

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault

---



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

---

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10158

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-63

---

## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA  
FROM : ELDER, WALTER  
TO : MILLER, WILLIAM

TITLE :

DATE : 07/14/1975  
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :  
ASSASSINATION  
VIET NAM  
CONIEN, LUCIEN

DOCUMENT TYPE : CABLE  
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/05/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 437

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

---

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA  
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10158  
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-63

---

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA  
FROM : ELDER, WALTER  
TO : MILLER, WILLIAM  
TITLE :  
DATE : 07/14/75  
PAGES : 10  
SUBJECTS : VIET NAM

CONIEN, LUCIEN

ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : CABLE  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED  
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : CCBOX 437

---

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

[illegible]

R 487

Box 7

SECRET

Review Staff: 75/1083

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

R487

14 July 1975

Mr. William G. Miller  
Staff Director  
Select Committee To Study Governmental  
Operations With Respect To Intelligence  
Activities  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

Attached are four paraphrased copies of the following  
requested cables in response to a request arising from  
Mr. Colby's appearance before the SSC on 20 June 1975:

1. SAIG 1445, 5 October 1963
2. SAIG 1447, 5 October 1963
3. DIR 73661, 6 October 1963
4. SAIG 1463, 7 October 1963

CAP 63560 dated 5 October 1963, also requested, is  
not included. This is a White House message, and we have  
no copy.

DEPTEL 534, 5 October 1963, is also not included. The  
Third Agency Rule applies to this document, and the SSC  
should contact the State Department for this cable.

Sincerely,

*Walter Elder*

Walter Elder  
Assistant to the Director

Attachments: a/s

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 15 1975

CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to  
Criminal Sanctions.

SECRET

Classified by 007789  
Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption schedule 5D (1), (2), (3)  
Automatically declassified on  
Date Impossible to Determine

TOP SECRET

ROUTING

1	100	4
2	110	5
3		6

: DIRECTOR

DM : SAIGON

TION: C/FE 1-6 (DCI, DDP, C/FE ISSUED TEMPO COPIES 1055 5 OCT/OJ)

FO : DCI 7, D/DCI 8, DDP 9, RF 10, VR 11

R487

T O P S E C R E T 051210Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE SAIG 1445

RYBAT TUCOBALT

1

2

*sent Cobalt address*

15 OCT 63 IN 33921

1. LT. COL. CONEIN MET WITH GEN. DUONG VAN MINH AT GEN. MINH'S HEADQUARTERS ON LE VAN DUJET FOR ONE HOUR AND TEN MINUTES MORNING OF 5 OCT 1963. THIS MEETING WAS AT THE INITIATIVE OF GEN. MINH AND HAD BEEN SPECIFICALLY CLEARED IN ADVANCE BY AMBASSADOR LODGE. NO OTHER PERSONS WERE PRESENT. THE CONVERSATION WAS CONDUCTED IN FRENCH.

2. GEN. MINH STATED THAT HE MUST KNOW AMERICAN GOVERNMENT'S POSITION WITH RESPECT TO A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WITHIN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. GEN. MINH ADDED THE GENERALS WERE AWARE THE SITUATION IS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY AND THAT ACTION TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE TAKEN OR THE WAR WILL BE LOST TO THE VIET CONG BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT NO LONGER HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE. GEN. MINH IDENTIFIED AMONG THE OTHER GENERALS PARTICIPATING WITH HIM IN THIS PLAN:

MAJ. GEN. TRAN VAN DON

BRIG. GEN. TRAN THIEN KHIEM

MAJ. GEN. TRAN VAN KIM

RECEIVED FROM

15 1975

CIA

TOP SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

Copy No.

3. GEN. MINH MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT EXPECT ANY SPECIFIC AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR AN EFFORT ON THE PART OF HIMSELF AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT BUT HE STATED HE DOES NEED AMERICAN ASSURANCES THAT THE USG WILL NOT RPT NOT ATTEMPT TO THWART THIS PLAN.

4. GEN. MINH ALSO STATED THAT HE HIMSELF HAS NO POLITICAL AMBITIONS NOR DO ANY OF THE OTHER GENERAL OFFICERS EXCEPT PERHAPS, HE SAID LAUGHINGLY, GEN. TON THAT DINH. GEN. MINH INSISTED THAT HIS ONLY PURPOSE IS TO WIN THE WAR. HE ADDED , EMPHATICALLY THAT TO DO THIS CONTINUATION OF AMERICAN MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID AT THE PRESENT LEVEL (HE SAID ONE AND ONE HALF MILLION DOLLARS PER DAY) IS NECESSARY.

5. GEN. MINH OUTLINED THREE POSSIBLE PLANS FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT:

A. ASSASSINATION OF NGO DINH NHU AND NGO DINH CAN KEEPING PRESIDENT DIEM IN OFFICE. GEN. MINH SAID THIS WAS THE EASIEST PLAN TO ACCOMPLISH.

B. THE ENCIRCLEMENT OF SAIGON BY VARIOUS MILITARY UNITS PARTICULARLY THE UNIT AT BEN CAT. (COMMENT: FIFTH DIVISION ELEMENTS COMMANDED BY GEN. DINH.)

