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OCI No. 1586/64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Current Intelligence 4 June 1964

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

104-10338-10018

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America Since July 1963

1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevitability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to violence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high.

In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re-2. captured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's militants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and "open the breach." On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperialists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accomplished 'many other revolutions like ours will appear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation."

3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolutions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as possible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolutionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts.

Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi-4. sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was successfully transferred following President Leoni's dramatic election victory last December; and the outbreaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April revolt in which President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. Moreover, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then.

5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (before the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

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Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means."

A number of reliable clandestine sources 6. have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious form of subversion from Havana is its training of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred of mine known 2,450 Babbn Americans who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train-It has been learned that "scholarship students" ing. who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" re-ceive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence networks to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruction on how to operate independently in the countryside for extended periods of time. A separate training school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's oneyear course is divided between the study of Communist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are developing extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to an appendice, trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar questions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge un a gent ina.

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7. Latin Americans returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. **Conceal the fact that** they have been in Cuba. **Conceal the fact that** they have been in Cuba. **Conceal the fact that** they have been in Cuba. **Conceal the fact that** which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. <u>Some guerrilla warfare</u> trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine communications, which permits them to maintain a contact with Cuba after they have returned home.

8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and elsewhere. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary effort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba.

9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela on 1 November, however, has there been incontrovertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of longestablished patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.

10. Another important aspect of Havana's efforts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

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labor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its constituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's support for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "solidarity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress--which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian government--would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi. Brazil in March 1963.

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ANNEX

Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year confirms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to establish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists support control reportant Hereof to the Americo Barrisos, the normal report and the to the the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peronists believed to be directed and supported to the Cuban temperature terrorists.

Last January, salling traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas possessed the same specifications as those found in the 1 November Venezuelan arms cache. It is believed to be of Cuban origen.

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2. Bolivia

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Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

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President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his supporters some arms and money to aid his bitter struggle with President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country. Submodule of the country. Cuban Charge Roberto Lassale said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to supply the required arms.

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Cuban government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to offer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance.

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countires. It is possible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been a favorite transit area for terrorists returning to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led

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police to an arms cache which was to be used to support guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authorities have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year.

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3. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operating primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brotherin-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow.

Logic La Construction account once soil Cuban. Minine Call assistance to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy_some_arms" from his Popular Mobilization_Front.

to buy arms. In addition, a usually reliable preports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil

Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba. The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues

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had increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar organizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)--which is planned to replace the moribund Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL)---was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delegation to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly supporting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them direct support.

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4. British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Gulana, In contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime.

<u>Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative</u> in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP). Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

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Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America.

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Communist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Export (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment **cash**, 300,000, to the manager of GIMPEX (IN September, ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses.

Georgetown (normalized) officials believe Cubantrained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in Georgetown. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army.

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5. Chile

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The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on support for the presidential campaign of Salvadore Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communistdominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp."

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A clandestine source incoma good compared swith reported in February that arrecentily methomedes student said some 40 Chileans would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The source said these Chileans had received political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identified 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as "subversives," but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of Chilean groups in Cuba.

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6. Colombia

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Cuba has been providing funds to subversives... in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recipients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source reported **Description** to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity.

Cuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army troops who are fighting the bandits have found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits. Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had substantial success so far in directing bandit activity for political ends.

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7. Costa Rica

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have

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begun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for antigovernment action. Much of the pro-Castro activity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on occasion crossed into Nicaragua. The police inspector at a town in the Pacific banana zone reported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica attempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other Latin American countries, is an important Havana asset in San Jose.

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8. Dominican Republic

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The country's two militant pro-Communist organizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faithful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, however, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country. Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla training in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new organization is to promote urban terrorism. A terrorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms and guidance from Castro.


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
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9. Ecuador

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Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandestime sources reported that Supremark that axistemistic guerrial a tead of the Statemark that axistemistic guerrial and the statemark to the statemark with the guerrian source reports one of the parsons teached the Statemark to the molemature explication of methomemade forms was acknowledged by the challemark to commune the Party as a converted by the statemark commune to Party as a converted by the statemark commune to Marxist journalist victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-Subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala. The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guerrillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communications and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets.

At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandestine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 traveled secretly and that these received training in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination.

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

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A French-language transmission is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses. The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broadcasts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla training in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti. The longtime presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire.

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13. Honduras

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role.

Two recent clandestine sources report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an effective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organization with no direct ties to orthodox Communist groups. The Cubans are said to have selected Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to investigate their readiness for armed action against Honduras' military government.

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14. Mexico

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The Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point.

