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Item 1-B

P. 11 - when?

P. 15-16 - 1 letter or 2.

P. 17 - did all

mail go thru or

facility.

Can we say generally
that none of our
letters were
mailed.

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Purpose and Scope of Study

The Central Intelligence Agency's performance in its role of support to the Warren Commission has been a source of controversy since the inception of the Warren Commission. Critics have repeatedly charged that the CIA participated in a conspiracy designed to suppress information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy.

During 1976 the critic's assertions were the subject of official inquiry by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC). The SSC, in its report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies" reached the following conclusion:

The Committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

The Committee has, however, developed evidence which impeaches the process

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by which the intelligence agencies arrived at their own conclusions about the assassination, and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission. This evidence indicates that the investigation of the assassination was deficient and that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI and the CIA, as well as other agencies of Government, who were charged with investigating the assassination. (SSC, Book V, p 6) 1

This Committee has sought to examine in greater detail the general findings of the SSC. The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, the misinforming or withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission was the

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result of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employees.

The Committee has sought to examine the issue detailed above in both an objective and disciplined manner. In order to accomplish this goal the Committee has utilized a 1977 ^{CIA} Task Force Report ~~by the CIA's Inspector General~~ (hereinafter 77 ^{TFR} IGR). This Report was highly critical of the SSC findings and asserted that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of limited effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission in its work. The 77 ^{TFR} IGR was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the ² Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports." (77 ^{TFR} IGR, Introduction to Tab E.)

In order to demonstrate further the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77 ^{TFR} IGR contained a comprehensive listing of CIA generated material made available

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to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. In this respect, the Committee agrees with the 77 ^{TFK} IGR wherein it is stated that "This compilation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort." (77 ^{TFR} IGR, Introduction to Tab E) 3

In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA generated material referenced above, the Committee has paralleled its review to the structure given to these materials by the 77 ^{TFR} IGR. In this regard the 77 ^{TFR} IGR details four inter-related compilations of Kennedy assassination material. These four compilations are:

- 1) Agency dissemination of information to the Intelligence Community (Formal and Informal Disseminations)
- 2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission

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3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al
regarding rumors and allegations
regarding President Kennedy's
assassination

4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the
Warren Commission on Rumors and
Allegations Relating to the President's
Assassination (77 IGR, Introduction
to Tab E.)

In reviewing these compilations,
the Committee focused upon those
CIA materials which the 77 ^{TFR} IGR documented as having
made available in written form to the Warren
Commission.

During the course of this study, additional
Agency files have been reviewed. These files have
been examined in an effort to resolve certain
issues created by the review of the Agency's
compilations discussed in this report. Where
apparent gaps existed in the written record,
files have been requested and reviewed in an effort
to resolve these gaps. Where significant substantive

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issues have arisen related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. ★
As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising an approximate total of ninety volumes of material have been examined and analyzed in preparation of this report.

The findings set forth herein are subject to modification due to the following considerations. During the course of the past fifteen years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. ~~In spite of the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system,~~ Certain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. Whether these documents merely have been filed incorrectly or destroyed, gaps in the written record still do exist.

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Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of investigative

★ Eg : CIA JFKassas. materials provided the Rockefeller Commission, CIA materials pertaining to Luisa Calderon Carallero, Maria Teresa Proenza, AMMUG-1 (Cuban Intelligence Service Defector), AMKASH, CIA "Soft Files" pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald. CIA materials generated by Warren Commission but carrying Agency classification

relevancy adopted by the CIA and this Committee, certain files requested by the Committee for review

have been made available to the Committee in a sanitized fashion. [★] Therefore, to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial of access and/or sanitization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the best evidence available to the Committee though this may not be all relevant evidence to which the Agency has access.

One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance of these discussions, briefings, and meetings may not always be reflected by the written record made the subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session hearings with

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★ CIA files pertaining to AMMO-1, Maria Teresa Proenza, and in Scott's personal safe holdings were made available to this Committee subject to Agency sanitization of the material

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key Warren Commission staff and members and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to resolve questions that are not addressed by the written record. The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject for discussion herein.

In addition, this report will examine the following subjects generated by the Committee's study as outlined above, in the following general order of discussion:

- 1) the organization of the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination;
- 2) the working relationship of the Warren Commission staff and those CIA representatives concerned with the Warren Commission inquiry;
- 3) the standards of investigative cooperation which the Warren Commission staff believed to govern the quality and quantity of information supplied by the CIA to the Warren Commission;

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- 4) the CIA's concern for protection of its sensitive sources and methods and the consequent effects of this concern upon the Warren Commission investigation; and
- 5) the substance and quality of information concerning Luisa Calderon passed to the Warren Commission and the results of this Committee's investigation of Calderon and her significance to the events of November 22, 1963.

II. Select Committee Study of
Information Made Available by CIA to Warren
Commission

see CIA page 2000517 infra
for beginning of this section

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To be inserted prior to section II

**I. Organization of CIA Investigation
of President Kennedy's Assassination**

In his Executive Session testimony before the Select Committee, Richard Helms, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during 1963, described the CIA's role in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination as follows:

This crime was committed on United States soil. Therefore, as far as the Federal government was concerned, the primary investigating agency would have been the Federal Bureau of Investigation without any question. The role of the CIA would have been entirely-supportive in the sense of what material we are (sic) able to acquire outside the limits of the United States with reference to the investigation. ... For investigative purposes, the Agency

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had no investigative role inside the United States at all. So when I used here the word "supportive," I meant that in the literal sense of the term. We are (sic) trying to support the FBI and support the Warren Commission and be responsive to their requests, but we were not initiating any investigations of our own or, to my recollection, were we ever asked to.

(Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 17-18.)

On November 23, 1963 Helms called a meeting of senior-level CIA officials to outline the Agency's investigative responsibility vis a vis the assassination. (SSC, Book V, p. 25.) At that time, Helms placed John Scelso, Branch Chief for CIA operations in Mexico, Central America, and Panama, in charge of the Agency's initial investigative efforts. (HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 111-112, Exec. Session Testimony

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of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.)

Scelso testified before the Select Committee,
that he was given charge of the Agency's investigation
on the basis of two considerations: 1) his prior
experience in conducting major CIA security investi-
gations and 2) the observance of Oswald ^{as reported to} by CIA
surveillance in Mexico, (Scelso's operational concern)
less than two months prior to the assassination. (SSC
Book V, p. 25, HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso,
5/16/70, pp. 111-112.; Scelso also noted that
during the course of his investigative efforts, Helms
did not pressure him to adopt specific investigative
theories nor reach conclusions within a set period of
time; ^{HSCA Class. Deposition of John Scelso,}
~~Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms,~~
~~5/16/70, p. 112.~~
~~8/9/78, pp. 9-10.) *~~

- * Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for
CIA's Counterintelligence Staff characterized Scelso's
responsibility not as a mandate to investigate but
rather to "coordinate traffic (code facilitation,
telegram or telegraphic consideration) for working
with the DDP with respect to what was being done over
the whole world..." (HSCA Classified Deposition of
R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 9.)
Rocca referred to this phase of CIA activity as
the GPFLOOR phase. (Ibid.)

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Scelso described in detail to the Committee the
manner in which he conducted the Agency's investiga-
tion:

...practically my whole Branch participated
in the thing. We dropped almost everything
else and I put a lot of my officers to work
in tracing names, analyzing files.

√ We were flooded with cable traffic, with
reports, suggestions, allegations from all
over the world, and these things had to be
checked out. We were checking out just dozens
and dozens of people all the time. (HSCA Classified
Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/70, p. 131)*

* During the course of the Agency's investigation, Liaison
with the FBI was handled for the CIA by [REDACTED]

√ (Ibid. p. 80.) At the time of the assassination Mr. [REDACTED]
a former FBI agent, was Chief of the Special Investigations
Group of the CIA's Counterintelligence Staff. (HSCA Classified
Deposition of [REDACTED] 6/20/78, p. 7 .) Mr. [REDACTED]
characterized his functions with respect to the Agency
as follows:

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on bottom of page 5)

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Scelso stated during his testimony that CIA field stations worldwide were alerted to the Agency's investigation "and the key stations were receiving tips on the case, most of which were phony. We did not send out instructions saying everybody participate in ✓ the investigation." (Ibid., p. 133.) It was his recollection, however, that throughout his tenure as coordinator of the Agency's investigation, the ~~Mexico City Station~~ was the only CIA field station directly

Footnote * -- continued from bottom of page 4.

I knew that we (at CIA) did not have the basic responsibility for investigating the assassination of the President. If there was a crime committed in the course of this activity, ✓ (sic) it belonged to the FBI. I recognized that it was our responsibility to give the fullest cooperation to the FBI to protect the Agency with regard to any aspects of our operations, you understand, and at the same time giving them cooperation, and I was in close contact with Mr. Sam Papich (of the FBI), and always fully co-operated, and he always fully cooperated with me. ✓ (Ibid., p. 52.)

noted that his office (CI/SIG) at the direction of the Chief of Counterintelligence, James Angleton, was designated the central point for collection of assassination- ✓ related information made available to the FBI. (Ibid., pp. 52-53.)

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involved in investigatory activities related to President
✓ Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid.^{p. 134})

During the latter half of December, Scelso
issued a summary report which described Oswald's
activities in Mexico City from September 26, 1963 -
October 3, 1963. Scelso characterized the summary report
as incomplete by comparison to assassination-related
information then available to the FBI but not provided
✓ to CIA until late Dec. 1963. (Ibid., pp. 114-115.) (CIA
Document Report by John Scelso to C/CI, 24 Dec. 63.)*

Following issuance of this report, Helms shifted
responsibility for the CIA's investigation of President
Kennedy's assassination to the Counterintelligence
Staff. (HSCA Classified Deposition of John Scelso,
✓ 5/16/78, p. 136, cf. HSCA Classified Deposition of
Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 15 wherein Rocca states that
responsibility shifted from Scelso to CI Staff on
January 12, 1964.) Helms testified that this shift in

* Approximately two days after President Kennedy's
assassination, Scelso prepared a summary report,
provided to President Johnson by Helms. This report
~~adopted the position~~ that Oswald probably was a lone
assassin who had no visible ties to Soviet or Cuban
intelligence though such ties could not be excluded
from consideration. (Ibid. p. 114.)

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HSCA CLASS. DEPO. OF JOHN SCELSO

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responsibility was a logical development because the
investigation had begun to take on broader tones.

✓ (Executive Session Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78,
p. 14, see also HSCA Classified Deposition of John
Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 138.)

Helms' reasoning was expanded upon by Raymond
Rocca who testified before the Committee that the
shift in responsibility described by Helms was caused
in part by the establishment of the Warren Commission.

