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December 20, 2016

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.

[Redacted]

FOIPA Request No.: 1341703-000  
Subject: 080-HQ-612

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information related to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

A portion of that information has been returned to the FBI and is enclosed. Deletions have been made pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section(s) 552 as noted below. See the enclosed form for an explanation of these exemptions.

**Section 552**

**Section 552a**

(b)(1)

(b)(7)(A)

(d)(5)

(b)(2)

(b)(7)(B)

(j)(2)

(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

(k)(1)

(b)(7)(D)

(k)(2)

(b)(7)(E)

(k)(3)

(b)(7)(F)

(k)(4)

(b)(4)

(b)(8)

(k)(5)

(b)(5)

(b)(9)

(k)(6)

(b)(6)

(k)(7)

19 pages were reviewed and 19 pages are being released.

Deletions were made by Department of Army, United States Army Intelligence and Security Command. If you wish to appeal those denials, please write directly to that agency.

Commander  
U.S Army Intelligence and Security Command  
Freedom of Information/ Privacy Office (Appeal)  
2600 Ernie Pyle Street, Room 3S02-B  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755-5995

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the [www.fbi.gov/foia](http://www.fbi.gov/foia) website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. Your patience is appreciated.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov). Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing [foipaquestions@ic.fbi.gov](mailto:foipaquestions@ic.fbi.gov). If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy  
Section Chief,  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

The enclosed documents represent the second interim release of information responsive to your FOIA request.

As previously indicated, document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning another agency (ies). We are consulting with the other agency (ies) and are awaiting their response. Our office has processed all other information currently in our possession. Upon the completion of the outstanding consultation by our office, the FBI will correspond with you regarding those documents when the consultation is completed.

This material is being provided to you at no charge.

## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

EPC:ON

Washington, D. C.

March 2, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NATHAN.

Re: Communication and Code Division  
of the Army Signal Corps.  
Captain [redacted]

Mr. Tolson.....
Mr. Nathan.....
Mr. E. A. Tamm.....
Mr. Clegg.....
Mr. Coffey.....
Mr. Glavin.....
Mr. Ladd.....
Mr. Nichols.....
Mr. Rosen.....
Mr. Tracy.....
Mr. Carson.....
Mr. Egan.....
Mr. Gurnea.....
Mr. Hendon.....
Mr. Jones.....
Mr. Quinn Tamm.....
Mr. Nease.....
Miss Gandy.....

b6 per Army

In a letter dated February 25, 1939 the SAC of the Washington Division relayed two suggestions from Captain [redacted] present Chief of the Communications Division of the Signal Corps of the U. S. Army. The first is to the effect that if the Bureau desires any of its employees given instruction in the use of the Morse telegraph code, Captain [redacted] would be pleased to arrange instruction in this respect over at the Army Signal Corps.

b6 per Army

In regard to this I do not recommend that any action be taken at this time. There are presently in the laboratory four or five employees who have an understanding of the Morse telegraph code. One of them, Mr. [redacted] can read the code at the speeds which it is normally sent. The others, [redacted] Parsons, [redacted] and possibly [redacted] can read the code only at slow speeds but are able to read it off of tape or from a phonograph record. The whole question of proficiency in Morse code after one learns the basic system is constant practice. If it became desirable to have employees in the Bureau able to rapidly read the code as it is sent over the radio or telegraph lines, proficiency could be attained by this group of present employees solely through daily practice. By the same token, the efficiency is rapidly lost once the continual practice is discontinued. For this reason there would seem to be no purpose in sending men over to the Army Signal Corps.

b6 per Army

b6 per Army

In the same letter Captain [redacted] through the Washington Division, extended an invitation to Bureau representatives to visit the Message Center of the Signal Corps, particularly for the purpose of getting acquainted with the radio communication setup. Captain

LENOLA

*fac*

INDEXED

80-612-111

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

MAR 8 1939

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NATHAN

TAMM

CLERK

3/2/39

[ ] followed up this invitation by a personal telephone call b6 per Army and on Monday, February 27th, he called at my office and escorted Mr. Conrad and me on this visit. Captain [ ] took us first to Battery Grove, Virginia, where the Army maintains its radio receiving antenna and relay stations for the Washington area. These are somewhat on a make-shift basis for the reason that the land occupied, which is an old shipyard on the Potomac River, is the subject of controversy with the City of Alexandria as to whether it will be made into a city park. Until this question is cleared up, permanent improvements are not being made by the Army. Captain [ ] stated, however, that it was the most ideal spot for radio reception in the vicinity of Washington and the Army was hopeful of maintaining this land and eventually improving it.

