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The Nuited States Bruate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities:

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Washington, D. C.

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CONTENT

TESTIMONY OF

Richard Cotter

PAGE

STAFF INTERVIEW

Wednesday, Mayy5, 1976

United States Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to [Intelligence Activities,

Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 o'clock a.m., in Room 608, the Carroll Arms Hotel.

Staff: Paul Wallach.

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TESTIMONY OF RICHARD COTTER

Mr. Wallach. Would you please state your name and address for the record.

Mr. Cotter. Richard Cotter, C-o-t-t-e-r, 5337 Ravensworth, R-a-v-e-n-s-w-r-t-h, Road, Springfield, Virginia.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Cotter, you have been interviewed before the Committee before, is that correct?

Mr. Cotter. Yes, I have.

Mr. Wallach. At that time were you placed under oath, was a Senator present?

Mr. Cotter. There was no Senator present. I believe I was placed under oath, yes.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, the testimony you give here today will be available for you to review, and I would like to proceed with the understanding that at such time that you review it, that if we desire, that you will swear to the truth of the statements contained therein.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Additionally, as I mentioned to you before, Senator Schweiker cannot be here today because he is tied up in some Committee hearings. Our rules do provide that you are allowed to have a Senator here, and your statement was that you agreed to proceed in his absence, is that correct?

Mr. Cotter. That's correct.

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Mr. Wallach. Additionally, as we advise all witnesses, you do have the right to counsel, and if at any time you want to adjourn and secure counsel, we will do that.

Mr. Cotter. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Wallach. Just very briefly, could you for the record tell us when you first came into the Nationalities Intelligence Division -- or Section. I'm sorry -- within the Domestic Intelligence Division, and from that point on just briefly trace your career with the Bureau.

Mr. Cotter. Okay, I may be a bit fuzzy, but I was assigned to Nationalities Intelligence initially in mid-1953, and I worked continuously thereafter in Nationalities Intelligence until 1970 in various capacities. About 1959 I was named a unit chief in that section, and about 1962 I became the number one man, or assistant section chief under W. R. Wannall, and the in 1965, following a reorganization of the Domestic Intelligence Division, I became a section chief in Nationalities Intelligence, and remained in that capacity until January 1970.

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention now to the period prior to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy -- as I explained to you the major thrust of our questions today wit. go to the assassination and the FBI's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, but calling your attention to the period before that time, I take it that you were, by virtue of your position, familiar with FBI's -- I use the work.

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Cuban operations, although they might be operations in the technical sense. -- were you in the Nationalities Intelligence Section prior to the time that Castro took over?

Mr. Cotter. Yes, I was, briefly:

Mr. Wallach. Were you familiar with the operations that Clark Anderson was running out of Havana?

Mr. Cotter. I was generally familiar with what the Legal Attache, Havana, was doing. I don't know particularly -- you're not referring to any particular operation.

Mr. Wallach. No, I'm not.

Mr. Cotter. No, I was generally aware of his work.

Mr. Wallach. I wantuto be clear. I don't at this point want to get into the operations or sources or anything like that We don't need to get into that.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. It's just generally my understanding that at the time Clark was the Legat down there, that the Bureau had some very good sources within the Batista Government, and what I would like to ask you is from your experience afterwards, when Castro came in, did the Bureau still have sources within the Cuban Government from say the period 1961, 1962 and 1963.

Mr. Cotter. I have no knowledge that we had, within the Cuban Government during that period. Maybe, you know, I don't know offhand when the Legal Attache left.

Mr. Wallach. I think it was in '59 or '60.

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Mr. Cotter. Yes, shortly afterwards. I don't have any information about the Bureau's operations in Cuba after Castrotook over. I seriously doubt that they did.

Mr. Wallach. I am not really asking whether or not they did have a particular high level source, whether a particular person wasna source. What I'd really like to know is was the Bureau gleaning positive intelligence information from Cuba, for example, at the time of the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Cotter. Yes, but from very fringe type sources as a rule, refugees from Cuba, American businessmen and so forth who had contacts in Cuba. A lot of it was unverified, unsubstantiated there wasn't too much real hard, accurate information available to the Bureau.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know Vince Nasca?

Mr. Cotter. Yes, I do, quite well.

Mr. Wallach. Vince is still with the Bureau, and it is my understanding that at that time he evolved on the desk that was working on anti-Castro groups?

Mr. Cotter. Yes, that's true. In the part he's handled both pro-Castro and anti-Castro. I think his principal specially has been anti-Castro in recent years.

Mr. Wallach. Who in your estimation would have been or were the people at the Bureau most knowledgeable in the Cuban area in late 1963?

Mr. Cotter. Certainly Masca. Ray Wannall, the section

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chief who was in Overall charge, the number one man, myself, although to a much lesser degree than Nasca or Wannall, perhaps the head of the Division, who was W. C. Sullivan. If there was something really high level, something of importance going on, Sullivan would have known. And one other possibility would be the foreign liaison people who ---

Mr. Wallach. Dan Brennants?

Mr. Cotter. Dan Brennan's section. Now, at that time I don't think Brennan was a section chief. I don't know for certain, but it might have been his predecessors in that job, people like Graham Day.

You don't happen to know offhand when Brennan served as section chief?

Mr. Wallach. No, I don't, but he was there.

Mr. Cotter. Also there was a foreign liaison unit in addition. Brennan was a section chief, but there was also a unit that supervised the operations of all legal attaches and Nate Ferris was the key man in that. He was a supervisor in charge. Now, offhand I don't remember when he, Ferris, retire is but I think he was still there in '63.

Mr. Wallach. He's fairly old now, isn't he?

Mr. Cotter. He's quite old.

Mr. Wallach. Lat me change the subject for a second,

24 Mr. Cotter.

When is the first time you recall becoming aware of the

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fact that the United States Government, and particularly the CIA, had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Cotter. After Tileft the Bureau, incother words, as a result of press dislosures. In other words, I never received my information from within the Bureau.

Mr. Wallach. So to the best of your recollection, then, at no time while you were in the Bureau --

Mr. Cotter. At no time did I receive any information, director or indirect about an attempted assassination of Castro by any government agency.

Mr. Wallach. Let me just for the record show you a memorandum from Mr. Hoover dated May 10, 1962, and I want to be clear for the record there is no indication you received this. In fact, I doubt that you did.

Mr. Cotter. Okay.

Mr. Wallach. The memorandum deals with many different matters, but the last page, page 6, the latter part of page 6 and page 7 describe a conversation between Mr. Hoover and Attorney General Robert Kennedy in which they talk about an assassination plot. The CIA had hired the Mafia to assassinate Fidel Cattro.

Let me show you the last paragraph of that page.

Are you able to read it?

Mr. Cotter. I think so.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Cotter. There are a few words I can't read.

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Mr. Wallach, Well it & more for your information, to see that that information was available. We do have other memoranda too, that indicates the Bureau was fully aware of what we have termed the Mafia plots, the CIA Mafia plots to assassinate Castro that took place in '61 and '62.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah, that certainly is pretty convincing.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, once again you are clear that you were never told about these plots.

Mr. Cotter. No.

Mr. Wallach. Did you have any direct dealings with anyone in CIA, or was that handled directly through Papich?

Mr. Cotter. 99 percent of it was handled through Papich,
but occasionally we would meet with our CIA counterparts to
discuss matters of interest. I do not offhand recall any meet:
that I had with any CIA people on Cuban affairs. I had a
number of meetings on Chinese matters, I know that.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever meet Desmond Fitzgerald?

Mr. Cotter. On one occasion. I remember meeting him in a big conference they had, but that had nothing to do with the

Mr. Wallach. So then all of your contacts would have been handled through Papich.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Cuban situation.

