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June 16, 2017

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.

[Redacted]

FOIPA Request No.: 1357639-000
Subject: Intelligence Assessment: Decade in Review:
Self-Selecting US Persons Drive Post-2006 Increase
in Anti-US Plotting

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted in the file to indicate where pages were withheld entirely. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions:

- | Section 552 | | Section 552a |
|--|---|---------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A) | <input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B) | <input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1) |
| _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2) |
| _____ | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(3) |
| _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(4) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(8) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5) | <input type="checkbox"/> (b)(9) | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6) |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6) | | <input type="checkbox"/> (k)(7) |

15 pages were reviewed and 15 pages are being released.

- Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency (ies) [OGA].
 - This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
 - We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.
- In accordance with standard FBI practice and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a (b)(7)(E)/(j)(2)], this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject's name on any watch lists.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us."
The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. Your patience is appreciated.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@ic.fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing, and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

In response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, enclosed is a processed copy of the responsive FBI document.

The enclosed document represents the final release of information responsive to your FOIA request.

This material is being provided to you at no charge.


EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



Federal Bureau of Investigation
Intelligence
ASSESSMENT

Intelligence Assessment

~~(U//FOUO)~~ Decade in Review: Self-Selecting US Persons Drive Post-2006 Increase in Anti-US Plotting

7 March 2011

Prepared by

FBI

Los Angeles/JRIC

(U) Executive Summary

(U//~~FOUO~~) Analysis of all plots^a against the United States and US interests between 2001 and 2010 by action-oriented indicted Islamic extremists^b indicated there was an 11 percent increase in the number of incidents after 2006 as compared to the earlier half of the decade. The FBI and the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) assess [redacted] based on available and reliable open source reporting, that US person activity drove the post-2006 rise, as the group was five times more active than foreign nationals in the same timeframe.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and the JRIC assess [redacted] based on available and reliable open source reporting, that [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] In addition to [redacted] information from the dataset appeared to indicate [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Analysis of the dataset showed that as activity by US persons rose, activity by foreign nationals dropped. [redacted]

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[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and the JRIC assess [redacted] based on available and reliable open source reporting, that the upward trend in participation by the US persons named in the dataset was due to [redacted]

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[redacted] The FBI and the JRIC [redacted] however, based on the current dataset, [redacted]

[redacted]

^a (U) See Appendix A for a list of the 57 plots included in this assessment.

^b (U) For the purpose of this assessment, the definition of an “action-oriented” indicted Islamic extremist is a person with expressed interest in performing, or significantly supporting, a violent act against the United States or US interest abroad.

[redacted]

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(U) Scope Note

(U//~~FOUO~~) This assessment responds to a request from law enforcement executives within the JRIC area of responsibility.^d It will attempt to provide a better understanding of [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] This assessment addresses the intelligence question [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) The dataset assembled consisted of action-oriented extremists indicted between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2010, which yielded 57 entities (see Appendix A). The size of the dataset [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) A key assumption is despite the limited size of the dataset, examination will yield sound conclusions and repeatable results. The FBI and the JRIC acknowledge [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted] As appropriate, the language used in the course of the narrative addresses [redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) The 57 examined plots^e included those carried out in the United States or against US interests overseas by homegrown or international extremists arrested or indicted within or by the United States, including some persons indicted on terrorism charges, but not tried yet in US courts. Analysts counted multiple arrests or indictments stemming from a single plot or attack, and the inclusion of multiple persons in the same indictment, as a single "incident." Throughout the assessment, analysts used the terms "arrest," "indictment," and "incident" interchangeably.

(U//~~FOUO~~) To reduce subjectivity and to create consistency, analysts counted incidents in the year the subject or subjects were arrested, or, if they were still at large, indicted; in the event of multiple arrests or indictments resulting from the same incident, analysts added the episode to the year in which the first arrest or indictment occurred. [redacted]

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[redacted] One limitation of this standard is the information is not available in every case. Another is [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Based on the parameters of the dataset, incidents in which federal prosecutors did not file terrorism charges against the subjects, or did not file charges as of the date of this

^d (U) The JRIC area of responsibility mirrors that of the FBI Los Angeles Field Office, comprising Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Ventura, Santa Barbara, and San Luis Obispo counties.

^e (U) For the purpose of this assessment "plot" or "plotting" refers to plans or planning, as well as successful or unsuccessful attacks.

assessment, such as the 2009 shootings at Fort Hood and an Arkansas military recruitment center, are not included.

