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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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Vol. 2 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject  
to Criminal Sanctions

R478

# The United States Senate

*Goodwin*

## Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED:  
ON 3/2/77  
BY EC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000061326

Thursday, July 10, 1973

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Taps and Waste turned over  
to the Committee for destruction)

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TESTIMONY OF

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Richard M. Goodwin.

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, July 10, 1975

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United States Senate,  
Select Committee to Study Governmental  
Operations with Respect to  
Governmental Activities,  
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:02 o'clock  
p.m. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church  
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan,  
Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and  
Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick  
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority  
Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan,  
David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea,  
Professional Staff Members.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

The Chairman. We will come back into order.

Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?

Do you swear that all the testimony you are about to give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Goodwin. I do.

The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has been some problem in connection with your appearance here today and that there are some notes that you have that you feel you need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought with you. Is that the case?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful. They have been in storage for several years and I just had no access to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They were notes -- my files and everything have been in storage for several years. I've had no access to them. And they consist of the files that I brought from the White House with me.

The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the staff and shown certain documents that the staff believes will be pertinent to your testimony?

Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.

The Chairman. And do you believe that you are prepared today to give us testimony relating to Mr. Trujillo or do you

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1 believe that you need to or ought to review those notes before  
2 you give any testimony?

3 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm of course fully prepared to testify  
4 to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think  
5 probably in the case of the Dominican Republic, the documents  
6 have been adequate. I think there's a good chance that going  
7 through the files may very well add something to my recollection  
8 of Cuba and Castro.

9 The Chairman. Well I will have this suggestion to make.  
10 We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and  
11 then -- how long will it take you to get your files and review  
12 them and come back fully prepared to give us your testimony on  
13 the other issues?

14 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it will take a day or two. It is  
15 possible I will not be able to get access to them until Monday  
16 morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello  
17 and find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine.  
18 But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.

19 The Chairman. So that if the Committee were to give you  
20 that opportunity, would you then get those files, review them,  
21 and respond to the request by the Committee that you appear the  
22 first of next week to testify?

23 Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly.

24 The Chairman. We are most anxious to complete the record  
25 and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly

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1 accomodate our need if you would cooperate.

2 Mr. Goodwin. I would be glad to.

3 The Chairman. All right.

4 With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you  
5 prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?

6 Mr. Schwarz. I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't have  
7 a chance to get together. I thought we were going to have a  
8 chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to  
9 speak to you but I do know some of the material, and perhaps  
10 we can work on the material.

11 Before we do so, could you state your full name and your  
12 address please?

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1 TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. GOODWIN

2 Mr. Goodwin. Richard M. Goodwin, 1536 32nd Street, N.W.,  
3 Washington, D.C.

4 Mr. Schwarz. And as a matter of course, we tell all of  
5 our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their  
6 right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop  
7 to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?

8 Mr. Goodwin. I already have too many lawyers.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional  
10 rights are?

11 Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the  
13 Dominican Republic in the winter and spring of 1961?

14 Mr. Goodwin. I came into the White House as Assistant  
15 Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin  
16 American affairs policy statements in the preceding campaign.  
17 I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until  
18 I left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a  
19 daily basis with President Kennedy and his activities in Latin  
20 America which included what was happening in the Dominican  
21 Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepared  
22 cables that went to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that  
23 you are interested in, and I was with him every day on something  
24 connected with Latin America.

25 Mr. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary

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1 material, would you recount for the Committee your understanding  
2 of what the United States government policy toward the Dominican  
3 Republic was in the winter and spring of '61 and what actions  
4 were taken to implement that policy.

5 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of the  
6 policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in  
7 accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -- decided  
8 to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican  
9 Republic and the situation which you know arose was precipitated  
10 by the attempted assassination of President Betancourt by the  
11 President of the Dominican Republic.

12 So that from that point on when we came in, the feeling  
13 was, first of all, of course that Trujillo was even more  
14 at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress than  
15 had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other  
16 relations, that Trujillo's time in office was probably  
17 numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade  
18 which was often in great domestic difficulty had been the  
19 concept of American support, it strengthened Trujillo against  
20 his opposition.

21 At that point our policy became one of trying to anticipate  
22 at least, the fall of Trujillo. Of course the Castro thing  
23 was very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern of  
24 the President, the one thing he didn't want was for Trujillo  
25 to go and a Communist leader to come in. So I think the policy

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1 was to keep up our economic and diplomatic pressure to hope  
2 that when Trujillo went, however he went, whether violently or  
3 peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would  
4 be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of  
5 the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keep in  
6 touch with and help out and keep communications open with  
7 the potential successor groups, and it was very hard to  
8 pinpoint.

9 Mr. Schwarz. What steps did you take during the period  
10 of time you were involved, or prior thereto, if you know  
11 about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident  
12 groups?

13 Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from  
14 policy statements, the use of USIA, the use of economic  
15 pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile  
16 groups principally in New York and elsewhere. A certain number  
17 of limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn  
18 of course was one of the principals, his principal instruction  
19 was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was  
20 zealous in this because he disliked Trujillo intensely himself  
21 and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups.  
22 And I read through the sort of overall planning papers, and I  
23 think they fairly reflect that range of operations.

24 None of them were terribly effective.

25 Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arms,

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Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of people had

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1 tried and most of them, they were all dead. It was a very  
2 risky business. It's not the kind of thing they would want to  
3 try with a .38.

4 And I think also, I mean nobody, I think -- as I say, we  
5 had no particular anticipation that this or any other group  
6 would be successful in something that nobody had been able to  
7 do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know how the arms were passed into  
9 the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the dissidents?

10 Mr. Goodwin. No, I only know what Dearborn later told me  
11 in conversation. I only have this fifteen year old memory  
12 on my part that he gave them to them in the consulate. I may  
13 have known at one time how he got them. There were a lot of  
14 guns in the Dominican Republic.

15 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know [REDACTED] 24  
16 [REDACTED]

17 Mr. Goodwin. I did not know that, but I wouldn't be  
18 surprised, weapons of that size.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Now again, when were the arms passed, as  
20 far as you know?

