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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

FOIA Case: 104363  
30 May 2018

JOHN GREENEWALD  
27305 W LIVE OAK RD  
SUITE 1203  
CASTAIC CA 91384

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of 18 May 2018 for Intellipedia pages on Adel al-Jubeir which was received by this office on 18 May 2018. Your request has been assigned Case Number 104363. For purposes of this request and based on the information you provided in your letter, you are considered an "all other" requester. As such, you are allowed 2 hours of search time and the duplication of 100 pages at no cost. Your request has been processed under the provisions of the FOIA.

For your information, NSA provides a service of common concern for the Intelligence Community (IC) by serving as the executive agent for Intelink. As such, NSA provides technical services that enable users to access and share information with peers and stakeholders across the IC and DoD. Intellipedia pages are living documents that may be originated by any user organization, and any user organization may contribute to or edit pages after their origination. Intellipedia pages should not be considered the final, coordinated position of the IC on any particular subject. The views and opinions of authors do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government.

We conducted a search across all three levels of Intellipedia, and located the documents that are responsive to your request. The documents are enclosed. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the documents.

Some of the withheld information has been found to be currently and properly classified in accordance with Executive Order 13526. The information meets the criteria for classification as set forth in Subparagraph (c) of Section 1.4 and remains classified CONFIDENTIAL as provided in Section 1.2 of Executive Order 13526. The information is classified because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause damage to the national security.

Also, this agency is authorized by statute to protect certain information concerning its activities (in this case, internal URLs), as well as the names of its employees. Such information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA, which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statute applicable in this case is Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605). We have determined that such information exists in this record, and we have excised it accordingly.

In addition, personal information regarding individuals has been deleted from the enclosure in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6). This exemption protects from disclosure information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In balancing the public interest for the information you request against the privacy interests involved, we have determined that the privacy interests sufficiently satisfy the requirements for the application of the (b)(6) exemption.

Since these deletions may be construed as a partial denial of your request, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. If you decide to appeal, you should do so in the manner outlined below.

- The appeal must be in sent via U.S. postal mail, fax, or electronic delivery (e-mail) and addressed to:

NSA FOIA/PA Appeal Authority (P132)  
National Security Agency  
9800 Savage Road STE 6932  
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6932

The facsimile number is (443)479-3612.

The appropriate email address to submit an appeal is [FOIARSC@nsa.gov](mailto:FOIARSC@nsa.gov).

- It must be postmarked or delivered electronically no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. Decisions appealed after 90 days will not be addressed.
- Please include the case number provided above.
- Please describe with sufficient detail why you believe the denial was unwarranted.
- NSA will endeavor to respond within 20 working days of receiving your appeal, absent any unusual circumstances.

For further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request, you may contact our FOIA Public Liaison at [foialo@nsa.gov](mailto:foialo@nsa.gov). You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. OGIS contact information is: Office of Information Services, National

Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park,  
MD 20740-6001; e-mail: [ogis@nara.gov](mailto:ogis@nara.gov); main: 202-741-5770; toll free: 1-877-  
684-6448; or fax: 202-741-5769.

Sincerely,

  
*for*

JOHN R. CHAPMAN  
Chief, FOIA/PA Office  
NSA Initial Denial Authority

Encls:

a/s

# (U) Crisis in Qatar

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From Intellipedia

(U) The Crisis in Qatar, also referred to as the "Gulf Crisis" is a developing situation between Qatar and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

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## (U) History

(U) Over the last few decades Members of the Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) have accused Qatar of destabilizing the region and claimed Doha has relations with the Islamic State, Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood. The tension has increased drastically over the last few year in response to the Arab Spring. Many Gulf and Arab countries have harshly criticized Qatar's news channel Al Jazeera for providing a platform for the brotherhood to voice it's views. In March 2014, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE pulled their ambassadors in Qatar claiming that Qatar was supporting armed groups (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood) and that it's hostile media (Al Jazeera) was interfering with the affairs of other countries. However, during this event the borders between these countries remained open. The result of this situation lead to 7 Muslim Brotherhood leaders leaving Qatar, Qatar's agreement to not provide support to armed groups and more editorial regulation of Al Jazeera. [1] [2]

