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Date : 08/06/95  
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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ORIGINAL  
Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

**The United States Senate**

R1567

**Report of Proceedings**

INVENTORISED  
DATE 5/27/77  
BY EE

**Hearing held before**

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, October 9, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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C O N T E N T S

PAGE

1  
2 TESTIMONY OF  
3 Bronson Tweedy

3

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COMMITTEE MEETING

Thursday, October 9, 1975

United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to  
Governmental Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:00 o'clock  
p.m. in Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church,  
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Mondale, Huddleston,  
Hart of Colorado, Baker, Goldwater, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel;  
Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Frederick  
Baron and Rhett Dawson, Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

The Chairman. Would you please take the oath?

Do you solemnly swear that all the testimony that you will  
give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth,  
and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

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11-10-68 10:00 AM - 10:00 PM

1 TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

2 The Chairman.. Would you please state your name?

3 Mr. Tweedy. Bronson Tweedy.

4 The Chairman. Mr. Baron, are you going to commence the  
5 questioning?

6 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have the  
7 right to counsel?

8 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

9 Mr. Baron. You are appearing voluntarily today without  
10 counsel?

11 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

12 Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have the right  
13 at any point to cease answering questions in order to consult  
14 with counsel?

15 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

16 Mr. Baron. Are you finally aware that all of your Consti-  
17 tutional rights are intact before the Committee, including your  
18 Fifth Amendment rights?

19 Mr. Tweedy. I am.

20 Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, the Committee has been informed that  
21 we have gone over your testimony on the Lumumba case in some  
22 detail in two sessions, one today when you reviewed some docu-  
23 ments that we obtained since your first examination. And I  
24 would like to begin by reading a quotation from your first  
25 examination before you had seen these documents.

TOP SECRET

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1 morning but did not get a chance to get through it. There seems  
2 to be something incomplete with that answer of mine, however,  
3 there is no question in reading the documents that I read this  
4 morning, which I had not seen in the better part of fifteen  
5 years, that a man did go out from Headquarters and was provided  
6 with material which you mentioned and had a discussion along  
7 these lines with the Chief of Station.

8 He did not, however, go out with instructions to the Chief  
9 of Station without further reference to Headquarters to set  
10 about assassinating Lumumba.

11 Mr. Baron. In your answers that we have just reviewed in  
12 your first examination, you indicated that you had no knowledge  
13 of a mission by Dr. Gottlieb to the Congo and that there was  
14 nothing in your experience in the Agency that would really bear  
15 on the question whether such a mission was undertaken or what  
16 the character of it was.

17 Has the review of the documents today refreshed your  
18 recollection to some substantial degree?

19 Mr. Tweedy. What I was certainly trying to say the first  
20 time, and I repeat it, I said I had no recollection of Dr.  
21 Gottlieb going to the Congo, but if the Chief of Station said  
22 he was there, I was perfectly prepared to believe the Chief of  
23 Station.

24 I have now reviewed these documents. I recall the circum-  
25 stances in which these things occurred, and there's no question

TOP SECRET

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1 Mr. Dulles, which implied to me there was policy agreement in  
2 Washington. When I say policy agreement in Washington, I cannot  
3 be more specific because I never knew any more specificity.  
4 However, it was perfectly clear that the Agency felt that it  
5 had some sort of policy consensus in Washington about the need  
6 for the removal of Lumumba. When I say removal, I mean by  
7 whatever means; this does not necessarily have to be confined  
8 to assassination, a political way of doing it, or anything  
9 else.

10 Mr. Baron. It did not exclude assassination?

11 Mr. Tweedy. No, indeed it did not.

12 Mr. Baron. You are referring to the cable of August 26th  
13 from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in the Congo. Had  
14 you seen that cable shortly after it was sent?

15 Mr. Tweedy. I suspect, again I cannot be sure, I suspect  
16 that I saw it when it went out. At this point, I could not  
17 even tell you. On instructions, I might even have drafted it,  
18 this seems odd. I might have done, or had a hand in drafting  
19 it, I do not know. It was basically Mr. Dulles' cable expres-  
20 sing to the Station the type of authority that he had to pass  
21 such a message to the field. I certainly would have seen it  
22 on its way out.

23 Mr. Baron. When you spoke to Mr. Bissell, either in the  
24 first talk or in any subsequent talks --

25 The Chairman. Where is this cable?

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

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1 Mr. Baron. Tab 2 in the Senator's packet.

2 The Chairman. Thank you.

3 Mr. Baron. In your talks with Mr. Bissell, where the  
4 subject of the assassination of Lumumba was raised in any  
5 fashion, did Mr. Bissell move from this general information  
6 to you that the subject had been opened at very high levels  
7 to asking you to proceed to explore means to getting access to  
8 Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?

9 Mr. Tweedy. The purpose of his conversation with me was  
10 to initiate correspondence with the Station for them to explore  
11 with Headquarters the possibility of this, that is assassina-  
12 tion, or indeed any other means of removing Lumumba from power.  
13 In other words, the purpose of the exercise was to tell the  
14 Station what Headquarters had in mind, giving it some idea of  
15 the policy background of it, and then to have the Station  
16 start reviewing possibilities, assets, and discussing them with  
17 Headquarters in detail in the same way that we would with any  
18 operation, whether it was as sensitive as this, or less so.

19 It was, in other words, the initiation of quite normal  
20 operational dialogue between Headquarters and the field, apart  
21 from the fact that it was an unusual subject.

22 Mr. Baron. At some point after the series of conversations  
23 with Richard Bissell, did you have a conversation with Sidney  
24 Gottlieb about a mission that he was to undertake in the  
25 Congo?

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

9

1 Mr. Tweedy. I was certainly reminded of that in this  
2 correspondence, as I think I told you in the first instance.  
3 If Gottlieb went to the Congo, there is no question that I would  
4 have seen him before he went. This traffic makes it perfectly  
5 clear that I did. The actual content of that conversation is  
6 no more clear to me now as is revealed in this cable traffic.  
7 On the other hand, I do think that is the gist of it.

8 Mr. Baron. You are referring to the cable that appears in  
9 Tab 3, a cable of September 19th that you signed and Richard  
10 Bissell signed and dispatched to the Chief of Station in  
11 Leopoldville telling him that Sid from Paris, a man who would  
12 announce himself as Sid from Paris, would be coming soon to  
13 Leopoldville to explain an assignment to the Chief of Station.

14 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

15 The Chairman. Sid from Paris being Dr. Gottlieb?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Baron. As we discussed earlier today, you do have  
18 a recollection of setting up a specially restricted channel of  
19 communication by this cable which would hold all communications  
20 on this operation to the eyes only of the Chief of Station,  
21 is that correct?

22 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. This was done immediately after my  
23 first discussion with Mr. Bissell.

24 Mr. Baron. Do you remember any instance where Mr. Bissell  
25 asked you to speak to Dr. Gottlieb and give him this assignment?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

10

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1 Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. My assumption would be that  
2 he would have had the first conversation with Dr. Gottlieb and  
3 quite routinely have said, now you talk to Mr. Tweedy, Chief of  
4 the Division, before you go out.

5 Mr. Baron. Would you assume in this normal course of  
6 operations in the DDP at that point you would have spoken to  
7 Bissell before you spoke to Gottlieb about this mission?

8 Mr. Tweedy. Inevitably, I think, I think Gottlieb was in  
9 effect sent by Mr. Bissell. He was not sent by me. Mr. Gottlieb  
10 I think Dr. Gottlieb was, at that time, an assistant to Mr.  
11 Bissell. He was not my assistant. I would not have sent him.

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12 Mr. Baron. As best you can recall, what instructions did  
13 you give to Dr. Gottlieb when you met with him?

14 Mr. Tweedy. This is very general, but I think it covers  
15 it: to assist the Chief of Station in his operational planning  
16 for this particular purpose.

17 Mr. Baron. Would that planning have included planning for  
18 the assassination of Lumumba?

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19 Mr. Tweedy. Specifically, I do not think Dr. Gottlieb  
20 would have been there to discuss Constitutional means of over-  
21 throw of Lumumba. He was there for one purpose only. He was  
22 a technician. He had this material with him. He was thus  
23 to act, as I think, a technical advisor on these matters to  
24 the Chief of Station. I do not think he was to be there as a  
25 general operational advisor. That was not within his competence.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

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1 his training, or anything else. It would not have been his  
2 assignment.

3 Mr. Baron. What did you tell Dr. Gottlieb about the source  
4 of authority for this mission?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure I told him anything. I assumed  
6 that came through Mr. Bissell.

7 Mr. Baron. I will represent to you, as I did earlier today,  
8 that Dr. Gottlieb testified that in his conversation with you  
9 you indicated to him that you were giving him this mission on  
10 the authority of Richard Bissell.

11 Would that be consistent with the way you operated at that  
12 time?

13 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. The only thing that is wrong there is  
14 the use of the verb -- I was not sending him to the Congo. He  
15 routinely checked, probably on Mr. Bissell's instructions, with  
16 me, Chief of the Africa Division. He had already been given  
17 his marching orders to go to the Congo by Mr. Bissell, not by  
18 me.

19 Mr. Baron. You would assume that Dr. Gottlieb had a  
20 separate conversation with Richard Bissell, where Richard Bissell  
21 told him, it is time for you to go to the Congo and deliver a  
22 lethal material and a certain set of instructions to the Chief  
23 of Station.

24 Mr. Tweedy. I cannot assume what was said in such a  
25 conversation, but that Dr. Gottlieb talked to Mr. Bissell before

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

12

1 he went to the Congo is without question. I do not know what  
2 was said. I assume the general outlines of the purposes of  
3 him going to the Congo were discussed, and I would be discussing  
4 them with him in greater detail.

5 Mr. Baron. Turning to Tab 6 of the Senator's books, I'm  
6 referring to a cable we reviewed this morning issued on  
7 September 27th by the Chief of Station and sent to you, Eyes .  
8 Only, at the CIA Headquarters where the Chief of Station indi-  
9 cates that he contacted Gottlieb on the 26th of September and  
10 they were on the same wavelength.

11 Mr. Tweedy. Which one is this?

12 Mr. Baron. This should be marked number 6.

13 Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, excuse me.

14 Mr. Baron. It begins, "Iden Ref contacted 26 September."  
15 In this cable, the Chief of Station indicates that he had had  
16 two talks with Dr. Gottlieb. He and Dr. Gottlieb had been  
17 considering a list of possibilities as follows.

18 In paragraph 3 at the bottom of the next page, the Chief  
19 of Station says, "Plan proceed on basis priority as listed  
20 above unless instructed to contrary."

21 And paragraph A on the first page was Chief of Station's  
22 top priority plan which related to recalling a certain agent  
23 from Stanleyville and having him take refuge with Big Brother.  
24 The cable continues, "would thus act as inside man to brush up  
25 details to razor edge."

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET

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1 Having reviewed this cable early this morning, is it your  
2 understanding, Mr. Tweedy, that Big Brother refers to Lumumba?

3 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I do.

4 Mr. Baron. That this was a report from the Chief of  
5 Station to yourself informing you that the top priority plan would  
6 be to recall an agent from Stanleyville and ask that agent to  
7 infiltrate the entourage of Lumumba where he could assess the  
8 possibility for poisoning Lumumba, would that be your under-  
9 standing?

10 Mr. Tweedy. Eventually, when a number of other steps had  
11 taken place before and they would, for example, have included  
12 a discussion between the Chief of Station and this agent which  
13 would have made clear to the agent what this was all about.

14 At this stage, he had no idea of it, and our series of  
15 exploratory cables between Leopoldville and Headquarters  
16 outlining the degree -- <sup>04</sup> [redacted] is his name -- <sup>04</sup> [redacted]  
17 access to the entourage, what he found out and whether any of  
18 this basically bore on the feasibility of the operation.

19 Mr. Baron. This was one of a series of cables where the  
20 Chief of Station was reporting on his attempt of finding means  
21 of access to Lumumba for the purpose of poisoning him?

22 Mr. Tweedy. Throughout this whole period, the activity of  
23 the Chief of Station in correspondence with Headquarters was  
24 exploratory.

25 Mr. Baron. What was being explored was the means of access

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TOP SECRET

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1 to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?

