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Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10066

RECORD SERIES : MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.
TO : FILE

TITLE : FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE

DATE : 02/24/1975
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :

ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE
BREWER, GEORGE
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1A; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Mason
286-11

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman

February 24, 1975

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

*NOTE: Incidents without page numbers
indicated were not specifically
mentioned in the transcript.*

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- SSCI Box 286, Folder 11 -

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: JAMES N. ROETHE

- Record Number 157-10011-10066 -

SUBJECT: Further Information obtained from George Brewer
(See February 18 Interview)

On Monday, February 24, I again spoke with George Brewer in the Commission offices from approximately 9:00 am until 10:15 am. The following additional information was obtained.

Technical Operations

In 1960 and 1961, Brewer was primary involved in Bay of Pigs operations (providing support to the Miami Field Office in smuggling friendly Cubans into the United States). He was engaged in little technical activity during that time. Between 1962 and 1965, he was involved in approximately 30 technical operations, only four of which were telephone taps (the rest were mike and wire cases). During that same period four or five other support agents were also engaged in technical activities, each performing approximately the same amount of technical work that Brewer was performing. Some of the agents doing technical work were Jack Cryer, [redacted] and Bill Simpson, the latter being a former instructor of Brewer's. Both Cryer and Simpson had been doing technical work for quite some time (throughout the 50's). ~~(115-52)~~ (1151-52)

In 1965 or 1966, following President Johnson's Executive Order precluding wire taps without court order or without approval of the Attorney General in security cases, technical work performed by Brewer and others at the Washington Field Office almost stopped completely. Brewer can recall only two taps that were placed during that period. One of these was placed in a Safe House in the Washington area, and the other was placed in a New York apartment in connection with Project PARAGON. Brewer assumes that the appropriate approvals were obtained prior to his placing these taps. ~~(115-52)~~ (1147-48)

Most of the technical operations in the early 1960's were performed at the request of the Operations Directorate. While Brewer was not privy to the purpose for each technical operation that he performed, he believes that many involved

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Safe Houses for use by defectors and the wiring of operations assets' apartments or other premises where conversations with assets would be forthcoming. For instance, in 1962 the apartment of a defector (Golitzen) was wired. It was believed that Golitzen had become unhappy with CIA treatment and was considering leaving the country. A telephone tap was placed on his phone to attempt to verify this. Brewer believes that these cases involved positive foreign intelligence gathering as opposed to being security cases. From the names of the individuals whose conversations were to be recorded, Brewer presumes that most of these technical operations were directed against foreigners.

Brewer is aware of a few technical operations relating to security. One involved the bugging of the premises of a former employee [redacted] in about 1964 because of his questionable associates. Another, in 1963, involved a telephone tap on a newsman (although Brewer was unaware at the time the tap was placed that it was being directed against a newsman). (1149)

The Technical Division of the Office of Security may have been involved in some technical operations in the United States during the 1960's and earlier. However, their primary responsibility was counter-audio work overseas. Brewer does not believe that they would have been involved in significant amounts of technical work in the States.

To his knowledge, FBI was not informed of these technical operations. p. 1185

Surveillance Operations

Prior to 1968, the Washington Field Office was performing some unsophisticated surveillance. This generally related to surveillance of defectors and training operations directed against perspective overseas CIA agents. The purpose of the training was to assist WFO in its surveillance techniques and to determine how well the perspective overseas agents could make contacts and "drops" without being detected. The Field Office had little equipment to undertake sophisticated surveillance at that time. (1120-28)

In 1968, with the creation of the Surveillance and Technical Unit, a much more concentrated effort was made in the area of surveillance. (1127)

Assistance to Local Police

Brewer remembers that at some point in time two sets of alias documents prepared by Technical Services were given to the Metropolitan Police Department. This included a social security card, driver's license, D. C. permit, etc.