C. DIRECT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MILITARY UNITS INVOLVED IN THE COUP AND LOYALIST MILITARY UNITS IN SAIGON. IN EFFECT, DIVIDING THE CITY OF SAIGON INTO SECTORS AND CLEANING IT OUT POCKET BY POCKET. GEN. MINH CLAIMS UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES DIEM AND NHU COULD COUNT ON THE LOYALTY OF 5,500 TROOPS WITHIN THE CITY OF SAIGON.

REC

TOP SECRET

JUL 15 1975

CIA

6. CONEIN REPLIED TO GEN. MINH THAT HE COULD NOT ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTION AS TO USG NON-INTERFERENCE NOR COULD HE GIVE ANY ADVICE WITH RESPECT TO TACTICAL PLANNING. HE ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT ADVISE CONCERNING THE BEST OF THE THREE PLANS.

7. GEN. MINH WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT THE MOST DANGEROUS MEN IN SOUTH VIETNAM ARE NGO DINH NHU, NGO DINH CAN AND NGO TRONG HIEU. MINH STATED THAT HIEU WAS FORMERLY A COMMUNIST AND STILL HAS COMMUNIST SYMPATHIES. WHEN COL. CONEIN REMARKED THAT HE HAD CONSIDERED COL. TUNG AS ONE OF THE MORE DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS, GEN. MINH STATED "IF I GET RID OF NHU, CAN AND HIEU, COL. TUNG WILL BE ON HIS KNEES BEFORE ME."

8. GEN. MINH ALSO STATED THAT HE WAS WORRIED AS TO THE ROLE OF GEN. TRAN THIEN KHIEM SINCE KHIEM MAY HAVE PLAYED A DOUBLE ROLE IN AUGUST. GEN. MINH ASKED THAT COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PREVIOUSLY PASSED TO GEN. KHIEM (PLAN OF CAMP LONG THANH AND MUNITIONS INVENTORY AT THAT CAMP) BE PASSED TO GEN. MINH PERSONALLY FOR COMPARISON WITH PAPERS PASSED BY KHIEM TO MINH PURPORTEDLY FROM CAS.

9. MINH FURTHER STATED THAT ONE OF THE REASONS THEY ARE HAVING TO ACT QUICKLY WAS THE FACT THAT MANY REGIMENTAL, BATTALION AND COMPANY COMMANDERS ARE WORKING ON COUP PLANS OF THEIR OWN WHICH COULD BE ABORTIVE AND "A CATASTROPHE."

10. MINH APPEARED TO UNDERSTAND CONEIN'S POSITION OF BEING UNABLE TO COMMENT AT THE PRESENT MOMENT BUT ASKED THAT CONEIN AGAIN MEET WITH GEN. MINH TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC PLAN OF OPERATIONS WHICH GEN. MINH HOPES TO PUT INTO ACTION.

TOP SECRET

REC NO FROM  
JUL 15 1975

CIA



**TOP SECRET**

IN 33921

PAGE 4 OF 4

SPECIFIC DATE WAS GIVEN FOR THIS NEXT MEETING. CONEIN WAS AGAIN NON-COMMITTAL IN HIS REPLY. GEN. MINH ONCE AGAIN INDICATED HIS UNDERSTANDING AND STATED THAT HE WOULD ARRANGE TO CONTACT CONEIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND HOPED THAT CONEIN WOULD BE ABLE TO MEET WITH HIM AGAIN AND GIVE THE ASSURANCE OUTLINED ABOVE.

**TOP SECRET**

RECEIVED

JUL 16 1975

CIA

**TOP SECRET**

TS 333

**TOP SECRET**

ROUTING

1	2	3	4	5	6
1	2	3	4	5	6
2	3	4	5	6	
3	4	5	6		

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : SAIGON

ACTION: C/FE 1/2 (O/DCI, DDP, C/FE NOTIFIED AND COPIES ISSUED 1240 5 OCT/OJ)

INFO :DCI 3, D/DCI 4, DDP 5, RF 6, VR 7

T O P S E C R E T 051305Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE SAIG 1447

5 OCT 68 IN 33965

(IN 33921)\*

1. SAIG 1445 DISCUSSED WITH AMBASSADOR LODGE AND DCM TRUEHEART. AMBASSADOR NOW COORDINATING DRAFT MESSAGE TO RUSK AND <sup>OFFICIAL</sup> CIA / WITH GENERAL HARKINS. MESSAGE IN PRESENT FORM ASKS FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON FOLLOW UP OF MINH -CONEIN INSTRUCTIONS AND RECOMMENDS THAT GEN. MINH BE GIVEN THE ASSURANCES HE DESIRES.
2. I HAVE RECOMMENDED TO AMBASSADOR LODGE THAT:
  - A. THAT WE PROCEED WITH THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH GEN. MINH.
  - B. WE DO NOT SET OURSELVES IRREVOCABLY AGAINST THE ASSASSINATION PLOT, SINCE THE OTHER TWO ALTERNATIVES MEAN EITHER A BLOODBATH IN SAIGON OR A PROTRACTED STRUGGLE WHICH COULD RIP THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY ASUNDER.
  - C. THAT EQUAL OR GREATER WEIGHT BE GIVEN TO DISCUSSION AND PLANNING OF ALTERNATIVES THAN TO DISCUSSION OF MEANS TO BRING DOWN THE GOVERNMENT.
3. IN SEPERATE DISCUSSIONS WITH DCM TRUEHEART I HAVE COMMENTED:
 

