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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES

18 February 1963

RIVAL FORCES IN LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSION

- I. Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. As Mr. Martin aptly put it yesterday, Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow.
- II. This same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries.
- III. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.
  - A. Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets.
    1. Latin American delegates to the East German Party Congress last month told one of our  reliable agents in the Communist party on their return that most Latin American Communist party representatives strongly supported the position of the USSR regarding the differences between

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it and China. Both the Cuban and Venezuelan representatives took a "neutral position," that is, they did not support the Soviets.

- [REDACTED]
2. Last summer a group of dissident Brazilian Communists who had split off from the regular party went to Cuba to seek Castro's support for their movement. According to one of our established sources [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] they got it. Castro advised them to organize guerrilla activities and launch a revolution as quickly as possible. He reportedly told the group that powerful revolutionary movements were being built up in Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

3. The activities of the splinter-group Communists has so rankled the regular party that its leader, Luiz Carlos Prestes, a veteran in the Communist movement in Latin

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America, left on 7 February on a trip to Moscow, Prague, and Havana to build a counter-fire against the dissidents. According to [redacted] reliable covert sources [redacted]

[redacted] Prestes planned to stop in Prague to arrange with the Chinese Communist Ambassador there to send two representatives to Peiping to make a direct complaint about support being given by Communist China to the splinter group. Prestes plans to stop on his way back in Havana to discuss Cuban support for that same splinter group. While in Moscow he reportedly will discuss the Sino-Soviet ideological differences and assure the Soviets of his party's support.

- B. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. Elsewhere in Latin America the Communist parties officially support more moderate Soviet views but there are serious dissensions among some of the leaders and within the membership. The Cuban missile crisis exacerbated these differences.

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1. The Brazilian case is the only clear split so far noted in the major Latin American parties, but the Paraguayan Communists have just conducted a purge of some 34 members and leaders for deviationist thinking.
2. The Ecuadorean Communist Party has disowned two leaders who have attempted to organize guerrilla bands without party sanction. One of them, Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, returned in early 1962 from a trip to China where he reportedly received some support.
3. Other parties have these problems as well. There are many impatient leaders and more followers who want to get on immediately with revolutionary economic, social and political reform.

IV. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Communist-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conservative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force.

A. Chile represents an inviting opportunity for the Communists to take power legally.

1. The present outlook is that there is at least an even chance for election of an anti-US, Communist coalition government in 1964.
2. The Communist party, legal in Chile, is a small but influential factor in the organized opposition to President Allesandri's conservative government. The Communists effectively control the left-wing coalition of Communists, Socialists and National Democrats.
3. Socialist Senator Salvador Allende is this coalition's presidential candidate in the 1964 elections. He was defeated by only a narrow margin in the 1958 election.
4. This coalition has increased its popular support since 1958 by advocating wage increases and social reform projects vetoed by Allesandri on orthodox economic grounds.

B. From the Soviet point of view other Latin American countries also appear to be drifting in the right direction.

1. In Brazil an increasing number of leftists have been appointed to positions of importance in the government. The government has recently been loosening its traditional ties with the United States and has shown signs of heading into the "neutralist" camp. Its dire economic straits make it a likely target for expanded Bloc economic exploitation.
2. Bolivia has been controlled by a leftist movement since the sweeping revolution of 1952. The government continually shows favoritism to Communists. Vice President Juan Lechin, recently made Ambassador to Italy, has maintained liaison with the Communist party over the past year. He is a leading contender in the presidential election to be held in 1964.
3. In Argentina the extremely unstable political and economic situations provide an ideal atmosphere for the type of coalition maneuvering in which Soviet-influenced Communists engage.



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V. Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing.

A. An excellent example of this was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

1. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level.
2. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system.
3. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance.
4. We have been reliably informed that posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries" as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the

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near future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin America.

5. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America.
6. The institute expects to enter into close contact with the principal Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963.

VI. One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to further Communist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions.

- A. As can be seen on this map the USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists, of course, have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with

Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries--Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official ties whatever with any bloc country.

B. Uruguay offers a good example of how the Communists misuse diplomatic missions and the importance the Communists attach to them.

1. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations against Argentina, Paraguay, etc.
2. Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist,

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but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself.

3. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any time.

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DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES

18 February 1963

CONCLUSIONS

- I. I should like to conclude with a word of caution.  
Some of the information I have given you is al-  
ready public knowledge, but I have attempted to  
include as much pertinent information as I can  
without jeopardizing valuable assets and important  
operations.
- II. We are working with the Department of State to de-  
termine how much of the information available to  
us can be made public through some appropriate  
channel in order to make plain the Cuban threat  
to Latin America. In the case of certain informa-  
tion from clandestine sources, we are attempting  
to manipulate it to the surface without exposing  
our agents. We have informed our stations of the  
importance this government attaches to exposing  
Cuban operations.
- III. I am sure, however, that you gentlemen can realize  
the sensitivity of information which comes from  
 penetrations of Communist parties, and  
the vital importance to the United States of con-  
tinued protection of these men.

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