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December 13, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recommended Course of Action on the Congo.

1. We are seeking to reintegrate the Katanga, to strengthen and maintain a moderate government in Leopoldville that can, in fact, run the country, and to prevent an increase in Communist influence in the Congo.

2. Efforts to reintegrate the Katanga have bogged down as a result of Tshombe's intransigence and Adoula's rigidity. However, what could prove a major breakthrough occurred yesterday with Tshombe voluntarily agreeing that the UMRK should turn over its foreign exchange and revenues to the Monetary Council for division between the Central Government and the Katanga. (Some of Tshombe's conditions may be troublesome, but we are taking his reply as acceptance and are proceeding accordingly.)

3. In light of this development, the following course of action is recommended for the immediate future:

- (a) Adoula should be persuaded that this is a significant development which he should seize upon as a basis for re-entering negotiations with Tshombe on the other major elements contained in the UN Reconciliation Plan (division of powers between the Central Government and the Katanga, an amnesty, military standstill in North Katanga). In this connection, we should seek to re-establish discussions between Elisabethville and Leopoldville through an acceptable intermediary, presumably Gardiner. (To accomplish this, if necessary

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if necessary we should insist that Adoula prorogue the Parliament and govern with backing of a pro-Western group headed by Mobutu.)

- (b) To restore GOC confidence in its position and exert additional pressure on Tshombe, we should seek UN agreement that if Katangan military planes continue to attack, not only will the UN interdict them in the air, but also destroy them on the ground.
- (c) We should also support advance staging of a "GOC air force" through additional CIA efforts.

4. Given the UN's financial plight and the anticipated decrease in its military strength with the scheduled withdrawal of Indian troops in January, very little time remains to achieve our objectives. We believe that a maximum of two weeks can be allowed for the working out of the payments scheme and substantial progress on other elements of the plan. If, in fact, the payments plan does not succeed, and if the other practical aspects of reintegration are not accomplished within this period, we should be prepared to move on to stronger measures than purely economic. The economic measures contemplated beyond the UMHK scheme are likely to be drawn out and ineffective and would require considerable and probably unproductive consultations with our allies.

5. In these circumstances, we should decide now/^{on}a contingency plan for the adoption of stronger measures by the UN and the United States to be put into effect in two weeks if significant progress has not in fact

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(not just in words) been achieved.

The major requirement of such a policy would be the creation of adequate UN military strength to make the possibility of a forceful solution of the Katangan secession problem credible to Tshombe and evidence of our determination to use it. The use of such a strengthened UN position, both as a deterrent and as a force, should be adjusted to a graduated scale of pressures. For example, if negotiations failed, the UN could stop all rail traffic in Elisabethville. If this did not achieve its desired result, the UN would announce that it planned to extend its perimeter to include Jadotville and Kolwezi in order to bring about control of Katangan exports so that payments required under Congolese law would be paid to the GOC.

While the UN will have adequate ground forces during the next six weeks to carry out such missions, a substantial increase in the UN air arm would be required.

A number of additional planes from UN members are on the way. However, it is doubtful that there would be enough to perform the task adequately and a contingency decision is required now that the United States would, in the last analysis, use its own power in order to prevent chaos, large-scale massacres, and/or a major Soviet presence called in by radical successors to Adoula. This would mean in practice, that the United States, once it has decided that practical progress is stalled, would make available to the UN a fighter unit for use in the Congo which should have both psychological and military value to the UN force. This squadron would be under UN Command.

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It is not certain that the Secretary-General would accept such an offer, but making it would be a concrete indication of our determination to see the UN's policy succeed. We have considered and discarded the possibility that such an offer would result in a counter-offer of the Soviet Union's being accepted.

The above course of action raises serious issues requiring at the appropriate time full consultations with Congressional leaders, the UN, and our allies, particularly the United Kingdom and Belgium.

M:FCMcGhee/IO:HCleveland/IO:UNP:JJSisco:WBBuffum/ck
December 13, 1962

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