21 Mr. Goodwin. Well I don't know. I don't have the exact --  
22 the message is in here. I think it was after President  
23 Kennedy took office.

24 My knowledge of it was on the basis of the message --

25 The Chairman. Is there someone that can help Mr. Goodwin

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1 with the documents?

2 Mr. Schwarz. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1,  
3 a document consisting -- dated May 13, 1961 and headed  
4 Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating:  
5 "Attached is the special briefing paper of CIA covert activities  
6 directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by  
7 Mr. Richard Goodwin at the White House," and attaching a  
8 several page document with that heading and that date.

9 Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and  
10 that's where, I guess, I found out about it.

(The document referred  
11 to was marked Goodwin  
12 Exhibit No. 1 for  
13 identification.)  
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11

1 Mr. Schwarz. Now that indicates, does it not, that the  
2 weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell  
3 that?

4 Mr. Goodwin. Yeah.

5 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

6 You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which  
7 indicates when the request for the passage of the arms was  
8 made.

9 Mr. Goodwin. Yes, it says in late January. Of course  
10 they weren't authorized until the 12th.

11 Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, after  
12 the Kennedy Administration took office.

13 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Now you told President Johnson, Vice  
15 President Johnson.-- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2,  
16 a memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab H, the book which is  
17 marked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1961.

(The document referred to  
was marked Goodwin  
Exhibit No. 2 for  
identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin,  
2 this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject  
3 Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.

4 Would you read into the record the second paragraph?

5 Mr. Goodwin. "At one point during the meeting, the Vice  
6 President asked about the three carbines which the Agency had  
7 turned over to the dissidents, specifically asked about the  
8 date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effect  
9 that this was done under the previous Administration, i.e.,  
10 prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the  
11 Special Group."

12 Can you tell me if this his memo I'm reading? I'd like  
13 to know.

14 Mr. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottom  
15 of the page, do they help you decide whose memo it is?

16 Mr. Dennin. I believe we were told by Secretary of State  
17 Rusk that it's Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what  
18 the U stands for.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?

20 Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is an  
21 inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it  
22 would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen.  
23 I thought that I wouldn't have made it. I had no purpose in  
24 making it. And this is --

25 The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?

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13

1 Mr. Goodwin. The delivery of the arms was not made prior  
2 to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to  
3 January 20th.

4 Senator Schweiker. Was when, again? Was what date?

5 Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January.

6 Senator Schweiker. What year?

7 Mr. Goodwin. 1961.

8 Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when?

9 Mr. Schwarz. Sometime subsequent to January 20th.

10 Mr. Goodwin. Well, now that I look at this, all it says  
11 was late January.

12 The Chairman. This is June 1st, this is dated June 1st,  
13 and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the  
14 meeting the Vice President asked about the three carbines  
15 which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents and  
16 specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin  
17 made the statement to the effect that this was done under  
18 the previous Administration, i.e., prior to January 20th,  
19 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."

20 Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.

21 Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my first impression on reading  
22 that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator,  
23 so I suppose the 20th or the 19th in somebody's mind could be  
24 late January. I mean, I don't really remember.

25 Mr. Schwarz. But Mr. Goodwin, you know, independent of

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1 the document which we marked as Exhibit 1, in fact the arms  
2 were delivered after January 20th.

3 Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I -- my first  
4 knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requested  
5 which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had been  
6 made in late January. I don't know any more than that.

7 Mr. Schwarz. All right.

8 Mr. Goodwin. This is my source of knowledge. I may have  
9 learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.

10 Mr. Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, were  
11 you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?

12 Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the meetings.

13 Mr. Schwarz. Who do you remember from the CIA?

14 Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -- I can't be sure who all was  
15 there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure some-  
16 body like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm  
17 sure you must have a list.

18 Mr. Schwarz. Now I would like you to testify in answer to  
19 a series of questions as to what you were or were not told.

20 Now, were you told that the arms which had been delivered  
21 had been delivered to persons who said at times that they  
22 wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more  
23 often that they wanted to use them for assassination purposes?

24 Mr. Goodwin. I was given to understand and told  
25 specifically and it's reflected in the documents, that they

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1 wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, they thought  
2 they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns.  
3 I don't remember any indication that anyone thought that a  
4 carbine or a .38 was adequate to mount an effort of that kind  
5 against Trujillo. But they, of course, were interested in  
6 assassinating Trujillo, involved as they were in a very life  
7 and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered --

8 Mr. Schwarz. The record demonstrates that the Agency was  
9 informed in April, prior to the memorandum that went to you  
10 which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the dissidents intended to  
11 undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the  
12 means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the  
13 road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress.  
14 And that they intended to do it whether or not they received  
15 the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns, just  
16 to help.

17 Now, were you informed by the Agency or by anyone else  
18 that the dissidents intended to accomplish the assassination  
19 with the small arms whether or not they got the machines?

20 Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other  
21 groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got  
22 reports of assassinations about to occur almost every two or  
23 three weeks in the White House. There is a long gap between  
24 wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -- but  
25 at all times, continually, up into May, there was the very

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16

1 insistent request for additional arms that would make the  
2 plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy,  
3 those arms were denied and --

4 Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know  
5 what you were informed about the intentions of the dissidents.  
6 You didn't answer my question. You said you were frequently  
7 informed about assassination plots all over the world, but  
8 specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you  
9 or were you not informed that the Agency had been told by the  
10 dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination  
11 of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not  
12 they received the machine guns?

13 Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. I  
14 wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that  
15 wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you  
16 mean Dearborn, or --

17 Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.

18 Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency  
19 in this instance?

20 Mr. Schwarz. There were Agency people in the Republic.  
21 Did you know there were Agency people in the Republic?

22 Mr. Goodwin. I knew they were in and out.

23 Mr. Schwarz. In and out?

24 Mr. Goodwin. They ran some guns in at one time, as I  
25 remember, and they also were engaged in the collection of

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17

1 intelligence about dissident groups.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Was it your impression that Dearborn was  
3 in charge of the Dominican Republic, or the Agency personnel  
4 was in charge of the Dominican Republic?

