore, try to arouse inter- 3
national pressures for a conference to settle the problem 4
of Vietnam before it expanded into a more general conflict 5
in the Far East. In such a case, the US could probably 6
expect little political support from its major allies. 7

(f) The principal determinant of DRV prosecution of the 8
war would not be the damage suffered from such small scale 9
operations, but the course of the war in the South and the 10
risk Hanoi believes would be involved in its prosecution. 11

(7) The Committee, while more sanguine than the Board, 12
agreed that it was far from clear whether even the successful 13
conduct of the proposed operations would induce Hanoi's leaders 14
to diminish their support of the VC. However, the Committee 15
concluded that the risks associated with the operations were 16
outweighed by the potential damage to the North Vietnamese 17
economy and morale; further, that, in any case, until more 18
vigorous measures were taken than those then underway, the 19
United States would not know whether the physical, propaganda, 20
and economic pressures on Hanoi would be likely to influence 21
their conduct. The members of the Committee, therefore, 22
recommended the President's approval of the program out- 23
lined above. The Secretaries of State and Defense, and the 24
DCI concurred in that recommendation. 25

f. State-DOD-CAS, in a joint message of 16 January 1964, 26
indicated that the recommendations of the interdepartmental 27
committee had been approved by the President;* further, that the 28

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approval embodied the execution, in a four-month period 1
commencing on 1 February 1964, of specified elements of 2
OPL- 34A (those elements were listed in the message). 3

(1) Other key provisions of the message follow: 4

(a) The above four-month program was to be 5
accompanied by further detailed planning for continuation 6
and intensification of the program, if so directed. 7

(b) The United States could plausibly deny the 8
actions selected. 9

(c) There should be no ground reconnaissance action 10
into the DMZ. 11

(d) Overflights of Laos in support of physical 12
destruction actions were prohibited. 13

(e) The following structure for execution of the 14
operations listed in paragraph 2 had been approved by 15
all agencies in Washington, subject to any comments from 16
the Ambassador, COMUSMACV, or CAS Chief, Saigon: 17

1. Overall political control in Saigon - 18
Ambassador. 19

2. Overall operational control - COMUSMACV. 20

3. Planning, liaison, logistics, training and 21
advice - Joint MACV-CAS Task Force, reporting 22
directly to COMUSMACV. Chief of Task Force to be 23
a colonel level military officer selected by 24
COMUSMACV; Deputy Chief of Task Force to be a CAS 25
officer s 26

4. Other personnel for the Task Force would be 27
contributed by MACV and CAS as required and agreed 28
locally. 29
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(f) All operations against NVN would be under the Task Force and all in-country resources of the US military and CAS would be available for support of approved operations. It was assumed the Ambassador would monitor the program on a continuing basis.

(g) Additional actions required in Saigon to implement this program were

1. To bring the GVN into the planning process, on a most discreet basis, since covert use of the best of their regular forces as well as some of their military resources, would be required. This might be done at once, in the manner considered by Ambassador Lodge and General Harkins to be most secure.

2. To create security and cover arrangements to support the expanded training requirements.

(h) Assembly of the required materiel had proceeded at high priority.

(2) As already noted, the OPLAN 34A Program of Actions comprised these categories of actions: intelligence collection, psychological operations, physical destruction, aerial attack; further, the Program contained a total of 72 actions which if implemented over a 12-month period, would produce a total of 2,062 separate operations. Out of the 72 actions proposed in OPLAN 34A, 33 were ultimately approved for implementation during Phase I. A breakdown follows:

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B-171

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

<u>Category of Action</u>	<u>No in OPLAN 34A*</u>	<u>No. Approved for Phase I-*</u>	
Intelligence Collection	4	4	<u>1</u>
Psychological Operations	24	15	<u>2</u>
Physical Destruction	33	14	<u>3</u>
Aerial Attack	<u>11</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	72	33	<u>5</u>

(3) With regard to the responsibility for the execution of OPLAN 34A, CIA agreed that the executive authority should be the DOD.*** That authority is reflected in the implementing message which assigns overall operational control to COMUSMACV.* Subsequently, with respect to OPLAN 34A, CINCPAC stated that:

There should be no doubt as to COMUSMACV overall authority for the program in Vietnam. We understand that chain of command is from SECDEF through the JCS and the Unified Commander (CINCPAC) to COMUSMACV.

g. In forwarding OPLAN 34A for approval, COMUSMACV stated that "whether or not the plan is acceptable to the GVN has yet to be determined. Informal discussions on broad conceptual terms indicate a willingness to consider undertaking increased operations in NVN.**** The State-DOD-CAS implementing message (paragraph f (1) above) pointed out "the need for the GVN to be brought into the planning process, on a discreet basis, since covert use of the best of their regular forces, as well as some of their military resources will be required." Pursuant to those instructions, Ambassador Lodge, on 21 January 1964, presented to high GVN officials a sanitized concept of the operations envisaged in OPLAN 34A.

* (TS) CINCPAC OPLAN 34A, Appendices 1-4 to Annex C.

**

**** (TS) OPLAN 34A, paragraph B, p. 11.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

B-172

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

He then initiated arrangements for GVN support.* In addition, 1
 arrangements were made for discussion of certain military details 2
 of the plan with high military officials on 23 January 1964 3
 Subsequently: 4

(1) On 30 January 1964, in a coup d'etat, General Khanh 5
 replaced General Minh as Premier. A number of other high 6
 GVN officials who had been given information on OPLAN 34A 7
 were also deposed. According to CINCPAC, however, the infor- 8
 mation to deposed officials did not include specifics as to 9
 targets in NVN or the tactical plan, except for two 10
 destruction action targets (33 and 35)** which had been used 11
 as examples during the oral presentation to GVN officials on 12
 21 January 1963. 13

(2) The high GVN officials, remaining in the GVN power 14
 structure and who had been familiarized with OPLAN 34A, 15
 recommended that it be implemented on schedule (beginning 16
 1 February 1964), subject to approval of the concept by 17
 General Khanh, the new Premier. CINCPAC, nevertheless, 18
 considered that the information possessed by these deposed 19
 officials could cause serious repercussions if it were 20
 passed to neutralists or communists. Consequently, 21
 CINCPAC recommended that all reconnaissance and physical 22
 destruction actions be postponed until a complete assessment 23
 of the material and information known or possessed by the 24
 deposed RVN nationals could be reviewed by Headquarters PACOM 25
 and Washington levels.*** In a subsequent evaluation, CINCPAC 26
 recommended that action against the two destruction action 27

* 1 (TS) COMUSMACV Msg 0842, DTG 02072Z February 64. 29

2. (TS) [REDACTED] 21 January 64. 30

** Target 33 was a SEAL team strike on bridges and the buoy tender 30
 in the Haiphong Channel. Target 35 was SEAL team strike on the
 Ben Thuy petroleum storage. 31

*** (TS) 1. CINCPAC Msg DTG 312340Z January 64. 31

(TS) 2. CINCPAC Msg DTG 012314Z February 64.
 [REDACTED]

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B-173

Appendix B

~~TOP SECRET~~

targets be held in abeyance, that other selected
actions should go on, and that preparations should be
continued for executing plans against the foregoing two
targets.*

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(3) General Khanh was briefed on OPLAN 34A on 3 February
-1964. He approved the plan in concept and promised full
support of it.** (On 12 March 1963, in a conversation with
Secretary McHamara, Ambassador Lodge and General Taylor
(CJCS), General Khanh agreed that actions designed to exert
increased pressure on NVN could be a helpful assist to his
effort but that they would be no substitute for successful
actions in SVN against the VC. Further, General Khanh said
that his "base in SVN was not strong enough for overt
operations against NVN but that he would like to 'redouble'
covert operations right away.>")***

* (TS) CINCPAC Msg DTG 030529Z February 64.
** [REDACTED] DTG 010400Z February 64
*** (TS) Saigon Msg 1740, DTG 130430Z March 64

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B-174

Appendix B