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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY OFFICE
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AUG 0 3 2018

Freedom of Information/
Privacy Office

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.
27305 West Live Oak Road
Suite 1203
Castaic, California 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is in further reponse to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of March 28, 2018, and supplements our letter of April 19, 2018.

Coordination with another element of this command has been completed and a record returned to this office. The record has been reviewed in accordance with Executive Order (EO) 13526. As a result of our review the information is releasable and a copy enclosed for your use.

There are no assessable FOIA fees for processing this request.

If you have any questions regarding this action, feel free to contact this office at 1-866-548-5651, or email the INSCOM FOIA office at: usarmy.meade.902-mi-grp.mbx.inscom-foia-service-center@mail.mil and refer to case #0495F-18. Please note that you now have the ability to check the status of your request online via the U.S. Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) website: https://www.foia.army.mil/FACTS/CaseStatus.aspx. Please refer to FOIA Control Number: FP-18-015397. You may also seek dispute resolution services by contacting the INSCOM FOIA Public Liaison, Mrs. Joanne Benear at 301-677-7856.

Sincerely,

Michael T. Heaton
Director
Freedom of Information/Privacy Office
Investigative Records Repository

Enclosure

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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THE IRAQ WAR – THE "INVARIABLE" AND THE "VARIABLE"

YILAKE ZHANZHENG DE "BUBIAN" YU "BIAN"

By: Liu Jianggui

## THE IRAQ WAR – THE "INVARIABLE" AND THE "VARIABLE"

By: Liu Jianggui

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Liu Jianggui is a captain who is a graduate student and an associate researcher at the National Defense University.

The Iraq war is over, but its effects continue. Just what kind of war was the Iraq war? This is still being studied. This paper will limit itself to some views on the "invariables" and "variables" of this war.

The "Invariable" is that this war was a social phenomenon. It shares some common aspects with previous wars fought by the US. Forces.

FIRST, LOOKING AT THE POLITICAL NAUTRE OF THE WAR, IT WAS ALSO FOR MILITARY HEGEMONY: USING STRONG MILITARY FORCES FOR POWER POLITICS

Since the end of the cold war, the United States has continued to use the overwhelming superiority of its economy, military and science and technology to conduct a policy of force to carry out unilateralism and to make war an important means of achieving its strategic interests. This was the case in the war in Kosovo, the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq as well. The United States is riding a new wave of strategic expansion. 9-11 was a calamity for the United States, but it also provided an excuse for the United States to play the "counter terrorism" card to actually carry out expansionism. Just as Kissinger pointed out on March 26, 2003, The Iraq war was an inseparable part of the war on terrorism and was the second stage of the war in Afghanistan. The United States viewed the Iraq war as a strategic action to form their "new world order." British Prime Minister Blair believes that: the Iraq war will "determine world politics for decades to come," and will determine the "method used settle major security problems in the 21st century." The Iraq war demonstrated that the United States will not hesitate to use military force to overthrow the government of a sovereign country, giving a new expression and new developments to its hegemonism and power politics. A great deal of attention will have to be paid to the next step by the United States in Iraq.

SECOND, LOOKING AT THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR, IT WAS YET ANOTHER WAR TO CONTROL ECONOMICS: OBTAIN THE GREATEST POSSIBLE

2

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

War is also a continuation of economics. On the surface, it is the politicians who make the decision to fight a war or not, but actually, it is the big capitalists and the financial groups behind the politicians who make this decision. Some people have pointed out the primary reason the U.S. Army went to war so quickly was because it was in the interest of the defense contractors. The United States has tasted success in several wars following the Cold War. Iraq possesses strategic and economic interests most required by the United States. According to statistics, the oil reserves of Iraq are about 3150 barrels (sic), about the same or more than those of Saudi Arabia. From this aspect, the Iraq war not only had to be fought, but it had to be won. For the American economic interests, the Iraq war was first of all for the control of the world's economic lifeline. The Middle East oil is the world's economic lifeline. Bush has already proposed that the United States be prepared to establish a "U.S.-Middle East free trade zone" in the next ten years. We can see from this just what the long-term U.S. Middle East strategy is from military occupation to the change of the political blueprint, to the control of the economic lifeline. Second, it was for control of the European Dollar. The war in Kosovo almost ruined the European dollar. In the Iraq war, the U.S. also took it to France and Germany, and further reduced the prestige of the European Dollar. Just as a high ranking U.S. official pointed out, "without military force, the European Dollar would be just like the Japanese Yen, unable to become a basic world currency." Third is it was a help to the U.S. economy. The positive effects of the Iraq War on the U.S. economy were: The war benefited the interests of defense contractors; the postwar reconstruction of Iraq would bring a large batch of orders to U.S. corporations; it resulted in increased investor and consumer confidence. It is just because the military investment brought such great returns, the United States voted Congress passed the record defense budget of 400.5 billion Dollars on May 22, 2003. The reason the United States maintains such a high level of military spending is because of the unprecedented threat, but it is also in preparation for winning future wars without a battle.

