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104-10336-10003  
CIA IR-04

**Assassination Records Review Board**  
 600 E Street NW • 2nd Floor • Washington, DC 20530  
 (202) 724-0088 • Fax: (202) 724-0457

**CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
 RELEASE IN FULL**

December 18, 1997

Mr. John Pereira  
 Chief  
 Historical Review Group  
 Center for the Study of Intelligence  
 Central Intelligence Agency  
 Washington, D.C. 02505

2000

Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board's Requests for  
 Additional Information and Records

Dear John:

I am writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious concern about the status of CIA's responses to the Review Board's requests for additional information and records. Although CIA has completed its responses to several requests, and many others have been answered in part, a significant number of requests have not been answered — including some that were made more than two years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and go without answers. It is now extremely important that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct a proper follow-up if necessary. The issues that we can now identify as being of the highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks (\*\*)<sup>1</sup> and we request that they be answered within the next month. We request that the remaining requests be answered by April 1, 1998.

The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts: first, a listing of the formal requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.

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<sup>1</sup>As identified more fully below, the issues are: CIA-1 Organizational Material, CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic "take" from Mexico City, CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports, CIA-IR-22 "A" Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison.

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### ***Informal Requests***

Each of the following informal requests was previously made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided below.

**CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64 (see RIF 104-10065-10199).**

This request is complete.

**CIA-IR-02 Location of Cable Identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.**

This request is complete.

**\*\*CIA-IR-03 Full Computer Search for List of Documents in HTLINGUAL File.**

CIA agreed to undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents in April 1997. To date, no response has been received by ARRB. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record.

**\*\*CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's Files.**

The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for *Mangold v. CIA*. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files.

In addition, the ARRB staff's review of the *Mangold v. CIA* files designated additional documents from those files as assassination records. These documents are: Tab D, documents Nos. 95, 109-116, 120, and 121; and from the Denied

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Documents file: documents Nos. 496, 498, 499, 500, and 510. The Review Board is awaiting confirmation that these documents are at HRG for processing.

**CIA-IR-05 Possible Foreign Source for Records on Oswald.**

CIA was informally requested to use its contacts to pursue certain records related to Oswald that were orally described to CIA. The Review Board understands that the CIA has taken steps to pursue these records.

**\* \* CIA-IR-06 QKENCHANT.**

The Review Board seeks information regarding the purpose of QKENCHANT and its connection with Clay Shaw, Howard Hunt, and Monroe Sullivan.

The Review Board was initially provided some information in regard to this request that now appears to be incorrect. CIA is now seeking additional information to correct or to clarify its previous answers. The Review Board seeks an immediate, full, and accurate formal response to this request. Once the formal statement is provided, this request will be complete.

**✓ \*\*CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart.**

The ARRB staff has reviewed all records that CIA has been able to locate to date. During the course of this review, additional questions were raised that CIA agreed to pursue. CIA also agreed to conduct additional searches to determine whether there may be additional retrievable records on Mr. Capehart. The Review Board seeks a full and accurate formal response to this request. Once the formal statement is provided, this request will be complete.

**\* \* CIA-IR-08 Unredacted Copy of the "Family Jewels" Memoranda.**

ARRB has reviewed a redacted version of the "Family Jewels." Additional questions have been raised. At meeting between HRG, ARRB and the DCI/IRO on December 11, 1997, specific redacted pages were identified for ARRB staff review. These pages should be made available as soon as possible.

ALSO BY TOM MANGOLD

*The Tunnels of Cu-Chi*

*The File on the Tsar*

BARRY

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE IN FULL

2000

# COLD WARRIOR

JAMES JESUS ANGLETON:  
THE CIA'S  
MASTER SPY HUNTER

**Tom Mangold**

SIMON & SCHUSTER  
New York London Toronto  
Sydney Tokyo Singapore

Golitsyn." Rocca replied that he knew very little about the defector or his handling.

Perplexed, Kalaris countered, "Ray, you're the deputy in here. Jim stressed Golitsyn's importance to me yesterday."

Still no briefing. Kalaris concluded this was turning into a waste of valuable coffee-drinking time.

"What *can* you tell me about, Ray?" he asked patiently.

"I can tell you all about The Trust," Rocca replied brightly.

"But that all happened a half century ago," wailed Kalaris in despair. "I want to know what's happening *now*!"

Rocca continually referred Kalaris to Angleton after each successive question. Finally, Kalaris acknowledged defeat and went for his coffee.

When Angleton eventually arrived for work, Kalaris asked him for an up-to-date situation report: current cases, operations, personnel problems, budgets, and so on. To his alarm, Angleton instead began to talk again at length about Golitsyn and his brilliant analysis of the international Communist threat. A great sense of *déjà vu* descended on Kalaris. Angleton next launched a ferocious attack on Colby, bitterly complaining how Colby had destroyed the CIA's counterintelligence capability, and how he had taken the Israeli Account away.

Angleton also specifically complained that the Counterintelligence Staff had lost the right to vet DDO assets—the new sources being developed by the case officers in the field. As a former senior official in the clandestine service, Kalaris knew the answer to that one. The vetting process had become so inefficient under Angleton that it was taking up to six months to clear an operation. CIA officers trying to develop assets were seeing them slip from their grasp during the interminable wait for head office approval. Colby had turned over the vetting process to the CIA's Foreign Intelligence Staff, which had quickly revived it.

At midday, Angleton took Kalaris to one of his celebrated liaison lunches at La Niçoise in Georgetown. The waiters bowed and scraped on cue as Angleton entered the restaurant. The two men were ushered to Angleton's usual table, where a senior British liaison officer was already waiting. Angleton tossed down four huge martinis as he and his foreign guest, to the deliberate and humiliating exclusion of Kalaris, proceeded to talk in code about several active cases of which the new chief as yet knew nothing.

On their return to Langley, a stack of cables awaited Angleton in his office (now officially Kalaris's office, though he had temporarily taken a smaller adjacent room as he waited politely for Angleton to leave). Had Jim read any of these cables, Kalaris asked. "No," answered

Angleton bluntly. "Well, I guess I better start reading them," said Kalaris heavily. He turned to Angleton's (now his) secretary (the loyal Bertha Dasenbourg had retired several years earlier) and instructed her to ensure that *all* future cable traffic come to him first. The secretary looked at Angleton and winced. Kalaris made a mental note to dispense with her services as soon as possible.

As Kalaris went on to assemble his own deputies and they began to consolidate their arrival, the time for game playing with the *ancien régime* finally came to an end. Kalaris was becoming increasingly anxious to find out what had actually been going on inside the staff.

First, his new team attacked the Fort Knox array of safes and vaults. Expeditionary forces led by intrepid junior officers found entire sets of vaults and sealed rooms scattered all around the second and third floors of CIA headquarters.

Even before these safes were opened, one team (literally searching on its hands and knees) had discovered a packet of some forty-five letters which had slipped behind a safe and lain there unopened for five years. This political time bomb was placed unceremoniously on Kalaris's desk. Gingerly, he poked the pile and established that this mail was an infinitesimal part from the take of HT-LINGUAL, which had simply gotten lost inside Angleton's domain. These letters had been sent by Soviet citizens and Americans visiting the USSR to people in the United States. All of the addressees were friends or relatives, rather than spies and traitors.

Kalaris contemplated the pile with anguish. He knew full well that it was a federal offense for him even to have the letters in his possession, let alone open them or, God forbid, destroy them. The pile ticked menacingly in his in-tray for several days as he devised a plan for what to do. This was the post-Watergate reform era. He and the CIA needed another scandal like rowboats need hurricanes.<sup>5</sup>

Kalaris eventually untied the Gordian knot by using a series of untraceable cut-outs to have the letters dumped on an earnest young Capitol Hill staffer who was preparing evidence for congressional hearings on Operations CHAOS and HT-LINGUAL. The CIA's involvement was suitably obscured. (The letters were eventually forwarded to the addressees with an apology, although there was no clue provided for the puzzled recipients as to why the U.S. mail had taken five full years to deliver them.)

As the Kalaris commandos pressed forward, they came across safes which had not been opened for ten years. No one on Angleton's remaining staff knew what was in them. Worse, no one had the combinations anymore. In one case, Kalaris was forced to call in the CIA's Office of Security, which sent over a crack team of safebusters to drill

open the door. The entire safe-checking operation took several weeks to complete, since there were more than forty safes involved, each weighing about 1,000 pounds. The final stages of each opening were accompanied by a breathless hush, as a trained counterintelligence officer withdrew the contents.

The audience cheered when, inside one stubborn safe, they extracted a primitive African bow and arrow (it had come from South Africa). In others they found tapes, photographs, and "bizarre things of which I shall never ever speak"—as Kalaris later muttered mysteriously to his team.

There was one enormous safe—everyone called it the "Grandpa" safe—which was located in a storage room down the hall from the main Counterintelligence Staff offices. The troops reckoned that this huge contraption with five file drawers inside had come from Angleton's own office. When an Office of Security safecracker finally opened it, they found it crammed with Angleton's own most super-sensitive files, memoranda, notes, and letters. Among these papers were files from the Sir Roger Hollis and Graham Mitchell investigations. There were also files on journalists, including a number of reporters who had worked in Moscow.

