

THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS AND RESEARCH OF:

THE BLACK VAULT

THE BLACK VAULT IS THE LARGEST ONLINE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT / GOVERNMENT RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING:

[HTTP://WWW.BLACKVAULT.COM](http://www.blackvault.com)

YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE .PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE!

-1-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 01/31/2004

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, aka "Chemical Ali" (Blacklist #5) date of birth July 1, 1941, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was [redacted] US Army Representative. [redacted] FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:

b6
b7C

MAJID is from the Abu Nasir tribe or clan located in and around Tikrit, Iraq. Fourteen different tribes/families lived in this area. MAJID's grandfather was the Governor of Tikrit. His father was a well-known, highly respected individual in Tikrit who had "no problems with anyone." There were no major problems between the families of the area. Issues were normally solved without approaching the government for a solution.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

Tribal thoughts and customs pervade the entire social structure in Iraq including Baghdad. As an example, MAJID described how the tribe deals with an incident such as a car accident involving a fatality. After the accident, an agreement between the families of the involved parties normally takes place regarding the punishment of the person deemed at fault. This agreement is then presented to a court and sentencing occurs based on the recommendation from the two families.

MAJID's tribe has two primary rules, one which prohibits "fighting" within the tribe and the other which prohibits a man from "flirting" with a single woman. For violation of either rule, an offender would be killed.

The oldest male member of the tribe is generally the "sheikh" or leader and tends to be the one who is most respected and fair. Sometimes, however, the oldest male may not be able to fulfill this function due to mental or physical difficulties. MAJID became "sheikh" of his tribe after the death of the third person in line. Saddam Hussein, MAJID's cousin and former

Investigation on 01/31/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-221 Date dictated 01/31/2004
George L. Pirob6
b7C

by [redacted]

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 2

President of Iraq, later declared that he was "sheikh" of MAJID's tribe.

Concerning the Iraqi Ba'ath Party (Ba'ath), MAJID advised that from its inception the Party embraced a "democratic and humanitarian vision." MAJID still believes in these principles. The party does not believe in war, killing, mass killings, one person taking charge, oppression, or "bad behaviors." MAJID added Islam does not believe in violence or oppression.

The acts of some members of the Ba'ath, including Hussein, "brought shame to the Party." This included "bad behaviors" that were individual acts of Ba'ath members. MAJID agreed that there was a contradiction between the original tenets of the Ba'ath and the way it was practiced under Hussein's regime. This change occurred from the beginning and continued throughout Hussein's Presidency.

MAJID described a meeting which took place in July, 1979 shortly after Hussein assumed leadership of Iraq. Hussein invited all Ba'ath members to a meeting in Baghdad. MAJID was the Director of a "branch" of the Ba'ath at the time. At the meeting, Hussein provided details of a coup attempt in the Party. Over sixty members were identified and taken by security forces from the meeting hall. The investigation into this matter was headed by Barzan Ibrahim Hasan Al-Tikriti, Hussein's brother. MAJID does not know the details of the investigation and did not look at the files. Until the moment the "plot" was announced, MAJID had heard no information regarding this matter. It appeared that many people had been "marked," meaning they had been previously identified, rightly or wrongly, as being involved in a plot against Hussein. If some were wrongly accused, it was by Barzan and not Hussein. MAJID thought this "plot" might have been a continuation of one uncovered in previous years involving Abdul Khaliq Al-Samarra'i and Nathim Ghezar. In 1979, MAJID said, "If Samarra'i lives, coups will continue." MAJID was in a "sad mood" at the time of this meeting. However, he felt all persons identified were guilty.

MAJID described his views regarding Hussein. During the period twenty years ago and more, MAJID considered Hussein to be the closest person to him. They grew apart from then until a period of time about ten years ago. At that time, MAJID came to a "crossroads" in life and was thinking about leaving the Ba'ath. Hussein convinced him to remain. Without Hussein's approval, MAJID's resignation would "shame" his tribe. Thus, MAJID continued

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 3

in government service during the past ten years, though not as a volunteer.

MAJID stated that during this time he was appointed to three different Ministerial posts without first being asked or notified. He learned of these appointments from radio and television announcements. Concerning his most recent appointment as Minister of Interior, MAJID heard that Hussein was reluctant to ask MAJID to serve in this capacity for fear that MAJID would refuse and thereby embarrass Hussein.

Before the 2001 Ba'ath Conference, MAJID asked Hussein whether he would continue as a Party member. MAJID simply wanted out of the Ba'ath. Hussein denied this request. In more recent times, Hussein told MAJID that he could terminate his membership in the Party at the 2004 Conference. MAJID described the day he heard this news as "the happiest day of my life."

During the last seven to eight years, Hussein refused to accept advice or criticism from his closest advisors even if he was wrong. After Hussein Khamil, Hussein's son-in-law, fled Iraq to Jordan in 1995, Hussein did not trust anyone and appeared to change for the worse. He seemed particularly wary of individuals who were respected in the Party.

MAJID described his feelings and those of others regarding issues leading the latest war with the United States. MAJID wanted the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors to visit Iraq in 2003, as did the majority of the Ba'ath leadership. They felt the boycott would not be ended without certification of the termination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. Hussein, however, did not agree that the inspectors should be allowed to enter Iraq. Thus, MAJID and the other leaders had to support Hussein. If not, they would have been viewed as traitors and on the side of the United States.

During this period, Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Taha Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, and MAJID held a discussion regarding WMD. The four men "pressed" Hussein to tell UNSCOM and the world that Iraq has no WMD. Hussein did not agree stating that Israel would strike Iraq if they felt Iraq had no WMD. At this meeting, MAJID asked Hussein, "Do we have WMD?" Hussein asked, "Don't you know?" MAJID stated "no" to which Hussein replied "no."

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 4

Prior to the 2003 war, MAJID attended a meeting of the Iraqi leadership, including Hussein, where MAJID stated that "Iraq will lose the war." However, Hussein was convinced that Iraq would win. MAJID considered this unbelievable as Iraq had undertaken no preparations or special precautions in anticipation of the war. Additionally, no plans were made for the post-war period, especially regarding the potential needs for adjustments or changes in the leadership of Iraq. As before, MAJID wanted to resign. He did not want to take responsibility for the actions of one individual, Hussein. MAJID added, "I'm fair. Saddam is not." Hussein was a "dictatorship of one man." Hussein is "cruel in dealing with everyone including relatives."

MAJID does not believe he has a chance to "clear his name" while imprisoned. He would like to see all the former Iraqi leaders, including those currently in jail, tell the truth and "criticize" Hussein. If MAJID were to do this by himself, he believes he would be viewed as a spy. MAJID stated it would be more appropriate for him to first solicit the opinions and support of other Iraqi leaders.

At this point, interviewers asked how one could get Hussein to take responsibility for his actions. MAJID replied that Hussein would take responsibility if "faced with the facts" such as the previously discussed issue regarding UNSCOM weapons inspectors. Interviewers later asked whether MAJID and other Iraqi leaders would be willing to compile a list of advice offered to Hussein on major issues which Hussein ignored or rejected. MAJID responded that he would first need to talk to these former Iraqi leaders. Later, however, MAJID stated that this could best be accomplished if he were released from custody and had the opportunity to form his own political party.

Interviewers asked whether MAJID considered Hussein "evil." MAJID replied "there are two faces of Saddam." One face revealed a man who freely shared his wealth with those in need. MAJID once saw Hussein crying while reading the Koran. The other face of Hussein was one of "evil." He was "so cruel you could not imagine."

Hussein had no friends, either inside or outside his family. Hussein did not even trust his own sons. His personality was not stable and he was "lonesome." When presented with a problem, Hussein often made quick decisions without all the facts. His worst decision was the most recent war with the United States,

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid Al-Tikriti, On 01/31/2004, Page 5

the world's greatest superpower, coming after a lengthy and unsuccessful war with Iraq and thirteen years of an economic boycott.

MAJID acknowledged the "shame" Hussein had brought upon his tribe and the Iraqi people. MAJID appeared to agree that he had a responsibility to reclaim honor for his tribe as a result of Hussein's actions while serving as leader of Iraq.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 02/04/2004

ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, aka "Chemical Ali" (Blacklist #5) date of birth July 1, 1941, place of birth Tikrit, Iraq was interviewed at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Also present at the interview was [redacted] US Army Representative. [redacted] FBI Language Analyst, provided Arabic/English translation. After being advised that the interviewing Agents were members of the United States Government from Washington, DC, MAJID provided the following information:

b6
b7c

MAJID described his role in Kuwait from August, 1990-January, 1991.

MAJID first provided background information leading to his appointment to duties in Kuwait. MAJID was summoned to an Iraqi leadership meeting on August 7, 1990. In attendance were Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders. Hussein told MAJID that he (MAJID) needed to go to Kuwait. MAJID told Hussein "the leadership is here," and there should be someone among them who is qualified for the job. He reminded Hussein that he had previously sent the Intelligence Director on such a mission and "me going will do no good." Hussein replied, "OK. We'll see." Upon conclusion of the meeting, Hussein announced to everyone that MAJID would be going to Kuwait. At the time of this announcement, MAJID remembers Hussein was placing his handgun on his person. MAJID responded, "By your order, I go." At the time, Sabawi Hasan Ibrahim, Hussein's brother, was already in Kuwait.

Hussein's declaration to the Iraqi leadership authorized MAJID and Sabawi the responsibility of "managing" Kuwait. Aziz Saleh Al-Noman was appointed Governor of Kuwait and "included" in the security plans.

The work in Kuwait was divided into two parts, with Sabawi serving as Director of Intelligence in charge of security of Kuwait and MAJID charged with the responsibility of maintaining "organization" among the various Ministries. Sabawi was in charge of the Security Committee of Kuwait with members from various government components including intelligence, special security, the

Investigation on 02/04/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HQ-1448534-20
George L. Piro

Date dictated 02/04/2004

by [redacted]

b6
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, On 02/04/2004, Page 2

police, the military, and the militia. MAJID stated both he and Sabawi had equal overall responsibility with respect to Kuwait.

In Kuwait, MAJID interacted with various ministers including the Minister of High Education, the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Transportation, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Industry, and the Minister of Local Government.

Part of MAJID's duties and one which he was "happiest" to perform was the protection of the "belongings and finances" of the people of Kuwait. MAJID stated, "I was severe in performing my job" and "committed crimes." These "crimes" were actions directed at Iraqi military personnel who broke the law. MAJID described the details of three events or "crimes."

In one instance, a captain in the Iraqi forces told soldiers under his command to burglarize an electronics store in Kuwait. The soldiers complied, broke into the store, and took various electronic devices including televisions. When MAJID heard of this incident, he ordered the arrest of the captain. The matter was then referred to a committee for investigation. Upon conclusion, the captain was sentenced to death. Normally, the arrest of a military officer requires approval by Hussein or the Minister of Defense. In this instance, MAJID called one of Hussein's bodyguards for "approval" to carry out the sentence after the conclusion of the investigation and trial. Thereafter, Presidential Secretary Hamid Hamadi informed MAJID of the approval. The execution was carried out in Kuwait in front of a government building in the county of Al-Kathima.