We next visited the radio transmitting stations of the U. S. Army, located at Ft. Myer, Virginia. There is a much more modern plant here and transmitters ranging in size from 500 KW to 5000 KW are in use on regular communication circuits from Washington to Army points throughout the United States and insular possessions. It should be understood that both the receiving and sending stations are merely relay stations, i.e., they are subject to remote control from the War Department headquarters in the Munitions Building in Washington and all messages originate at headquarters and not at these relay stations.

We next visited the Message Center in the Munitions Building at Washington. This is a very similar setup to the Navy Communications Center which is in the same group of buildings. The principal method of communication utilized is point to point radio. Apparently a large traffic is handled, there being some 30 to 40 employees in evidence. High speed tape sending equipment is used and Mr. Conrad informed me that the equipment and procedures appear to be fairly modern, but perhaps not quite up to expectation in so far as the Army's communication system would lead one to anticipate. Captain [ ] informed that of the normal traffic handled, about 50% is the radio telegraph business of the Army and the remaining 50% constitutes the radio telegraph business of the various government departments, which is handled for them by the Army. It was noted that the Message Center has a direct

b6 per Army

3/2/39

teletypewriter line to the Department of Justice and that the Department of Justice sends a great deal of its telegraphic work through the Army net.

While in the building a visit was made to the Cryptographic Section which also comes under Captain [redacted]

b6 per Army

Subsequently Captain [redacted] entertained Mr. Conrad and me at lunch at the Army-Navy Club. Throughout the entire visit he exhibited the utmost cordiality. He seemed unusually anxious to be of any assistance possible to the Bureau and appeared to very freely discuss any and all matters of Army communication policy. In this connection it should be noted that Captain [redacted] and his staff have been quite cooperative with the Washington Division in connection with the recent Bruce Espionage surveillances. I was somewhat surprised to find that the Signal Corps' Washington stations are concerned entirely with point to point communication handling regular traffic, and that only very occasional monitoring or radio intercept work is done. I say I was surprised at this because in my previous conversations with Captain [redacted] I gained the impression that they were doing a lot of radio intercept work around here in connection with their espionage. When I asked him about this he hedged to the effect that the bulk of the radio intercept work was done by their radio stations in the field.

b6 per Army

b6 per Army

Although Captain [redacted] is most cordial and undoubtedly highly cooperative, I could not escape the impression left by his verbosity and loquaciousness.

A letter on personal stationery is attached hereto thanking Captain [redacted] for the courtesy extended.

b6 per Army

Respectfully,



E. P. Coffey.



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. LADD *[Signature]*  
 FROM : S. S. Alden *[Signature]*  
 SUBJECT:

DATE: 6/19/45  
 SWR:mkm

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
- Mr. Clegg ✓
- Mr. Coffey ✓
- Mr. Glavin ✓
- Mr. Ladd ✓
- Mr. Nichols ✓
- Mr. Rosen ✓
- Mr. Tracy ✓
- Mr. Carson ✓
- Mr. Egan ✓
- Mr. Hendon ✓
- Mr. Pennington ✓
- Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Beahm
- Miss Gandy

b6 per Army

Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] of the Military Intelligence Division, advised Special Agent S. W. Reynolds of the Liaison Section, that upon the termination of hostilities there will be numerous M209 Hagelin Enciphering Devices on hand, which will have to be turned over to the Surplus Property Administrator for disposal.

b6 per Army

Colonel [redacted] stated that according to Regulation No. 7, Special Order No. 4, of the Surplus Property Board, dated April 24, 1945, they only have the authority to dispose of and destroy such military property as regards the protection of public safety, health and security. Colonel [redacted] indicated that the Surplus Property Administrator has interpreted this order to mean destruction only of lethal weapons.