THIRD, LOOKING AT THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF THE WAR, THE WAR STILL SERVED TO PROMOTE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS: USING WAR TO TEST AND PROMOTE U.S. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

War is the best test site and classroom for the military. Since the end of the cold war, the United States military has consistently maintained the policy that emphasized the use of warfare to test the forces, to train officers and to summarize lessons from warfare to constantly improve equipment, training and organization so their war machine keeps running better. In the Gulf War, the war in Kosovo and in the war in Afghanistan, the U.S. military always emphasized the assessment of the effectiveness of weapon on the battlefield and raising recommendations for the improvement of these weapons as well as placing special emphasis on allowing those who command combat to participate in the development and improvement of weapons to achieve

having combat requirements lead weapons development. In the Iraq war, we can see the results of the lessons learned by the U.S. forces in the three previous wars in a number of different aspects. When the Iraq war had just ended, the director of the Defense Department Force Transition Office stated that the experiences of the Iraq war will become the key for further changes. Based on the experiences of the Iraq War, the U.S. forces are proposing plans for personnel changes and preparing to change 320,000 military positions to civ8ilian or contractor positions in order to expand the size of the forces.

FOURTH, LOOKING AT THE FACTOR FOR VICTORY IN THE WAR, IT WAS STILL SUPERIORITY OVER INFERIORITY: USING ABSOLUTE SUPERIORITY TO WIN VICTORY AT THE LOWEST POSSSIBLE COST

For the U.S. forces, the Iraq War was almost line a large scale live exercise against the background of real war, or it could be called a unique war against a unique adversary under unique conditions. However, it should also be noted that it basically reflected the direction of the transition of the U.S. military and its ability to fight informationized warfare, especially its superiority in joint information. If we say that the first Gulf War was gave an understanding of the superiority of its Air and Navy forces and the power of its missiles, then the Iraq war provided an initial understanding of the power of joint operations using information technology. With just this superiority, the U.S. forces ended Saddam's 24 years of rule in just three weeks. In the war in Iraq, the U.S. military used 186 satellites which could receive all sorts of information from the battlefield. After evaluation and filtering of this information by over 100 intelligence and operations command personnel, it was relayed to the screen of the highest ranking commander at the greatest possible speed, ensuring timely decision making by the commander. Because the United States had absolute superiority in "one-way transparency" of information, this war was fought according to their rules.

Naturally, the most lasting impressions of the war in Iraq were the "variables," and they changed imagination. For example, during the war, large scale electronic warfare was carried out before any air strikes; the primary target of air strikes were mostly command and communications centers at the residence of the military and political leaders, with almost no bombing of facilities and civilian facilities in the cities; there was no ground assault after large numbers of the enemy had been killed; they did not take major defense positions and then march into Baghdad; they did not wait for relief forces to attack the capital; the war ended without urban fighting in the streets and alleys. The basic reason for this was the role of science and technology. That is, high tech weapons and equipment with information technology at the core. According to Vice President Cheney, it was because of the new forms of warfare used by the U.S. forces in the war in Iraq: the percentage of precision guided weapons reached 68%; the use of high technology permitted the time required for target reconnaissance evaluation and strike preparation from the two days necessary in the Gulf War to just a few seconds; the use of high

technology provided the decision making levels with a new concept of war, and the experiences accumulated in past wars were completely useless in this war; the objectives of the war were changed from the destruction of the enemy's ability to resist in its cities, economy and population to the use of high tech intimidation to break the enemy's will at a smaller cost.