✓ (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, ^{7/17/78} pp. 12-13.)

Rocca added:

It was entirely appropriate in the
GPFLOOR phase that he (Scelso) would
have that (responsibility for the Agency
investigation.) But the minute you had
a commission set up outside the line
obviously had to be the Director, and from
the Director to his Chief of Operations
overseas, because the spread involved
then all of the divisions. Here you had
Mr. (Scelso) being asked to sign off on
cables that had to do with the Netherlands,
with ~~U.K.~~, with Australia, and it would
have seemed to me utterly administratively
simply a hybrid monster. (HSCA Classified
✓ Deposition of R. Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 12.)

James Angleton supported Rocca's belief that "the
spread (of investigative responsibility) involved...

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(Ibid.)
all of the (CIA) divisions." [✓] Angleton testified
to this Committee that the Agency's efforts to
gather and coordinate information related to
the assassination underwent a metamorphic
transition. Initially, Angleton noted, the
Director, Deputy Director, Division Chiefs and
Case Officers approached Warren Commission.
requirements in a piecemeal fashion. However,
Angleton testified the Agency was eventually
able to focus its resources to avoid duplication
of effort and provide a system for the central
referencing of assassination related information
as such information was developed. (HSCA
Classified Deposition of James Angleton,
✓ 10/5/78, pp. 76-77, See also HSCA Classified
Deposition of Raymond Rocca, ⁷8/17/78,
p. 23.)

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The record reveals that during this second phase of CIA information collection efforts in support of the Warren Commission investigation the concentration of Agency resources shifted in emphasis from exploration of Oswald's activities in Mexico City to his residency in the Soviet Union during 1959-1962 and possible association with the Soviet intelligence apparatus.* ^(see p 9a. ff)
_{for *}
✓ (Ibid., pp. 32-33, 44, Executive Session of Testimony of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 23.) Accordingly, Rocca commented that during this phase primary interest in support of the Warren Commission was to follow-up on Soviet leads:

on the assumption that a person who spends four years** in the Soviet Union, under his circumstances, had to be of specific interest to Soviet State security and their collateral authorities. (HSCA Classified Deposition of
✓ Raymond Rocca, pp. 32-33.) (see p 9c for **)

Therefore, Rocca concluded, the areas the CIA tended to concentrate on concerned the Soviets:

(Category 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100)

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*The following exchange between Mr. Rocca and Committee Counsel sheds further light on the difficulties encountered by the Agency related to its investigation of possible Cuban involvement in the assassination:

Mr. Goldsmith. Earlier, when I asked you which areas of the case received emphasis, I believe that you indicated that on balance the primary area of emphasis was the Soviet connection.

Mr. Rocca. That was certainly the one that I would say dominated -- looking at it from my point of view.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, had you known about the anti-Castro assassination plots on the part of the CIA, would you have given more priority, more emphasis, to the possibility of a Castro conspiracy to kill the President?

Mr. Rocca. Again, I say that it would have simply intensified it, that there was attention given to it, not particularly by the staff. I had no capabilities on the Cuban side.

The organization of their service and their operation in Mexico was something entirely entirely (sic) within -- it was an enigma at the time. They were just getting started. This was ~~Win's~~ area. This was ~~Win-~~ ~~Scott's~~ area of proficiency. So the defectors had only begun to come out and they came out later, the Cuban defectors.

So, I can't -- I really can't say that (a) the Cuban connection was ignored, because it wasn't. The press was filled with it at the time.

The Harker interview should have been undoubtedly given greater attention in a generalized sense; but it was given specific attention, I was told at the time of the Rockefeller thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what way was the Cuban connection investigated?

Mr. Rocca. I don't know. I don't know this. That side of the report strikes me as being inadequate.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Well, when I said to what extent
was the Cuban connection investigated, I don't mean by
the Warren Commission. I mean to what extent did the
Agency provide --

Mr. Rocca. That I can't answer. I certainly
didn't do it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Pardon me?

Mr. Rocca. We certainly didn't, in R & A.

Mr. Goldsmith. So, CI/R & A did not --

Mr. Rocca. Go into the Cuban side of it at all.
This was something left to the people who were concerned
specifically with Cuban intelligence and security operation.

Mr. Goldsmith. But I believe earlier we
established that Mr. Helms gave orders that information
pertinent to the assassination was to go through your
office, correct?

Mr. Rocca. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And once information pertinent
to the assassination went through your office, I take (it)
you or Mr. Helms would decide what information would
be relevant for the Warren Commission to see.

Is that correct?

Mr. Rocca. Well --

Mr. Goldsmith. Based upon what you knew?

Mr. Rocca. Well, everything would go, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Therefore, you were in the
position, it would seem, to know what information was
being generated in the field that was going to the
Warren Commission.

Earlier I asked you which area received emphasis
and I believe you indicated that the Soviet area (did).

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Mr. Rocca. Primarily, primarily. But I didn't mean by that that it excluded the Cuban, because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's continue.

Mr. Rocca. My recollection is that at the time the great press manifestation was that Cuban exiles who were in touch with CIA had been somehow involved in this. This was the great concern.

Mr. Goldsmith. That's another possibility. There are different --

Mr. Rocca. Questions went down to WH: do you have anybody who could possibly have gotten involved in this kind of thing.

There was extraordinary diligence, I thought, exercised to try to clarify that side.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think that the possibility of an assassination plot by Castro against the President was adequately investigated?

(Pause)

Mr. Rocca. With the advantages of 20-20 hindsight, I could say probably not. But at the time it seems to me that they gave due attention to it -- within the information that I had at my disposal.

**In fact, LHO spent 2 years, 8 months in the Soviet Union
October 1959 - June 1962

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(Continued from p. 9)
... because the people he was in touch with in Mexico had traces, prior traces, as KGB people. They were under consular cover and obviously could have been doing and were undoubtedly doing a consular job in those earlier contacts."

(Ibid., p. 33)

However, Rocca did indicate that Cuban aspects of the CIA investigation were not ignored "because there was a lot of material that came through and went to the Commission that concerned the Cubans."

✓ (Ibid., p. 44)

Mr. Helms also testified that the possibility of Cuban involvement in President Kennedy's assassination was a source of deep concern within the Agency. (Exec. Session Testimony of R. Helms, 8/9/78, p. 21) Nevertheless, Mr. Helms stated that development of information pertaining to Cuban knowledge of or participation in the assassination was very difficult to obtain.

✓ (Ibid., p. 138)

Angleton was in agreement with Rocca's analysis that during the second phase of the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission the CIA concentrated its resources on exploring possible Soviet influence on

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Oswald. ✓ (Angleton, p. 86) He stated for the record
with regard to the Warren Commission's investigation
(with the CIA's support) of possible Cuban involvement
in the assassination:

I personally believe that the United
States intelligence services did not
have the capabilities to ever come to
an adjudication (of the Cuban aspect).

I don't think the capabilities were there.

(HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton,

10/5/78, p. 93)

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As noted above, the CI Staff assumed responsibility in late December 1963 - early January 1964 for the coordination of CIA efforts to assist the Warren Commission in its investigation. At that time, Raymond Rocca, Chief of Research and Analysis for CI Staff, was designated point of contact with the Warren Commission. (HSCA Classified Deposition of James ✓ Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.) Rocca's Research and Analysis component was concerned with:

"analytical intelligence, analytical brainpower, which meant all source, all overt source comprehension; a study of cases that had ceased to occupy operational significance, that is, closed cases, to maintain the ongoing record of overall quality and quantity of counterintelligence being performed by the entire DDP operational component;... the Deputy Director for Plan, (HSCA Classified Deposition of R. Rocca, ✓ 7/8/17/78; See also HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 77.)

p. 7. Mr. Rocca testified that assassination-related information generated by CIA components was directed to his staff (as designated point of contact with the Warren Commission) in the normal flow of day to day

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✓ *USCIB Classified Exposition of Ray Rocca, 7/17/78,*
work (*Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.) This information was then
reviewed by Rocca or his assistants who included
Thomas Hall, (Soviet Expert), Paul Hartman (general
research and search man for the U.S. Intelligence
Community and its resources), and Arthur Dooley (who
had transferred to the CIA from the FBI a number of
years prior to the assassination) (*Ibid.* p. 17.) ✓
During the course of the Warren Commission investi-
gation, Hall, Hartman and Dooley worked with those
CIA divisions producing substantive information
related to the assassination. (*Ibid.*) ✓

Mr. Rocca testified that even though
CI/R&A was the Agency's point of reference with regard
to the Warren Commission, neither his staff nor the
CI staff in general displaced the direct relations of
Mr. Helms or any other concerned Agency official with
✓ the Warren Commission. (*Ibid.*; Rocca testified that neither
CI Staff nor his staff displaced the CIA's Soviet
Division (represented by David Murphy, Chief of the

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SR division and his assistant, Tennant Bagley) in its contact with the Commission; nor did CI/R&A displace John Scelso in his contact with the Warren Commission.) Rocca testified that in some instances J. Lee Rankin of the Warren Commission would go directly to Helms with requests, and in other instances David Slawson, a Commission Staff counsel, conferred directly with Tom Hall of Rocca's staff. (Ibid., p. 36.)*

The record reveals that on certain issues of particular sensitivity Rocca was not permitted to act as the Agency's point of contact with the Warren Commission. He testified that "compartmentalization was observed, notwithstanding the fact that I was the working level point of contact." (HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond

* Although James Angleton functioned as Rocca's direct superior during the course of the Warren Commission investigation, he did not participate on a regular basis in the Agency's efforts to supply substantive information to the Warren Commission nor did he deal on a direct basis with Warren Commission representatives. (excepting Allen Dulles on an unofficial basis; HSCA Classified Deposition of Raymond Rocca, 8/17/78, p. 17-18; HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 78.) However, Angleton testified to this Committee that he did attempt to keep apprised of developments as the investigation progressed through consultation with Rocca. (HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 81)

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✓ Rocca, ³8/17/78, p. 18) Rocca cited by way of example the case of the Soviet defector Nosenko. Rocca testified that he did not attend any of the Agency discussions pertaining to Nosenko's case (Ibid.) ✓
Rather, (as it affected the Warren Commission investigation) responsibility for the Nosenko case was assigned to David Murphy, Chief of SR Division, in addition to Richard Helms. (Ibid) ✓

Rocca described the CI staff mail intercept program, HTLINGUAL, as a second example of an Agency matter about which he had no knowledge nor input vis a vis the Agency's support role to the Warren Commission.

✓ (Ibid., pp. 19-20.) Rather, James Angleton and

handled the disposition of this particular material (HSCA Classified Deposition of J. Scelso,

✓ 5/16/78, p. 113, wherein Scelso states that CI Staff

including was repository of HTLINGUAL intercepts;

but see HSCA Class Dep. of 9/20/78, pp 83-84 wherein states that he did not know whether Warren Commission had knowledge of the HTLINGUAL program because it was not his responsibility to provide the Warren Commission with materials derived from the HTLINGUAL program.

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In summary, it was Rocca's testimony that an internally decentralized information reporting function best characterized the organization of this second phase of the Agency's investigative efforts to assist the Warren Commission. ^{HSCA Class. Dep. of Ray Rocca, 7/17/78} (Ibid., p. 10; HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 75, 80. See also CIA Doc. Rocca Memo for Record, 1 April 1975, Subject: Conversation with David W. Belin, April 1, 1978, wherein it is stated that Helms remained senior official in charge of the overall investigation, with CI staff acting as a coordinator and repository of information collected.)

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**A. Opinions of Warren Commission and CIA Representatives
Regarding Warren Commission-CIA Relationship**

The Committee has contacted both representatives of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA-generated information to the Warren Commission.. The general consensus of these representatives is that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18) (See also Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 24.) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson on matters which utilized the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. (See HSCA staff interview of William Coleman, 8/2/78.) Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's cooperation and quality

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of work. (Executive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 17; see also JFK Exhibit 23.)

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured by the CIA that the Agency would cooperate in the Commission's work. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/7/78, p.4; HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 9)

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis-a-vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 5) Mr. McCone was responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters were

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conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission.

(Ibid., pp. 5-6) In this regard, Mr. McCone testified that:

The policy of the CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him -- giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satisfied. (Ibid., p. 9)

However, as will subsequently be discussed, the CIA policy was not to give the Warren Commission everything it had, but rather to provide the Warren Commission with all material the CIA deemed relevant to the work of the Warren Commission.

Materials Be Made Promptly Available By
CIA To Warren Commission

policy with respect to Mr. Raymond Rocca, the working level implementer of CIA the Warren Commission investigation,

characterized the Agency's role as one of

full support to the Warren Commission. Mr.

Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and

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Analysis Division for the Counter-Intelligence
Staff of the CIA, stated under oath that
Richard Helms had given the following
directive:

All material bearing in any way that
could be of assistance to the
Warren Commission should be seen by CIA
staff and R and A and marked for us. He
issued very, very strictly worded
indications -- they were verbal in so
far as I know -- that we were to leave no
stone unturned.

↓ (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca,
7/17/78, p. 24)

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Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees.

✓ (Ibid.) Mr. Rocca concluded that on this basis: "the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission." (Ibid., p. 26.)

A different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation, was directly responsible for the

CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination *and the establishment of CIA policy vis a vis the Warren Commission.*

✓ (Ibid., p. 23.) He testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (Exec. Sess. Text. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 10.) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Commission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Ibid., pp. 10-11.)

However, it was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission primarily

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on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under oath he supported this proposition:

Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms: That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which something different might have occurred, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them.

As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.
(Ibid., p. 34.)

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a ^{by case} case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was asked by Committee Counsel whether he worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission. In response, Mr. Rankin testified as follows:

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission communicate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right

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questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd.

✓ (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p. 4)

Mr. Slawson added support to Rankin's position testifying that Warren Commission requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (Exec. Sess. Test. of W. David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 29)

B

CIA's failure to Disclose CIA anti-Castro Assassination plans to Warren Commission

An unfortunate consequence of Warren Commission reliance on the CIA to provide the Commission with all relevant CIA material is reflected in

the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots [7(SSC Book V) see also (Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Interim Report, SSC, 11/20/75)7. Paradoxically, even if the Warren Commission had requested information on such plots, the CIA's point of contact with the Warren Commission would not have been able to provide the

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Commission with information so requested. As
Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had no
knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission
investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate
Fidel Castro. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond
✓ Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 50)

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Had Rocca, as the CIA's working level representative to the Warren Commission, been requested by the Commission to research and report on any and all CIA anti-Castro assassination operations, Rocca's ^{at his working level} efforts would have produced no substantive information. (Ibid., p. 49)*

The record also ~~reveals~~ that the CIA desk officer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr. Helms to investigate Lee Harvey Oswald, and the assassination of President Kennedy had no knowledge of such plots during his investigation. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 73, ¹⁴²⁻¹⁴³ ~~111-112~~) Mr. Scelso testified that had he known of such assassination plots the following action would have been taken:

"we would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban sources queried about it." (Ibid., p. 166)

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As the record reflects, these plots were known

by few within the CIA. Mr. Helms' testimony regarding

* Rocca testified he was not in a position to answer questions related to CIA assassination plots against Castro but that these have to be answered by others who were in the chain of command and who would have had all the information* (Ibid., p. 49) ✓

*See also HSCA Classified Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, pp. 86-87 wherein Angleton states that he did not learn of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation.

these plots reveals that the Agency compromised ~~the policy of~~
~~its Director~~
~~its promise~~ to supply all relevant information to
(see statement of John Malone, p 10a herein)
the Warren Commission. The following exchange

between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates

the extent of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees or to anyplace else without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

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Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall.
(HSCA Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard
Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 30-31., *emphasis added*)

Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John McCone, 8/17/78, p. 13)

When asked whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he gave the following response:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (Ibid., p. 16)

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, Warren Commission counsels Rankin, Slawson and Spector were in agreement that such information should have been reported to the

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(HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78,
pp 61-63)

Warren Commission. (Exec. Sess. Test. of W.