(U) There are at least two narratives for how we got here. If you believe the government of Qatar, the official Qatar News Agency was hacked on May 24 and a fake news story was transmitted quoting Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani as saying, "There is no reason behind Arabs' hostility to Iran." The allegedly false report reaffirmed Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian offshoot, Hamas, as well as claiming Doha's relations with Israel were good.[3]



Qatar Regional Map

## (U) Overview

(U) On June 5- June 6 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Maldives, and Yemen cut diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing Qatar of supporting terror groups. Resulting in a closure of all land air in sea routes through these countries to Qatar. All GCC countries ordered their citizens out of Qatar. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE gave Qatar visitors 2 weeks to leave their countries. [4] Bahrain and Egypt gave Qatari diplomats 48 hours to leave their countries.[5] Qatar was also expelled from the Saudi Arabian-led intervention within Yemen. [6] [7]


(U) As of June 10, the list of countries that cut diplomatic ties with Qatar grew adding Mauritania, Comoros.[8] , Libya, and Somaliland [9]

(U) As of June 12 2017, Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Jordan, Niger and Senegal downgraded their

diplomatic ties with Qatar without fully cutting their relations. [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

## (U) U.S. Relations with Qatar

(U) A recent Congressional Research Report, by Kenneth Kztzman provided the following summary: Qatar hosts nearly 10,000 U.S. forces at its military facilities, including those that house the regional headquarters for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). These forces are participating in operations all over the region, including Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) against the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria. The United States and Qatar have had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) since 1992, which provides for the U.S. troop presence, consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar, U.S. training, and other defense cooperation. The Qatari government is helping the United States combat regional Islamist terrorist organizations. However, radical Islamist organizations profess ideologies that are attractive to some Qatari citizens, and there have been repeated accusations by international observers that wealthy Qataris have contributed funds and services to these groups. Members of Congress generally have taken into account these and all the other aspects of Qatar's policies in consideration of U.S. arms sales to Qatar. Even though Qatar's former Amir stepped down voluntarily, U.S. and international reports criticize Qatar for numerous human rights problems. Most of them, such as suppression of critics using social media and deprivation of labor rights, are common to the other GCC states. A recent Gulf-wide trend also apparent in



(U) US Forces Based in Qatar

Qatar has been a crackdown on dissent against the ruling establishment on social media networks. Qatar is also the only one of the smaller GCC states that has not yet formed a legislative body that is at least partly elected, even though such elections have long been promised. Qatar has held municipal elections, most recently in 2015. Qatar is wrestling with the downturn in global hydrocarbons prices since 2014, as are the other GCC states. Qatar is positioned to weather the downturn because of its small population and substantial financial reserves. Qatar shares with virtually all the other GCC states a lack of economic diversification and reliance on revenues from sales of hydrocarbon products.<sup>[15]</sup>

(U) Qatar entered into a formal defense cooperation agreement (DCA) with the United States on June 23, 1992. The DCA was renewed for 10 years, reportedly with some modifications, in December 2013. While the specific text is classified, the agreement provides for U.S. military access to Qatari military facilities, pre-positioning of U.S. armor and other military equipment, and U.S. training of Qatar's military forces.<sup>[16]</sup> The U.S. personnel deployed to Qatar participate in U.S. operations such as Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) to combat the Islamic State organization in Iraq and Syria. Qatar's own air force participated in some of the first OIR air strikes against Islamic State forces in Syria in late 2014 but, after a few weeks of such operations, Qatar curtailed its participation in the air operations, according to press releases from the U.S. military.<sup>[17]</sup>

(U) Qatar is a complicated situation for the United States because, Qatar has played a dual role in its fight against radicalism in the Middle East. The US knows Qatar is a large source of support and funding for groups it considers to be terrorist organizations, like Hamas, or adversaries, like the Muslim Brotherhood. But on the other hand, it has also been willing to allow the Pentagon to operate bases in its territory and to serve as an intermediary between Washington and Islamist groups across the region. One high-profile example, Qatar helped broker the deal with the Taliban that won the release of the imprisoned US Army SGT. Bowe Bergdahl. This shows successive US administrations have been willing to work with Qatar out of a belief that the positives outweighed the clear negatives, including its unofficial support for militant activities in the region. The US's interest for all the countries in the region to be on good enough terms to be able to join the US-led campaign against ISIS.

