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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

S.D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA

EXTENSION

NO.

OLC 79-0113/d

DATE

16 February 1979

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

1. Dolores Tuohy SA/DDCI
7E-12

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EXECUTIVE REGISTRY
FILE # Spec Int 8

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDCI

Executive Registry

79-477

Delores,

The attached is a lengthy epistle to HSCA on a draft we formerly were told was to be held as a classified annex. Now we are told they want to publish.

If the HSCA staff has persuaded itself that its criticisms are so strong that they must seek publication, the attached strongly worded letter is meant to point out its ridiculously extensive errors, which destroy the criticisms the treatment has to offer. Beyond that, it details security considerations.

It is tactical, personal from me to Blakey, but making it clear we are prepared to go past the staff to the Committee members, in order to make our points.

I hope you do not feel it too strongly worded, but I sense that something strong is necessary to get Blakey's attention.


S. D. Breckinridge

Date 16 February 1979

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OLC 79-0113/d

15 February 1979

Office of Legislative Counsel

Mr. G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Blakey:

It had been indicated earlier, in discussions with members of your staff, that the section discussing Luisa Calderon and other topics was not intended for unclassified publication. Mr. Gabrielson understands from your recent comments that it now is your desire that it be published in unclassified form. (U)

If Mr. Gabrielson's understanding is correct, it comes as something of a surprise, as you undoubtedly realize that the draft treats in explicit detail a number of sensitive intelligence activities and arrangements that we are obliged to protect. It is doubtful that the subjects treated, without reference to the quality of that treatment, could properly be discussed at all in published materials. As written, analysis and views are so closely interwoven with sensitive materials that it does not lend itself to sanitization. After you have reviewed these comments, it might be useful for us to consider them together. We have classified it Secret in its present form and request that you handle it accordingly. (U)

There are two areas of comment on the draft. The first, as noted above, has to do with the detailed treatment of highly sensitive subject matter. The second has to do with the extensively incorrect treatment of the substance. An advance summary of the latter might be useful, as the separate comments may be fragmented. The following comments are therefore offered at this point: (U)

(1) A telephone conversation by Calderon is assigned an inference--quite tenuous and therefore debatable--based on an early mistranslation of what she said. That inference was then used as the basis for critical treatment of the Agency's not reporting it to the Warren Commission. When the correct translation was brought to the attention of your investigator--quite frankly, seriously further weakening the basis for the original inference--your investigator held to

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his original thesis, continuing to use the incorrect translation, blandly preserving the original rationale, although discussing the correction in a way that seems to deliberately confuse it. That the author was wed to the treatment he had already contrived seems to be the kindest explanation. (S)

Having asserted significance for Calderon, based on the mistranslation (the assertion continuing after the translation showed it to be in error), the author then seizes on a suspicion of a DGI defector that Calderon might have been a CIA--or American--agent. Without reference to what the defector knew (which was nothing), the fact is that CIA did know. Calderon was not a CIA agent. That is quite clear. And given the Inter-Agency Source Register, it was further clear that she was not registered to any other American intelligence organization. To cap it, local operating conditions were such that CIA had further reason to know that Calderon was not an agent. Why CIA should report to the Warren Commission the suspicions of an uninformed defector, known to be incorrect, presents a major question as to the thought processes of the author of the draft report. (C)

The draft next asserts that Calderon's possible connections with the DGI, and similar possible contacts with Oswald during his visit to Mexico City, were withheld from the Warren Commission by CIA. It is noted that this is in error. The 19 June 1964 memorandum cited at page 0000085 of the draft report makes it clear that this information was made available to Mr. Willens of the Warren Commission. It was reviewed by your investigator in June and August 1978. (U)

The assertions by the draft about a possible connection between Calderon and American intelligence are simply in error. The assertion of withholding information about the possibility of ties between Calderon and the DGI, and about possible contacts with Oswald, are gross error. That leaves the telephone conversation to stand by itself, so far as any shred of significance is concerned. (C)