Overall, the war in Iraq served to promote the new strategies of the United States, to test its new tactics, and as a comprehensive testing ground for its new weapons. It served as a stage for the United States to display its determination, strength and policy of hegemony. There were some new changes worthy of note in the United States' objectives, strategic guidance, forms of combat, combat command and combat support in this war.

FIRST, OBJECTIVES IN THE WAR: DISPLAY ONE'S SELF, CONTROL THE ENEMY

Military strategy and objectives or war are determined by political strategy. Since the beginnings of war, preserving one's self and destroying the enemy have been the basic objectives of wars. The war in Iraq, however, did not follow these rules. To preserve their own forces, the United States military relied on their great superiority in informationized weapons, and primary considerations in the war were not how to preserve their own forces, but were the pursuit of the objectives of ensuring victory, a quick fight to a quick finish, displaying themselves (including will and capability), and defeating the enemy and intimidating potential adversaries, resulting in multiple effects of the war. The advances in technical means made the changes in the objectives of the war possible. In order to achieve these objectives, the U.S. forces first of all changed their tactics of first conducting prolonged large scale air strikes, conducting joint operations by all services from the very beginning of the war, with actions taking place at the same time in the air and on the ground and at the front and in depth, using naval and air forces in concentrated strikes against strategic targets in Iraq, using special forces to seize major in-depth targets. In less than 15 hours following the initial air strikes, ground forces conducted a "quick fighting to a quick finish decisive battle." Within three days, lead units of the U.S. 3rd Mechanized Division had penetrated 200 kilometers inside of Iraq. In three days, the 3rd Mechanized division advanced about 700 kilometers. This was four times that of the Gulf War. This may have been done for the Iraqis to see, but it as also done to give the rest of the world to see. The U.S. objectives were not to destroy Iraq, but to control Iraq, so it was necessary to focus on the rebuilding of Iraq. An American colonel stated "throughout recorded history, there has never been a country or an army which was able to both win a war and to preserve the local resources and basic facilities while also keeping not-combat casualties to a minimum and also conducting humanitarian actions." Rumsfeld also stated that this is a time when it is necessary "to minimize the loss of life for allied forces and Iraqis." Actually, the U.S. forces not only toppled the Iraqi regime, but also raised changes in the stances of a number of countries. To a certain degree, this achieved the objective of displaying themselves.

### SECOND, STRATEGIC GUIDANCE: LIGHTNING STRIKES FOR INTIMIDATE TO "STRIKE FIRST TO CONTROL THE ENEMY"

The strategic guidance and combat methods in a war are determined by the objectives. In order to achieve the objectives of displaying themselves, the United States used the strategy of striking first to control the enemy" and lightning strikes and intimidation. The war in Iraq was the first time the United States used the strategy of "striking first to control the enemy." That this should become the strategy of the United States indicates that war has become an inevitable continuation of United States politics, and that it has become an effective choice for United States power politics. This is a major change in the national strategy and military strategy of the United States. In order to realize this strategy, the United States used the theory of "shock and fear" proposed in 1996 in the war in Iraq emphasizing the use of fierce firepower, shocking strikes against he enemy, no differentiation between the front and the rear, conducting rapid strikes against he enemy from all directions, and attacking enemy targets while attempting to minimize casualties on both sides; launching air and ground actions at the same time to destroy the will of the enemy so its regime crumbles, thereby achieving the objective of defeating the enemy's military without a fight; carrying out such tactics as "decapitation," "a quick and decisive battle," "shock and fear" and "cutting off the head of the snake." In past wars, the U.S. forces emphasized deterrence before the war, but once war began, deterrence was ineffective, and once war broke out, they abandoned deterrence and concentrated solely on military actions. This war was clearly different, with combat and deterrence conducted throughout the war. The second stage of the war was codenamed "shock and fear," which clearly demonstrates this point. The reason the U.S. forces used this strategic guidance was the lesson learned from the Vietnam War and the experience from a number of wars since the end of the cold war. It is not only using a battleaxe to kill a chicken, but also using it early on to kill more than one bird with one tone.