## (U) Russian Involvement

(U) The Qatari government reported a false new statement was put out on 23 May 2017, stating that Qatar's Emir had made friendly comments toward Iran and questioned how long President Trump would remain in office. Qatari officials claimed that this fake news statement was the product of Russian hackers designed to discredit the Emir of Qatar. The Russian government denied any involvement in the situation. A FBI inquiry of the situation revealed that Russian hackers were responsible for sending out the fake messages however, the FBI believes the Russia government has no involvement with the hackers. The FBI stated that they were freelance Russian hackers paid to undertake the work on behalf of another state or individual.<sup>[18]</sup>



(U) Sergey Lavrov(left) meets US SECDEF(right) to discuss the crisis in Qatar

(U) On 10 June 2017, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov spoke with US Secretary of State Rex

Tillerson about the dispute between Qatar and members of the GCC. The discussion "pointed to the need of resolving disagreements through negotiations and expressed their willingness to contribute to such an effort". The Russian Minister also stated to the press after the meeting that Russia was "ready to do everything in it's power" to resolve the crisis in Qatar.<sup>[19]</sup>

## **(U) Qatar Foreign Policy**

(U) Qatar has a tendency to play both sides of the coin. This provides them with a means to arbitrate issues and influence progress throughout the region. Qatar has served as a key mediator in regional conflicts such as engaging Israeli officials while simultaneously entering discussions with Hamas. Qatar's ties to Iranian leaders have proven critical, during this recent period of political turmoil for the country. Additionally, Qatar has hosted an office of the Afghan Taliban movement, and facilitated talks between the United States and the Taliban. Other examples of military intervention include airstrikes to support forces that ousted Libyan leader Mu'ammar Al Qadhafi and support for Sunni groups battling to overthrow President Bashar al Asad of Syria. Qatar developed some ties to the Al Nusra Front rebel group in Syria as part of an apparent effort to persuade the group to sever its links to Al Qaeda.<sup>[20]</sup>

(U) Qatar and the GCC: Qatar is a member of the GCC, often diverging from its GCC allies on key regional issues, embracing Muslim Brotherhood movement, arguing that the movement represents a moderate political Islamist movement which may foster regional stability. A development that has helped GCC unity was the resolution in 2011 of a long-standing territorial dispute between Qatar and Bahrain, dating back to the 18th century, when the ruling families of both countries controlled parts of the Arabian peninsula. Qatar and Bahrain agreed to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1991 after clashes in 1986 in which Qatar landed military personnel on a man-made reef (Fasht al-Dibal) that was in dispute.<sup>[21]</sup>

## **(U)HAMAS's role**

(U) Bethlehem Ma'an News Agency in English 0745 GMT 12 Jun 17

[Unattributed report: " Hamas pledges not to intervene in the affairs of Arab countries amid Qatar crisis"]

BETHLEHEM (Ma'an) -- Days after Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing the Gulf state of supporting "terrorism," the Hamas movement -- named as one of the groups allegedly receiving Qatari sponsorship -- pledged Saturday it would not intervene in the affairs of any Arab countries "regardless of the pressures." "Hamas' weapons will be directed only at the enemy (Israel), and Hamas will maintain its policy of not intervening in Arab countries' affairs regardless of pressures or events," Deputy Hamas chief Mousa Abu Marzouk was quoted in an official Hamas statement as saying. Disagreements among Arab countries, "are their own business," he said, though the question of Palestine "will remain the core issue for everybody, and support for the Palestinian plight should be indisputable regardless of any situation that may arise." Abu Marzouk added that Hamas has come under pressure in the past from the Arab world and internationally, and said "we will always deal with such pressures responsibly. We won't be in disagreement with any country." In a similar statement Friday, Hamas politburo member Khalil al-Hayya that "the Palestinian armed resistance is directed only towards the Israeli occupation, and that the Palestinian resistance will not deviate from this track," he said, reiterating the faction's rejection of its designation as a terrorist organization by the US, Israel, and several other countries. Hamas identifies as a Islamist national resistance movement.

