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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate R3022

Report of Proceedings

3/17/77  
EG

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Monday, May 10, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

Harold Swenson  
--accompanied by--  
Robert D. Peloquin

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

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Monday, May 10, 1976

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United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to  
Intelligence Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:18 o'clock  
a.m., in Room 608, The Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable  
Richard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Jim Johnston, Michael Epstein and Paul  
Wallach, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 Senator Schweiker. All right, Mr. Swenson, we swear in  
3 all of our witnesses, if you would rise and raise your right  
4 hand, please.

5 Do you solemnly swear the testimony you're about to give  
6 is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,  
7 so help you God?

8 Mr. Swenson. I do.

9 Senator Schweiker. Be seated.

10 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Swenson, would you state your name and  
11 address?

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1 TESTIMONY OF HAROLD SWENSON  
2 ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT D. PELOQUIN  
3 Mr. Swenson. Harold Swenson. My home address is 5005  
4 Edgemore Lane, Bethesda, Maryland.  
5 Mr. Johnston. And you are accompanied by counsel this  
6 morning, is that correct?  
7 Mr. Swenson. That's correct.  
8 Mr. Johnston. I would ask counsel to identify himself  
9 for the record.  
10 Mr. Peloquin. Robert D. Peloquin, 1707 H Street, N.W.  
11 Mr. Johnston. Let me state for the record that I called  
12 Seymour Bolten at the Agency this morning and stated that you  
13 were going to represent Mr. Swenson, and he stated that that  
14 was acceptable to the Agency.  
15 Mr. Peloquin. I am proud to hear that.  
16 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Swenson, you are appearing here  
17 voluntarily today. Do you understand that you have all of your  
18 constitutional rights before this Committee?  
19 Mr. Swenson. I do.  
20 Mr. Johnston. And your attorney may be consulted at any  
21 time.  
22 Mr. Swenson. Thank you.  
23 Mr. Johnston. Would you state the dates and position  
24 you occupied in the Special Affairs Staff of CIA?  
25 Mr. Swenson. I joined the Staff at the time it was known

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1 as the task force at the time of the missile crisis in Cuba,  
2 and I continued with the task force, which later became known  
3 as SAS, up to 1965, within the United States as Chief of  
4 Counterintelligence. My first job was Assistant to the  
5 Director of the Task Force for the crisis in Cuba, the missile  
6 crisis. I then became Chief of Counterintelligence.

7 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall exactly when you became Chief  
8 of Counterintelligence?

9 Mr. Swenson. I really can't.

10 Mr. Johnston. Can you recall the month that you left?

11 Mr. Swenson. Well, let me say that when I was assigned  
12 abroad I continued to have a relationship with that staff. That  
13 was during a period of assignment in Europe, so I really  
14 continued in a way to have a relationship with the Staff until  
15 I retired from the Agency in 1968. Yes, 1968.

16 Mr. Johnston. President Kennedy was assassinated on  
17 November 22nd, 1963, and I take it you were Chief of Counter-  
18 intelligence for the Special Affairs Staff at that time.

19 Mr. Swenson: I was.

20 Mr. Johnston. And that was the staff that was responsible  
21 for Cuban matters, is that correct?

22 Mr. Swenson. That is correct.

23 Mr. Johnston. Who were you responsible to?

24 Mr. Swenson. I believe at that time Harvey had been  
25 replaced by Des Fitzgerald, I believe. Des Fitzgerald was the

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1 Chief of SAS at that time.

2 Mr. Johnston. And you were responsible directly to him.

3 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

4 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the fact that shortly

5 after the assassination of President Kennedy, the CIA initiated

6 an investigation into the Assassination?

7 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

8 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall who was in charge of that

9 investigation?

10 Mr. Swenson. No, I do not.

11 I assume it would have been the CI Staff.

12 Mr. Johnston. Speaking of the CI Staff, who was in

13 charge of the CI Staff?

14 Mr. Swenson. Jim Angleton.

15 Mr. Johnston. And what was your responsibility to Mr.

16 Angleton?

17 Mr. Swenson. Well, there was a common interest in

18 counterintelligence matters, and if something came up which

19 required consultation, I would consult with that staff.

20 Mr. Johnston. Were you subordinate to Mr. Angleton?

21 Mr. Swenson. Not really, no.

22 Mr. Johnston. What was the relationship between SAS

23 Counterintelligence and the Counterintelligence Staff at the

24 Agency?

25 Mr. Swenson. Well, the SAS Counterintelligence Staff

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1 was sort of a microcosm of the Agency with emphasis on Cuban  
2 matters, Cuban intelligence service especially.

3 Mr. Johnston. What was the size of the Counterintelligence  
4 Staff within SAS?

5 Mr. Swenson. I suppose I had perhaps 30 people.

6 Mr. Johnston. At headquarters, is that correct?

7 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

8 Mr. Johnston. Going back now to the assassination of  
9 President Kennedy, were you aware of the fact that a special  
10 investigation was initiated shortly after the assassination that  
11 was not located in Mr Angleton's bailiwick?

12 Mr. Swenson. I knew that there was a special investigation  
13 but I had nothing to do with it.

14 Mr. Johnston. Did you know Mr. Jack Whitten, or  
15 John Whitten?

16 Mr. Swenson. Yes, I knew him.

17 Mr. Johnston. Did you know him as being in charge of the  
18 investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

19 Mr. Swenson. I don't recall that.

20 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever contact Mr. Whitten about the  
21 Kennedy assassination?

22 Mr. Swenson. I did not.

23 Mr. Johnston. Were you personally aware of any information  
24 about Lee Harvey Oswald before the assassination?

25 Mr. Swenson. To the best of my recollection, it's rather

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1 hard for me to place before and after, his name appeared as  
2 having paid a visit to a Cuban or Soviet embassy in Mexico  
3 City, and that's about the only knowledge that I had.

4 Mr. Johnston. And you have a recollection of knowing that  
5 before the assassination?

6 Mr. Swenson. Now, I cannot remember that it was before.  
7 This is what I am unsure about.

8 Mr. Johnston. All right.

9 Mr. Swenson. Normally a great deal of information went  
10 past the desk. I delegated screening of voluminous materials  
11 which came in to various people who worked for me, and they  
12 would call to my attention things which appeared significant  
13 and then I would look into those. But really, as far as the  
14 assassination of President Kennedy is concerned, I am afraid  
15 I don't have anything to contribute. I don't know anything  
16 which didn't appear in the press, really.

17 Senator Schweiker. You were never asked to conduct any  
18 investigation separately or specially or apart from what --

19 Mr. Swenson. No, Senator. The only request which was  
20 levied on me with regard to the assassination, as I can recall,  
21 was to find whether the FBI had given to my staff any information  
22 which was relevant, and I caused a search of our records to be  
23 made, and I believe there had been some memorandum which was  
24 relevant, which had then been passed on to Jim Angleton's  
25 CI Staff, and I passed on that information, and I think that

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1 was the full extent of it.

2 Mr. Johnston. Had that information been passed on to the  
3 CI Staff prior to the assassination?

4 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

5 Mr. Johnston. The routing on it, which I assume we are  
6 talking about the same thing, was the report of FBI agent  
7 Kaak on Oswald's activities in New Orleans.

8 Mr. Swenson. That was probably it, yes. As I say, I have  
9 a very vague recollection of it.

10 Mr. Johnston. And that routing sheet on that memo indicates  
11 it went to the CI Staff on November 22nd.

12 Is it your recollection that it went there before the  
13 assassination?

14 Mr. Swenson. I really can't recall. I am sorry. All I  
15 know is that McCone wanted to know had anything come in, I  
16 caused a search to be made. Normally Sam Papich, who was the  
17 Bureau liaison officer who came to my office every working  
18 day, would see one of the people working for me, now deceased,  
19 Austin Horn, and we would pass to the Bureau any information  
20 which appeared pertinent to the Bureau purposes, and we would  
21 receive from the Bureau anything which they considered appro-  
22 priate for us.

23 So that the memorandum, as I recall, which came in, I had  
24 never seen, but it had been received by the office and passed  
25 on in due course.

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1 Mr. Johnston. What role did the SAS staff itself play  
2 in connection with the investigation of President Kennedy's  
3 assassination?

4 Mr. Swenson. Directly, none.

5 Mr. Johnston. Did you advise either Mr. Whitten or Mr.  
6 Angleton about Cuban angles to it?

7 Mr. Swenson. Well, we -- you know, I was very conscious  
8 of all of the activities of Cuban intelligence. Probably  
9 I was better informed than any other one individual about  
10 Cuban intelligence activities, and I knew and know of nothing  
11 which made a contribution as far as the assassination was  
12 concerned.

13 Mr. Johnston. Were you consulted, though, by Mr. Angleton  
14 or Mr. Whitten?

15 Mr. Swenson. No, I can't recall that I ever was, but  
16 I would have discussed anything probably with Des Fitzgerald.  
17 As I say, I can't recall any specific discussion because I  
18 had nothing to offer.

19 Senator Schweiker. Did you ever pass on any information  
20 to the CIA investigation relating to CIA attempts or plots to  
21 assassinate Castro?

22 Mr. Swenson. Senator, would you mind repeating that?  
23 not sure that I follow you.

24 Senator Schweiker. During the course of the investigation

25 Mr. Swenson. Of Kennedy's investigation?

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1 Senator Schweiker. Right.

2 Did you ever pass on any information relative to plots  
3 against Fidel Castro's life by Task Force W or SAS or any  
4 other?