b6 per Army

Colonel [redacted] pointed out that, in accordance with this interpretation of these special orders, no provision would be made for the destroying of the M209 Hagelin Enciphering Devices. Colonel [redacted] stated he had ascertained that the law enforcement officials of the United States had in the past exhibited some concern over the use and utilization of enciphering devices by the criminal elements, as a means of communication and hampering their immediate detection by legitimate law enforcement agencies. Colonel [redacted] advised Mr. Reynolds that he had heard of an attempt in the past to make use of code devices by the rum runners, back in the days of prohibition.

b6 per Army

Colonel [redacted] advised Mr. Reynolds that he was making this information available to the Bureau in the event that the Bureau saw fit to take some affirmative action toward requesting the proper officials of the Government to take steps to destroy the M209 Hagelin Enciphering Devices, or to render them useless to the criminal elements.

*[Handwritten initials]*

RECORDED & INDEXED

151

71-612-109

*[Handwritten notes and stamps]*  
 7  
 6/23  
 7-5-45  
 27-11-45



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

CFD:JCM

TO : MR. COFFEY - 7642 *392*

DATE: July 5, 1945

FROM : C. F. DOWNING

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF HAGELIN CRYPTOGRAPHERS  
BY SURPLUS PROPERTY ADMINISTRATOR

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Mumford \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

On June 19, 1945 Mr. Alden prepared a memorandum for Mr. Ladd in which he pointed out that Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] of MID had advised Special Agent S. W. Reynolds of the Liaison Section there will be numerous Hagelin cipher machines on hand upon the termination of hostilities which will have to be turned over to the Surplus Property Administrator for disposition; that according to Regulation No. 7, Special Order No. 4, of the Surplus Property Board, dated April 24, 1945, the Board has the authority to dispose of and destroy such military property as regards the protection of b6 per Army public safety, health and security; that the Surplus Property Administrator has interpreted this order to mean destruction only of lethal weapons. Colonel [redacted] was of the opinion that law enforcement officials had in the past exhibited some concern about the use of enciphering devices by the criminal elements and advised Mr. Reynolds that he was making this information available to the Bureau in the event that the Bureau saw fit to take some affirmative action toward requesting the proper Government officials to destroy the Hagelin Cryptographers or otherwise render them useless.

As you know the security afforded by these machines, if used properly, is relatively high and were they thrown on the market at small cost which they undoubtedly will be unless some action is taken, they would be available to any organized criminal elements numbering conceivably among the members ex-service personnel sufficiently well acquainted with the Hagelin's operation to produce a maximum effectiveness and use it to our distinct disadvantage.

In connection with this matter, you inquired if we might be able to employ the Hagelin machines for Bureau communications. In my opinion, we should certainly get a sample of each type for examination but I do not believe on the other hand we should consider their use at this particular time since they would not afford us the same security as our double code system.

**RECOMMENDATION:** 1. That the Bureau protest the release of these Hagelin Cryptographers. 2. That a sample of each different type be obtained for Laboratory examination.

EX - 59

RECORDED

*71-112-110*

Addendum: I disagree with Downing's view that there is any great problem here in the use of this equipment by criminal elements and therefore I feel no protest should be made on that score. I agree that we should get as many as possible for the Laboratory samples of each of the different models. Should it subsequently turn out that any of these would be useful in the Bureau's communications system a recommendation should then be made.

b6 per Army

*7/12/45 Downing's view*  
*Call with address*  
*7/19/45*  
*EPC*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

STR:edm

TO : MR. D. M. LADD *JSL*DATE: 7/28/45 *W*

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF HAGELIN CRYPTOGRAPHERS  
BY SURPLUS PROPERTY ADMINISTRATOR

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Gandy	

Reference is made to the memorandum to Mr. Coffey from Mr. Downing in the above-captioned matter dated July 5, 1945, which memorandum referred to a conversation had between Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] of the Military Intelligence Division and Special Agent S. W. Reynolds of the Liaison Section regarding the disposition of Hagelin Cryptographers. Attached to the referenced memorandum was an addendum by Mr. Coffey which indicated he did not feel the Bureau should take any action or make any protest against the disposition of these Cryptographers, but should attempt to procure as soon as possible laboratory samples of each of the different models. You agreed with Mr. Coffey's addendum.