(U//~~FOUO~~) In most cases, [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) A number of assessments have addressed the rise in terrorist actions against the United States or US interests. This is the first product to analyze [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

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(U) Source Summary Statement

(U) The data for this study came primarily from court records, sometimes augmented by media coverage that provided details of the subjects' backgrounds that went beyond the scope of prosecutorial needs. In these cases, multiple sources were used to corroborate facts. The FBI and JRIC believe these sources provide an accurate assessment of the reasons for the rise in anti-US plotting.

(U) Introduction

(U//~~FOUO~~) Analysis of 57 terrorist plots against the United States and US interests that occurred between 2001 and 2010 indicated an 11 percent increase in activity from 2006 onward as compared to the first five years under examination. [Redacted]


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(U//~~FOUO~~) US Persons Drove Post-2006 Rise in Anti-US Activity

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and the JRIC assess [Redacted] based on available and reliable open source reporting, that US persons were responsible for the rise in anti-US activity that characterized the post-2006 years. As seen in Graphs 1 and 2, foreign nationals led anti-US targeting prior to 2006, 52 percent to 44 percent^h among foreign nationals and US persons, respectively. However, at 70 percent, activity by US persons and groups dominated post-2006 numbers.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Between the first and second halves of the decade, incidents involving US person action-oriented extremists rose 75 percent (Graph 1, left); during the same period, incidents involving foreign nationals fell 71 percent (Graph 2, right). [Source: original work by author]

^f (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

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^g (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

^h (U//~~FOUO~~) Percentages are based on 57 total incidents; 27 prior to 2006; 30 after 2006. A graph of activity by [Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) US Persons: [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and the JRIC assess [redacted] based on available and reliable open source reporting, the post-2006 rise resulted from [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] A further breakdown among the US person group into sub-categories, including [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Beyond this tendency, analysis found [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) US Person [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Examination of [redacted] among the 57-unit dataset found [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Based on their own statements, [redacted]

[redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

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ⁱ (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

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^j (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

[redacted]

^k (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

[redacted] During the same period [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Unquantifiable. [Redacted]
[Redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted] especially during
the second half of the decade. [Redacted]

[Redacted] of the

persons included in this assessment, specifically as these [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Generally, court documents and open source reporting did not indicate

[Redacted]

[Redacted] are often cited as a source of radicalization,

factors outside the scope of this assessment— [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) Although there is no mechanism to measure the effect of [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

(U//~~FOUO~~) During the same period that arrests and indictments of US persons rose, those of
foreign nationals fell. Activity by foreign nationals dropped 71 percent after 2006. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

¹ (U//~~FOUO~~) [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

^m (U//~~FOUO~~) Problems identified by the FBI with [Redacted] precluded the Bureau from
tracking statistics from these years.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Self-Selection: Within the Dataset, US Persons [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) While some US persons, notably Bryant Neal Vinas (US Person), David Coleman Headley (US Person), and Najibullah Zazi (US Person) [redacted]

[redacted]

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however, the current dataset does not support this proposition.

(U//~~FOUO~~) The dataset also [redacted]

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[redacted] In 2003, Tarek Mehanna (US Person) and Ahmad Abousamra (US Person) traveled across Yemen trying to enlist in terrorist training without success.¹⁴ Abousamra additionally traveled to Pakistan and Iraq in an effort to join the *mujahideen*, but foreign operatives told Abousamra he was either “not needed” or would not be allowed to participate because he was an American.¹⁵ Although Abousamra and Mehanna hoped to attend camps operated by Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or the Taliban, they were willing to fight anywhere groups engaging in *jihad* would accept them.¹⁶

(U//~~FOUO~~) Extrapolating from anecdotal evidence within the dataset that [redacted]

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[redacted] the FBI and the JRIC assess the post-2006 rise in plotting was [redacted]

[redacted] Higher numbers in 2010 did not

appear to be a result of these efforts.

(U) Alternative Analysis

(U//~~FOUO~~) The preceding analysis showed targeting by US persons was on the increase. As seen in Graph 3 (page 9, left), an alternative methodology, a three-period moving average, confirmed the upward trend in targeting by US persons. The trend began in 2004 and continued until 2010, which was the end of the period studied.