5 Mr. Swenson. No, I did not pass on any such reports.

6 Senator Schweiker. Why did you not?

7 In other words, wouldn't that have been very relevant to  
8 the investigation?

9 Mr. Swenson. I had nothing to do with any such plots  
10 against Castro, Senator.

11 Mr. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable of them at the  
12 time?

13 Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall now whether my knowledge that  
14 there were such plots was before or after. I would just like  
15 to say I heartily disapproved of it, I thought it was a lot  
16 of nonsense, and my position on that was very clear, and I  
17 don't think people generally talked to me about it because of  
18 the way I felt.

19 Mr. Epstein. You said before or after. Before or after  
20 what?

21 Mr. Swenson. Before or after the Kennedy Assassination.  
22 In other words, I can't recall that I knew that there  
23 had been plots prior to that time, or whether I knew of it  
24 subsequent to that time. My own staff was not involved in  
25 way, and the only knowledge that came to me about it was

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1 staff meetings and concerned people who might have been  
2 involved. And I thought, as I said, it's a lot of nonsense.

3 Senator Schweiker. Were you either asked by Des Fitzgerald  
4 or the Director of CIA not to discuss or pass on information  
5 relating to plots to assassinate Castro?

6 Mr. Swenson. Absolutely not, no.

7 Senator Schweiker. Or anyone else?

8 Mr. Swenson. By no one.

9 Mr. Johnston. What discussions did you have with Mr.  
10 Fitzgerald about the Kennedy assassination, and especially about  
11 your expertise on Cuban matters?

12 Mr. Swenson. To the best of my knowledge, there was  
13 never any discussion with Des about Cuban participation in a  
14 plot against President Kennedy's life because it never appeared  
15 pertinent.

16 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you why you don't feel it was  
17 pertinent, and let us just take as a basis for that question the  
18 fact that Oswald was associated with the FPCC, and in that  
19 capacity, claimed to be pro-Castro, and the fact that he  
20 visited the Cuban consulate in Mexico City to attempt to get  
21 a visa to Cuba shortly before the assassination.

22 Mr. Swenson. I don't think that the evidence which we  
23 saw, any hard information which we had, indicated that Oswald  
24 was anything but a nut, perhaps a dangerous nut. We simply  
25 had no information to indicate that he was part of a Cuban

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1 intelligence organization or had any real connection with them.

2 I might add that I did talk to many people, Cubans, who  
3 were knowledgeable about intelligence activities, Cuban intelligence  
4 officers, defectors, and I got never a single bit of  
5 information indicating that there was any association whatsoever.

6 Senator Schweiker. But when he went to visit the Russian  
7 embassy in Cuba, it was known at the time through the intelligence  
8 agencies that he was with Kostikov, who was also known to be  
9 a member of Department 13, which was assassination, was it not?

10 Mr. Swenson. I did not know it at the time, and this is  
11 the first I've heard of that, Senator.

12 Senator Schweiker. You did not know that?

13 Mr. Swenson. No, I did not.

14 Senator Schweiker. That he visited with Kostikov or that  
15 Kostikov was a member of Department 13?

16 Mr. Swenson. I did not know either. I did have within  
17 my own group some people who were Soviet experts, and we  
18 kept tabs on Soviets who were in Cuba. I did a great deal of  
19 research about their activities, but what you have just  
20 mentioned, Senator, never came to my attention.

21 Senator Schweiker. As part of your job, which groups did  
22 you work with of the Cuban exile groups specifically? In  
23 other words, what one --

24 Mr. Swenson. I did not work with any of them, Senator.

25 Senator Schweiker. Well, then, which ones would you be

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1 monitoring as Chief of CI? Certainly you would be monitoring  
2 some of them as Chief of CI or getting intelligence back as  
3 Chief of CI.

4 Mr. Swenson. Primarily I targeted our duties against the  
5 Cuban Intelligence Service. I did not deal with the Cuban  
6 groups. That fell within other jurisdictions.

7 Senator Schweiker. In dealing with the Cuban Intelligence  
8 Service, weren't some of these people bound to be included in  
9 some of these Cuban exile groups?

10 Mr. Swenson. Let me put it this way. I did not monitor  
11 groups as such.

12 Senator Schweiker. Right.

13 Mr. Swenson. I did monitor individuals so that if a  
14 name which had any relationship with the perations of Cuban  
15 intelligence surfaced, I would look into that very closely.  
16 I cannot recall a single name that surfaced which related to  
17 the Kennedy assassination or any information which I ever got  
18 at any time which related to the Kennedy assassination.

19 Senator Schweiker. Do you specifically recall where some  
20 of your contacts were located that you were monitoring? Were  
21 they in, for example, the DRE groups or the Alpha 66 group, or  
22 for example, where were some of the contacts that you were  
23 monitoring?

24 Mr. Swenson. I was not monitoring contacts within those  
25 groups. If a name surfaced, regardless of what group he would

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1 be in, and he was within the United States, for example, and  
2 I felt that there was some reason to be concerned from a  
3 counterintelligence standpoint, I usually would interview him  
4 myself. I would interview him at great length. Some of these  
5 were, let's say, people who were singletons. They were not  
6 associated with any group.

7 The only group I can think of offhand was the AMCANOE  
8 group which I was concerned about, the penetration --

9 Senator Schweiker. What was that?

10 Mr. Swenson. AMCANOE. It was a cryptonym. I don't know  
11 it by any other name.

12 Senator Schweiker. Well, it would seem to me, and maybe  
13 it is a matter of functional definition, that your Cuban  
14 exiles group would be a fertile field for any intelligence  
15 activity. This is where both the pro- and anti-Castro agents  
16 were operating, where all of your activities would primarily  
17 be, wouldn't they?

18 Mr. Swenson. Not mine, no, Senator.

19 Senator Schweiker. In dealing with counterintelligence,  
20 wouldn't you have to be dealing with people who would have come  
21 out of Cuba and been working in these exile groups, unless  
22 I don't understand the nature of your job, and maybe I don't.

23 Mr. Swenson. Well, that's probably it, Senator. We were  
24 highly compartmentalized, and I saw my role in counterintelli-  
25 gence as being focused primarily on the opposite professionals.

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1 not as a broad gauged thing. We had other staff, sir, other  
2 components which focused primarily on other aspects, let's  
3 say, the non-professionals, the non-professionals.

4 Senator Schweiker. In other words, on Cuban intelligence  
5 agents, per se, is that what you're telling me?

6 Mr. Swenson. Yes. If they were Cuban intelligence  
7 agents, that was my jurisdiction.

8 Senator Schweiker. But what I'm getting at is wouldn't  
9 a number of these be working undercover in the anti-Castro  
10 exile groups? That would certainly be the logical cover that  
11 they would come into this country on.

12 Mr. Swenson. Senator, I was very alert to this. This  
13 was part of my job, so this was why I would have all of those  
14 names and operational aliases where we knew them, searched  
15 very carefully to see if they merited further attention, but  
16 I cannot recall anything relating to any one particular group  
17 except the one which I was concerned about because it appeared  
18 that that was --

19 Senator Schweiker. You are saying you did not really deal  
20 with groups per se.

21 Mr. Swenson. That is correct.

22 Senator Schweiker. Now about if you found an agent that  
23 you thought, a suspect planted in one group. Now, we know  
24 CIA was operating certain of these groups. Wouldn't you have  
25 gone to the case officer for that group to find out about that

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1 person?

2 Mr. Swenson. I would have gone to the other staffs, or  
3 the case officer or whoever was responsible, and yes, I would  
4 have discussed that. If I had any doubts about it, I would  
5 have expressed them very strongly and would probably have taken  
6 other measures.

7 Senator Schweiker. During your tenure as Chief of CI, were  
8 you ever alarmed or concerned about leaks from our side to  
9 theirs and was part of your job to plug these leaks?

10 Mr. Swenson. Yes, I was concerned and took measures to  
11 plug leaks where I suspected them.

12 Senator Schweiker. Did we have substantial leaks or normal  
13 leaks, or how would you describe the kind of information flowing  
14 back to Castro?

15 Mr. Swenson. It is very hard to say how substantial the  
16 leaks were.

17 Let me give you an example, Senator. We had operations  
18 targeted against Cuba involving Cubans, resident in the United  
19 States, who were often very indiscrete, so that if a mission  
20 were planned to land some of them on Cuba, for example, they  
21 would sometimes pick up the telephone and they would call a  
22 friend, a relative in Cuba, and they thought they were being  
23 very discrete, I suppose, by talking about hoping to see their  
24 aunt or their grandmother or something like this, and really  
25 they weren't. Those calls were monitored by the Cuban

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1 intelligence service, and some of those people were arrested or  
2 killed on landing. This was of great concern to me.

3 My role in this was simply the protective measure, to try  
4 to determine who might be involved, and insofar as people in the  
5 United States were concerned who were suspected of being  
6 Cuban intelligence agents, I would discuss that with Sam Papich  
7 because I felt that the Bureau had a jurisdiction within the  
8 continental United States.

9 Senator Schweiker. As part of your role, would you ever  
10 infiltrate an American agent to act as a double agent to find  
11 what the leaks were? Was that part of your work, too?

12 Mr. Swenson. Yes, if I had had such an opportunity, I  
13 would have taken it. I did not.

14 Senator Schweiker. You did not.

15 Mr. Swenson. I did not. I would have if a suitable  
16 opportunity had presented itself.

17 Senator Schweiker. All right, go ahead.

18 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the allegations of a man  
19 named Alvarado in Mexico City?

20 Does that name ring a bell?

21 Mr. Swenson. Yeah, it is such a common name.

22 Mr. Johnston. Within three days after the assassination,  
23 he walked into the embassy, the U.S. embassy in Mexico, and  
24 was subsequently in contact with the Chief of Station. Essen-  
25 tially he alleged that he saw money passed to Oswald in the

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1 Cuban embassy in Mexico City.