To the surprise of the new team, they discovered that Angleton had not entered any of the official documents from these safes into the CIA's central filing system. Nothing had been filed, recorded, or sent to the secretariat. It would take a team of highly trained specialists another three full years just to sort, classify, file, and log the material into the CIA system.<sup>6</sup>

Angleton left behind three main vaults on which the Kalaris team focused their attention. Firstly, there was his own front office vault, which contained executive office materials; files produced by Angleton, his secretary, or Rocca; and anything Angleton needed for further reference. Secondly, there was a vault holding the HT-LINGUAL files, containing boxes filled with copies of letters intercepted from the mail-opening program. Thirdly, and most importantly, there was the substantive vault of counterintelligence records, which contained some forty thousand files stored in endless racks of brown envelopes. In all, there were ten racks with double rows, each rack standing 8 feet high and some 40 feet long. As far as the new team could determine, a large number of these files were not at all relevant to proper counterintelligence functions and had no real value. They contained data on foreigners, dead individuals (for historical purposes), former KGB and GRU officers, and U.S. politicians and legislative aides who had been in contact with Soviet bloc assets or the KGB.<sup>7</sup>

The files had been deliberately segregated for the private use of the

Counterintelligence Staff, thus placing one of the most sensitive and delicate functions of the CIA beyond executive control. As these records were restricted to the second floor only, they were kept organized and guarded by a staff officer posted at the vault every day. Access to the files was recorded in a logbook. Although the rest of the Directorate of Operations had been undertaking a crash program since 1972 to computerize its archives, none of this counterintelligence data had been entered because Angleton did not believe in the technology, nor was he going to share information through terminals blinking his secrets throughout the building.

In other words, Angleton had been quietly building an alternative CIA, subscribing only to his rules, beyond peer review or executive supervision.

Leonard McCoy waded through some four hundred of these name files before he concluded that the procedure was too time-consuming and exhausting for him to complete. He ordered his staff to finish the chore and to report to him on the merits of maintaining specific records. When they had finished the tedious work, they advised McCoy to retain less than one half of 1 percent of the total, or no more than 150–200 out of the 40,000.

McCoy ordered these few sanctioned records to be placed into the central registry, and the remainder to be rechecked again page by page for relevant material. The discards were then to be burned. (It was to take years just to destroy all of these files. The process was still continuing when McCoy left the staff a full four years later, in 1978.) He also advised that neither Angleton nor Rocca should be told of the destruction of their files.

Kalaris and McCoy then instituted a strict new policy for the creation of a Counterintelligence Staff file. The primary criterion was that there had to be a "reasonable national security suspicion" before a file could be opened on any person. On Kalaris's watch, very few new files were opened.<sup>8</sup>

When the Kalaris commandos reached Jay Lovestone's "JX Reports," the reviewers paused for breath and sat down to read them in loving detail. They contained a remarkable amount of high-class dinner-table gossip, including, by volume, approximately one foot of pages full of Washington chatter alone. The files confirmed that Angleton had indeed routed much of this salacious tittle-tattle to the DCI's office on the seventh floor. When the readers had finished their review, Kalaris phoned the chief of the DDO's Labor Division (the CIA section which should have been running the Lovestone operation all along) to reveal the existence of the Lovestone connection and invite him to take over the whole "JX" filing system. (When this officer heard the

news, he loudly feigned a nervous breakdown. He had never been told that Lovestone was a regular CIA informant-cum-agent!)

A flanking platoon of Kalaris aides was delayed for several weeks when they came across Rocca's famous Research and Analysis files on The Trust and the old wartime *Rote Kapelle*. (They discovered no less than forty separate studies on The Trust alone.) Beyond those half-century-old insights, they found files researching yet another decades-old caper: a World War II operation involving Soviet deception of the Nazis in the Caucasus. Kalaris was unable to comprehend their relevance to the real world of 1975.

Kalaris and McCoy personally led the elite force that stormed the inner sanctum: the super-secret Special Investigation Group's office and vault. Despite all of Angleton's gloomy briefings, they found not one single shred of hard evidence in the hundreds of SIG files that proved any of the accusations against any of the HONETOL or other molehunt suspects. The SIG had been the engine behind Angleton, Golitsyn, and the Fundamentalists, a perpetual generator grinding out the wattage for a bleak scenario in which Soviet agents were taking over key men in key positions throughout the globe. Yet the entire *raison d'être* of the SIG turned out to be so much documentary fantasy. Time and again, in file after file, the two men found only newspaper clippings, elevated gossip, chatty memoranda with waspish handwritten notes added, and unsubstantiated allegations.

Kalaris read through the two key British files, on Harold Wilson (OATSHEAF) and Sir Roger Hollis; there was nothing substantive in either of them. He perused the large file on Averell Harriman and smaller ones on Armand Hammer and Henry Kissinger (contrary to Ed Petty's belief that the latter didn't exist).<sup>9</sup> The new Counterintelligence chief was so ashamed at the unacceptable quality of the intelligence he uncovered that he had several dozen of the most egregious examples destroyed as soon as possible.<sup>10</sup>

A simultaneous priority for the hard-pressed Kalaris was dealing with what came to be known as "the Golitsyn factor." Angleton was insistent from the outset that Kalaris should inherit his prized Soviet defector and should treat Golitsyn with proper reverence and deference. Kalaris was less than enthusiastic. He already knew more than he wanted to know about the former KGB officer and his bizarre theories, and did not subscribe to the view that Golitsyn came with the Counterintelligence Staff's furniture.

Angleton, however, pressed his successor to attend a get-acquainted dinner with Golitsyn at an Italian restaurant in nearby Alexandria in late January 1975. Scotty Miler, who was still officially Golitsyn's case officer, came along too. As usual, the occasion began with a great

deal of drinking. In between toasts, Golitsyn offered to enlighten new Counterintelligence chief with all of his views about the Russian intelligence services. Angleton nodded enthusiastically, while Kalaris gritted his teeth and reached for his cigarettes.

After being bombarded by dozens of unfamiliar names and ideas that didn't seem to make any sense, the pragmatic Counterintelligence chief began to wonder whether he and Golitsyn were inhabitants of the same planet. There seemed to be some sort of galactic gap between the gruff Ukrainian's allegations and the reality of the intelligence world that Kalaris had moved in for more than twenty years.

To add to Kalaris's discomfort, Angleton and Miler kept nodding their heads in vigorous agreement with every new point Golitsyn was making. "See, George," they would repeat, as the defector hung on to one more unsupported conclusion on a trembling line of unchecked evidence. Throughout the spaghetti, scampi, wine, and Scotch, Kalaris simply couldn't understand what Golitsyn was talking about. In a respectful way, he tried to explain this to Angleton, but he sensed that his message was not getting through.

Kalaris left the dinner with relief, only to be ambushed by the Fundamentalists again a month later, when they insisted that he meet Golitsyn once more—this time in one of the CIA's favorite hotels, the Key Bridge Marriott at nearby Rosslyn Circle. It was an afternoon session, with Angleton and Miler again attending. Golitsyn talked and talked, and Kalaris again found it quite impossible to comprehend the briefing. As the three CIA men were leaving the hotel, Kalaris turned to Miler and told him, "This is the last time I intend to meet Golitsyn. I don't understand him or anything about him. I cannot and will not waste my time like this. In the future, if Golitsyn has something for my staff, I will send someone else to deal with him."<sup>11</sup>

"You can't do that!" a horrified Miler replied. "Golitsyn is very important and he has always dealt only with the top men."

Angleton supported Miler. "You've got to try hard with Anatoliy," he advised Kalaris. "These things can take years."

Kalaris relented and reluctantly agreed to a third meeting a few days later. Another lunch, more wine, more of Golitsyn's ponderous lecturing. Kalaris, eyes glazing, tried his best to show interest and remain calm. But when Golitsyn started talking about the "alleged" Soviet split, Kalaris exploded. "Are you telling me that what we have been seeing over there for fifteen years is not real?" he thundered.

"You don't understand, you don't understand," grumbled the Soviet defector.<sup>12</sup>

When Kalaris returned to his office, he summoned one of his trusted officers, Ernest Tsikerdanos. "I've decided to give you an assign-



interview with TM, June 12, 1989. In February 1974, Hersh had learned about the CIA's top secret, \$500 million Glomar Explorer project to retrieve a sunken Soviet submarine off the bottom of the Pacific Ocean—and he had, withheld publication on national security grounds.

31. William Colby strongly denies that he leaked any information to Seymour Hersh or that he had planned in advance to use the *Times* story to get rid of Angleton. "That's a lot of bull," Colby says. "I suspect Hersh got the information from several sources. If you look at his story, you can see he put it together. I would have handled Hersh the same way if Angleton were not around." William Colby, interview with TM, June 12, 1989.

Hersh states simply, "Colby was not the source for my story." Seymore Hersh, interview with TM, June 20, 1989.

32. William Colby, interview with TM, June 12, 1989.

33. As DCI, Colby was fully authorized to fire Angleton at his own discretion without appeal or outside review. For security reasons, the CIA was the only U.S. federal agency that permitted its director to take such unilateral action and bypass normal civil service regulations. The CIA's 1947 charter stated that the DCI may in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee of the agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States. Confidential interview.

34. Donald Moore, interview with JG, December 6, 1988.

35. Peter Wright, interview with TM, February 22, 1989.

36. Seymour Hersh, interview with TM, June 20, 1989.

37. ABC-TV News, untransmitted footage, held in a commercial film library in New York City and viewed in June 1990.

38. David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch* (New York: Atheneum, 1977), pp. 264–66; David Phillips, interview with TM, May 1, 1988. Phillips confirmed this anecdote from his book before he died in July 1988.

39. Wright, *Spycatcher*, p. 377.

40. James Angleton, letter to Marcel Chalet, February 28, 1975.

41. Cicely Angleton, interview with TM, May 30, 1988.

42. Peter Wright, interview with TM, February 22, 1989.

43. William Hood, on the other hand, offered to continue temporarily, since he felt he could make a contribution to the reformed Counterintelligence Staff.

44. Newton Miler, interview with TM, February 13, 1989.

## CHAPTER 22

1. Quoted in the *New York Times*, December 25, 1974, p. 1.

2. Confidential interview.

3. William Colby, interview with TM, June 12, 1989.

4. The non-attributable quotations in this chapter have been collected from friends and colleagues of the primary sources—and have been carefully cross-checked.