(U//~~FOUO~~) However, as seen in Graph 4 (page 9, right), activity by foreign nationals, which demonstrated a 71 percent decline based on the previous analysis, exhibited some volatility toward the end of the decade. Foreign nationals were involved in three^p incidents between 2009 and 2010 [redacted]

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ⁿ (U//~~FOUO~~) For the purpose of this assessment, [redacted]



[redacted]

^p (U) The three were Hosam Smadi, a Jordanian national who unknowingly collaborated with federal agents to attack a skyscraper in downtown Dallas, Texas; Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian national who allegedly collaborated with AQAP to bomb a Northwest Airlines flight into Detroit, Michigan; and Sami Samir Hassoun, a Lebanese citizen who allegedly planned to bomb targets in Chicago, Illinois.

relatively high activity by US persons during the same period, [redacted]

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Graphs 3 (left) and 4 (right) illustrate the value of the moving average method. Moving averages smooth fluctuations in data that vary widely, which can lead to a clearer trend line.⁹ [Source: Original work by author]

(U) Intelligence Gaps

- (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted]

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(U) [redacted]

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(U) This assessment was prepared by the Joint Regional Intelligence Center/Los Angeles Division of the FBI. Comments and queries may be addressed to the Joint Regional Intelligence Center at [redacted]

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⁹ (U//~~FOUO~~) These charts do not include [redacted]

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(U) Appendix A**(U) Dataset of 57 action-oriented indicted Islamic extremists****UNCLASSIFIED**

Year ^r	NAME
2001	US v. John Phillip Walker Lindh AKA Suleyman al-Faris, Abdul Hamid
2001	US v. Zacarias Moussaoui AKA Shaqil, Abu Khalid al Sahrawi
2001	US v Richard Colvin Reid AKA Abdul-Raheem, Abdul Raheem, Abu Ibrahim
2002	US v. Omar Ahmed Khadr AKA Akhbar Farhad, Ahmed Muhammed Khali
2002	US v. Jeffrey Leon Battle AKA Ahmad Ali, Abu Isa; Patrice Lumumba Ford AKA Lumumba; Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal; Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal; Habis Abdulla al-Saoub AKA Abu Tarek; October Martinique Lewis AKA Khadijah
2002	US v. Karim Koubriti; Ahmed Hannan; Youssef Hmimssa AKA Patrick J. Vuillaume, Michael Saisa, Jalali; Abdel-Ilah Elmardoudi AKA Abdella LNU, Jean Pierre Tardelli, George Labibe, Hussein Mohsen Safiddine, Nabil Hayamm; Farouk Ali-Haimoud AKA Khalid
2002	US v. Mohammed Mansour Jabarah AKA Abu Hafs al Kuwaiti, Sammy
2002	US v. Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani AKA Khaddafy Abubakar Janjalani, Abu Muktar; Isnilon Totoni Hapilon AKA Abu Musab, the Deputy; Aldam Tilao AKA Abu Sabaya, Abu Catada, Abu Ahmad Salayuddin; Jainal Antel Sali, Jr. AKA Abu Solaiman, the Engineer; Hamsiraji Marusi Sali AKA Jose Ramirez, Tiberkis
2002	US v. Imran Mandhai; Shueyb Mossa Jokhan
2003	US v. Randall Todd Royer; Ibrahim Ahmed al-Hamdi; Masoud Ahmad Khan; Yong Ki Kwon; Mohammed Aatique; Seifullah Chapman; Hammad Abdur-Raheem; Donald Thomas Surratt; Caliph Basha ibn Abdur-Raheem; Khwaja Mahmood Hasan; Sabri Benkhala
2003	US v. Iyman Faris AKA Mohammad Rauf
2003	US v. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali
2003	US v. Nuradin Abdi
2003	US v. Adnan Gulshair el-Shukrijumah
2003	US v. Majid Khan
2004	US v. Abdullah Ahmed Khadr AKA Abu Bakr
2004	Ahmed Hassan al-Uqaily
2004	US v. Ryan Anderson
2004	Shahawar Matin Siraj
2004	US v. Dhiren Barot AKA esa al-Britani, Abu Esa al-Britani, Esa al-Hindi, Issa al-Hindi; Nadeem Tarmohamed; Qaisar Shaffi
2005	US v. Wesam al-Delaema AKA Wesam Khalaf Chayed Delaeme
2005	US v. Kevin James; Levar Washington; Gregory Patterson; Hammad Riaz Samana
2005	US v. Michael Curtis Reynolds

^r (U) The information is arranged in chronological order by year arrested or indicted.