5 Mr. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the  
6 instructions given to Dearborn were carried out, and all  
7 instructions from the President went to Dearborn.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Apart from instructions from the President,  
9 was it your impression that the Agency was in charge of the  
10 Dominican Republic or that Dearborn was in charge of the  
11 Dominican Republic.

12 Mr. Goodwin. My impression was that Dearborn was in charge  
13 of the Dominican Republic, subject to very close supervision  
14 from Washington.

15 The Chairman. Dearborn was the --

16 Mr. Goodwin. He was the Consul. We had no formal  
17 relations.

18 The Chairman. He was the Consul?

19 Mr. Goodwin. Right.

20 Wasn't that true?

21 Mr. Schwarz. The paper record makes it look quite likely  
22 that the Agency, at least from their point of view, thought  
23 that they were in charge.

24 Mr. Goodwin. They should have told the President. We  
25 sent all of our messages to Dearborn.

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18

1 Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of the  
2 location of the machine guns that the dissidents wanted?

3 Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in here somewhere  
4 in the paper.

5 (Pause)

6 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question.

7 Did you know that the machine guns were sent to the  
8 Dominican Republic 74

9 Mr. Goodwin. I know now.

10 Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?

11 Mr. Goodwin. No. I knew, when the issue arose in May  
12 that we had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the precise  
13 method by which they were brought in I never asked about.

14 The Chairman. I am having a little difficulty following.

15 We began with your being told that it was the policy of  
16 the previous Administration to encourage dissident groups and  
17 do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down  
18 the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of  
19 President Kennedy, certain weapons are passed to these  
20 dissidents in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of  
21 assassinating -- of their use in the assassinating President  
22 Trujillo.

23 Now when did you learn that weapons had been in fact  
24 passed to dissident groups, that obviously had occurred after  
25 President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you first

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19

1 learn?

2 Mr. Goodwin. On the 13th of May when we requested from  
3 the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in  
4 the Dominican Republic, that had been conducted in the  
5 Dominican Republic.

6 Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from  
7 whom?

8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for  
9 the President.

10 Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?

11 Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.

12 The Chairman. From the CIA, and that briefing paper has  
13 been identified for the record?

14 Mr. Goodwin. That is correct.

15 The Chairman. All right.

16 When you found out that these weapons had been transferred  
17 in January to certain dissident groups for the purpose of  
18 assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?

19 Was it then your understanding that this was President  
20 Kennedy's policy?

21 Mr. Goodwin. No.

22 The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received  
23 that information?

24 Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator,  
25 and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinction

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20

1 between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of  
2 personal type side-arms, the self-defense attendant to any  
3 project and the desire for assassination weapons which would  
4 have consisted of machine guns.

5 Our response to this briefing paper was immediately to  
6 try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic  
7 and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks,  
8 instructions to the Consul about the nature of future relations  
9 with dissidents, because the President felt that things  
10 might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the  
11 Dominican Republic.

12 So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I  
13 said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to  
14 push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen  
15 next, because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than  
16 a Communist leader. And secondly, that the United States  
17 not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in  
18 the telegram that was --

19 The Chairman. All right.

20 Now when the President told you that those were his  
21 two concerns, what action was then taken to implement the  
22 President's policy?

23 Mr. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to take  
24 and set aside the original instructions from the State  
25 Department and at the President's instructions, I typed up the

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1 telegram which is here in my handwriting, which was to go and  
2 did go, slightly revised to --

3 Mr. Schwarz. All right. Let me mark the one in your  
4 hand as Exhibit 3.

(The document referred to  
was marked as Goodwin  
Exhibit No. 3-A for  
identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -- you  
2 know how to do this as well as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-B and  
3 3-C.

4 Mr. Goodwin. In which I personally added in the course  
5 of rewriting --

6 The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators' books  
7 where these documents appear?

8 Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3-A?

9 Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.

10 (Pause)

11 This xerox of my raw, personally typewritten draft appears  
12 on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.

13 And then page 256 is the final. And the same page, 242,  
14 page 237 and 242.

15 The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message  
16 that went out?

17 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

18 The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?

19 Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.

20 The Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed?

21 Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guess, but they  
22 are both my drafts. I received a draft from the State Depart-  
23 ment, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction  
24 prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden the State  
25 Department on my own, and adding to it two major points aside

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1 from rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, and  
2 the second one was to say in the final version, "However, we  
3 must not run the risk of U.S. association with political  
4 assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general  
5 policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is  
6 overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

7 That was inserted at the instruction of the President,  
8 a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State  
9 Department draft, and it finishes again with -- it says,  
10 "Clearly, at the present time we are unable to transfer arms  
11 to dissidents. We feel that the transfer of arms would serve  
12 very little purpose."

(The document referred to  
was marked Goodwin  
Exhibit No. 3-B for  
identification.)

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1 The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it  
2 before it was sent by State?

3 Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.

4 The Chairman. But you said that the State Department  
5 changed the language.

6 Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft  
7 which I changed and redrafted. Now that is here too, including  
8 a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their  
9 draft.

10 The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that  
11 you believed accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy?

12 Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction  
13 of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.

14 The Chairman. It was shown to the President?

15 Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.

16 The Chairman. Very well.

17 Then, reading the first paragraph, "The President has now  
18 approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here  
19 with one major exception. You are not to request a pre-  
20 signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups."

21 Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.

22 There was a proposal made in the State Department version  
23 that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case  
24 they managed to take over the government and there was some  
25 kind of fighting that they should request help from Venezuela,

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1 Columbia, a few of our allies and therefore we ought to prepare  
2 them in advance for such a request. The President thought that  
3 putting such a document in their hands would amount to a  
4 declaration of war and wanted it struck.

5 The Chairman. All right.

6 Then the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that  
7 you continue to work" -- well, before we go on with the second  
8 paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, "The President has  
9 now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here  
10 with one major exception."