5. Confidential interview.

6. Confidential interview.

7. Confidential interview.

8. Confidential interview.

9. Henry Kissinger, interview with TM, June 15, 1989. Henry Kissinger has told TM that he is unaware of the existence of any file on him from the Counterintelligence Staff.

10. As each of these files was destroyed, a complete record was carefully maintained about what had been done. Kalaris signed off on every file and the DCI's office was notified. Confidential interview.

11. Confidential interview.

12. Confidential interview.

13. Confidential interview.

14. Cordelia Hood, interview with TM, August 26, 1989; confidential interviews.

15. The CIA announced the results of Tweedy's investigation and distributed a condensed version of his final report to the delegates at the next CAZAB meeting at Camp Peary, Virginia. Confidential interview.

16. Confidential interview.

17. Newton Miler, interview with TM, February 14, 1989.

18. Leonard McCoy, interview with TM, June 1, 1988, and interview with JG, June 15, 1988.

19. Confidential interview.

24-JUN-96  
file

## ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

24 June 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham  
FROM: Barry Harrelson  
SUBJECT: ARRB Request re Angelton and Scott

1. Jeremy Gunn, ARRB staff, has requested (via telephone) access to the following files/documents:

a. Winston Scott documents, including the entire manuscript It Came to Little, and personal effects seized on Winston Scott's death;

b. files of James Angelton housed in the CI vault.

2. As [redacted] handled the recent FOIA litigation brought by Michael Scott (Win's son) for all documents on his father, Linda has copies of documents responsive to Gunn's first request in her office. I have spoken with Linda and we agree that, with your concurrence, the best course of action would be to have Gunn view the Scott documents and manuscript at OGC. You should be aware that during the course of that litigation, searches were conducted to locate personal effects seized by CIA upon Scott's death. Those effects were never located, but a destruction record that seems to refer to these personal effects was located and provided to OGC. Gunn would need access to that destruction record as well.


3. The second request of Gunn also was an issue in the Scott FOIA litigation. At that time the DO told IP&CRD that all Angelton documents were sorted through in the 1970s and that a separate CI Angelton holding no longer exist. Official files were incorporated into DO record system and material not deemed to be official records were destroyed. To the extent that any destruction records exist on Angelton's records, Jeremy would like to see these as well. Linda and I suggest that the DO search for any such destruction records and forward them to OGC. In this way, Jeremy can view them at the same time he views the Scott documents.

4. Jeremy has agreed that if CIA allows him to view the above records "informally" and he finds nothing that relates to the assassination, then he will not make an "official request" for these records. Of course, any records he believes to be relevant, he will have to make an official request and they will then become part of the JFK Collection.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY


## ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

5. Please let me know if you have any problems with the above proposal. Feel free to phone me (30292) or Linda (76124) if you have any questions or concerns.



Barry Harrelson

cc: C/HRG

  
Ellie Neiman

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IR-04

ALSO BY WILLIAM R. CORSON

*The Betrayal*  
*Promise or Peril*  
*Consequences of Failure*  
*The Armies of Ignorance*  
*The New KGB* (with Robert Crowley)

BY JOSEPH AND SUSAN TRENTO

*Prescription for Disaster*

BY JOSEPH TRENTO

*The National Aeronautics and Space*  
*Administration* (with Richard Hirsch)

# WIDOWS

William R. Corson, Susan B. Trento,  
and Joseph J. Trento

1979

CROWN PUBLISHERS, INC.

New York

ment. Somewhere in the CIA, and perhaps elsewhere in the U.S. government, at least one mole was digging in, and this unbelievably bright and complicated man wanted him trapped.

Within the CIA, everyone realized how tough Angleton's job was. Hank Knoche recalls Angleton's outlook: "Angleton had a special view of the world . . . colored very much by the responsibilities he had as chief of the CI staff, [a position he had held] for years and years. You almost have to be 100 percent paranoid to do that job. You always have to fear the worst. You always have to assume the worst of your enemies. You always have to assume, without necessarily having the proof in your hands, that your own organization has been penetrated and that there's a mole around somewhere. And it creates this terrible distrustful attitude."

Angleton's power exceeded by far the responsibilities of his job at the CIA. Although he never had more than 120 people working for him, he became a feared and revered legend. CIA employees would point Angleton out in the hallway, only to discover years later that they had pointed to the wrong man. He cast a giant shadow across the entire CIA, and yet few people ever worked with him. His search for the mole was spurred on by the warnings of one defector. Angleton had become almost bewitched by the conspiracies woven by a Soviet defector named Anatolyi Golitsyn.

Golitsyn defected in Helsinki in late 1961. Characterized by those who had to deal with him as arrogant, nasty, and loaded with details of KGB operations around the world, Golitsyn was the only defector Angleton ever trusted. "With the single exception of Golitsyn, Angleton was inclined to assume that any defector or operational asset in place was controlled by the KGB," said Clare Edward Petty, who worked for Angleton.<sup>1</sup> But Angleton was so infatuated with this man that he lowered his carefully constructed guard, which had, in the past, always prevented him and his counterintelligence staff from being captivated by defectors.

Before and after Golitsyn, other defectors did not fare as well as he did. Michal Goleniewski—code name SNIPER—the highest-ranking Polish agent ever to defect to the West, had so worn out his welcome by the early 1970s that no one from the CIA even remained in touch with him. According to Petty, Angleton considered Goleniewski a provocation, a Soviet agent sent to the West with carefully prepared false information. He was not to be trusted. But from the time he defected in West Berlin in 1960 with his mistress, his information proved to be reliable. He had warned the West of a Soviet mole—a "midlevel agent," and his warnings were ignored. The mole was the infamous British agent George Blake, who turned out to have been working for the KGB.

In 1970 the British contacted Petty and told him that they needed to speak to Goleniewski about an investigation they were conducting into the loyalty of Sir Michael Hanley, a senior official in MI5. Petty explained that the CIA had broken off its relationship with Goleniewski, but the FBI in New York kept in contact with him. Months later the British called Petty to tell him how extraordinarily helpful Goleniewski had been. Then they dropped a bombshell. As an aside to Goleniewski's devastating accusations about Hanley, he charged that Nixon's National Security Adviser—Henry Kissinger—was a Soviet agent. Petty was told by the British that Goleniewski had an office mate who had previously run operations for the Soviets in East Germany during the last few years of World War II and after the war. This agent handler had run some very sensitive cases, and he had a safe. When the agent handler died, Goleniewski was commissioned by the UB (Polish intelligence) to open up his safe and read the contents and inventory them. It was during this inventory that Goleniewski ran across a case of two Soviet agents run by his deceased colleague. According to Petty, Goleniewski said both of them had cryptonyms, exact information as to when they had been recruited, and a case file of what they had done. Goleniewski identified one as Henry Kissinger. He said that Kissinger had been returned to the United States and had been contacted subsequent to his return to continue his work for the Soviets in the United States.

Goleniewski knew that Kissinger had been put to work on a CIA project at Harvard. Petty and his colleagues were reasonably certain that Goleniewski could have come up with most of his information from open sources, but not the part about Kissinger's CIA connections. That had been secret. In 1971, Angleton's staff reluctantly began an investigation of Kissinger. They had no choice, according to Petty: "Despite the fact that Goleniewski had been widely discredited as being mentally deranged or perhaps a Soviet agent, the specificity of his lead was comparable to that [which was] characteristic of his best work, and could in no way be ignored," Petty said.

The CI division began using all its sources to pull together a dossier on the flamboyant and egotistical National Security Adviser. In the opinion of the counterintelligence officials at the CIA, Kissinger treated them as bothersome meddlers when they requested that he follow normal security precautions in dealing with the Soviets.

Petty gave Angleton a memo on the charges. But instead of notifying the FBI and ordering an investigation, Angleton, according to Petty, "sat on it." Although the British had vouched for Goleniewski, some at the CIA thought the defector was mentally unstable, and that his insistence that he was related to the Tsar was symptomatic. Angleton told the British, through one of MI5's assistant directors, Peter Wright,

Soviet Foreign Ministry. Ogorodnik was eventually transferred back to Moscow to work at the Foreign Ministry, in the Global Affairs Section.

Ogorodnik was not a believer in American democracy, but he did believe in capitalism. He sold out the Soviet government for several large payments in gold. The CIA's Soviet Division gave Ogorodnik the code name TRIGON. For two years a wealth of material—much of it gossip involving key personalities in the Soviet Foreign Service—emerged from TRIGON. But the handling of this source was neither careful nor skillful. Use of standard tradecraft in Moscow, such as dead drops, was considered both dangerous and potentially embarrassing. The KGB is so overstaffed that putting full surveillance on *all* CIA people in Moscow is standard practice. The compromise of Martha Peterson was fairly predictable, considering the risks of working in the Soviet Union.