The overall Calderon discussion is better fiction than professional fact and analysis. Having decided to assign to her some significance, the treatment twisted and turned to keep the conclusion alive as each assertion proffered in support collapsed. And in doing so, left intact the mistranslation that seems to have sown the seed from which it germinated in the first place. (U)

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(2) An erroneous working summary by a Warren Commission investigator (Mr. Slawson) is seized by the author of the draft report as the basis for arguing that CIA did not provide information from telephone intercepts to the Warren Commission until early April 1964. Depicting this as a "delay," the assertion is then made that in some way it prejudiced the Warren Commission's investigation (in the face of testimony to the contrary by Warren Commission people about the cooperation of the Agency). The assertions of the author, substituting his conclusions for fact, must be doubted. (S)

When the present HSCA draft was first reviewed some time ago, the author's attention was drawn to a 31 January 1964 memorandum from Mr. Helms to Mr. Rankin, indicating that the nature of it had been discussed some two weeks earlier between the two men. It is even indicated that the sensitivity of the sources was discussed in the earlier exchange between the two men. Your draft makes it clear that the FBI had told the Warren Commission about the sources, and it is quite possible that Rankin--if not Slawson--knew. That Rankin signed a letter on the subject can be likened to letters that you and I have signed to one another, and that have not always been read carefully (as I know from one or two discussions with you). (C)

The point is that the 31 January 1964 letter reported in extensive detail what CIA then knew about Oswald's activities in Mexico City. This included the very material that the author of the report said was not provided the Warren Commission until April 1964. While the sources were not specified in the letter, their reliability was endorsed emphatically in a strikingly unequivocal manner. There has been no significant addition to that information since then. (C)

It is not useful at this point to try and reconstruct the failure of the Warren Commission investigator to focus on and react to the facts in the 31 January letter. That the information had been available to him is a matter of record, if the draft report can be trusted. That he did err in this regard is the unavoidable fact. Your investigator, having built his argument originally on an erroneous description of this fact, nevertheless seeks to preserve the original argument even after the initial basis for it essentially has been destroyed. He is determined to perpetuate the error of the Warren Commission investigator, and displays far less objectivity and flexibility than did that gentleman. (U)

In the confused but categorical treatment of the subjects, the author betrays his unfamiliarity with intelligence reporting procedures.

One may take issue with the practice, but understanding it should restrain the sweeping statements made in the draft. It is standard procedure to report the facts, with an evaluation of the source, but not a specification of the source. That practice was followed in the written report, although it appears that oral elaboration probably was provided as well. As a result, the HSCA draft report is badly confused in its treatment of facts and sources, and has sought to salvage the argument by referring to "original source material" as a handwritten editorial insert. This transparent effort to preserve the false presentation merely emphasizes its tendentious nature. (U)

(3) Having sought to establish a non-reporting by CIA in the Calderon case, and of the material available from telephone taps, the author reached down into his bag of ready assertions and claims that this was due to CIA's concern for sources and methods. It should be most clear that CIA has no problem reporting the facts, or in protecting its sources in doing so. Well established practice makes this clear. The gratuitous observation that the FBI failed to report out of respect for CIA's sensitivities, without a shred of evidence, serves merely to emphasize the aberrant quality of the author's analysis. (S)

Having introduced this unsupported assertion as a statement of fact, the author tries to use it to reinforce his earlier assertions. He ascribes practices to the Agency in forms that either are incorrect completely or that are unrecognizable as described by him. It is clear that he is extensively uninformed about the way the Agency functions in the reporting field. (U)

The detailed comments follow. (U)

Fourth page. Handwritten notes. Substitute A-1 for Donald Bensen. (S)

Page 003. The two references to IGR in the second paragraph should be TFR. (U)

Page 005. Reference is made to "the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system." This is a reflection of the inexperience and lack of knowledge on the part of the writer. The ADP systems are not all that unusual, in addition to which there are a number of manual systems that cannot be called "sophisticated." The author has been told this, but persists in the description. While it is a minor point, it nevertheless is an imprecise description. (U)

