

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2016

Agency Information

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10011-10051

RECORD SERIES : NSF

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 5A

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : PHASE I

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS : NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED):1/62-6/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-90-47

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

300. FILED: NLK -11-56 8/11 (upheld ARK 5 14/5 12)

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (CIA)

1 - 15 March 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. * Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U. S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

2. 3 third-country intelligence staff officers in place in Havana.

To collect intelligence.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant.

3. 2 third-country trained intelligence officers, readied to travel in Cuba for temporary periods.

To collect intelligence.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

4. * Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.

To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)

5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.

As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for a current Intelligence Estimate as the U. S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

6. * Continue negotiating for [] help in contaminating locomotive lubricants.

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

[] assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16 - 31 March 1962

7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

[2]
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.
10. * Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.
11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence.

To ready agent operations.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

Possible future use in communications and support.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated in [redacted]. Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, Caracas, and Aruba. San Juan, Puerto Rico, and Santiago, Chile, are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

[3]

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 April 1962

| <u>ACTIVITY</u> | <u>PURPOSE</u> | <u>CONSIDERATIONS</u> |
|--|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <u>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</u> | | |
| 12. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | Number of agents undetermined as yet. |
| 13. 5 third-country agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | |

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 30 April 1962

| | | |
|---|--------------------------|--|
| <u>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</u> | | |
| 14. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. |
| 15. One third-country legal resident agent in Havana. | To collect intelligence. | Possible use for communications and support. |

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

1 - 15 May 1962

| | | |
|---|--------------------------|--|
| <u>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</u> | | |
| 16. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. |
| 17. 3 legal resident agents in Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | |

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

[4]
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 May 1962 (cont)

| <u>ACTIVITY</u> | <u>PURPOSE</u> | <u>CONSIDERATIONS</u> |
|--|--------------------------|---|
| 18. One or possibly two trained staff intelligence officers (non-U.S.) resident in Havana. | To collect intelligence. | |
| 19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | "Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods. |

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 31 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

| | | |
|--|----------------------------|---|
| 20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. |
| 21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines. | To collect intelligence. | Difficult. |
| 22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable. |
| 23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | |
| 24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents. | To ready agent operations. | |

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 May 1962 (cont)

| <u>ACTIVITY</u> | <u>PURPOSE</u> | <u>CONSIDERATIONS</u> |
|--|--|---|
| <u>OTHER OPERATIONS</u> | | |
| 25. By 31 May, develop a plan for counterfeiting currency, which would not be implemented until a decision was made to debase the economy in Cuba. | To debase the economy of Cuba. | A counterfeiting program is being developed. Needs are to staff the proposal thoroughly to permit a policy decision to be made and to staff out a feasible distribution plan. It is expected that no decision to implement such a plan would be made immediately. |
| <u>1 June - 31 July 1962</u> | | |
| <u>INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS</u> | | |
| 26. * 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. | To collect intelligence. | Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions. |
| 27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba. | To reinforce and resupply, as possible. | Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery). |
| 28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents. | To ready agent operations. | |
| 29. * Collection of psychological material. | To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime. | This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere. |
| 30. * Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers. | To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime. | This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents. |
| 31. * By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime. | To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime. | This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place." |

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 June - 31 July 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

End of July 1962

32. *) Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.

To provide the Special Group (NSC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.

The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U. S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U. S. military intervention.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (State)

March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

Political and economic operations to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some negative impact on the Cuban people, who are part of the target, but are consistent with an overt policy of isolating Castro and neutralizing his influence in the Western Hemisphere. They are noted here, for the sake of completeness, as actions now being carried out by the Department of State under other existing programs and projects.

[8]

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (Defense)

March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

1. Expand special intelligence and other sensitive intelligence coverage of Cuba as required.
2. Develop the means of the Inter-American Defense Board to provide substantive intelligence on Cuban activities.
3. Provide logistic and personnel support for CIA intelligence operations into Cuba.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue the planning and essential preliminary actions to assure a decisive U. S. military capability for intervention.

To develop increased "hard" intelligence.

To add to the U. S. intelligence coverage on Cuba and possibly to strengthen the concern of Latin American states for security.

To ensure optimum implementation of the intelligence plan.

To overthrow the Communist government of Cuba.

Use of cays near Cuba entail unacceptable security risks when vulnerable to Cuban landing parties. (Defense, in collaboration with CIA.)

Sensitivity of using this multi-national organization clearly restricts potential use by USA. Visibility of operational interest is an acceptable risk here.

The intelligence plan requires support by U. S. military manpower and equipment.

The U. S. military intervention must be conducted as quickly as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures is reduced to a minimum.

[9]
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

OPERATION MONGOOSE
PHASE I (USIA)

March - July 1962

ACTIVITY

Propaganda programs to isolate Castro regime and neutralize its influence in the Western Hemisphere.

PURPOSE

Activities in consonance with U. S. policy established after the April 1961 failure in Cuba.

CONSIDERATIONS

These activities will have some general impact upon Castro support and influence in the Western Hemisphere. There will be some new material for use as the Phase I intelligence operations produce but essentially the program is a continuation of that already in effect.

[10]