2 Mr. Tweedy. That was one of the things that was being  
3 explored. The other thing explored and constantly under review  
4 was the whole situation of Lumumba and were there other alter-  
5 natives. That does not appear in this particular cable; it  
6 appears in others.

7 Mr. Baron. Turning now to Tab 9 of the Senator's books,  
8 this is the cable of October 7 which you received in the Eyes  
9 Only channel from the Chief of Station which indicated that  
10 (Gottlieb had departed from Leopoldville for America on the  
11 5th of October, and it says: "View expiration date his  
12 materials. However left certain items of continuing usefulness.  
13 Guthman" -- which is a pseudonym for the Chief of Station whom  
14 we have been calling Hedgeman -- "Guthman plans continued  
15 try implement op."

16 Does that indicate that you received a report from the  
17 Chief of Station that he would continue to try to implement  
18 this operation against Lumumba even after Gottlieb had left  
19 the Congo?

20 Mr. Tweedy. He would continue to explore the possibilities  
21 of this operation and continue to report to Headquarters. That  
22 is all that this means.

23 It does not mean with the disappearance of Gottlieb he  
24 would try to pull off the operation without further reference  
25 to Headquarters. It just means a continuation despite the

TOP SECRET

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1 disappearance of Gottlieb and his materials that the Chief of  
2 Station would continue to examine the possibilities of carrying  
3 this out.

4 Mr. Baron. He was to continue, in your mind, at least up  
5 until the point where he had determined there was a feasible  
6 means of assassinating Lumumba?

7 Would that be correct?

8 Mr. Tweedy. I would put it more broadly than that. I  
9 would say that he was to continue to explore it to determine  
10 whether or not there was a feasible means. He perfectly well  
11 could come to the conclusion that with the hardest work in the  
12 world that he could see no way to do it. That would have been  
13 a perfectly acceptable conclusion to Headquarters, because a  
14 decision would have to be made professionally.

15 Mr. Baron. Turning to Tab 12 of the Senator's books, there  
16 is a cable that you sent in this Eyes Only channel to the Chief  
17 of Station on October 15th, which is the week after Dr. Gottlieb  
18 had left the Congo. In this cable, you are saying, you are  
19 referring first of all to another cable sent on the same day  
20 that was not sent through the Eyes Only channel, and then  
21 reassuring this Chief of Station that ~~WIRROAK~~<sup>02</sup>, which is a  
22 pseudonym for Lumumba, is it not?

23 Mr. Tweedy. It is.

24 Mr. Baron. That ~~WIRROAK~~<sup>02</sup> was still a stumbling block and  
25 that it was increasingly apparent that all studying Congo

TOP SECRET

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1 situation closely and his disposition spontaneously becomes  
2 number one consideration."

3 In the second paragraph, you told the Chief of Station:  
4 "Raise above so you are not confused by any apparent duplication,"  
5 referring to the other cable. "This channel remains for  
6 specific purpose you discuss with colleague also remains highest  
7 priority."

8 Was the colleague that you were referring to Dr. Gottlieb?  
9 Mr. Tweedy. Without doubt.

10 Mr. Baron. What did you mean by disposition spontaneously?

11 Mr. Tweedy. The English of that cable, as I mentioned  
12 this morning, is absolutely appalling.

13 What I am actually saying is, wherever you talk to people  
14 like we did with the French, as I mentioned in the next sentence  
15 or anyone is studying the situation in Africa, they all came  
16 up with the same conclusion, that there was to be no solution  
17 to the Congo with Lumumba still in power, or in a position of  
18 overcoming it.

19 Mr. Baron. To summarize what we discussed this morning,  
20 despite the series of cables and the indication here that  
21 Lumumba's disposition spontaneously was the number one consider-  
22 ation and highest priority. You are still maintaining that  
23 the Chief of Station was not empowered to go through with  
24 assassination without checking back with Headquarters?

25 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

17

1 Mr. Baron. I have no further questions at this point.

2 (Whereupon, Senator Church left the hearing room.)

3 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Tweedy, how long did you serve  
4 with the CIA?

5 Mr. Tweedy. I started with CIG on the 1st of May, 1947 and  
6 served until March, 1973.

7 Senator Goldwater. You have had experience with intelli-  
8 gence gathering agencies all around the world, I assume, or  
9 most of them?

10 Mr. Tweedy. A considerable number, yes, sir.

11 Senator Goldwater. Is it common practice in intelligence  
12 agencies such as the CIA for a lot of people to know about  
13 everything that is going on, or am I right in assuming that  
14 there are many things that you do in the intelligence field,  
15 particularly the covert field, that the man sitting next to you  
16 may know nothing about. Is that correct?

17 Mr. Tweedy. That is correct, sir. Compartmentation was  
18 very heavy in CIA. There were a great many things going on that  
19 I never knew anything about and do not know to this day.

20 Senator Goldwater. Is that not in your experience the  
21 most successful form of intelligence gathering? Is that the  
22 British practice?

23 Mr. Tweedy. The only way that you can run an intelligence  
24 organization, in my view, is internally.

25 Senator Goldwater. You have been with the CIA actually

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

18

Page (Line 207) 544-4000

1 since before its conception. I want to ask you, and of your  
2 experience, what you think as a professional of the men in the  
3 CIA, men and women?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I came away from a career in intelligence in  
5 March of '73 with rather strong convictions. I might preface  
6 my remarks here in answer to your question, Senator, by saying  
7 I was in intelligence during the War, I was in Naval Intelli-  
8 gence. This was not OSS, but I was in intelligence. It also  
9 determined me, if the circumstances permitted, to make a  
10 career of intelligence after the War, and after the difficulty  
11 of making the right contacts and so on and so forth, eventually  
12 it worked and I spent a career in CIA.

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13 I have two very strong impressions of that experience.  
14 One of them has to do with my colleagues, the personnel of the  
15 Agency, who I found to be a remarkably talented group. The  
16 second was, and it was something that I think all of us were  
17 basically proud of, the esprit de corps was at a very high  
18 level and resulting from esprit de corps, as it usually does,  
19 discipline was equally of a very high level, and it came quite  
20 naturally, this was not a matter that had to be inculcated and  
21 beaten into junior officers, it came quite naturally because  
22 this was quite clearly the way the organization was run, and  
23 basically, we were proud of it.

