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## DISPATCH

S E C R E T

022-1-63

CIA/C, DCI - Deputy CIA, DCI/2A

SC 1-63-1-63  
621-63-1-63  
621-63-1-63

Chair of Station, Madrid

11 December 1963

Details of contacts between GENEVIEVE/1,  
AMALIE/1, and ANNEE/1.

AMALIE/1, and ANNEE/1.

See paragraph E, below

The following is a summary of a recent report prepared by GENEVIEVE/1 concerning his contacts with AMALIE/1 in Madrid and developments concerning ANNEE/1 and ANNEE/1.

1. GENEVIEVE/1 was contacted by AMALIE/1 in Madrid on 7 December 1963 and said:
  - a. The plans they had made in New York to get ANNEE out of PRAGUE are no longer necessary since he had come out via Prague-Paris.
  - b. He was very optimistic about his meeting with ANNEE/1 because:
    - (1) ANNEE/1 definitely counts on at least 5 commandos and many other officers for the coup.
    - (2) ANNEE/1 himself is again active in the Army with the help of Royal Castro.
    - (3) The situation in PRAGUE is deteriorating and the right moment for the coup lies in the next few months.
    - (4) ANNEE/1's morale is high and he plans to return to PRAGUE soon.
    - (5) AMALIE/1's people have contacted ANNEE/2 and ANNEE/3 in Madrid and knowing that "something was going on inside PRAGUE with a big Communist involved" (both said they did not give any names), AMALIE/1's people were so excited over this that AMALIE/1 himself was coming to Europe. (He arrived in Paris 2 or 3 days later).
  - c. AMALIE/1 was offering:
    - (1) Any amount of small weapons and money for a big operation.
    - (2) A well trained group of men.
    - (3) A small size air force and navy.
    - (4) Any sort of military action as requirement of the coup inside.
    - (5) Immediate diplomatic recognition of at least six Latin American Governments principally in Central America.
  - d. GENEVIEVE/1 would like to speak with GENEVIEVE and they should take the next plane for Paris.
  - e. GENEVIEVE told AMALIE/1 everything was all right except the three points above.
  - f. AMALIE/1 was offering paramilitary class help - 1000.
  - g. They can not take him earlier without ANNEE/1 as contact.
  - h. AMALIE/1 knows very little about what he is doing.
  - i. AMALIE/1 could be then supported GENEVIEVE/1 to some extent immediately when going on as he has to prove any existence of an organization.
  - j. AMALIE/1 was in touch with KGB and would need to be well advised.

AMGUY/1 was unable to return to Paris to see him. This apparently "Rich" did not do because the planning for AMGUY/1's arrival in Paris to get his decision regarding the meeting with AMIAZ/1, which had been AMGUY/1's other plan, that he knew nothing about the meeting. AMGUY/1 then took the next plane for Paris and instructed (AMGUY/1) to tell AMIAZ/1 that AMGUY/1 had decided not to meet with AMIAZ/1 for the present. AMIAZ/1 then left for New York City via Rome.

9. In the meantime AMGUY/1 had come to Rome with three of his men apparently determined to see AMIAZ/1. He sent Idea A to Madrid. Idea A told (AMGUY/1) that AMGUY/1 would like to speak with either AMGUY/1, AMIAZ/1 or AMIAZ/1 but that he could not come to Spain legally because of the Sierra Aranaz incident. (AMGUY/1 told Idea A that AMGUY/1 was in New York City and AMIAZ/1 had no intention of meeting with AMGUY/1, at least for the present, and that a conversation with (AMGUY/1) would not change anything). AMGUY/1 insisted on trying to see AMIAZ/1 and went to Paris with two of his men, one of whom is Idea B.
6. On 21 December (AMGUY/1 received a letter from AMGUY/1 in New York telling (AMGUY/1):
  - a. AMIAZ/1 did not want to meet with AMGUY/1 because of security.
  - b. AMIAZ/1 will return to PD ROMA at the end of January 1963.
  - c. AMIAZ/1 has a fixed idea of what the solution is to the PERSICO problem.
  - d. AMGUY/1 was coming to Europe shortly and he hoped the three of us could get together.
7. AMIAZ/1 phoned me from Paris on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December to tell me he would be here on 26 December and that he would try to stay at the Embassy. (AMGUY/1 told him about AMGUY/1's letter).
8. On 22 December AMGUY/1 phoned me (AMGUY/1) and told me the following:
  - a. A meeting of all forces is necessary.
  - b. To tell AMIAZ/1 that the "Americans" want to take him for the insurrection (sic) and that with the failure of the Bay of Pigs he, AMGUY/1, had had a very bitter experience, that was paid off in blood and jail and all because of the inconsistencies of American Policy.
  - c. That he has under his own control the necessary forces to protect, together with AMIAZ/1, a definite action without any outside help and even against anyone's will.
  - d. He was going back to PARIS for a few days on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of December to clarify a few things and then back to Paris.
  - e. That regardless of AMIAZ/1's decision he wants to speak with AMGUY/1 anyway.
  - f. That he was sending Idea A to Madrid on 23 December as his contact man.

9. (AMGUY/1) summed up his opinion as follows.

- a. Regardless of whatever explanation is given, the situation is ~~get~~ ~~in~~ ~~PARIS~~.
- b. In view of all the circumstances I do not think AMGUY/1 can go on much longer with this approach without taking some definite action or being discredited and I feel that AMIAZ/1 knows it.
- c. I feel this is the moment to reconsider the whole business and come out with some specific plans to be put to bed and used.

6. Something has to be done within the next few days.
10. In view of AMEMT/1's close liaison with AKANR/1, AMEMT/1, AKANR/2, AKANR/3, and AMEMT/1's place of birth, AMEMT/1 is kept fully informed on all contacts between AMEMT/1 and AKANR/2, as well as AMEMT/1's travel plans to Europe.

Wallace A. GROVES

29 December 1963

Attachments: Identities A and B, under separate cover.

Distribution:

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