2 Were you aware of that fact?

3 Mr. Swenson. I can't recall it now. I am sorry.

4 Mr. Johnston. Wouldn't that fact, an analysis of that have  
5 been in your jurisdiction?

6 Mr. Swenson. If that had come to my attention at the time,  
7 we would have examined it very carefully, and I would say that  
8 either it was not taken seriously, or for some reason it didn't  
9 get to my attention.

10 Mr. Johnston. Let me address the point of your taking it  
11 seriously.

12 Mr. Alvarado's allegations were briefed to President  
13 Johnson at the time they were being made. Now, are you testi-  
14 fying that you were never consulted about the Alvarado  
15 allegations?

16 Mr. Swenson. I do not recall them.

17 Mr. Johnston. Did you know about technical coverage on the  
18 Cuban consulate and Cuban embassy in Mexico City?

19 Was that in your jurisdiction?

20 Mr. Swenson. Knowledge of it I did have. It was not  
21 within my jurisdiction to operate. That was not my staff's  
22 function.

23 Mr. Johnston. What does technical coverage of an embassy  
24 or a consulate supposed to do?

25 Mr. Swenson. Well, when you say technical coverage, of

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1 course, that would include the use of --

2 Mr. Johnston. What is the purpose of it?

3 Mr. Swenson. Well, the purpose of it was to obtain  
4 intelligence about hostile intentions.

5 Mr. Johnston. Were you ever asked whether any of Oswald's  
6 contacts in Mexico City were DGI?

7 Mr. Swenson. I can't recall the specific question  
8 directed to me on that score, but had I known of any DGI contacts  
9 with Oswald, I would have discussed them.

10 Mr. Johnston. How would you have known who the contacts  
11 were?

12 Mr. Swenson. Well, my role was really the Cuban intelli-  
13 gence service, and we went to great lengths to keep track of  
14 Cuban intelligence officers, their contacts, and their  
15 activities.

16 Mr. Johnston. How would you have known whose Oswald's  
17 contacts were?

18 Mr. Swenson. I would have known only if one of those  
19 known contacts of Cuban intelligence had been in touch with  
20 anybody, and if Oswald's name had surfaced, I would have looked  
21 at that.

22 Mr. Johnston. But you were never given a name or a group  
23 of names of the Cubans with whom Oswald may have been in contact  
24 in Mexico City.

25 Mr. Swenson. I do not recall that, no.

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1 Mr. Johnston. And given your advice on whether they were  
2 DGI.

3 Mr. Swenson. However, let me go a step further. I  
4 prepared a rather elaborate system of identification of people  
5 connected with Cuban intelligence service. This was computerized  
6 so that people who had clearances were welcome to look at that  
7 list for any connections. So this group, like Jack Whitten's  
8 group, which had a specific function, could have simply looked  
9 at that. They need not have talked to me.

10 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you whether in November of  
11 1963 you were aware of an operation that had the code name  
12 AMLASH.

13 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

14 Mr. Johnston. And do you know who AMLASH was, his real  
15 identity?

16 Mr. Swenson. I did know, yes.

17 Let's go off the record. I can't recall his name.

18 Mr. Johnston. Let's go off the record.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 Mr. Johnston. Back on the record, did you know back in  
21 November 1963 that the CIA was meeting with AMLASH?

22 Mr. Swenson. Yes, and I had expressed my reservations about  
23 such a meeting. I didn't consider him to be responsible.

24 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you a preliminary question. Have  
25 you ever been asked by this Committee as to your knowledge as to

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1 AMLASH?

2 Mr. Swenson. No.

3 Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald met with  
4 AMLASH in late October of 1963?

5 Mr. Swenson. I believe I did. I have a vague recollection  
6 of that now, yes.

7 Mr. Johnston. And do you know about the purpose of that  
8 meeting?

9 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

10 Mr. Johnston. What was the purpose of that meeting?

11 Mr. Swenson. I believe this was related to the  
12 assassination, an assassination plot against Castro, and as  
13 to this I had reference before. I couldn't recall the exact  
14 time frame, but I thought it was nonsense. I thought it would  
15 be counterproductive if it had been successful, so I opposed  
16 it.

17 Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald went  
18 ahead with it?

19 Mr. Swenson. Yes. Mr. Fitzgerald and I did not always  
20 agree.

21 Mr. Johnston. But he told you he was going ahead with  
22 the operation.

23 Mr. Swenson. I expressed my reservations about it. He  
24 went ahead. He didn't ask my permission. He was my boss.

25 Mr. Johnston. Did you in fact know about the October 27...

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1 meeting in Paris?

2 Mr. Swenson. I knew he had the meeting, yes.

3 Mr. Johnston. That Mr. Fitzgerald personally had  
4 gone to the meeting.

5 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

6 Mr. Johnston. Did you know that Mr. Fitzgerald had  
7 assured AMLASH that he was the personal representative of  
8 Attorney General Kennedy?

9 Mr. Swenson. No, I don't know that he did that.

10 Mr. Johnston. And again as a matter of background, have  
11 you read the Committee's report on assassinations?

12 Mr. Swenson. I have not.

13 Mr. Johnston. Did you know that on November 22nd,  
14 1963 the case officer was meeting with AMLASH?

15 Mr. Swenson. I believe I knew that about that time there  
16 was to be a meeting.

17 Mr. Johnston. Did you also know that proposed for the  
18 meeting was the fact that the case officer was going to offer  
19 AMLASH a poison pen?

20 Mr. Swenson. No, I did not.

21 Mr. Johnston. You had no knowledge at the time of the  
22 poison pen?

23 Mr. Swenson. No. As I told you, I disagreed basically  
24 with the whole thrust of the AMLASH operation. My disapproval  
25 of it was very strong. Des Fitzgerald knew it, and Des ro...

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1 preferred not to discuss it anymore with me.

2 Senator Schweiker. What was the basis of your disapproval?  
3 I mean, why did you disagree?

4 Mr. Swenson. Well, I didn't think it was a sensible  
5 operation, Senator. "I felt first that we were dealing with  
6 people whose bona fides were subject to question, whose  
7 professionalism was subject to question, and I felt that if they  
8 had succeeded in killing Castro, that he might have been succeeded  
9 by his brother, for example, who would be worse. So I thought  
10 it was a pointless operation. I thought it was a lot of  
11 nonsense.

12 Mr. Johnston. Were you asked to provide counterintelligence  
13 support for the AMLASH operation?

14 Mr. Swenson. I provide counterintelligence support for  
15 everything in the sense that I have already described. Any  
16 names which came up I would check for.

17 Mr. Johnston. But specifically for AMLASH.

18 Mr. Swenson. Well, in debriefing people connected with  
19 Cuban intelligence, I had a lot of names, and I had collected  
20 a lot of information, including information on AMLASH, so  
21 that information which I collected I turned over to them.

22 Mr. Johnston. Were you ever asked specifically what  
23 seems to me to be a logical question before CIA went and  
24 met with AMLASH, that question being, as this operation seemed

25 Mr. Swenson. As I have already indicated to you, I can't

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1 them I disapproved it, I didn't trust the people, I didn't  
2 consider it a good operation on security grounds or any grounds.

3 Mr. Wallach. Did you consider it an assassination  
4 operation?

5 Mr. Swenson. Did I consider it?

6 Mr. Wallach. Is that how it was explained to you, an  
7 assassination plot?

8 Mr. Swenson. Oh, that's it, yes.

9 Senator Schweiker. There wasn't any doubt in your mind  
10 about that.

11 Mr. Swenson. That that was the intent of it? No. I  
12 just thought it was silly.

13 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the statement that  
14 Fidel Castro made to the AP reporter Daniel Harker on September  
15 7th, 1963, and in that statement said the U.S. was meeting  
16 with dissident groups and was planning to eliminate Cuban  
17 leaders, and that Cuba would retaliate if that continued?

18 Mr. Swenson. I don't have a firm recollection now. I  
19 probably did.

20 Mr. Johnston. Let me go then to 1965.

21 What happened with the AMLASH operation, to your recollec-  
22 tion, in 1965?

23 Mr. Swenson. I draw a completely blank. I don't remember  
24 now.

25 Mr. Johnston. Do you remember the name Victor Espinoza?

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Mr. Swenson: Not really.

Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection, that at least according to the files, you and the FBI met with Victor Espinoza in New York City in 1965.

Mr. Swenson. Excuse me. The name still doesn't ring a bell. I met with a Cuban in New York in 1965 for the purpose of training him and sending him back to Cuba.

Is this what you are talking about?

Mr. Johnston. No. Victor Espinoza was part of the AMLASH group that had knowledge of the AMLASH operation as it had evolved into 1965.

Mr. Swenson. Yes I remember the man now, yes, yes I do.

Mr. Johnston. Did you meet with him and debrief him?

Mr. Swenson. Yes, yes I did. I met him at the FBI office in New York.

Mr. Johnston. At that time did you know of any connections between Victor Espinoza and anything dealing with the investigation into President Kennedy's assassination?

Mr. Swenson. I can't recall. Anything which I knew about Espinoza I would have put into the memorandum at the time after I met him at the New York Office. And I couldn't even remember the name, as I told you, until now.

I do know that he went into the office, that he wanted to see someone, I believe it was Sam Papich that first told me of it, and I went in for the purpose of debriefing him, and

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1 remember he made a number of allegations, all of which I  
2 recorded in a memorandum at the time.

3 Mr. Johnston. Do you remember that he alleged that one  
4 of the CIA officers in Spain had been compromised by Cuban  
5 intelligence officers?

