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19 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with ANWHIP-1 in New York City,  
17 March 1965

Meeting Time/Place/Purpose:

1. The undersigned met ANWHIP-1 at the del Pezzo Restaurant, 33 West 47th St., at 1300 hours on 17 March for the purpose of briefing him on better telephone security while in Europe. Other operational matters as discussed below were broached.

Details of the Meeting:

15-4  
2. In response to a request from (Paris) ANWHIP-1 was given a security briefing for his trips to Europe. We paid particular attention to the need for security consciousness while telephoning his KUBARK contacts at the various [redacted] in Europe. We stressed France in particular as it had been this [redacted] which reported a certain laxity in ANWHIP-1's security practices in Paris. ANWHIP-1 appreciated the advice and guidance and said he would adhere to it in the future. He in turn stated he felt that "Roberto" should begin meeting him in more secure places than his hotel room, where apparently the majority of the ANWHIP-1/Roberto meetings take place. We stated we would take this up with Roberto in Paris prior to ANWHIP-1's projected trip during the week of 21 March.

3. It was also suggested to ANWHIP-1 that due to the sensitivity of the <sup>205</sup>USNAFU-19 CA operation he was about to undertake, he forego meeting any KUBARK staffers in Europe during his forthcoming trip. He was told he should contact only Roberto in Paris since this had been specifically requested by Roberto and his meetings with Roberto should be kept to a minimum. Any information he

obtained from his trip which could not be held until his return to New York could be given to Roberto in Paris for transmission to the undersigned at Headquarters.

Rafael Garcia-Bango Dirube


4. ANWHIP-1 was asked if he knew Garcia Bango (GB) whom we described as a lawyer, 33 years old, who had just arrived in Madrid and claimed that he had a message obviously coming from ANLASH-1 or members of his group. ANWHIP-1 replied that he knew GB who had been a friend of ANLASH-1's for the past twenty years. ANWHIP-1 stated that GB was essentially a crook, and his assessment of GB corresponded pretty well with that forwarded in (MADR) 3486 (IN 24295). ANWHIP-1 stated it was possible, but not probable, that GB had been sent by the ANLASH group to convey the message as indicated in the forementioned (MADR) cable. ANWHIP-1 further stated he felt GB would be personally loyal to ANLASH-1 in spite of any DSE suggestion to the contrary. (This again is a feeling which ANWHIP-1 had and is not to be taken as gospel.) He also mentioned the brother of GB, Jorge, on whom there are a number of traces at Headquarters.

5. ANWHIP-1 also discussed the contents of a letter received from ANLASH-2. The essential part of this letter plus a telephone call from ANLASH-3 from Madrid was that ANLASH-3 was somewhat upset by the fact that he was having difficulty in getting a visa for the U. S. and/or the Dominican Republic. ANWHIP-1 then spent considerable time discussing the treatment of ANLASH-2 and ANLASH-3 in Madrid by KUBARK. He said he felt that ANLASH-2 and ANLASH-3 should be contacted by KUBARK and treated and handled well. If this were done, they would both serve a very useful purpose for KUBARK ends both in Europe and in Cuba. The undersigned told ANWHIP-1 that we essentially agreed with his position and would take up the matter with our superiors when we returned to Washington. On the matter of the visa for ANLASH-3, we pointed out that we could not intercede for ANLASH-3 in either case because it would be compromising to him. To illustrate the point we explained that both governments knew that ANLASH-3 was a Captain in the Rebel Army and had up until recently been working actively for a ministry of the Cuban Government and therefore considered a Cuban official working in behalf of the Castro Government. As such ANLASH-3, or anyone in that position, would not be entitled to enter either country under normal circumstances. We pointed out that the Cuban Government in all probability knew of this; and, if ANLASH-3

succeeded easily in entering either country, this would be a rather obvious indication to the Cuban DSE that AMLASH-3 must be cooperating with one or the other government. AMWHIP-1 accepted the explanation and felt it would be readily understandable and a good excuse to give to AMLASH-3.

6. AMWHIP-1 also talked at length on the subject of ANBIDDY-1 and ANLASH-1. He repeated his previous position that the marriage of ANBIDDY-1 and ANLASH-1 would brood no good, that an unnecessary number of people now know of ANLASH-1's plans, and that ANLASH-1 himself was very skeptical of the arrangement with ANBIDDY-1. Furthermore, as a result of this, he is somewhat unsure of his position vis-a-vis ODYOKE.

7. AMWHIP-1 said he would advise us of his exact departure date in the event we had any further instructions for him. The meeting terminated at 1520 hours. There were no incidences of a security nature to report.



WH/C/FI/TC