

~~TOP SECRET~~ / *1105002* Z OCT 73

CITE TEHRAN

TO: THE WASHINGTON SIGNAL CENTER

FROM: AMB. HELMS

PLEASE DO NOT SEND THIS MESSAGE TO THE WHITE HOUSE ELECTRONICALLY. RATHER, PLEASE PLACE IT IN AN ENVELOPE ADDRESSED TO GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE, AND HAVE IT DELIVERED TO HIM BY CLASSIFIED MESSENGER. ON THE ENVELOPE PLEASE WRITE, "TO BE OPENED ONLY BY GEN. SCOWCROFT". E2, IMPDET.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008

HR70-14
(U)

NOTE: Commo this refers to attached cable.

RELEASED: *Net*

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T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY 110500 Z OCT 73 VIA SRF CHANNELS
CITE TEHRAN 100

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT/HAL SAUNDERS, WHITE HOUSE (EYES ONLY)

FROM: AMB. HELMS, TEHRAN

REFS: A. PARA 4 OF TEHRAN 082

B. PARA 5 OF TEHRAN 086

C. TEHRAN 092

D. WH 31980

E. TEHRAN 094

COMMENT: THIS MESSAGE IS AN EFFORT TO BRING YOU UP-TO-DATE ON THE STATUS OF THE CONTINGENCY PLANNING EFFORT AS IT STOOD HERE JUST PRIOR TO THE RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPT-SYRIA. IT WILL PROVIDE A BENCH MARK FOR US WHEN YOU GET BACK TO SUCH PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS LATER ON. IT IS CERTAINLY NOT DESIGNED TO DISTRACT YOUR ATTENTION FROM THE ONGOING PRESSURES OF THE CURRENT WAR, WHICH OF COURSE COULD CHANGE CONDITIONS RADICALLY.

1. HAVE NOW HAD TWO SESSIONS WITH SHAH ON CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND TO A LESSER EXTENT FOR KUWAIT AND JORDAN. ONE THING EMERGES CLEARLY: SHAH HAS NO INTENTION OF PUTTING ANYTHING ON PAPER UNTIL HE SEES WHAT USG IS PREPARED TO DO PARTICULARLY

/CONTINUED/

RELEASE: *lit*

T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY

PAGE 2 TEHRAN 100 T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY

IN STANDING OFF ANY POSSIBLE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT. HE DOES NOT ARTICULATE THIS IN THE WORDS I USE, BUT THE SENSE IS PRETTY CLEAR. IN FACT, I WONDER WHETHER WE WILL EVER GET ANYTHING FROM HIM IN WRITING ALTHOUGH HE WILL DOUBTLESS TELL US WHAT HE IS PREPARED TO DO UNDER SPECIFIC CONDITIONS. ONE THING HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED THUS FAR: SHAH HAS INDEED FOCUSED ON ALL ASPECTS OF PROBLEM PARTICULARLY THE MILITARY. HE HAS GIVEN PRACTICAL THOUGHT TO WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE DONE. THIS PLANNING IS NOW A PART OF HIS MILITARY STRATEGY.

2. AS A RESULT OF SHAH'S REQUEST IN MY FIRST SESSION AND IN EFFORT TO INSURE WE BOTH TALKING ABOUT SAME THINGS, I SUBMITTED FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY OPTIONS ^(To Him) BASED ON YOUR SUBMISSIONS IN WH-31980. IN ADDITION, I INCLUDED BRIEF POLITICAL RATIONALE WITH A VIEW TO KEEPING EXERCISE IN PERSPECTIVE.

"1. WHEN LAST WE DISCUSSED CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON SAUDI ARABIA, YOU ASKED THAT I SUBMIT A SET OF POSSIBLE OPTIONS, SITUATIONS WHICH MIGHT CONCEIVABLY EVENTUATE. I HAVE IDENTIFIED THREE IN WHICH SOME ACTION FROM OUTSIDE MIGHT IMPROVE THE CHANCES OF KEEPING A FAVORABLY ORIENTED GOVERNMENT IN POWER. THESE I OUTLINE BELOW.

