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October 1961

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE JAG CARD

SUBJECT: List of Outstanding JMAFE Problem Areas

1. Boat Operations. What is the infiltrator-exfiltration authority of RAVB? While we have all agreed for a number of months that authority to run infiltration-exfiltration boat operations should be given RAVB and, in fact, there has been some such authority extended by cable and confirmed in dispatches, but each time a specific operation arises, the same old reservations come up in our minds here in Headquarters. As a specific example, UN 4040 of 4 October, Operation CARIBOU, states that the RAVB is running an infiltration operation, that there is "no KUBARK interest," and that they "only provided them with food and fuel." This is an excellent example of double talk. In fact, it is virtually impossible at the present time for any of the known groups in the Miami area to put an operation of this nature into Cuba without utilizing some personnel who could point a finger at KUBARK and/or the U.S. Government with regard to one or more of the following: contact and/or debriefing by CIA, training, support in repair or maintenance of boats, knowledge of KUBARK installations, special visa consideration, Coast Guard and IAMI forbearance or non-observance of covert type activities and the like. In view of this, is it incumbent upon the Division or the Branch to acknowledge with an "approved" or "disapproved" message in response to UN 4040?

2. It will be recalled that several weeks ago former Ambassador to London SCJAB proposed a sabotage operation of a peculiarly and flagrantly unsavory nature. We had some reservations about this, first of all, because of LDCB's holdings in the Dominican Republic and a lot of other places, and at the French level, we did not know if the Agency wanted to become a partner with LDCB. We did not believe that SCJAB would "buy" the proposal without some expression of U.S. Government approbation. Thirdly, we doubted whether all the mechanics of pulling the operation could be effected without some direct Government support. Finally, we felt the U.S. would be, in any event, accused before the UN of being sponsor, or at least tolerated the operation, and we were not sure what the U.S. government "posture" would be in such an event. After various consultations at various levels in the Agency, SCJAB was told we would not finance the operation. He has now come back and stated that Aliceburg and Malone will finance the operation and has implied, at least, that the Canadians will permit him to buy the planes and other equipment. All they want now is the green light from KUBARK. We in the Branch do not see that the situation has changed very much, but would like to bring this matter to the attention of HQ for authority for review. In short, when is "plausible denial" more than "self-delusion" in this type of thing?

3. A.I.C. Goodwin and his lawyers. It does not advise that the Cuban factions of the lawyers and judges refused to accept assistance from MIRC, as we thought they probably would. It will be recalled that on C.U.T 47836 A.I.C. was informed on 10/24/61 that responsibility for organization and plans for exile Cuban, priests and lawyers will lie with MIRC's. This cable was cleared, according to Col. King, by Mr. Goodwin and AIA of State, as noted on the cable 11:21M b, Col. King, Conclusion: Do we now wish to support the Cuban lawyers in any way or just let them drift and possibly become a nucleus of opposition to MIRC, and another divisive factor of significance over whom we will (then) exert virtually no influence?

4. CONTE Aguirre and Mr. Howard Hunt's memorandum of conversation with Mr. Marshall, C.U.T 973, mentioned above, stated that turning the lawyers over to MIRC did not constitute a precedent and MIRC's demand for responsibility as exclusive channel to Cuban exile groups, Dixie and Ford, specifically rejected. A.I.C. agreed (then) that strategy to turn these groups into the CRC would likely in the long run prove counter productive, although hopefully we could endeavor to give political guidance to the leaders of these entities. Since then we have had an exchange of cables with Brazil in which it was indicated by Brazil that MIRC in fact went back to CONTE Aguirre and insisted that CONTE's future activities be subject to the direction of the CRC. In reply to A.I.V. that CONTE's long maintained position of non-alignement with any political group was an asset; for his activities and his job would not depend on his joining the CRC. Now we have a memorandum of 6 October from Mr. Hunt which in effect says we must reach an understanding with CONTE whereby independent support cannot be used to impede CONTE's joining the CRC. This of course does not mean that CONTE's broadcasts need be terminated, simply that they be filtered and conducted through the existing CRC mechanism. Obviously this is in direct contradiction to our previous understanding with AIA and the White House. Aside from the need for Hunt to keep in closer touch with the Agency, what is the answer?

5. CRC and internal Cuban groups. We have now been informed that as a result of our urging, the principal internal political groups have agreed to send representatives to the CRC, however, before final agreement:

- 1.

If this is given to MIRO, probably in the next day or two, they would then have a real reading from us as to whether we sincerely want to do this and what by U. They say, and MIRO admitted to HUB/RH, representatives on 10 September, that they had told him so, that the CEC was of no importance on the inside. They also say they see no real use in having the CEC unless it helps the U. S. Government in some way.

a. It will be recalled that Col. Johnson has been sent to Miami under no cover for TSY to meet with MIRO. MIAC on the other hand, having fully utilized his strength vis-a-vis Washington in getting Col. Johnson assigned to Miami now leaves Col. Johnson sitting in Miami while he, at the scheduled time for the meeting, comes to Washington to raise questions, such as: did FBI know of Col. Johnson's appointment before Col. MIRO, knew? Obviously MIAC is following the advice still of YRCNA and is playing politics against the Agency. Questions: Is it now worthwhile trying to establish a public relations cover for Col. Johnson or should we simply have him represent himself as an intermediary of the U. S. Government? This "cover" indicates clearly the lack of any real agreement in the White House and State Department; or for that matter in the Agency as to exactly how we wish to conduct relations with the CEC, even at a procedural level, much less with regard to major substantive issues. Any guidance on this would be extremely helpful.

[redacted]  
Acting Chief, WH/4

LOP/FBI/4 [redacted] Mac (6 October 1961)

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