I again interviewed Mr. Brewer at approximately 2:30 pm on the same day, just prior to his leaving for the Commission hearings, at which he was testifying. indicated that it was the policy of the CIA to offer gratuities to various

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police officers in the Washington, D.C., area for their assistance to the CIA. Each Christmas a list would be prepared of those individuals from local police departments who had provided assistance, and appropriate gifts would be given to these individuals, ranging from candy and liquor to \$25 gift certificates. The money for these gifts was taken from CIA's "Blue Jay" fund, used for miscellaneous expenses. Some police officials would not accept such gratuities.

(1172575)
Brewer is also aware of one occasion when police officials from several departments were flown to a hunting lodge owned by the Agency in southern Virginia. Brewer recalls several officers from the Montgomery County, Fairfax County (including [redacted] and Metropolitan Police Departments (including [redacted] but not [redacted] --who refused an invitation) attending, as well as a high police official from Boston. Brewer himself attended this gathering and indicated that as best as he can remember it was strictly a social affair. Brewer could not recall ever having agreed to provide [redacted] of the Fairfax County Police Department with an automobile while [redacted] was on vacation in California, although he would not deny that he may have done so.

(1172573)
Brewer indicated that all gratuities given police officials were approved by Headquarters and that none were specifically connected with any particular request being made of the police by the CIA. (1172)

(full distribution)

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COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, DC 20500

February 20, 1975

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MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: JAMES N. ROETHE

SUBJECT: Summary of an Interview with George R. Brewer, Conducted on Tuesday, February 18, 1975, in the Offices of the Commission by James N. Roethe and Robert Olsen

The interview commenced at approximately 4:00 pm on February 18, 1975, and ended at approximately 8:30 pm on the same date. Mr. Brewer appeared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff.

Background of Mr. Brewer

Mr. Brewer is a graduate of the University of Maryland. He has been with the CIA for over twenty years and is presently Chief of the Director's Security Staff. The interview concerned itself primarily with the activities of the Washington Field Office of the Office of Security. Mr. Brewer first worked in that office from January 1955 to February 1956. From February 1956 to April 1959 he was on Director Dulles' personal security staff. He served with the Headquarters Field Office (now defunct) from April 1959 to August 1960 and again served with the Washington Field Office from August 1960 to July 1973, when he obtained his present position.

Activities at the Washington Field Office

The Washington Field Office is made up of 35-40 agents. Clericals bring the total of employees to about 100. It is by far the largest security field office. The majority of the agents are designated as field agents, whose primary activity is investigating applicants for employment with the Agency and some covert investigations (investigations under cover, such as investigations of contractor's employees or individuals planning to be sent overseas under cover). The remaining agents are designated as support agents (about 8 men) who provide a broad range of support to the field agents. In 1966 Mr. Brewer, a support agent, was designated as the Washington Field Office's liaison with the local police (including the Metropolitan Police Department, most suburban police departments, and the Virginia and Maryland State Police). In November of 1968, Mr. Brewer was placed in charge of a newly created "Surveillance and Technical Unit" of the Support Squad. He remained in both positions until he left the Office in July of 1973. Mr. Brewer emphasized that no activity was undertaken by the field office without the approval of headquarters. Requests for action in Mr. Brewer's areas of interest would be received by headquarters security, generally from the Operations Directorate. The "Security Support Branch" at headquarters would pass the request on to the

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"Assistant Special Agent in Charge of Support" at the field office (Mr. John Hutchinson during most of Mr. Brewer's tenure), who in turn would ask Mr. Brewer to carry out the request.

The following persons have headed the Washington Field Office as "Special Agent-in-Charge":

Charles Kane	1960-1963
Marvin Gentile	1963-1964
John Noble	1964-1968
Ed Klippa	1968-1973
Jack Cryer	Present

Covert Investigations by Field Agents

Such investigations were conducted much less frequently than overt investigations of applicants for employment. Several unofficial covers were used by investigators to prevent the person being investigated from being exposed as a CIA contact.