Page 006. The footnote indicates the intention to use the symbol A-1 in lieu of the cryptonym AMMUG. Please do so in all places. I note pages 78, 81-85, 90, 94, and 95. (S)

Page 007. The author of the HSCA draft report seems to have a problem in viewing the entire working arrangement and the understandings at the time of the Warren Commission. It therefore is worth some comment at this point. However well or poorly conceived those arrangements, the fact is that the FBI had responsibility for primary investigative work. CIA reported to it in detail. CIA also responded to all Warren Commission requests, as well as taking the initiative in reporting materials that seemed relevant and significant. However, reporting to the FBI was, in effect, appropriate reporting to the arm of the government that would in turn report to the Warren Commission. It is doubted that there was any real misunderstanding at the time that this is the way it was being done, or that it was appropriate. It would be an interesting line of inquiry to consider how current investigators, who have different views of how things were or should have been, would ask questions in interviews on the subject. There is much room for inadequate communications on this. In any event, the one-dimensional description of what Warren Commission people "believed" is too simplistic to serve the public's right to really have it told in clear and accurate terms. (U)

Page 008. I can't identify CIA page 2000517 so cannot comment at this time. (U)

Page 010. It would be more appropriate to describe this as Helms designating WH Division to handle the matter, when initially it seemed that the Agency's role would focus on Mexico. Scelso happened to be desk chief at the time, so got the assignment within WH Division. (U)

Page 011. Delete reference to CIA surveillance in Mexico. (C)

Page 012. Delete Birch O'Neal's name, mentioned four times. (C)

Page 013. Scelso's recollection that the Mexico City Station (it should not be mentioned in the unclassified paper) was the only Station directly involved in the investigation during his tenure is wrong, as ten Stations were tasked four days after the assassination, and all of them were tasked immediately after the assassination. (C)

Same page. Delete O'Neal's name. (C)

Page 014. The thirteenth of December is the first half not the latter half of December. (U)

Same page. The characterization of Scelso's "report" is incorrect, when given the description of stating a "position." It is a factual presentation of what was then known. (U)

Page 015. References to the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Australia should be deleted. (C)

Page 018. The references to Win Scott and WH, in connection with Mexico, should be modified. (C)

Page 024. References to Hall, Hartman, Dooley, and Murphy should be removed. (C)

Page 025. References to Bagely and Hall should be removed. (C)

Page 026. References to Murphy and O'Neal should be removed. (C)

Page 030. The handwritten note in the middle of the page is literally correct, but so phrased as to leave a distorted inference CIA did not give the Warren Commission everything. For instance, if we had reports on why the monkeys lost their tails in Zamboango, it would not be provided as it had nothing to do with the Kennedy assassination (although some HSCA investigators might think it so). What the Agency did was to supply material that was deemed relevant. (U)

Page 031. The first word in the 6th line of the quoted testimony should be "instructions" and not "indications." (U)

Page 033-034. Helms' testimony giving his recollection on that CIA took no initiative vis-a-vis the Warren Commission, but was only responsive, is incorrect. The record reveals various CIA initiatives. The arrangements at the time have a contribution to make to understanding. The FBI had primary responsibility for conducting the investigation; it alone had the manpower. CIA provided all kinds of reports to the FBI, in the context of its primary investigative responsibility. It also responded to Warren Commission requests, as well as providing other materials on its own as judged appropriate. (U)

The comments of the draft about the "unfortunate consequence" of the Warren Commission's reliance on CIA seems to relate to the subsequent revelations about the anti-Castro plotting. While it is wished that someone at the time perceived a possible tie between those activities and the assassination of the President, the simple fact is that it was not perceived. The draft HSCA report, which we reviewed at your offices, makes the point rather strongly that the concept did not emerge until the later 1960's, well after the Warren Commission inquiry. While CIA accepts its failure to see what others did not (despite wide-spread knowledge of the provocative nature of U.S. policies and activities against Castro), the categorical condemnation of this presentation is unbalanced. Even now, the relevance of the Castro plots are as much hypothesis as fact. (U)

