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Pre-dates
HSCA request

(Call 3rd Agency)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

DC/OS/

EXTENSION

3441

NO

DATE

30 July 1963

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment)

1.

DO/SR

30/7

[Signature]

2.

DO/SAT

SR/CI/

AUG 8 1963

[Signature]

2- This information was sent to CI Staff recently and has probably been forwarded to you for reply. Though you might be able to use this extra copy.

3.

4.

5.

6.

CSR/CI/K

CH

CHANGED FROM RID/CI

7.

8.

EE/G/CE-

19/8

[Signature]

9.

SR/CI/K

[Signature]

10.

11.

SR/CI/A

AUG 20 1963

[Signature]

12.

13.

RID/AN

CRS

14.

RID/MIS

[Signature]

15.

RID/Files

6-8 note in memo on Schroeder apparent BMD approach a subsequent Sov. approach - could Falge have a political job 1963? 8 to 9: Looks like RIS was on him first, but they may have sent Falge (or another) at him for a false flag recruitment attempt. Little bit of info; To be kept in mind.

FORM 3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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100-5-1

SECRET SENSITIVE

5 July 1963

Chief, CI Staff/L
2 C 42 Hqs

Chief, Contact Division, OO

Attempted RUS Penetration of Bell Telephone Laboratories - 44-10612

1. Attached are two memoranda, dated 26 June 1963, from our [] Field Office concerning apparent RUS interest in [] and [] Bell Telephone Laboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. We believe this information should be passed to the FBI immediately. We would appreciate being advised the date this information is forwarded to the Bureau.

2. For your information, permission to brief [] prior to his trip to the USSR was requested by our [] Office but refused by FI Staff. In view of his employment, however, and previous CI/CO contacts with him, FI recommended he be provided with a strong defensive and realities briefing.

3. Further inquiry may be directed to Mrs. [] CI/CO, Support Branch, Room 413, 1717 H Street, N. W., extension 2288.

7/22
George N. []
Adm. [] 7/26/63
advises CI/CO []
for [] []
[] [] 7/26/63

Reals: As stated above

CC: OS

11 Aug 63

100-5-1

APPROVED INDEX

30 JULY 63

CS COPY

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44-10612

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-106

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Chief, Contact Division
Attn : /Lincoln Staff
FROM : Chief, Office

DATE: 1 July 1963

SUBJECT: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs


Ref: ☐ Reports 2988-3 and 2989-3

1. We thought the attached reports would be of interest to Lincoln Staff from a Soviet realities standpoint. We also felt that they should be brought to the attention of Division management because the M.O. outlined therein is becoming a major factor in dealing with sources who have contact with Sovbloc nationals. It has been our experience that the type of activity outlined has been on a marked increase, particularly since the establishment of the KGB 10th Directorate. Although such activity by Sov legals is taking place throughout the continental U.S., undoubtedly its greatest impact is being felt in the and Washington, D.C. areas because of the large Soviet Government establishments in both of these cities. For this reason it would seem imperative that both WAFO and be extremely vigilant for such activity in companies and institutions with which they are dealing in order that it may be recognized in its earliest stages and appropriate CI/CE countermeasures instituted. In order to assist other offices in this respect, we plan to write in the near future an article for the Division Newsletter, outlining some of our experiences along these lines.

2. We were somewhat disappointed in CI Staff's reaction to our recent request for assistance in defensive briefing of the subject of one of the attached reports. It seems to be quite clear now that our original assumption concerning his being R.I.S. targeted was quite correct and that there is a strong likelihood that his current trip behind the Curtain will be utilized by the opposition for provocation and/or an actual recruitment attempt. We wonder in future cases of this nature exactly what support we may expect from Angleton's shop. Although we feel that we have a fair capability for handling such matters here in we do admit that, at least on this one, we would have felt slightly more comfortable had a CI specialist been along, if for no other reason than to preclude any possible Monday morning quarterbacking by the "old pros."