THAT:

  - A. ANY PLAN TO ELIMINATE NGO DINH CAN AND NGO DINH NHU

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 15 1975

CIA

**TOP SECRET**GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

REPRODUCTION BY OTHERS IS PROHIBITED

TOP SECRET

IN 165 PAGE 2 OF 2

AND RETAIN PRESIDENT DIEM IS NAIVE SINCE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS DIEM PROBABLY WOULD NOT COOPERATE WITH THE PERPETRATORS OF THOSE ACTS.

(CIA / <sup>3</sup>OFFICIAL AGREES WITH THIS VIEW IN DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE).

B. WHILE IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT BIG MINH HAS THE WILL AND ABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE PLANS HE OUTLINED TO CONEIN, HE PROBABLY FEELS HE EITHER HAS TO ACT OR SEE THE INITIATIVE PASS TO THE HANDS OF JUNIOR OFFICERS WHOSE EFFORTS WOULD PROBABLY BE ABORTIVE.

C. THE SELF-IMMOLATION OF THE BONZE IN SAIGON TODAY MAY BE THE BEGINNING OF A CAMPAIGN OF ADDITIONAL SUICIDES AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE WHICH WILL DEEPEN THE CRISIS HERE.

4. I HAVE FULLY IN MIND CIA / <sup>OFFICIAL'S</sup> ADMONITIONS NOT RPT NOT TO EMBARK ON THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVEL. THUS, EACH RECOMMENDATION AND COMMENT IS PREDICATED UPON MY RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM HQS.

5. FOR THE RECORD, I HAVE CONSIDERABLE CONFIDENCE THAT CONEIN CAN ABLY CARRY OUT WHATEVER        ROLE IN THIS AFFAIR THAT HQS MAY DIRECT.

T O P S E C R E T

C/S Comment: \*Minh told Conein he must know American Govt. position with respect to a change in the GVN within the very near future. Minh outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the change.

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 15 1975

CIA

TOP SECRET

W. COLBY  
MT : C/FE  
CT :  
ATE : 6 OCT 1963

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

☐ INDEX  
☐ NO INDEX  
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

11  
SECRET

1	
2	
3	

TO : SAIGON

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF : C/FE 2

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DDP, RF, VR

6 OCT 63 17 25

DEFERRED SIG DEN

ROUTINE

PRIORITY SAIG

INFO

CITE DIR

RYBAT

RE SAIG 1447 (In 33965)

GUIDANCE ON SAIG 1445 (IN 33921) WILL COME IN SEPARATE  
MESSAGE. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, CIA / OFFICIAL DIRECTS THAT YOU WITHDRAW  
RECOMMENDATION TO AMBASSADOR REF PARA 2 B UNDER CIA / OFFICIAL'S INSTRUCTIONS.  
AS WE CANNOT BE IN POSITION ACTIVELY CONDONING SUCH COURSE OF  
ACTION AND THEREBY ENGAGING OUR RESPONSIBILITY THEREFOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: \*TOP SECRET.

WFC  
C/FE  
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

JUL 15 1975

CIA

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

## CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

**SECRET**

## ROUTING

1	4
2	5
3	6

O , DIRECTOR

ROM , SAIGON

ACTION: C/FE 2

INFO , DCI, D/DCI, DDP, RF, VR

SECRET 070547Z

17 OCT 63 IN 34280

PRIORITY DIR CITE SAIG 1463

RYBAT

2

REF: DIR 73661 \*

ACTION TAKEN AS DIRECTED IN REF. IN ADDITION, SINCE

DCM TRUEHEART WAS ALSO PRESENT WHEN ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATION <sup>WR</sup> ~~CIS~~ OFFICIAL'S  
 MADE, SPECIFIC WITHDRAWAL OF RECOMMENDATION AT CIA / INSTRUCTION  
 WAS ALSO CONVEYED TO TRUEHEART. AMBASSADOR LODGE COMMENTED THAT  
 HE SHAPES BRENT'S OPINION AS REFLECTED IN SAIG 1448. (IN 34026)

SECRET

official

C/S COMMENT: \* CIA / directed that COS withdraw the recommendation  
 to the Ambassador.

\*\* Ambassador Lodge recommended that Conein when next approached  
 by Minh assure him that US will not attempt to thwart his plans, other than the  
 assassination plans, and assure Minh that US aid will be continued to Vietnam under  
 a government which gives promise of gaining the support of the people and winning  
 the war against the Communists.

RECEIVED FROM

JUL 15 1975

CIA

**SECRET**

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification