

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault

---



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

## Agency Information

AGENCY : KISS/SCOW  
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10003-10090

RECORD SERIES : CHURCH COM.

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 7506462 (2)

## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : NSC

FROM :

TO : RECORD

TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62

DATE : 09/06/1962

PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS  
OPERATION MONGOOSE  
CUBAN EXILES  
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified

RESTRICTIONS : 1C

CURRENT STATUS : Redact

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Attached to 1781000310069. Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET.

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on  
Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin;  
Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and  
General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow

1. Sabotage Operation

General Carter reported that information should be available by Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr. Bundy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the information is obtained.

2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st. He noted that some of the operational representatives had questioned whether this was responsive to the changed situation engendered by the issuance of NSAM 181, but said that this plan had been prepared within the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16). Mr. Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to NSAM 181 has been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that the approach taken in the August 31st paper was satisfactory.

3. The following specific comments were then made on Activities listed in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not given to the paper at this meeting.)

a. Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal

UNMARKED  
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Photocopy  
from  
Gerald R. Ford Library

is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method and place of launching, the technical details of the release of leaflets, etc., etc.

b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of arms) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S. objectives toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should be done with the idea of providing a pretext for further action.

c. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported by State, said that Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr. Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount against U.S. radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared.

d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed at Bloc personnel in Cuba) was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than just to the latter.

e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce.

f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.

h. General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22 (submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy.

*Revised background*

4. The Group then turned to a discussion of [redacted]

[redacted] General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of [redacted]

Photocopy  
from  
Gerald R. Ford Library

[redacted]  
[redacted] Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must avoid [redacted], unless they could be completely covered up.

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.

He mentioned as examples what the U.S. response should be in the event of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mounted.

The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military contingency plans already prepared, must be pursued.

Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the MONGOOSE framework, Mr. Bundy <sup>suggested</sup> that General Lansdale's group, particularly the State representative, <sup>might</sup> could do the initial exploration of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible decisions of this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time available for MONGOOSE operations. This matter was left open for further consideration at a meeting next week.

cc - Gen Lansdale - destroyed 4/8/63 - mm