Meanwhile, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Muhammed bin Abd al-Rahman al-Thani reportedly said Saturday that, "The US views Hamas as a terror organization, but to the rest of the Arab nations it is a legitimate resistance movement. We do not support Hamas, we support the Palestinian people." "Hamas's presence in Qatar doesn't mean there's support for Hamas in Qatar," he said, highlighting the fact that Qatar also cooperates with the occupied West Bank-based Palestinian Authority to promote Palestinian reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah. Following the abrupt severing of political ties with Qatar, Hamas slammed the development as a "politicized" attempt to force Qatar to abide by the interests of Israel and the United States. Ahmad Yousif, a former senior Hamas figure who remains close to the movement's leadership, described the political developments as part of an "American-Israeli-Saudi coalition" in the region -- a sentiment expressed by other commentators owing to US President Donald Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia and Israel in recent weeks and Saudi Arabia's growing ties with Israel over the years. Saudi Arabia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir had stated that Qatar would have to cut support to Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood if the country wanted to restore diplomatic relations. Qatar has also reportedly expelled members of Hamas from the country owing to the pressure, however, Hamas denied these claims, saying several leaders left Qatar "willingly" in order to avoid adding to Qatar's difficulties. [Description of Source: Bethlehem Ma'an News Agency in English -- Bethlehem Ma'an News Agency in English -- English-language website of independent, leading Palestinian news agency headed by renowned journalist Nasir al-Lahham. It is part of the Ma'an Network ; URL: <http://www.maannews.net/>] [22]

## **(U) Economic and Socioeconomic Impacts**

(U) Qatar-bound flights by foreign operators can use the airspace of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain under certain conditions, the Gulf countries' civil aviation authorities have said in identical statements. Foreign carriers who submit a request 24 hours in advance, accompanied by the names and nationalities of passengers and crew and a cargo inventory, would be allowed through to Qatar. The aviation authorities of the three countries "reiterated their commitment" to the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation but "reserved their sovereign right to ensure their national security." On 5 June, three Gulf countries and their regional allies severed ties with the sheikhdom, restricting land, air and maritime access to their neighbor. [23]

## **(U) Resulting actions by Iran**

(U) The boycott of Qatar from Saudi Arabia joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt to cut diplomatic ties and close air, sea, and land routes. They stated Qatar is funding terrorist groups threatening their national security and that Doha maintains close relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia's long-standing rival. The closure of Qatar's land border crossing with Saudi Arabia has disrupted food imports. Qatar is reported to source about 80% of its imports via its Gulf Arab neighbors. [24] This has allowed Iran to strengthen their ties with Qatar. Iran is shipping 180 tons of fruits and vegetables to avoid further humanitarian crisis within the country. [25] Iran's Interests in the Qatar-Saudi Arabia Tension aside, the shared gas and oil fields of Iran and Qatar have resulted in good relations between the two countries, forming a divide in the Arab anti-Iranian front. Dr. Ali Bigdeli (University Lecturer) talked about the speculations that this tension can be a prologue to increased pressure on Iran by trans regional powers, and said: "If Iran were to be concerned about the role of trans regional powers in resolving the tension and using it to increase pressure on Iran, it should have been concerned about the Riyadh summit because this anti-Iranian circle was formed at the presence of Trump in the Riyadh summit. [26]

(U) As a result, Iran's strategic position is to break up this coalition through various means. For Iran, the key was Qatar. Iran is attempting to abuse the situation by sending a message to the international community that there is no unity in the GCC or among Arab nations. Iran is rejoicing the fact that the divisions between Qatar and other GCC allies are diverting attention from the region's geopolitical and security priority; which is confronting Iran's military adventurism and expanding influence in the Middle East. While the headlines are directed towards the rift between Qatar and other Arab allies, Iran is liberally increasing its financial, military, advisory, intelligence and weaponry assistance to Bashar Al Assad, Shia militias and some designated-terrorist groups in Syria. Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps and its elite wing, the Quds Force are deploying more troops in Syria as well. In Iraq, Iran is expanding its Shiite militia proxies and arming them in order to further control the political destiny of the nation. [27]

