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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
Caribbean Admission Center, Port-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.	To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)
Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress operations.	To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U. S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)
<u>OPERATIONS</u> Continue negotiating for help in contaminating locomotive lubricants.	To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.	[redacted] assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced.

16 - 31 March 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.
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Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

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16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

ACTIVITYPURPOSECONSIDERATIONS

Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Possible future use in communications and support.

By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

To ready agent operations.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

* Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated [redacted] Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, [redacted] are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

INTER OPERATIONS

None.

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