Havana may find it difficult, however, to. avoid exploiting the endemic peasant unrest which is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine source ported

behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities considerably in recent months.

At least 1963; 143 in 1963; 143 in 1964 to Cuba from January through April of This year.

15. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revolutionary organization. Most of this group's guerrilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolutionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon.



Panama

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Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in October 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably reported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR).

Seven Panaman an extremists actumed to Panama in-late March alter having spent varying periods of timestraining in Cuba. Four of these were VAN members. Another group of recently-returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future.

Sixty-one Penaman fans-traveled to Cuba-in 1963.

17. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and

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attention, which is given through the Cuban embassy fundamentation of the cuban second guerrilla training in Cuba.

A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.

Only six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in 1963. However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana.

18. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450 and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla training abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the movement is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training. Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September.

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited recurring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have occurred there.

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19. Uruguay

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We have no evidence of Cuban support for revolutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been particularly useful as a transit point for air fravel to Cuba of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propaganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.

Avalenst 153 Uruguayans are known to have thaveled to Cuba in 1963; 22 traveled to Cuba through April of this year.

20. Venezuela

The current level of Cuban activity in Venezuela is considered fairly low. International reprecussions stemming from the unprecedented discovery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist campaign to disrupt the December national elections, and the presently increased capabilities of the Venezuelan military and security forces will probably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the short run. There is no reason to believe, however, that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high priority on Cuba's target list for subversion. Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly will continue, and may even increase.


The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activities, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963. The decision in late April of the central committee of the Communist party to continue using violence

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as a political instrument probably presages a gradual increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May led by Communist-dominated students took place in Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same time, one successful student-led robbery of a post office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery of the university payroll.

Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist activities.



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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963

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| BOLIVIA | 1 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 14 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 21 | 5 | 1 | 17 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 0 | 69 | 48 |
| BRAZIL | 11 | 19 | 22 | 13 | 9 | 6 | 18 | 7 | 10 | 5 | 1 | 6 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 121 | 0 | 2 | 162 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 219 | 242 |
| BR. GUIANA | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 17 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 0 | 26 | 25 | 51 |
| CHILE | 31 | 44 | 26 | 20 | 13 | 42 | 20 | 8 | 9 | 14 | 3 | 8 | 20 | 1 | 22 | 47 | 175 | 1 | 9 | 70 | 9 | 54 | 18 | 7 | 355 | 316 |
| COLOMBIA | 54 | 39 | 7 | 12 | 13 | 9 | 23 | 5 | 7 | 15 | 3 | 7 | 29 | ۱ | 6 | 14 | 17 | 1 | 8 | 14 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 4 | 182 | 122 |
| COSTA RICA | 9 | 0 | 0 | 29 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 0 | ۱ | 4 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 47 | 56 |
| DOM. REPUBLIC | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 37 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 19 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | . 74 | 24 |
| ECUADOR | 20 | 0 | 20 | 5 | 10 | 1. | 31 | 1 | 24 | ١ | 4 | 6 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 121 | 20 |
| EL SALVADOR | 7 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 1 | ۱ | 0 | 3 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 12 |
| GUATEMALA | 30 | 18 | 0 | 5 | 15 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | · 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 64 | 23 |
| HAITI | 0 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 23 | 22 |
| HONDURAS | 11 | 12 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 11 | 0 | · 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0. | 0 | 0 | 50 | 39 |
| JAMAICA | ۱ | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 33 | 1 | 0 | 2 | ۱ | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 38 | 6 |
| MEXICO | 100 | 81 | 22 | 0 | 26 | 38 | 37 | 18 | 34 | 54 | 14 | 42 | 65 | 28 | 34 | 63 | 84 | 36 | 24 | 71 | 23 | 27 | 49 | 72 | 512 | 530 |
| NICARAGUA | 4 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ۱ | 1 | 0 | 0 | ۱ | 12 | 9 |
| PANAMA | 4 | ١ | 20 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 13 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 61 | 24 |
| PARAGUAY | 2 | 3 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | l | 0 | 3 | 0 | . 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 9 |
| PERU | 6 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | ١ | 5 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 9 | ۱ | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | ١ | 2 | 33 | 38 |
| URUGUAY | 19 | 19 | 16 | 14 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 12 | 9 | 0 | 17 | 15 | 10 | 16 | 56 | 6 | 3 | 27 | ۱ | 0 | 6. | 13 | 158 | 130 |
| VENEZUELA | 26 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 37 | 0 | 11 | 10 | 6 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 139 | 35 |
| MONTHLY TOTALS | 354 | 296 | 212 | 150 | 124 | 149 | 223 | 88 | 163 | 144 | 73 | 103 | 319 | 47 | 104 | 214 | 587 | 64 | 76 | 380 | 69 | 99 | 126 | 132 | 2430 | 1843 |

The peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the "26 July" movement, and to the international architects' congress in October.