b6 per Army

Mr. Reynolds on the basis of this information advised Colonel [redacted] that the Bureau did not desire to take any definite stand regarding the disposition of these Cryptographers. Mr. Reynolds pointed out that the Bureau would desire models of these Cryptographers for study. Colonel [redacted] stated that he felt there would be no difficulty in procuring these models. Colonel [redacted] advised Mr. Reynolds that he would make note of the Bureau's stand but inasmuch as he felt this should be a matter of record, he was consequently contemplating addressing a letter to the Bureau reiterating his request. Mr. Reynolds stated that if he saw fit to take this action, the Bureau would merely reiterate the stand as outlined by Mr. Reynolds.

RECORDED & INDEXED *81-112-111*  
*151*

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that this be forwarded to the Technical Laboratory for their information.

*11h* EX-59 *11h*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SWR:ems

TO : MR. D. M. LADD *[Handwritten initials]*

FROM : Mr. E. G. Fitch *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF HAGELIN CRYPTOGRAPHERS  
BY SURPLUS PROPERTY ADMINISTRATOR

DATE: 11/5/45

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Clegg *[Handwritten initials]* \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Coffey *[Handwritten initials]* \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Beahm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to a memorandum to you from Mr. R. R. Roach dated July 28, 1945, in the above-captioned matter, which indicated that Special Agent Reynolds of the Liaison Section had contacted Colonel [redacted] in the above-captioned matter at the time indicating that the Bureau did not desire to take any action or make any protests against the disposition of these cryptographic machines. At that same time, as noted in the reference memorandum, Mr. Reynolds indicated to Colonel [redacted] that the Bureau would like to have a couple of the Cryptographers for laboratory purposes. At that time Colonel [redacted] advised Mr. Reynolds that there would be no difficulty in procuring these models.

Mr. Reynolds has followed this matter from time to time with Colonel [redacted] b6 per Army. Colonel [redacted] now advises that he has discussed this matter with General Clarke and that they felt that while there is no objection to furnishing these machines to the Bureau inasmuch as these items are not expendable items, some account would have to be made for them. Colonel [redacted] suggested a letter be addressed to the Secretary of War setting forth the Bureau's desires so that the transfer could be effected.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this be forwarded to the Technical Laboratory for information and appropriate action.

CORDEI

&  
CORDEX

35

EX-49

59 FEB 1 1946

*Letter 1/12/46*

116

*1/12/46*

January 23, 1946

Commanding Officer  
Army Security Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

By a letter dated December 31, 1942 over the signature of Brigadier General Frank E. Stoner, the Office of the Chief Signal Officer transmitted one Hagelin Cipher Machine, Model C38, to the Bureau on a loan basis. A subsequent letter from Major General Clayton Bissell dated August 7, 1945 advised that the Army has in storage a large quantity of cryptographic devices, including those designated as SYKO, M-94 and the Hagelin M209, which apparently were to be disposed of.

The original Hagelin C38 borrowed in December 1942 is still in the possession of the Bureau and if agreeable with you we desire to retain this particular machine as our permanent possession, transferring it with no reimbursement involved.

We also desire to obtain samples of the SYKO, M-94, and any other cryptographic devices which the War Department can make available to us. Your cooperation in helping us in this matter would be greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

*To Gen. Clarke's office  
1/29/46*

*RECORDED & INDEXED  
1-25-46*

*180-612-117*  
F B I

30 JAN 30 1946

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TWN:DMS  
30-612

58 FEB 6 1946

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

Washington, D. C.  
February 25, 1939

Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

It is the understanding of Special Agent F. M. HICKEY of this office that some of the Technical Experts in the Bureau's Laboratory are desirous of becoming experts in the use of the Morse Code System.