Once Peterson was arrested, the CIA considered TRIGON compromised. It was clear to McCoy that Peterson had been set up for her arrest at the drop site. What the CIA did not know was how long the KGB had been onto TRIGON, or how they had got onto TRIGON in the first place. Another thing the CIA had to know was if the KGB had forced TRIGON to start feeding back phony material, and if so, when. Almost immediately, Leonard McCoy, who had been a reports officer on so many similar cases, would now look at the TRIGON case as a counterintelligence officer. Since early 1975, McCoy had been the number-two man to George Kalaris, who had replaced James Angleton. Neither Kalaris nor McCoy had any real experience in counterintelligence when they took over from the renowned spymaster. And in the ensuing years, they did little to impress many counterintelligence veterans or the FBI. But, as discussed later in this book, the biggest body blow to Kalaris and McCoy was the bizarre management of the Nick Shadrin case.<sup>37</sup>

By 1977, when Martha Peterson was arrested, McCoy's reputation as a counterintelligence expert was suffering badly. McCoy says that CIA Director Adm. Stansfield Turner gave him only two weeks to find out how TRIGON was compromised. In an attempt to find out what had happened that caused the Peterson arrest and the subsequent execution by the KGB of TRIGON, McCoy found himself in a political mine field. For a brief time, McCoy suspected that Dr. Henry Kissinger may have played a role in the compromise of TRIGON. One piece of intelligence that came McCoy's way was a bizarre NSA intercept from the Soviet Embassy in Washington in April 1977. The cable was sent by Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow. It referred to advice Henry Kissinger had given Dobrynin on how to deal with the new Carter administration in the ongoing SALT II negotia-

tions. For McCoy, the cable was a shocking document. The idea that a former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser would meet alone, as a private citizen, with the Soviet Ambassador to discuss negotiating techniques seemed almost beyond belief to McCoy.

The cable gave credence to an old file McCoy had inherited when he moved into CI—the file of the original investigation and supporting documents looking into Kissinger's loyalty that grew out of Michal Goleniewski's charges in 1969. What made matters worse was that Angleton's old office files also reflected long meetings Kissinger and Dobrynin had had alone during the Nixon years. Angleton noted that Kissinger had refused to be debriefed after those meetings. All McCoy knew was that Kissinger had displayed a questionable pattern of behavior. Now a key source in the Soviet Foreign Ministry had been lost, and it was a source that Kissinger was in a position to identify to the Soviets.

9 JAN 97

## MEMORANDUM

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE IN FULL

To: Barry Harrelson

From: T. Jeremy Gunn

2000

Subject: Requests to CIA for Records-Related Information- UPDATE

Date: January 9, 1997

(703) 615-1111

The following is a list of our current requests for information. These should be considered informal requests for which we await your response. If you have any additional questions or responses, you should call either Bob Skwirot or the analysts identified below. We are willing to formalize any of the requests into our numbered series if you would so prefer.

Response	Date	Request	Analyst
partial response 10/96	9/6/96	Spas Raikin files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them.	Combs
pending	9/6/96	Spas Raikin file in Box 15 folder 34. Who is the person signing the DCD messages? Did Raikin work for CIA? Did he work for DCD/OO? What is relationship between documents in file and Raikin?	Combs
pending	9/6/96	Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630 (Box 34, F 22) p. 2. Cable number (IN 24738) 7 July 62. We can send fax if helpful.	Legaspi
partial response 10/96	9/6/96	Marilyn D. Murrel files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them.	Combs
pending	9/96	Information on HTLINGUAL	Combs
complete 10/96	9/96	Information on Angleton's filing system at CI	Combs
pending	10/17/96	Location of DRE, CRC, MRR(?) monthly operational reports	Legaspi
pending	10/24/96	Tapes	Marr
pending	10/24/96	Moscow	Combs
pending	11/06/96	Tapes of Alvarado Interrogation	Marr
pending	12/10/96	New Orleans, Hunter Leake, Clay Shaw, QKENCHANT, and ZRCLIFF	Legaspi
pending	12/10/96	Claude Barnes Capehart	Skwirot
pending	01/07/97	Howard Guebler	Gunn

SECRET

SECOND DRAFT 3/6/97 [arrbci.do2]  
NOTES BY TJG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD  
JANUARY 15, 1997

Cleveland Cram  
Untitled (History of the old CI staff) (beginning to dismissal of Angleton)  
II Volumes (c.1981)  
1063 pages

The Post-Angleton CI Staff  
2 volumes (July, 1993)

The ARRB requested access to any and all internal CIA histories of the CI staff for the purpose of determining whether they contain any information that would be useful for understanding the assassination of President Kennedy, including for example, the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald, the structure of CI with respect to the components of the office that had responsibility for handling Oswald's file at different times (particularly CI/SIG), and any aspect of HTLINGUAL related to Oswald. Because the Agency keeps these histories closely held, it was believed that they are relatively more likely to be candid assessments of CI and its activities than one might obtain from more widely circulate documents.

I was provided complete access to the entire 11 volumes of an untitled history of the old CI staff (*hereafter Old CI Staff*). The *Old CI Staff* covers counterintelligence at CIA from its origins to the departure of James Jesus Angleton. The histories appear as typed legal-size pages in green, cardboard folders. The first volume is hand dated (1981) and is signed "Cleveland Cram." I was also provided complete access to a second history of counterintelligence, the *Post-Angleton CI Staff* (*hereafter Post-Angleton*) which starts with the departure of Angleton and continues to the conversion of the CI Staff into the CI Center in the spring of 1988.

By all appearances, the histories appear to be relatively candid assessments of CI Staff activities. I was able to identify information that illuminated some of the issues of concern, and those will be outlined below. I identified no information that would lead to any significant reevaluation of the role of CI in issues related to Oswald or to the assassination. For the purpose of understanding the assassination of the President or the other issues that come within the scope of the Review Board's mandate -- **other than the information identified below** -- I do not believe that the histories themselves, nor copies of any of the pages of the histories, would provide any significant useful additional information that would enhance the understanding of the assassination and I see no need for any further information to be released from the histories. [It is my preliminary judgment that the page numbers highlighted below should be copied and attached to this memorandum so that they can be made public.]



The information contained in the histories consists largely of case studies of important counterintelligence activities. As a rule, the histories do not describe the structure of the CI offices, the personnel, the filing system, or operations generally – although discussion of some of these issues arises. The principal sources used by the authors consisted of documents from the CI Staff and interviews with officers. There are relatively few footnotes and the citations are, accordingly, quite thin. There are, for example, only 8 footnotes in volume 1 of the *Old CI Staff* history, which themselves are sketchy.

### *Old CI Staff*

1. The introduction to the *Old CI Staff* refers to an earlier CI history that was written by a person who was provided only limited access to Angleton and the files. The author, accordingly, found the history to be unhelpful for understanding sensitive CI activities. (*Old CI Staff*, pp. 1-2). There are references to two additional documents that should be requested: The Bronson Tweedy [w/Goleniewski?] study on Golitsyn (1975) and the John Hart study on Nosenko (called "The Monster Plot"). (Charles Battaglia, Staff Director of the SSCI, told me that the ARRB should request The Monster Plot for review under the JFK Act.)
2. There is a reference to a 1959 IG survey of CI which should be requested for review. (See e.g., *Old CI Staff*, pp. 47,56)
3. The 1959 IG analysis stated that, within the CI staff, "96 were professionals, 75 clerical and four staff agents. The Staff also had one Headquarters contract agent, and several agents under projects." (*Old CI Staff*, p. 48)
4. There is a discussion of the Special Investigations Unit (circa 1959) and HTLINGUAL. Copies of pages 49-51, and 55, which describe the SIU and HTLINGUAL, should be evaluated to determine whether they contribute to understanding of relevant issues.
5. Angleton was on sick leave from the agency from May, 1960 to 12 January 1961. During Angleton's absence, [S. Herman Horton] was Acting Chief and James Hunt was Acting Deputy Chief. Hunt subsequently became the regular deputy and served until 1969. (*Old CI Staff*, p. 58)
6. Routine liaison with FBI was conducted by Jane Roman "from the late 1940s onward...." (*Old CI Staff*, p. 70). Sensitive matters were handled, however, by Angleton or Hunt (*Old CI Staff*, p. 70) although this practice "did not develop until the early 1960s after the defection of Golitsyn....." (*Old CI Staff*, p. 71).
7. The activities of CI/SIG are described on pp. 144-45. The sources cited in the

Old CI Staff are the 1955 and 1973 descriptions of its activities. It should be decided whether these two pages should be copied for attachment to this memo.

I did not find that the references to Nosenko provided additional information that enhances the historical understanding of the assassination. Mr. Angleton's testimony to the Church Committee is much more illuminating in that regard.

The *Post-Angleton* history, although covering the period after Oswald and the assassination, discusses the issues of the disposition of the files of James Jesus Angleton and a few other matters. Because of the speculation about the contents of the files, discussions of their disposition would seem to be relevant. The pertinent points are as follows:

*Post Angleton, Volume I:*

1. The volume describes the CI staff, at the departure of Angleton, as being seriously disorganized and as being intellectually detached from the work of the rest of the agency. (*Post-Angleton*, p. I:6-8.)
2. The Angleton office files were voluminous and in disarray at the time of his departure from the Agency. It may be appropriate to make copies of pp.I:8 (last paragraph) up to the last paragraph on p. 14, 53-57 to illustrate this.
3. [F]iles were found on the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert F. Kennedy. These included autopsy pictures of the remains of Robert Kennedy. Although Nosenko's account of the KGB's involvements with Lee Harvey Oswald and his denial that the KGB had anything to do with the murder of John Kennedy might reasonably explain an Angleton interest in the John Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee, with whom Kalaris consulted on this bizarre finding, had any idea why Angleton had the pictures. Neither could they think of any reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files to contain them. They were accordingly destroyed." (*Post-Angleton*, p. I:11). I subsequently spoke with the author, who told me that he had spoken to Kalaris and Blee about this, and neither man could remember anything in the files except the Robert Kennedy photographs and some newspaper clippings.
4. The files revealed evidence that Angleton conducted "counterintelligence [operations or activities?] abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in the way in which the local station would be effectively cut out and command channel and communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington." (*Post-Angleton*, p. I:22.) (sic). I interpret these words to say the following: Angleton conducted counterintelligence operations [activities?] abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in such a way that local stations would be

effectively cut out; command channel and communications would run directly to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington. [Gunn would like to re-review this page to make sure that he has quoted from it correctly.]