11 Now, what were those contingency plans that had been  
12 discussed?

13 Mr. Goodwin. They have them here, I believe. I think --  
14 this is a very thick document, where you have a series of  
15 contingency plans, it discusses here. "The paramount interest  
16 of the United States is to assure that Castro-Communist  
17 elements not take over." It says Trujillo is weak, and then it  
18 is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the  
19 weakness of the Trujillo regime, and it goes into the covert  
20 activities, which, I think probably -- is that your principal  
21 interest at this time?

22 The Chairman. Yes.

23 Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sets forth all the  
24 covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States,  
25 not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform pro-U.S.

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1 dissidents that if they succeed on their own and form an  
2 acceptable government we will be glad to come in and help them  
3 and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing --

4 The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency  
5 plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?

6 Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that  
7 he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.

8 The Chairman. But if he were assassinated, it would have  
9 presumably been the result of an action by a dissident group  
10 to overthrow his regime?

11 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

12 The Chairman. All right.

13 Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message -- the President's  
14 message to Mr. Dearborn, "We consider it essential that you  
15 continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissi-  
16 dent groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable.  
17 However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with  
18 political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general  
19 policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is  
20 overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

21 Now that language, it has been suggested by some members  
22 of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoiding  
23 any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the  
24 United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved  
25 in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, "nowever

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1 we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political  
2 assassination, since the U.S. as a matter of general policy  
3 cannot condone assassination. This last principle is over-  
4 riding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

5 Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves  
6 to the interpretation that your primary concern was that the  
7 United States should not get caught?

8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because  
9 I think, to me, the plain meaning of the words and as I  
10 understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S.  
11 association with political assassination. That means not  
12 be associated with the process of political assassination in  
13 any form.

14 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?

15 In that same vein, if I could interrupt for just a second,  
16 is it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had  
17 already been dispatched?

18 Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns.

19 Senator Baker. I'm not talking about how many, Fritz.  
20 Guns had been dispatched.

21 Mr. Schwarz. But this telegram refuses the passage of  
22 four machine guns.

23 Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am  
24 just saying that guns had been dispatched.

25 Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this telegram?

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1 Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination,  
2 two days before the assassination.

3 Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched.  
4 Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over  
5 to the dissidents.

6 Senator Baker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite  
7 sure -- or there's no indication that the guns were actually  
8 used in the assassination, although they may have been in the  
9 back seat. Is that about the way it stacks up?

10 The Chairman. And the dissidents had requested machine  
11 guns.

12 Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has  
13 said we thought the signals for assassination efforts for  
14 machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead  
15 with the material in hand.

16 Mr. Goodwin. I believe they had additional guns of their  
17 own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.

18 Senator Tower. I think the type of guns is important,  
19 because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassination  
20 against a heavily armed --

21 Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards in a  
22 heavily armed car.

23 Also, if I might add, Senator --

24 The Chairman. Just to understand what you have said,  
25 as the author of this instruction and having conferred about

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1 it and having shown it to President Kennedy, are you testifying  
2 that it was your understanding that the meaning of that  
3 sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr.  
4 Dearborn a prohibition against involving the United States  
5 in an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Trujillo?

6 Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my first draft, I did it  
7 in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase  
8 about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the  
9 President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul;  
10 because I used the very word disclosure, you can see here, and  
11 I crossed it out, in my handwriting.

12 Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you  
13 changed it?

14 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it's not very grammatical, it's  
15 embarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't read the hand-  
16 writing on the xerox.

17 "However we also must not" -- something -- "permit any  
18 danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political  
19 assassination or intervention in the Dominican Republic,"  
20 it says or intervention. All that was struck.

21 Senator Baker. That sounds like exactly what the Chairman  
22 asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please  
23 don't get caught.

24 Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why I changed it,  
25 Senator, to read "However, we must not run risks of U.S.

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1 association with political assassination since the U.S., as a  
2 matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination."

3 Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it to  
4 be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this  
5 document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to me like  
6 the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught  
7 the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.

8 Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this  
9 time.

10 Senator Baker. Nor was I, at that time.

11 I need reassurance, and I think the record does, that the  
12 coincidence of that this cable, this wire, going out, say two  
13 days before the assassination, after guns in fact had been  
14 dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under  
15 the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.

16 This witness says it does not. There is no evidence to  
17 the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need  
18 to pursue the issue any further.

19 Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Senator --

20 Senator Baker. And it also, as Smothers points out, that  
21 there was another communication saying destroy anything you've  
22 got, all those communications except this cable.

23 Mr. Aaron. That is standard practice. That is the standard  
24 practice for covert operations.

25 Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines

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1 and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent  
2 to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking  
3 office. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. I haven't  
4 seen any indication of the date of that transfer. I do know  
5 that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns,  
6 because he told me he was not aware of it, until we finally  
7 requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of  
8 our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at  
9 which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred.  
10 I still don't know the date of that transfer.

11 And then it was the basis of that briefing paper, which  
12 obviously the Dominican Republic was not the first matter on  
13 President Kennedy's agenda when he came into office, on the  
14 basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sent  
15 this telegram.

16 The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call  
17 off any further involvement by the United States government in  
18 an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo.

19 Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United  
20 States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to  
21 slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The President was  
22 not that anxious to see Trujillo thrown out.

23 Senator Tower. That doesn't totally answer the question.

24 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm sorry.

25 The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony,

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1 that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had been  
2 transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had  
3 expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Correct.

5 The Chairman. So there was a connection, the connection  
6 being that the American government, through the CIA, furnished  
7 weapons to a group that had communicated its interest, if not  
8 its intention, to assassinate Trujillo.

9 So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the  
10 message was meant to call this off, this involvement. What  
11 exactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arms.

12 Mr. Goodwin. No, I wasn't. No.

13 The Chairman. But at the same time, you were saying, don't  
14 transfer the machine guns, were you not?

15 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -- what  
16 we were saying is --

17 The Chairman. What exactly were you saying?

18 Mr. Goodwin. We were saying that we didn't want to do  
19 anything that would involve us further, the United States  
20 further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo.