David Slawson, 11/15/77, p. 27; Exec. Sess. Test.

of Arlen Specter 11/8/77, pp. 45-46; CF, Exec.

Sess. Test. of Wesley Liebeler, 11/15/77, p. 71

where he states that possible withholding of
information by CIA about Agency attempts to
assassinate Castro did not significantly affect
Warren Commission investigation)

From the CIA's perspective, Mr. Rocca
testified that had he known of the anti-Castro
assassination plots his efforts to explore the
possibility of a retaliatory assassination against
President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensi-
fied. He stated that: " a completely different
procedural approach probably would and should have
been taken." (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca
7/17/78, p. 45)

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer
who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President
Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility
was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff,
offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms'
non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

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Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78)

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II. C. Agency Concern for the Sanctity of Sensitive Sources and Methods - Factors Affecting CIA Response to Warren Commission Requests

The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information was dependent upon 1) the availability of information; 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request and 3) the extent to which the relevant information touched upon sensitive CIA sources and methods. On the first two points, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve

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checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 25)

At times the CIA's concern for protecting its sensitive sources and methods caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting relevant information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue.

J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's

effort to protect its sensitive sources and methods, particularly with regard to CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City, affected the quality of the information to which

the Warren Commission and its staff were given

access. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin 8/17/78,

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p. 22) As a result of the CIA's concern, in some instances the Agency made the unilateral decision to limit access to CIA materials by the Commission.

✓ (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 158)

The Committee has identified two ^{related} areas of concern in which the Agency's desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods impeded the Warren Commission's investigation. These are:

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- 1) Withholding information from the Warren Commission pertaining to ~~the photo-surveillance and~~ telephonic surveillance operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station
 - 2) As a related consideration, the Agency's reticence to reveal the origin of the photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man" developed by the CIA's Mexico City photo-surveillance operations.
-
- CIA's Initial Concern for Revealing Sensitive Sources and Methods**

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the inception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations."

✓ (Ibid., p. 158) But Scelso did testify that:

We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including the telephone intercept and the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from the telephone intercepts. (Ibid.)

Mr. Scelsco's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding

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Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (CIA DOC. FOIA #509-803, 1/31/64, Memorandum for J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The CIA policy limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave ODACID (CIA Doc. FOIA #420-757, 12/20/63, Dir 90466)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 10, 1963 (as it specifically concerned the CIA's relations with the FBI.) (CIA Memorandum for File, 12/20/63, [redacted] included in with Soft file materials) In that memorandum, [redacted] of the CIA Counterintelligence/Special Investigations Group Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam

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Papich, FBI liaison to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 that had been submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided [] with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was tapping telephones in Mexico and asked him whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with the source of the telephone taps. [] memorandum shows that he discussed this matter with Scelso. After a discussion with Helms, Scelso was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission.

[] wrote:

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He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI--sensitive information which could relate to telephone taps, (CIA Memo for File, 12/20/63, by [redacted] included in Soft File materials)*

(?)
(Not A Sentence)

* The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 20, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized fashion. When Helms expressed his concern regarding exposure by the FBI of Agency sources to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information (as determined from Agency sources) coinciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (CIA dissemination to FBI, 1/14/64, CIA # CSCI-3/779/510.

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA might be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work cooperatively with the Commission in a manner which would protect CIA information, sources and methods. Among the policies articulated were two which Helms claimed would enable the Agency to control the flow of Agency originated information. In this way the CIA could check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were:

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The CIA policy of eliminating reference to Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. (CIA Doc. FOIA #398-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) This cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was still being withheld from the Warren Commission, and stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, the CIA was to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission which would be in a form

protective of the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques (Ibid.)

(Footnote cont'd from pg. 23.)

- 1) Your Bureau not disseminate information received from this Agency without prior concurrence
- 2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments (sic) or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible future interest of the Commission and initiate certain preparatory steps to meeting its needs. (Ibid.)

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HSCA Report
~~History~~ ~~Continuity~~ Copies

RETURN TO CIA

I. Previously ~~redacted~~

180-10110-10005 ✓

2. JFK Box 22, Folder 19: Pg 25 - "telephone taps... telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authorities..."

Pg 79: no redactions, i.e., "USGW 5031, 3/23/65" was released

Pg 50-52 missing

180-10142-10015 ✓

2. JFK Box 22, F 17, 02: Pg 25 - "telephone taps... telephone taps... Mexican authorities" (i.e., "in conjunction with the" was released)

Pg 79: "USGW" was redacted

Pg 50-52 missing

3. 2nd copy, sawer 180 ID: Pg 25: "Mexican authorities... between Mexico and the United States" (i.e., both telephone tap phrases and the "in conjunction with" phrase were not yellow highlighted)

Per Barry:

④ Have Shwirut check NARA original for this ID: were there two copies?

Pg 79: "USGW" not highlighted

Pg 50-52: missing

180-10142-10025 ✓

1. JFK Box 22, F 13, 01G: Pg 25: "Mexican authorities... between Mexico and the United States" (i.e., yellow highlighting is the same as the 2nd copy, 180-10142-10015, above.)

Pg 79: "USGW" is yellow highlighted

Pg 50-52 are here - with no proposed redactions

1. JFK Box 22, F 19, 01: Pg 25: highlighted were the second "telephone taps" phrase and "the Mexican authorities". This version, reviewed 12/18/96, needs reconsideration, say Dick/Rathy: releasing "telephone taps" poses problem, given the above release.