## (U) See Also

- Qatar
- Saudi Arabia
- UAE
- Bahrain
- Yemen
- Egypt
- Gulf Cooperation Council
- Maldives
- Mauritania
- Comoros
- Libya
- Somaliland
- Russia
- United States
- Chad
- Djibouti
- Eritrea
- Jordan
- Niger
- Senegal
- Iran
- HAMAS
- [REDACTED]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

## (U) External Links

- [REDACTED]
- Israel-Saudi-UAE-team-anti-Qatar-lobbying-move (<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/israel-saudi-uae-team-anti-qatar-lobbying-move-170610023635122.html>)
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[Redacted]

- Russian-hackers-Qatar-crisis-FBI-inquiry-Saudi-Arabia-UAE (<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/07/russian-hackers-qatar-crisis-fbi-inquiry-saudi-arabia-uae>)

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

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~~(U//FOUO)~~ [Redacted]

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24. [https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS\\_0\\_0\\_200\\_203\\_121123\\_43/content/Display/IML2017061452698797#index=4&searchKey=26482308&rpp=10](https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_0_200_203_121123_43/content/Display/IML2017061452698797#index=4&searchKey=26482308&rpp=10)
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# (U) Adel Al-Jubeir

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From Intellipedia

 (U) This page has not been edited since March 12, 2013. Please help with completing or updating the page if it has intelligence value

(U) See Intellipedia:Abandoned pages for more information about pages with this banner.

(U) See the discussion page for more information about the status of this page.

(U//~~FOUO~~) His Excellency **Adel A. M. Al-Jubeir** is the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States. His credentials were accepted on 21 February 2007.<sup>[1]</sup>

## (U) 2011 plot to kill Al-Jubeir

(U//~~FOUO~~) On Tuesday, 11 October 2011, the United States Government announced that it had foiled a plot by Iran to assassinate Ambassador Al-Jubeir as part of a major terrorist attack. A criminal complaint charges Manssor Arbabsiar, a 56-year-old naturalized US citizen holding both Iranian and US passports, and Gholam Shakuri, an Iran-based member of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force. The plot called for the assassination of the Saudi envoy in an explosives attack, which could have killed many other people and would have been just "the opening act" in an attack on US soil. The plot also included a bomb and subsequent bomb attacks on the Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington.<sup>[2]</sup>

## (U) Operation RED COALITION

(U//~~FOUO~~) The case, called Operation RED COALITION, began in May 2011 when an Iranian-American from Corpus Christi, Texas, approached a US informant seeking the help of a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador.<sup>[2]</sup>

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2. Agence France Presse report of 11 OCT 2011 [redacted]

Retrieved from [redacted]

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Categories: Abandoned since 2013 | Saudi personalities | Diplomatic incidents

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# (C) Adel Al-Jubeir

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## Summary

(U) **Adel Al-Jubeir** has served as the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United States since January 29, 2007. Prior to this appointment he had served as an advisor to the Royal Court since 2005.

**Adel Al-Jubeir**



**Ambassador to the United States**

<b>Nationality:</b>	Saudi Arabia
<b>Surname:</b>	Al-Jubeir
<b>Given Name:</b>	Adel
<b>Addressed As:</b>	Mr. Ambassador
<b>Pronunciation:</b>	
<b>Date of Birth:</b>	
<b>Place of Birth:</b>	
<b>Languages:</b>	Arabic, German, English

## Personal Data

## Curriculum Vitae

### Awards

### Education

- Bachelor's Degree in Political Science and Economics, University of North Texas
- Master's Degree in International Relations, Georgetown University

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[Redacted]

**Titles**

**Languages Spoken**

**Political Affiliation**

**Religion**

**Skills**

**Physical Data**

**Meeting Notes**

**Cables**

[Redacted]

**Attachments**

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