5. The author cites two examples where Angleton ran liaison with friendly governments without the local station chiefs being specifically aware of Angleton's activities. The station chiefs found this "frustrating." (*Post-Angleton*, pp. I: 25-26).

6. (Circa 1976) "[H]andling [FOIA requests for information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald] required the creation of a task force of 13 operations officers and analysts, plus clerical personnel, and their full-time efforts for over a month." (*Post-Angleton*, p. I:67.)

7. Discussion of activities of part of CI staff circa 1976: "Double Agent Branch -- was charged with the conduct of and coordination o double agent operations abroad. Since the vast majority of DA cases were run by the US military services, the FBI, or -- in some instances -- foreign-liaison services, the branch was very heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations." (*Post-Angleton*, p. I:71).

8. The author refers to an August 1976 IG report sometimes called the Freer report. It analyzes Angleton's stewardship over CI compared to that of Kalaris. It discusses how Angleton ran CI. We should review this report. [It is cited in Mangold, Cold Warrior, at 316.]

#### Post-Angleton, Volume II:

The only significant reference in the second volume pertains to the final completion of the review of the Angleton files. (*Post-Angleton*, p. II:114.)

e\ci

New Note\Personalized

CL BY: xxx

CL REASON: Section 1.5

DECL ON:

DRV FRM:

**From the Desk of Richard D. Kovar-Y-  
QKSCIF**

**NOTE FOR:** J. Barry harrelson  
**FROM:** Richard D. Kovar-Y-  
**OFFICE:** DCI  
**DATE:** 09/25/98 17:38:59  
**SUBJECT:** Jeremy's CI History requirements

**From the "Old CI Staff":**  
Pages 49-51, and 55 (HTLINGUAL)  
Pages 144-45 (CI/SIG)

**From "Post-Angleton": (I and II are Roman numerals, apparently volumes)**  
Pages I:6-8 (Staff disorganization)  
Pages I:8, starting with the last paragraph, up to the last paragraph on page 14, 53-57 (sic). (Files disarray)  
Page I:11 (Kennedy files)  
Page I:22 (CI abroad)  
Page I:67 (FOIA)  
Page I:71 (Double agents)  
Page II: 114 (File review)

**CC:**

New Note\Personalized

**SECRET****DRAFT NOTES BY TJG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD****JANUARY 13, 1997**

On January 13, 1997, Michelle Combs and Jeremy Gunn from the ARRB Staff reviewed the files of Winston McKinley Scott at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The General Counsel's office stated that the files presented for our examination are the "complete" files known to the CIA on Scott.

The documents total approximately 6 inches, and include:

(1) A manuscript entitled "It Came to Little," by Ian Maxwell (pseud.), which contains 221 enumerated pages. The foreword to the manuscript states that the events recounted therein contain "no exaggerations and no deviations from basic truth." (unpaginated forward). It reveals that some true names have been used, and that this has been done without the consent of the persons named. The author expresses his "most sincere admiration and utmost respect for: Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation [sic]; Mr. James R. Murphy, wartime director of OSS/X-2; and particularly, the late Allen Welsh Dulles, OSS Chief in Switzerland during World War II, a principal architect in the creation of CIA for President Harry Truman and the Greatest Director CIA has had." The author refers to the blight of communism, and the courageous people who have worked to fight it, but nevertheless concludes that "all the effort [to thwart Communism] has come to little." (unpaginated forward)

There is only one chapter that makes any identifiable reference to the assassination of President Kennedy and to the events related to Mexico City at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was alleged to have visited. That chapter has been released in full to the public.

(2) A Supplemental Declaration of J. Barry Harrelson from the case Michael Scott v. CIA, CA No. 1:93CV00686 with attached documents. The attached documents contain documents released in full and some that are redacted. According to CIA, all redacted documents are a part of the JFK collection. This should be confirmed. If they are part of the collection, no further steps need be taken. If not, they must be fully reviewed to determine whether they are assassination records.

(3) Documents that appear to be copies of the personnel file of Win Scott. All of the documents in this file were reviewed to determine whether any assassination records are included. Our review disclosed no "assassination records." Although not assassination records, the following information was located in the personnel file:

-- The records disclose that during World War II, while in the employ of the FBI, Scott worked in "connection with espionage and subversive activities" and in "counterespionage" while based in Havana.

-- Document, dated 7/23/69, refers to the possibility that CIA might attempt to recruit Scott for the "Civilian Reserve Program (HR 20-15) following his retirement from the agency.

-- On May 6, 1969, Scott was recommended for a Distinguished Intelligence Medal by William V. Broe, who was then Chief of WH. The recommendation includes the following statement:

"Mr. Scott built a large and highly effective organization targeted against highest priority national security targets; namely, the Soviet bloc presence south of the border. Given the nature of the target, Mr. Scott molded his station with a predominantly CI orientation until it has become a highly effective counterintelligence mechanism capable of covering Soviet Bloc and Cuban [activities]."

His Citation for the Distinguished Intelligence Medal includes the following statement:

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"[H]e has served brilliantly in Mexico for over twelve years where among other things he has built a remarkable counterintelligence machine—a true bulwark helping to guard our southern border. His station has long been a showcase of technical intelligence methods as well as classical operations."

— There is no record in the file that suggests, one way or the other, that Mr. Scott was ever treated for or suffered from any mental or emotional issue.

Unless the following are already part of the JFK collection, they should be designated "assassination records" and processed under the JFK Act.

— AR: Doc. 93: 8 Oct. 1976 for Chief, Security Analysis Group from [xxx] in Security Analysis Group, subject: Philip B. F. AGEE Exposure of CIA Personnel (4 pp.).

— AR: Doc. 94: discussion of Chapter 21 of manuscript.

— AR: Doc. 129: discussion of chapter 21 of manuscript

— AR: Doc. 131: discussion of removing Scott papers after his death

— AR: Doc. 132: ditto

— AR: Doc. 134 brief message re: manuscript

TJG was shown the Records Control Schedule that appears to document the destruction of some Win Scott documents. This record should, perhaps, be designated an "assassination record."

*item  
fixed by  
Lindc.*

Queries/follow-up:

Verification no other WS files

Process ARs

Which records are already in collection?

ARRB must still review any Scott destruction schedules.

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2. There is a reference to a 1959 IG survey of CI which should be requested for review. (See, e.g., Cram 47, 56)
3. The 1959 IG analysis stated the within the CI staff, "96 were professionals, 75 clerical and four staff agents. The Staff also had one Headquarters contract agent, and several agents under projects." (Cram, 48).
4. There is a discussion of the Special Investigations Unit (circa 1959) and HTLINGUAL. Copies of pages 49-51, and 55, which describe the SIU and HTLINGUAL, should be evaluated to determine whether they contribute to understanding of relevant issues.
5. Angleton was on sick leave from the agency from May, 1960 to 12 January 1961. During Angleton's absence, S. Herman Horton was Acting Chief and James Hunt was Acting Deputy Chief. Hunt subsequently became the regular deputy and served until 1969. (Cram, 58).
6. Routine liaison with FBI was conducted by Jane Roman "from the late 1940s onward . . ." (Cram, 70). Sensitive matters were handled, however, by Angleton or Hunt (Cram, 70) although this practice "did not develop until the early 1960s after the defection of Gollitsyn . . ." (Cram, 71).
7. The activities of CI/SIG are described on pp. 144-45. Cram's cited sources are the 1955 and 1973 descriptions of its activities. It should be decided whether these two pages should be copied for attachment to this memo.

I did not find that the references to Nosenko provided additional information that enhances the historical understanding of the assassination. Mr. Angleton's testimony to the Church Committee is much more illuminating in that regard.

....

The [ ] history, although after the period of Oswald and the assassination, discusses the issues of the disposition of the files of James Jesus Angleton and a few other matters. Because of the speculation about the contents of the files, discussions of their disposition would seem to be relevant. The pertinent points are as follows:

[ ] volume I:

1. [ ] describes the CI staff, at the departure of Angleton, as being seriously unorganized and as being intellectually detached from the work of the agency. [ ] p. I:6-8.)
2. The Angleton office files were voluminous and in disarray at the time of his departure from the Agency. It may be appropriate to make copies of pp. I:8 (last paragraph) up to the last paragraph on p. 14, 53-57 to illustrate this.
3. "[F]iles were found on the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert F. Kennedy. These included autopsy pictures of the remains of Robert Kennedy. Although Nosenko's account of the KGB's involvement with Lee Harvey Oswald and his denial that the KGB had anything to do with the murder of John Kennedy might reasonably explain an Angleton interest in the John Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee, with whom Kalaris consulted on this bizarre finding, had any idea why Angleton had the pictures. Neither could they think of any reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files to contain them. They were accordingly destroyed." [ ] p. I:11). I subsequently interviewed [ ] who told me

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that he had spoken to Kalaris and Blee about this, and neither man could remember anything in the files except the Robert Kennedy photographs.

4. The files revealed evidence that Angleton ran "counterintelligence [operations] abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in the way in which the local station would be effectively cut out and command channel and communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington." [redacted] p. I:22.) (sic). I believe [redacted] is saying the following: Angleton ran counterintelligence operations abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in such a way that local stations would be effectively cut out; command channel and communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington.

5. [redacted] cites two examples where Angleton ran liaison with friendly governments without the local station chiefs being specifically aware of Angleton's activities. The station chiefs found this "frustrating." [redacted] pp. I:25-26).

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8. Bonner refers to an August 1976 IG report sometimes called the Freer report. It analyzes Angleton's stewardship over CI compared to that of Kalaris. It discusses how Angleton ran CI. We should review this report. [It is cited in Mangold, Cold Warrior, at 316.]

[redacted] volume II:

The only significant reference in Bonner pertains to the final completion of the review of the Angleton files. [redacted] p. II:114.)