"A. A MILITARY GROUP SEIZES CONTROL OF ONE OR MORE

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T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY

RADIO STATIONS AND SOME OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTALLATIONS, PROCLAIMS ITSELF THE REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT OF ARABIA AND CALLS FOR RECOGNITION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM IRAQ, PDRY AND THE SOVIET UNION.

"B. A SUCCESSION CRISIS FOLLOWS KING FAYSAL'S DEATH IN WHICH PRINCES FAHD AND SULTAN WITH THE SUPPORT OF THEIR "SUDAYRI" BROTHERS AND COUSINS CONTROL THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE, WHILE THE NON-SUDAYRI PRINCES CONTROL THE NATIONAL GUARD AND CONTEST THE SUDAYRI DOMINATION OF THE GOVERNMENT.

"C. A PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL COUP BY ANTI-ROYALIST ARMY ELEMENTS IS RESISTED BY THE ROYAL FAMILY SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND SOME LOYAL ARMY ELEMENTS, LEADING TO CIVIL WAR. IRAQ, PDRY AND THE SOVIET UNION RECOGNIZE THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND COMMENCE SENDING IT MILITARY AID.

"2. IN PRESENTING THE ABOVE OPTIONS, I AM NOT ESTIMATING THAT ANY OF THESE CONTINGENCIES IS LIKELY. IN POINT OF FACT KING FAYSAL'S RECENT RAPPROCHEMENT WITH PRESIDENT SADAT HAS DOUBTLESS STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION AS AGAINST HIS RADICAL ARAB OPPONENTS. RATHER I AM FOLLOWING THE SUGGESTION OF KING HUSSEIN WHEN AT NOWSHAHR HE POSTULATED THE DESIRABILITY OF THINKING IN CONTINGENCY TERMS

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SIMPLY BECAUSE CONSULTATION AMONG GOVERNMENTS WHEN A CRISIS DOES ARISE ARE USUALLY TOO SLOW TO BRING ABOUT AN EFFECTIVE RESULT. OF COURSE WE ALL HOPE THAT NONE OF THESE SITUATIONS WILL DEVELOP SINCE THE EXTENT OF ESCALATION WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT AND COULD BE DOWNRIGHT NASTY. CERTAINLY WE MUST CONTINUE TO PURSUE OUR JOINT EFFORTS IN SAUDI ARABIA DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN ITS STABILITY AND TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS OF AN ORDERLY SUCCESSION TO KING FAYSAL WHEN HE PASSES FROM THE SCENE."

3/ YOU MAY WONDER WHY SOVIET UNION WAS SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THESE OPTIONS. THE REASON WAS THAT THE MORE ONE THINKS ABOUT REAL TROUBLE IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD, THE MORE ONE IS CONVINCED THAT A TOUGH STAND BY THE SOVIETS MIGHT STAY THE HAND OF ALL THE SMALL POWERS, FREEZE THEM INTO IMMOBILITY. ONE CAN ARGUE THAT SOVIETS HAVE NO LEGITIMATE CLAIMS IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, BUT A BOLD PLAY WHICH SUCCEEDED IN SAUDI ARABIA WOULD BE SO DISASTROUS FOR THE U.S. THAT WE CANNOT SIMPLY ASSUME IT COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT HAPPEN. THE SOVIETS HAVE A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH IRAQ WHICH PROVIDES FOR CONSULTATION IN THE EVENT OF "AGGRES-

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SION" AGAINST EITHER PARTY. IRAN AND THE USG MUST KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN CONSIDERING THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF IRANIAN MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ. CONSIDERING THAT THE SOVIETS IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED THE QASIM REGIME IN IRAQ AFTER THE OVERTHROW OF NURI SAID IN 1958 AND IMMEDIATELY RECOGNIZED THE DA'UD REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, WE MAY BE SURE THEY WOULD NOT DELAY RECOGNITION OF A REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN SAUDI ARABIA. THEY HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE THERE SINCE THEY HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC OR CONSULAR RELATIONS OR ANY OTHER ASSETS AT RISK. ONLY THE CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR ASSISTANCE TO A REBEL REGIME IN SAUDI ARABIA WOULD LEAD TO DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT TO DETER THE SOVIETS. TIFLIS IS A LOT CLOSER THAN FORT BENNING TO DHAAHRAN.