Technical Operations

Technical operations consisted of the planting of electronic listening devices (King) and the telephone taps (Queen). No technical devices were planted by the Washington Field Office after the formation in 1968 of the "Surveillance and Technical Unit." However, Mr. Brewer has planted technical devices prior to 1968:

1. In about 1966 Mr. Brewer planted a listening device in an apartment at the Savoy Apartments in Washington, D. C. (a CIA Safe House). This device was later removed and Brewer was told it was never used.
2. About 8 years ago Mr. Brewer placed several bugs in a Washington Safe House. He believes they have never been removed. They have never been used to his knowledge.
3. About 10 years ago Mr. Brewer was called back from vacation to bug a cadillac to be used by two Chinese generals.
4. At one time Mr. Brewer bugged hotel rooms in the Washington area where unwitting U-2 pilot applicants were being interviewed.
5. In 1963 Mr. Brewer placed telephone taps on phones in a home in Washington (MOCKINGBIRD case). At the time he did not know he was tapping a news columnist's phone, but he later learned that that had been the case.
6. Four houses in Miami were bugged by Mr. Brewer shortly after the Bay of Pigs incident.

7. A hotel room in Los Angeles was bugged by Brewer several years ago. It was to be used for some kind of interview.
8. A home in Bethesda, Maryland, was also bugged before being occupied by a Cuban National.

In all, Mr. Brewer believes he was involved in more than ten technical operations, but less than 100 prior to 1968. In all cases he was merely supplying technical support for operations at the request of his superiors, and was not witting to the actual operation. In each case he assumed the propriety and lawfulness of the operation.

Since 1966, Mr. Brewer has been engaged in only one technical operation (Operation PARAGON--threat against Director Helms and Vice President Agnew). When that threat was made, Brewer suggested that a line be run into the informing agent's apartment. Such a line was run from that agent's telephone (a telephone tap). This operation was approved by higher authority.

Surveillance

Surveillance was conducted off and on through the period from 1960 to 1973. However, active surveillance did not begin until 1968 when the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" was formed. Prior to 1968, surveillance was restricted to training exercises and surveillance of defectors. Mr. Brewer estimated that he engaged in about ten such operations prior to 1968. Training surveillance continued after 1968, but only one surveillance of a defector was made during that time.

In 1966 Headquarters requested that the Washington Field Headquarters form a sophisticated surveillance unit. Such a unit was not really created until Brewer took over the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" in 1968. After 1968 surveillance took up a large part of the time of the "Surveillance and Technical Unit's" time. The Unit consisted of 14 support agents and was expanded to 20-24 men during some surveillances. The Washington Field Office did surveillance for the entire country with regard to Security Office matters. If a surveillance was conducted anywhere in the country, Brewer believes he would know of it. If surveillance was conducted in the territory of another field office, that field office would have been in charge, with the Washington Office providing the support. The following surveillance was undertaken by Brewer's Unit:

1. Surveillance of Employees or Former Employees

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- b. Project CAPUSTO (8 Ball): Employee associating with former defector was surveilled.
 - c. Project TOMCAT: An associate of CAPUSTO was surveilled.
 - d. Project MONEY: A former employee planning to attend the SALT talks with his new boss was surveilled.
 - e. Project SIESTA: Surveillance on a former employee and the suspected Castro agent she was living with.
 - f. Project PINEAPPLE: Surveillance of a former employee living above his means. Washington Field Office surveilled outside D.C. Anderson Associates surveilled in D.C. and at subject's Arlington home. Washington Field Office did not participate in any break-in of subject's apartment.
 - g. Project AMOS: Former employee surveilled to Champaign, Illinois.
 - h. Project PIXIE: (last job): Two employees and son of another surveilled for suspected drug use and/or sale.
 - i. Project PARAGON: Informer who reported threat against Director Helms and Vice President Agnew surveilled in New York and Detroit.
 - j. MARCHETTI: Former employee threatening to publish classified material (which he could not have obtained during the course of his employment) was surveilled. Three cars were used in surveillance. No police cover.
2. Surveillance of Newsmen (to determine source of security leaks)
- a. [redacted] Brewer knew that surveillance was to determine source of [redacted] publishing of classified information. Mr. Brewer questioned his superior (John Hutchinson) about the case. He wondered why the FBI was not involved and understood that the FBI didn't want to touch the case (rumor). Along with [redacted] and [redacted] were surveilled.
 - b. [redacted] Mr. Brewer also questioned this surveillance, but not strongly as [redacted] was relatively unknown. Further, he really didn't know the reason why [redacted] was being surveilled until later.
3. Other Surveillances
- a. A nephew of an assistant to Director McCone was surveilled after he went berserk and threatened to go to the Russians. He was surveilled for two days.