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


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-2-

Subject: Attempted R.I.S. Penetration of Bell Telephone Labs

3. Judging by the attached material, it would appear that, despite established Bell policy (see our 16 May memorandum re Case 39,790), the opposition has seen fit to deflower at least two of Bell's scientific virgins. We seriously wonder at this point just how many other Bell people might be in the same boat. Perhaps, as a result of all this, some representation by Bell management to the KGB will be forthcoming, spelling out to that organization, as was spelled out to our own, established company policy pertaining to such matters. In any event, it would appear that at least one or two Bell scientists, and there are probably more, have been giving the R.I.S. more cooperation and reporting than the Agency. Let's hope that in the near future Bell management takes some effective steps to rectify this rather ludicrous, and patently dangerous, situation.



Attachments: ☐ Reports 2988-3
and 2989-3

☐/mg

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : Chief, Contact Division.

DATE: 26 June 1959

Attn : Support []

FROM : Chief, [] Office

SUBJECT: < Apparent RIS Interest in [] (201-734194) >
Bell Telephone Lab

201-734194

1. 0930-1230 hours 14 June, [] of Bell Labs received a strong defensive briefing in connection with his June-July trip to the USSR and Bulgaria (see our 7 May Coordination Outline for subject). During [] briefing, [] elicited from him that prior to a trip to the USSR in 1959 he had been contacted by an individual who represented himself as a West German Intelligence Officer. More important, we also learned that, at about the same time, RIS cultivation of [] apparently began.

2. Concerning the West German approach, [] indicated that his mother, who resides in Hamburg, was telephoned in 1959 by an individual who claimed to be an old acquaintance of her son's and who was interested in contacting him concerning employment in the US. The caller left a phone number and said that he would appreciate it if [] could call him next time he was in Hamburg. [] mother relayed the message to her son, and, as requested, he telephoned the caller just prior to his 1959 USSR junket. The individual he called identified himself as a West German Intelligence Officer and said that he would like to meet [] as soon as possible. [] agreed. When they met, the individual in question ([] does not recall his name) presented suitable credentials and expressed interest in [] trip to the USSR. According to [] account, the West German Intelligence Officer gave him the old "keep your eyes and ears open" pitch, and told him that he would contact him in the first West German city in which he touched down after his USSR trip. [] was contacted in Stuttgart promptly after returning to Germany from the USSR on his way back to the US. Because of his US employment and the fact that Bell paid for his trip, [] became very apprehensive about any further contact with the West German service and at the time of the call indicated that he had nothing to say and wanted no further contact. Other than the cursory examination of credentials (as reported above), [] made no attempt to establish the bona fides of the German who made the approach. We pointed out to [] the unlikely possibility that the approach might not have been bona fide and might, in fact, have been a provocation.

* copy attached.

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downgrading and
declassification

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Subject: Apparent U.S. Interest in Minors in Soviet Union
Telephone Call

3. Apparently R.I.S. cultivation of [redacted] began prior to the above incident. According to his account, he had received what appeared to be a routine invitation to visit Soviet acoustics facilities in Moscow and Leningrad in August 1955. In connection with the invitation, he wrote to the Soviet government that during his visit he would like to meet V. I. Volgin, a leading Sov acoustics engineer who was very interested in sound waves and had done several Russian translations of Sakis' book. As a result of this correspondence, [redacted] received a telephone call at his home a couple of days prior to his departure for his trip from an individual who claimed to be a Sov official representative in New York. The caller told [redacted] that he had a letter from Moscow for delivery to him a special invitation from G. M. Gvishvili of the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Work. The caller, whose name [redacted] could not recall, said that he would like to deliver the invitation to him personally, but he had to depart. [redacted] indicated that he was very busy, with the last major project which he had to get in order on his trip and asked if the invitation couldn't be delivered to him. When the caller insisted that his instructions were to deliver the invitation personally, Gvishvili finally agreed to have his wife send the letter to him to pick up the invitation. Incidentally, at one point in the conversation [redacted] invited the Sov to deliver the invitation to his home; the latter declined, however, saying that Gvishvili's home was in an area closed to travel by Sov diplomatic personnel. In any event, the Sov arranged to meet Gvishvili's wife in a secret corner in Chatham, New Jersey, and at that time turned over to her the invitation for her husband.