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24 I have never regretted for a second my career, and I am  
25 very proud of it and my associations.

**TOP SECRET**

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**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

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1 politics, and I cannot follow the idea that such a serious  
2 undertaking was an assassination, regardless of who the target  
3 might be, would be a subject that would be dreamed up in the  
4 locker room at some lower level. Those decisions and other  
5 covert decisions, in my opinion, have to start someplace, and  
6 they do not start at the bottom.

7 Mr. Tweedy. I would agree with you, sir. My experience  
8 in this particular case -- the only one of its kind that I have  
9 ever had any experience with -- indicate exactly what you say.  
10 I never felt at any time that I was operating in a policy  
11 vacuum. I never had the impression that any of my seniors  
12 felt that they were either.

13 Senator Goldwater. That is all the questions I have.

14 Senator Huddleston. I just have a few questions.

15 What is your concept of the term higher or highest author-  
16 ity?

17 Mr. Tweedy. Highest authority was a term that we used in  
18 the Agency and it was generally recognized as meaning the  
19 President, and I would like to make myself quite clear on this.  
20 in this context, that although, as I said a minute ago I  
21 never felt that I was in a policy vacuum or that the Agency was.  
22 I have no idea of the context in which policy was passed to the  
23 Agency on this. I do not know whether the President  
24 personally played a role, whether he played a role and passed  
25 the message to the National Security advisors or the Secretary

**TOP SECRET**



TOP SECRET

21

1 of State or whoever. I have no idea.

2 I merely felt that the concensus at the policy levels of  
3 government were that Lumumba must go and that discussion of the  
4 feasibility of assassination was at least part of this. I cannot  
5 to any further than that.

6 Senator Huddleston. Do you recall being told specifically  
7 that this operation had the approval, or was, in fact, the  
8 policy of the highest authority?

9 Mr. Tweedy. No, sir, I do not recall that. Highest  
10 authority was normally used in cable traffic, so we did not have  
11 to say the President. I do not recall that the word "highest  
12 authority" in connection with this particular operation was  
13 used.

14 Senator Huddleston. It is not an unfamiliar term? It was  
15 used during your experience in the Agency?

16 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, certainly it was. It was sometimes  
17 necessary for example, that Headquarters would come to the field  
18 and say, you will understand, I'm not talking about this  
19 operation, but just generally, you will understand, that in a  
20 matter of this kind, it will require the approval of highest  
21 authority. And normally this meant in my mind, overseas, the  
22 40 Committee or its several equivalents, most of which decisions  
23 were referred to the President. That is basically what it  
24 meant.

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TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

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1 Senator Huddleston. What types of action come to your  
2 mind when the instructions come down that a certain individual  
3 must be removed or possibly eliminated, or whatever form of  
4 instructions may come?

5 Mr. Tweedy. This is the only case that I personally was  
6 ever involved with. What we were talking about was the removal,  
7 by any means, of an individual, and, as I have tried to make  
8 clear in my previous testimony, this involved the launching of  
9 the idea with the field so they in turn could make the proper  
10 operational explorations into the feasibility of this,  
11 reporting in all detail back to Headquarters for guidance. At  
12 no point was the field given carte blanche if they thought they  
13 had found a way to do the job, just to carry it out with no  
14 further reference. So it never occurred to me or anybody else  
15 in the position of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville to feel  
16 that he had that kind of delegated authority.

17 Senator Huddleston. Removal would include all the way up  
18 to assassination?

19 Mr. Tweedy. We are now talking about in this specific  
20 case, yes, sir.

21 Senator Huddleston. You had no lack of understanding?

22 Mr. Tweedy. We had no lack of understanding that Head-  
23 quarters wanted this explored. At no point did Headquarters  
24 ever say to the field, he is to be assassinated at all costs.  
25 It said, it is important he be removed. Among the tools of

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

23

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1 removal is assassination, you will explore it and report.

2 Senator Huddleston. Is it common within the Agency, that  
3 instructions of this nature be handed down in oral fashion from  
4 the Director to the Deputy Director for Plans to the Station  
5 Chief?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Not the Station Chief unless you actually ask  
7 the Station Chief to come back.

8 Senator Huddleston. A cable would have to be used?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Or send a messenger personally out.

10 Normally on something like this, as it happened in this  
11 case, Mr. Bissell talked to Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell talked  
12 to me and he did not sit down and write a memorandum to me.  
13 I am virtually a hundred percent sure.

14 Senator Huddleston. Is it your belief that participants  
15 in these kinds of discussions had very explicit understandings  
16 about what each was talking about? No possibility, virtually  
17 no possibility that there would be a misunderstanding as to  
18 what the instructions were and what the limits were?

19 Mr. Tweedy. Really the only people that were seriously  
20 involved with this were in the field, the Chief of Station;  
21 if you are talking about operational detail, myself and my  
22 deputy, with Mr. Bissell included, to the extent that he needed  
23 to get into the operational detail.

24 On that score, I would say no misunderstanding whatsoever.

25 Senator Huddleston. Mr. Bissell's communication with the

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

24

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1 Director of the CIA would be such that they would have no  
2 misunderstanding?

3 Mr. Tweedy. I always assumed so, sir. Obviously, again,  
4 I cannot comment specifically.

5 Senator Huddleston. Given their experience and their  
6 knowledge of each other and the knowledge of the operation --

7 Mr. Tweedy. They were very close personally, Mr. Bissell  
8 and Mr. Dulles, and Mr. Dulles had personal affection for him  
9 and enormous respect for him, intellectually and professionally.

10 Senator Huddleston. Even the communication between the  
11 National Security Council and the Director of the CIA who was  
12 a member of the Council, it was not likely that there would be  
13 a great deal of misunderstanding there between what you really  
14 are talking about, although there is no written order?

15 Mr. Tweedy. That would have been my assumption, Senator.

16 Senator Huddleston. Senator Schweiker?

17 Senator Schweiker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Mr. Tweedy, in the August cable that Allen Dulles sent to  
19 Chief of Station, he started out with the words "In high  
20 quarters here." What does that mean to you, "in high quarters  
21 here"?