21 The Chairman. I see. I see.

22 Mr. Goodwin. Because we were not for assassination.

23 Senator Baker. The distinction is --

24 Senator Tower. Well, it says here in number 3, it says,  
25 continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support of their

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1 position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn  
2 from this is that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead  
3 and have the other guys on, because their position would be to  
4 assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is saying,  
5 let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support  
6 for what they are doing.

7 Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our support for what they  
8 were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency  
9 paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office  
10 we wanted to be our man, that is correct. And so we were going  
11 to support and try to retain relations and say we would support,  
12 which is not a difficult thing to do, as you know, any group  
13 that might take office and be moderate and pro-United States.  
14 That was all we were interested in, was having a pro-American  
15 government.

16 Senator Schweiker. Well, there are two other references  
17 here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, "In case of assassination or  
18 overthrow" -- obviously you still had a reference there, whether  
19 initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the  
20 planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we  
21 feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and  
22 expose the United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure  
23 in participation in an assassination attempt," and that is  
24 scratched out, and says "assassination attempt," meaning that  
25 there was -- to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate

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1 since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.

2 So what interpretation? I mean, this is rift here with  
3 assassination propositions, and the fact that you have "ultimate  
4 disclosure," fear of ultimate disclosure of participation,  
5 meant that certainly there was something already afoot, that  
6 ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this  
7 pass through.

8 Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did,  
9 it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away,  
10 but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there  
11 were many groups, a continual flow of groups, of information,  
12 that there were various groups planning to assassinate  
13 Trujillo.

14 Senator Schweiker. Well, if that's what it meant, then  
15 why did you delete it?

16 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --

17 Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why  
18 in fact did you delete those four words, "ultimate disclosure  
19 of participation?"

20 Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell me what page you're reading  
21 from?

22 Senator Schweiker. Page 3.

23 The very words that you interpret one way were in fact  
24 deleted, which shows to me that you meant them another way, or  
25 they wouldn't have been deleted, and you substitute two words

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1 for it.

2 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --

3 Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they  
5 were words that were going to give exactly the impression you  
6 are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, we  
7 were afraid of being found out and what we didn't want was any  
8 association with the assassination attempts, so the reference  
9 to disclosure was struck and the words association were  
10 inserted.

11 Senator Schweiker. But you still call off -- you still  
12 left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms  
13 would serve very little purpose and expose the United States  
14 to great danger of association with assassination attempts.  
15 That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had  
16 other language, that says "ultimate disclosure of participation"  
17 which implies to me you were concerned about other things you  
18 were doing and things that had already been programmed and an  
19 operation that you were as much concerned about those being --  
20 or you wouldn't have changed the language to still say the same  
21 thing with that one distinction about something else being  
22 afoot. I don't --

23 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I changed it, I believe, Senator -- I  
24 mean it's hard to be held responsible for language that was  
25 rejected because it was inaccurate. The problem was not one

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1 of disclosure, the problem was we did not want to be associated  
2 with assassination. That's why I struck it out.

3 Senator Schweiker. You changed the language, but the first  
4 part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, we feel the  
5 transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose  
6 the United States. So while you changed the language, you had  
7 the same condition there that you were not going to supply those  
8 arms.

9 Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --

10 Senator Schweiker. But why were you not concerned about  
11 the other language, because --

12 Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other language  
13 was that, well, we were worried about being found out, when in  
14 fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be  
15 involved. So I struck the implication.

16 Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why was the communication of  
17 our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have  
18 been any closer to this plot would have been to become one of  
19 the dissident group. They told him everything they did, down  
20 to and including when the car was coming down the road. And  
21 we knew that, didn't we?

22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to  
23 us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his  
24 instructions was to keep in very close contact with these  
25 dissident groups. I wouldn't be surprised if they dropped by

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1 and if they told him everything they were planning to do. But  
2 it's a long jump between saying you're going out and kill  
3 Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.

4 But I was not aware, as I can remember, that he had any  
5 kind of detailed information.

6 Mr. Smothers. His messages back to CIA, in fact, convey  
7 those details, don't they?

8 Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these --  
9 none of them that --

10 Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that  
11 the dissidents intended to use the small arms, carbines and  
12 pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended  
13 to use the weapons we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in  
14 precisely the way he was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know  
15 that before you wrote the telegram, or not?

16 Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I'm responding to is a  
17 request that says we can't do it unless we have the machine  
18 guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. We are  
19 saying, don't give them machine guns.

20 Later on they said to Dearborn, I mean he did tell me  
21 that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, we'll  
22 do it, whether or not we get the machine guns. I mean, that  
23 might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying,  
24 well, you might as well give it to them anyway since they're  
25 going to do it. I don't know why anyone would take on

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1 Trujillo with a .38. I wouldn't have thought that, if I thought  
2 about it.

3 President Kennedy went to Paris a week or two later. When  
4 the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by  
5 surprise, so that Dearborn had detailed knowledge of when it  
6 was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- he called  
7 an emergency meeting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent  
8 to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announced  
9 by Pierre Salinger.

10 But this instruction, the President told me he wanted to  
11 make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in  
12 assassinations.

13 Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record shows -- I think  
14 you've testified to this -- that toward the end of the Eisenhower  
15 Administration, they decided to supply arms to this dissident  
16 group and assist in the assassination of Mr. Trujillo. Then,  
17 as these documents show, at some point very near to the time  
18 that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was  
19 sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with  
20 this.

21 Why didn't we also say stop it, tell these people not  
22 to proceed further, in light of the fact that they may have  
23 thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to  
24 assassinate Trujillo had our blessing? In other words, there  
25 is still a piece missing, in my opinion, that should have

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1 suggested --

2 Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to  
3 inform dissidents of U.S. support for their position."

4 Senator Mondale. In other words, if I were one of those  
5 dissidents and I got that from the United States pursuant to  
6 this earlier agreement, I would feel encouraged to believe that  
7 I had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, and  
8 that we weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our govern-  
9 ment was not really neutral, that it encouraged them.

10 It is true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it  
11 is true, apparently that what you understood was that they  
12 wanted the machine guns for assassination and they wanted the  
13 other weapons for personal defense, but there was still, it  
14 would seem to me, reason for them to believe that they had our  
15 support.

16 Why didn't we say or communicate to them we want you to  
17 stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you  
18 to know that we will have nothing to do with it?

19 Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more  
20 point --

21 There was a similar telegram sent just before Diem was  
22 assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and  
23 I appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're  
24 worried about human life, if we're worried about correcting a  
25 policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion,

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1 the way to really disassociate it is to say stop, and that is  
2 really what I don't understand.

3 Mr. Goodwin. Well, let me say, Senator, first of all,  
4 that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's  
5 minds. There is no doubt that we hoped that Trujillo would be  
6 overthrown. Not only was there no doubt, but there was a  
7 unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it  
8 be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hope that it  
9 might happen. And that occurred ever before we took office and  
10 we were in full agreement with it.

11 There are papers here which talk about the event of a coup  
12 of how you're going to get Trujillo some money to get him out  
13 of the country. Assassination was always a possibility, but  
14 a coup d'etat, a revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole  
15 range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that  
16 Trujillo was going to be overthrown one way or another and  
17 not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassi-  
18 nation because -- in fact, it would seem at that time to be the  
19 most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and  
20 protected, ordinarily. They knew more about it than we did.

21 And when that happened, which we favored that happened,  
22 because we felt that the establishment of a democratic regime  
23 in the Dominican Republic was something not only beneficial to  
24 the United States and to our policies. I mean, when we're  
25 talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life,

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1 the man was not only a Fascist, but he was a murderer. He used  
2 to have a freezer room in the back of his house where he would  
3 take people and show them the bodies of enemies.

4 But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real  
5 concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we  
6 wanted to be associated with the new government.

7 Senator Mondale. I understand, but the argument is made  
8 with respect to that last telegram that it was a fig leaf  
9 telegram designed to cover our tracks should assassination occur  
10 and you argue, and I think persuasively, that you intended much  
11 more than that, you intended to make it clear that we were not  
12 supporting the assassination, that machine guns were not going  
13 to be used.

14 If that was our intent, and I take it that it was, why  
15 we didn't we go one step further and say please communicate to  
16 these dissidents who have every reason to believe from past  
17 history that we may be supporting the overthrow, including  
18 assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.

19 Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of  
20 the business?

21 Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I  
22 suppose, clearer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's  
23 their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted  
24 to. It was not going to be us that dealt with him in this  
25 fashion.

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1 Senator Mondale. Yeah, but see, if we were completely  
2 neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate  
3 Trujillo that's their business. I agree with it, that's none  
4 of our business.

5 But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like  
6 being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day  
7 before the job is done and not telling anybody. It seems to  
8 me you should say, boys, I'm out and I don't want you to do it.

9 The Chairman. I've changed my mind.

10 Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.

11 Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that's  
12 been described to us where people were beyond control and you  
13 couldn't communicate with them after the forces had been set  
14 in motion.

15 Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, I don't know that there  
16 ever was any statement that those guns that were authorized on  
17 January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequent, for  
18 the purposes of assassination or otherwise.

19 Mr. Schwarz. Well, there were scores of those;  
20 and whether they reached you or not is a separate and important  
21 question, but there are four or five examples of communication  
22 to the Agency, and I think passed on to the State Department,  
23 and that those guns were to be used for an assassination effort  
24 whether or not the machine guns were obtained.

25 Senator Mondale. Well, you see, that could be important.

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1 because if your understanding was as you have just described  
2 then the telegram makes more sense. But if in fact we were  
3 implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --

4 The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I  
5 think it's very important to understand this matter, to look  
6 at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He  
7 was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having  
8 received the instruction, the following -- now this is at Tab  
9 J, book 2 of 2, the second J.

10 It says -- first of all, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?  
11 Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.

12 The Chairman. It says: "One, I believe we can hold pro-United  
13 States dissidents, although with some grumbling on the basis  
14 set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tell  
15 them you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr.  
16 Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.

17 "Two, following our observations for Department and CAS  
18 considerations, A) if attempt is made by United States' friends  
19 to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations against us  
20 and the best we can do is see there is no proof."

21 Senator Baker. To see there is no proof.

22 The Chairman. "The greatest danger point is Thomas Stockard.  
23 He was given a small number of arms by dissident agents to hold  
24 several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained  
25 these items from Consulate. Stockard told me saying, I have

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1 informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he  
2 requested me supply arms through him for dissidents, I told  
3 him it was impossible. He is greater danger because of  
4 personal embitterment against CAS, a matter of which CAS head-  
5 quarters is fully informed."

6 Then he goes on to say that "since local CAS is now to  
7 engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I  
8 recommend urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three  
9 CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materialize  
10 they would be in danger and might be picked up for Trujillo-  
11 type questioning. This is easily avoidable by quick transfer  
12 now. These three have engaged in fully authorized activity  
13 which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public  
14 position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage  
15 and the collection and reporting and need to follow GONR,  
16 foster Leftist activities."

17 Now there's a vote on.

18 I read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a  
19 different message than the one you say you intended to send.

20 (A brief recess was taken.)

tap 6a

21 The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.

22 Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, to me, Senator,  
23 Paragraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of  
24 instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear.  
25 He says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms

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1 to the dissidents, and that is what is what Kennedy, of course,  
2 had said in the telegram. And the request had been to know  
3 whether or not he could supply arms.

4 So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure,  
5 quite clear, in what way he misinterpreted the telegram.

6 The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he  
7 has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms.  
8 That's clear enough. But if you go down to B -- are you with  
9 me now?

10 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

11 The Chairman. "Since local CAS" -- I guess that should  
12 be Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief of Station, then" --  
13 and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief  
14 of Station is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection  
15 and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from Dominican  
16 Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot  
17 should materialize" -- now that in itself, if I may digress a  
18 moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion assassination might  
19 be imminent. For he says "If simmering assassination plot  
20 should materialize, they would be in danger and might be picked  
21 up for Trujillo-type questioning. This is easily avoidable by  
22 quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling  
23 that an assassination might be imminent, otherwise, why transfer  
24 them. "These three have engaged in fully authorized activities  
25 which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public

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1 position."