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In all cases of surveillance, photographs of the subject and his contacts were taken. Further, the identity of the contact was also ascertained and reported to headquarters. No surveillance was ever placed on a Congressman, Senator, Judge or Justice or other public figure except the newsmen previously mentioned. Mr. Brewer believes that there were no cases of surveillance undertaken by his Unit which did not involve either (1) a threatened security leak to newsmen, or (2) a potential security violation, except Project PARAGON.

The records kept on surveillances include the letters assigning the surveillance to the Unit, the agents' logs, photographs taken and the final report of each project. This information was all sent to Headquarters. The Field Office would also retain copies but never made any use of these files.

Break-Ins:

Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was only involved in one break-in in connection with Project SIESTA, involving a former employee living with a suspected Castro sympathizer. A photographic studio, jointly operated by the employee and her Cuban boy friend, was broken into. This didn't bother Brewer, as there was strong evidence suggesting a possible security violation. Further, the suspected pair was soliciting passport photo business at CIA, which would give them information about the travels of CIA agents. A second break-in was effected by Anderson Associates (a CIA proprietary) in Project SIESTA. Brewer doesn't know who headed up Anderson Associates. He believes that Ralph True, Joe Langon and Don Connor may have had some connection with it.

Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was disbanded in June or July of 1972. Brewer is not sure why the Unit was disbanded. The Washington Field Office still does training surveillance and surveillance of defectors. There have been no instances (to Brewer's knowledge) of potential employee security leaks since the Surveillance Unit was disbanded.

Activity with Dissident Groups

On three occasions (in 1969, 1970 and May 1971) the CIA participated with the Washington police in monitoring peace and anti-war demonstrations. In each case a request was made by the Washington Police Department (MPD), through [redacted] for assistance. The Washington Field Office of CIA furnished six vehicles with communications gear and men to operate the gear. Mr. Brewer believes that two CIA agents and one police officer occupied each car. (More CIA agents than police were utilized, as MPD didn't have the necessary manpower.) The only purpose of this operation was to monitor the movements of the crowds. There was no attempt to penetrate any dissident organization or to photograph the crowds. The CIA agents involved in the May 1, 1971, operation carried police ID's. CIA also provided a fully-staffed communications center at MPD to receive communications from the cars. This provided MPD a second radio frequency and freed MPD's own channels for other police business.

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Brewer believes that the primary purpose of this operation was to render communications assistance to the local police. The secondary purpose was to monitor crowds so as to protect CIA installations. (For example, MPD had obtained some information that various dissident groups planned to picket CIA Headquarters and planned to harass Director Helms during a planned speech.) All of these CIA operations were verbally approved by Headquarters Support Branch (Mr. Cryer). Total period of time devoted to monitoring dissident groups with MPD (for all three occasions) was about five days. Brewer is not aware of any instance where the Washington Field Office tried to penetrate any dissident groups.