Page 036. Scelso really didn't know the nature of the AMLASH operation, yet nevertheless is prepared to speak broadly about it. An indication of his gratuitous wisdom is his saying that he would have AMLASH polygraphed. He knew so little about the AMLASH operation that he did not know that AMLASH had refused the polygraph earlier. He also clearly knew practically nothing about the nature of CIA's relationship with him; it had no substance prior to the death of President Kennedy. (C)

Page 039. Scelso receives unusual space in the report. This is not because he knew anything, but must be because he was prepared to speak about things that he did not know. He was in the overall investigation a month and a half, and speaks inaccurately about it. He was not in on the AMLASH operation, but speaks of it. He would never qualify as a competent witness in court. (U)

Page 040. Title for Section II. The word "Sanctity" should be replaced by the word "protection." (U)

Page 041. Delete reference to CIA surveillance operation in Mexico City. (C)

Same page. Delete surveillance references in Mexico. The statement in the paragraph ending five lines above the bottom of the page about limitation of access to "original source materials," reflects the difficulty the Committee has with intelligence reporting. No distinction is drawn between the providing of substantive information, with evaluation of the sources and the reliability of the information, and protection of the actual identity of the sources. It is correct to say that initially CIA limited access to the source, but it is incorrect to leave that without balancing it with a statement that the substance of the reports was conveyed. Intelligence reporting traditionally does not reveal its sources. Perhaps this should always be done for a Congressional investigation, but it is doubtful that such an unqualified practice will be accepted. In any event, the presentation of the draft is not accurate or even-handed. (S)

Page 042. References to telephone and photograph operations in Mexico City will have to be deleted. (S)

Same page. Scelso (speaking about telephone operations--which will have to be deleted) was doing his best to explain reporting procedures (protecting the sources) although he doesn't do this very well either. (S)

Page 043. The FOIA document was reviewed but denied. Delete reference. (C)

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Same page. References to Mexico City and telephone operations should be deleted. (S)

Same page. The word "State" instead of "ODACID." (C)

Same page. Again, O'Neal and telephone operations. (S)

Page 044. Delete reference to O'Neal and telephone operations. (C)

Page 045. O'Neal. (C)

Same page. The discussion of Helms' desire to protect sources makes it sound as though this was unique during the Warren Commission period. It was merely a continuing application of established practice, however unfamiliar to the uninitiated. (U)

Page 046. Delete Mexico City Station. (C)

Page 047. Delete references to telephone and photograph operations in Mexico City and liaison relationships. (S)

Same page. The 31 January memo laid it all out. Additionally, the covering memo makes it appear that the sources had been discussed with Rankin. Rankin's letter of 10 February is viewed by the HSCA as demonstrating that he did not know about the telephone operations. Yet we know that Sam Papich had already told the Committee in December that there were telephone operations by one of the American agencies. (S)

Page 049. The statement at top of page is incorrect. Substantive knowledge had been given (31 January report and Calderon debriefing). (C)

Same page. Reference to telephone operations must be deleted. (S)

Page 050. Section Title--references to telephone operations there as well as in the text. Delete. (S)

Page 051. Win Scott, telephone operations, and Mexico Station. Delete. (C)

Same page. The paragraph is wrong as well as referring to an intelligence operation. It says "it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the written material." The author knows that is not true. It does reflect accurately the misunderstanding that initiated his line of treatment. The fact is that the Commission had the substance in detail with emphatic positive affirmation of the reliability of the information. Beyond that, while the preceding statement says the Warren Commission didn't see it until

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9 April, the draft also says it knew about it on 12 March. The writer has difficulty keeping these facts straight, without reference to security considerations. (C)

Page 052. What Slawson thought about the 31 January 1964 memo, that was so different from what his April memo said, is difficult to understand today. He at least eventually got it right. (U)

Page 053. The author focuses on the transcript, ignoring the detailed information that had been provided from it in another form. He was not, in fact, limited to the Duran report. (C)