2 Now I would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn  
3 anticipated at least the real possibility of assassination  
4 attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommending  
5 that those CIA officers that had been connected with having  
6 supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic  
7 right away.

8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, I would agree with a good part of that.  
9 Senator, although I think that there were assassination plots  
10 simmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this  
11 in fact took place. And I think he was concerned that the  
12 assassination would be unsuccessful, that Trujillo would pick  
13 up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of  
14 guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had  
15 been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill them.

16 And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in  
17 the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing,  
18 I think, in the telegram that was sent to him that denies the  
19 possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there  
20 might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of  
21 Dearborn's, because if the assassination was successful, there  
22 was no need to get the CIA out.

23 The Chairman. But there is something more, really. If  
24 the possibility of assassination was a long continuing thing,  
25 always on the mind of Dearborn, why does he respond to this

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1 instruction by saying, get these men out now?

2 Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had  
3 relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt  
4 anyway, with or without the machine guns. He thought the attempt  
5 might be abortive, and if so, he thought that all Americans or  
6 people that worked for him or with him would be in danger.

7 The Chairman. Then you would have to agree with me,  
8 wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had  
9 evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt  
10 was imminent.

11 Mr. Goodwin. I think that's clear. Yes, I think it was.

12 The Chairman. And he took this sufficiently serious to  
13 recommend getting the three CIA agents out without further  
14 delay?

15 Mr. Goodwin. I think that's right. That's absolutely  
16 true, because I think he believed that there was a serious  
17 attempt in the offing, as indeed there was, and he was absolutely  
18 right and he was doing his job well.

19 I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of  
20 the telegram, is that I sat in the office with President  
21 Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he  
22 wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which I  
23 did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, because he cannot  
24 testify to that matter, so it's not a question of reading the  
25 text so much as deciding whether or not I'm telling the truth

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1 about that instruction.

2 Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --

3 Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.

4 Mr. Schwarz. We have to explore whether something went  
5 wrong in the communication process, and I want to put some  
6 information in front of you and then see if you can help us  
7 explain what, if anything, went wrong.

8 Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.

9 Now Exhibit 2-A is a cable dated March 20th from the Agency  
10 in the Dominican Republic to the Agency in Washington. And  
11 reading in Paragraph 3, it describes the way in which -- it  
12 describes a plot.

13 In Paragraph 4, it says the following: "To do, they need  
14 five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds  
15 ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use  
16 quiet weapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently  
17 the assassination.

18 Now again, were you told -- now, in Exhibit 1, you were  
19 told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the  
20 carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense  
21 weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.

22 Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says.

23 Mr. Schwarz. Right. I understand that.

24 Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that  
25 the weapons had been passed for personal defense purposes, do

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1 you think that is consistent, is candid, in light of the  
2 fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons were  
3 going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are several communications  
5 regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously  
6 inconsistent.

7 Mr. Schwarz. They are.

8 Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand,  
9 a carbine or pistol is hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would  
10 regard that as saying I am going to strangle him. And if  
11 you're going to have a fire fight with machine guns, I mean  
12 in other words, it seems to me that somebody is interpreting  
13 what they say, or they might have had five or six different  
14 plans.

15 The request that came to the White House, finally, was  
16 very specific, and this is too, that additional weapons are  
17 needed in order to carry out an assassination plot. I mean,  
18 however you read this, they do say they need additional weapons  
19 to carry off an assassination. And that is what the President  
20 at that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about  
21 the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that  
22 he had established or any directions that he had given. Immediately  
23 said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting  
24 involved in assassinations. They can do what they want, but  
25 we are not going to get involved.

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1 Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was  
2 advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we  
3 were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of  
4 it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that,  
5 and that is what you thought you had done?

6 Mr. Goodwin. I would phrase it a little bit differently,  
7 Senator, which is to say I would say there were people who  
8 wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns  
9 and his response was probably like, you mean some idiot gave  
10 them guns? I said, yes. He said -- this is a paraphrase --  
11 you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or President Kennedy,  
12 I mean, he said, well, let's make it clear. And if you compare  
13 my draft with the State Department draft, I was overriding, as  
14 they point out, because their draft says, we're trying to get  
15 this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have  
16 to send his message instead. They would rather blame me, of  
17 course, than the President.

18 It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear  
19 that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condone  
20 assassination. It does not say cannot condone being caught at  
21 assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And I did  
22 that because he told me to do that.

23 The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kennedy  
24 policy as one of getting the government no further involved  
25 because there had been a past involvement? He knew that and

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1 you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished  
2 dissident groups who had expressed an interest in assassinating  
3 Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram  
4 was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kennedy Administration  
5 wanted no further involvement in this --

6 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the President  
7 found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that  
8 preceded his coming into office that a couple of carbines and  
9 pistols had been transferred in order to mount a major assault  
10 on a government that had lasted for thirty years, and it seemed  
11 at that point like a formidable threat to Trujillo.

12 He wanted to make it absolutely clear when he found out  
13 that anybody who wanted to assassinate Trujillo in the Dominican  
14 Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the  
15 United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out  
16 no more weapons and this is why he said we do not want to  
17 condone assassination or be associated with it. And that's why  
18 I wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.

19 Senator Tower. Well, may I ask you, then, what you  
20 interpreted the meaning of the first sentence in number 3,  
21 "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for  
22 their position?"

23 Mr. Goodwin. They were -- their position was that, what  
24 they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and replaced  
25 by a moderate government. We supported that position, as did

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1 the other members of the Organization of American States, and  
2 we wanted to make it very clear that we did support that  
3 position, and we wished them well in their efforts to establish  
4 that position and if they did we would recognize their govern-  
5 ment and send them assistance, which we did.

6 As a matter of fact, we took much greater efforts to  
7 get rid of Ramfies Trujillo in the six months that followed the  
8 assassination than anything that preceeded it, including bringing  
9 the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad  
10 Trujillo at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Instead  
11 of carbines and pistols, we brought in destroyers, aircraft  
12 carriers and Marine battalions so that they would know what  
13 the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they got  
14 out.

15 If I might make one more point, Senator, if I may, is that  
16 the countries of South America are full of guns sent there  
17 by the American government to be used to kill thousands of  
18 people over the last several decades, and with the lone  
19 exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armies  
20 from on top -- of course you're well-acquainted with that --  
21 sent knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal  
22 struggles. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo  
23 happened to be the head of State, which is a practical  
24 distinction, but you could hardly make a moral one.

25 Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question in

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1 that respect?

2 The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that,  
3 although that is a philosophical argument.

4 Senator Baker. Are you telling us, Mr. Goodwin, that  
5 assassination, not of heads of state, but assassination of  
6 lesser figures was a common, ordinary occurrence in South  
7 America at the behest of America or with American support?

8 Mr. Goodwin. No, I am talking about that we supply arms  
9 to revolutionary groups or to armed groups which we did in  
10 say Bolivia, or sometimes to the government itself, or in Chile  
11 we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with  
12 the knowledge that our assistance would be used in internal  
13 struggles.

14 I don't have to use the word assassinations.

15 Senator Baker. But how about for internal struggles, then,  
16 as opposed to assassination?

17 Mr. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struggle in the  
18 Dominican Republic.

19 The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction,  
20 because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is  
21 a difference between first degree murder and manslaughter.  
22 There is supposed to connote a certain difference in moral  
23 connotations, and undertaking deliberate action that is  
24 targetted against a particular person with the intention of  
25 murdering that person is normally regarded under our criminal

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1 laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore  
2 definted as 'murder' in the first degree. So there must be some  
3 gradation there.

4 Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are gradations, although I do  
5 think that many of the activities against, say, someone like  
6 Allende or others are equally targetted in Latin American  
7 countries and not just general conflict or the killing of  
8 particular -- Mexicans, of course, traditionally go out and  
9 shoot down leaders of new guerrilla groups or insurgents, but  
10 not necessarily with our guns.

11 The Chairman. But in any event you're not testifying here  
12 to your certain knowledge the United States government participa-  
13 ted in an assassination attempt or assisting in an assassina-  
14 tion attempt --

15 Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that  
16 subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acts.  
17 In any event, I do want to return to this.

18 This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to  
19 yours.

20 Mr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took place,  
21 President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we  
22 looked at indicates, there was a meeting at which Vice President  
23 Johnson was interested in finding out what had happened and you  
24 had a review of this, and discussed in that review that the  
25 weapons had been passed, the small arms and the machine guns

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1 hadn't been passed and the assassination occurred.

2 Now, after that review, were any steps taken to make, as  
3 a matter of more general, governmental policy, the policy which  
4 is expressed in the telegram you drafted at President Kennedy's  
5 instruction?

6 Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.

7 (A brief recess was taken.)

8 The Chairman. Do you have any more questions?

9 Mr. Schwarz. I don't have any more questions.

10 The Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you  
11 can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enlighten-  
12 ment?

13 Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination?

14 The Chairman. On the assassination.

15 Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through  
16 all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have  
17 something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do  
18 think this is pretty complete.

19 The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again early next  
20 week, on the Cuban phase of your testimony.

21 Mr. Goodwin. And Duvallier.

22 The Chairman. Mr. Dennin, they've been up all night,  
23 would like to ask two questions.

24 Mr. Dennin. Well, when you said there were no more  
25 questions, I just raised the possibility and you discussed it

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1 about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington  
2 when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held  
3 after the assassination before he came back, at which the  
4 whole matter was discussed, initially with Vice President  
5 Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last one, with President  
6 Kennedy.

7 Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We had, of course, a series  
8 of emergencies. We had an emergency meeting, and cabled the  
9 President who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind  
10 was how to keep Ramfies Trujillo, who was the son of Trujillo,  
11 from taking over, and we didn't know where he was, at first,  
12 it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at  
13 least indicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it  
14 wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found he  
15 was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to  
16 detain him, but it was too late. By the time we found out, he  
17 had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to  
18 Ciudad Trujillo, and I believe there was some effort made to  
19 bluff him off by sending messages to the plane in flight,  
20 diverting it to some American airport, but he didn't do that.  
21 and he landed and took over. And I think the principal aim of  
22 our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle,  
23 Hector -- and I forget the other fellow's name -- out of there  
24 so that the kind of moderate government that we wanted could  
25 be installed.

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1 And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make  
2 various inducements like he could take his money out, it was  
3 discussed that if he would leave peaceably, but what finally  
4 happened was when McNamara moved the fleet in over the horizon  
5 and an Air Force General bombed the palace, that was the end,  
6 he got on his boat and left.

7 The Chairman. Air Force General?

8 Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Force General.

9 He decided that was an easier target than the American  
10 fleet.

11 The Chairman. Was the bombing done at our instruction?

12 Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't believe so. I was trying to  
13 remember that, but I don't believe it was. As I remember,  
14 it was quite a surprise to us that this fellow had taken the  
15 initiative. The moving of the fleet was intended as sort of  
16 a threat that if they didn't get out we might come in and get  
17 them. There was no, however, no, at that point, no country  
18 attempted to do that, just to scare them. And the fleet was  
19 actually cheered in the Dominican Republic, a very rare  
20 occasion.

21 But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make  
22 himself dictator and two of his own officers arrested him. They  
23 all had been trained in American military schools.

24 Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to  
25 the telegram. We had Dearborn's reaction. We will read into

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Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to meet with the staff so that the pertinent documents that will

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1 up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be  
2 reviewed. We're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We  
3 want you to be fully aware of whatever documentation we have  
4 so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the  
5 policy at the time.

6 Mr. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and  
7 then duplicate it.

8 Mr. Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the  
9 staff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony  
10 Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?

11 Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and  
12 getting the things out, I think it will be safer Wednesday, if  
13 that's not too inconvenient.

14 The Chairman. Wednesday?

15 All right. Thank you very much.

16 (Whereupon, at 6:35 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed,  
17 to reconvene at 8:30 o'clock a.m., Friday, July 11, 1975.)

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