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JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

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16c

OBJECTIVE C: INTENSIFY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

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<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
34. Spot, recruit, and train legally established Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban Government Posts abroad. (CIA, supported by State and Defense):	<p>The purpose of all activities under this objective is to provide maximum intelligence coverage of Cuba with particular emphasis on the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>Capabilities and intentions of the Castro Government.</li><li>Soviet activities in Cuba including details of Soviet military personnel, units, locations, capabilities, et al.</li><li>Activities of Cuban G-2.</li><li>Military and militia order of battle and morale.</li><li>State of resistance including the tone and temper of the population.</li><li>Focus of power and/or stress and strain among the "Power Centers" in the Cuban Government.</li><li>Evidence of Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.</li></ol>	<p>When possible they will be recruited and trained while visiting outside Cuba; however, when necessary recruitment and training will be done inside Cuba either by established agents or by agents infiltrated especially for the task. Whether this is done unilaterally or jointly with a third country intelligence organization is determined on a case by case basis.</p> <p>In some cases the travel as generated specifically by CIA; in other cases the travels can be utilized to meet intelligence requirements.</p>

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ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

34. (continued)

In addition to meeting the above cited intelligence objectives, operational intelligence, and recruitment leads as well as agent material result from the Opa-locka and [ ] operations. In addition to meeting basic intelligence requirements above, timely operational intelligence is vital to CIA current operations.

35. Spot, recruit, and train third country nationals resident in Cuba. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.

36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).

See 34 above.

37. Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense, USIA, and other support).

See 34 above.

The continuation of the refugee flow and the selective debriefing of refugees provide the most significant source of intelligence. Follow up debriefing of selected refugees after departure from Opa-locka will continue.

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ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
38. Continue [redacted]/CIA interrogation center, [redacted] (CIA)	See 34 above.	Due to local conditions and problems, the [redacted] Debriefing Center will continue to be more limited in size and selective in choice of refugees than Opa-locka. This is primarily an NSA problem but CIA will continue to assist as practicable.
39. Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support).	[redacted] well as to continue the exodus of skilled manpower from Cuba.	PAA requires financial assistance to continue this activity.
40. Continue and expand, as practical, communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications nets. (Defense and CIA).	See 34 above.	It is recognized that significant increase in coverage of the internal micro-wave system would become a major budget and personnel problem.
41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA).	To obtain intelligence and propaganda material.	This is done on a regular basis by FBIS.
42. Urge, assist, and/or support friendly third country intelligence services to expand their intelligence coverage of Cuban intelligence requirements. (CIA).	See 34 above.	This will be handled through existing liaison channels.

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ACTIVITY

43. Expand, as practical, audio coverage of potentially profitable Cuban intelligence targets. (CIA)

44. Establish program of periodic reports from U.S. Embassies in Hemisphere analyzing the effects of existence of the target area regime on host country. (State).

PURPOSE

See 34 above.

To maintain a reasonably current estimate of the impact of the target area regime on the Hemisphere.

CONSIDERATIONS

These installations are in third countries.  
In some cases,

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ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
38. Continue [ ] CIA interrogation center, [ ] (CIA)	See 34 above.	Due to local conditions and problems, the [ ] Debriefing Center will continue to be more limited in size and selective in choice of refugees than Opa-locka. This is primarily an NSA problem but CIA will continue to assist as practicable.
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