22 Mr. Tweedy. The policy level. As I say, I cannot necessarily  
23 say it included a specific conversation with the President. It  
24 certainly, in my view, would have involved the National Security  
25 Council, the advisor to the President, Secretary of State.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

25

1 I mention the Secretary of State, because later on in the cable,  
2 Mr. Dulles says to the extent that the Ambassador desires to be  
3 consulted, you may seek his concurrence. Mr. Dulles was  
4 perfectly content to have this discussed with the State Depart-  
5 ment in the field, i.e., the Embassy, if this should prove to  
6 be necessary.

7 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Bissell testified before this  
8 Committee that "in high quarters here" meant the President to  
9 him. I assume that you are not as convinced of that as Mr.  
10 Bissell?

11 Mr. Tweedy. I do not think it a question of conviction. He  
12 was closer to the policy level than I was; he would have a better  
13 feel for this than I would. He never explained to me what the  
14 specific policy level decision was. He was the one Executive  
15 Director who would talk directly with the Director. Conceiv-  
16 ably -- I do not say he did not, and I do not say he did. He  
17 may even have talked to the senior members of the government;  
18 I did not.

19 Senator Schweiker. He also testified that the further  
20 part of the paragraph, consequently we conclude that his removal,  
21 that removal meant assassination.

22 Does that or does that not concur with you?

23 Mr. Tweedy. It does not concur; it would refer to assas-  
24 sination but not exclusively.

25 Senator Schweiker. It goes on to say "We further authorize

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

26

1 expenditures of up to \$100,000 to carry out any programs in  
2 which you do not have the opportunity to consult. Please  
3 advise."

4 Does that not mean to you, here is \$100,000, do with it as  
5 you want, you do not have to consult if you do not have the  
6 opportunity?

7 Mr. Tweedy. This is certainly the way it would read. I  
8 read it, and I think I read it at the time, when you are talking  
9 about that kind of money and crash programs, what you are talking  
10 basically are political action type programs, not assassination  
11 type programs.

12 Senator Schweiker. Of course--

13 Mr. Tweedy. The beginning of that paragraph says, "Hence  
14 we wish to give you wider authority," et cetera, et cetera,  
15 "including more aggressive action, if it can remain covert."

16 Senator Schweiker. What does the term mean, "more  
17 aggressive action? How aggressive can you get, even more  
18 aggressive, "including even more aggressive action, if it can  
19 remain covert" meaning if you can get away with it.

20 Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

21 My own belief is, because quite frankly I cannot recall  
22 what this had specific reference to -- my belief is that this  
23 had reference to general political action along the lines of  
24 mounting successful political operations against Lumumba, which  
25 is the sort of thing that would cost a lot of money.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

27

1 Senator Schweiker. Of course, we know now that at the time,  
2 or very shortly about the same time we were sending poison down  
3 there, certainly it was not political action. In light of what  
4 we know now, would it not mean fairly clearly that this was an  
5 authorization for an assassination?

6 Mr. Tweedy. No, sir, I do not believe so, for the simple  
7 reason that although we sent Dr. Gottlieb and his materials  
8 down to the Congo, the Chief of Station was always exploring,  
9 as many of these cables indicate, other means of getting rid of  
10 Lumumba besides assassination. It was always, certainly in my  
11 mind, and I think in Mr. Bissell's mind, a clear realization --  
12 and certainly the Chief of Station's mind -- that when every-  
13 thing had been examined, a successful way of doing assassination  
14 was not necessarily to be expected. Maybe it would, but it  
15 was not necessarily to be expected.

16 Thus, it was incumbent upon the Chief of Station to keep  
17 his eye on the whole spectrum of possibilities of getting rid  
18 of Lumumba, politically or any other way.

19 Senator Schweiker. We know two things now in light of  
20 this. One is he asked an agent to kill Lumumba, one agent  
21 declined. He asked another agent to go down and do that, and  
22 he assented. Since he specifically mentioned the two separate  
23 agents, one in which the agent testified, sitting where you are,  
24 that he declined to kill him, the other saying that he would  
25 take the poison, it seems to me very likely that this language

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

28

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1 has to refer to that kind of authority, or I cannot see how  
2 Mr. Bissell would have respected -- you say you respect Mr.  
3 Bissell and he operates within the CIA system. Is it not  
4 inconceivable to you that he could be doing this without this  
5 kind of authority?

6 Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not.

7 Senator Schweiker. He would be doing it without authority?

8 Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not within my belief of Mr. Bissell  
9 that he would be doing it without authority.

10 Senator Schweiker. All right.

11 One other point. It says, consult the Ambassador if he  
12 desires or you may seek his concurrence if he desires it, and in  
13 any particular case he does not wish to be consulted, you can  
14 act on your own authority where time does not permit referral  
15 here.

16 I cannot imagine a more blank check wording, saying, first  
17 consult the Ambassador if he wants to be consulted. It also  
18 says in that particular case where he does not wish to be  
19 consulted, you have your own authority without conferring back  
20 here. I think that this is at variance with the point you were  
21 speculating on earlier, that we had to have the final go  
22 decision, when in fact it seems to me that that line says,  
23 here is authority if time does not permit referral here.

24 Mr. Tweedy. I can only assure you, Senator, that this  
25 was always my understanding, not even understanding, it was quite

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**TOP SECRET**



**TOP SECRET**

29

1 routine, that in any kind of an operation as sensitive as was  
2 involved in the United States that there would be no blanket  
3 delegation of authority to the field. Although I quite under-  
4 stand your point here, I can only assure you that that is the  
5 way I felt about it then, feel about it now, and believe this  
6 opinion was shared by the Chief of Station.

7 Senator Schweiker. That you can act on your own authority  
8 does not mean that to you?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Not to pulling a trigger or administering  
10 poison or what have you.

11 In other words, we do not want to hear anything about it.  
12 If you find a chance to do it, do it and report later, no.