Mr. Wallach. Similarly, in terms of what I have labele: the CIA Mafia attempts against Castro, we also recently -- the

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Bureau has also recently provided us with documents indicating that certain persons within the Nationalities Intelligence Section, yourself not included, had knowledge of the fact that in '63 or they acquired this knowledge within the Bureau in late '63, early '64 that the CIA was also attempting to use certain Cubans to assassinate Fidel Castro.

pid that ever come to your attention?

Mr. Cotter. I have no recollection of it, no. You know, it's even possible that I may have seen that memo that you just showed me from Mr. Hoover, but it just didn't register that I did see it.

Mr. Wallach. It's also my understanding that parts of the memorandum from Mr. Hoover were distributed because they related to different subject matters. For example, there was discussion between the Attorney General and Mr. Hoover on the Latin American Academy.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah.

Mr. Wallach. Which was excerpted and certain of it was put into files. So you may have seen that.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. But I take it it doesn't ring any bells when you say anything about assassination plots.

Mr. Cotter. No.

Mr. Wallach. You would doubt that you did see that.

Mr. Cotter. Normally when Mr. Hoover writes a memo like

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that, they do distribute it around to any interested section, or division or supervisor, unless there was some reason why they considered it ultra-sensitive and withheld distribution.

Mr. Wallach. Well, that was stamped confidential. Would that have any effect on distribution?

Mr. Cotter. I don't know what effect. I know the Bureau did not normally classify its internal mail at that time, so that would have been a mark that Mr. Hoover considered it ultra-special or ultra-sensitive.

Mr. Wallach. When the assassination of President Kennedy took place on November 22nd -- well, let's take a step backwards first. In the period 1961, '62, '63, do you recall at any time anyone from the Bureau going to any meetings at the Pentagon or going to any meetings in general to get involved in the Cuban operations that the U.S. was conducting against the Castro regime?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't. I do recall -- I can't place the time, unfortunately, but I do recall one occasion where General Lansdale, I believe it was --

Mr. Wallach. Lansdale.

Mr. Cotter. Lansdale. Visited the Bureau and conferred with Mr. Belmont, who at that time was an assistant to the Director.

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember, could that have been 'ed Mr. Cotter. I am sorry, but I just can't place that.

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 might have been '62, it might have been '63. I don't even recall specifically whether it was before the Kennedy assassination at all. I presume so

It washafter Castro had been pretty well entrenched in power for a year or two, and Lansdale came over to see Belmont, and I know at that time I was a Supervisor in charge of what they called the Western Hemisphere Unit, which handled Cuban matters, and Vince Nasca was the supervisor that handled a lot of Cuban, individual Cuban cases. Sterling Donahoe was the section chief, at that time, and at Donahoe's instructions, Nasca and myself accompanied him to Belmont's office to sit in on this conference between Belmont and Lansdale, and to lend whatever support or information Belmont needed.

Mr. Wallach. What took place at that meeting?

Mr. Cotter. There was just a general discussions of what could be done about Castro, that sort of thing, what the Bureau was doing, and what the prospects were for the future, and I don't recall too much specific, but I do recall one thing that occurred that sort of ties in here a little bit in an indirect way. At some point along the line, toward the end of the meeting -- and I think they were just sort of, Belmont and Lansdale were kind of saying their amenities, almost and Belmont made what I knew to be a joking comment about -- Lansdale evidently, I don't know exactly how he was introduced but the people attending the meeting, at least my perception of

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him was that he had been placed in charge of doing something will affect the property of the about Castro, something in ther terms of secret operations and so forth, and Belmont said something jokingly to him about why doesn't he hire, I forget whether he used the term Mafia, or some term about the underworld, and take care of Castro. But he said it with a smile on his face, and I'm sure it was intended strictly as humor. Well, the odd part about it was that Lansdald immediately perked up and took it seriously, and you know, startid asking Belmont, well, you know, do you think this could be arranged and this sort of thing. And Belmont was shocked by the reaction he got, and he immediately, you know, tried to put some distance, tried to make it clear to Lansdale that he was just kidding, and he tried to get off the subject, and they never, Lansdale could never, you know, get him back touserious! talk about it. But I definitely do remember that little incident.

Mr. Wallach. This was at a time when Donahoe was still the section chief, and --

Mr. Cotter. Donahoe was the Section Chief, right, because Wannall was not at this meeting. It was just four of us from the Bureau: Belmont, Donahoe, Masca and myself.

Mr. Wallach. Do you remember if you and Nasca were asked any questions?

I would like to go more particularly into dotails. I realize we are talking about a meeting and conversations that are

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some 14 years ago.

Mr. Cotter. I really don't recall. I'm sure that Nasca and myself had some things to say, and Donahoe, too.

Mr. Wallach. Would you have written a memorandum on the meeting?

Mr. Cotter. It would have been normal procedure. It would be highly unusual not to write a memorandum, although it is possible. I mean, it may have been -- this is one of those things that may have fallen between the desk, because maybe it wasn't clear who was going to write the memorandum. It could have been any one of the four of us. But usually, whenever α mesting like this took place, a memorandum was written for Mr. Moover's information if for nothing else.

Mr. Wallach. You don't remember being instructed not to write a memorandum of this meeting.

Mr. Cotter. No. I think I would remember that, if I was told not to write it. Chances are there was a memo written, at least to tell Mr. Hoover what was going on, and especially Belmont was very careful to observe the rules in that regard.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if Lansdale had requested a meeting, or Belmont had requested it?

Mr. Cotter. I couldn't say for sure. It was my impres.: .! that Lansdale had requested it, and it was just thrickly an assumption on my part, but I gathered that he was touching base with all the intelligence agencies.

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Mr. Wallach. Had you been briefed before the meeting about what Lansdale was involved in, or was that general knowledge in the Bureau to people in this area?

Mr. Cotter. Well, as I say, to the best of my recollection, I cannot specifically recall words, but I'm sure Donahoe probably told Nasca and I that he wanted us to accompany him to Belmont's office, that this General Lansdale was going to be there, that he had been appointed, I believe, by the White House to head up a special projects type thing with regard to Cuba, but that was it It would have been very general, and that we were going along just in case Belmont needed some information about what the Bureau was doing.

Mr. Wallach. All right.

One of the points you said Lansdale wanted to find out was what the Bureau was doing vis-a-vis Cuba.

What was the Bureau doing vis-a-vis Cuba at that time? Mr. Cotter. Well, we were investigating very strenuously with regard to any allegations of individuals or groups who were or alleged to be engaged in pro-Castro activities. The emphasis was always on trying to find Cuban intelligence agents operating in the United States, and there were several cases where we either identified agents or people were very highly suspected of such.

Mr. Wallach. Without going into any names at all, we were told that the Bureau did have a highly placed source within the

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Cuban consulate in New York City at that time.

D Do you recall that?

Mr. Cotter. Yes, there was one old-time there, an old-time source. He had been a source, as I recall, long before Castro took over under Batista. Somehow he managed to maintain his position after Castro took over, at least for a while. He was a career type.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if he was around at the time of the Kennedy assassination, or you really don't recollect?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't recall that.

Mr. Wallach. But was the Bureau doing anything affirmatively vis-a-vis Cuba? I understand they were in counterintelligence or in a counterespionage sense trying to detect agents and try to neutralize them. But were they doing anything operationally or assistingly as to those operations, or were they themselves doing anything against Cuba?

Mr. Cotter. I don't have any knowledge of that, no, no. I would say no, definitely not.

Mr. Wallach. Did Lansdale ask the Bureau to do anythin Did he want the Bureau's assistance?

Mr. Cotter. Not at this meeting he didn't, and I don't have any other knowledge that he did ever ask anything specific He was just, I think, briefed.

Mr. Wallach. Being briefed as to what?

Mr. Cotter. He was searching for ideas on what he might

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consider, as, you know, feasible projects to adopt to get rid of Castro, as it were. I don't know that he used those terms either. That is my own terminology. But they wanted to do something to curb, check, eliminate Castro.

Mr. Wallach. Was this after or before the Bay of Pigs, do you remember? I would thinkiit would be after.

Mr. Cotter. Afterwards you think?

Mr. Wallach. Yes.

Just from my own knowledge of when Lansdale was appointed.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah. Well, it could have been, it could have been, you know, after that proved to be a failure, why maybe they adopted this procedure.

Mr. Wallach. In any event, what was Lansdale briefed upon:
Was he briefed upon Cuban intelligence axtivities within the
United States, or what did the Bureau --

Mr. Cotter. He was told, in other words, roughly what the Bureau had developed in terms of how many Cuban sympathizers, how many pro-Castro type people there were, what groups there were. There were several active groups within the United States where the focus was all concentrated, and I believe he would have been briefed about those people who had been tentatively ident in as intelligence agents, and what -- the general nature of the Bureau's coverage. The Bureau was getting a lot of what we call positive intelligence. They were making every effort to interview people who had just been in Cuba, or who had visited interview people who had just been in Cuba, or who had visited

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24 25 Cuba, or who had relatives and friends. We were getting information out of Cuba in one form or another.

Mr. Wallach. And these are from persons for the most part, refugees in Miami?

Mr. Cotter. Most of them are one shot type things, you know, temporary type informants or sources. Some were more steady than others. I mean, there were a few people who the Bureau got a lot of information from over a long period of time.

Mr. Wallach. Did these people have friends and relatives back in Cuba?

Mr. Cotter. Either that or business contacts.

As I recall, there were one or two people -- I know then: was one woman in New York that gave us a lot of information, most of which was very flaky and at least in my opinion was of very doubtful value. I know that a lot of the sources that were reporting to the Bureau kept portraying the hardships that were going on in Cuba, and they painted a picture in general that Castro couldn't last, that they were running out of oil, they were running out of rubber, they were just -- his regime just would not survive, and that turned out to be false, of course.

Mr. Wallach. Was there any more specific type of intelligence information that was provided in terms of what Castro was actually doing, or what the military was doing and things like that, or was it just general?

Mr. Cotter. Whatever was available, we took and funnelied

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Other interested agencies, CIA, State Department basically, sometimes the military, if it seemed to have a military interest.

Mr. Wallach. Were you ever informed or are you aware of whether or not Lansdale ever met with anyone else?

Mr. Wallach. Yes., on Yes with their

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't know that. You mean in the Bureau

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't know that he ever met with anyone else in the Bureau.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall an occasion on which Sterling Donahoe went out to the Pentagon to meet with Lansdale?

Mr. Cotter. No.

Now that you mention Sterling Donahoe going out to the Pentagon, though, I do recall one occasion where Donahoe went ont to the Pentagon, I'm sure it was the Pentagon, and took me along with him to meet with some people from other agencies, and I believe there was a CIA man there -- I don't recall his name.

Mr. Wallach. Does William Harvey ring a bell, big heck, bulging eyes?

Mr. Cotter. The man I recall was quite short, squat, not particularly big, and he talked up a storm all the time. 22 he talked in very stilted intelligence type language. I resear the that was the big thing that impressed me about the meeting. . : 24 " was all -- I mean, you had to almost interpret what he said. / know.

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Mr. Wallach. Was this meeting, if you recall, before or after the occasion when Lansdale came to meet with Belmont?

Mr. Cotter. I don't recall that either. Probably before. But it had no connection with Lansdale, and I don't recall it having any overtones or any connections, whatever, with any secret or clandestine-type operations or assassination attempts or anything.

Mr. Wallach. We are talking about the meeting at the Pentagon.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah.

Mr. Wallach. Now, were you briefed as to what the purpose of that meeting was, or what was your understanding as to the purpose of that meeting, if you can possibly recall?

Mr. Cotter. You know, over the years you attend so many of these meetings, and they kind of get to be a big blus.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Donahoe has testified that the subject of assassinating Castro was brought up at that meeting.

Mr. Cotter. At a meeting.

Mr. Wallach. At a meeting at the Pentagon.

Mr. Cotter. At which I was present?

Mr. Wallach. He recalled someone else at the Bureau went with him, but he could not recall who else it was.

Mr. Cotter. I did accompany him to this one meeting, maybe it was the same.

Mr. Wallach. You testified you only went to one.

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Mr. Cotter. Well, maybe it is then. Was Harvey the man

Mr. Wallach. He did not recall, but he recalled that Lansdale was at least present for a time.

Mr. Cotter. Well, I am sorry to be so damned indefinite.

I don't recall the subject of assassination ever being mentioned at that meeting.

Mr. Wallach. What was discussed at that meeting?

Mr. Cotter. I can't recall anything other than just generalities about what the different agencies, what their assets were.

Mr. Wallach. In Cuba?

Mr. Cotter. Regarding Cuba.

Mr. Wallach. What agencies were there? You said

Mr. Cotter. I couldn't even identify those clearly. The military -- you might say who in the military.

Mr. Wallach. No, I'm not.

Mr. Cotter. No. There was nobody there from State, as I remember. I think there were just four or five people.

Mr. Wallach. You don't remember the names of anyone.

Mr. Cotter. No, and I don't chink even if you told me their names, that I could recall it.

Mr. Wallach. Would you have prepared, in all likelihood. a memorandum on the meeting?

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I would think so, just based on the way we operated, yes. I don't recall it specifically.

I remember Donahoe and I on the way back talking about this CIA fellow's style of speech. It was so far out in terms of you know, he had his own --

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Donahoe specifically recalled -- and I'm paraphrasing his testimony, and of course, I don't have it here before me, to the effect that the subject of using the Mafia to assassinate -- he didn't say the word assassinate was used -but to get rid of Castro was brought up, and he sort of said how inappropriate this would be, et cetera, et cetera.

You don't recall that?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't recall it, but it certainly was logical. I know the Bureau, that would be the Bureau's reaction. and if it was brought up, I am sure it wasn't brought up by anybody from the Bureau, or it's possible it was brought up. mean, there were so many things mentioned, you know, some halfway in ject and some -- well, not in jest, but sort of -- at any kind of a brainstorming session I'm sure a lot of things were mentioned that -- a hell of a lot of thought has to be given to.

Mr. Wallach. It's Donahoe's recollection that this meeting took place after he had been or become Belmont's number one many the meeting at the Pentagon, and that he thought that he took someone from the section with him.

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Mr. Cotter. I would have been a logical one to take, if not the logical one, either me or Nasca.

Mr. Wallach. Getting back to the other meeting that Lansdale had with Belmont and the others at the FBI offices, do you recal! whether Belmont mentioned any names within the Mafia or organized crime? Did he mention Giancana, Rosselli, or why don't you hire one of those fellows?

Mr. Cotter. No. I would be pretty sure of that because the only mention made of assassination or Mafia or anything like that was this one little occasion I told you that took place toward the end of the meeting, and Belmont, he had sort of -- he was sort of a whimsical character, and I'm sure he intended this just as a joke, and I know that as soon as Lansdale evinced interest, Belmont just scrambled to make it clear that he was only kidding. He didn't, you know, he had no -- and therefore Belmont would never -- I'm sure he didn't bring out any specifics whatsoever.

Mr. Wallach. Aside from those two meetings we discussed Mr. Cotter. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. Were you at any time involved in, prior to the assassination, in any meetings with any persons discussing other than the Bureau's counterespionage activities vis-a-vis-22 ! Cuba, in other words, you are aware that, even if the knowledge ! came later, that the government was running what they called Operation MONGOOSE, the CIA was in paramilitary operations against.

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Cuba. Were you ever involved in any of those type meetings that you recall?

Mr. Cotter. I was never in any meetings. The Bureau would get information from time to time about the CIA. Before the Bay of Pigs took place, for example, we did occasionally get information about the CIA preparations or about the anti-Castro movement, what they were doing, or the fact that they were training in Mexico, I believe, right?

Mr. Wallach. Uh-huh.

Mr. Cotter. And occasionally the Bureau would get some tidbit of information that we think might be of interest to CIA, some rumor of a penetration by Castro, of an activity or something like that.

Mr. Wallach. I think they might have been training in Guatemala.

Mr. Cotter. Guatemala, you're right, yes.

Mr. Wallach. But at that time, to the best of your knowledge --

Mr. Cotter. But I didn't attend any strategy meetings, either in or outside of the Bureau, with regard to paramilitat; operations or anything related.

Mr. Wallach. In 1963 do you know whether or not the Burrell had any sources, and by that I mean informants, assets, whate term you want to use, within the Cuban diplomatic establishes. In Mexico City, the Cuban consulate?

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Do you remember?

Mr. Cotter. I don't recall any. It is possible that if such a source existed, he would have been operated by the Legal Attache in Mexico City. And it's possible he did have one. I doubt it. I never saw any information that showed any inside information coming out of Mexico.

Mr. Wallach. Did the Bureau at that time run operations against the Cubans out of Mexico City?

Mr. Cotter. Run operations, you mean have the Legal Attache directing operations against Cubans?

Mr. Wallach. Right.

Mr. Cotter. I don't know of any.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, something the BAC would do up in New York, for example:.

Mr. Cotter. Something the Legal Attache would organize to get information from the Cubans.

Mr. Wallach. Right.

Mr. Cotter. No, I'm not aware of anything like that.

Mr. Wallach. You were aware that they were getting information from CIA though.

Mr. Cotter. In general, yes. Yeah, the CIA, I know, had. I believe they had -- I may have this wrong -- CIA had certain types of coverage on the Cuban embassy. They may have had photographic coverage, a lookout or something like that, and they possibly had telephone coverage.

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Mr. Wallach. We've gotten into that because that came up in the Oswald case, but do you know whether the Bureau had any coverage itself?

Mr. Cotter. Not to my knowledge. I would say no, based on what I -- I don't know of any.

Mr. Wallach. At the time of the assassination, if you can recollect for us what you recall happening and your involvement at the Bureau --

Mr. Cotter. Yeah. Well, at the time of the assassination, Oswald was identified, of course, immediately, and it turned out that Oswald was the subject of a dual-captioned case. In other words, he was of interest to both the Soviet section, which had the prime investigation of Oswald, Oswald having defected to the Soviet Union, or he was a repatriot, and the Soviet section which was then known as the Espionage Section had a case going on him.

Mr. Wallach. That was Branigan's section?

Mr. Cotter. Branigan's section.

And I believe the case at that time was assigned to Bert Turner.

Mr. Wallach. He was headquarters supervisor.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah. But at the same time, Castro had been involved in -- with the Fair Play for Cuba --

Mr. Wallach. You mean Oswald had been involved.

Mr. Cotter. Excuse me, Oswald had been involved with the

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Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, and therefore the case, a corollary interest held by our section, Nationalities Intelligence, and by our particular supervisor, was Lambert **设设的生命的协会。** Anderson, who was supervising the Cuban aspects of it.

And so some of the mail that would come in under Oswald's 不是你就不够的影響 name would be routed to Nationalities Intelligence whenever there was a possible Cuban interest.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Anderson, Lambert Anderson, fairly familiar with Cuban operations, and I use that term loosely, in general, was he familiar with Cuba, or was he just someone doing the job?

Mr. Cotter. He was fairly new at the time, and young. had only come into the Bureau within the past year, I think, a year or two I think maybe. I wouldn't consider him an expert on Cuba, but he did have this case.

Mr. Wallach. Well, let me ask two questions, then I'll go back to my question as to what happened on the day of the assassination.

Did the Bureau have any high level sources within the Paris Play for Cuba Committee, the FPCC?

Mr. Cotter. I guess the answer to that would be no. Advant the Fair Play for Cuba Committee for a time was assigned to : > when it first got started.

Mr. Wallach. Have you heard the name Vincent Lee? Mr. Cotter. Vincent lce.

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Mr. Wallach. I believe he was the president of it at the time of the assassination, or maybe Theodore Lee. Maybe I'm confused.

Mr. Cotter. Well, the big gun in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, I know when I had it, was abguy by the name of Tabor, Robert Tabor, and there was a fellow named Gibson. Are you familiar with Bigson's name?

Mr. Wallach. Yeah, Gibson left and went over to Europe somewhere.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah. Well, Gibson was a source, or was a strong ted to be operated as a source by the CPA: & know GPA contacted Gibson, and he was sort of a half-baked source

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Mr. Wallach. Do you know whether the Bureau had any high level -- I think your answer was no, they did not have any high level sources.

Mr. Cotter. No, we didn't have any high level sources.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if the CIA did at the time

of the assassination?

Mr. Cotter. Other than Gibson, at don't know of an

no: Gibsong I whink by this time Gibson was pretty suspect

Mr. Wallach. I think that the name of the person I am thinking of is $V.\ T.\ Lee.$

Mr. Cotter. I do remember the two principal authors.

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was Lee.

Vincent T. Lee was in the New York Office. Mr. Wallach. Mr. Cotter: He was one of the chief officers of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. Wallach. I think he was president.

Mr. Cotter. Well, it's possible, but he wasn't a source.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever hear that he was a CIA man?

Mr. Cotter. Uh-tih. It would surprise me if he was.

Mr. Wallach. We have some documentation on what I would call a mild COINTELPRO against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. Cotter. That's true.

As a matter of fact, I remember handling some of the mail on that. The Bureau did try to promote some dissension within the Fair Play for Cuba Committee because both the CP, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Workers Party were strenuously striving to get control of this, and the Bureau was trying to promote this rivalry, and the New York Office, with Bureau headquarters approval, and perhaps even at our direction -- ! wouldn't swear who instigated the idea -- but we did have an 20 anonymous letter prepared directed -- I forget which faction, directed it against the other, but it was an effort to exploit 21 22 this ill-feeling, and I think it centered around in particular some woman named Green, Bertha Green or something like that, who 23 we tried to make something of the fact that she was trying to

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use the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, not for its own best interests, but for the interests of the SWP.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any other COINTELPRO type efforts against the FPCC except that one?

Mr. Cotter. No, that's the only one.

Mr. Wallach. Are you aware that the CIA was running extensive COINTELPRO type operations against the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

Mr. Cotter. No. It doesn't surprise me, but I didn't know of any.

Mr. Wallach. Turning back, now, to --

Mr. Cotter. The Fair Play for Cuba Committee, I might add.

did come upon -- I mean, there was a lot of ill-feeling among
the top leaders, and it did become ineffective because of
leadership rivalries, and I know the Bureau, whether rightly
or wrongly, we always felt we had something to do with this
by this little COINTELPRO effort.

Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this. Going to the visit that Oswald made to Mexico City.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Where he was in contact with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic establishments.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. When there was a correspondence from the CIA, I guess, from the Legat which indicated that Oswald was

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in contact with these establishments, and that he in fact, in the Soviet establishment had been in contact with someone named Kostikov, does that mean anything to you?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't remember any names. The only thing I recall about that is there were a couple of pieces of mail, I recall only one specifically, which came across my desk when I was number one man. It was one of these things that was captioned Oswald ISR and maybe IRS-Cuba, and it mentioned the fact that Oswald had been in Mexico City and had been in touch with the Soviet and Cuban embassies, and it was being routed to Nationalities Intelligence because of the Cuban contact, and I just remember seeing that piece of mail. It was only a few days before the assassination. That's why it registered with me.

Mr. Wallach. Did the DOI at that time have an assassination capability in the United States?

Mr. Cotter. You're talking about Cuban intelligence?
Mr. Wallach. Yeah.

Mr. Cotter. It would be strictly speculative. I mean, we didn't have any hard information.

Mr. Wallach. I think we were told at a briefing that there was one operation -- I don't know the date. It may have been in the early '60s, at least no earlier than '62, later, where the DGI was running out of New York assassination attempts against some of the Anti-Castro leaders.

Do you have any recollection of that?

Mr. Cotter. No. I don't recall any, you know, specific cases that the Bureau got involved in where we were exploring that particular type thing. I mean, we were generally aware, you know, just in terms of potential, but I don't recall any particular cases or information regarding Cuba, and efforts to assassinate in the United States.

Mr. Wallach. All right, turning to the time of the assassination, do you recall what was your involvement in any investigation, what do you remember observing, whether there were meetings or anything like that going on?

Mr. Cotter. Meetings, you're talking about within the Bureau?

Mr. Wallach. To decide what investigative techniques -I'm sorry, to decide on what investigative strategy would be use:
in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Cotter. I did not attend any policy meetings within the Bureau on that type of thing.

Mr. Wallach. Were you ever asked --

Mr. Cotter. The only thing I may have done, and I'm sure everybody in the Domestic Intelligence in one part or another got involved in this case helping out, doing name checks or something, or helping with memos, and I am sure that along the way I probably -- I do remember helping Stokes and Lenihan handle certain projects, mostly file reviews, but I

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certainly, I know I wasn't present at any meetings that would have been held; that would have been focused in the Espionage Section.

Mr. Wallach. Were there ever any meetings that you recall where there were discussions as to whether or not the Cubans had been involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Cotter. No. 'I don't recall at all. I would say no.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know if that possibility was investigated?

Mr. Cotter. Well, I can't even say that for sure, no, I can't.

Mr. Wallach. We have here an article that was picked up by the New Orleans Times-Picayune on September 9, 1963, which I think has recently been in the press again. I will reader portioned it to you. It says "Prime Minister Fidel Castro turned up today at a reception at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana and submitted to an impromptu interview by Associated Press: Correspondent Daniel Arthur."

Now, we have been told by CIA experts that Castro giving an interview at that time was somewhat unusual.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. Cotter. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. And it was also unusual that he would go : a reception at the Brazilian embassy.

Mr. Cotter. What's the date here?

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Mr. Wallach! September 9, 1963

Mr. Cotter. Uh-huh.

Mr. Wallach. And the first paragraph of the article says, "Prime Minister Castro said Saturday night U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba." Then it goes on from there.

Do you recall ever seeing that article or hearing that statement from Castro?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't. In retrospect that certainly looks like a pointed signal, doesn't it.

Mr. Wallach. It does, and for reasons of the Brazilian Embassy, does take on significance because some of the Brazilian contacts were being made.

Was anything brought to your attention that any attempts were being made on Castro at that time?

Mr. Cotter. No.

Mr. Wallach. You see, what I'm trying to do is make a distinction between the blustery statements that Castro was making generally about how everybody was trying to get rid of him, and a specific threat against the President, and he continues on in saying "We are prepared to fight them and annove. in kind. United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they thomas by will not be safe."

Now, copies of this -- in fact, a copy of this article, a

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from the New Orleans Times-Picayune, but the same statements were sent up by Clark Anderson I think on the 27th or 28th of November, and he thought there was something to them.

Do you recall any of this ever being brought to your attention?

Mr. Cotter. No. I don't:

Mr. Wallach. Doyou recall at any time ever seeing any memorandums or instructions that Cuban sources be contacted to see if there was any Cuban involvement in the assassination of Prosident Kennedy?

Mr. Cotter. Well, that's what I was running through my mind when you read that article. If it had come to our attention, if it had any -- you know, if this article had been routed to us, that would have been a typical reaction by headquarters, to instruct the key field offices handling Cuban matters to alert their sources and be aware, you know, be particularly aware of anything that might indicate an assassination attempt, but there was no such communication, to my knowledge, ever sent out from headquarters.

Mr. Wallach. If they were sent out, in all likelihood year, probably would have known about it?

Mr. Cotter. Yes, I think I would have. It's -- that would have been a normal way of handling this kind of thing.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know who reached a decision as to the investigation that would be conducted because from the documents.

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ever pressed the button at the Bureau saying we've got to investigate the possibility of whether Cube, or there was Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Do you know who made the decision really not to push that button?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't.

Mr. Wallach. Would you agree that the button really wasn't pushed?

Mr. Cotter. Well, yeah. In retrospect, I -- there was very little emphasis on that from what I saw on the investigating possible Cuban involvement.

MR. Wallach. What was the emphasis on?

Mr. Cotter. Well, you'd have to talk to the fellows that were running the case, but, I mean, the emphasis was highly diverted. They were investigating painstakingly every damned angle they could think of, but this particular phase, I don't recall any great stress being placed on it, or any stress at all, actually.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know why?

I mean, here we have a situation where the documents rafter: that senior Bureau officials were aware of CIA attempts against Castro, and a specific Castro threat back, and there was some other additional information.

Mr. Cotter. Well, it looks like two and two today, but

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apparently it didn't look like two and two then. They just didn't put it together, or I am not aware of it if they did.

Mr. Wallach. You're not aware one way or another if they did put it together and made a decision not to follow it up?

Mr. Cotter. Yes, that's true, or maybe they did follow it up.

But whatever, it did not come to my attention.

Mr. Wallach. I showed you before a copy of a cablegram dated 11/25/63 to the Director from Legat, Mexico City. It is No. 182 and 183. The paragraph on the fourth page, the bottom paragraph, says, "Ambassador here feels Soviets much too sophisticated to participated in direction of assassination of President by subject, but thinks Cubans stupid enough to have participated in such direction, even to extent of hiring subject. If this be the case, it would appear likely that contract would have been made with subject in U.S. and purpose of his trip to Mexico was to set up a getaway route. Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in U.S. in effort to confirm or refute this theory." And then as I showed you this document before, there is a line drawn to that portic. of the document which says, "give consideration to polling all Cuban sources," and then I think you said it was your handwriting: "Not desirable. Would serve to promote rumors."

I wonder if you recall anything about that.

Mr. Cotter. I don't recall it now, but that is definitely

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my handwriting, yes

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I don't recall making that comment or reading this particular communication, but it is my handwriting.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall ever being told that on the day of the assassination a Cubana airliner with no passengers aboard waited five hours in Mexico City and flew to Havana?

Mr. Cottor. Come again. I missed that.

Mr. Wallach. Were you ever made aware of any unusual Cuban airlines activity following the assassination of President Kennedy from Mexico City to Havana?

Mr. Cotter. No.

Mr. Wallach. Were you ever aware that one known Cuban traveled from Tampa at the time the President was there, and then ended up in Mexico City, and was the only passenger on a Cubana Airlines flight from Mexico City to Cuba some two or three days after the assassination?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't have any recall on that either. Mr. Hallach. Were you ever informed of any conversations or any intelligence information that the CIA picked up from its intercepts in Mexico City that seemed unusual about the Cuban embassy or Cuban consulate there?

Mr. Cotter. If I had, it has slipped my memory. I don't recall it now.

There was a vast amount of mail coming in from a lot of different sources, and you know, it is possible something was

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included, but I don't recall it today.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall that there was a point in time when there was a Nicaraguan who was alleging that Oswald had received \$6500 in cash at the Cuban embassy?

I'll show youa memo here -- I don't think there's any indication that it went to you.

Mr. Cotter. I do not recall this, no.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any discussions --

Mr. Cotter. Incidentally, on reviewing this cablegram from Mexico that you just showed me where I made this written comment about not desirable to poll all Cuban sources in the U.S., I have just been thinking about it. I think I would made the same decision today. In other words, based on my knowledge. of what was available to the Bureau in terms of sources in the U.S. and so forth, I don't think it would have been wise to just go out on a shotgun type approach and approach 100 different people, or 50 or whatever it might be, to ask them for information which they would not have been in a position to hard. In other words, you know, the Bureau just didn't -- if we have one or two real highly placed sources who might have been privy to this type of sensitive information, I think it would have been a good idea, but the Bureau didn't have those kinds of sources in the U.S.

Mr. Wallach. Well, to the extent of your knowledge, it didn't.

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Mr. Cotter. That's true

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Mr. Wallach. But at least in the assassination attempts we documented, they had people close enough to Castro tokkill him.

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Mr.Cotter. The Bureau did, you say?

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Mr. Wallach. No, but the Bureau was aware that there were persons in the United States, be it Mafia figures or

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whomever, that had high enough level ties.

Mr. Cotter. Well, this suggests all Cuban sources.

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means all FBI sources.

were polled?

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Mr. Wallach. Well, do you know if any Cuban sources

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Mr. Cotter. No.

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Mr. Wallach. Do you know why?

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Mr. Cotter. When you say -- you mean FBI assets, informatis.

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sources of information, whatever we might have had?

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Mr. Wallach. Right.

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Mr. Cotter. No, Iddon't know that anybody was ever polled on the theory that the Cuban embassy in Mexico might have directed or been involved in the assassination.

Mr. Wallach. Well, not specifically whether there was any Cuban involvement in the assassination.

Mr. Cotter. I don't recall. It's possible that was done, but I don't recall it being done.

I think it is likely that was done, as a matter of fact,

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but I don't recall the details

Mr. Wallach. I showed you this cablegram before which I read to you that portion of it which says the ambassador here feels Soviets much to sophisticated to participate in direction of assassination of President, by subject, but thinks Cubans stupid enough to have participated in such direction, even to extent of hiring subject.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah.

Mr. Wallach. All right, now, just taking that for a second, do you recall any discussions within the Bureau as to who was directing the investigation in Mexico City? Was it the Bureau's responsibility or was it CIA's responsibility, or State Department's, or whose?

Mr. Cotter. I don't think I should really comment on that because this would have been something worked out in Branigan's section, or at the Division level. It would not have had anything to do -- I would not have been involved in any such discussions or decisions.

so I don't know. I presume the Bureaudid have an agreement: with CIA as to what portions we would handle and what portions we wouldn't. But I don't know how that agreement transpired.

Mr. Wallach. Would any investigation in Mexico City of any possible Cuban involvement have been run out of your section?

Mr. Cotter. If the Bureau was involved in exploring a

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Cuban involvement in the assassination, it would have almost certainly been run out of our section, yes.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know of any such investigation?
Mr. Cotter. No, no I don't.

Mr. Wallach. Did you have any contact at all, or did you respond to any requests at all from the Warren Commission? Do you recall working on any of their requests? I'm not asking you specifically which one.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah.

I think I probably did, but I don't recall particularly. I know I had some matters about the Warren Commission came uplong after the assassination. I remember just within the last year, a year or two prior to the time I retired from the FBI, the matter came up involving the Warren Commission which I handled, it was sort of a review of Bureau files mostly.

Mr. Wallach. What was that matter?

Mr. Cotter. This was a -- let me recall now, particular, what -- it had to do with a rumor that Oswald had been a bure informant, one the reason I got involved was because somebee wanted to declassify that portion of the Warren Consission had rage. It has been classified top secret, and the question had arisen by somebody -- offhand I really don't recall who -- as to whether it could be declassified and released, and I was at that time the Bureau's classification officer, so they sent it to me to handle. So I do remember reviewing the files

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to see what documents were involved, and so forth, and as I recall, we decided to declassify it. It was a rumor that had originated with some newspaperman in Texas, and it had been relayed through the Attorney General of Texas, as I recall, of fellow by the name of Wagner.

Mr. Wallach. Wagner Carr.

Mr.Cotter. Wagner Carr, yeah.

Mr. Wallach. That was, I think, in early '64.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah, but at the time I reviewed it, this was:like '74.

Mr. Wallach. Did you at any time, prior to the public disclosure, have any knowledge that Oswald had left a note at the Dallas field office of the FBI before the assassination.

Mr. Cotter. No. The first I learned about that was $\ensuremath{\text{i.i.}}$ the newspapers.

Mr. Wallach. Where was Stokes? Is it John Stokes?

Mr. Cotter. John Stokes.

Mr. Wallach. What was his position back in '63?

Mr. Cotter. He was a supervisor in the espionage section, one of the better ones, more experienced ones.

Mr. Wallach. Which area did he handle?

Mr. Cotter. I don't know specifically. I know he hundled Soviet cases.

Mr. Wallach. Soviet cases?

Mr. Cotter. No, one phase. No, they broke them down, pos-

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know, one fellow would handle repatriots, and somebody else would handle immigrants, and somebody slse would handle embassy or U.N. mission and so forth. Stokes may not have been assigned this type of case originally, but he may have been put on it because he was considered a top notch agent.

(Pause)

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall generally any discussions within the Bureau about the Warren Commission and how it was perceived?

I might state for the record that Mr. Hoover's handwritten comments make it fairly clear that he viewed the Warren Commission as an adversary, and he didn't like the idea of anyone --

Mr. Cotter. Well, you see, that's a question. have any official information. I can't give you any hard information. This type of thing would have been talked about amongst supervisors and officials of our division. I am sure that I engaged, you know, that I either took part in or listened to conversations on the subject. I was generally aware of the fact that Mr. Hoover regarded them with a great deal of wariness and skepticism, and it was my general impression. based on what I saw and heard, that he wanted to treat them a arm's length and very officially, you know, and not get too chummy, as it were.

But I don't know of any particular disputes. The Bureau'.

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relations with several agencies were in the same category, you know, in other words, our relations with the CIA were sort of in that category. They were -- at least at Mr. Hoover's level. He treated them with reservations, let's say. He was very leary that the Bureau's interest would be damaged and so forth.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at some point after the assass nation Mr. Hoover or the Bureau stated that Oswald was the assassin and that he acted alone?

Mr. Cotter. How the Bureau did that, or when they did that?

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall that happening?

Mr. Cotter. I don't recall any particulars, no.

Mr. Wallach. Have you ever heard the phrase "don't embarrious the Bureau"?

Mr. Cotter. Oh, yes, yes. It's halfway a joke.

Mr. Wallach. Well, in a lot of these memoranda, Mr. Hoover refers to the actions of the agents involving the Oswald matter as having embarrassed the Bureau, saying that if they had been more diligent, etc., they would have been able to prevent that.

Mr. Cotter. It was an underlying theme in your Bureau career that anything that embarrassed the Bureau you were approximately highly disciplined on because of Mr. Hoover's attitude.

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Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you a question, and I don't want you to speculate, but if you are aware of any similar circumstances, or have been told about certain statements made by Mr. Hoover that later had to be supported by official research, etc., and the Bureau, for example — that one time, for example heccame up to the Hill and said the cost of crime was \$11 million or \$22 million, and that had to be documented. But in any event, what I'm trying to get at is the FBI had a security case on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assausination.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. And had interviewed him on at least two occasions.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah.

Mr. Wallach. And had other information on him.

Now, was there any discussion that you are aware of as to whether or not the Bureau would be blamed for the assassimition of President Kennedy, or B, if the investigation turned up other information on Oswald that the Bureau itself had not uncovered about any contacts that he may have had with the Soviets or with the Cubans, that this would put the Bureau a fairly bad light?

Do you recall any discussions?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't recall anything along that l...
No. I don't recall anything by either the people in the
Intelligence Division or otherwise, where any great amount.

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thought was given, or discussion regarding the Bureau's culpability in the thing. I mean, I know there was a big discussion and an inspection which took place, and some people got censured, and burned.

Mr. Wallach. That was Gale's inspection?

Mr. Cotter. Yeah, because of the fact that in retrospect they were deemed not to have acted properly or thoroughly enough, and there was a lot of discussion about whether they were really guilty of anything remiss. I know that throughout the Bureau there was some sympathy for the agents who had been, at least many of the agents who were burned because it was felt that -- and I shared this feeling -- that some of them were, or had done what was logical and everything, but they were being punished because of the bad publicity rather than because of any innate deficiency on their part.

For example, there was, I think one of the big things centered around the fact that whether Oswald was on the so-decire security index, a big issue was made about that.

Mr. Wallach. Excuse me for just a second.

(Fause)

Mr. Cotter. I think one of the central things that Gale was looking into when he was ordered to review this thing, to fix responsibility and whathot, was whether Gawes was on the Security Index or why he had not been recomments. To the Security Index. And again, you are familiar with

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that was. It was a list of people who would be considered dangerous in times of an emergency.

Mr. Wallach. I understand, but it is also my understanding also that under the dissemination procedures at that time, that that would not have resulted in dissemination to the Secret Service.

Let me -- I have not myself recently looked at these documents, Mr.Cotter, so let me take a look at them with you, and I want you to understand that most of the things we have talked about here today are still classified in one form or another, and I hope you will treat them as such.

Mr. Cotter. I certainly will.

Mry Wallach. This involves an individual named Gilberto Lopez Rodriguez, and I will ask you to take a look at that document.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Cotter. Okay.

Mr. Wallach. Now I will ask you to see this memorandum.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Cotter. Uh-huh.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time that name coming to your attention, or the fact that he had been the only passenger on the plane?

Mr. Cotter. I do not recall it, no.

Mr. Wallach. Where is John Stokes now, do you know?

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Mr. Cotter. I don't know that either, no.

I think he retired in the late tos and the last I heard of him he had not -- this is several years after he had retired him. He was fully retired. In other words, he never went back to work.

Mr. Wallach. Right.

Mr. Cotter. It certainly is interesting, isn't it.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall -- we do have some other documents that I'm not going to show them to you, where in essence the Bureau found out some very strange things about him and then said, well, there's nothing we can do about it because he is in Cuba.

Mr. Cotter. ABout Lopex?

Mr. Wallach. Yes. And the intelligence information they received from CIA was that he was playing dominoes in Cuba, which seems fairly strange under the Castro regime, you will admit.

Mr. Cotter. Well, didn't the Bureau conduct inquiries in the U.S. about his background and who he was?

Nr. Wallach. Yes, and they found out that he had come over from Cuba, I think recently before, a couple of years before, a year or so before the assassination, was involved a certain FPCC activities in the Tampa enapter, was allegedly awaiting -- and again I'm going on my memory of these doors of about a month or so ago -- waiting for a phone call from

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Cuba from one of his relatives, and he was going to go back to Cuba, and this phone call was coming at about the time the President himself was visiting the Tampa region, and then going down to Miami to address the Cuban refugees down there, and he went over to Dallas, and subsequently he did receive a phone call, and even though he was penniless, he managed to end up in Mexico City, and was the only passenger on a Cubana airlines flight, an unscheduled flight from Mexico City to Cuba.

Mr. Cotter. Well, that has all the earmarks of being highly -- what -- do you happen to know who in the Bureau conducted these inquiries?

Mr. Wallach. Stokes, I think, was the special supervisor.
I quess. Yeah.

Mr. Cotter. I forget, was that captioned IS, Cuba? or ISR?

Mr. Wallach. IS, Cuba.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah. A copy went to Wannall I noticed.

Mr. Wallach. I realize again this is hindsight, but for example, the records don't show that Marina Oswald was ever snown a picture of Lopez, which the Bureau has, or even askel if she'd ever seen the guy before.

Mr. Cotter. Well, from what you've shown me, it looks like it deserved a lot of investigation.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever talk to Sullivant or anyone else from the Domestic Intelligence Division about why they has

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decided on the investigative strategy they decided on?

Mr. Cotter. No. As I say, I wasn't involved in that phase of it.

Mr. Wallach. I'll read you the portion of the report. This is from one of the people that was interviewed.

There was talk about Lopez having been at his residence sometime waiting for a telephone call from Cuba which was very important. It was understood it was all dependent upon his getting the "go ahead order" for him to leave the United States. He indicated he had been refused travel back to his native Cuba before, and it also goes on into the fact that he was totally penniless, in fact, he owed people money. So it is neither here nor there if you don't remember his name.

Mr. Cotter. No.

Mr. Wallach. One other, do you recall anytime after the Warren Commission ended its inquiry that there were any reviews of the FBI's investigation of the assassination, general reviews.

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't have any information along that line.

Mr. Wallach. 'You are aware that the case was kept open.

Mr. Cotter. I am sure it was. It is probably still open today, isn't it?

Mr. Wallach. Where were you or what was your position in February of 1967?

Mr. Cotter: 67, I was section chief of Nationalities
Intelligence, which had Cuban matters.

Mr. Wallach. I'm going to give you a brief factual history of an event that transpired in 1967, and then show you one or two documents that related to it.

In February 1967 it was called to the Bureau's attention that -- well, I'll give you'the exact factual history -- Drew Pearson talked with a lawyer named Edward Pierpoint Morgan, whose name you may have heard of.

Mr. Cotter. I've heard of him.

Mr. Wallach. He was a former agent at one time, I believed in the late *40s.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. And Pearson went to the Chief Justice Warred and told him that Morgan had a client, and I am quoting now from a letter from Rowley, who was head of the SecretaService, to Mr. Hoover, dated February 13, 1967, who was in the underworld. and according to him, that Bobby Kennedy had organized a grout that went to Cuba to kill Castro, that all were killed or imprisoned except one person who escaped, and subsequently Castro decided to utilize the same procedure to kill Preprov
Kennedy, and that he hired Oswald to do the job.

In any event, what happened after that was that the confustice advised Pearson to have Morgan go see the Bureau, a Morgan said he couldn't because he wasn't on good terms with

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the Director. In fact, I believe, he was on the no-contact list. He went to see Rowley. Rowley never met with Morgan, for reasons that I still can't myself understand, and then by letter dated February 13, 1967, sent this letter to the Bureau.

Some two days later, a letter went back to Rowley from the Bureau stating thank you for your letter, and then "In connection with the allegation that a Castro conspiracy was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy, our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro or officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy."

And it goes on and says, "The Bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter."

Let me show you this letter dated February 15, '67.

Mr. Cotter. Okay.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Cotter. All right.

Mr. Wallach. Was this allegation ever discussed with you?

Ar. Cotter. No.

Ar. Wallach. In '672

Mr. Cotter. No.

Mr. Wallach. Were you ever asked whether or not the base that conducted an extensive investigation? I realize that the

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it into Oswald, and see that there were no Oswald Cuban connections, but were you ever asked whether or not the Bureau had conducted an investigation with respect to the possibility of Cuban involvement in the assassination at that time? Do you remember it? Do you remember the subject coming up?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't, suh-uh.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know why that letter would have been handled out of the Criminal or:General Investigative Division and not out of the Intelligence Division?

Mr. Cotter. That I don't know either. As a matter of fact, this is what kind of bothers me. You haven't asked this question but I'm sure you are aware of the fact that the investigation of the whole Oswald case was a dual case. Part of it was conducted by Intelligence Division and part by the, at that time it was known I guess as the Investigative Division.

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Rosen's division.

Mr. Cotter. Mr. Rosen's division, the Criminal Divis.
in effect, and fellows like Shroder and Raupauch, and a fellows names Rogge were the chief supervisors, Dick Rogge, who is not special agent in charge someplace.

Mr. Wallach. I think it is out on the west coast sold Mr. Cottor. I think it is Buffalo. I just read sold yesterday.

Mr. Wallach. I think you're right. I think it is I I

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Mr. Cotter. Anyway, just, I couldn't comment intelligently on what phases were handled by them and what phases, but it was my general impression that they handled the bulk of the investigation. We were conducting those aspects of it that had security angles, contacts with the Soviets and Cubans, etc.

Mr. Wallach. What, to your best recollection, was the investigation that was conducted by the Domestic Intelligence Division?

Mr. Cotter. I really couldn't comment intelligently on that to the extent of that, or what the criteria was or where the boundaries were between us and Division 6.

Mr. Wallach. If you say that the investigation had been divided up --

Mr. Cotter. Yeah.

Mr. Wallach. Between the two, and from my review of the documents, it seems that if anything the Domestic Intelligence Division just sort of merely retraced the information that is had already on Oswald in the security file, to see if there was --

Mr. Cotter. Well, maybe I'm wrong on this, but I think the mail, when it came in initially, went to Division 6. other words, they were the prime ones in charge, and then the base would route to us anything with security ramifications.

Is that true?

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Mr. Wallach. Mr. Sullivan has testified

Mr. Cotter. I mean, there must be memos written on this as to what the lines of jurisdiction are between these two Divisions.

Mr. Wallach. We've asked for them.

Mr. Cotter: That must have been one of the chief areas of discussion involving Sullivan and the Director and all of the people involved.

Mr. Wallach. I think the Bureau has told us they don't have any such memos.

Mr. Cotter. Really?

Mr. Wallach. In any event, I've taken you up to the paranow where we have a letter going back saying the Bureau will not do anything further on the Morgan allegation.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Even though the Oswald case is open.

Mr. Cotter. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Subsequently, at President Johnston's directive -- he found out about Morgan's allegations -- he directed through Deloach that the Bureau interview Edward Pierpoint Morgan. That interview was conducted by agents of the Washington Field Office on March 20, 1967. Again, 13 is conducted through the Investigative Division, not through the Intelligence Division.

Among Other things, Mr. Morgan detailed certain of th.

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plots and then went on to say -- he talked about his clients

who at that time the Bureau knew to be Mafia figures involved

in the CIA assassination plots. These participated in the

project, whom he represents, and that was the project against Castro, developed through feedback information that would identity Fidel Castro's counterassassins in this country who could very well be considered suspects in such a conspiracy, and continuing, he said his clients were aware of the identity of some individuals who came to the United States for this purpose, i.e., assassinating President Kennedy, and he understood that two such individuals were now in the State of New Jersey.

Do you recall that information ever being brought to your attention?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't, no.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know why it would not have been brought to your attention?

Mr. Cotter. Well, it's a little hard to explain. In 1967 I had nothing whatsoever to do with the Oswald investiga tion. In fact, at no point did I have any direct involvement.

Mr. Wallach. But you did have a lot to do with Cuban matters.

Mr. Cotton. I was the section chief of the Unit that was nanaling Cuban investigations, right?

Mr. Wallach. So can you think of any reason why this a

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least wouldn't have been brought to your attention, the fact that a specific allegation was being made, and the other senior Bureau officials knew that Morgans clients were involved in these assassination attempts, and they also had been getting feedback intelligence information from Cuba for --

Mr. Cotter. Well, if whoever read that memo, somebody at some point along the line, somebody must have decided -- this that you were just reading from the Washington Field, a letter or some kind of communication?

Mr. Wallach. Yeah, it was a blind memorandum that was furnished to the White House in response to the Morgan interview.

Mr. Cotter. Well, when that came in from Washington fire somebody had to be responsible for signing off for the file. In other words, whoever signed off for the file took the responsibility that that information had been fully acted on.

Mr. Wallach. Have you ever seen in your years with the Bureau a cover sheet that says eyes only on it?

Mr. Cotter. I know this term, but I don't recall the Bureau ever using it on internal documents, no.

Mr. Wallach. And also stamped secret?

Mr. Cotter. No.

Mr. Wallach. I might say that was only the incoming letter from Mr. Rowley, which gave information that was the available to him from a non-intelligence source.

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Mr. Cotter. Yes.

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Mr. Wallach. In March of 1967 there is a Drew Pearson column which I don't believe appeared in the Washington papers, which talks about a CIA plot to assassinate President Kennedy - I'm sorry, it talks about a CIA plot to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Do you recall that article being brougth to your attention; at all?

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't. Could I see it?

Mr. Wallach. Sure.

(The witness reads the document.)

Mr. Cotter. No, I don't recall it.

Mr. Wallach. I am going to give you these two memorands., the handwriting and the names is my handwriting. The names of the people, those names were originally crossed out on the documents, and the Burdau supplied me with the names, and I want you to just take a look at them and see if they ring a bell with you. They are a memorandum from Wannall to Sullivan dated March 6, '67, and a letter from the procetor, FBI, to the Attorney General dated March 6, 1967.

(fne Witness reads the documents.)

Mr. Cotter. This letter just summarizes what is in the memo, take it?

Mr. Wallach. I believe that's the case.

Mr. Cotter. Yeah. Yea, okay.

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Mr. Wallach. Weave been told that that review took place over a weekend, and that virtually -- a lot of people from the section were called in, an awful lot of people were called in to review the files and do the work.

Do you recall participating in that at all?

Mr. Cotter. Gee whiz, no, I don't, although if it was a sectionwide project as you described -- now, wait a minute. This is Wannall; in 1967 Wannall was -- I am trying to think of what his role was at that time, his title, what he had under him.

Well, okay, I think this changed the whole ballgame here as far as my comments to the previous quencions. Cuban mate were not assigned to me after I became section chief in 1965. They went to Wannall's section. In other words, they split up in 1965 or late '64, whenever it was, shortly following the Dominican crisis, '65 I'm sure it was, about mid-'65, they split what had been the Nationalities Intelligence section is two sections, and one of them became known as the Latin American section, and Wannall, who had been section chief in Mationalities Intelligence took over as the Latin American section Chief and myself, who had been number one man of Nationalities Intelligence, remained as section chief of Mationalities Intelligence.

Now, Cuban matters went to the new section, the Datin
American section, along with anything in the Western Hemingles ,

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and the Nationalities Intelligence Section in effect remained the same section, minus the Latin American stuff, including Cuba. So therefore, like you asked those questions, this whole thing about '67 I would not have seen because I wasn't involved in any way with Cuba at that time.

Mr. Wallach. Who became Wannall's number one man?

Mr. Cotter. George Mohr was his number one man for quite
a while, George C. Mohr, and when Wannall got promoted up,

Mohr took over as section chief.

Mr. Wallach. Was Mohr with you before?

American unit, in the Nationalisies intelligence section of the data to this division of the section in two. In other works, and the time of the assassination, if think hambert and a going back now, mambert Anderson was a poservisor working under George Mohr in that unit, the Latin American unit, and the Latin American unit became sort of the moders of the north and the new merican. They expended it greatly, you know, they approach now and the work with expensis on beautiful out that a section are a section and the modern and the matter and the modern and the expenses that whose effects in the latin observation are a section.

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, have at turther questions.

If there's any statements that you'd like to make on the record, feel free to do so.

3. 4 Mr. Cotter. No, except that it may have seemed that a lot of my answers were quite fuzzy and whatnot. I have cooperate to the best of my ability.

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Mr. Wallach. I think that's true. Thank you very much.

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(Whereupon, at 1:00 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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