Recently CAPTAIN [redacted] Signal Corps, U. S. Army, while in conversation with Agent HICKEY, inquired as to whether the Bureau had any Agents or employees who were proficient in sending and receiving the Morse Code and stated that should the Bureau desire to have any of its employees become proficient along this line, he would gladly assign some men from his office as instructors and would be very glad to assist in any way possible.

b6 per Army

CAPTAIN [redacted] has likewise extended an invitation to any of the Bureau's employees to visit the Message Center of the Signal Corps in the Munitions Building for the purpose of becoming familiar with the various equipment used in the sending and receiving of code messages.

b6 per Army

Very truly yours,

*Guy Hottel*  
GUY HOTTEL  
Special Agent in Charge

FMH:JGM

7-1-1-24

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
FEB 27 1939  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TOI SON  
LABOR  
INTEG

*7/1/39  
8/2/39*

EPC:ON

October 4, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD <sup>OK</sup>

Re: ~~Army~~ contacts -  
~~Communications Center;~~  
~~Cryptographic Division;~~ Army  
Signal Corps.

b6 per Army

I took Captain [ ] to lunch yesterday. He was formerly in charge of the Army Communications Center. He has been a good contact. He advised me that he had been relieved of his post as Chief of the Communications Center and is presently assigned to studies at the Army War College but he expects this study course to be terminated shortly due to the present war situation and expects he will probably be assigned at Washington to the War Planning Division.

After lunch Captain [ ] introduced me to Major [ ] [ ] who is the new Chief of the Army Communications Center. I invited Major Trench to visit the Bureau. Major [ ] appears to be friendly and I will further develop the contact.

b6 per Army

Subsequently Captain [ ] and I called on Lieutenant [ ] in charge of the Army Signal Corps, under which comes the Military Cryptographic Section. I talked at some length with Colonel [ ] and also Mr. [ ] civilian head of their Cryptographic Section. [ ] mentioned that the Signal Corps is considering hiring as a civilian employee Mr. [ ] who is presently a CAF 5 fingerprint employee in the Bureau. [ ] has made cryptography an avocation for many years. I inquired as to what position would be offered Napier and was informed that the best they could do at the present was a P-1 position, starting salary \$2000.

b6 per Army

Colonel [ ] offered to make available to any of the Bureau laboratory examiners at any time the cryptographic and code libraries of the Army Signal Corps. These would be very helpful indeed, particularly in the search for little used commercial codes in connection with any decoding work being done in the Bureau's laboratory.

b6 per Army

I also sounded out Colonel [ ] concerning their receptiveness to giving about 100 hours training to another representative of the FBI in cryptographic work. He was very receptive to this ~~method of covering~~ <sup>31X</sup>

b6 per Army

Memo for Mr. Ladd

-3-

10-4-39

the same in a separate memorandum.

Mr. [ ] inquired about the cipher which was used in b6 per Army the Rummich Spy Case. I told [ ] and Colonel [ ] that if they visited the Bureau arrangements would be made to show them the cipher in the Rummich Case which is on display in the Bureau's laboratory exhibit. [ ] inquired whether they could have a photograph of this cipher which actually is a very simple system. I told him I would advise the Director of his request in this regard. Mr. [ ] within the last few days had a representative of the AP Photo Syndicate prepare such a picture. In view of the excellent cooperation existing with the Army Signal Corps I recommend that a similar photograph be made by the Bureau's Photographic Section for them and I am attaching hereto a letter for the Director's signature addressed to Colonel [ ] transmitting such a photograph.

Respectfully,

H. P. Coffey

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER  
DIRECTOR

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

EPC:ON

Washington, D. C.

October 3, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Re: War Department Correspondence  
Course in Cryptography.

The attached memorandum prepared by Mr. [redacted] b6 per Army under date of September 20, 1939 refers to the correspondence courses offered by the War Department on cryptography. There are two such courses, the elementary and the advanced course. The Bureau's laboratory has had these courses for several years and they have been included in the regular conferences on cryptography.