6 Mr. Swenson. Yes, I remember that.

7 Mr. Johnston. Was that true?

8 Mr. Swenson. I don't know whether it was true or not.  
9 I would say that the number of operations that were being  
10 conducted in Spain again were not secure from a counterintelli-  
11 gence standpoint. I thought that they were rather sloppy, and  
12 I indicated that.

13 Mr. Johnston. One of your memoranda that you wrote after  
14 the Espinoza meeting states -- and all I have are my notes from  
15 it -- the AMLASH circle is wide, and each new friend of whom  
16 we learn seems to have knowledge of the plan. I believe the  
17 problem is a more serious and basic one. Fidel reportedly knew  
18 in 1962 that the group was plotting against him and enlisted  
19 its support. Hence we cannot rule out the possibility of  
20 provocation.

21 Do you recall that memorandum?

22 Mr. Swenson. This is true, and this is what I testified  
23 to already. I had serious misgivings about the security of  
24 the whole operation.

25 Mr. Johnston. And what did you mean by provocation?

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1 Mr. Swenson. I meant that the Cubans might have been trying  
2 to turn their knowledge of what we were doing to their purposes,  
3 if only for propaganda purposes.

4 I felt from the outset the whole thing was nonsense, as I  
5 have said repeatedly, and in my debriefings of people, the  
6 more I learned, the more insecure it appeared to me, so I  
7 simply continued to oppose such ventures. I thought they were  
8 silly.

9 Senator Schweiker. Knowing Fidel Castro's personality and  
10 temperament, and on the assumption that you were right, that he  
11 had some knowledge of these operations which you feared, obvious-  
12 ly, from the record of what you said, wouldn't you possibly have  
13 meant provocation more than just reciprocating with propaganda,  
14 knowing his personality?

15 Mr. Swenson. Well, I would have considered any type of  
16 retaliatory measure by Castro, and this was the purpose of the  
17 dissemination of such material to other government agencies  
18 which had jurisdiction, such as the FBI and the Secret Service.

19 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, isn't it obvious that if  
20 CIA was plotting to assassinate Castro and he became aware of  
21 it, that he might retaliate, especially when he had warned about  
22 retaliation?

23 Mr. Swenson. It is possible, of course. This is one of  
24 the things that concerned me, but I never knew that as a result  
25 of all of this there was any attempt on the part of the Cuban

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1 government or of Cuban intelligence to assassinate the President.

2 Mr. Johnston. Did you conduct an investigation in order to  
3 determine whether the Cuban government had retaliated specifically  
4 for the AMLASH operation?

5 Mr. Swenson. Well, your using the term investigation is  
6 what is puzzling me here. What I did is a constant function,  
7 was to look for any activities on the part of opposition  
8 services which would threaten the United States or people in the  
9 United States, United States security. This was a continuing  
10 function. There was no particular investigation except as  
11 part of what I did all the time. The AMLASH group was of  
12 concern to me because I thought they were sloppy, but I never  
13 did find out from all of the many interviews I conducted, and  
14 the research I did, and that of everybody on my staff, that  
15 there was ever any attempt on the part of the Cubans to  
16 assassinate the President.

17 Mr. Johnston. Are you aware of an agent who was involved  
18 in the AMLASH operation who had the crypt AMWHIP?

19 Mr. Swenson. This goes back a long time. I remember the  
20 AMWHIP.

21 Mr. Johnston. Let me mention his name off the record.

22 (Discussion off the record.)

23 Mr. Johnston. Back on the record.

24 Did you ever suggest that either AMLASH or AMWHIP be  
25 interrogated about the Kennedy assassination and its connection.

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to the AMLASH operation?

Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall whether I suggested it or not. I believe I did question AMWHIP myself.

Mr. Johnston. In what year?

Mr. Swenson. This I can't recall, the exact timeframe. It is quite a long time ago.

Mr. Johnston. Was that 1965 that AMWHIP was interrogated?

Mr. Swenson. I would say it was probably in 1965 because it was in 1965 that I departed for Europe, and I think it was prior to my departure, and that's the best I can do about fixing it.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever talk to the case officer who had been at the November 22nd meeting about whether anything was mentioned at the meeting that might indicate retaliation?

Mr. Swenson. I probably did. I can't recall anything specific, but I talked to the people, to the case officers who were involved. They were well aware of my reservations about people with whom they were dealing.

Mr. Johnston. After the assassination of President Kennedy, did you have any discussion with Mr. Fitzgerald or Mr. Helms about the possibility of retaliation because of the AMLASH operation?

Mr. Swenson. I would say that possibly at a staff meeting I might have mentioned the possibility with Des Fitzgerald, but I had no concrete information to indicate that there was

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1 an attempt at retaliation.

2 Mr. Johnston. And who would have been at that staff  
3 meeting?

4 Mr. Swenson. Probably Sam Halpern, Seymour Bolten,  
5 possibly Nestor Sanchez. There are a couple of others whose  
6 faces I recall but I don't know that I'd even remember their  
7 names.

8 Senator Schweiker. Would the Director have been there?

9 Mr. Swenson. No, he would not.

10 Mr. Johnston. Would Mr. Helms have been there?

11 Mr. Swenson. No, he would not.

12 Mr. Johnston. And can you place a date, an approximate  
13 date on the staff meeting, or at least a date in relation?

14 Mr. Swenson. We had staff meetings just daily, sir.

15 Mr. Johnston. Was it about the time of the Kennedy  
16 assassination or shortly after the Kennedy assassination?

17 Mr. Swenson. I am sure that in that general timeframe  
18 there was a staff meeting, and I would have at the time expressed  
19 any counterintelligence views which I considered appropriate,  
20 just warnings, or let's say, being careful.

21 Mr. Johnston. Well, let me refine it.

22 Do you have a recollection of mentioning a connection  
23 or the possibility of a connection between AMLASH and  
24 Kennedy's assassination at a staff meeting?

25 Do you have a recollection of doing that?

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1 Mr. Swenson. I don't have a firm recollection now. You  
2 had a memorandum from which you quoted.

3 Mr. Johnston. Apparently a 1965 memorandum?

4 Mr. Swenson. I can't recall anything as of the  
5 Kennedy assassination, nothing definite.

6 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion now?

7 Mr. Swenson. Not positively.

8 Mr. Johnston. That you said that sometime.

9 Mr. Swenson. What I am getting at is that this is  
10 one of the things I would normally have considered.

11 Senator Schweiker. You're saying it may have occurred.

12 Mr. Swenson. It may have occurred, but I don't have any  
13 firm recollection.

14 Mr. Peloquin. May we go off the record?

15 Senator Schweiker. Sure.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 Mr. Johnston. Back on the record. My question to you  
18 is this. Do you have a recollection of a staff meeting at  
19 some time with the participants you described at which a  
20 possibility of a connection between ANLASH operation and the  
21 Kennedy assassination was discussed?

22 Mr. Swenson. No specific recollection, no.

23 Mr. Johnston. Did it occur to you at the time that  
24 there might be some such connection?

25 Mr. Swenson. I am merely assuming that I would have

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1 explored or would have thought about it as well as all other  
2 ramification.

3 Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you at this point --

4 Mr. Swenson. I don't remember.

5 Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you at this point whether you  
6 explored it. I'm just asking you whether you drew a possibility  
7 of a connection in your mind?

8 Mr. Swenson. I probably would have. I don't have any  
9 specific recollection of it.

10 Mr. Johnston. Do you now draw the possibility of a  
11 connection?

12 Mr. Swenson. As a possibility, yes, but all of my  
13 efforts over a long period of time which were say exhaustive  
14 and extensive, both, failed to produce any connection. I would  
15 be mindful at all times of such possibilities in everything  
16 that I did, and I interrogated many people, I interviewed many  
17 people. I read reports from many sources. I never found even  
18 a thread of a connection.

19 Mr. Johnston. Well, let me ask you as a specific fact  
20 whether you knew that on November 22nd an aircraft flight  
21 in Mexico City, a Cubana aircraft flight from Mexico City to  
22 Havana was detained from about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon  
23 until 10:00 o'clock in the evening awaiting a passenger who  
24 arrived in a twin-engined aircraft, who bypassed Customs and  
25 who rode in the pilot's cabin on the flight to Havana?

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1 Mr. Swenson. I have no recollection of it.

2 Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of checking  
3 into that, either receiving that or checking into that?

4 Mr. Swenson. Not specifically.

5 Senator Schweiker. Do any recollections come back to you  
6 of unusual movement of Cuban intelligence agents immediately  
7 prior to, during and after the Kennedy assassination?

8 Mr. Swenson. They do not, Senator.

9 Mr. Wallach. I am sorry I had to miss the beginning of your  
10 testimony and I may be going over something that was already  
11 asked. Just let me know.

12 It is my understanding that you were aware generally  
13 of the AMLASH operation and the purpose of the operation in 1963.

14 Mr. Swenson. Generally and specifically both, I would say.

15 Mr. Wallach. You were aware that there was a meeting  
16 set up with AMLASH in Brazil in September of 1963 or thereabouts?

17 Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall. I would have known  
18 probably that there was such a meeting to be held. I was  
19 on record as considering that this was a dangerous and  
20 stupid operation.