4. [redacted] said that his 1955 visit to the USSR was quite routine and that he could recall nothing but the ordinary happenings during the trip. During the visit, his Sov counterpart, Orlov, who speaks fluent German, acted as his host and was at his side almost continually.

5. (Sometimes in 1951) [redacted] received a phone call at his home one evening from Vladimir Volgin. [redacted] identified himself as a representative of Amtorg (A.S.). Volgin said that Samuel's old friend Furduyev had just completed a visit to New York and before leaving the city had asked him to deliver a present to [redacted] for him, hence the phone call. Volgin insisted on delivering the present to Schneider in person, and the two made arrangements to have lunch together the following week in Manhattan. This began a series of approximately six

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Subject: Apparent His Interest in [redacted]
Bell Telephone Labs.

or more contacts with Volgin which lasted until late 1961 when [redacted] received a note from Volgin stating that he and his family were returning to the USSR in order that his wife could undergo medical treatment there. Incidentally, [redacted] only other contact with Volgin was in 1962 when he met him in Copenhagen at a professional meeting.

6. [redacted] said that most, if not all, of Volgin's phone calls to him were to his home and usually appeared to have been made from pay phones. [redacted] said that his meetings with Volgin included lunches and dinners in Manhattan, socializing at a New York I.R.E. Meeting, theater, and entertainment of each other in their respective homes. [redacted] claims that his wife accompanied him during most of his contact with Volgin. Other than to his own family, Volgin never introduced [redacted] to any other individuals.

7. [redacted] claims that on a couple of occasions he turned over unclassified technical papers to Volgin, who claimed to be an electrical engineer. [redacted] can't recall whether Volgin specifically requested the information or whether he turned it over to him on his own initiative. At one point during their relationship, Volgin asked [redacted] to write an article on US acoustics work for publication in a Soviet technical journal. [redacted] declined.

8. In retrospect [redacted] admitted that he had been quite naive about his relationship with Volgin and expressed some concern that Bell security hadn't been more active in admonishing him against development of relationships with Sov Government representatives. His view of his experiences now completely coincides with ours as a result of our discussion.

9. Another factor which obviously enters into [redacted] R.I.B. picture is his wife's Bulgarian extraction. [redacted] states that neither he nor, to the best of his knowledge, his wife have ever been approached by Soviet representatives in this country concerning his wife's family in Bulgaria. His wife's mother, Ivanalia Menschik, immigrated to the US in April 1960 and lived with [redacted] and his wife until November 1962 when she returned to Sofia, apparently because she was homesick and couldn't adjust to the new language and life in the US. [redacted] said that his mother-in-law's original exit visa request was rejected in 1958 by the Bulgarian Government, but after he and his wife wrote several letters to the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry she was finally granted permission to leave in 1960.

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in [redacted]
Bell Telephone Labs

10. After [redacted] visits the USSR on his current trip, he plans to fly to Sofia to spend approximately a week with his wife's family there. [redacted] had not mentioned the Bulgarian visit in outlining his original itinerary to [redacted] of this office, therefore, it was not mentioned in [redacted] Coordination Outline.

11. All of the above would seem to indicate quite strongly that [redacted], as we originally surmised, has been targeted by R.I.S. In briefing [redacted] we ran through some of the typical entrapment situations fabricated by the opposition, e.g., women, homosexuals, purchase of drugs for Sov citizens, black market activity, acceptance of letters to mail outside the USSR, commitments to disaffected Sovs, etc. In addition, we stringently admonished [redacted] against any notetaking or photography which could in any way be construed as compromising. We also alerted [redacted] to the fact that some attempt might be made to use his wife's family as leverage in a recruitment attempt. In this connection, we pointed out to [redacted] that there was a strong likelihood that the R.I.S. and/or Bulgarian service would make an approach to him during his forthcoming visit to Sofia. An approach in Bulgaria would give the Sovs an opportunity for disavowal and also would provide the proper setting for maximum utilization of relatives. When [redacted] mentioned that his sister-in-law, FNU [redacted] had indicated several times in the past that she would like to leave Bulgaria, we strongly admonished him against making any commitments to her, pointing out that she may possibly be co-opted by the opposition. We told [redacted] that any representations to gain an exit visa for his sister-in-law should be channeled through the US Legation in Sofia. [redacted] was told that, if any pressure were applied concerning his wife's family, his best reaction would probably be a noncommittal, "I'll think it over when I get home." All in all, we alerted [redacted] as best we could to the opposition M.O. and prepared him on how best to avoid some of the not so obvious pitfalls which might be in store for him.

12. Prior to our briefing of [redacted] [redacted] alerted Bell management to all of the ramifications of [redacted] travel behind the Curtain. The management was informed by [redacted] that we felt it our obligation to point out to them the strong possibility that [redacted] had been targeted in order that they would have all of the facts available before signing off on his trip.

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in [redacted]
Bell Telephone Labs

13. Assessment of [redacted] Subject, a very accomplished scientist, heads up all acoustics research [redacted] He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch, and English. He impresses us as being a rather savvy, discreet, cooperative, mature, stable, well motivated individual. We attribute [redacted] apparent lack of discretion in his dealings with the Soviets more to the subtlety of the Sov approach than to his own naivete. It has been our experience that most US businessmen and scientists are very susceptible and vulnerable to the opposition approach mainly due to somewhat of a lack of realistic public education concerning contacts with Sovbloc nationals. We feel that [redacted] degree of cooperativeness with US services has been enhanced considerably by his feeling that he has really been taken for a ride by the opposition.

Incidentally, when we asked subject for permission to release this information with source disclosure to the FBI, he was at first somewhat apprehensive and expressed the desire to talk it over with one of his [redacted] superiors before he made any commitments. He finally agreed, however, when we convinced him that it would certainly be in his best interest to get on record with the FBI as soon as possible. Most of his apprehension about the FBI seemed to be attributable to the fact that he has just been granted US citizenship and, in addition, is now somewhat concerned that his activities with the Soviets in some way may effect his security status which in turn could be very detrimental to his career.

Based on our limited contact with [redacted] we have every reason to believe that he would be suitable for operational use, should the Bureau choose to pursue such a course.

14. We would strongly recommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with [redacted] and provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Sov or Bloc nationals in this country.

[redacted]

[redacted]/ng

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2. FOBI, FOBI as of 1986. Also Germany. C. West
Germany - West German. C. West Germany
and. Also for Germany 22 January 1986.

3. ~~done~~ Abstract: 15. Cases reviewed
Qualitative, for secondary

Page 4 of 30

Technical Staff:
Mr. J. L. Bowers
Murray Hill, New Jersey

Blond v. Nox. v. Loe brenn. v. ch

5. Reference: Subject will tentatively depart US 10 May, arriving Moscow 19 May. In view of the time involved in traveling from Moscow and homing at the invitation of D. Orlovskii, Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research. If the 19 May arrival date is not acceptable to the Soviets, subject will make the trip in June or July.

6. Preceding the Night! During November 1968, while in Europe, subject received an invitation from the USSR Academy of Sciences to visit various Soviet scientific laboratories. Because of a slight schedule at that time subject declined. The invitation. In early March of this year he received the invitation from Orskolend mentioned above.

During the trip, subject will discuss with Soviet counterparts various aspects of voice communication research, electroacoustics, and architectural acoustics. He will also visit Soviet laboratories involved in research in these fields.

7. Security Training: Subject was granted Secret clearance by WLL on 10/1/76. Subject was assigned to the Air Material Command on July 1976 in anticipation of his being used on classified project at Bell Laboratories. Allen was about on subject pending.

3. Harlowe Hurlburt was contacted by me by CA/CO Field Office re identified after a trip to the USSR. At the time he was generally cooperative,

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but somewhat apprehensive. He was again contacted in 1962 for briefing subsequent to a US visit of a Soviet counterpart.

9. Relatives or Close Friends in Denied Areas: Subject's wife was born in Sofia, Bulgaria. She now reportedly holds US citizenship. In November 1962 subject managed to arrange for immigration to the US of his mother-in-law, [redacted]. After a short stay in this country, however, she returned to her home in Sofia in March 1963. In addition to his mother-in-law, presumably there are other relatives of his wife still living in Bulgaria.
10. Extent of Previous Trip to Denied Areas: 13-18 August 1959 subject visited scientific laboratories in Moscow and Leningrad.
11. Analysis of Subject's Capabilities: Subject is a very competent acoustic scientist. He reads Russian and is fluent in German, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch and English.
12. Extent of Personal Assessment: During our constant limited relationship with subject he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, mature, and cooperative.
13. Extent of Substantive Briefing Provided and Requirements to be Fulfilled: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.
14. Defensive and Political Briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and Soviet realities briefing.
15. Briefing Officer and Participation: Briefing will be conducted by C2/30 [redacted] Field Office personnel.
16. Funding of Trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.
17. Finalization Briefing: 15 May 1963.

11617

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET
SENSITIVE

TO : Chief, Contact Division
 Attn : Support []
 FROM : Chief, [] Office

DATE: 26 June 1963

00-A-3266992

([]-29883)

SUBJECT: ~~OF~~ Apparent RIS Interest in []
 Bell Laboratories

DISCUSS
 OFF SCIENTIST
 BELL LABORATORIES

1. During routine debriefing of [] of Bell Laboratories in connection with his recent USSR visit to attend the Popov Society Meeting, 5-14 May, Moscow (see [] 8878 for Coordination Outline)* subject mentioned having had recent contact with a Soviet Government representative in this country. The Soviet in question identified himself to [] as Gleb Aleks² Pavlov and gave his address as 1216 First Avenue, Manhattan.

2. According to [] his initial contact with Pavlov took place in late March following the International Convention and Show of the I.E.E.E., 25-29 March, New York City (see Case 39843). At the convention [] became friendly with two Soviet counterparts in attendance, A. V. Tiel and Anatole Trutka, both of whom [] invited to his home for a social visit during their US stay. When the Sovs departed for home following the convention, [] saw them off at New York International Airport. It was at the airport that he first met Pavlov, who apparently was seeing off all of the Sov I.E.E.E. delegates. After the Sov delegation had departed, [] and Pavlov returned to Manhattan together and, on parting, exchanged addresses.

3. A couple of weeks after their initial meeting, Pavlov telephoned [] at his home and told him that Tiel and Trutka had asked him to send their warmest regards to [] and thank him for the hospitality which he showed them during their trip to this country. During the conversation, Pavlov expressed an interest in renewing his acquaintance with [] and suggested that he would enjoy visiting him at his home in Madison, New Jersey. [] said that he would enjoy seeing Pavlov, but that he was currently preparing to leave on a trip to the USSR and Europe and was not scheduled to return to the US until late May. [] suggested that, in view of this, perhaps early June would be a good time for them to plan on getting together. Pavlov replied that he, himself would be in the USSR then, but would contact [] when he returned in early July. Incidentally, Pavlov's

* copy attached

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declassification

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in [redacted]
Bell Laboratories

phone call to [redacted] was made on a pay phone. In fact, when the operator cut in for overtime, [redacted] called Pavlov back at the pay phone. [redacted] mentioned that he possibly might have the phone number written down somewhere.