13 Senator Schweiker. Mr. Tweedy, have you ever heard of the  
14 words Health Alteration Operation?

15 Mr. Tweedy. What was that?

16 Senator Schweiker. Have you ever heard the words Health  
17 Alteration Operation?

18 Mr. Tweedy. Never.

19 Senator Schweiker. Have you ever heard of a Health Alter-  
20 ation Committee chaired by a Mr. Herman Horton?

21 Mr. Tweedy. No.

22 Senator Schwiker. Are you familiar that an effort ever  
23 was made to send a biological agent to incapacitate Iraqi  
24 Colonel Fahil Mahdawi?

25 Mr. Tweedy. No.

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TOP SECRET

30

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1 Senator Schweiker. Do you know Mr. Herman Horton, or did  
2 you know him?

3 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, very well.

4 Senator Schweiker. Did you know a [redacted] <sup>03</sup>  
5 Acting Chief of the Near Eastern, South Asian Division?

6 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I did, sir.

7 Senator Schweiker. The Committee has a record of a memo  
8 there sent from [redacted] <sup>02</sup> recommending a Health Alteration  
9 Operation Against the Colonel.

10 Mr. Tweedy. I have never heard of the phrase Health  
11 Alteration.

12 Senator Schweiker. None of this is familiar to you.

13 Mr. Tweedy. It is the first time I have ever heard of it.

14 Senator Schweiker. That is all I have.

15 Mr. Dawson. You described this operation against Lumumba  
16 at various times in your testimony as exploratory. To the  
17 best of your knowledge, or your knowledge now having been  
18 refreshed, having seen a variety of documents, was anybody ever  
19 asked by the CIA to assassinate Lumumba?

20 Mr. Tweedy. No third party, no agent.

21 For instance, [redacted] <sup>011</sup> who appears in this traffic,  
22 he was never asked to assassinate Lumumba. When you say that  
23 I characterized it as exploratory, may I just expatiate on that  
24 for a moment?

25 Whenever, under our system and in our profession, you go out

TOP SECRET

31/8/68

**TOP SECRET**

31

1 to the field asking that something be accomplished which clearly  
2 is not the sort of thing that you just do off the top of your  
3 head, like having lunch with Mr. Smith tomorrow, but achieving  
4 the difficult result, the task of the field is to explore the  
5 feasibility of such a request by Headquarters.

6 This might be done quite quickly. It might take an  
7 infinite amount of time. Headquarters would expect the field  
8 to report regularly on its progress, giving Headquarters a chance  
9 to comment, as we have done in this traffic. This particular  
10 modus operandi was no different in this case than the cases of  
11 infinitely less sensitivity or importance. That aspect of it  
12 was quite routine. There was no way in the world that the Chief  
13 of Station was going to come back, sir, I understand what you  
14 want, I will have it down in twenty-four hours. He had no  
15 inkling that this was going to occur. It took him obviously,  
16 totally by surprise. He had to sit down and examine the  
17 feasibility of it. In the end, he could not come up with an  
18 answer.

19 I think the exploratory nature is in the innate nature of  
20 our business on something of that kind.

21 Mr. Dawson. Thank you.

22 Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Tweedy, assuming that the Chief of  
23 Station out there had the impression at the time that the  
24 messenger, or any other reason, that this was authorized by the  
25 President of the United States, this whole operation, knowing

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

32

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1 what you know about the business, would he have conducted  
2 himself any differently than what you now see as this case?

3 Mr. Tweedy. Not the slightest. He would consider himself  
4 in a disciplined organization, a servant of his chain of command  
5 as a member of the organization and not receiving some direct  
6 word from the President which, in effect, would have made him  
7 feel to go out and do anything he pleased.

8 Mr. Kirbow. Is it not the paramount situation, the non-  
9 attribution type situation, was the only thing that he could  
10 undertake, that it could not be attributed to the United States?

11 Mr. Tweedy. That was inherent in all of the correspondence  
12 on the subject, our intercourse in the field on this. I think  
13 this makes it amply clear in something like this, on attribu-  
14 tion, obviously would be very important. The other was just  
15 plain feasible access.

16 Mr. Kirbow. Thank you.

17 Mr. Smothers. As I listen to the testimony here, we may  
18 not be terribly clear on what would have happened had our Chief  
19 of Station come up with what he considered to be a feasible  
20 plan.

21 How would he have communicated a feasible plan back to  
22 you?

23 Mr. Tweedy. Through this channel.

24 Mr. Smothers. What would have happened if you had received,  
25 for example, the message from him that we now have a feasible

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210 544-8008 (Area 202) 544-8008

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

33

1 plan for the removal or the killing?

2 Mr. Tweedy. I would immediately have shared it with Mr.  
3 Bissell. After that, I can only speculate what would happen  
4 and I know Mr. Bissell would have talked to Mr. Dulles. Where  
5 it would have gone from there, I just cannot do anything more  
6 than speculate. I do not think that would be very helpful.

7 My duty was quite clear. I was charged up the chain  
8 of command. I would probably comment on it operationally to  
9 Mr. Bissell. I would say, professionally this seems sound or  
10 professionally I do not agree with it.

11 Mr. Smothers. It is your assumption that it would have  
12 gone up even beyond Mr. Dulles, your assumption from your years  
13 of work with the Agency?

14 Mr. Tweedy. I think that would be fair to say, but that  
15 would depend so much on the understanding between Mr. Dulles  
16 and the policy levels of government to which I was not privy,  
17 I really cannot comment substantively on that.

18 Mr. Smothers. I have some problem in looking back at the  
19 testimony, your previous testimony -- which I realize you have  
20 not had a chance to review. The gist of what you say on page  
21 34 of the transcript is that this operation against Lumumba  
22 was certainly something that was so extraordinary that you would  
23 have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba -- I use  
24 your words here -- yet at that time your recollection was  
25 certainly not as clear as it was from a review of the documents.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

34

1 In your experience, are we talking about this activity  
2 being an extraordinary situation?

3 Mr. Tweedy. The only one to which I was ever exposed of  
4 its kind.

5 Mr. Smothers. In terms -- the only one of its kind, you  
6 mean the only one involving an assassination?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Let us be quite clear; exactly. I was never  
8 personally involved in any conversations about a specific  
9 assassination at any other time in my career in the Agency, nor  
10 was I aware of any other, so this was the only one that I  
11 personally had any experience with.