21 Mr. Wallach. The meeting in Brazil with AMLASH was --  
22 can you give me that?

23 Mr. Johnston. September 5th, or early September.

24 Mr. Swenson. I cannot remember the exact dates. It was  
25 a long time ago.

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1 Mr. Wallach. With AMLASH's case officer, correct, and  
2 then subsequently appearing in a September 7th edition of  
3 the New Orleans Times-Picayune, Fidel Castro goes down to the  
4 Brazilian consulate in Havana and makes a speech or grants an  
5 interview to Daniel Harker, the AP reporter, and specifically  
6 uses the words "eliminate" --

7 Mr. Swenson. I believe this has already been covered.

8 Mr. Wallach. I know Jim did raise that but what I'm  
9 asking you is whether or not in your counterintelligence  
10 background and your knowledge of Castro whether or not Castro's --  
11 A, the fact that he granted an interview; and B, the fact that  
12 he apparently went to the Brazilian consulate, which I  
13 understand that he did not frequent very often, has any  
14 significance? I am asking this to you as an expert.

15 Mr. Swenson. Mr. Castro is a very bold, imaginative  
16 person who is capable of doing anything. Does it have some  
17 special significance relating to the Kennedy assassination?  
18 I don't see any.

19 Mr. Epstein. The suggestion has been made that he chose  
20 the Brazilian consulate because that was his method of getting  
21 a message, if the operation had been compromised, that he had  
22 learned of the meeting that had happened in Brazil in September  
23 of 1963. The suggestion has been made that that is the way  
24 he was getting the message to the United States.

25 Do you remember that ever being discussed or considered?

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1 Mr. Swenson. I don't recall that, no.

2 Mr. Epstein. In retrospect, now, is that an issue that is  
3 considerable by counterintelligence people, and does it  
4 trigger any kind of thoughts in your own head when you hear  
5 it now?

6 Mr. Swenson. Well, you see there are so many things that  
7 were going on all over Latin America with regard to Cuban  
8 activities in the different countries. I would go to  
9 Brazil, for example, or, for example, of seeing people who  
10 had been connected with Cuban intelligence, and debriefing them  
11 and so on, and I would not read that Castro's visit to the  
12 Brazilian installation had anything to do with the Kennedy --  
13 had anything to do with a whole host of things.

14 Mr. Epstein. No. The issue is whether his visit to the  
15 Brazilian consulate would have had anything to do with --

16 Mr. Swenson. With getting our attention --

17 Mr. Epstein. Getting our attention, and indeed, the  
18 veracity of his assertion, that he had learned of plots --

19 Mr. Swenson. I would not attribute that special signifi-  
20 cance to it because there were so many reasons he could have  
21 done it.

22 Mr. Johnston. Let me go back to the aircraft. I show  
23 you Director Cable 8604 dated 30 November '63, which is the  
24 cable to Mexico City about this fact, and I call your attention  
25 to the upper left hand corner which would indicate SAS, EOB

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1 is the drafter of that?

2 Mr. Swenson. Uh-huh.

3 Mr. Johnston. And EOB is what office in SAS?

4 Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall what it meant right now,  
5 nor can I recognize the initials.

6 Let me see if I can read this first.

7 (The Witness reads the document.)

8 Mr. Swenson. I'm sorry. Normally they would have put  
9 down my own group here, SAS/CI. This apparently did not reach  
10 me for some reason.

11 Senator Schweiker. What does that SAS up there mean?

12 Mr. Swenson. Well, the SAS referred to the task force,  
13 really, Special Affairs Staff. They changed the name of the  
14 task force. And then the slash was to separate it from some  
15 component, and I think that the EOB -- they changed names --  
16 I think that the EOB had to do with a staff which was trying  
17 to engage in positive intelligence operations against Cuba,  
18 things like AMCANOE and AMLASH, but I really can't tell you  
19 the exact destination, but you'll note that it did not come  
20 to my staff.

21 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, did you receive information  
22 about a Cuban-American by the name of Gilberto Policarpo Lopez?

23 Mr. Swenson. At the time the name does not ring any  
24 recollections.

25 (Discussion off the record.)

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1 Mr. Johnston. Gilberto Lopez crossed the border from  
2 Texas into Mexico on the 23rd of November. The border had been  
3 closed by Mexican authorities on the 22nd, after the assassi-  
4 nation. He went to Mexico City, arriving there on the 25th  
5 of November, and on the 27th of November departed as the only  
6 passenger on a Cubana airline flight to Havana.

7 Do any of those facts --

8 Mr. Swenson. They really don't register with me now.

9 Mr. Johnston. Do you ever recall being consulted about  
10 that trip?

11 Mr. Swenson. I simply have no recollection at all.

12 Mr. Johnston. Could you have made a contribution on that?

13 Mr. Swenson. I would have, let's say, searched through  
14 the computer runs to see if such an individual had ever been  
15 a contact of Cuban intelligence service. Other than that, I  
16 don't know what I could have done because in Mexico City there  
17 were people who were there for that purpose.

18 Senator Schweiker. Here is one of the copies we are  
19 talking about. We just wonder if it helps you to recollect.

20 (The Witness reads the document.)

21 Mr. Swenson. The only thing I can say, Senator, is  
22 when they mention ODENVY, which is the Bureau, if it was a  
23 Cuban affair, any discussion with the Bureau should have been  
24 through me. I do not now have any recollection of this.

25 Senator Schweiker. Here is one referring to something

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1 about his activities in Los Angeles. At that particular time  
2 he was coming out of Miami, as I recall.

3 Mr. Johnston. Let me correct for the record. Initially  
4 they have identified -- they thought he was the same as  
5 Gilberto Lopez who was in Los Angeles. Subsequently they found  
6 it was not true.

7 Mr. Wallach. Who did you deal with at the Bureau? Did  
8 you deal with Papich or did you deal with someone directly?

9 Mr. Swenson. Usually Papich stopped in my office every  
10 day, every working day.

11 Mr. Wallach. Did you have any direct contacts with  
12 anyone at the Bureau in the Domestic Intelligence section?

13 Mr. Swenson. I think someone else came over one time. I  
14 don't remember his name, a young fellow who is far lower in  
15 category than Sam. The only times I dealt with other people in  
16 the Bureau were on those occasions when we had to cooperate  
17 in a joint operation such as their transferring an agent to me  
18 who was going to send him back to Cuba, that sort of thing.

19 Mr. Wallach. Prior to the assassination, or immediately  
20 after the assassination, did you ever sit in on any of the  
21 meetings where Bureau persons were present and Cuban policy was  
22 generally discussed?

23 Mr. Swenson. I did not.

24 Senator Schweiker. We came across some documents in the FBI  
25 that as of about 1961, that the FBI had surveilled about 200

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1 agents, or 200 potential agents who were with the Fair Play for  
2 Cuba Committee as possible Cuban intelligence personnel.

3 Does this ring a bell with you, and what do you recall about  
4 the information supplied to you by the FBI on the Fair Play for  
5 Cuba?

6 Mr. Swenson. Well, we received a great deal of information,  
7 Senator, from the Bureau about people like this who might be  
8 sympathetic to Cuba. I was not interested in a positive  
9 operation, by function, unless there was a Cuban intelligence  
10 connection, unless there was a way that I could use that to  
11 penetrate the Cuban intelligence service. Other staffs were  
12 interested in it for other purposes, for debriefing them, for  
13 positive intelligence, and anything that could be gleaned, sort  
14 of a vacuum cleaner approach. My approach was strictly --

15 Senator Schweiker. Penetration.

16 Mr. Swenson. Penetration of the Cuban intelligence  
17 service, or protection of our own resources.

18 So I did not get involved in that.

19 Now, had one of those individuals had a meeting with a  
20 known Cuban intelligence officer, then I would have been  
21 concerned and would have become involved.

22 Senator Schweiker. Do you recall after the assassination  
23 the Cuban policy review that was initiated by the Director,  
24 after the Kennedy assassination, a review of the whole Cuban  
25 policy of the CIA?

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1 Mr. Swenson. I have a vague recollection of it, but only  
2 a vague recollection.

3 Senator Schweiker. Do you recall what form it took or  
4 just how it was done?

5 Mr. Swenson. Well, my best recollection was that he wanted  
6 to be sure that no one had been remiss, and he wanted to take  
7 a look at the scope of the operation before, and whether it  
8 should be maintained at the same level and things of this  
9 nature. I was not directly involved. My own staff's function  
10 was clearcut, and up until the time I left, continued in the  
11 same form.

12 Senator Schweiker. Was this done through written report  
13 to the Director, or how was this done?

14 Mr. Swenson. I customarily -- this is a management  
15 procedure in my own staff -- kept track of how we were doing,  
16 what we spent, what we needed, and how effective we were,  
17 and I don't recall any special effort at that time to give  
18 more than I had already done. I think they could have taken  
19 any one of the reports that I submitted, and it would have  
20 presented the situation as of the time.

21 Senator Schweiker. After the review was completed, did  
22 the Director send out an internal directive as to the future  
23 Cuban policy?

24 Mr. Swenson. Senator, I just don't remember. I am sorry.

25 Senator Schweiker. Did you have any specific dealings with

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1 Alpha 66, any recollections of agents?

2 Mr. Swenson. I remember the name, and that is all, Senator.

3 Senator Schweiker. No specific case.

4 Mr. Swenson. I don't recall anything specific. If there  
5 had been somebody who was incidentally a member of that group  
6 who would have had a connection with Cuban intelligence, I  
7 would have looked into it, but I don't remember now.

8 Mr. Epstein. What did you mean by the word remiss, that  
9 part of the reassessment of Cuban policy involved the study of  
10 whether you had been remiss?

11 Mr. Swenson. I think the then Director McCone then wanted  
12 to make sure that nobody had dropped the ball. For example,  
13 he wanted to know what information had gone to the Bureau,  
14 what information the Bureau had sent us, and where it was.