Same page. References to the Mexico City Station. In the quotes the word "State" should replace "ODACID." (C)

Page 054. The author still dwells on the transcripts even though he knows that the Warren Commission investigator Slawson had all the information. (C)

Same page. The reference to intercepts at the bottom of the page, below the portion marked for deletion, should also be deleted. (S)

Page 055. Delete a reference to telephone intercepts. The author continues to fail to distinguish between access to the information and knowledge of the source. By now he has also forgotten they were aware of the fact of telephonic coverage. (S)

Page 056. Delete two references to the intercepts. (S)

Same page. The rhetorical conclusion of the paragraph in the middle of the page might have stated alternatively that Slawson simply mishandled the information that he had in considerable detail. (U)

Page 058. Bottom of page. After treating this subject in an inaccurate and confused manner, the author continues to hold tenaciously to his thesis that "initial withholding of original source material... may have impeded" the Commission's ability to reach accurately reasoned conclusions. It did no such thing. Slawson erred, but it didn't hurt his ultimate findings. He at least had the quality of correcting his errors. No evidence--other than some ESP quality of the author--supports the assertion that the Warren Commission's inquiry was affected by whatever happened. (U)

Page 059. References to phone and photographic operations and Win Scott and Mexico City Station should be deleted. (S)

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Same page. Clark Anderson's name without "e." (U)

Page 060. References to photograph operations and Win Scott should be deleted. (S)

Page 061. References to Win Scott should be deleted as should be the coverage of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City by CIA. Once more, Slawson's errors are used by the author to support criticism of CIA. (S)

Page 062. Delete Mexico City and photo operations. (S)

Page 063. Delete Mexico Station and photo operations. (S)

Page 064. Delete Mexico City and CIA photo operations. (S)

Page 065. Delete telephone and photo operations and Mexico City. (S)

Page 066. Delete photo operations. (S)

Page 070. Delete Mexico City Station. (C)

Same page. References in first quote should be CD 674. (U)

Page 071. Delete CIA Station in Mexico. (C)

Page 073. Telephone intercepts and Mexico Station. Delete. (S)

Page 074. This detailed discussion cannot be declassified. An excerpt from a casual telephone conversation five hours after the assassination of President Kennedy, is assigned a significance by the HSCA draft that the actual words do not support. The draft then attempts to build a further case for the significance of the speaker, thereby reinforcing its asserted significance. It then returns to the conversation, criticizing CIA for not reporting a meaningless item that did not merit reporting. (S)

The following presentation in the HSCA draft provides the basis for the present comments:

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news (of the assassination). Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew (sic) almost before Kennedy." (Ibid.)

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Paraphrasing the CIA's telephone intercept transcript, it states that the caller told Luisa the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she also knew this. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a "gringo." The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination and that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented: (S)

"We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows."

Luisa responded:

"Imagine, one, two, and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)"

The HSCA presentation then quotes a memorandum by a CIA employee, written in 1975, based on the above mistranslation of what Luisa Calderon said. The translation apparently was accepted at face value. The memorandum discusses the telephone conversation as the only item in the intercept coverage "that contains the suggestion of fore-knowledge of expectation." (S)

In fact, the translation on which that is based, and that is used in the HSCA draft, is in error. The author knew this, but still elected to employ the mistranslation, probably because however tenuous the significance given it, the argument (developed before the correct translation was brought to his attention) is best served by using it instead of the correct one. (S)

In handling the reams of information that it receives, CIA regularly appraises information before disseminating it. It does not disseminate bad reporting. In the present instance, when the transcript was received at Headquarters, the correct meaning was noted. It should have been translated as follows: (S)

"Yes, of course, I found out (learned about it) almost before Kennedy."