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Year	NAME
2005	US v. [REDACTED]
2005	US v. Hamid Hayat; Umer Hayat
2005	US v. Ronald Allen Grecula
2005	US v. Tarik Ibn Osman Shah AKA Tarik Shah, Tarik Jenking, Abu Musab; Rafiq Sabir AKA the Doctor; Mahmud Faruq Brent AKA Mahmud al-Mutazzim
2006	US v. Syed Hashmi AKA Fahad
2006	US v. [REDACTED]
2006	US v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi; Marwan Othman el-Hindi; Wassim I. Mazloun; Zubair A. Ahmed; Khaleel Ahmed
2006	US v. Syed Haris Ahmed; Ehsanul Islam Sadequee
2006	US v. Derrick Shareef
2006	US v. Narseal Batiste AKA Brother Naz, Prince Manna; Patrick Abraham AKA Brother Pat; Stanley Grant Phanor AKA Brother Sunni; Naudimar Herrera AKA Brother Naudy; Burson Augustin AKA Brother B; Lyglenson Lemorin AKA Brother Levi, Brother Levi-El and Rotschild Augustine AKA Brother Rot
2007	US v. Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed and Youssef Samir Megahed
2007	US v. Mohamed Ibrahim Shnewer; Dritan Duka AKA Distan Duka, Anthony Duka, Tony Duka; Eljvir Duka AKA Elvis Duka, Sulayman; Shain Duka; Serdar Tatar; Agron Abdullahu
2007	US v. Russell Defreitas AKA Mohammed; Kareem Ibrahim AKA Amir Kareem; Abdul Kadir; Abdel Nur
2007	US v. Christopher Paul AKA Abdul, Abdul Malek, Abdul Malik, Abdul Melik, Abdulmaled, Abdel Malek, Abdul Malek Kenyatta, Paul Kenyatta Laws, Paul Laws
2008	US v. Bryant Neal Vinas AKA Ibrahim, Bashir al-Ameriki, Ben Yameen al-Kanadee
2009	US v. Najibullah Zazi (Adis Nedunjanin; Zarein Ahnedzay)
2009	US v. Betim Kaziu
2009	US v. Michael Finton AKA Talib Islam
2009	US v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Abousamra
2009	US v. Daniel Patrick Boyd; Hysen Sherifi; Anes Subasic; Zakariya Boyd; Dylan Boyd; Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan; Ziyad Yaghi
2009	US v. James Cromitie AKA Abdul Rahman, Abdul Rehman; David Williams AKA Daoud, DL; Onta Williams AKA Hamza; Laguerre Payen AKA Amin, Almondol
2009	US v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi
2009	US v. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
2009	US v. Ilyas Kashmiri; Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed AKA Major Abdur Rehman, Pasha; David Coleman Headley AKA Daood Gilani; Tahawwur Hussain Rana
2009	US v. Colleen LaRose; Jamie Paulin Ramirez
2010	US v. Faisal Shahzad
2010	US v. Raja Lahrasib Khan

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Year	NAME
2010	US v. Barry Walter Bujol
2010	US v. Abdel Hameed Shehadeh
2010	US v. Paul Gene Rockwood
2010	US v. Sami Samir Hassoun
2010	US v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud
2010	US v. Antonio Martinez AKA Muhammad Hussain
2010	US v. Farooque Ahmed

(U) Endnotes

- ¹ (U) Internet site; NEFA; FD-302 Interviews of Derrick Shareef"; 7 December 2006; http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Abujihad_FBIInvus.pdf; accessed on 27 October 2010; NEFA is a tax-exempt, charitable organization developed after the 9/11 attacks.
- ² (U) FBI; Press Release; "Two Chicago Men Charged in Connection with Alleged Roles in Foreign Terror Plot That Focused on Targets in Denmark"; 27 October 2009 <http://chicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/cg102709.htm>; accessed on 27 October 2010.
- ³ (U) Internet site; Brian Michael Jenkins; RAND Corporation; "Would-be Warriors"; 2010; http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf; accessed 27 October 2010; RAND Corporation is an established think tank and independent, nonprofit organization.
- ⁴ (U) Internet site; Anna C. Henning, Elizabeth B. Bazan, Charles Doyle, and Edward C. Liu; Congressional Research Service; "Government Collection of Private Information: Background and Issues Related to the USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization"; 23 December 2009; http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40980_20091223.pdf; accessed 27 October 2010.
- ⁵ (U) Internet site; Office of the Inspector General; "Statement of Glenn A. Fine before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties concerning the FBI's Use of National Security Letters and Section 215 Orders for Business Records"; 15 April 2008; <http://www.justice.gov/oig/testimony/t0804/final.pdf>; accessed on 27 October 2010.
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