Pg 79: USGW not highlighted

Pg 50-52 are missing.

*Effect of CIA Concern for Sensitive Sources and Methods in its
Telephonic and Photo Surveillance Operations of Mexico City
Station*

Telephone Taps

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the Commission's work, of the CIA's telephonic and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City.

The reason for the sensitivity of these telephone taps and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but the telephone taps were running in conjunction with the Mexican authorities and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 51-52)

The CIA's unwillingness to inform the Warren Commission in the early stages of its investigation of the above-described surveillance operations is a source of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an Agency policy designed to skew in its favor the form and substance of information the CIA felt uncomfortable providing the Warren Commission. (HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso, 5/6/78, p. 158) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in

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its investigation with all the facts before it.

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during September 26, 1963 - (CIA Doc. FOIA #509-803 1/31/64) October 3, 1963.[↑] That memorandum did not mention that Oswald's various conversations with the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates had been tapped and subsequently transcribed.[↑] by the Agency's Mexico City Station Furthermore, that memorandum did not mention that the CIA had tapped and transcribed conversations between Cuban Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Armas which the CIA had also tapped and transcribed.

?
On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission and likely ^{discussed} discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #498-204, 1/29/64, DIR 97829) On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. (JFK Doc. No. 3872) A review of Rankin's letter

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indicates that as of his writing, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of the telephonic surveillance operation or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 letter whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in Paragraph 1 of January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, had the Warren Commission been informed of the telephonic surveillance operation and its success in tapping Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. (HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make

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this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission first learned of these operations. (Ibid.)

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency neither revealed the source of this information in its response to the Commission nor indicated that this source would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing). (Ibid.)

Warren Commission Knowledge of CIA Telephonic Surveillance

During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, and

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and Willens did not obtain access to CIA telephonic surveillance materials until April 9, 1964. On that date, Coleman, Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, who provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from CIA telephone taps of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson Memorandum of April 22, 1964, Subject: Trip to Mexico City p22)

Prior to April 9, it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12, 1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did maintain telephonic surveillance of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum of March 12 reveals that the Warren Commission had learned that the CIA possessed transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. The Dorticos-Armas conversations, requested by the Warren

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Commission representatives at ^{the March 12} meeting with
CIA officials, including Richard Helms, concerned
Silvia Duran's arrest and interrogation by the
Mexican Federal Police. (Slawson Memorandum of
April 22, 1964, pp. 3, 19, 45-46) Helms responded
to the Commission's request for access, stating
that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren
Commission's representatives to review this material.
(Slawson Memorandum of March 12, 1964, p. 6)

Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25,
1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. In that memo
Slawson wrote that the tentative conclusions
he had reached concerning Oswald's Mexico trip,
were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964
and February 19, 1964, (Slawson Memorandum of March
25, 1964, p. 20) and, in addition, a Mexican federal
police summary of interrogations conducted shortly
after the assassination with Silvia Duran, her husband Horacio, and handful of friends

Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report)
is simply a summation of what the Mexican
police learned when they interrogated Mrs.
Silvia Duran, an employee of the Cuban
Consulate in Mexico City, and is there-
fore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's
testimony to the police. (Ibid.)

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These comments indicate that Slawson placed qualified reliance upon the Mexican police summary.

Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran telephonic intercept transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Silvia Duran. As Slawson reveals, the Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a summary report issued by the Mexican Federal Police. Thus, the Agency had ^{precluded} for over three months ^{actual analysis} exposing the surveillance operations to the ^{review} of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of telephone taps, in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave ODACID here.
(CIA Doc. FOIA #420-757, Dec. 20, 1964,
CIA p. 2144, DIR 90466)

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The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran^{telephonic intercept} transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (CD 692) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. (Ibid, p. 2) This conclusion, ^{again} he wrote, was based upon an analysis of Silvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears no indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, had Slawson been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis would have reflected the fact of his review either by its corroboration or criticism of the above cited Mexican police summary report.

Logically, access to the CIA's telephonic surveillance production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m.

(Slawson Memorandum of April 21, 1964, Subj: Intercepts

from Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico, p. 2) ^{put S.O. at}
^{end of sentence}

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Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, subsequently identified by CIA analysts as Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy. (Ibid. p. 4) *corroborating Oswald's visits to the Cuban Embassy* Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than *reflected in his memorandum* they were as of March 27, 1964.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of telephonic intercepts. *although now aware of their existence* A memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, posed one question to the CIA and made two requests for information from the Agency. (Slawson - Coleman Memorandum of April 2, 1964, Subj: Questions Raised by the Ambassador Mann File) Coleman and Slawson wrote:

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that

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Oswald intended to settle down in
Odessa;

- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the intercepts, translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts refer to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see the intercept in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed (Ibid.)

The question initially posed by (Item ¹/~~1~~) in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA telephonic intercept of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson Memorandum of April 21, 1964, p. 1) Obviously, if Slawson found it necessary to request the source of the information, he had not as yet been provided access to the original material by the CIA.

Item Number Two of the above listing tends to show that the Commission had not been giving access to the intercepts concerning the assassination.

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Item number three of the above listing reveals that the intercept of the Dorticos-Armas conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies was discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts at a March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency representatives. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: Conference with CIA on March 12, 1964)

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson expressed their concern for receiving complete access to all materials relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip:

The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

...In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or

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possible conspiracies have been followed
through with negative results), we must
become familiar with the details of what
both the American and Mexican investi-
gatory agencies there have done. This
means reading their reports, after trans-
lation, if necessary, and in some cases
talking with the investigators themselves.