15 Mr. Epstein. You mean with respect to Oswald?

16 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

17 Mr. Epstein. Were any deficiencies found as a result?

18 Mr. Swenson. Not that I know of.

19 Mr. Epstein. Would that be a different kind of review  
20 than a policy review?

21 Mr. Swenson. Oh, yes.

22 Mr. Epstein. Well, I'm splitting it into two categories.  
23 In other words, did we miss something?

24 Mr. Swenson. Well, it would be different. I mean, when  
25 the President is assassinated, every bit of effort which could

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1 be brought to bear was brought to bear, to look for anything  
2 which pertained to it. I drew a blank. I didn't find anything.

3 Mr. Epstein. What I'm asking you is were there two types  
4 of --

5 Mr. Swenson. There were two different things.

6 Mr. Epstein. Two different types of assessment made. One  
7 would be what should this agency's policy or this government's  
8 policy be with respect to Cuba, i.e., what kinds of operations  
9 should we run hereinafter, and two, did we drop the ball in the  
10 past?

11 Mr. Swenson. Well, I would say that this sort of reassess-  
12 ment was probably done, and Des Fitzgerald was probably involved  
13 in it at this time. I don't recall that I made any particular  
14 contribution.

15 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall whether that included any  
16 assessment of the possibility of the AMLASH operation having  
17 been compromised?

18 Mr. Swenson. No, I can't recall anything specific about  
19 it.

20 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask -- I show you a document  
21 dated 23 November 1963, which is a memorandum for the Acting  
22 Deputy Director of Plans from the acting Chief of the SR  
23 Division, which was in Mr. Angleton's staff, and the subject is  
24 the contact of Lee Oswald with a member of Soviet KGB assassina-  
25 tion department. The contents I don't think are of great

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1 bearing to you except for the fact that that document mainly  
2 is a two-page analysis of the possible significance of Oswald's  
3 possible contact with Kostikov and possible Soviet involvement.

4 My question is, given the fact that the Soviet experts in  
5 counterintelligence would do an analysis like this, why was  
6 not SAS counterintelligence doing a similar analysis?

7 Mr. Swenson. I can hardly tell you more than I have on  
8 that subject. I simply had a continual function of looking  
9 at all operations of the Cuban intelligence service. I could  
10 not have done any more than I was doing, so I continued doing  
11 what I -- I never recall seeing this.

12 Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders to first of all  
13 investigate the connection between AMLASH and the Kennedy  
14 assassination?

15 Mr. Swenson. No.

16 Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders to conduct an  
17 investigation into the Kennedy assassination?

18 Mr. Swenson. No.

19 Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders to cooperate  
20 either with Mr. Whitten's investigations or Mr. Angleton's  
21 investigation?

22 Mr. Swenson. No. My cooperation would have been given  
23 had it been asked for.

24 Senator Schweiker. When you interviewed AMWHIP, what  
25 deductions did you draw out of your interview with AMWHIP

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1 about possible linkage between AMLASH and the Kennedy assassi-  
2 nation?

3 Mr. Swenson. I didn't draw any specific conclusions that  
4 I can recall, Senator. I didn't think he was a very impressive  
5 or true to form individual.

6 Senator Schweiker. Did it confirm in any way your fears  
7 that Castro might have had knowledge of AMLASH's operation?

8 Mr. Swenson. No, sir.

9 Senator Schweiker. So you drew no conclusions from your  
10 briefing?

11 Mr. Swenson. Well, this is a long time later, but so  
12 far as I can recall, my conclusions were that he was a person  
13 prone to exaggerate his importance, and that a lot of it was  
14 sort of gossip, and that he was not really what I would have  
15 considered a very effective agent.

16 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the polygraph of AMWHIP?

17 Mr. Swenson. I cannot recall now.

18 Mr. Johnston. Were you aware that the polygraph indicated  
19 deception on questions related to his ties to Cuban intelligence  
20 and AMLASH's ties to Cuban intelligence?

21 Mr. Swenson. I'm really drawing a blank on this now. I  
22 don't know.

23 Mr. Johnston. Were you interviewed in 1967 by an Inspector  
24 General in connection with the report of the Inspector General  
25 office on assassination plots?

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Mr. Swenson. 1967?

Senator Schweiker. For the IG investigation.

Mr. Swenson. No, because I would have been in Europe at that time.

Mr. Johnston. Did they come to Europe to talk to you?

Mr. Swenson. No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you come back to talk to Mr. Earman or anyone in the Inspector General's office about --

Mr. Swenson. No. When I came back from Europe, which was about the time that I had said I intended to leave the Agency, I had a meeting with the IG at the time, with a number of people, who tried to persuade me to stay, and I said I was not interested in staying.

There were no specifics that were raised in those discussions.

Mr. Johnston. You don't recall being interviewed about assassination plots?

Mr. Swenson. Absolutely not.

Mr. Johnston. Were you knowledgeable of the CIA dealings with the Mafia and attempts to assassinate?

Mr. Swenson. Long after the time.

Mr. Johnston. Not at the time?

Mr. Swenson. Long after the time.

Mr. Epstein. How long afterwards?

Mr. Wallach. After the assassination?

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1 Mr. Swenson. Long after that?

2 Mr. Epstein. While you were still in Washington?

3 Mr. Swenson. Probably after I left Washington. I think  
4 I probably might have heard some what you might call scuttlebutt  
5 about it, second or third hand comments about it, but I didn't  
6 have any real specific knowledge about it.

7 Mr. Epstein. How did you come to be consulted on the  
8 AMLASH problem?

9 Mr. Swenson. I don't think it was a matter of my being  
10 consulted. I think it was a matter of my expressing doubts about  
11 the AMLASH operation.

12 Mr. Epstein. How did you learn of it, do you remember  
13 that?

14 Mr. Swenson. Because his name came up -- names would  
15 be run through my shop to see if there was a bearing on  
16 Cuban intelligence operations, and I had debriefed Cuban  
17 intelligence officers, that is, interrogated them in depth and  
18 had extracted as much information as I could, and one of the  
19 persons concerning whom I got information was he.

20 Mr. Epstein. And that information was that he was not  
21 reliable?

22 Mr. Swenson. I felt there was good reason to doubt his  
23 reliability.

24 Mr. Epstein. So you would be preparing a response to the  
25 name check request, is that how you would come to learn of...

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1 they were interested?

2 I'm still not quite clear on how you learned they had  
3 the assassination plot.

4 Mr. Peloquin. Can we go off the record for a second?

5 S Senator Schweiker. Sure.

6 (Discussion off the record.)

7 Mr. Swenson. Mike, trying to answer your question, when  
8 matters were surfaced at staff meetings at which I was present,  
9 I expressed my views and I would do my homework and I would  
10 go back and check any things which came up. Additionally when  
11 I was interrogating intelligence people in the course of  
12 debriefing them as thoroughly as possible, I would disseminate  
13 that information to other people on the staff, and I believe  
14 that the AMLASH, the results of my debriefings on AMLASH and  
15 the purposes for which they intended to use him, I had come  
16 up on both these contacts that I had obtained information  
17 concerning him that was not all favorable, and that at a staff  
18 meeting his name was mentioned.

19 Mr. Johnston. Are memos prepared on these staff meetings?

20 Mr. Swenson. No, they generally were not.

21 Mr. Johnston. You don't have any record of what transpires?

22 Mr. Swenson. No, because generally staff meetings were  
23 held every day, and the cables which came in which were  
24 considered appropriate for discussion were discussed. If there  
25 was anything that you had to note for your purposes, you did

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1 it. But there was no formal --

2 Mr. Wallach. Who decided what cables were to be discussed  
3 or the topic of discussion?

4 Mr. Swenson. Well, I would raise any cables which had  
5 a counterintelligence importance, and which I considered  
6 should be discussed with other people, you know. If we had  
7 staff meetings all day long, we wouldn't get anything done.

8 Mr. Wallach. Was Helms ever present at any of these  
9 staff meetings?

10 Mr. Swenson. No.

11 Mr. Epstein. Did there ever reach a point in time when  
12 you received an indication from debriefing intelligence officer  
13 or in any other way that specifically the AMLASH assassination  
14 plot against Castro had been compromised?

15 Mr. Swenson. No. I can't recall any specific.

16 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall any discussion surrounding  
17 the Castro speech at the Brazilian consulate relating to the  
18 question of whether some CIA operation had been compromised  
19 and that that is what Castro was referring to?

20 Mr. Swenson. I don't recall and I have no specific  
21 recollection of that, no.

22 Mr. Epstein. Following the assassination of President  
23 Kennedy, I think you have testified that there were staff  
24 meetings at which you were present and which the issue of  
25 retaliation was --

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1 Mr. Swenson. I said I had no specific recollection.  
2 But I would assume now that that might have been mentioned.

3 Mr. Epstein. Was there any specific investigative  
4 responsibility or counterintelligence responsibility levied  
5 or divided or assigned at those meetings with respect to  
6 determining whether or not the Cuban government was involved  
7 in the assassination?

8 Mr. Swenson. I can't recall any specific requirement that  
9 was levied on me for example, but it really wasn't necessary.  
10 I mean, it was an obvious thing which I would look for to  
11 see if there was anything. This was part of my ongoing  
12 responsibility, and I never found any relationship.

13 Mr. Epstein. Was an instruction issued to the WAVE  
14 station to determine that issue?

15 Mr. Swenson. Possibly. I have no recollection. Possibly  
16 it was.

17 Mr. Epstein. What I'm getting at here is the question  
18 of whether or not that is a logical issue to arise in debriefings  
19 and a logical issue to be handled by the counterintelligence  
20 people if it comes up in the course of a contact with a source  
21 or an asset as distinguished from specific instructions to  
22 contact all known sources, informants, assets, and operations  
23 to determine any and all information bearing on that issue.