Collection of Information on Dissident Groups

During the period of the demonstrations in 1969-1971, all field offices and resident agents were requested by Headquarters to look out for literature and other information which might in any way affect the CIA. No conscious intelligence gathering of literature was requested. Items to be looked for included campus news clippings, etc.. This project was not a continuing one over the three-year period when most demonstrations occurred. It was renewed from time to time as flare-ups in activity occurred. Mr. Brewer does not know the quantity of material collected or the use made of that material. The only information that Brewer knows was collected by the Washington Field Office consisted of the weekly intelligence summary prepared by MPD. Headquarters specifically asked Brewer to get the summaries (either Jack Cryer, Tex Mills or Curt Rivers), and they were forwarded to Headquarters. No effort was made by Brewer to obtain information concerning any dissident group's intended activities.

Police Cover Operations

Mr. Brewer indicated that Washington Field Office agents have received police cover from the following police departments:

1. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) During the May 1971 demonstrations, MPD furnished ID's to those CIA agents monitoring the crowds along with police officers. These ID cards were in fact used. No other police cover was obtained from MPD.
2. Fairfax City Police Department: In connection with Operation SIESTA (which included a break-in at the photographic studio in Fairfax City, operated by a suspected Castro Agent) cover was obtained from the police. One CIA agent was given a Fairfax City police badge in case some one walked in on the break-in. The badge was never utilized. Brewer didn't actually remember obtaining this badge, but it was obtained by some one.

3. Fairfax County Police Department: Apparently undercover CIA agents in the county (under DOD cover) were being continuously harassed and challenged in the county while on operations. They feared their cover might be blown and felt it would be good to have police cover to prevent this from occurring. Mr. Brewer himself may have suggested getting badges and identification from the county police. In any event, he thought it was a good idea and Headquarters approved it (per John Hutchinson, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office). Thereafter, (latter part of 1971) Brewer went to [redacted] and asked about obtaining some badges and ID's. [redacted] reported that [redacted] was originally reluctant to give CIA the badges and ID, but in early spring of 1972 he changed his mind and relented. Brewer does not know if Osborn called [redacted] or if there was any arm-twisting by the CIA. Brewer himself did no arm-twisting. Nine patrolman's badges and one sergeant's badge were obtained, plus ten blank ID cards. The true names of CIA agents were placed on the cards by Brewer. It was understood that if the badges and ID's were ever used that [redacted] would immediately be notified. In fact, they were kept in a safe at Washington Field Office Headquarters and never used. They have recently been returned to Fairfax County.

No police cover was ever obtained by Washington Field Office, or used by them for the purpose of performing police activity. Brewer stated that local police were always kept informed of CIA activities in their jurisdiction.

Other Assistance Rendered CIA by Local Police

Project SIESTA:

This project involved the break-in into a photographic shop in Fairfax City. Three Fairfax City police assisted in the operation. One entered the apartment with several CIA agents; one stood watch on the front steps; and one waited in a squad car outside the building. Much material in the photographic studio was photographed. Surveillance was constantly maintained on the operators of the studio while the break-in was being carried out.

Use of Fairfax County Facilities:

On at least one occasion the Fairfax County police station was used for CIA training purposes. CIA desired to assure themselves that new recruits for covert overseas duty could not be "broken" if siezed by foreign authorities. Consequently, CIA officials would "arrest" these unwitting recruits on some bogus charge and take them to Fairfax County jail where they would be subject to strong interrogation to see if they would "break".

Other Assistance

Almost every police department has agreed to immediately notify the CIA if one of its agents is arrested.

Assistance Rendered to Local Police by the CIATraining Programs:

In late 1971 a course in photography was offered to officers of local police departments by the Washington Field Office, and in 1972 courses in both surveillance techniques and photography were offered. Representatives from MPD and most large suburban police departments attended. These courses were stopped after the printing of a New York Times article criticizing the training of New York City police by the CIA.