In another incident, a woman in Kuwait, possibly Lebanese, was sexually assaulted by an Iraqi soldier. MAJID contacted the head of the military unit of the accused soldier and a committee was formed to investigate the attack. The soldier was found guilty and sentenced to death. With the permission of the woman, the soldier was executed at the same location the assault occurred.

The third incident involved three Iraqi military personnel who raped a Kuwaiti woman and stole items from her house. Again, an investigation took place and the three men were sentenced to death. With the permission of the woman, the men were executed in front of her house.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, On 02/04/2004, Page 3

MAJID only attended executions of military personnel. He never attended executions of civilians.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any atrocities committed in Kuwait by Iraqi military members or Iraqi citizens prior to or during the reported occurrences during the occupation of Kuwait. MAJID is aware of media reports regarding these events which came after the occupation. MAJID is not aware of the results of an international (and not Kuwaiti) investigation detailing the crimes committed. He has no knowledge of the findings of the investigation which details the atrocities including torture sites located at police stations or sports facilities, punishment including amputations of limbs, ears, noses, tongues, genitalia, and eyes, and torture via use of electric shock. Furthermore, MAJID is not aware of 500 Iraqis identified as war criminals and 1082 Kuwaiti civilian deaths, including 57 mentally handicapped individuals, which occurred as a direct result of Iraqi misconduct. MAJID denied knowledge of punishment, including execution, of individuals who failed to display pictures of Hussein, displayed pictures of the Kuwaiti royal family, or wrote anti-Iraqi graffiti. MAJID stated "If I had heard of these atrocities you detailed, I would have asked to be released from duty." He does not doubt they occurred but reiterated that he never heard such information, did not witness such events, and had no knowledge of these events at that time. If committed, these atrocities would have been carried out by the Iraqi Intelligence Service under the direction of Sabawi who reported directly to Hussein.

MAJID is aware of the destruction/sabotage of the Burgan and Al-Rumaila oil fields by the Iraqi military. This "operation" was not the responsibility or under control of MAJID but fell under the direction of the Iraqi military.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Shia Muslims living in southern Iraq in 1991. He denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Shia villages during this or any other time.

MAJID denied personal knowledge of any persecution, including executions and imprisonment, of Kurdish individuals living in northern Iraq during the Anfal Campaign in the late 1980s. He denied personal knowledge of the destruction of Kurdish villages during this or any other time.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AL-TIKRITI, On 02/04/2004, Page 4

MAJID denied personal knowledge or responsibility regarding Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, against the Kurds, or at any other time. He stated, "I never used or saw anything about chemicals."

MAJID avoided interfering with "things that had nothing to do" with him. He felt as if Hussein was "watching" him. At one point, Hussein took some property from MAJID.

When asked whether he feared Hussein in the past, MAJID replied, "Yes. I was afraid that if I disobeyed him, he would tell our tribe that I was a coward." When asked whether he feared Hussein now, MAJID replied, "No. If given a month to talk to our tribe, I would be able to convince them and Saddam would lose to me."

MAJID wishes Hussein was dead. MAJID wishes Hussein had "martyred or killed" himself instead of being captured. Hussein's sons (Qusay and Uday) died "honorably," even though Uday was a bad person. In contrast, Hussein's ending (capture) was "lousy," displayed his cowardice, and brought shame to the tribe. Martyrdom of Hussein would have brought honor to the tribe. After Hussein's capture, MAJID offered to kill him for the US military. MAJID believes history will be the judge of Iraq and Hussein as its ruler for the past twenty-four years.

MAJID does not consider himself a failure, except that he "stayed with Hussein." MAJID feels he had no choice but to carry out Hussein's orders.

Though Hussein is no longer head of their tribe, MAJID stated that he could not testify against him because it would "shame the tribe." If given the opportunity to first talk to the tribe, MAJID feels he could explain the situation. Then, he might be able to provide information in public regarding Hussein.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/21/2004

On 03/21/2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Al-Majid was advised the interviewing agents were representatives of the United States Government. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

b6
b7C

During the years 1987 through 1989, Al-Majid served as Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party's Northern Bureau Command with responsibility over northern Iraq including Kurdish territory. Iraq was divided into the Northern, Central, Euphrates, and Southern Sectors. Al-Majid replaced Mohammad Hamza Zubaydi (Black List #9), former Secretary General. Saddam Hussein appointed Al-Majid to this position during a meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). At the meeting, Hussein informed Al-Majid of his new responsibilities while simultaneously appointing Zubaydi as Iraqi Minister of Transportation. Al-Majid's appointment was made personally by Hussein, as he was clearly in charge, and no vote was taken by the RCC. Prior to this appointment, Al-Majid was the Deputy Commander of the Ba'ath Party's Military Organization.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 160, dated March 29, 1987, signed by Saddam Hussein, which sets forth details regarding Al-Majid's appointment as the representative of the Ba'ath Party for the northern region of Iraq, including the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan. Al-Majid acknowledged that this decree was issued and that it spelled out his authority over all civilian, military and security agencies in the region. He stated a decree is issued at the conclusion of an RCC meeting which details issues addressed by the RCC. Al-Majid denied, however, having authority over the military forces or security services in the region, as the security services are never subordinate to anyone in the government except Hussein. The security services, Fedayeen Saddam, and Saddam's Cubs answered to Hussein only and took their instructions only from Hussein. Al-Majid received a copy of decree number 160 in writing at a later time. Immediately after issuance of the decree, he also

Investigation on 03/20/2004 at Baghdad, Iraq

File # 315E-HO-1448534-34 Date dictated 03/21/2004

b6
b7C

by George L. Pira [redacted]

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid ; On 03/20/2004 , Page 2

received additional instructions in writing from the Presidential Diwan which further defined his authority.

As specified to him in the additional instructions, Al-Majid only used the authorities in the decree for the "collectivization" of the villages in the northern region located within five kilometers (km) of provinces, and areas classified as cities, zones, or suburbs. This "collectivization" consisted of moving villagers from their homes to Iraqi government housing complexes. Per the additional instructions given to Al-Majid, areas outside of five km fell within the control of the military including cities near the border between Iraq and Iran. Al-Majid noted that the Anfal Campaign in Kurdish territory in 1988 was conducted by the military under the command of Sultan Hashim Ahmad Al-Tai (Black List #27). The instructions that followed decree number 160 set the aforementioned five km parameters and restricted Al-Majid's authority. Al-Majid acknowledged that he did delegate orders to the security services as it pertained to the areas under his span of control, but the services acted independently everywhere else to include their technical work.

Al-Majid claimed to have once excused himself from a meeting where a discussion was to take place regarding the collectivization of villages outside the five km boundary. In Al-Majid's opinion at that time, such actions would have required a large budget, engineers, planners and other professionals which he did not have at his disposal. Al-Majid concluded that such tasking should have been controlled by the Minister of Housing. The Ministry of Housing had the responsibility for the construction of housing complexes for the villagers affected by the collectivization. Al-Majid's role was to inform the governors of the various provinces of the completion of the complexes to initiate the transfer of the villagers.

Al-Majid claimed each province had a security committee composed of representatives from the various security services. These committees were not, however, under his control. If Al-Majid required assistance, he would seek it from the Army Chief of Staff. The military had two major bases, one in Suleimaniyeh and the other in Kirkuk, where the 1st Army Corps headquarters was located.

Al-Majid does not hate the Kurds as they are Iraqis and his people. Just as the Arabs, the Kurds have good and bad people. Al-Majid claimed to have personal relations with many Kurds. Al-Majid had a good relationship with Jalal Talabani and claimed

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/20/2004, Page 3

they had eaten at each other's homes. Al-Majid disliked Talabani but did not hate him. He affectionately referred to him as the "sheikh of the saboteurs." Al-Majid stated "saboteurs" was the term the Iraqis used in official documents to describe Kurds who resisted Iraqi government rule. Al-Majid had only heard that the "saboteurs" had relationships with other governments such as Iran and Turkey, and eventually with the United States and other western countries. Iran entered into a relationship with the Kurds, whereby Iran not only benefitted from the relationship but also destroyed the Kurds Iraqi reputation. In 1987, Iran declared that year would be the last one of the Iran-Iraq War and sent its agents into Kurdish territories inside Iraq. Iran attempted to establish its presence in certain areas such as Halabja and others. According to Al-Majid, these actions necessitated military action by Iraq. Al-Majid agreed that it was difficult for the Iraqi government to distinguish Kurds from Iranians or good individuals from bad ones.

Al-Majid's powers in the northern region lasted approximately two years until April, 1989, but he does not recall whether an RCC decree was issued repealing his powers. Hassan Ali Al-Amiri replaced Al-Majid as the Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. In June, 1989, Al-Majid was appointed Minister of Local Government.

Al-Majid denied having any knowledge of executions of Kurds in Northern Iraq. Al-Majid stated his duties included the collectivization of villages within the specified five km boundary into government housing complexes. Those villages outside of the five km boundary fell under the control of Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff. As part of the process, Al-Majid ordered Kurds within the Ba'ath Party to explain the need for collectivization to the effected Kurdish population. Additionally, Al-Majid declared that no one, not even one person, would be moved until the land was prepared and electricity was established. As part of their relocation, the affected Kurds were given 3,000 Iraqi Dinars (approximately \$10,000) to build new homes within the authorized zones. Alternatively, the Kurds were allowed to choose new living quarters within the government housing complexes. Al-Majid also coordinated the travel of those living in distant villages to their new homes by communicating with the governors of the provinces. These tasks required considerable effort from all the government services.

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid . On 03/20/2004 , Page 4

After the deportation or collectivization process began, Al-Majid believed that the Kurds and Iranians felt threatened. The Iranian insurgents previously would have had to walk only approximately five km in mountainous terrain to bordering villages where refuge or assistance was provided. However, because of the deportation process, this distance was increased and it became more difficult for insurgents to cross mountainous terrain without safe havens.

Al-Majid agreed that most Kurds did not want to move or leave their homes. Those that did were seeking improvements such as electricity, refrigerators, and school teachers. If Kurds refused to be relocated, they were forced into vehicles and taken with their belongings to government housing complexes. Once the villagers were deported, the villages were leveled so as not to become safe havens for saboteurs. Al-Majid stated these were not his personal orders but those of the Iraqi government as it cost millions of dinars and required the efforts of all of the government's ministries.

Interviewers played a portion of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. (This tape is described in a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes, as a recording of a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. According to HRW, the tape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.) In the tape, Al-Majid discusses the previous decision to collectivize and destroy villages. Al-Majid acknowledged that the tape contains his words and his voice. He acknowledged that he ordered the destruction of homes within the prohibited zones after the residents were removed. Al-Majid acknowledged that he held a separate meeting wherein he instructed those under his command that no house was to remain standing within the prohibited zones. Al-Majid also acknowledged that he informed his subordinates that he would tour the prohibited zones and if his orders were not carried out completely, he would hold the section commander responsible.