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DRAFT NOTES BY TJG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD  
JANUARY 15, 1997 ✓

Cleveland Cram

Untitled (History of the old CI staff) (beginning to dismissal of Angleton)

11 Volumes (c. 1981)

The Post-Angleton CI Staff

2 volumes (July, 1993)

The ARRB requested access to any and all internal CIA histories of the CI staff for the purpose of determining whether they contain any information that would be useful for understanding the assassination of President Kennedy, including, for example, the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald, the structure of CI with respect to the components of the office that had responsibility for handling Oswald's file at different times (particularly CI/SIG), and any aspect of HTLINGUAL related to Oswald. Because the Agency keeps these histories closely held, it was believed that they are relatively more likely to be candid assessments of CI and its activities than one might obtain from more widely circulate documents.

I was provided complete access to the entire 11 volumes of Cleveland Cram's (untitled) history of the old CI staff. The Cram history covers counterintelligence at the CIA from its origins to the departure of James Jesus Angleton. The histories appear as typed legal-size pages in green, cardboard folders. The first volume is hand dated (1981) and signed "Cleveland Cram." There are 1063 pages in the Cram history. I was also provided complete access to [redacted] history of counterintelligence, which starts with the departure of Angleton and continues to the present.

By all appearances, the histories appear to be relatively candid assessments of CI. I was able to identify information that illuminated some of the issues of concern, and those will be outlined below. I identified no information that would lead to any significant reevaluation of the role of CI in issues related to Oswald or to the assassination. For the purpose of understanding the assassination of the President or the other issues that come within the scope of the Review Board's mandate -- *other than the information identified below* -- I do not believe that the histories themselves, nor copies of any of the pages of the histories, would provide any significant useful additional information that would enhance the understanding of the assassination and I see no need for any further information to be released from the histories. *It is my preliminary judgment that the page numbers highlighted below should be copied and attached to this memorandum so that they can be made public.*

The information contained in the histories consists largely of case studies of important counterintelligence activities. As a rule, the histories do not describe the structure of the CI offices, the personnel, the filing system, or operations generally -- although discussion of some of these issues arises. The principal sources used by the authors consisted of documents from CI and interviews with officers. There are relatively few footnotes and the citations are, accordingly, quite thin. There are, for example, only 8 footnotes in volume 1, which themselves are sketchy. The points that enhance the historical understanding of the assassination are:

1. The introduction to Cram's history refers to an earlier CI history that was written by a person who was provided only limited access to Angleton and the files. The author of the first history was given, for example, no access to any CI/SIG documents. Cram, accordingly, found the history to be unhelpful for understanding sensitive CI activities. (Cram, p. 1-2). There are references to two additional documents that should be requested: the Goleniewski study on Golitsyn (1975) and the John Hart study on Nosenko (called the "Monster Plot"). (Charles Battaglia, Staff Director of the SSCL, told me that the ARRB should request the Monster Plot for review under the JFK Act.)

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2. There is a reference to a 1959 IG survey of CI which should be requested for review. (See, e.g., Cram 47, 56)
3. The 1959 IG analysis stated the within the CI staff, "96 were professionals, 75 clerical and four staff agents. The Staff also had one Headquarters contract agent, and several agents under projects." (Cram, 48).
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I did not find that the references to Nosenko provided additional information that enhances the historical understanding of the assassination. Mr. Angleton's testimony to the Church Committee is much more illuminating in that regard.

....

The [ ] history, although after the period of Oswald and the assassination, discusses the issues of the disposition of the files of James Jesus Angleton and a few other matters. Because of the speculation about the contents of the files, discussions of their disposition would seem to be relevant. The pertinent points are as follows:

[ ] olume I:

1. [ ] describes the CI staff, at the departure of Angleton, as being seriously unorganized and as being intellectually detached from the work of the agency. [ ] p. I:6-8.)
2. The Angleton office files were voluminous and in disarray at the time of his departure from the Agency. It may be appropriate to make copies of pp. I:8 (last paragraph) up to the last paragraph on p. 14, 53-57 to illustrate this.
3. "[F]iles were found on the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert F. Kennedy. These included autopsy pictures of the remains of Robert Kennedy. Although Nosenko's account of the KGB's involvement with Lee Harvey Oswald and his denial that the KGB had anything to do with the murder of John Kennedy might reasonably explain an Angleton interest in the John Kennedy assassination, neither Kalaris nor Blee, with whom Kalaris consulted on this bizarre finding, had any idea why Angleton had the pictures. Neither could they think of any reason why it was appropriate for CI Staff files to contain them. They were accordingly destroyed." [ ] I:11). I subsequently interviewed [ ] who told me

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that he had spoken to Kalaris and Blee about this, and neither man could remember anything in the files except the Robert Kennedy photographs.

4. The files revealed evidence that Angleton ran "counterintelligence [operations] abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in the way in which the local station would be effectively cut out and command channel and communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington." [redacted] I:22.) (sic). I believe [redacted] is saying the following: Angleton ran counterintelligence operations abroad as Chief of the CI Staff in such a way that local stations would be effectively cut out; command channel and communications would run direct to counterintelligence headquarters in Washington.

5. [redacted] cites two examples where Angleton ran liaison with friendly governments without the local station chiefs being specifically aware of Angleton's activities. The station chiefs found this "frustrating." [redacted] pp. I:25-26).

6. (Circa 1976) "[H]andling [FOIA requests for information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald] required the creation of a task force of 13 operations officers and analysts, plus clerical personnel, and their full-time efforts for over a month." [redacted] p. I:67.)

7. Discussion of activities of part of CI staff circa 1976: "Double Agent Branch -- was charged with the conduct of and coordination on double agent operations abroad. Since the vast majority of DA cases were run by the US military services, the FBI, or--in some instances--foreign-liaison services, the branch was very heavily a coordinator rather than active runner of operations." [redacted] p. I:71).

8. [redacted] refers to an August 1976 IG report sometimes called the Freer report. It analyzes Angleton's stewardship over CI compared to that of Kalaris. It discusses how Angleton ran CI. We should review this report. [It is cited in Mangold, Cold Warrior, at 316.]

[redacted] volume II:

The only significant reference in [redacted] pertains to the final completion of the review of the Angleton files. [redacted] p. II:114.)

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13-24 JAN 97

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**DRAFT BY KMHC AND TJG FOR ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD  
REVIEW OF MANGOLD V. CIA FILES  
JANUARY 13 and 24, 1997**

The Mangold v. CIA FOIA litigation files consist of 7 redwelds, totalling approximately 18 inches. They are organized by "tabs," which can be described as follows:

**Tab A:** copies of published newspaper and magazine clippings that were released in full. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

**Tab B:** copies of published newspaper articles, the texts of which have been released in full. The agency did redact marginalia, which consisted exclusively of file names and indicators. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

**Tab C:** documents about Angleton from the 1940s, including his career with OSS. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

**Tab D:** docs 94-230, AR (unless already part of the collection): Docs. 95 (24 Nov. 1978, Memorandum JJA testimony to HSCA). On December 11, 1978, the D.C.-based law firm of Duncan, Brown filed a FOIA request on behalf of James Angleton in conjunction with his anticipated testimony before the HSCA. Presumably all records related to this matter are AR and should be processed under the JFK Act. See doc. nos. 109-116, 120, 121.

Includes fitness reports (not designated). All of the fitness reports were reviewed to determine whether they contained probative information.

**Tab E:** documents previously released to Edward J. Epstein in response to a request for book reviews from CIA's internal journal "Studies in Intelligence." These documents are all copies of book reviews from Studies in Intelligence on issues related to intelligence. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

**Tab F** contains documents previously released to Henry Hurt in response to a request for documents concerning Alexander Orlov. Most of the documents are newspaper articles and reprints of Senate testimony. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

**Tab G** contains documents previously released to A. Doppelt (on behalf of The Readers Digest in response to a request for documents concerning Nicholas Shadrin. These documents include a speech by DCI Turner, testimony by Capt. Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov (Shadrin) before the Committee on Un-American Activities (Sept. 14, 1960), a transcript of a Panorama show on Artamonov, and extensive correspondence from his wife to various USG officials about Shadrin's disappearance. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

The Denied Documents File contains no assassination records and probably no EHUs, with the possible exception of the following records:

From Category VII: nos. 496, 498, 499, 500, 510

Doc. no. 496 is directly relevant for potential future leads. The document is a memorandum dated February 7, 1974. Docs. 498 is of interest regarding the Mafia, Teamsters, and Hoffa. Docs. 499-500, 510 regard allegations concerning assassination plots.

Otherwise, the Denied Documents file contains background information on JA, medical records, signed Special Clearance forms, administrative personnel information, information from denied FOIA requests,

enhance historical understanding

~~SECRET~~

and various memoranda relating to different conversations between JA and Agency officers on a wide variety of issues.

The Partial Releases File contains no assassination records and no EHUs. This file contains OSS background information, OS files, administrative personnel information, and medical records. I see no need to designate any documents as assassination records from the set.

## MEMORANDUM

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE IN FULL

September 12, 1998

2000

To: Laura Dank  
Executive Director

cc: Bob Scared  
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs *Michelle Combs*  
Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: CIA-IR-04 Records of James Jesus Angleton

Many stories exist about the records created and maintained by James J. Angleton, Chief of Counterintelligence, over his thirty-year reign and about their reported destruction after his retirement. The Review Board asked the CIA to search for any records maintained by Angleton still extant or to provide records showing the destruction or incorporation of records identified as Angleton's. In response, the Directorate of Operations provided three memoranda dated November 23, 1976, August 5, 1977, and November 29, 1979 that record the CIA's review of Angleton's counterintelligence files. These memoranda show that after a review of the records, a small percentage were incorporated into the files of the Directorate of Operations. Other records, either duplicates or not worthy of retention, were destroyed. The review process took several years to accomplish. The Directorate of Operations did not provide destruction records to the Review Board. Thus, CIA reported that any extant records, once known as Angleton's are no longer identifiable or retrievable as a separate collection. The memoranda describing Angleton's files are being processed for the JFK Collection at the National Archives. The CIA provided these three memoranda in a classified form with their response to CIA-IR-04.