Metropolitan Police Department:

1. May Day - 1971: MPD was furnished six cars equipped with communications gear, plus two men for each car, from the Washington Field Office (WFO). WFO also furnished a central communications command post plus operators. The purpose of this assistance was to permit the monitoring of crowds.
2. In about 1972, Brewer performed a telephone tap for MPD in connection with an internal affairs matter where eleven police officers were potentially involved in a bribe. Brewer understood that a court order was obtained before the taps were put on. [redacted] of MPD made this request and CIA Headquarters approved it.
3. During 1969 demonstrations, [redacted] of MPD asked Brewer if he could wire a lamp in the apartment of a witting police informant who had penetrated anti-war dissident groups. Brewer passed this request on to security headquarters, and the Technical Services Division performed the wiring. CIA did not monitor or receive copies of any conversations recorded.
4. Shortly after a CIA surveillance training course which several MPD officers attended, MPD became desirous of maintaining surveillance on one of its unwitting police informants to see if she was doing what the police paid her to do. MPD asked Brewer if his men would assist the new trainees in the project. Brewer's surveillance unit did furnish assistance, including four cars and at least one man for each car. These CIA agents, together with MPD officers, surveilled the subject for one and one-half days. This is the only time Brewer's surveillance team actually provided manpower to assist MPD in a surveillance.

5. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972 the Washington Field Office loaned the MPD Morals Division a device to tap a touch-tone telephone. The request came from [redacted] and [redacted] [redacted] Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with [redacted] and [redacted] for equipment requests. Dollard or Foran would call Sayle, who in turn would direct Brewer to provide the equipment.
6. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972, Sayle directed Brewer to provide receiving devices to MPD. Once [redacted] of MPD personally contacted Brewer and requested a receiver. It was provided (ostensibly for training purposes).
7. On several occasions covert miniature transmitters were furnished to MPD on an indefinite loan.
8. The Washington Field Office also gave MPD personnel technical advice on use of double tape machines and advice on photography from time to time.

MPD received no assistance from the Washington Field Office when they set up their Intelligence Division in 1967-68. No other assistance was ever rendered MPD concerning solving particular crime or interrogating a particular witness. Sometime after Director Schlessinger became DCI, the MPD was asked to return all equipment previously loaned to it by the CIA, and most was returned. Apparently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other police departments as well).

Montgomery County Police Department

In about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some transmitters to [redacted] (Ret.) and [redacted] of the county police. They had already been loaned some receivers before Brewer came with the Washington Field Office.

Fairfax County Police Department

1. Years ago the county was given an old Ampex 601 recorder equipped to take a telephone tap off a dial phone.
2. On one occasion Brewer accompanied a county police representative to U.S. Recording on S. Capitol Street to help him pick out a dial recorder for telephone taps.
3. In 1969-70, Brewer loaned some photographic equipment to the county police forces intelligence unit. The equipment has never been returned.

No personnel have ever been loaned to the county. No assistance has ever been given concerning a specific crime or witness.

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Other

1. In 1969 or 1970 metal detection demonstrations were given at CIA Headquarters to representatives of all Virginia and Maryland Police Departments.
2. Director Helms owned a beach house near Lewes, Delaware. On one occasion Brewer met with the chief of police there concerning the security of the beach house, as Helms had been receiving threats. Apparently Osborn gave the police chief a box of flares and other equipment (as a gift to the department) for the chief's assistance.

At some point during the interview, Mr. Brewer indicated that he had not discussed his testimony with any representative of the Agency prior to the interview--except the General Counsel.

IMPRESSIONS

Mr. Brewer was originally somewhat reluctant to be interviewed and at one point was considering whether he should retain a lawyer. However, as we went along he opened up considerably to the point where I now believe I have a pretty good understanding of the Office of Security's Washington Field Office. It would appear that the Washington Field Office did conduct much, if not most, of the physical and technical surveillance directed against American citizens subsequent to 1968. In every case the surveillance was directed by higher authority. It also appears that the Washington Field Office gave substantial assistance to local police departments in the Washington, D. C. area. Much of this assistance was obviously an appropriate exchange of information between two intelligence units. Most disturbing is the incident where CIA agents assisted MPD officers in a bona fide police surveillance (a law enforcement function), but this seems to have been an isolated case.

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