Respectfully,

*E.P.C.*  
E. P. Coffey.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
OCT 10 1939
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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EPC:AF

February 7, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LADD

Re: GBO Cipher  
Army Signal Corps

I had a very satisfactory conference this morning with Colonel [redacted] head of the Army Signal Corps, Captain [redacted] of G-2, and several of their assistants, concerning the GBO cipher. The Army is most cooperative and willing to help. They said they have their best cipher specialist working constantly on this and they would like to put more personnel on it but it is absolutely impossible at present to do so due to other pressing business. They stated they have concluded it is a double transposition cipher which is the most difficult of all ciphers to solve. Colonel [redacted] suggested that we send two of our cipher experts over there Monday morning at 9 o'clock and they would spend the day in conference with Captain [redacted] and Dr. [redacted] and others of their cipher staff, during which time our men would be coached in every modern and confidential method of attack which the Army has on the double transposition cipher.

b6 per Army

Colonel [redacted] further suggested that they could furnish one of our cipher experts with a mathematical formula wherein one of the GBO cipher messages which contains the letters C and H would be reduced to numbers. This numerical formula then could be given to twenty selected clerks with a brief instruction and proceeding on an elimination basis Colonel [redacted] stated these twenty clerks should be able to solve that particular cipher message. He stated that the clerks need not know what they are working on, that they would have nothing to deal with but numbers and that the answer would be reached when the numbers were re-arranged into a certain position. He stated this is the only suggestion he could make whereby mass production would be of any help in reaching the solution. I think both suggestions are excellent.

b6 per Army

RECORDED & INDEXED

76-612-48

Unless otherwise advised, Blackburn and Napier of the Laboratory will be sent over there Monday morning for the special

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Foxworth \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nathan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

Memo Mr. Ladd  
Page 2

conference on this type of cipher. I further recommend that, on the return of these men and after it is possible to estimate the maximum length of time which would be required for elimination purposes, using the numerical formula suggested by Colonel [ ] a special staff of twenty persons be assigned to this work. I think we can take ten from the Laboratory off other work, and suggest that effort be made to obtain ten more from other sections of the Bureau.

b6 per Army

I consider the solution of this cipher one of the essential problems before the Bureau at the moment.

Colonel [ ] also asked for more information on the cipher which he stated would be of great assistance to them in attempting to break it over there. Specifically he asked for the date and time of each of the transmissions or intercepts, any direction bearings on the locations of the stations involved, the frequencies used for the transmission, any headings, procedure signals, call letters, signatures, or acknowledgments which may have been part of the transmissions and any return traffic which may have followed the sending of each message, and any other messages in this particular form of cipher which the FBI may have. All of these items might be of help in solving the cipher and I recommend that where available these data be confidentially furnished Colonel [ ]. In this connection, I also point out that these data were "on the air" when the messages were sent and that they were all intercepted by the FCC and therefore might well be made available to Colonel [ ]. If approved, I will prepare these data for him.

b6 per Army

Respectfully,

E. P. Coffey.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Foxworth \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nathan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

JBD:BCB

April 17, 1941

Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington, D. C.

Attention of Technical Laboratory

RE: HAGELIN CRYPTOGRAPHER

Dear Sir:

In accordance with your teletype of April 15, 1941, MR. STUART HEDDEN was contacted at the office of FULLER, RODNEY & CO., 44 Wall Street, New York, N. Y. by Special Agent J. B. Drury.

HEDDEN advised that the Hagelin Cryptographer is manufactured in Stockholm, Sweden, which factory is the sole source of available supply. He stated that the United States War Department had recently purchased two large models and fifty small models, which machines were transported to this country through the assistance of the United States Department of State. S

RECORDED & INDEXED 80-612-54  
According to HEDDEN, it is expected that a large order may soon be placed by the War Department, which order would be sufficient to justify the erection of a factory in this country. However, delivery could not be made from the product of such a plant until about one year after the award of the contract. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION APR 18 1941 LAB. OFFICE

A factory for the manufacture of the cryptographer is located in France and the last information coming to HEDDEN's attention indicated that the French Army had about 2,000 cryptographers in its possession. In addition to France, according to HEDDEN, a number of other European and South American Governments use the Hagelin Cryptographer.

The small portable set sells for about \$325., delivered in Stockholm, and the large keyboard cryptographer sells for approximately \$1,750., delivered in Stockholm. Fifty of the large sets are presently under construction for the Swedish Government.

ENCLOSURE  
B.F.W.  
M.H.  
1/10

Letter-Director  
Attn: Tech. Lab.

April 17, 1941

To the best of HEDDEN'S information, the only Hagelin Cryptographers in the United States are owned by the United States Army and by certain Embassies in Washington, D. C.