### THIRD, COMBAT COMMAND: PRECISE, JOINT AND TIMELY COMMAND

Command is the most effective method of bringing subjective activism to bear, but it is very difficult. During the war in Iraq, the United States used its superiority in information in an attempt to achieve precise joint command. The united states used its tremendous informational superiority for accurate reconnaissance and early warning, precise moving positioning, precise coordination and command, precise transmission of information, precision strikes against targets, precise damage assessments and precise advances of logistics support to achieve precision in everything from strategic planning to campaign deployment to tactical strikes, from drafting the war plans to preparing for the war, to deploying for the war, to battlefield support, to striking targets, intelligence support, and command and control. Most people believe that all of this depended upon a seamless digital network composed of sensors, communications facilities and weapons. Actually, it made greater demands on commanders at all levels be familiar with and

understand the precisely drafted joint combat plans. First of all, there must be a uniform combat theory and combat philosophy, after which the plans are drafted. Prior to the war, the United States took a number of different steps to constantly improve the precision of the combat plan and to unify the philosophy and actions of commanders at all levels. Following the last Gulf War, the U.S. military has always maintained combat contingency plans focusing on Iraq and have listed them among the five major combat contingency plans and has made updates and revisions to these plans every two to four years. In January of 2002, with authorization from President Bush, the U.S. military began to formally draft the "overthrow of Saddam" war plans, and in 14 months they discussed no less than 20 different plans. The U.S. Department of defense and General Franks conducted a number of briefings and discussions, and President Bush was personally briefed on more than ten occasions. The United States military conducted exercises of varying sizes to ensure a good job in command and control in the war in Iraq. Through these exercises and through training, the U.S. military on one hand was able to conduct testing and demonstration of the Iraq war plans, with revisions and improvements when any problems were detected, and on the other hand, was also able to test and improve the abilities of command personnel at all levels to use new command measures for command and coordination of large scale joint operations, to test and calibrate the command communications of command posts at different levels and to test the precise coordination abilities of the units of the different services.

The precise and joint U.S. command was determined by both technology and by commanders with a philosophy of joint operations. Looking at the resumes of several of the high-ranking U.S. commanders, they all have experience in commanding joint operations. They are officers of the highest quality, so with technical support, they were basically able to achieve real time command. Highly effective information processing supported mechanized warfare, primarily using precision guidance weapons: informationized warfare is primarily highly effective information processing supplemented by precision-guided weapons. In the war in Iraq, the U.S. forces applied space equipment down to the smallest combat unit, achieving the digitalization of the individual soldier so special forces soldiers were able to use space-based systems to transmit target location information at the greatest possible speed for direct guidance of long-range, precision strikes by firepower outside the theater, achieving result-based, real time precision command and strikes. During the Gulf War it took 80 to 102 minutes to complete the F2T2EA chain (detection – positioning – tracking – aiming – attack – assessment), in the war in Kosovo, it took about 30 to 45 minutes, in the war in Afghanistan it took 15 to 19 minutes, but in the war in Iraq it took only about 10 minutes. In the Gulf War, most of the U.S. combat aircraft followed an air strike plan drafted the day before, and it was very difficult to change the air strike plans when new targets were detected during operations. During the war in Kosovo, a portion of aircraft conducting air strike missions were given new strike targets after they took off. This portion was greatly increased during the war in Afghanistan. During the war in Iraq, the strikes were almost real time. We can see from the operations of the informationized war machine that the planning and preparation time for the war was long, the logistics support time

was long, the time for the conduct of the war was short, that there were many command personnel in the war, there were more combat support personnel and fewer main combat unit personnel. This means that information technology has not only resulted in changes in the forms of combat, but has also brought about changes in the methods and procedures in preparing for war: warfare is no longer the monopoly of armed forces and the soldier. Everything from innovations in combat theory to the combat tactics, from the conduct of combat to battlefield support requires the participation of civilians. The civilianizing of preparations for war and the marketizing of research into military theory will be the trend in future developments.

