

6

1

4

21638

17 OCT 73 17 33z

*NA*

171614<sup>Z</sup> OCT 73 ZFF-1

FM THE WHITE HOUSE  
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
ZEM

*Tehran*  
To [ ] ANKARA  
*p.m. Bhutto left before message received*

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY [ ]

*received you will Pick Embassy and tell him you have message for him*

WH32513

OCTOBER 17, 1973

TO: AMBASSADOR HELMS, TEHRAN

HR70-14  
(U)

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 2008

REF: 'TEHRAN [ ]

1. THANK YOU FOR REFTTEL. BHUTTO IS CORRECT THAT THIS CHANNEL IS BEST FOR THESE MATTERS. MESSAGES SHOULD GO THROUGH YOU IDEALLY [ ]

2. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO RESPOND TO BHUTTO AS INDICATED BELOW. IF HE HAS DEPARTED TEHRAN, CAN YOU REACH HIM THROUGH DISCREET CHANNELS OF YOUR OWN? OR SHOULD WE REPEAT MESSAGE DIRECTLY TO [ ] JIDDA OR ANKARA?

3. YOU SHOULD TELL BHUTTO THE FOLLOWING: THE PRESIDENT AND I EXTEND OUR WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS. PRESIDENT DEEPLY APPRECIATES BHUTTO'S ANALYSIS OF SITUATION, HIS DESIRE TO EXERCISE HELPFUL POSITIVE INFLUENCE, AND HIS COURAGEOUS STAND AGAINST PRESSURES.

*THIS* IS IN SPIRIT OF OUR TALKS IN SEPTEMBER AND COMMON US-PAKISTANI INTEREST. ERUTTO CAN ASSUME US IS FOLLOWING STRATEGY WE DISCUSSED IN SEPTEMBER. PRINCIPLE THAT MILITARY ACTION SPONSORED AND SUPPLIED BY SOVIET UNION CAN SUCCEED IS OF COURSE EXCEEDINGLY DANGEROUS, NOT ONLY FOR MIDDLE EAST BUT ALSO FOR SOUTH ASIA AND INDEED GLOBALLY.

4. WHETHER TO GO TO DAMASCUS OR NOT IS DECISION FOR ERUTTO TO

MAKE. ON BALANCE WE DO NOT THINK IT A GOOD IDEA. BUT IF HE SHOULD DECIDE TO GO, HE COULD CONVEY FOLLOWING TO SYRIAN LEADERS:

(A) THE US INTENDS TO USE AFTERMATH OF THIS CRISIS AS OPPORTUNITY TO VIGOROUSLY PROMOTE A RAPID, COMPREHENSIVE, AND JUST SETTLEMENT. THE GUARANTEE OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE US SIDE WILL BE FOUND IN THE OBJECTIVE SITUATION AS WELL AS IN THE FORMAL US COMMITMENT TO ENGAGE ITSELF FULLY.

(B) HOWEVER, IF THIS DIPLOMACY IS TO BE GIVEN ITS ~~ROLE~~ <sup>FULL</sup> OPPORTUNITY, A CEASEFIRE MUST PRECEDE IT. CEASEFIRE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY UNDERTAKING OF PARTIES TO START TALKS UNDER AEGIS OF UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTION GWRW IN ALL ITS PARTS. NEITHER SIDE CAN EXPECT OR INSIST UPON GUARANTEE OF ITS MAXIMUM OBJECTIVES AS PRECONDITION OF <sup>TALK.</sup> TAL. THE US IS CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT COMMENCEMENT OF PROCESS WILL ESTABLISH MOMENTUM AND PROVIDE US WITH BEST CONTEXT OF EXERTING VIGOROUS INFLUENCE.

5. WARM REGARDS.

500

#3425