4. SET FORTH HERE ARE SOME OF THE SHAH'S COMMENTS SOLICITED BY THE STATED OPTIONS:

A) SAUDI ARABIA: (1) IT IS ESSENTIAL TO HAVE IDENTIFIED SOME POLITICAL GROUP WHICH IS PREPARED TO REQUEST IRANIAN MILITARY HELP. THIS IS A TASK WHICH ONLY THE U.S. CAN PERFORM, AND IT MUST BE DONE IN ADVANCE. (2) A SUITABLE AIRFIELD MUST BE QUICKLY SECURED. THIS WOULD TAKE A BRIGADE-PLUS OF IRANIAN PARATROOPERS. (3) IRAN

/CONTINUED/

PAGE 6 TEHRAN 100 T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY

MUST HAVE A HEAVY AIRLIFT CAPABILITY. THIS MEANS THAT THE GOI WILL BUY THE SAME PLANE FOR COMMERCIAL USE BY IRAN AIR AS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT LIFT. (THE 747 APPEARS TO HAVE THE BEST CAPABILITY AND CONFIGURATION FOR BOTH PURPOSES). (4) IRAN AIR FORCE MUST HAVE AIR REFUELING CAPABILITY, AND IN ADDITION NEEDS THE F-14 FOR SATISFACTORY RANGE. (5) SHOULD SOVIET UNION INTRODUCE A "NASTY" ELEMENT, THE UNITED STATES WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT. THE U.S. MUST DECIDE WHAT IT IS PREPARED TO DO AND THEN TO ADVISE IRAN HOW IT FITS INTO THE PLAN. THE SHAH CAN HANDLE BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF PLANNING WITHOUT CUTTING IN OTHER IRANIAN OFFICIALS.

B) JORDAN: (1) A MILITARY AIRFIELD SHOULD BE BUILT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. THIS IS IMPORTANT. EITHER JORDAN OR SAUDI ARABIA SHOULD FINANCE THIS. (2) WITH DELIVERY OF ADDITIONAL C-130 AND CURRENT U.S. ARMS PACKAGE PLUS RECENT UNDERSTANDINGS WITH EGYPT AND SYRIA, KING HUSSEIN APPEARS TO BE IN A MUCH BETTER POSITION TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF. (IMPLICATION HERE WAS THAT NO IMMEDIATE ADDITIONAL PLANNING NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW).

C) KUWAIT: (1) THERE IS NO WAY TO PROTECT THIS COUNTRY

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T O P S E C R E T/EYES ONLY

MILITARILY FROM OUTSIDE BECAUSE OF ITS SIZE. (2) IRAN MUST BECOME SO STRONG, HAVE SO MUCH OVERKILL (AS U.S. ONCE DID) THAT NO NEIGHBOR WOULD CONSIDER MILITARY ADVENTURES IN ITS AREA LET ALONE ATTACK IT. (IMPLICATION WAS THAT A STRONG IRAN IS THE BEST PROTECTION KUWAIT COULD HAVE, PARTICULARLY FROM IRAQ. NO MATTER HOW STRONG IRAN BECOMES, HOWEVER, SHE WILL HAVE TO KEEP IN MIND IRAQ'S SOVIET ALLIANCE WHEN WEIGHING DIRECT MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ TO PREVENT IRAQI SEIZURE OF KUWAIT. IF KUWAIT WOULD SIGN A MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH IRAN, THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE LESS VULNERABLE TO SOVIET INTERVENTION ON THE SIDE OF IRAQ IN THE EVENT OF CONFRONTATION OVER KUWAIT. KUWAIT IS NOT DISPOSED TO NEGOTIATE SUCH A TREATY, HOWEVER, AND TENDS TO LOOK TO IRAN ONLY WHEN UNDER ACTUAL MILITARY PRESSURE FROM IRAQ.)

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