FOURTH, FORMS OF COMBAT: CONTROLLING THE GORUND FROM SPACE, USING PRECISION AGAINST PRECISION

The United States has used different forms of combat in almost every one of the several wars they have launched following the end of the cold war. The 1991 Gulf War reflected primarily "non-linear mobile warfare" joint operations using "first strike by air and then by ground, with air strikes being the primary form." The war in Afghanistan was special operations joint operations with assistance across the total spectrum. The war in Iraq was unified joint operations using primarily air forces. Some people believe that in the Gulf war the U.S. Air Force played the leading role, that the main forces were the cruise missiles and with the army playing a supporting role. In the war in Iraq, however, the Air Force played a supporting role, primarily providing support and cover for the ground assault missions while the Army played the leading role, and the precision guided weapons were the primary force. Actually, the air actions in the war in Iraq were not merely support, but were also leading actions which continued through the entire course of the war. The air actions were necessary for of the ground assaults, urban fighting and special forces operations. Even the ground fighting was three-dimensional combat with space, air, ground and naval forces. The reason the U.S. ground forces dared to drive in along the highways was that they were certain the Iraqis would not dare to resist with entire battalions or regiments because there was nowhere for the Iraqis to hide large scale units in the open desert and they cold be easily detected and destroyed by U.S. patrolling aircraft. During the war in Iraq, the U.S. and British forces would have been unable to advance and their ground weapons would not have been as effective without the coordination of precision air strikes.    During the war in Iraq, the U.S. launched an average of over 1,000 sorties per day, launched a total of over 800 cruise missiles and dropped over 20,000 precision-guided bombs. We can also see that "the Navy, army and Air Force units can share intelligence and tactical information even more quickly, so all units have an awareness of the big picture and can adapt to changes even more quickly." All of this results from the superiority of the U.S. forces in space and the air. So-called precision against precision is the use of precision weapons to strike precisely selected targets. Technical advances have allowed the U.S. forces to complete larger missions with fewer aircraft and fewer troops. The United States mobilized 500,000 troops for the Gulf War, but only 125,000 in the war in Iraq. This signifies that the United States military

no longer need concentrate its energy on the destruction of the enemy, but it can concentrate its forces on attacking targets. In strikes against targets, the U.S. and British forces no longer used blind saturation bombing, but precisely selected targets to be attacked. "Tomahawk" cruise missiles with a range of 1600 kilometers have a circular probability of error of only three meters. In order to deal with hardened underground bunkers, the U.S. especially developed and produced a batch of precision missiles for attacking underground bunkers. These can penetrate up to 15 meters of cement, sufficient to damage underground bunkers and command posts.

## FIFTH, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE: MULTIPLE ELEMENT FORCES, STRATEGIC ROLES

Psychological warfare has been around since ancient times. The war in Iraq was different, however, first of all in the elevation of psychological operations to a strategic level. Second, in changing the timing for the outbreak of the war. This is because psychological warfare began before the first shell exploded. Psychological attacks were closely coordinated with battlefield operations, closely combining the physical battlefield with the invisible battlefield. This was a prominent characteristic of the war in Iraq. In the war in Iraq, the U.S. forces conducted large scale, high intensity and multiple forms of psychological operations against the Iraqis and made special use of information technology in psychological warfare. The detail and scope of the joint forces psychological warfare plans were unprecedented. Before the war, the joint forces drafted detailed psychological warfare plans, and made comprehensive use of different psychological warfare methods during the war in psychological assaults. Psychological warfare is no longer limited to military fields or to the battlefield, but it has been expanded to cover all aspects of the international community and it has increasing effects on and beyond the battlefield.

The participation of the media, the direct broadcasting of the war are et another characteristic of this war. During the Gulf War, the Pentagon demanded the reporters stay far from the front lines. Today, the United States believes that since the military cannot control the military, it might as well make full use of the media and utilize the propaganda media as a tool of psychological warfare and to incorporate it into the overall war plans. Just as printed in the "New York Times," the U.S. forces were forced to accept the media, but they make the greatest possible use of the media. The U.S. has established a "Strategic Effects Office' (Now changed to the Global Propaganda Office) for the purpose of controlling international opinion. During the war, the U.S. and British authorities increased controls over the media, especially controlling news reports concerning opposition to the war, civilian casualties and coalition casualties. Prior to the war, the United States and England arranged for more than 550 reporters to accompany the military forces in combat training and set the limits to reporting. Once the war began, the news was constantly reported on television sets and newspapers around world that the war was proceeding smoothly. The United States forces used the information provided by the media to

harass and intimidate the leadership levels within the Iraqi military. Naturally, the Iraqi leaders also provided videotapes of U.S. prisoners of war, downed aircraft and wounded or dead civilians to the Arab television. Psychological warfare must be incorporated within peoples war.