In addition, the Review Board staff examined the Mangold v. CIA Freedom of Information Act files consisting of seven redwells totaling approximately 18 inches. The redwells are organized by "tabs" which they can describe as follows:

Tab A: copies of published newspaper and magazine clippings that have been released in full. No assassination records were designated.

Tab B: copies of published newspaper articles, the texts of which have been released in full. No assassination records were designated.

Tab C: documents about Angleton from the 1940's, including his career with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). No assassination records were designated.

Tab D: on December 11, 1978, the Washington, DC-based law firm of Duncan, Brown filed a Freedom of Information Act request on behalf of James Angleton in conjunction with his anticipated testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations. All records related to this matter, documents numbered 94-230, are designated assassination records unless they are already a part of the CIA sequestered collection. This redwell also contains Angleton's personnel evaluation reports. The Review Board staff reviewed these reports for probative information but they were not designated as assassination records.

Tab E: documents previously released to Edward J. Epstein in response to a request for book reviews from CIA's internal journal Studies in Intelligence. These documents are all copies of book reviews from Studies in Intelligence on issues related to intelligence. No assassination records were designated.

Tab F: documents previously released to Henry Hurt in response to a request for documents concerning Alexander Orlov. Most of the documents are newspaper articles and reprints of Senate testimony. No assassination records were designated.

Tab G: documents previously released to A. Doppelt on behalf of The Reader's Digest in response to a request for documents concerning Nicholas Shadrin. These documents include a speech by Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner, testimony by Captain Nikolai Fedorovich Artamonov (a pseudonym for Shadrin) before the Committee on Un-American Activities on September 14, 1960, a transcript of a Panorama Show on Artamonov, and extensive correspondence from his wife to various U. S. Government officials about Shadrin's disappearance. No assassination records were designated.

Finally, the Review Board staff examined the Denied Documents and Partial Releases files for Mangold v. CIA. The Denied Documents file contains background information on Angleton, medical records, signed Special Clearance forms, administrative personnel information, information from denied Freedom of Information Act requests, and various memoranda relating to different conversations between Angleton and CIA officers on a wide variety of issues. Documents numbered 496, 498, 499, 500, and 510 were designated assassination records unless they already exist in the CIA sequestered collection.

The Partial Releases File contains additional records on Angleton such as Office of Strategic Services background information, Office of Security files, administrative personnel information, and medical records. No assassination records were designated.



**SPECIAL COLLECTIONS**  
**RELEASE IN FULL**  
**2000**

*fol 27*  
24 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Laura Denk  
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson,  
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-04, Disposition of Angleton Files

1. The following is responsive to referent request.
2. The ARRB staff requested that the Agency provide an explanation of the disposition of the files of James J. Angleton, Chief, Counter-Intelligence Staff, following his retirement from the Agency in 1975.
3. Research on the question determined the following. After Angleton's departure, his files were incorporated within the files of the CI Staff and the Directorate of Operations (DO). Per three memoranda dated 23 November 1976, 5 August 1977, and 29 November 1979 respectively, these files were reviewed and incorporated into the DO records system. Items that were duplicates or not worthy of retention were destroyed. The memoranda describe the CI file collection under Angleton and the process that was followed to incorporate significant and non-duplicative files into the records system. Because the files that were once known as Angleton's have been dispersed within the DO records, they are no longer identifiable as a collection.
4. The three memoranda are classified and have been made attachments hereto. They have been included within the JFK collection for review, processing and release to the National Archives.

J. Barry Harrelson

~~ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY~~

CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE IN FULL  
2000

5 August 1977

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Leslie S. Raty  
Deputy Chief, IMPG

SUBJECT: Processing of Documents by the Analysis Unit  
in CI Staff

1. This will confirm the conclusions of a discussion held on 26 July 1977 between the members of the CI Staff Analysis Unit and the undersigned.

2. It was the understanding of the ISS team that surveyed the records of CI Staff that the Analysis Unit would process information found in the Staff which had not been previously processed into the records system. It would compare files opened by CI Staff with files already opened in the central system consolidating them where duplication existed and registering unique files centrally when warranted. It would also process unique documents found in the staff which had not been previously processed. The survey team recognized, however, that the CI Staff held literally thousands of documents which were duplicates of documents already processed for the central system for other DDO components. These included non-record or carbon copies

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
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of cables and dispatches and memorandums for which CI Staff was only an information addressee. These the team did not believe warranted reprocessing. Where these documents are an integral part of a file being integrated into or consolidated with a duplicate file in the central system the documents should be retained in the official file but not be reprocessed individually.

  
Leslie S. Raty

Distribution:

Orig - CI/RA  
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1 - CI/RMO

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CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
2000

23 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

FROM : Charles A. Briggs  
Chief, Information Services Staff

SUBJECT : CI Staff Records Study

REFERENCE : Memorandum for the Record dated 4 February 1976,  
Subject: Meeting with Chief, CI Staff, from  
Chief, Information Services Group

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

1. At the request of Chief, CI Staff, an ISS Analyst Team has worked with the CI Staff to:

a. Conduct a study of CI Staff's records holdings, records keeping practices and problems.

b. Develop recommendations for bringing CI Staff's twenty-five year accumulation of compartmented and sensitive records and files under control of the DDO Central Records System.

c. Design methods for recording sensitive information in the DDO Central Records System to provide leads to CI Staff's holdings while providing appropriate protection.

d. Coordinate systems development activity needed to help CI Staff accomplish the recommended objectives.

2. The ISS Team surveyed the CI Staff's records holdings to determine how these records relate to the DDO Central Records System. All records being held at Headquarters were reviewed; a sampling of the material being held at the Records Center was reviewed.

3. The ISS team reviewed current records handling practices to measure records traffic and ascertain that material was being properly processed into the DDO Central Records System.

B. FINDINGS

1. The records currently being maintained by CI Staff to support its existing organization are generally well organized and for the most part, properly maintained. There are cases where

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official files have not been opened and records are not being processed into the DDO Central Records System because the material is considered too sensitive. Procedures for processing this material into the records system are being developed.

2. CI Staff has accumulated several hundred feet of files that contain a mixture of record and non-record material. Many of these files are fragmented, reflecting previously divided or parallel responsibilities among CI Staff, and in some cases, other DDO components. There are many files, and many documents within files, particularly CI Staff memoranda, codeword material, sensitive liaison correspondence, etc., which have never been processed into the records system. Some of these files, especially those being held at the Records Center, are ambiguously identified. Some of the documents in these files are completely unrelated to the subject of the file. The files that have a continuing operational value should be pulled together and the records in the files indexed and abstracted in accordance with existing procedures. The files that no longer have an operational value should be retired in their present form. While it is not necessary to perform in-depth indexing of these dormant records, it is important that the names of people with whom the Agency has been operationally involved be identified in the records system. Files that contain background, reference, and working papers are being held but apparently are not being used. The ISS recommendations for disposition of the files, including the destruction of much material in accordance with approved records schedules and the retirement or transfer of other holdings to more appropriate components, are contained in Annex A.

3. There are a number of policy and management files that should be established for the documents that reflect the Staff's plans, policies and procedures. The documents that provide this type of information are currently buried in miscellaneous files and cannot be retrieved in an organized manner.

4. There are several card indexes being held by CI Staff. These indexes do not reflect current Staff needs nor do they meet the indexing criteria established for the DDO Records System. They are filled with extraneous information such as the names of authors of CI Staff papers. CI/Research and Analysis Group maintains an index of 270,000 3x5 cards that provides access by name to its extensive document holdings. The cards in this index contain a name and document reference but no biographic data to facilitate identification. Many of the cards should be purged, but there is insufficient data on the cards themselves to make a judgment. These indexes should not be integrated into the Records System. The names can be indexed into the system directly from the documents that warrant processing into the central system.

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5. Some material is considered too sensitive to be processed by the Central Records System. There are names that cannot be disclosed during a routine name trace because of the personality's notoriety or operational significance. There are documents which require special handling to protect sensitive sources and the CI Staff's interest in certain cases and subjects.

### C. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

1. Annex A identifies the files being held in each CI Staff office and the Records Center and contains recommendations for their disposition. A considerable number of these files should be analyzed to ensure that records are properly filed and identified in the DDO Central Records System. Miscellaneous files such as background, reference, and working papers that do not contain record material need not be processed into the records system. CI Staff should review them to determine their utility and destroy those that are no longer used. The following recommendations on staffing, computer support, and space should help to support integration of the appropriate records into the central system.

#### a. Staffing

(1) A project team consisting of ISS personnel should be established to analyze the record material and perform the necessary codification, abstracting, indexing, cross-referencing and cross-filing. Experience or training as an ISS analyst is a prerequisite for processing this material. The age and diversity of the material will present unusual problems. Experience with both the older records and the facilities provided by the records system to support document processing is desirable.

(2) There is a total of 418 feet of record material to be analyzed and it will take an estimated 11.9 man years based on the following statistics.

<u># pages</u> <u>per foot</u>	<u># pages</u> <u>per document</u>	<u># documents</u> <u>analyzed per hour</u>
2000	2 1/2	7

(3) The project team should consist of four ISS analysts. Three of these analysts should process records full time. The fourth should be a senior analyst who can supervise the project and process records half time. The senior-analyst must have a practical knowledge of the records system, especially the older records, and the CI Staff's past records keeping practices.