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

| NATIONALITY JANU | | | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA |
|------------------|-----|------|---|
| | то | FROM | |
| ARGENTINA | 9 | 3 | 1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba. |
| BOLIVIA | 3 | 1 | l attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu- nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school. |
| BRAZIL | 0 | 0 | |
| BR. GUIANA | 1 | 0 | 29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown. |
| CHILE | 14 | 15 | Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution. |
| COLOMBIA | 4 | 0 | An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations. |
| COSTA RICA | 11 | 13 | 3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration. |
| DOM. REP. | 0 | 1 | 1 attended Architects Congress |
| ECUADOR | 8 | 0 | 5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. |
| EL SALVADOR | 0 | 0 | |
| GUATEMALA | 0 | 0 | |
| HAITI | 0 | 0 | |
| HONDURAS | 0 | 1 | |
| JAMAICA | 0 | 0 | |
| MEXICO | 87 | 45 | |
| NICARAGUA | 0 | 1 | |
| PANAMA | 1 | 1 | |
| PARAGUAY | 0 | 0 | |
| PERU | 5 | 3 | |
| SURINAM | 0 | 0 | · |
| TRINIDAD | 0 | 0 | |
| URUGUAY · | 0 | 7 | |
| VENEZUELA | 5 | 0 | |
| TOTALS | 148 | 91 | |

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JANUARY 1964

| NATIONALITY | JANUARY | | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA |
|-------------|----------|------|--|
| | TO | FROM | |
| ARGENTINA | 9 | 3 | 1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba. |
| BOLIVIA | 3 | 1 | 1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu- |
| | - | | nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the |
| | | | Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school. |
| BRAZIL | 0 | 0 | |
| BR. GUIANA | 1 | 0 | 29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown. |
| CHILE | 14 | 15 | Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution. |
| COLOMBIA | 4 | 0 | An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added |
| | | | to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for |
| | | | December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to |
| | | | Cuba for the 1 January celebrations. |
| COSTA RICA | 11 | 13 | 3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan |
| | | | charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to |
| | | | Habana for 2 January celebration. |
| DOM. REP. | 0 | 1 | 1 attended Architects Congress |
| ECUADOR | 8 | 0 | 5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. |
| EL SALVADOR | 0 | 0 | |
| GUATEMALA | 0 | 0 | |
| HAITI | 0 | 0 | |
| HONDURAS | 0 | 1 | |
| JAMAICA | 0 | 0 | |
| MEXICO | 87 | 45 | |
| NICARAGUA | 0 | 1 | |
| PANAMA | 1 | 1 | |
| PARAGUAY | 0 | 0 | |
| PERU | 5 | 3 | |
| SURINAM | 0 | 0 | |
| TRINIDAD | <u> </u> | 0 7 | |
| | 0 | 0 | |
| VENEZUELA | <u> </u> | | |
| TOTALS | 148 | 91 | |

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KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964

| NATIONALITY | MARCH TO | I-APRIL FROM | PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA |
|---------------------|------------------|-----------------|--|
| ARGENTINA | 11 | 10 | 1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban Construction Ministry. |
| BOLIVIA | 8 | 2 | 3- Attending May Day Celebration. |
| BRAZIL | 0 | 0 | |
| BR. GUIANA | 2 | 2 | |
| CHILE | 14 | 37 | 4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16- Returning are members of delegation from School of Economy of University of Chile. |
| COLOMBIA | 7 | 0 | |
| COSTA RICA | 3 | 3 | 1- En route to East Germany. 2- In attempt to obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara. |
| DOM. REP. | 1 | 7 | 4- Returning from 26th July Celebration. |
| ECUADOR | 5 | 2 | |
| EL SALVADOR | 3 | 8 | 2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning from military training in Cuba. |
| GUATEMALA | 0 | 0 | |
| HAITI | 0 | 0 | |
| HONDURAS | 0 | 0 | |
| JAMAICA | 0 | 0 | |
| MEXICO | 32 | 24 | 3- Attending May Day Celebrations. |
| NICARAGUA | 2 | 1 | |
| PANAMA | 2 | 14 | 3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action |
| PARAGUAY | 0 | 0 | |
| PERU | 9 | 0 | |
| SURINAM | 0 | 0 | |
| TRINIDAD URUGUAY | 14 | 11 | |
| VENEZUELA | $-\frac{14}{17}$ | 11 | |
| TOTALS | | 121 | |

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