### SIXTH. SPECIAL OPERATIONS: UNPRECEDENTED SCALE, MAY DIFFERENT TYPES OF MISSIONS

Special operations generally refer to crack units with special organization training and equipment which use special tactics to conduct unconventional combat actions. During the war in Iraq, large special forces units were used to perform a broad range of missions and playing a major role in the war. Their actions included gathering intelligence, point out targets for air strikes and guiding attacks; preventing the Iraqis from conducting missile attacks against Israel; and protecting the Iraqi oil fields. Conducting operations by combining high tech with special forces tactics is one of the major achievements in the military reforms of the United States. According to reports, the United States used over 10,000 special forces on the battlefield in the war in Iraq, twice as many as in the Gulf War and perhaps the most in the history of warfare. The special forces did everything in Iraq, and they started before the war formally began on March 20. 2003. On April 6, the Headquarters for the U.S. special forces in the Gulf region issued a statement that in the war in Ir4aq, the U.S. and British special forces took action of unprecedented scale resulting in unprecedented achievements. The General Franks, commander in chief of the U.S. Central Command stated in his initial press conference following the start of the war that all air strikes by the coalition forces so far had been conducted based on accurate target intelligence. It was because of these tremendous achievements by the special forces that the U.S. media reported that the U.S. special. Forces commander Hollander had already proposed to the pentagon increasing the size of special forces by adding another 9000 to the already 47,000 in place, and for five years beginning on October 1, 2004, the special forces would require 23 billion U.S. dollars in extra funding for the "transition to special agents" of the special forces to lay the "foundation" for shouldering the responsibility for conducting strikes against "Al Qaida" and other terrorist organizations around the world. In the past, special forces units primarily conducted independent missions, but now they are primarily responsible for target indication missions. This raises new demands for special forces training. It is worth looking into whether more money should be spent on building up the special forces or if other forces should possess certain features of special forces.

### SEVENTH. COMBAT SUPORT: SUFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE, WITH CIVILIAN SUPPORT

The United States had a number of successes in the gulf War, but they did not include logistics equipment and support. At the time, of the 40,000 container loads shipped to the theater, half were not used, with 2.7 billion Dollars worth of supplies being shipped back to the

United States. In the war on Iraq, the U.S. military used "timely logistics supply" – materials were only delivered to where they were needed at the time they were needed, and there was no storage to deal with possible situations. "For today's warfare, there is no need for large-scale storage of materials, but what is needed is very high tech system support. Inspired by Fedex and "WO'ERMA" (phonetic) Corporation, the Army equipped each of its transport vehicles with a radio sensor which could send a signal precisely indicating its position so the soldiers were able to use electronic equipment to control their logistics supply and could automatically monitor where the supplies were unloaded. This enabled materials to be found in 20 minutes during the war on Iraq, which would have taken several days during the Gulf War. During the Gulf War the U.S. forces first deployed combat forces and then deployed support forces. The vanguard units relied primarily on the host countries to provide support forces, encountering fairly serious problems. This time, the U.S. forces deployed support forces first. In the early stages of force deployment, two theater support headquarters under the U.S. Army Headquarters Europe deployed advance support forces to countries around Iraq and the support forces within the Army were deployed together with the combat forces. In order to ensure weapons operated normally, the U.S. forces also placed special emphasis on using reserves to improve support capabilities. Because there are an increasing number of technical fields involved in modern weapons, active forces are not only incapable of maintaining such a large number of training facilities, they are also unable to provide overall training to their support personnel in so many different fields. The reserves, however, can easily obtain the skills needed for support through civilian channels. It would cost six times as much for the active duty forces to perform the support mission as it would for the reserves to do the same thing. The U.S. forces are currently continuing to expand the support role of the reserves in time of war. In the war on Iraq the U.S. forces called up seven groups of reserves totaling 155,000 men, more than the number of active duty forces. A number of U.S. defense contractors assigned personnel to Kuwait and Iraq to provide maintenance and repair and logistics support for systems they had manufactured, and at times even directly operated these systems. This goes to show that in logistics construction, not only is it necessary to emphasize learning advanced management methods from the civilian sector, but it is also necessary to adjust the center of gravity of logistics.

There continue to be advances in science and technology, and continue to be developments in warfare. There are similarities and differences between the war on Iraq and wars in the past. There is only one way to correctly reveal the laws of informationized warfare and to scientifically determine the strategy for building informationized forces. That is to keep up with the times in ones way of thinking. Promoting a military reform, which is uniquely Chinese, requires thinking, decision-making and actions, which keep up with the times. This is also the most valuable thing we should learn from the war on Iraq.

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