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The context and timing of the conversation is clear. It was a joking conversation (as admitted in the HSCA draft), five hours after the assassination, when the television news broadcasts had been filled with details. Luisa Calderon and her unidentified caller both had the same incorrect information about Oswald's association with a Fair Play for Cuba Committee (it was learned later that there was no such committee, and that Oswald had developed a sham Committee, apparently to develop credentials). Calderon, however, did not know as much as her caller, not knowing that the assassin was a "gringo," having to ask. Joking about the death of a public figure she probably considered unfriendly to Cuba, she made the casual remark: (S)

"...I learned about it almost before Kennedy."

The draft seeks to give this major significance, retaining the incorrect translation and all, although followed by her elaborating statement "that she had learned about (it) only a little while ago." It warranted no attention then, nor does it merit it now. Its treatment is inaccurate (tenaciously holding to the mistranslation that made it a question at all) and exaggerated beyond reason. (S)

Page 075. We agree with the statement appearing following the quotation--"Standing by itself, (the) cryptic comments do not merit serious attention." Read in the context discussed above, this correct judgment is reinforced. (C)

Page 077. The correct citation of the CSCI in the next to last paragraph; was 1965, not 1963. It post dates the Warren Commission. (U)

Page 080. We would prefer no reference in an unclassified report to what is in the Calderon 201 file. (C)

Page 081. Langosch/Swenson. Replace true name with pseudonym. (C)

Page 084. Langosch/Swenson. (C)

Page 085. The 19 June 1964 memorandum reported showing a number of debriefing reports to the Warren Commission investigator. Among them were reports of the defector's reference to Calderon's possible DGI connections, as well as her reported contact with Oswald during his Mexico visit. The HSCA investigator seems to have become confused in his notes of this exchange. The facts do not support his statements. (U)

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Reference to possible ties to CIA or American intelligence must be designated as a remarkable assertion. The defector was speaking to American intelligence, which knew Calderon had no such ties; the defector was not qualified to speak authoritatively except as to someone's suspicion of the possibility. He was speaking to the authority. Surely, there is no requirement for CIA to report something it knows to be untrue? (U)

Page 087. Delete references to the telephone conversation. (S)

Page 088. Delete Mexico City Station. (C)

Page 089. In response to the rhetorical questions at the top of the page, CIA did provide the Warren Commission with information about Calderon's alleged DGI ties, and her possible knowledge of Oswald. The 19 June 1964 memorandum cited on page 0000085 of the draft HSCA report shows that the defector debriefings on these points were shown the Warren Commission investigator. As for why alleged ties with CIA or American intelligence were not reported, the source was the defector, who expresses suspicions on the subject. However, his suspicions cannot be given the sort of credence the author would wish, to build the case of CIA not reporting, when CIA knew these were erroneous statements. The author of the draft report seems confused on who was saying what to whom, no serious claim should be made that this erroneous information should be passed on. (U)

Same page. Langosch/Swenson. (C)

Page 090. Having beaten around the bush he states the finding that Agency files reveals no "ostensible connection." They reveal no connection. Any other statement is untruthful. (U)

Page 091. Line 13. CIA Document Dispatch No.... (U)
Line 23. CIA Document Dispatch No.... (U)

Page 092. Dave Ronis' name appeared six times. Delete. (C)

Page 093. Ronis' name two times and Piccolo. Delete. (C)

Page 094. Delete Ottawa reference. Cite IN 68894. (C)

Page 095. Line 2. CIA Document Dispatch No....(U)

Same page. Delete the Ottawa references, per above. (C)

Page 101. Line 17. CIA Document Dispatch No....(U)

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Page 101. The statements about CIA's "withholding" are worth addressing again. CIA did not withhold. The author takes a very thin-- if not non-existent--interpretation of significance in a telephone conversation, and uses it as the basis for making strong statements of an unqualified nature. He then seeks to reinforce the tissue of his case with a series of hopefully mutually supporting untrue statements on other points. While there may be disagreement on the significance of Calderon's statements (if the Committee feels committed to staff attitudes) there can be no disagreement with the record. CIA did report the defector's statements about Calderon's possible DGI ties and possible Oswald contacts. (S)