12 Mr. Smothers. After looking at the documented evidence,  
13 your memory is now much better concerning your own involvement  
14 in the cable traffic.

15 Mr. Tweedy. In the specificities of it, Mr. Smothers,  
16 yes. In terms of the general role I played as Chief of the  
17 Africa Division, there was never any doubt about that, but  
18 the specificities of this, really -- I had forgotten, as I  
19 told Mr. Baron the other day, for example, that there was a  
20 period when Lumumba was actually in the hands of the U.N. I  
21 had just forgotten.

22 I had not remembered that Mr. O'Donnell had been asked by  
23 Mr. Bissell to assist the Chief of Station in this operation  
24 until I was reminded of it. I'm afraid that's my frailty.  
25 But that is -- my conscience, however, is quite clear, but

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

35

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1 my memory is not quite as clear.

2 Mr. Smothers. I do not want to belabor the documents we  
3 have gone over today. As you have reviewed them and as you  
4 recall this timeframe, and giving us some assistance in inter-  
5 preting what the documents say, is there any other matter that  
6 bears on the question of the discussions surrounding the  
7 Lumumba case that we have not gone into that have come to mind  
8 as you think about the circumstances of this case that you think  
9 will be helpful to this Committee in understanding, if you will,  
10 both the question of the flow of authority and indeed the scope  
11 of what was intended?

12 Mr. Tweedy. From the time that this was first broached to  
13 me by Mr. Bissell, I do not believe I discussed this matter  
14 with anybody else but Mr. Bissell; certainly Mr. Gottlieb when  
15 he went out on this trip; certainly now that I've been reminded  
16 of his tasking by Mr. Bissell, Mr. O'Donnell; obviously, the  
17 Chief of Station; and my Deputy.

18 I never discussed it ever with Mr. Helms. I suppose I  
19 did discuss it with Mr. Dulles. I think it was much more that  
20 I knew perfectly well that Mr. Dulles was familiar with it  
21 rather than I actually had any conversation with Mr. Dulles on  
22 it. I think those were all conducted by Mr. Bissell and passed  
23 down to me. I do not think I probably had any.

24 Mr. Smothers. Let me understand the reference to Mr.  
25 O'Donnell. Are you saying you probably discussed it with him?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

36

1 Mr. Tweedy. No, I think probably I did not directly. I  
2 was perfectly aware of his knowledge of it, but at this point  
3 I cannot recall having discussed it with him.

4 To put it differently, there was no reason for me to,  
5 because I would have had nothing to say to him that I was not  
6 saying to Mr. Bissell, who in turn would have passed it to  
7 Mr. Dulles, as he saw fit. And in any event, that unless  
8 invited by Mr. Dulles, I would not have jumped the chain of  
9 command.

10 Mr. Smothers. I have nothing further.

11 Senator Huddleston. Mr. Schwarz?

12 Mr. Schwarz. This is the only killing incident you know  
13 of?

14 Mr. Tweedy. The only killing incident I know of. It is  
15 the only question of assassination which (a) I knew of, or (b)  
16 I have ever played any role in.

17 Mr. Schwarz. You refer to the special channel of cable,  
18 the YOPROP.

19 Did you ever use the YOPROP in any other operation?

20 Mr. Tweedy. YOPROP was a one-time thing for this opera-  
21 tion. We could have attempted to assassinate 500,000 people  
22 and there would always have been an additional channel set  
23 up.

24 Mr. Baron. We were told by the YOPROP channel, by the  
25 review staff of the CIA that the channel was set up for eyes

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TOP SECRET

37

1 only use for the Chief of the Africa Division, primarily for  
2 personnel matters; that it was just taken advantage of for  
3 this operation because it already existed.

4 Mr. Tweedy. I will not gainsay them, but I think they are  
5 wrong. I think this was set up purposefully for this. This  
6 cryptonym was only used for this particular operation. I do  
7 not think it had anything to do --

8 Mr. Kirbow. You were Chief of the Africa Division?

9 Mr. Tweedy. I do not think it had anything to do whatsoever  
10 with other sensitive matters in the Division, not at all.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Both in the sense that this is the only  
12 assassination matter that you were ever connected with and the  
13 special treatment of the cables, it was a matter of significant  
14 importance at the time, was it not?

15 Mr. Tweedy. Yes, it was a matter of significant importance,  
16 as I made clear to Mr. Baron this morning and Mr. Dawson. The  
17 setting up of special channels and special indicators for  
18 sensitive operations was and is a completely common occurrence  
19 in the Agency. It has nothing to do specifically with assassina-  
20 tion; a very common occurrence.

21 Mr. Schwarz. Do you know any other incident in which  
22 poisons were used in your experience?

23 Mr. Tweedy. No.

24 Mr. Schwarz. When did you first recall -- Mr. Tweedy, you  
25 have appeared before us this summer formally and in this occasion.

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**TOP SECRET**

38

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1 formally this morning. You were examined under oath on  
2 September 9th and you appeared before us informally on one or  
3 two occasions.

4 Mr. Tweedy. No, just once, whenever that was; this must  
5 have been back in June or July.

6 Mr. Schwarz. When did you first recall that poisons were  
7 used to attempt or prepare to assassinate Patrice Lumumba?

8 Mr. Tweedy. By having my memory jogged, I guess. I  
9 remember the first time it was mentioned when somebody said,  
10 would it have been possible that poison had been sent to the  
11 Station? I said, yes, indeed, it would have been possible.  
12 Did I know that the Chief of Station had sent poison there, that  
13 he had kept it in his refrigerator? I said no, I did not recall  
14 it, but that I would not gainsay it, that if someone testified  
15 that it was there -- this has all come back as a result of my  
16 memory being jogged.

17 I was not -- certainly the poison was considered; that I  
18 remember quite clearly.

19 Mr. Schwarz. From the beginning?

20 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. That was obviously one of the ways that  
21 it might have been carried out.

22 Mr. Schwarz. I would like to explore for a moment, of all  
23 the methods that you used to jog your memory, we showed you  
24 documents. Did you see any documents at the Agency?

25 Mr. Tweedy. No, I have seen none, nor have I talked to

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

39

1 anybody, because there is nobody to talk to who, you know,  
2 participated in this experience with me.

3 Mr. Schwarz. You did not talk to Mr. Bissell?

4 Mr. Tweedy. I have not talked to Mr. Bissell.

5 Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Fields?

6 Mr. Tweedy. I have not seen Mr. Fields; I have not talked  
7 to him by phone or any other way, nor have I seen any files.

8 Mr. Schwarz. The totality of your effort to refresh your-  
9 self has been efforts in the course of working with people on  
10 the staff of this Committee, is that right?

11 Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

12 Mr. Schwarz. You have not talked to any current, or have  
13 not talked to any current or former Agency employees?

14 Mr. Tweedy. No, sir, not on the subject of this field.  
15 The only thing I have discussed with them, as I told you, I  
16 was working on a job with the Agency this summer. I guess I  
17 told Mr. Elder I was going to be going up to testify primarily  
18 to find out whether I could get a car or something. No point  
19 in discussing it with him, because he would not have told me  
20 anything about it.

21 Mr. Schwarz. When you were told to take steps to move  
22 towards the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, did you consider  
23 declining to do that? If not, why not?

24 Mr. Tweedy. I will try to be as honest with you as I can.  
25 I certainly did not attempt to decline it, and I felt, in view

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40

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1 of the position of the government on the thing, that at least  
2 the exploration of this, or possibility of removing Lumumba  
3 from power in the Congo was an objective worth pursuing.

4 Mr. Schwarz. Including killing him?

5 Mr. Tweedy. Yes. I suspect I was ready to consider this.

6 Mr. Schwarz. That was an objective worth pursuing, right?

7 Mr. Tweedy. Getting rid of him was an objective worth  
8 pursuing, and if the government and my betters wished to pursue  
9 it, professionally, I was perfectly willing to play my role in  
10 it, yes.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Looking back now from the perspective of  
12 1975, do you think the United States should continue to enter-  
13 tain assassinations of foreign political leaders?

14 Mr. Tweedy. I have never thought that assassination in  
15 most cases was anything more than a mugs game, for the simple  
16 reason that I do not think in most cases, because I think an  
17 excellent case could have been made that the early elimination  
18 of Hitler would have saved us all a hell of a lot of trouble.  
19 But that was an almost unique case. Most people do not control  
20 situations totally within themselves. I think Hitler did, and  
21 I know something about that.

22 In other words, I don't think anybody else would have  
23 continued if Hitler had either had a heart attack or dismembered.  
24 I think the thing would have folded.

25 In most cases, I think we kid ourselves that getting rid

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

41

1 of -- Henry II said, "this turbulent priest is in effect, take  
2 care of the issue.

3 Having to do it all over again, it would be my strong  
4 recommendation that we not get into it. I was never in any  
5 doubt whatsoever about it on a professional basis, because there  
6 always was a possibility that the Soviets might try this kind  
7 of thing on what I would call a professional basis.

8 Mr. Schwarz. What do you mean, professional basis?

9 Mr. Tweedy. Get at our sources, or conceivably even  
10 getting to staff officers, this type of thing. I was never in  
11 any doubt whatsoever that to engage in anything like this, if  
12 the Soviets should show inclination to do so would be totally  
13 non-productive.

14 Mr. Schwarz. You mean having a war back and forth between  
15 the two intelligence services?

16 Mr. Tweedy. The only reason I mention it, services have  
17 done this. The Soviets certainly have done it with some of  
18 their own operational agents, and other services have done it.  
19 We had a couple of conversations in the Agency, I remember quite  
20 informal, if the Soviets ever started a game like this whether  
21 it would be worth retaliating. I think we all agreed that the  
22 answer would be no. Two can play at this game, and there  
23 would be no end to it. In fact, of course, it never has  
24 happened, to my knowledge.

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TOP SECRET

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42

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1 Mr. Schwarz. What was so special about Lumumba that  
2 justified killing him?

3 Mr. Tweedy. There was nothing special about Lumumba as  
4 a person.

5 Mr. Schwarz. In that sense, you would distinguish him  
6 from Hitler, whom you did say was special as a person?

7 Mr. Tweedy. No, let me try to answer your question, which  
8 has to be answered more fully than just discussing Lumumba.

9 The concern with Lumumba was not really the concern with  
10 Lumumba as a person. It was concerned at this very pregnant  
11 point in the new African development of the effect on the  
12 balance of the Continent of a disintegration of the Congo, and  
13 it was the general feeling that Lumumba had it within his  
14 power to bring about this dissolution, and this was the fear  
15 that it would merely be the start -- the Congo, after all, was  
16 the largest geographical expression. Contained in it were  
17 enormously important mineral resources. Africa as a whole,  
18 the Congo itself, is adjacent to Nigeria, which at that point  
19 was considered to be one of the main hopes of the future  
20 stability of Africa, and if the Congo had fallen, then the  
21 chances were Nigeria would be seized with the same infection.

22 This was why Washington, after the point the Western  
23 world was so concerned about Lumumba, not because there was  
24 something unique about Lumumba, but it was the Congo.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever consider in your discussion of

**TOP SECRET**

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1 this subject what effect it would have on the United States'  
2 position in Africa if it were to be known. the policy makers  
3 in Africa sat around thinking about killing Patrice Lumumba?

4 Mr. Tweedy. Policy makers in America?

5 Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

6 Mr. Tweedy. Indeed we did, which was one of the reasons,  
7 one of the sine qua nons of this operation was that the American  
8 hand would be totally hidden, which was, amongst others, a  
9 criteria that we were never able to achieve.

10 Mr. Schwarz. In fact, it is probably something that is  
11 not possible to achieve, is it not?

12 Mr. Tweedy. It is never possible to achieve anything with  
13 100 percent assurance, no. Certainly you can achieve professional  
14 results with a high degree of assurance, but you can never go  
15 further than that.

16 Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further.

17 Senator Huddleston. I have nothing further, and a vote  
18 is on.

19 Am I to understand that Senator Church is coming back or  
20 not?

21 Mr. Schwarz. I did not have that impression.

22 Senator Huddleston. We will recess at this time.

23 (Whereupon, at 5:10 o'clock p.m. the hearing concluded.)

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