During a portion of the same tape, Al-Majid stated that he discussed with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, the failure of Tali' Al-Duri, 5th Army Corps Commander, to carry out his orders. Al-Majid claimed that this portion of the tape demonstrates that he did not have authority over the military, as Al-Majid could only complain about military officers that failed to carry out their orders. Al-Majid claimed that if he did have

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid , On 03/20/2004 , Page 5

authority over the military, he would have removed Al-Duri. However, Al-Duri was allowed to finish his assignment and continued to other posts.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a handwritten letter in Arabic, described as number 3324, dated May 14, 1987, from the Director of Security, Halabja Security Directorate to the Suleimaniyeh Security Directorate. The letter details an order by the Commander of the First Army Corps, as requested by Al-Majid, to execute wounded civilians, to use bulldozers to level neighborhoods, to impose a curfew, and to destroy with tanks and bulldozers any house which opens fire. Al-Majid denied knowledge of this order from the Iraqi military or any such request from him and suspects the document is a forgery. Al-Majid stated he would not have issued an order to a Corps Commander. In Al-Majid's opinion, the letter did not follow the normal chain of command. Al-Majid denied that civilians were executed after interrogations. He added that interrogations were the responsibility of the security services.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as number 28/3650, dated June 3, 1987, signed by Al-Majid, marked "Top Secret and Personal" directed to various military, political and security commands. It orders, in part, that the armed forces kill any human being or animal present within the prohibited areas. Al-Majid admitted to issuing such an order, and that it was sent to the referenced agencies including the military. Al-Majid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, signed by Al-Majid, addressed to various military commands. The subject of the directive is "Dealing With The Villages That Are Prohibited For Security Reasons." It lists certain actions to be effective as of June 22, 1987. Paragraph two states, "The presence of human beings and animals is completely prohibited in these areas, and these shall be regarded as operational zones in which the troops can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our headquarters." Paragraph four states, in part, "The Corps Commands shall carry out random special bombardments using artillery, helicopters and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited areas." Paragraph five states, in part, "All

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/20/2004, Page 6

persons captured in those villages shall be detained because of their presence there, and they shall be interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 are to be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them." Al-Majid admitted issuing the order in paragraph two. According to Al-Majid, everyone, whether civilian or military, knew that no one was allowed in those areas as it was a theater of operations. Anyone caught in those areas, including women and children, was to be killed. Al-Majid denied issuing the orders in paragraphs four and five. Al-Majid acknowledged the authenticity of the copy of this document and confirmed the authenticity of his signature on the last page.

Al-Majid was shown and read a copy of a document written in Arabic, dated November 22, 1988, from the Deputy Brigadier General of Security, Director of Security of Erbil Province to the Section Security Chiefs. This document reiterates paragraph five of Directive 4008, dated June 20, 1987, and states that this portion of the directive "is to be applied to anyone present in the prohibited areas." Al-Majid questioned the authenticity of this document stating that such an order (Directive 4008) was already in effect and did not need to be repeated.

Al-Majid stated that while he was authorized to issue orders to the military, he did not have the authority to take action against military members if they did not carry out his orders.

Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 03/27/2004

On 03/27/2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

b6
b7c

Al-Majid claimed he does not consider himself a leader. He stated he is a prisoner of the United States government and does not consider himself as being senior over any of the other prisoners. When the former Iraqi regime fell, Al-Majid believes he lost his position as a leader. Al-Majid again denied that the other prisoners within the military detention facility viewed him as a leader.

Al-Majid acknowledged that in a previous interview, on 01/31/2004, he stated that if he were released from custody he would like to form his own political party for the betterment of Iraq. The interviewer asked Al-Majid whether he told other prisoners about a deal he was developing with the United States government regarding his own political party. Al-Majid denied he told others about a deal, but acknowledged that he told some of his fellow prisoners that he had presented recommendations to the US government. Al-Majid stated he should not hold any Iraqi government position. Before the recent war, Saddam Hussein told Al-Majid that he would be allowed to leave the leadership in 2004.

Al-Majid acknowledged that in a previous interview he expressed his wish to talk to his tribe about Saddam Hussein. Al-Majid stated he still wished for the opportunity. When questioned whether he still had a desire to lead, Al-Majid stated he had deceived himself about his own aspirations while in custody. He added, "You (meaning the United States) are in charge of the country." Al-Majid stated all discussions should concern ways for Iraq to better co-exist with the United States.

Investigation on 03/27/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 ³⁷ _{THAN} Date dictated 03/27/2004by George L. Firo [redacted]b6
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/27/2004, Page 2

Al-Majid stated he intended to be completely cooperative with the interviewers as it is his belief that such cooperation is necessary to help bring an end to Iraqi bloodshed.

Al-Majid acknowledged that during a previous interview on 02/04/2004, he told interviewers that he had offered to kill Saddam Hussein after his capture. Al-Majid repeated this offer to the interviewers. He claimed that prior to the United States invasion and the fall of the Iraqi regime, there was little opportunity to kill Hussein. In addition, it would have been impossible to try to eliminate him from the tribe or even to speak about wanting to do so without first consulting other tribal leaders. This would have resulted in the tribe killing Al-Majid or his sons. Al-Majid denied that his negative statements regarding Hussein or his expressed desire to kill him were made to please the interviewers. He emphasized that his derogatory comments about Hussein represent his true feelings.

At a 2001 Ba'ath Party meeting, Al-Majid told Hussein he did not want a nomination to the Iraqi leadership. Minutes before the meeting, Hussein told Al-Majid that he would be nominated again. Al-Majid noted that it would have been disgraceful to object.

Al-Majid reiterated his wish to kill Hussein. He also reiterated his wish to have an opportunity to speak with his tribe.

Al-Majid stated that if given the opportunity to speak to Hussein, he would tell Hussein that he (Hussein) loved himself more than the people of Iraq.

Al-Majid blames Hussein for the war and the present condition of Iraq. He added that Hussein never listened. Al-Majid claimed he spoke out against the war and supported the return of United Nations inspectors. According to Al-Majid, Hussein forced Iraq into war because he did not believe the United States would be able to enter Baghdad. Al-Majid believes God blinded Hussein from realizing the force of the United States. He stated Hussein did not care about the nation of Iraq, the people of Iraq or his own family, including his sons.

Al-Majid acknowledged that he was a member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the Ba'ath Party National Command. He added that he was Hussein's closest relative holding a position within these institutions until Qusay Hussein was

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/27/2004, Page 3

appointed to the RCC. Al-Majid denied that he was one of the four individuals comprising the Council of Ministers, reportedly including Taha Yasin Ramadan, Tariq Aziz, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, and Al-Majid. However, Al-Majid stated that he was "one of the four important people."

When asked if there was anyone in history to whom Hussein could be compared, Al-Majid answered, "There is no equal." Al-Majid was surprised, if not disgusted, when he first heard about Hussein's actions when captured. He had always considered Hussein to be courageous. According to Al-Majid, his peaceful surrender shattered that image. Al-Majid believes it would have been more honorable if Hussein had died as a martyr. He now wishes Hussein would commit suicide. Although Al-Majid suspects that other prisoners in the camp share his negative views about Hussein, he claims not to have spoken to them about this matter.

According to Al-Majid, Hussein prepared and approved all decrees for the RCC. However, between 1991-2003, the RCC met on only two or three occasions and these were merely to nominate Hussein to be the President of Iraq. In retrospect, Al-Majid considers this to be a mistake of the Iraqi leadership. He further admitted that the Iraqi leadership bears the blame for granting Hussein authority to make immediate decisions without the RCC's approval. Al-Majid acknowledged that the Iraqi leadership has to answer for remaining silent about their true sentiments for Hussein and added that "we are now paying for it."

Al-Majid considers his current detention to be partial payment for his crimes. He believes that any future payment for his actions will be decided in a court of law. Al-Majid stated that if he is released, he would not enter an Iraqi city but instead isolate himself. Although he wants to see his family again, Al-Majid stated he does not consider himself fit to take care of them.

Al-Majid was asked to describe Hussein as a father. He responded by stating that Hussein was a failure as a father, a failure as a leader, a failure as a President and "a failure of everything." Al-Majid emphasized that these characterizations reflected his true feelings, and he denied making them to please or ingratiate himself with the interviewers.

Al-Majid claimed Hussein's only good quality was his charity to individuals. For example, when Hussein would see a poor

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/27/2004, Page 4

or needy individual, he would give the person assistance and sometimes cry for them. Al-Majid acknowledged, however, that this behavior contrasted sharply with Hussein's excesses such as his continued construction of opulent palaces while large segments of the Iraqi people suffered in poverty. Al-Majid stated that this paradox was due to Hussein's pride and personality.

Al-Majid stated he was afraid that Hussein would distort his (Al-Majid's) history. During the last three to four years, Al-Majid intentionally isolated himself from Hussein. He was fearful that his prominence in the military might cause Hussein to feel threatened, and he wanted to alleviate any mis-perception Hussein may have had about him wanting to become President. The interviewer reminded Al-Majid that during an interview 01/31/2004, Al-Majid expressed a desire to create his own party and lead the people of Iraq. Al-Majid acknowledged making this remark but explained that he made it during a period of mental fatigue and that he no longer had this ambition.

Al-Majid claimed that all of the instructions given to him by Hussein had to be implemented and he "had no choice" but to follow orders. Although he feared Hussein, Al-Majid claimed that this fear did not cause him to do things he would normally not have done and that all of his actions were his decisions. Al-Majid recalled an incident which occurred on August 7, 1990 in the course of a meeting of the leadership called by Hussein. During this meeting, Hussein turned to Al-Majid and stated that Kuwait was worrisome to him. He recommended that Al-Majid "go calm things down." Al-Majid suggested to Hussein that these duties could be accomplished by the Minister of Interior or others. However, as the meeting ended, Hussein ordered Al-Majid to "guard" Kuwait. Al-Majid stated he had no desire for this duty but had to follow orders.

Al-Majid acknowledged the differences between the treatment of prisoners in an Iraqi prison and in an American detention center. He ascribed this difference to the fact that the United States is an advanced country with human rights, while Iraq is a third world country. Al-Majid commented that the former regime must have done something good to have been able to be in the custody of the United States. If a coup had taken place in Iraq before the war, Al-Majid stated he would have been executed long ago. Now, he is alive and hopes to see his family.

315E-HQ-1448534-302

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 03/27/2004, Page 5

Al-Majid was confronted with the fact that his cooperation with the interviewers is less than desirable and that he seems only willing to discuss matters when all the facts are laid in front of him. Al-Majid denied doing this and reiterated he is cooperating. He added that he has not participated in the killing of any persons and that he has no information about weapons of mass destruction. Al-Majid stated that the United States does not need to place mental pressure on him in order to receive information.

