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Mr. Kito has also informed me, that under the present system, the  
legislative and executive departments are not given the opportunity to  
act, whereas it will be given the opportunity to act in accordance with the  
law.

32. ALSO has information on, does not know what others will be no anomalies present of the  
application of these technical methods and may still cause no runs, does not

Mr. HARRIS AND MRS. "LUCY" TROTTER  
Sgt. CARLSON HEATON  
Sgt. JAMES CESTELLO  
Dr. A. VICTOR HACKE  
Dr. KENNEDY MAY for Dr. RALPH PEASE

THE LITERATURE

other post will automatically go to Mr. Arturo. Dr. Miro said he personally would prefer Mr. Arturo for the post of Minister of Defense but indicated the post may very well go to Mr. Vargas. Our suggestion - transmitted through Mr. Carr - that Mr. Arturo might be an excellent choice for the position of Minister of Defense in view of his popularity with the men in the camps, his youth, his ability to work in with the Strike Force on D-Day as a representative of the Council - was flatly turned down by Dr. Miro who said the position is an important one and must be filled by a man of experience and maturity. He said that Mr. Arturo has considerable promise but he is not ready, as yet, to assume a position of such responsibility.

4. Dr. Miro made it very plain to Mr. Carr that he wishes to cooperate as fully as he can with us but that he will accept no dictation from us and will resign his position if there is any attempt to force decisions on him which he cannot conscientiously go along with. At the same time he assured Mr. Carr that he does not intend, in any way, to interfere with the military aspects of the project. However, he says it is vital that he be able to confer as soon as possible with a person on "the highest level" to discuss the military question and the appointment of a "jefe de operaciones."

5. VISIT TO CAMP. Dr. Miro informed Mr. Carr that he would like to visit the Camp accompanied by all six members of the Council and by an aide. If this is not acceptable he will take only his aide. He will not, as we had suggested, take Mr. Arturo along with him except as a member of his six-man council. When it was pointed out to him that Mr. Arturo's great popularity with the troops might be an important factor in influencing the troops to support the Revolutionary Council, Dr. Miro's response was: "If the Council as constituted by me and under my leadership can't stand on its own merits, we'd better find that out right now". (In a conversation on the evening of 24 March 1961 (after our discussion with Mr. Carr) Mr. Hunt informed Mr. Strother that Dr. Miro had told him that he

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would like to take Mr. Heredia and Lieutenant Rodriguez, a Cuban man who had escaped from La Cabaya a few months ago, with him to the Camp. (We have not received any confirmation of this from Mr. Carr as of this writing.)

6. REDACTAMIENTO A SOLICITUD DE MIRE (Cuban white paper). Dr. Miro informed Mr. Carr that he had charged Judge Antonio Silio with the writing of the so-called "white paper" which we have asked him to prepare and that the paper will be ready by Monday, 27 March.

7. Propaganda Chief. Dr. Miro informed Mr. Carr that Roberto Espin has not been officially appointed as Propaganda Chief of the council and that he himself will wish to examine any important propaganda issued in the name of the Revolutionary Council before it is disseminated.

8. Conclusions and Recommendation

It is already evident that Dr. Miro intends to be a President in fact and not in name only. We feel that this is a healthy sign and that in the long range it will redound to our interests, so long, of course, as he is willing to maintain an open mind and a desire to cooperate, and will honor his commitment not to interfere with the military operation. It would, in our opinion, be a serious mistake to try to impose any person or any course of action on Dr. Miro. This does not mean that we must not try to persuade him along a certain course when the issue is an important one and our arguments are logical and valid. Specifically we would recommend that we let Dr. Miro ~~know~~ who he wants to take to the Camp with him and that we gracefully abide by his decision. Also we feel it of utmost importance that Dr. Miro and his party be received at the camp by our officials with courtesy and deference and that they be accorded all due honors and a free and unhampered hand in their contact with the troops. Any attempt on the part of our officials at the camp to tell Dr. Miro how he will conduct himself, how long he will talk, what he will say, etc., could do us incalculable harm and jeopardize

the ultimate aim of the overall project, which is the replacement of the Castro government by a government which will be friendly to the United States. We feel that this point cannot be over emphasized and propose that unequivocal instructions be transmitted to the Camp for its guidance.

[Redacted]  
Gerard O'Boyle