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Memorandum [redacted] to Mr. W. M. Felt
 Re: LIAISON SECTION

with other agencies is handled by domestic liaison supervisors dealing with those agencies. In similar fashion the [British] will not furnish derogatory (S) information directly to the Department of Defense in connection with its background-type investigations but require that such data be channeled through FBI. These are just two of the instances in which a foreign liaison matter becomes a domestic liaison matter and should be under the same supervision.

Our foreign offices are necessarily closely involved in the operations of several U. S. agencies and require domestic liaison with those agencies. Our many problems surrounding the establishment and maintenance of foreign offices have to be coordinated with the Department of State. It is essential that we know and have access to the proper official at State in order to solve problems faced by the Legats as without prodding State moves very slowly. [Our foreign offices work closely with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) stations abroad. [CIA Headquarters does not permit its overseas stations to disseminate information to other agencies overseas, including our Legats, except in unusual circumstances.] They frequently, however, suggest to our Legats that CIA Headquarters be asked for particular items. These can most rapidly be secured by direct request from a domestic liaison supervisor.] In a number of areas, our Legal Attaches work closely with (S) local representatives of the U. S. military. Leads are passed to our Legat which are then followed up by liaison contacts in Washington with the appropriate military headquarters.

Liaison, or, in other terms, the establishment of a harmonious relationship, is basically the same whether practiced in Washington or Tokyo. I feel that it would be to the Bureau's advantage to have our liaison operations closely coordinated and directly supervised in the same area. This has proved to be an efficient and productive arrangement in the past, and we believe that the re-establishment of limited direct liaison in Washington should be handled by the same supervision which has been given to our posts abroad. The work in both areas is primarily intelligence oriented, yet does not fall within the normal responsibilities of the present operational sections. It is considered that we should not leave the foreign supervision in its present area, which is fully occupied with Arab terrorism, Chinese espionage, and Cuban, Arab, Chicano and Jewish extremists. A logical and economical step would be to make the present foreign liaison supervision an integral part of the new liaison section. Under this arrangement, the foreign liaison supervision would be handled as a separate and distinct unit composed of the three supervisors presently engaged in this work. This unit would be completely

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