Al-Majid advised that before he was captured by Coalition Forces, he had wanted to surrender. He claimed he did not do so, however, because he could not find anyone to whom to surrender. Al-Majid expressed the opinion that those who have not surrendered are "losers and have a bitter life." Al-Majid stated that he is grateful that while in U.S. custody, his human rights are guaranteed. He is awaiting God's decision as to whether he will go to court, be executed or released.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription . 04/05/2004

On April 4, 2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

b6
b7c

Al-Majid was questioned regarding a letter issued by the Iraqi Ba'ath Party Northern Bureau Command, dated April 6, 1987, signed by him. Al-Majid was not shown a copy of the document as none was possessed by the interviewer. (This document is described as letter S Sh/18/2396 in the Human Rights Watch Report (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993. It is referenced on page 13 and in footnote 41 of the Prelude to Anfal section of the report.) According to the HRW report and as read to Al-Majid by the interviewer, the letter states the following, "By the authority vested in us by the Revolutionary Command Council's decree number 160 of March 29, 1987, we have decided to authorize the chairmen of the security committees in the northern governates to confiscate the real and personal property of the saboteurs, provided that their properties are liquidated within one month of the date of the issuance of the confiscation decree."

Al-Majid acknowledged giving such authority to the security committees, but does not remember the details. The confiscation discussed applied to money as well as real property. However, Al-Majid stated the authority for this order was not based on Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree number 160. It was based on a separate RCC decree which authorized the confiscation of funds and property of individuals who worked against the Iraqi government as saboteurs. (Al-Majid stated in a previous interview that saboteurs was a term used by the Iraqi government to describe Kurdish rebels.) This decree also authorized the confiscation of the funds and property of individuals in the Da'wa Party. These two categories of individuals were considered to be hostile or anti-Iraqi government political forces. Al-Majid does not remember the number or date of the other RCC decree.

Investigation on 04/04/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-58 Date dictated 04/05/2004by [redacted] *RAM*b6
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 2

Al-Majid's directive regarding the confiscation and liquidation of property and money was issued to the chairmen of the security committees of each province in Northern Iraq. The liquidation of property was accomplished through auctions. Al-Majid emphasized that money and property were taken only from saboteurs who had been proven to have participated in sabotage activities against the Iraqi government. Al-Majid noted the confiscation was not limited solely to Kurds, but also applied to Yezidis and Arabs as well.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as letter number 1/2713 of the Northern Bureau Command, dated April 10, 1987, issued by Radhi Hassan Salman, Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. This letter was distributed to all the Directorates and the Security of Chamchamal via a cover letter signed by the Deputy Director of the Security Directorate of Suleimaniyeh Governate. The document states, in part, "His Excellency has ordered that [legal] cases of people from the villages prohibited for security reasons, or cases of the saboteurs, regardless of their nature, not be heard and to freeze the cases that have already been heard." (The copy of this document was obtained from the HRW report titled "Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words," dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 35-36 of the report.)

Al-Majid stated, "I do not remember this." He added that all Northern Bureau Command orders were issued by him and not by his deputy. Al-Majid acknowledged that Salman was the Deputy Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He asserted that he would not have tasked Salman with issuing such an order and that Salman did not issue it in Al-Majid's absence. He stated that all [legal] cases are matters for courts of law and are not matters for the security committees. Al-Majid acknowledged that he did issue similar instructions to the courts in approximately June, 1987. He directed the courts not to hear cases and/or to postpone cases regarding individuals from the prohibited zones. In these zones, villages were cleared of people, their residences were demolished, and the residents were relocated to government housing complexes. Al-Majid reiterated that such an order would have been issued only by him and would have been logically directed to the courts and not to the security committees. He added that the security services were not in charge of the courts. When questioned about the authenticity of the document and whether he thought it was a forgery, Al-Majid stated, "I do not know. Maybe."

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of

Ali Hasan Al-Majid. On 04/04/2004, Page 3

Al-Majid was questioned regarding an order issued by him to the Security Directorates of the Northern Bureau directing the execution of all "first-degree relatives of criminals." Al-Majid was not shown a copy of two documents referencing this order as neither was possessed by the interviewer. (The two documents are described as a handwritten note, dated November 20, 1989, from the Security Chief, Interrogating Officer, Amn Office in Suleimaniyeh to an Iraqi citizen and letter number 106309, dated May 1, 1987, from the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region. These documents are referenced in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 13-14.) According to the HRW report and as noted to Al-Majid by the interviewer, the handwritten note provides a response to an Iraqi citizen's request for information regarding his missing parents and brother. The note states that the brother was executed July 12, 1987 as "a member of the group of Iranian saboteurs." The note further explains that the parents were executed May 19, 1987 "in compliance with the order from the Struggling Comrade Ali Hasan Al-Majid, member of the Regional Command [of the Ba'ath Party], that was relayed to us by letter number 106309 of the Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region, dated May 1, 1987, regarding the liquidation of first-degree relatives of criminals."

Al-Majid stated that he did not issue an order to execute the first-degree relatives of saboteurs. In July/August, 1987, he did, however, order the "deportation" of the first-degree relatives of saboteurs to the prohibited areas. Al-Majid issued this order to ensure the security of the cities. He was responsible for the security of the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. First-degree relatives included only the fathers of the saboteurs. It did not include the female relatives such as an individual's mother, sister, or daughter.

As previously described, prohibited areas were those regions where the Iraqi government had already removed the citizens and relocated them to government housing complexes. The order regarding deportation of first-degree relatives was intended to force fathers to control the actions of their sons. After the "gathering of people" into Iraqi government housing complexes, Al-Majid stated any acts of sabotage against the government would result in implementation of this order. Al-Majid wanted the sons who were saboteurs, and the consequences of their actions, to be a "pressuring factor" on the fathers. Al-Majid ordered first-degree relatives only to be deported to prohibited areas so that the security committees did not expand the order to include other

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 4

relatives. He acknowledged that other relatives including mothers, sisters, and daughters could have elected to join their relatives who had been ordered "deported" to the prohibited areas.

Al-Majid further acknowledged that Directive 4008 issued by him effective June 22, 1987 was still in effect at the time of his issuance of the order regarding first-degree relatives. As previously stated by Al-Majid and reiterated in this interview, anyone caught in the prohibited areas after June 22, 1987, including women and children, was to be killed. He added that Directive 4008 was modified in September, 1987 to allow farming in certain areas. When questioned whether the deportation of first-degree relatives to prohibited areas was tantamount to sentencing them to death because of Directive 4008, Al-Majid stated, "Why would we deport them to a prohibited area [so that they would be killed] when we could kill them?" When the interviewer suggested that perhaps this procedure was meant to minimize the "blood on the hands" of Al-Majid and others, Al-Majid offered no reply.

Al-Majid noted that saboteurs and first-degree relatives were given one month to decide whether they wanted to stay or leave. If they decided to remain in government housing complexes, they were required to pledge not to commit acts of sabotage against the Iraqi government.

Al-Majid denied chairing a meeting on or around September 6, 1987 of senior Ba'ath Party officials to discuss the national census of October 17, 1987. (This meeting and the national census are referenced in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Prelude to Anfal section, pages 17-20.)

Al-Majid stated that he was not involved with the national census as this was a "scientific and technical matter" beyond the scope of his duties. He did, however, facilitate the work of the census takers by means of seminars and meetings which explained the census process to residents of the northern region. In the north, a Kurdish individual named Dr. Samal Majid Faraj, Iraqi Minister of Planning, was in charge of the census. According to Al-Majid, a census takes place every ten years in Iraq.

Al-Majid denied that October 17, 1987 was viewed or treated by the Iraqi government as a "cutoff date" for the saboteurs in the north. He stated that neither a discussion took place at any meeting nor was a decision made to allow "subversives to repent" and "return to the fold" up to the day of the census.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid , On 04/04/2004 , Page 5

Al-Majid denied that he ordered family members of "unrepentant saboteurs" living in government-controlled areas be forced to join their "saboteur kin" in the prohibited areas after the date of the census. As previously stated, he did issue an order to deport first-degree relatives of saboteurs prior to the census. However, Al-Majid stated there was no connection between that order and the national census. Al-Majid stated there were no parameters placed on the ages of the "saboteur kin" or on the ages of the males ordered deported, including the age ranges between 12 and 50, 17 and 50, or 15 and 70.

Al-Majid characterized northern Iraq as "backward." For the census process, many translators were needed. Most residents of northern Iraq received information about the census and understood the instructions. According to Al-Majid, census takers did not travel into prohibited areas, which were under control of the Iraqi Army, and conducted their work only in cities and villages. Individuals were required to make themselves available to census takers in order to be counted. If an individual failed to participate in the census, Al-Majid stated, "He would be the loser." Without being counted, such an individual would have no citizenship and would not be allowed to send his children to school. However, other services, such as electricity and food from the government, were unaffected.

Al-Majid stated that an individual could register for the census according to their ethnicity and religion, whether Arab, Kurd, Yezidi, Christian, Jew, etc. In northern Iraq, a person was not required to register only as an Arab or as a Kurd, and no other ethnicity.

According to Al-Majid, an individual was not deemed an army deserter simply because of failing to register for the census. He noted that most Kurds neglected their military service. According to an RCC decree dated 1984/85, a Kurdish individual was required to serve only three months versus the normal three years of military service. As a result, some individuals registered themselves as Kurds during the census. Al-Majid recalled that four or five families in Mosul, whom he described as Jarjaris and as Arabs, registered as Kurds. This "error" was caught, however, and the individuals were directed to register their true ethnicity.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document written in Arabic, described as RCC decree number 10, dated January 3, 1988, signed by Saddam Hussein, which amended RCC

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid , On 04/04/2004 , Page 6

decree number 677, dated August 26, 1987. The document states, in part, "The Party organization shall carefully examine the situation of military deserters and draft dodgers who are captured. The death sentence shall be carried out by the Party organization, after that examination, on every deserter or draft dodger who is captured if the duration of his desertion or draft evasion exceeds one year or if he has committed the crime of desertion more than once. The provisions of this Decree shall apply to all persons who evaded military service prior to its date of promulgation and who do not follow up with their recruiting departments within 30 days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 89-91 of the report.)

Al-Majid acknowledged that he had "heard about" this decree, but stated he does not remember actually seeing it or the details contained within it. He denied that there was a connection between RCC decree number 10 and the national census. Al-Majid further denied there was a connection between registering or failing to register for the census and military service. Al-Majid reiterated that an individual was not deemed a deserter or draft dodger simply because he failed to register for the census. He added that RCC decree number 10 and its order to execute deserters and draft dodgers did not come into effect because an individual failed to register for the census. Al-Majid reiterated that those who failed to participate in the census lost their citizenship documents.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 9:55 to 16:06 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. Per FBI LS [redacted] the copy of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and governors of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan on April 15, 1988. From context, however, it appears this recording took place in 1987.)

b6.
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 7

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that he believes this meeting took place in April, 1987 rather than in 1988. Al-Majid stated that those present included the governors and Ba'ath Party secretary generals of each province of the Autonomous Region of Iraqi Kurdistan. These provinces included Irbil, Dohuk, Suleimaniyeh, Kirkuk, and Mosul.

Al-Majid stated that in the audiotape he is speaking about the "gathering of villages" in the northern Kurdish region of Iraq. In the audiotape, he explains the difficulty with moving safely between cities in the north and the numbers of "martyrs" suffered at the hands of saboteurs. Al-Majid is encouraging those present to "speed up the process" of gathering or collectivizing the villages in the north.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 3:28 to 4:25 of the tape and states the following, "If you remember, when I was placed in charge of the Northern Bureau, I was also tasked with additional responsibilities [including] administration, the relevant Special Services, the Security and Intelligence ones, and the Army, and the civilian wing of the Party, and the military wing of the Party. These were my responsibilities, that's all. So, I was to work as I wished. Therefore, we started making our own decisions and in some instances, even in violation of the Leadership's instructions. But Comrades, this was three months ago." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] the copy of this audiotape appears to be a portion of a meeting detailed in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, a recording documents a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. Per LS [redacted] the HRW translation of the audiotape of this meeting appears to begin at approximately 6:15. The recording referenced here appears to be from the same meeting and precedes the HRW translation.)

b6
b7c

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this audiotape recorded a meeting held by Al-Majid with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, Kamil Sajid, the Army First Corps Commander, Sultan Hashem, the Commander of the Anfal Operation, Tali'a Al-Duri,

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/04/2004, Page 8

outgoing Army Fifth Corps Commander, Yunis Zareb, incoming Army Fifth Corps Commander, and the Secretary Generals of the Ba'ath Party Sections. Al-Majid believes this meeting took place in late 1988 or early 1989.

Al-Majid stated that despite the impressions which may be given to the listener of this audiotape regarding the official in charge of the meeting and the person in charge of the military, he was only responsible for the cities and "what was in between the cities." Specifically, Al-Majid stated he was in charge of the "security of the cities" and the "security committees of the cities" during the period he served as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command. He added that he "had nothing to do with Iranian intelligence." Al-Majid reiterated that he was only in charge of the cities and roads connecting cities in northern Iraq. The Iraqi military was in charge of all other territory within that portion of the country. Within cities, Al-Majid commanded military forces, intelligence services, security services, and all other government agencies. Al-Majid stated he was in charge of the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Bazyan, Chamchamal, Koysanjaq, Al-Rabie, Kirkuk, Alton Kopri, Erbil, Shaqlawa, Hareer, Zakho, and Khabat. He added that he was in charge of the provinces of Dokan, Mosul (except Aqra), and Kirkuk (except Qader Karam).

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 8:25 to 9:28 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] the copy of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a Northern Bureau meeting to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the report, the audiotape is undated but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989. The recording referenced here appears to be from the same meeting discussed in the previous three paragraphs.)

b6
b7c

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this audiotape recorded the same meeting which was just previously discussed. Al-Majid stated that he met with Khazraji because "he had work" and "I had work." Al-Majid remembers complaining to Khazraji during this meeting about the delay of the military in leveling villages where residents had already been removed. According to Al-Majid,

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of

Ali Hasan Al-Majid

On 04/04/2004; Page 9

the village buildings needed to be removed as they often served as sanctuaries for saboteurs. He added that after removal or "deportation" of villagers, the army had the responsibility to remove "what was left."

During this meeting as acknowledged by Al-Majid, he criticized Tali'a Al-Duri, Army Fifth Corps Commander, because of his failure to execute his duties regarding the destruction of villages in a timely fashion. This complaint by Al-Majid placed the responsibility for handling this matter upon Khazraji. Al-Majid stated this audiotape shows that he was not in charge of military forces in northern Iraq during this period. If he had been in charge, Al-Majid would have removed Al-Duri and not just complained to Khazraji.

Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 04/10/2004

On April 9, 2004, Ali Hasan Al-Majid (Black List #5) was interviewed at a military detention facility at Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. The interview was monitored by a representative of the military Joint Interrogation Detainee Cell (JIDC). FBI Language Specialist (LS) [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Al-Majid provided the following information:

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 11:20 to 12:19 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] United Kingdom Liaison on Transitional Justice, Office of Human Rights & Transitional Justice, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the Human Rights Watch Report (HRW) report titled "Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds," dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987.)

b6
b7c

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that he believes this tape recorded a meeting which occurred some time during the first half of 1988. Attendees included officials of the Northern Bureau who were the Secretary Generals of the Sections of the northern provinces. They were sometimes called the Directors of the provinces. These individuals included Nazar Yunis of Mosul, Tariq Kafi of Dohuk, Soubhi Ali Al-Khalaf of Erbil, Khidhir Abdelaziz of Kirkuk, and Sayyed Aswad Ali of Suleimaniyeh.

Al-Majid acknowledged that he is discussing the success of the deportation campaign in northern Iraq during this taped session. He stated that the "gathering" of the people in the north brought them physically closer to the Iraqi government authorities,

Investigation on 04/09/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534 -59Date dictated 04/10/2004by [redacted] *Per*b6
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 2

separated the saboteurs from the Iranians, and ended sabotage operations.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 14:49 to 16:16.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this tape may have been recorded at the same meeting which was just previously discussed or from a meeting with Nazar Khazraji, Iraqi Army Chief of Staff, and Yunis Zareb, Fifth Corps Commander, among others, discussed during a previous interview.

During this meeting, Al-Majid is reviewing the positive results of the "gathering" of the villages. Al-Majid notes to the attendees that previous orders and decrees existed directing action against the saboteurs. However, there was "no enthusiasm regarding or execution of" these directives. In fact, some individuals, such as Army Commander Tali'a Al-Duri, did not "follow up on their work" and destroy buildings as had been directed.

Al-Majid stated that some villages had already been declared as prohibited before he was assigned as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau. These prohibited areas were specified on maps.

Regarding the statement "I know how rotten the Army is. I am its son, and its commander," Al-Majid stated that he was a civilian who was given military rank in 1991. He added that he was not the Army's "son." Al-Majid noted that he was a member of the military wing of the Party from 1968-91. Al-Majid further stated that when he said "I am its son, and its commander," he did not mean that he was, technically, a military commander. He was referring to the time during which served in the military wing of the Party.

In 1991, Izzat Ibrahim Al-Duri, Muhammad Al-Zubaidi, Mizban Hadi, and Al-Majid were all given military ranks. At the time, Al-Majid was serving as Minister of Interior. Al-Duri was given the rank of General, Al-Zubaidi and Hadi were given the ranks of Major General, and Al-Majid was made a Lieutenant General. Al-Majid reiterated that he had served as a commander in the Party's military wing, not in the professional Iraqi Army.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 3

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 9:35 to 10:47 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau to review the campaigns of 1987 and 1988. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is undated, but is in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.)

b6
b7c

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He added that this is probably the same meeting with Khazraji and Zareb, among others, discussed during a previous interview.

In the tape, Al-Majid stated that he is discussing "caring for the families of saboteurs" and is not discussing executing them. When questioned about his statement "I put his message to my head" and his seeming disregard of a message from Saddam Hussein to care for the saboteurs, Al-Majid asked, "I filed it in the back of my mind? I didn't listen to?" Al-Majid noted that if his intention had been to kill the people of the north, then why would he have "gathered" them and brought them closer to him. He stated that he would have sent the individuals to prohibited areas and the Army would have killed them. Al-Majid denied that a hypothetical act such as this is similar or identical to the actual order given by Al-Majid to "deport" the first-degree relatives of saboteurs to the prohibited zones, as discussed in a previous interview.

Al-Majid stated that he had no intention to kill the families of the saboteurs. He pointed out that there were three levels or stages of the process within the five kilometer zones around cities, the only areas for which he had responsibility. First, the gathering, then the declaration of forbidden zones, and finally, the establishment of a "certain level of trust between us and them." Al-Majid noted there was "not much trust." Neither the Army nor the administration was allowed to go into the prohibited areas. Once trust was established, however, the residents of the northern region were allowed to farm in the prohibited areas.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 4

Al-Majid stated that the goal of the campaign in the north was not to kill families, rather it was to end sabotage. From the five kilometer zones around the cities (Al-Majid's responsibility), he noted that no one was deported back to the prohibited areas. Al-Majid added that no one was found in a prohibited area within the five kilometer zones.

Al-Majid stated that citizens of the north who desired to move to other provinces were allowed to do so. Those moving to a different province in the Kurdish Autonomous Region were provided assistance in the form of funds from the government.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 3:30 to 5:00 of the tape. (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the previously described HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting held by Al-Majid on April 15, 1989 to welcome Hassan Ali Al-Amiri as his successor as Secretary General of the Northern Bureau.)

b6
b7c

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. This recording took place at a meeting in April, 1989 where Al-Majid is welcoming Hassan Al-Amiri as his successor. The attendees included officials of the Northern Bureau and possibly the governors of the northern provinces. Al-Majid is describing the situation at that time as "stable" and says that Al-Amiri is "the right person to take over." Al-Majid further states that it is not suitable for him (Al-Majid) to continue in this position. He does, however, offer to serve as an advisor if needed.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 6:56 to 7:35.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. The interviewer asked Al-Majid about the statement, "It will no longer be allowed for a member of the leadership to have power over the Army." Al-Majid stated that the extraordinary situation had ended in the north and these powers were no longer necessary. Once the transition had occurred, Jalal Talabani broadcast that Al-Amiri would not have the

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 5

same powers as Al-Majid because he was not a relative of Saddam Hussein. In the tape, Al-Majid is not referring to his power over the Army in the entire northern region, but his power over the Army in the regions within five kilometers of the cities. As noted in a previous interview, Al-Majid stated that specific written instructions followed Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) decree number 160 delineating the responsibilities and territories of Al-Majid and the Army. These instructions were issued in writing from the office of the Presidential Diwan, signed by Ahmad Hussein on behalf of Saddam Hussein. Al-Majid received a copy of these instructions. Khazraji and Al-Majid met to determine how to best implement the orders. They discussed each others responsibilities, including Al-Majid's duties regarding areas within five kilometers of cities and the Army's responsibilities for all other territory in the northern region.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 8:00 to 10:10.

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. In this recording, Al-Majid is referring to his first meeting with the Army corps commanders, police, security services, and Party officials regarding the situation in northern Iraq. Al-Majid stated that while it is true he assembled all of these individuals for this meeting, "I was not in charge of the Anfal Operation." He stated that his responsibilities did not include the "gathering" of all the villages of the north. He reiterated his area of responsibility only included the cities and areas within five kilometers of the cities. Al-Majid opined that a "regular citizen" bearing witness to events during this time period might not have known the difference between the responsibilities of Khazraji and Al-Majid.

Regarding the statement in the tape asserting "directives which are still in force and will remain in force," Al-Majid stated that he is referring the early stages of the campaign in the north. He denied that this statement refers to Directive 4008 and added that this directive ended in September, 1987 when the Iraqi government granted permission for northern residents to farm. Al-Majid reiterated that all of his statements concern his area of responsibility at that time, cities and zones within five kilometers of the cities.

The interviewer played a segment of the same audiotape from approximately 12:00 to 13:30.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 6

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. Al-Majid stated that his comments about an Army commander refer to Tali'a Al-Duri, Fifth Corps Commander. According to Al-Majid, Al-Duri asked that the campaign in the north be postponed for one month. Al-Majid refused this request and described Al-Duri as "reluctant" despite having been provided everything needed by Al-Majid. Al-Majid added that he was in charge of all things owned by the provinces, including bulldozers and other equipment. Such items were provided to Al-Duri to complete his assignment, which included destruction of the villages that had been evacuated. Again, Al-Majid stated his comments refer only to areas within five kilometers of the cities.

The interviewer replayed a portion of an audiotape discussed previously during the interview. The segment replayed was from approximately 10:11 to 10:47 and included the statement, "No, I will bury them with bulldozers." (This recording is the one previously described as being in a batch dated January 21 and 22, 1989.)

Al-Majid denied that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He stated, "Those are not my words." Al-Majid added, "I would neither bury them nor kill them. They are Iraqis." He stated that he did not bury people or order people to be buried. Al-Majid added that he has never heard or seen others doing such things. He stated, "If I had done such a thing, I would tell you I was carrying out an order."

Al-Majid acknowledged previous statements made by him during interview on February 4, 2004 including "I never used or saw anything about chemicals." Al-Majid again denied personal knowledge or responsibility regarding the Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, against the Kurds, or at any other time. He added, "I have never had any involvement with chemical weapons in my life."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a handwritten document in Arabic, described as letter number ShSh/4947, dated June 11, 1987, from the Security Directorate of Erbil Governate to the Security Directorate of Shaqlawa, issued by the Director of General Security of Erbil Governate. The document states, in part, "On 5/27/1987, our aircraft attacked the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh Aliya, and Bileh Sufla in Khalifan subdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs...A number of saboteurs were killed and about (30) people lost their eyesight as

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 7

a result of the bombing, including the family of Kamal Haji Khidr Agha, the commander of the 12th [PUK] Division..." (The copy of this document was obtained from the HRW report titled "Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in Its Own Words," dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 62-63 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated, "I have no idea about this." Al-Majid added that he does not think this document is genuine. He noted that security directors would not normally write about military matters such as those discussed in this document. Al-Majid further noted that Shaqlawa was subordinate to Erbil. In his opinion, it would have been more logical for a subordinate unit such as Shaqlawa to be communicating this information to a higher one such as Erbil. However, the opposite direction of communication is shown in this document. Al-Majid noted other discrepancies he perceived in this letter including the lack of use of state letterhead, the lack of a Top Secret classification on information this important, and the discussion of a matter in paragraph two which does not fall within the scope of the duties of the Director of General Security of Erbil. According to Al-Majid, this is a military intelligence matter. Finally, he stated that the author did not ask for any action. The last section, paragraph four, is blank and would normally include the action requested or any instructions. Al-Majid stated that he does not remember the name of the Director of General Security of Erbil.

The interviewer told Al-Majid that one of the common side effects of a chemical weapons attack is loss of vision. The interviewer further noted that the individual named as a victim in the document, Agha, was contacted by independent investigators. Agha confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blinded in a chemical attack on May 27, 1987. Al-Majid stated, "I have not heard of this attack, only one in the city of Halabja."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a handwritten document in Arabic appearing on official letterhead, described as a letter, dated May 10, 1988, regarding the fourth Anfal operation from the Third Shoba (branch) to the Director of the Fifth Subdirector of Military Intelligence. The document makes recommendations for the use of "special ammunition" against the areas "Alsamaqolyat-Balisan and the villages existing in the separate border zone between Corps 24 and Corps 23." The document also notes that on May 9, 1988 "...a direction was issued to

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 8

Special Ammunition Committee to study the issue..." (The copy of this document was obtained from the US Army Criminal Investigative Division.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated, in general, he did not know what took place between the Minister of Defense and military intelligence. According to Al-Majid, military intelligence reports directly to the President and only informs the Minister of Defense. He added that neither "special" nor regular ammunition was the responsibility of military intelligence. Al-Majid stated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Any order to use chemical weapons would have come from Saddam Hussein or the Army Chief of Staff. Al-Majid believes such weapons would have been used only against Iran if, and only if, Iraq was in "a difficult situation." He stated that he does not believe it is the responsibility of military intelligence to search for saboteurs and direct strikes against them. By 1988, Al-Majid asserted that the saboteurs had "reached the end" and the use of chemical weapons was not necessary. Control of the villages in northern Iraq did not require chemical weapons and the Anfal Operation did not require chemical weapons. Al-Majid suspects that this document is a forgery, but can not say for certain.

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number M5/Sh3/Q2/9879, dated May 18, 1988, and an attached report from the Director, General Directorate of Military Intelligence, to the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector. The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is our special report about the Northern Region for the month of April, 1988. Please be informed." On page four, paragraph c, the attached report states, "After the special strikes against the villages where the headquarters and bases of the agents were, their organization distributed a quantity of medical supplies against chemical strikes (injections and pills) among the inhabitants of those villages as well as neighboring villages." Paragraph (3) of the same page states, "The intensity of the artillery bombardments by our forces and the use of (the special ammunition) led to heavy losses among them." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 57-61 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. As used in this report, he reiterated that the term "special" refers to chemical weapons. Al-Majid doubts the

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 9

authenticity of this document. He stated that if chemical weapons had been used in Iraq, particularly in the northern region during this time, "We would have heard. No such thing can be hidden."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number Q3/Qadissiyat Saddam/404, dated June 26, 1988, and an attached report from Captain Kifah Ali Hassan, Director of the Intelligence Center of Kalar to the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector (Sh3). The cover letter states, in part, "Enclosed is the quarterly report about the saboteurs' movements within our sector during the first half of 1988. Please be informed." On page six, paragraph b, the attached report states, "During the month of March, 1988, our aircraft bombed the headquarters of the sabotage bands in the villages of Saywan (4596) and Balakajar (4294) in a chemical strike. This resulted in the death of 50 saboteurs and the wounding of 20 other saboteurs." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 49-52 of the report. According to the HRW report, the numbers appearing in parenthesis in paragraph b are coordinates given to the villages by the military.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He stated that this report should have been forwarded to the Northern Sector, Al-Majid's assigned location. Al-Majid doubts the authenticity of this document. He added, "I am certain chemical weapons were not used in the northern or southern sectors of Iraq, only in Halabja." According to Al-Majid, the Iraqi government's use of chemical weapons in Halabja was directed against Iranians. He emphasized, "If I used them, I would admit."

Al-Majid was shown and read a portion of a copy of a document in Arabic, described as cover letter number Sh3/Q1/Qadissiyat Saddam/16093, dated December 13, 1988, and an attached report from the Subdirector of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector, to the General Directorate of Military Intelligence (Sh3). The cover letter states, in part, "The following is the information that we received from source number 202 about the sabotage movements:" Page five, paragraph 10a, states, "After the expulsion of the saboteurs of the First Section of the Barzani band in the Badinan Sector by our forces during the Final Anfal operation, six British journalists arrived in the tri-border region of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to see the saboteurs who had come from the above sector via Turkish territory and interview them about the

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 10

chemical strike undertaken by our forces." (The copy of this document was obtained from the previously described HRW report dated February, 1994. It appears on pages 53-56 of the report.)

Al-Majid denied knowledge of this document or the events described in it. He noted that if this document is genuine, it proves that he was not in charge. Al-Majid was never informed of this matter. If he had been in charge, he would have been notified of this information. He added that he is unable judge the authenticity of this document. According to Al-Majid, the Iraqi government would not have had to use chemical weapons at that stage of the campaign in the north. The saboteurs were not stronger than the Iraqi military. Once the saboteurs were isolated from the cities, they "were weakened" due to lack of food, fuel, and other supplies. By this point in the operation, all the villages that could have provided assistance to the saboteurs had been removed. Thus, the Iraqi Army's advance into this area was not difficult so as to require the use of chemical weapons.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 21:59 to 26:44 of the tape and includes the statements "That evening, I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition," "I will attack it with chemical weapons," and "I will kill them all with chemical weapons." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987.)

b6
b7c

Al-Majid stated that this audiotape was "assembled" from tapes of two different meetings. One meeting, in the first half of 1988, was discussed at the onset of this interview, while the other took place in Mosul on March 30, 1991.

When the cities of Suleimaniyeh, Dohuk, Erbil, and Kirkuk fell out of Iraqi government control in 1991, Al-Majid was tasked with "liberating" Dohuk. He invited Abd Jawad Thannoon, Governor of Dohuk, Nasir Said, Fifth Corps Commander, and all state and Party officials to a "reception" at the Mosul Hotel in Mosul.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 11

There, Al-Majid gave a speech declaring "Whoever has a friend in Dohuk, I will attack with chemical weapons tomorrow." Said attempted to interrupt Al-Majid because he did not want the timing of the operation to be revealed. Al-Majid directed him to communicate this information to Dohuk. He wanted "the illusion" of a chemical weapons attack to be imprinted in the minds of those controlling Dohuk. Al-Majid stated that the Iraqi government was weak in 1991. Thus, the chemical weapons "threat" was used as a "scare tactic" against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

Al-Majid directed the military to procure bags of flour or cement and attach them to helicopters. These aircraft were then used the following morning to spread the material over Dohuk and give the further "illusion" of a chemical weapons attack. Al-Majid used this "scare tactic" to reduce losses on "our side and their side." Al-Majid walked into Dohuk at 9:30 am the same morning. Some Iraqi military members would not enter the city, however, thinking that a chemical weapons attack had actually occurred.

Al-Majid stated, "This tape has been altered." He added that the story he related about Dohuk is the real reason he is known as "Chemical Ali" and not because of Halabja. According to Al-Majid, Khazraji once told Abbas Mahmoud or Rasool Mahmoud that Al-Majid ordered the chemical weapons attack on Halabja. This is not true, however.

A portion of this tape states, "Jalal Talabani asked me to open a special channel of communication with him. That evening, I went to Suleimaniyeh and hit them with the special ammunition. That was my answer." Al-Majid stated I inspected Suleimaniyeh and it was not hit. He added that he has never heard of such an attack, particularly with chemical weapons. He stated he did not order a chemical weapons attack on Talabani and his headquarters in the Jafati Valley near Suleimaniyeh. Al-Majid stated, "This tape is not correct." He claimed that he actually went to Suleimaniyeh to meet with Talabani and that the words "and hit them with the special ammunition" have been inserted into this tape. The remainder of the tape is a threat or scare tactic used by Al-Majid against the saboteurs in Dohuk.