4. Soon after the phone call from Pavlov, [redacted] called John McVicker of the State Department and inquired if any clearance of Pavlov's proposed trip to his home in Madison would be necessary. McVicker told [redacted] that any such clearances were Pavlov's worry and that he need not be concerned about same.

5. During his recent trip to the USSR, it would appear that [redacted] was exposed to two incidents which possibly could have been of opposition fabrication. One involved an approach by a Soviet interpreter by the name of FNU Petrov, who took [redacted] aside and asked him if he could do him a personal favor by getting him a subscription to National Geographic Magazine for which he, Petrov, would reimburse [redacted] in rubles. [redacted] politely refused. *sent C.I.T. USSR*

6. The other incident involved [redacted] being photographed with an attractive young female interpreter, Ludmilla Oshkina. According to [redacted] when one of the Soviets in their party was about to take a picture of him standing next to Ludmilla, another individual standing nearby was pushed out of the way apparently so that he would not be included in the photograph. In addition, Ludmilla attempted to strike an affectionate pose with [redacted] for the photograph by slipping her arm through his. [redacted] claims to have pushed her arm away just as the photo was being snapped.

7. Assessment of [redacted]: Subject strikes us as being extremely naive and unrealistic. He appears to be more apprehensive about his dealings with CIA than his dealings with Soviets. In fact, when [redacted] was asked if he would mind if a tape recorder were used for debriefing, he became very nervous and expressed a fear that, if such a tape were made, perhaps the Soviets might gain access to it and use it against him in some way at a future date.

[redacted] had an outline in his own handwriting of the sessions of the Popov Society Meeting. When we asked for a photostat of same, he again expressed misgivings and indicated that he would prefer to have a typewritten copy prepared for us instead of a copy in his own handwriting because he was fearful that it might fall into Soviet hands.

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SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

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Subject: Apparent RIS Interest in []
Bell Laboratories

We inquired of [] why he had not mentioned Pavlov to us during our defensive briefing of him before his trip. He replied rather nebulously that it was his understanding that it was company policy that our only function in seeing him before his trip was to give him a defensive briefing, and that, since no debriefing was involved at the time, he felt no obligation to volunteer the information concerning Pavlov.

It is our opinion that []'s obvious naivete, apparent lack of sophistication, and extreme apprehension concerning dealings with our Agency would make him most unsuitable from the standpoint of operational utilization by the Bureau.

8. We would strongly recommend that all of the above be passed to the Bureau ASAP in order that that organization may effect contact with [] in time to provide him with proper guidance concerning any further approaches by Pavlov or other Sov legals in US.

[]/mg

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10612

SECRET

1 May 1963

~~SECRET~~ Coordination Outline - [redacted] Ball Labs

~~SECRET~~ [redacted] Field Office

Following is coordination outline for [redacted], Dr. W. O. Bahar requested that [redacted] be given defensive briefing by us before going behind Curtain. As you are already aware, Bahar is Vice President at Ball Labs and member of President's Scientific Advisory Council and President's Intelligence Board.