Same page. The presentation of the whereabouts of the memorandum bearing the sequential number 40 serves to demonstrate the author's inability to surrender a position once he had become committed to it, whatever the evidence. (U)

The question arises from a memorandum of the debriefing of a Cuban defector on the subject of Oswald. Memoranda of debriefings of the defector were numbered sequentially, and the one on the debriefing about Oswald does not bear the number 40, which it would be expected to bear in that sequence. (C)

Certain things are clear. There was one complete debriefing of the Cuban on the subject of Oswald. There is a memorandum of such a debriefing, at the time it should have occurred, but it does not bear the number. There is no memorandum in the file, numbered 40. It so happens that there was a follow-up question on one subject, and this resulted in a debriefing of the defector on that question. The significance of this event is that it provides the answer to why the memorandum of the debriefing on Oswald did not bear a number. (C)

The follow-up memorandum recites the handling of the earlier debriefing and memorandum. It states that the memorandum was dictated to a secretary in CI Staff (which was a different component from that handling the debriefing, and which also was responsible for the Agency's support of the Warren Commission inquiry.) The memorandum was typed in that component. Simply stated, the secretary who typed the memorandum was not a part of the component that usually handled these memoranda, and was not a part of the procedure that provided the sequential numbering. (C)

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There was one complete debriefing of the defector on Oswald. There is a memorandum of that debriefing. It happens to not bear the number 40. And why it does not has been made clear. The author may not admit that he understands it, but no alternative answer is conceivable. I believe that you have my earlier letter of 29 September 1978 on this subject. (U)

Page 102. Line 20. Delete Hidalgo and Piccolo. (C)

Page 105. Lines 10 and 20. Delete 201-749651. (C)

Page 108. The references to the AMLASH trial in 1965 should be deleted. Reportedly, Castro told the HSCA that he knew that AMLASH was Cubela; that is not for us to confirm. (C)

Page 110. Were the 1977 Task Force Report "intended as a rebuttal" it would not have accepted some of the SSC views, nor would it have explored new areas as it did. Anyway, how does the author know. As seems to be his practice, he relied on his instincts rather than evidence; he never inquired. (U)

There is one major section of the 1977 Report which takes issue with Book V of the Church Committee Report. This has to do with the AMLASH operation. The report accepted in principle certain of the views of Book V of the Church Committee Report and carried its inquiry into yet other areas, and beyond those of the 1967 IG Report. The 1977 Task Force Report did, in fact, conclusively refute the Church Committee presentation of the AMLASH operation in Book V. But that is not all the report did. The narrow, specialized, focus of the author seems to have contributed to his misreading this too. (U)


Page 111. Langosch who really didn't know anything about the AMLASH operation, as he has revealed in statements he has made about it, speaks broadly once again. He wasn't privy to the operation and what he knew when he testified to HSCA must be based on what he thinks he has learned since. He is not a qualified witness, however much of what he says appeals to the author of the report. (U)

As this paper has been designated as one that you wish to publish in unclassified form, it occurred to me that it might be appropriate to bring these preliminary comments to the attention of key Committee Members--Chairman Stokes, as well as Mr. Preyer and Mr. Devine, Chairman of the Kennedy Subcommittee and Ranking Republican Member, respectively. If they are to judge any eventual issues

that may arise over papers such as this one, it would be useful if they had the opportunity of developing some personal appreciation; comparison of these comments with the staff draft may help serve that purpose. Three extra copies, in addition to the original addressed to you, are therefore included. If you decide to not make the copies available as I suggest, it would be appreciated if you would so advise me. Of course, I stand ready to discuss with them any questions that they may have. (U)

Meanwhile, it is suggested that after you have reviewed the above comments, we arrange to discuss them together. (U)

Very truly yours,



S. D. Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator, HSCA

Enclosure

Distribution:

Original - Adse
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - LC
1 - Mr. Rininger
1 - Mr. Holmes
1 - Mr. Sturbitts
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - OLC/Subj
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OLC/SDB/ksn - 15 February 1979