The interviewer played a portion of a copy of an audiotape of Al-Majid's voice in Arabic. The segment played is from approximately 1:54 to 4:17 of the tape and includes the statements "...we will surround them in a small pocket and attack them with chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicals

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 12

just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for fifteen days." (The copy of this audiotape was obtained by the interviewer from [redacted] previously described. Per FBI LS [redacted] a translation of this audiotape closely approximates the translation provided in the HRW report dated July, 1993, Appendix A, The Ali Hasan Al-Majid Tapes. According to the HRW report, this recording documents a meeting Al-Majid held with members of the Northern Bureau and directors of the Ba'ath Party headquarters in the northern governates. Also according to the HRW report, the tape is dated May 26, 1988, but from context appears to be 1987. The copy of this audiotape obtained from [redacted] though appearing to be from the same meeting, was provided to the FBI as a separate recording.)

b6
b7c

Al-Majid acknowledged that the audiotape played is a recording of his voice and his words. He stated that this is the same meeting with Ba'ath Party Section officials and Governors of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan on April 15, 1987 discussed in a previous interview.

Al-Majid commented that these statements are attempts at "psychological warfare" against the enemy in the beginning of the campaign against the saboteurs in the northern region. His words were used as a scare tactic, similar to what was previously described in this interview and would later be used in Dohuk. In Al-Majid's opinion, the saboteurs would be "weakened by words." Logistically, they would later be weakened by their forced separation from the cities.

The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the meaning of the sentences "I will not let the government get involved. I will say it is from here [the Northern Bureau]." Al-Majid stated he was simply projecting the power of the Northern Bureau and that he had not exceeded his authority.

The interviewer questioned Al-Majid about the statement "I told the expert comrades that I need guerrilla groups in Europe to kill whomever they see from them [the saboteurs]." Al-Majid admitted to making this statement but asserted that it was simply part of the "psychological operations" against the saboteurs. He added that he had neither knowledge of nor authority over Iraqi government operations or operatives in Europe. However, Al-Majid believed that such a statement would become known to Talabani and would possibly diminish the strength of the saboteurs.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Ali Hasan Al-Majid, On 04/09/2004, Page 13

Copies of the documents referenced in this report are contained in the 1A section of the file.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/15/2004

Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, (Black List #205), date of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Sabir provided the following information:

b6
b7c

In 1987, Sabir was the Director of Military Intelligence (Istikhbarat). The Istikhbarat was responsible for collecting intelligence from all available sources. The collection effort was done through spies, technical resources involving specialized equipment, human sources, interrogations of arrestees, and aerial reconnaissance. During Sabir's tenure as the Director, the Istikhbarat was divided into the following five sections: Section I - responsible for gathering intelligence on all countries except Iran. Section II - responsible for gathering intelligence only on Iran. Section III - responsible for general security and the military. Section III was divided during the Anfal Campaign and was moved from Section I to Section II. The individual in charge of Section III during the Anfal Campaign was General Walid Khalid (phonetic). Section IV - technical resources section. Section V - administrative section.

Sabir provided a historical account of the events that eventually led up to the Anfal Campaign. The Iraq-Iran War was ongoing, and a four month battle just concluded in Basra in which the Iraqi military was victorious. After the battle, the Iranian military continued to shell the city of Basra. This caused the Iraqi military to draw forces from other battle fronts to assist in defending the city. Iran discovered a lack of Iraqi troops in the Northern Region of Iraq, particularly in the area of Sulayminiyah. Iran took advantage of the lack of Iraqi troops in the Northern Region and conspired with the Kurdish opposition groups led by Barzani and Talabani. The balance of the war shifted toward Iran which prompted the Iraqi government officials to develop a new strategy. According to Sabir, President Hussein, Ali Hasan Al Majid, the Minister of Defense - Adnan Khairallah (phonetic), and the Army Chief of Staff - Nizar Al Khazraji (phonetic), developed the strategy for the Northern Region. Sabir advised his role as the Director of the Istikhbarat was to gather intelligence, and

Investigation on 06/11/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-80 Date dictated 06/15/2004by SSA George L. Piccolo
by SSA [redacted] tmib6
b7c

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri . On 06/11/2004 , Page 2

disseminate that intelligence to the high level Iraqi Government officials which consisted of President Hussein, the Minister of Defense, Army Chief of Staff, and the Presidential Secretary. The intelligence was studied, and a recommendation for a plan of action was discussed and subsequently implemented.

The deployment of Chemical Weapons (CW) during the Anfal Campaign was at the sole direction of President Hussein. The chain of communications to utilize CW during the Anfal Campaign would flow from President Hussein to the Presidential Secretary, and then to the Army Chief of Staff or Minister of Defense depending on the delivery method for the CW. If the CW were to be deployed via the Air Force, the orders would have been passed through the Minister of Defense. If the CW were to be deployed via artillery or other conventional means, the orders would have been passed through the Army Chief of Staff to the Corps Commander. Sabir advised there was a special division within the Iraqi Army, known as the Chemical Disbursement Division, who were responsible for manufacturing, housing, and distributing the CW. The Army Chief of Staff, or the Deputy Chief of Staff were responsible for the Chemical Disbursement Division which was located at the Al Bakr Base. Sabir advised a CW advisor was attached to the I Corps of the Iraqi Army during the Anfal Campaign.

Sabir described the events that eventually led to the CW attack on Halabja. Sabir remembers that Halabja fell under Iranian control, and the city of Sulayminiyah was being threatened. Sabir and his Deputy, Wafiq Al Samarai (phonetic), were traveling to the Sulayminiyah area to check on their military positions, when an intelligence officer advised them of the CW attack on Halabja. Once he learned of the CW attack, Sabir traveled to the city of Kirkuk and met with Army Chief of Staff, Nizar Al Khazraji. During this meeting, Khazraji told Sabir that Adnan Khairallah - Minister of Defense (phonetic), who was in Kirkuk with Khazraji, had just received orders from President Hussein to launch a CW attack on Halabja. Once Khairallah received the orders from President Hussein he telephonically contacted the Commander of the Air Force, Hameed Sha'abin Al Tikriti (phonetic), and ordered him to launch the CW attack on Halabja. Sabir advised the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack on Halabja were from the Al Bakr Base. Recently, Sabir has learned from other detainees at Camp Cropper that detainee, Hamid Raja Shalah Al Tikriti (phonetic) (Black List #17), was the Air Force Squadron Commander stationed at the Al Bakr Base, who led the Air Force planes that conducted the CW attack on Halabja.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri , On 06/11/2004 , Page 3

Sabir was under the impression that Halabja was under Iranian control, and was not aware of a number of Iraqi citizens that were still residing within the city during the CW attack. Sabir claims the decision to utilize CW on Halabja came quickly, and the Istikhbarat was not consulted.

It was Sabir's understanding the Anfal Campaign had an announced purpose and a hidden purpose. The announced purpose was to relocate the Kurds from the Northern Region of Iraq, provide them adequate housing, and improve their quality of life. The hidden purpose of the Anfal Campaign was to relocate the Kurds toward the interior of Iraq, away from the border of Iran, and clear the Northern Region of the opposition groups that were led by Barzani and Talabani. There was concern the Kurds were going to conspire with these opposition groups, and this was the reason why the Kurdish villages were razed. The Iraqi Government believed that the destruction of the Kurdish villages would deter and prevent the Kurds from returning to the area.

Sabir concluded the interview by stating Saddam Hussein doesn't care about anybody, and would have done anything to stay in power. In addition, Sabir advised Hussein destroyed Iraq, and does not want Hussein put to death, but wants him to suffer.

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/04/2004

Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, (Black List #205), date of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. Department of Defense (DOD) representatives' [redacted] (LNU) were also present, and observed the first thirty minutes of the interview. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. Sabir provided the following information:

b6
b7c

Sabir was the former Director of the Istikhbarat (Directorate of Military Intelligence) and former Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Services (IIS) (Mukhabarat). In 1987, during the Iraq-Iran war, the primary role of the Istikhbarat in the Northern region of Iraq was to gather intelligence on Iranian forces. The secondary role of the Istikhbarat was to gather intelligence on the activities of the Kurds and determine their relationship with the Iranians. During this time frame, Sabir was a member of the Northern Affairs Committee and advised the Chairman of the committee, was Izzat Ibrahim Al Duri (Black List #6), Deputy Secretary General of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Other Directors of the Iraqi security services were members of the Northern Affairs Committee.

The Iraqi government utilized tribal Sheikhs to recruit Kurdish fighters (Jahsh) in the war against Iran, and during the Anfal Campaign. The tribal Sheikhs would get paid by the Government of Iraq (GOI) by the number of Kurdish fighters they recruited. The Sheikhs who recruited the Kurdish fighters on behalf of the Iraqi government were known as Mustashars.

Sabir believes the planning stages for the Anfal Campaign occurred between approximately 1985 and 1987. Three Corps' of the Iraqi Army were positioned in the Northern Region of Iraq at this time. The I Corps was located in Kirkuk, the II Corps was located in Diyala, and the V Corps was located in Mosul. The Corps of the Iraqi Army concentrated on the war with Iran, while the Jahsh Battalions were responsible for defending the Kurdish territory. Each Corps had an Istikhbarat officer assigned to it who was responsible for gathering intelligence. The Istikhbarat officer

Investigation on 06/03/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-36 Date dictated 06/04/2004by SSA George L. Piro
by SSA [redacted] tmib6
b7c

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SABIR.302.TMI.06032004

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/03/2004, Page 2

reported directly to Sabir. Sabir formed two units of the Istikhbarat in the Northern region, the first unit was located in Kirkuk, and the second unit was located in Mosul. Both units reported to Sabir. General Farhan Jaaburi (phonetic) was in charge of the Northern Region Military Directorate of Intelligence and reported to the Northern Region Section located in Baghdad. The Northern Region Section in Baghdad would report to Deputy Wafiq Al Samaarai (phonetic), who was in charge of Section/Department III, which had responsibility over the Northern region of Iraq. The Iraqi Intelligence and Security Services reported to the Security Committee, who in turn, would report to the Presidential Secretary. Copies of the operational intelligence and information reports would get disseminated to the Presidential Secretary, Minister of Defense, Chief of Staff, and Military Committee.

During this time frame, Ali Hasan Majid (Blacklist #5) was stationed in Kirkuk and was responsible for the Ba'ath Party and the Northern Region. Sabir was unsure of the exact dates, but believes it was approximately 1987 that Ali Hasan Majid was given the authority by the RCC to become the Commander of the Northern Region of Iraq. Sabir initially advised the control of the Istikhbarat did not fall under Majid's authority, and later advised that Majid had complete authority over the military and the Ba'ath Party. According to Sabir, Majid did not have the authority to meet with the Directors of the Intelligence Services, however, Majid would exert his power over them.