1. Name: [redacted]
2. Date and Place of Birth: [redacted]
3. Name and Address: 48 Fairview Avenue, Madison, New Jersey.
4. Place of employment and position: Ball Labs, Murray Hill, New Jersey; Electronics Engineer.
5. Itinerary: Subject departs on 3 May for Moscow to attend Popov Society meeting, 5-14 May. Following Moscow meeting he will visit labs in Western Europe for approximately one week.
6. Mission and reason for trip: Subject was invited to give paper at Popov meeting by USSR Academy of Sciences via I.E.E.E. (International Electronics and Electrical Engineers).
7. Security Status: We hold favorable SAS completion on subject dated 29 Jan 59.
8. Previous Intelligence Activities: Subject was contacted by CIA/OS 1958-59 concerning info on Soviet work in his field which he acquired from contacts with Soviet scientific counterparts attending international meeting in USSR.
9. Relatives or close friends in denied areas: None.
10. Extent of previous trips to denied areas: None.
11. Analysis of Subject's Competence: Pa. State College, B.S., E.E., 1943; Columbia University, M.A., 1952; US Army Signal Corps, 1943-44; USAF, 1944-46, on radio countermeasures, 1944-45; Retired Lt. Col. USAF; Member (Civilian) panel on Electronics Countermeasures R&D Board, Dept of Defense, 1946-53.
12. Results of personal assessment: During our limited relationship with subject, he has given every indication of being discreet, security conscious, cooperative, well motivated, mature. He is well regarded in his particular field of competence.
13. Nature of substantive briefing proposed and requirements to be met: None. Subject will not be briefed on operations of any kind. No photography or incriminating note taking will be requested of him.
14. Defensive and realities briefing: Subject will receive routine defensive and realities briefing.
15. Funding for trip: Subject's trip will be funded by his company.
16. Briefing office and participants: Briefing will be conducted by [redacted] Office personnel.
17. Coordination Outline: 2 May 1963.

SECRET

10612

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY USSR

REPORT NO.

000-1

SUBJECT Alleged House Arrest of Soviet Scientist, L Chistovich

DATE DISR

NO PAGES

REFERENCES

DATE OF

INFO.

July 63

PLACE &

DATE ACQ -- July 63

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE US citizen, professor in a US university.

He is an authority on acoustics.

1. I attended the Third International Congress on Acoustics, 1-8 Sept 59, Stuttgart, West Germany.
2. While at this Congress I met a Soviet female scientist, L Chistovich, who is connected with the Pavlov Institute of Physiology, Leningrad. One day during the Congress I took a walk in the Black Forest with L Chistovich and another Soviet scientist. After a short time, the other Soviet scientist excused himself saying that he had to rejoin his colleagues.
3. In June 1963 [redacted], an acoustician with Bell Telephone Laboratories, was in the USSR. On his return to the US he told me that he had heard while in the USSR that L Chistovich, on her return from the 1959 Stuttgart Congress, had been placed under house arrest. He also said that he had seen L Chistovich while he was in the USSR, and he had asked her whether it was true that she had been placed under house arrest on returning from the Stuttgart Congress. He said Chistovich's only reply was to blush.
4. I suspect that the individual who reported L Chistovich to the authorities was Yuri Pavlovich Lysanov. He is connected with the Acoustics Institute in Moscow. He publishes very little and his conduct has seemed strange to me. He was in the United States in 1946-1947. I suspect that the fact that L Chistovich took a walk with me alone may well have been the reason she was placed under house arrest.

- end -

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ARMY

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MC

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INFORMATION REPORT

NO DISSEM ABROAD

Dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence component, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who need access to the information. However, unless specifically excluded, paragraph 8 of ICED 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government directly and of the local intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to contractors, except as authorized by the U.S. Government within the scope of the contract.

FBI report dated 22 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Memo for Secretary, 4470 Special Committee

FBI report dated 25 Oct. 62 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Exchange of Information Regarding
Soviet & Satellite Diplomats

FBI report dated 31 Oct. 62 (N.Y., N.Y.)

FBI Memo dated 24 Jan. 63 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 26 Feb. 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 21 March 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 25 April 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 24 May 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 20 June 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 22 July 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 19 Aug 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed (E) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Analysis dated 4 Sept 63 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 4 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C.)

Re: Unknown Subjects (two); Observed Taking
Photographs in Vicinity of U.S. Naval
Station, Wash. D.C.

FBI Report dated 25 Nov. 63 (Wash. D.C.) filed 4(S) 65-63478

Re: Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Activities in U.S.

FBI Report dated 27 Dec 63 (N.Y., N.Y.)

TOP SECRET CROSS REFERENCE SHEET (FBI Report 22 May 63)

Re: Soviet Personnel Intelligence Activities