24 Mr. Swenson. I simply cannot recall anything specific on  
25 the subject.

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1 Mr. Epstein. You don't recall that kind of an instruction  
2 being issued.

3 Mr. Swenson. No.

4 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall any discussion or decision  
5 to involve or to run a counterintelligence operation specifically  
6 designed to determine that fact?

7 Mr. Swenson. No.

8 Mr. Epstein. Was it ever considered?

9 Mr. Swenson. I can't recall that any such was considered.  
10 Really, good counterintelligence operations depend on having  
11 something tangible which you can use. So if there was ever  
12 an opportunity for any counterintelligence operation, I would  
13 examine it in the light of the approach which was feasible and  
14 how we could exploit it to the maximum degree. I cannot  
15 recall that there was ever an opportunity to do anything which  
16 would throw light on the Kennedy assassination.

17 Mr. Epstein. With respect to the connection between the  
18 CIA and the underworld figures with respect to the assassination  
19 plot.

20 Mr. Swenson. I know nothing about that at all, strictly  
21 hearsay long after that.

22 Mr. Epstein. I would like your help in understanding why  
23 that kind of an operation would not have been useful, the  
24 knowledge of that kind of an operation and the details of  
25 who was involved in it would not have been useful or relevant.

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1 from a counterintelligence standpoint in order for you in your  
2 general business to determine what sources the Agency had, what  
3 assets they had, and if a person was in a position --

4 Mr. Swenson. I believe it might have been relevant, but  
5 it was never discussed with me, and to the best of my knowledge,  
6 underworld contacts had occurred prior to the Kennedy assassi-  
7 nation and prior to the time that I became chief of Counter-  
8 intelligence.

9 Mr. Epstein. Were you aware of who those contacts were?

10 Mr. Swenson. At the time?

11 Mr. Epstein. Right.

12 Mr. Swenson. No. I read about it in the newspapers.

13 Mr. Epstein. Were you aware at that time that there were  
14 contacts?

15 Mr. Swenson. At that time, no.

16 Senator Schweiker. Have you finished your point, Mike?

17 Mr. Epstein. Yes.

18 Senator Schweiker. Can you just very briefly recall  
19 what relationship did General Lansdale and MONGOOSE have to  
20 your relationship functionally, organically, or structurally?

21 Mr. Swenson. I would say there was none, Senator.

22 Senator Schweiker. None?

23 What he was doing, I have heard different versions of  
24 how it was set up and one version was that at one point he  
25 was overall coordinator, including the CIA component. The

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1 other version I have is that he was really working primarily  
2 with Defense and State and other non-CIA agencies in his  
3 MONGOOSE work.

4 What is your best recollection of that?

5 Mr. Swenson. I had no occasion to meet with him or  
6 participate in any discussion with members of his group, but  
7 Des Fitzgerald certainly knew him and met with him. There was  
8 no, let's say, reporting function by anybody in the Agency that  
9 I knew of to Lansdale.

10 Senator Schweiker. In other words, Des Fitzgerald --

11 Mr. Swenson. Did not report to him.

12 Senator Schweiker. On a regular basis or rather not  
13 a regular basis? In other words, it was sort of a separate  
14 operation from what you recollect?

15 Mr. Swenson. My best recollection --

16 Senator Schweiker. And just coordinated.

17 Mr. Swenson. Yes.

18 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you first of all, was Raul  
19 Roa, Jr. --

20 Mr. Swenson. Was he what?

21 Mr. Johnston. DGI, or was he suspected of being DGI?

22 Mr. Swenson. I was very hazy on that. I was very  
23 interested in Raul Roa, Jr., because possibly he could  
24 provide useful intelligence, but I cannot recall that there  
25 was anything that really indicated he had an intelligence

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1 function.

2 Mr. Johnston. How about Carlos Lachuga, who was Raul  
3 Roa's successor at the United Nations, was he DGI?

4 Mr. Swenson. I think there was suspicion that he was,  
5 but I don't think we had positive information.

6 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall the name of Charles Santos  
7 Bushe, who was one of the founders of the Fair Play for  
8 Cuba Committee?

9 Mr. Swenson. It doesn't ring a bell with me now.

10 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you finally, did Mr. Fitzgerald  
11 have a principal deputy on Cuban matters?

12 Mr. Swenson. Well, you're talking -- you see, Des  
13 Fitzgerald for a time succeeded Bill Harvey as Chief of the  
14 Task Force when it became Special Affairs Staff. Subsequently,  
15 the Special Affairs Staff was reincorporated in the WH  
16 Division. At that time Des Fitzgerald became the Chief of  
17 WH, and John Hart became the Chief of the SAS component. So  
18 SAS became like bigger than any branch, but still responding  
19 to Chief, WH, which it had not before.

20 Mr. Johnston. In November 1963 did he have a principal  
21 deputy?

22 Mr. Swenson. November of '63?

23 I don't think so, no.

24 Senator Schweiker. Does a Cuban intelligence agent by  
25 the name of Ruiz, R-u-i-z ring any bell with you?

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1 Mr. Swenson. Ruiz? Senator, it doesn't ring a bell with  
2 me now. At the time it might have, I don't know. It is a rather  
3 common name, Senator.

4 Senator Schweiker. So you wouldn't know offhand if that  
5 was a particular Cuban in the intelligence organization.

6 Mr. Swenson. I wouldn't know.

7 Senator Schweiker. There's an allegation that he was in  
8 Dealey Plaza that day. I want to make clear it is just an  
9 allegation.

10 Mr. Swenson. I have no recollection.

11 Mr. Wallach. Do you have a recollection of any suspected  
12 Cuban agents being in the Dallas area the day of the assassi-  
13 nation?

14 Mr. Swenson. No.

15 Mr. Wallach. Not that they had anything to do with the  
16 assassination.

17 Mr. Swenson. I do not.

18 Mr. Wallach. Let me go back a second to a line of  
19 questioning that Mr. Epstein was asking before.

20 Do you recall at any of the meetings, the staff meeting  
21 or otherwise, immediately after the assassination, and  
22 shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy, whether  
23 there was any discussion as to A, whether the CIA had  
24 jurisdiction to look into the assassination and to investigate  
25 the assassination, or B, whether it was just the FBI's job

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1 and that the CIA would respond to any requests from the FBI.

2 In all fairness -- well, I'm sorry. Just go ahead and  
3 answer the question.

4 Mr. Swenson. Well, I remember we had a number of  
5 discussions, many of which were informal at the time.

6 (Discussion off the record.)

7 Mr. Swenson. In answer to your question, there were  
8 never discussions as to who does what and so forth, but  
9 let's say it was very clear in my mind as to where, what the  
10 Agency's role was and what the Bureau's role was.

11 Mr. Wallach. What was that?

12 Mr. Swenson. Well, the Bureau was concerned, in my view,  
13 with Domestic Intelligence, and we were supposed to be concerned  
14 with foreign intelligence.

15 Mr. Wallach. We have heard testimony from other high level  
16 CIA officials stating that insofar as they were concerned,  
17 the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy  
18 was an FBI matter.

19 Was that ever told to you or discussed in your presence?

20 Mr. Swenson. I don't think anybody had to tell me, but  
21 I would assume that this was discussed at the time. It was  
22 certainly a matter of interest to me. I saw Sam Papich  
23 daily. I felt sure that it was primarily the Bureau's jurisdic-  
24 tion to investigate within the United States, yes, and  
25 my role would have been to see if there was anything that I

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1 could contribute from the standpoint of Cuban intelligence  
2 connections,,or possible connections.

3 Mr. Wallach. But as your role vis-a-vis your normal  
4 job, and any information you may have picked up, is that  
5 correct?

6 Mr. Swenson. What do you mean by my normal job?

7 Mr. Wallach. Well, let me go back.

8 Did you ever receive, or are you ever aware of anyone  
9 ever receiving in the CIA specific instructions to investigate  
10 the assassination of President Kennedy?

11 Mr. Swenson. That has been asked before, and it has been  
12 answered.

13 Mr. Wallach. Well, I'm asking it insofar as you are  
14 concerned, was it ever issued anywhere?

15 Mr. Swenson. (Nods in the negative.)

16 Mr. Wallach. I take it you are not aware of any  
17 investigation conducted by the CIA.

18 Mr. Swenson. And I don't specifically recall Whitten's  
19 heading the particular group.

20 Senator Schweiker. Or Angleton?

21 Mr. Swenson. Or Angleton. I do recall making sure  
22 that the information which had come to me or passed through  
23 me, that there was nothing which had been left out.

24 Mr. Wallach. Did you tell Papich about AMLASH?

25 Mr. Swenson. I don't think so.

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1 Mr. Wallach. Do you know if Papich knew about AMLASH?

2 Mr. Swenson. I don't know.

3 Mr. Wallach. Is there a reason why you didn't tell him  
4 about AMLASH?

5 Mr. Swenson. I don't think that was the type of informa-  
6 tion which I would have discussed with him.

7 Mr. Wallach. Who might have discussed that type of infor-  
8 mation with him?

9 Mr. Swenson. Des Fitzgerald. Sam's normal contact within  
10 the Cuban task force or SAS was myself, but there were times  
11 when he talked to Des or Des talked to him.

12 Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether or not the Bureau at  
13 any time until recently knew about the AMLASH operation?

14 Mr. Swenson. I don't know. I would doubt it.

15 Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you just one last question, and  
16 I guess we've gone through pretty much your testimony about it  
17 and your concept. Let me restate what I think you have  
18 testified, and that is that at least in your mind, that you  
19 drew a connection, the possibility of a connection between  
20 the AMLASH operation and the assassination of President  
21 Kennedy.

22 Mr. Swenson. I wouldn't put it quite that way. What I  
23 meant to say was that without a specific recollection, that  
24 would tie the two together. My role was to consider all  
25 possibilities, and I think I would have considered that

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1 among others, but I don't recall anything specific relating  
2 or tying the two together.

3 Mr. Johnston. Would you quarrel with individuals who had  
4 the same knowledge you did -- and you have testified that they  
5 did not draw such a connection?

6 Mr. Swenson. That they did not draw a connection?

7 Mr. Johnston. Yes.

8 Mr. Swenson. I couldn't quarrel with them, no.

9 Mr. Johnston. In other words, you think knowledgeable  
10 officials, knowledgeable of both the Kennedy assassination  
11 investigation and of the AMLASH operation --

12 Mr. Swenson. I think it would have been logical for  
13 them to consider that there could be a connection and to  
14 have explored it on their own.

15 Mr. Johnston. But therefore you say it would not seem  
16 logical for them to testify they drew no connection.

17 Mr. Swenson. Well, I'm not saying that.

18 Mr. Peloquin. Let me just say that I think it is a  
19 semantic difficulty there.

20 Mr. Swenson. Plainly speaking, everybody's imagination  
21 is different. My job, I had many, many years in intelligence,  
22 going back to pre-Pearl Harbor, so perhaps I had a devious  
23 mind so I would consider such things. I think that many people  
24 just never considered it.

25 Mr. Johnston. Finally, let me ask you, knowing that CIA

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1 had a special group to investigate the Kennedy assassination,  
2 I ask you how they could have conducted that investigation  
3 thoroughly if, A, they didn't know about the AMLASH operation --

4 Mr. Swenson. I really can't respond because I can't  
5 remember the group or what they did, or I can't recall any  
6 with them about it.

7 Mr. Johnston. As a counterintelligence expert, could you  
8 have conducted an investigation if you did not know about the  
9 AMLASH operation?

10 Mr. Swenson. I think I would have considered it had I  
11 had that role. I didn't have it.

12 Senator Schweiker. I gave you a wrong name there. How  
13 about Raul Diaz, R-a-u-l, D-i-a-z, as a Cuban intelligence  
14 agent.

15 Mr. Swenson. I think he might have been, Senator. The  
16 name sort of stirs a faint recollection.

17 Senator Schweiker. The name was incorrect before. There's  
18 an allegation that he was at Dealey Plaza. If he were there,  
19 pictured somewhere, would you attach much significance to that  
20 or not?

21 Mr. Swenson. I wouldn't know, Senator, without knowing  
22 more about his background. I'd have to see what sort of  
23 relationship he had to Cuban intelligence.

24 Senator Schweiker. Did you ever hear of a Morris  
25 Bishop or Bishop who was acting in some capacity with the

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1 exile group?

2 Mr. Swenson. Morris Bishop?

3 Senator Schweiker. Bishop or just Bishop as a code name  
4 or either the name of a Bishop or Morris Bishop?

5 Mr. Swenson. I don't recall.

6 Senator Schweiker. It doesn't ring any bell at all?

7 Mr. Swenson. (Nods in the negative.)

8 Mr. Epstein. What other assassination plots, if any, were  
9 you aware of against Castro that were being planned by the  
10 CIA other than AMLASH?

11 Mr. Swenson. I think that was the only one that I  
12 personally knew about at the time. I think there might have  
13 been one other. My stand was the same on this generally.

14 Mr. Epstein. Did the other one have the same security  
15 problem involved?

16 Mr. Swenson. I don't recall that it did. Really, I don't  
17 have any keen recollection of anything on this. If there were  
18 something significant that would have emerged, I would tell you  
19 because I would have remembered it.

20 Mr. Epstein. At any of the meetings or discussions that  
21 followed President Kennedy's assassination, was any concern  
22 ever expressed that an investigation of possible Cuban  
23 ties might result in exposing the CIA's plot to assassinate  
24 Castro?

25 Mr. Swenson. Absolutely not. I don't think any friend of

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1 mine would have considered that at all. They wouldn't have  
2 cared.

3 Mr. Epstein. They wouldn't have cared if the CIA's  
4 plots to assassinate Castro were exposed?

5 Mr. Swenson. Not if that had a bearing on the assassination  
6 of the President. I'd say there was no attempt on the part of  
7 any people I knew to cover up anything which would be embarrass-  
8 ing, if that's what you're getting at.

9 Mr. Epstein. Well, my question also relates to your own  
10 operation in investigating possible connections.

11 Would --

12 Mr. Swenson. Had I found a connection, I would have  
13 surfaced it immediately.

14 Mr. Epstein. I understand, but in the decision as to what  
15 leads to set out or what breadth to give to the exploration  
16 of that issue, or what assets to contact, would not an issue  
17 involved in how broad to carry that be involved with the question  
18 of whether it would compromise an ongoing CIA operation?

19 Mr. Swenson. I suppose it would be an element. I try to  
20 consider everything if I'm doing it. But it would not have  
21 deterred me.

22 Mr. Epstein. Were the Agency personnel attached to the  
23 Miami office aware of the security problems involving AMLASH  
24 and the possibility that that Agency plot might have been  
25 compromised?

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1 Mr. Swenson. I can't recall specifically. Insofar as  
2 people located at the WAVE station who had any participation  
3 or connection with it are concerned, I would have seen to  
4 it that they were alerted concerning any misgivings I had.

5 Mr. Epstein. Would that have included every person connected  
6 with WAVE station that was interrogating Cuban intelligence  
7 assets?

8 Mr. Swenson. Well, I wouldn't have gone to talk to  
9 everybody there, but there was a CI staff at the WAVE station  
10 which reported to the then Chief of Station at WAVE, and in  
11 a dotted line function reported to me, and I certainly looked  
12 at everything that they were doing, and when I had misgivings  
13 I would go there and express them.

14 Mr. Epstein. Do you remember discussing the possibility  
15 of the insecurity of AMLASH being the subject of discussion  
16 between you and the Chief of the WAVE station?

17 Mr. Swenson. I have no specific recollection.

18 Mr. Epstein. Did you have any contact with the Warren  
19 Commission?

20 Mr. Swenson. None.

21 Mr. Epstein. Do you recall who did?

22 Mr. Swenson. I do not.

23 Mr. Epstein. Was any requirement ever levied on you  
24 for information bearing on the assassination to be supplied to  
25 the Warren Commission?

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1 Mr. Swenson. Not that I can recall.

2 Mr. Wallach. Were you ever at any time learn or  
3 pick up knowledge that Castro might possibly have sent teams  
4 of persons into the United States, for sabotage missions or  
5 otherwise, in mid-'63 or late '63 in retaliation for the  
6 sabotage attempts against --

7 Mr. Swenson. Not in retaliation, no.

8 Mr. Wallach. Well, how about just for sabotage here?

9 Mr. Swenson. Well, I think he -- the teams which he  
10 sent in of which I am knowledgeable, were sent for the purpose  
11 of intelligence collection or penetration of anti-Castro groups  
12 within the United States.

13 Mr. Wallach. Were you ever aware, or are you aware that  
14 sometime -- I cannot recall the date, it was '61 or '62.

15 Mr. Epstein. '62.

16 Mr. Wallach. '62. they were run out of New York, which  
17 was later intercepted, caught by the FBI, that there was  
18 an assassination attempt being run by DGI and certain persons  
19 within the United States?

20 Is that a fair question?

21 Mr. Swenson. I think in 1962 we didn't know there was  
22 a DGI.

23 Mr. Wallach. Cuban intelligence.

24 Mr. Swenson. Well, what they used to call Cuban  
25 intelligence which was, you know, our knowledge early on was

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1 quite fragmentary. We learned about the Cuban intelligence  
2 function through the defection of a rather well-placed person  
3 whom I debriefed at great length, and I never got from him  
4 anything which is germane to what we are discussing here.

5 Mr. Johnston. What was his crypt?

6 Mr. Swenson. AMMUG-1.

7 Mr. Wallach. In any event, the FBI did through a well-  
8 known Cuban in New York City, intercede and stop assassination  
9 plots against certain of the anti-Castro leaders.

10 Was that ever called to your attention in '62?

11 Mr. Swenson. I can't recall that.

12 Mr. Epstein. Just one more general --

13 Mr. Swenson. It might have been prior to the time that  
14 I went to the Counterintelligence group.

15 Mr. Wallach. Generally, can you describe for us from  
16 your knowledge, what you know, if anything, about the Mafia  
17 or Mafia-run operations in Cuba in '63?

18 Mr. Swenson. No knowledge.

19 Mr. Wallach. No knowledge?

20 Mr. Swenson. Absolutely none.

21 Mr. Epstein. Was that an issue that was ever considered  
22 by your operation, the possibility, not for assassination  
23 purposes necessarily --

24 Mr. Swenson. I had no knowledge of it at that time, and  
25 I would not have looked on it with great favor anyway.

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Mr. Epstein. You're saying your operation --

Mr. Swenson. I didn't know about it, had no connection with it, and I have no firsthand knowledge.

Mr. Epstein. And it was never considered as a method of counterintelligence activities by your --

Mr. Swenson. Not by me, no, or my staff.

Senator Schweiker. Well, we want to thank you very much.

I think we have pretty well exhausted ourselves. I hope you are not too exhausted, Mr. Swenson. We appreciate your cooperation in coming here this morning.

Mr. Swenson. Very glad to have been here.

(Whereupon, at 11:52 o'clock a.m., the interview in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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