Interviewers refreshed Sabir's memory and told him that Majid was given the authority as Commander of the entire Northern region of Iraq as referenced in RCC decree #160 dated March 29, 1987. Sabir viewed a copy of this decree, which formally appointed command of the Northern Region of Iraq, to include the autonomous region of Kurdistan, to Ali Hasan Majid. RCC decree #160 gave Majid authority over the Foreign Intelligence Apparatus, the Internal Security Force, the Military Intelligence, the Popular Army, and the Military. (A copy of RCC decree #160 which Sabir viewed in Arabic along with the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 1 & 2).

During the Anfal Campaign, the military was responsible for fighting on the front lines and clearing the areas of resistance. The Istikhbarat was responsible for gathering intelligence from within each of the Corps. Sabir did not have knowledge of Majid's specific defined areas of responsibility, and

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/03/2004, Page 3

advised areas outside of Majid's responsibilities would have been given to the military. The military was also responsible for removing the Kurdish population in the Northern Region, and the Governors in each of those areas were responsible for relocating the displaced Kurds. Each Governor was responsible for reporting directly to Majid.

Sabir viewed twenty-five pages of documents in Arabic which centered around the time frame of 1987 involving pre-Anfal and Anfal Campaign activities. The copies of documents describe correspondence between different entities within the Iraqi Government involving the use of "Special Ammunition" in the Northern Region of Iraq. Sabir acknowledged that Special Ammunition was a term used by the Iraqi government to represent Chemical Weapons (CW).

Sabir doesn't remember each and every document, however, did verify his signature on the bottom of several of the documents, and thus concluded they were authentic. (A copy of the twenty-five pages of documents viewed by Sabir, and the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 3 & 4).

While viewing the copies of documents, and upon verifying his signature, interviewing agents observed the following physical changes in Sabir. Sabir started to profusely perspire, his facial characteristics dramatically changed, and his lower lip began to uncontrollably quiver. Additionally, after explaining the April 16, 1987 chemical weapons attack on the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wasan, Sabir's eyes began to tear. Sabir stated that decisions made by President Saddam Hussein to utilize CW directly led to the deaths of the men, women, and children in those villages.

The original plan to use CW was formulated in 1986 when it was perceived that Iraq was losing the war, which was due in part to the loss of the Faw Peninsula to Iranian forces. Sabir believes the general consensus was that the Iraqi forces needed a small victory to boost their confidence and continue fighting the war with Iran. The idea to utilize CW against Iran during the war was originally brought up by his subordinates within the Istikhbarat. The Istikhbarat's primary mission was to defeat and expel the Iranian forces, and not utilize the CW against innocent civilian populations which included women and children. Sabir advised the Istikhbarat was responsible for collecting information

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of Sabir Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/03/2004, Page 4

for target identification and providing that information to the Iraqi military in 1987.

Sabir viewed another document which was dated June 23, 1987, drafted by Ali Hasan Majid of the Northern Bureau Command, to the Commander's of the I, II, and V Corps. This memo set policy on dealing with the Kurds by turning the prohibited areas in the Northern Region of Iraq into free fire zones, and ordered the arrest, interrogation and summary execution of all those aged 15-70 who were found in the prohibited areas. In addition, it gave permission to the pro-government Kurdish militias (Jahsh), to keep everything they might seize in those prohibited areas, not only light weapons but also personal belongings. Sabir acknowledged this memo and reiterated that Majid had the authority to act on his own, and had the support of President Saddam Hussein and the RCC. (A copy of the document viewed by Sabir in Arabic, and the accompanying English translation will be maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope and marked as Document #'s 5 & 6).

- 1 -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 06/25/2004

SABIR ABD AL AZIZ HUSAYN AL DURI, (Black List #205), date of birth May 19, 1949, was interviewed at a detention facility located at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), Baghdad, Iraq. Interviewing Agents identified themselves as representatives of the United States Government from Washington, DC. FBI Language Specialist [redacted] provided Arabic/English translation. SABIR provided the following information:

b6
b7c

During the time frame of 1997-1988, NAZAR KHAZRAJI (phonetic) was the Army Chief of Staff, and ADNAN KHAIRALLAH (phonetic) was the Minister of Defense. In early 1997, HUSAYN RASHID (Black List #131) was the Commander of the Republican Guard in the Sulaminiyah area, and then was named the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. According to SABIR, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations was responsible for carrying out and executing all Army operations.

There were two main Directorates under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, which were the Directorate of Planning and the Directorate of Military Movements. The Directorate of Planning was responsible for studying and planning operations for the military. The Directorate of Military Movements was responsible for executing the operational plans. During this time frame the Director of Military Movements was AYAD FUTAYYIH KHALIFA AL RAWI (Black List #30). AYAD then became the Commander of the Republican Guard when HUSAYN RASHID became the Deputy Chief of Staff. When this occurred NAJEM ABDULLAH (phonetic) took AYAD's position as the Director of Military Movements. MUHAMMAD ADBUL KADIR (phonetic) was the Director of Planning then became the Director of Tourism. YUNIS ALTHARAB (phonetic) then replaced KADIR as the Director of Planning.

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) (Istikhbarat) would gather intelligence on the enemy, Iran, and would disseminate the intelligence to the Minister of Defense and Army Chief of Staff. The intelligence would then be passed to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. Because Iraq was still at war with Iran, the intelligence flowed quickly through the various levels of command.

Investigation on 06/23/2004 at Baghdad, IraqFile # 315E-HQ-1448534-105 Date dictated 06/25/2004by SSA George L. Piro
by SSA [redacted] tmib6
b7c

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SABIR. 202. Tml. 06/23/2004

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of SABIR Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/23/2004, Page 2

SABIR viewed several copies of documents in the Arabic language and was asked if he could identify individuals' signatures/initials on these documents, and in certain instances provided additional details regarding the document. All of the documents viewed by SABIR along with the English translation will be marked appropriately and maintained in a FD-340/1(A) envelope.

Document 1/Page 1 - Subject: Using the Special Ammunition. In addition to his own signature, SABIR identified the Director of SH3, WALID KHALID (phonetic), and advised this was the individual who authored the document. SABIR also identified the signature of the Deputy of the Istikhbarat, WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I (phonetic).

Document 1/Page 5 - Document from the Istikhbarat dated March 31, 1987. SABIR identified the initials of WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I in the lower portion of the document.

Document 1/Page 7 - Subject: The Use of Special Weapons, dated April 3, 1987. In the lower right portion of the document, SABIR identified WALID KHALID's signature. In the lower left portion of the document he identified the signature of WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I. SABIR also identified his own signature at the bottom center portion of the document.

Document 1/Page 8 - Subject: The Use of Special Ammunition, dated March 29, 1987. SABIR identified the signature of SALEH FAYAD (phonetic), who was the Secretary to the Director of the Istikhbarat in the lower left portion of the document. In the lower right portion of the document, SABIR identified his own signature, and identified the signature of WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I, Deputy of the Istikhbarat, in bottom center portion of the document.

Document 1/Pages 9, 10, 11 - Subject: The Use of the Special Ammunition, dated March 3, 1987. After reviewing this document, SABIR advised the letter/memo was from the Third Branch Second Section, and the initials on page number eleven represented the author of the document, who was the Director of the Second Section, Staff Colonel SALEH Last Name Unknown (LNU). He identified his own signature at the bottom of page eleven, and also identified the signature of WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I in the lower left portion of the document.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of SABIR Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri, On 06/23/2004, Page 3

Document 1/Page 12 - Signed June 5, 1987. SABIR believed the signature at the bottom of the document was WALID KHALID's, but was not positive.

Document 1/Page 13 - Subject: The Use of Special Ammunition, dated March 13, 1987. After reviewing the document, SABIR advised the "committee" referred to within the document regarding the special ammunition comprised a representative from the Directorate of Planning and a representative from the Directorate of Military Movements. A representative from the Istikhbarat and other representatives from different services were also on this committee. The committee would meet approximately every two weeks, and the highest ranking member would chair this particular committee. The committee provided recommendations regarding operations and the use of chemical weapons (CW) to the Army Chief of Staff. The recommendations were then presented to the Minister of Defense or Armed Forces Committee.

The Armed Forces Committee comprised the following individuals: Minister of Defense, Director of the Istikhbarat, Commander of the Navy, Commander of the Air Force, Commander of Army Aviation, Army Chief of Staff, the four (4) Deputy Army Chiefs of Staff, Director of Planning, Director of Military Movements, and the Minister of Military Affairs. President SADDAM HUSSEIN chaired the Armed Forces Committee which would meet twice a week. The Secretary of the Armed Forces Committee was 'ALA DIN KATHEM AL JANABI. Any plans for military operations were discussed in this committee. SABIR does not recall CW being discussed within this committee because all secret matters were routed directly to the President's office. President HUSSEIN would issue the decisions to use the CW and the Presidential Secretary would then issue the orders to the Minister of Defense or Army Chief of Staff. SABIR advised that in the past, President HUSSEIN had ordered the immediate deployment of CW based on reports from the Istikhbarat.

Document 1/Page 14 - Subject: The Use of Special Ammunition, dated March 19, 1987. SABIR identified the signature of Director SINAN ABDUL JABAAR ABU GHALIL. He advised this document was from the First Directorate/Division who were responsible for the Iranian Branch, Northern Branch, and external matters.

Document 1/Page 15 - Subject: Information, dated March 12, 1987. SABIR could not identify the signatures on this document.

315E-HQ-1448534

Continuation of FD-302 of SABIR Abd Al Aziz Husayn Al Duri . On 06/23/2004 , Page 4

Document 1/Page 16 - Subject: Information, dated March 11, 1987. SABIR identified WAFIQ AL SAMARA'I's signature located on the bottom center of this document.

Document 1/Page 17 - Subject: Information, dated March 11, 1987. SABIR could not identify the signatures on this document.

Document 1/Page 25 - Signed March 13, 1987. SABIR could not identify the signature on this document.

Document #15 - After viewing these documents, SABIR advised Project #858 was the responsibility of the Special Security Organization (SSO), and was headed by AHMED MURTADA (phonetic). MURTADA's last position within the Iraqi Government prior to his capture by Coalition forces was Minister of Transportation. The mission of Project #858 was to gather intelligence through the use of listening posts on the Iraqi borders. SABIR advised that HUSSEIN KAMEL would receive the intelligence through the intercepts and would send the information to the Presidential Secretary. The information would then be disseminated to the Istikhbarat who would confirm the information collected on the intercept.

SABIR was the Director of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) (Mukhabarat) from 1991 until his retirement in 1994. He assumed this position from SABAWI IBRAHIM HASAN AL TIKRITI, President HUSSEIN's half brother.