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b. Computer Support

(1) It is recommended that a Video Display Terminal and a remote printer be installed in the CI Staff area. This display terminal and associated printer will enable the analysts to communicate directly with the computerized data base containing name, file, and document status information. These terminals will be used to process the old records into the system and to perform current records processing needs.

(2) It is recommended that two Four-Phase Data Entry terminals be installed in the CI Staff area to allow analyst to key new index and abstract records. It is estimated that somewhat less than 50% of the documents to be analyzed will require processing. Using an average of two index and one abstract records per document, approximately 500,000 records will have to be keyed. Remote installation at the analysts' working area will eliminate the need to mail documents to IP Electronic Data Input Section for processing.

c. Space

A secure area will be needed as work space for the analysts, computer and data entry terminals, and document storage. The CI/Research and Analysis Group's vault, Room 2B-28 is recommended. It is large enough to accommodate a team of four analysts. Its proximity to ODP's Special Computer Center and IP/Electronic Data Input Section facilitates computer and data entry terminal installation. Also, a large portion of the files to be analyzed are already stored in this area.

2. The responsibility for maintenance of files that are split between two or more CI Staff components should be assigned to a single component and the material in the files consolidated.

3. The CI/RMO should establish Policy and Management files to provide a repository for the records that document the plans, policies, and procedures of the CI Staff. Annex A, Attachment 3 identifies such files deemed necessary by the ISS survey team.

4. The senior analyst who supervises the ISS team should also serve permanently as the CI Staff analyst to perform four basic functions:

a. Process CI material currently being handled by the IP/Data Management Section.

b. Ensure that files are properly opened and maintained.

c. Serve as a records referent to provide advice on how sensitive cases and projects can be processed into the records system in a manner that protects the privacy of sources and methods.

d. Analyze and process current as well as backlogged, sensitive material, (including CI Operational Letters and ZRTAFFY) into the Central Records System.

5. A computerized information system should be developed to enable CI Staff to maintain a central index of names that are considered too sensitive to record in the DDO Central Records System. Indexes to sensitive names are currently being held by individual case officers and it is difficult to account for the names and the documents they are identified in. A compartmented computer file will enable CI Staff to identify readily their sensitive name holdings and account for the associated documents.

6. The system should also allow DDO main index name trace requests to be compared with the sensitive name file. The fact that another component or agency is conducting a trace on a name considered sensitive by CI Staff concerns the Staff. This type of comparison will provide a mechanism for alerting the Staff to outside interest. CI Staff personnel can then take appropriate action (such as contacting the requester).

7. All processing that involves these names must be done in a manner that affords maximum security. Annex B contains a proposal for developing a computerized system for handling these sensitive names. However, ISS is considering other alternatives for meeting this requirement.

#### D. ALTERNATIVES

1. All solutions to the CI Staff's record keeping problems explored by the ISS team involved processing the appropriate holdings into the DDO Central Records System. Failure to process the material into the Central Records System means running the risk that, in any investigation, or in response to Freedom of Information Act or Privacy Act inquiries, information will be overlooked or brought forth piecemeal to erode the Agency's credibility or bring into question management's control over information collection and exploitation. The following solutions were explored:

a. The various card indexes being held by CI Staff could be entered into the records system to provide access to the CI files. The files could continue to be held in hard copy or converted to microform to reduce storage requirements. However, these indexes do not contain the biographic data necessary to facilitate positive identification during a name trace of the central system. The files themselves must also be reviewed and processed to eliminate fragmentation, incorrect titles and filing, etc.

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b. The existing records could be sent to IP/Data Management Section for processing into the records system. IP/DMS has the records expertise and the computer terminals necessary to support records processing. This approach would necessitate moving the records from CI Staff to IP/DMS which could present security problems. It would also impede CI access to the material while it was being processed. Because the IP/DMS analysts have other work to perform, the CI material would have a secondary priority which would defer the completion of the project.

#### E. RECOMMENDATIONS

The ISS Team's recommendations are that:

1. CI Staff's record material should be integrated into the DDO Central Records System.
2. A project team should be established to expedite this records integration.
3. Computer terminals should be installed in CI Staff to facilitate records processing.
4. Fragmented files should be consolidated and responsibilities for them fixed.
5. Policy and management files should be opened.
6. A computer system should be developed to allow names of sensitive personalities to be recorded in the central system for access by authorized CI Staff personnel and to enable CI Staff to monitor interest in these personalities. Controls for sensitive files should be developed on a case by case basis.
7. A senior ISS analyst should be assigned to CI Staff to handle current records processing needs.
8. Although the ISS Team did not attempt to make recommendations on altering the design of the DDO Records System, they did see a need to improve the system's facilities for handling sensitive material. CI Staff is not the only component that deals with sensitive material, and other components like CI Staff tend to control their sensitive material outside the central system. To ensure that sensitive material is accounted for in the central system, methods for protecting sensitive holdings must be designed into a future records system.

/s/ Charles A. Briggs

Charles A. Briggs

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Subject: CI Staff Records Study

Attachments:

1. Annex A - Survey of the Active Records of the Counterintelligence Staff

Attachment 1: Records requiring processing  
Attachment 2: Sensitive records requiring special processing  
Attachment 3: Recommendations for Policy and Management files

2. Annex B - Computer system proposal for handling CI Staff's sensitive names

DDO/ISS/SG/AD [ ] :bg (19 November 1976) X7371

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1 - EPS/EG (Mr. Glenn Brown) (w/o att)

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S E C R E T

29 Nov 79

CI 140-79

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Staff

ATTENTION : Chief, Operations Group

FROM : David H. Blee  
Chief, Counterintelligence Staff

SUBJECT : CI Staff Record Study

REFERENCE : Information Services Staff Memorandum,  
76-572, dated 23 November 1976

1. The IMS Analyst Team assigned to CI Staff has completed a little over two years of an estimated 3.4 years' assignment to the Staff. During this period much of the original 417 feet of Staff unprocessed records have been reviewed by either the IMS Analysts or CI Staff personnel. The Analysts recently completed the processing of over 2,000 soft files which are the responsibility of our Technical Branch. This task was done in a most expeditious manner. We remain thankful for the caliber of personnel you have been sending to the Staff. (C)

2. In order to more fully understand how best to complete the remaining unprocessed records we have compiled a listing of those records reviewed by the ISS Analyst Team in 1976, but not yet completed. We estimate that 246 feet of files have been reviewed by the Task Force and another 81 feet by CI Staff personnel, leaving roughly 90 feet of unprocessed material yet to be reviewed and possibly incorporated into the DO Central Records System. Much of the paper reviewed by CI Staff personnel were found to be duplicate and were destroyed. Those documents which had to be processed were given to the IMS Analysts for processing. (U)

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INTERVIEW SOURCES  
AND METHODS INVOLVED

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3. The following files remain to be reviewed and possibly processed: (S)

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FILE DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>FOOTAGE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
a. C/CI	Miscellaneous Policy, Operational, and Subject Files	6	Some COMINT- primarily integrate into existing files.
b. C/CI	Operation <u>CANARY</u> - Soviet Contacts - Misc Subject Files	1	Open Subject files. Integrate into 201 files.
c. C/CI	ZRTAFFY Chrono	8	Sensitive - Restricted - None in DO Records System.
d. C/CI (Records Center)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 1.2em; margin-bottom: 0.2em;"></div> Case - The X-Y-Z Case - DEWINDOW Project- <u>NOBETTER</u> Case - <u>BGMORNING</u> - <u>ZRPASSKEY</u> Project - <u>ZRCHEST</u> Project - <u>PBHULKAGE</u> Project - <u>NIKE/PORTIO/HAITI</u> - <u>NHILKY</u> Case - ITKIN File	11	IMS Analyst processing required. Some sensitive.  5 X 8 Card Index in CI/A/IS.
e. CI/A/IS (Records Center)	<u>GROUNDHOG</u> Case - Covers period 1944-1969.	22	Review files. Some material integrate into PMF and other official files. Obtain file number, register crypt. Index individuals involved in case.
f. C/CI/OG	Misc. Liaison Files - Sensitive portions of 201 and Operations Files.	1	Processing required.

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FILE DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>FOOTAGE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
g. CI/A/T	COMINT Case Files.	2	Review for processing into official files.
h. CI/A/JS	<del>UCNAYT OVL</del> Project	9	Some official documents. Includes approximately 10,000 5 X 8 index cards. Official subject file 100-006-113 already indexed but should be reviewed for future retention. Request IMS advice on how to proceed with this review.
i. CI/A/JS	Sensitive CIA/ LIAISON Files.	30	Contains memoranda - Very Sensitive - None in DO Records System.

4. In addition to the above, a member of your Staff has been reviewing and consolidating the ~~WHEAT~~ Project. When the review is completed we hope to receive a recommendation on whether or not this material should be processed. This project is sensitive and contains some 35 feet of unprocessed paper. Present plans, agreed to by members of your Staff, call for the same kind of review of the ~~GROUNDHOG~~ Material (Item e) prior to processing by the IMS Analysts assigned to the Staff. (S)

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5. Unfortunately the time required to complete the above will have to be a rough estimate. At times the Analysts have been able to move rapidly through the files, while at other times they have run into records problems and the work has been slow. They have just begun the processing of Item i above. This is a compartmented codeword file and every document will have to be reviewed and most processed into the DO Central Records System (STAR). We believe there will be considerable indexing to do and it may take from 6 to 8 months to complete this project. The time remaining to complete everything will depend upon the decision made concerning the WHEAT Project, the GROUNDHOG Project, and the LCMAYFOWL Material. These three files constitute 66 feet of paper. We will work closely with members of your Staff on these decisions. (S)

David H. Blee

DDO/C/CI/A/IS/[ ] as 29 March 1979 R-9429

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee  
1 - C/CI Chrono  
1 - CI/A/IS Chrono

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