HEDDEN furnished the enclosed pamphlet entitled "The Hagelin Cryptographers", together with the eight photographs also enclosed. He advised that he would be pleased to arrange for a demonstration of the cryptographer either in Washington, D. C. or in New York.

Very truly yours,



B. E. SACKETT,  
Special Agent in Charge.

Encls. (9)

SPECIAL DELIVERY

Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice

Post Office Box #2344  
Boston, Massachusetts

April 21, 1941.

Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation,  
Washington, D. C.


Re:



b6 per Army

Dear Sir:

Mr.



who is a captain in the Signal Reserve,  
United States Army, called on me April 17, 1941 at which  
time he brought with him a device he has arranged for  
ciphering and deciphering coded messages.


The device is said to be based on multiple substi-  
tution. He claims it would be impossible for anyone to  
decipher messages written by use of this particular device.  
Captain Bacon also has an electrical device which operates  
on the same principle.

The hand device, however, consists of tape which  
is turned by a knob on the outside of the small encasement  
which contains the tape. The tape is about three and one  
half feet long and at each turn of the tape there is a new  
combination of letters consisting of the entire alphabet,  
and on the device itself is a code containing a fixed  
alphabet.

It is impossible to explain the device in a com-  
munication of this kind as it is very complicated. However,  
it appears to me that possibly the device may have some  
merit although it would require an expert in that field  
to determine whether it does possess the merit which Captain  
Bacon claims for it.

b6 per Army

Captain [redacted] has been attempting to interest the  
Army and Navy in connection with this device and states all  
he asks is a fair trial which he has not as yet received  
from the Army or Navy. He states there is a large amount of  
jealousy among graphologists and he feels that



Spec Lab  
FBI  
APR 24 1941

Captain Bacon

7

Director,  
Federal Bureau of Investigation. -2-

April 21, 1941.

to this professional jealousy his device was cast aside without having had a fair trial. He showed me a letter he received from the War Department in which they advised they did not believe the device had the security which he alleged. Captain [redacted] states this letter indicates that with reference to certain tests he forwarded to them they had not attempted to decode the messages he submitted. He also showed me a letter he received from the Navy Department in which, indirectly, it was admitted they could not break down his code, but the letter indicated he had not complied with the tests in that he had used different codes for different messages. He stated this was absolutely untrue and this in itself is proof his device has the security which he alleges.

b6 per Army

Of course I know nothing concerning this individual but he did not impress me as being a "crackpot" and he repeatedly stated his sole interest is to see that his device does have a fair trial and then in the event it does not possess the merit he claims it could be discarded.

As the Bureau knows, Mr. [redacted] called on me at the Bureau's request.

b6 per Army

If the Bureau should be interested in this matter, it is possible Captain [redacted] could make arrangements to visit the Bureau's Laboratory at some time in the future although he did not definitely promise he would do so and I did not encourage same inasmuch as I did not know the Bureau's desires in this matter.

b6 per Army

Very truly yours,

*V. W. Peterson*  
V. W. PETERSON,  
Special Agent in Charge.

VWP:MP

- Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Coffey \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Kramer \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. McGuire \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Beahm \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
United States Department of Justice  
Washington, D. C.

EPC:AF

December 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TRACY

Re: ~~HAGELIN~~ CRYPTOGRAPHER  
(Cipher Machine)

The Laboratory has recently acquired a pair of the new model American-made Hagelin Cryptographers. These are small portable cipher machines. In connection with our study of these machines we are very anxious to borrow for comparison purposes one of the older models as originally made in Sweden (model #C-28).

We have definite information that the Cryptographic Section of the Army Signal Corps has a number of these older models.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Bureau's liaison officer discuss with General Strong the possibilities of arranging for the temporary loan, for comparison purposes, of one of the Army's model C-28 Hagelin Cryptographers.

Respectfully,

*[Handwritten signature]*  
E. P. Coffey.

*7/1/43  
Telephone call to Mr. Coffey advised  
check amount for records  
available to us  
[Signature]*



59 MAR 12 1943

RECORDED  
INDEXED

80-612 94		
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6	FEB 25 1943	
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