(Slawson and Coleman Memorandum, April
13, 1964, Subj: Additional lines of
Investigation in Mexico Which May Prove
Worthwhile, p. 11.)

Manifestly, Coleman's and Slawson's desire
for a thorough investigation had been ^{impeded} by
the CIA's concern lest its sources and methods,
however relevant to the Commission's investigation,
be exposed. Considering the gravity and signi-
ficance of the Warren Commission's investigation

the

Agency's withholding of material from the
Commission staff was clearly improper.

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1964

On April 8, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. (Slawson Memorandum, April 22, 1964, Subj: Trip to Mexico City, p. 1) Prior to their departure, they met with Thomas Mann, the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid.) Ambassador Mann told the Warren Commission representatives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Ibid., p. 3)

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA (Ibid. pp. 9-10)

That same day, during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the CIA's telephonic surveillance operations accompanied with English translations of the transcripts. (Ibid.) In addition,

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he provided the group with reels of photographs
for the time period covered by Oswald's visit
that had resulted from photosurveillance of the
Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. ^(Ibid.) David Slawson
wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning
of his narrative that he intended to make
a complete disclosure of all facts,
including the sources of his information,
and that he understood that all three of
us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and
that we would not disclose beyond the
confines of the Commission and its
immediate staff the information we obtain-
ed through him without first clearing it
with his superiors in Washington. We
agreed to this." (Ibid.)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission repre-
sentatives the CIA's course of action ^{directly}
following the assassination, indicating that his
staff immediately began to compile dossiers on
Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico
whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald
(Ibid.) Scott revealed that all known Cuban and Russian
intelligence agents had ^{quickly} been put under
surveillance following the assassination. Slawson
concluded :

"Scott's narrative plus the material we
were shown disclosed immediately how
incorrect our previous information had
been ~~on~~ Oswald's contacts with the Soviet
and ~~Mexican~~ Embassies. Apparently the
^{Cuban}

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distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close notes as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit." (Ibid, p. 24)*

★ A separate Slawson memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with the telephonic intercepts pertaining to the Duran and Oswald conversations for the period Sept. 27 - Oct. 1, 1963. (Slawson Memorandum, April 21, 1964 Subj: Intercepts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case the telephonic surveillance intercepts, seriously impaired the Commission's ability to draw accurately reasoned conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City. It meant that as of April 10, 1964,

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nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise materials could have been made available for analysis ~~by the Commission.~~ (Ibid.) Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation e.g., Cuban involvement, that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided.

Mexico City Station Photosurveillance and the
Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, FBI Special Agent Odum showed Marguerite Oswald a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son (Warren

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✓Commission Report p. 364) This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. ^{Ibid.} (CIA Doc. DDP4-1555, 3/25/64, Warren Commission Doc. 67) This photograph, which was one in a series resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates, Prior to the assassination, had been linked by the Mexico City Station to Lee Harvey Oswald. (Ibid.) Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. (Warren Commission Affidavit of Richard Helms 8/7/64, Vol. XI, pp. 469-470) In his affidavit Mr. Helms explained that the photograph was taken outside the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City on Sep 26, 1963 & Nov. 22, 1963. On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. (Warren Commission Report Vol I, p153) Mrs. Oswald testified that she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. (Ibid.) ^{Warren Commission Report, p. 364}

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Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote to Thomas Karramesines, Assistant DDP requesting both the identity of the individual depicted in the photograph and an explanation of the circumstances by which this photograph was obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872)

On that same day, in a separate letter, Rankin wrote to DCI McCone regarding materials that the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963 to the Secret Service but not to the Warren Commission. ★ Rankin requested copies of these materials which included three CIA cables. The cables concerned the photograph subsequently shown by the FBI to Oswald's mother of the individual originally identified by the Mexico City Station as Lee Harvey Oswald. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin Feb. 12, 1964, JFK Doc. #3872)

★ Among the materials disseminated by the CIA to the Secret Service was a November 26 dissemination. (CIA Doc DIR 85177, 11/26/64) That cable concerned

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the Dorticos-Armas conversations and disclosed the existence of CIA telephonic surveillance operations in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit ^(lib 5) AS a result the CIA was reluctant to make the material disseminated to the Secret Service available to the Warren Commission for in so doing the Agency would have necessarily exposed its telephonic surveillance operations to the Commission.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission recounting the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?" ~~LIB 5~~ [HSCA class. Depo. of

John Scelso, 5/16/78, p 158
Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission. ~~(lib 5)~~

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

~~(HSCA Class. Depo. of John Scelso 5/16/78, p. 158)~~ ~~158~~ ibid

In summary the records shows that

By February 12, 1964 the Warren Commission had inadvertently requested access to telephonic surveillance production, a cause for concern within the Agency

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due to the sensitivity of Agency sources and methods. Similarly, the possible disclosure of the photosurveillance operations to the Warren Commission had also begun to cause concern within the Agency.

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding the CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. ^(b, d) Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter to McCone requesting access to CIA reports provided the Secret Service after November 22, 1963, ✓ (JFK Doc. 3982). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies or the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..." (CIA Doc. FOIA #579-250, 3/5/64; see also HSCA Classified ✓ Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, pp. 131-132

(b, d)

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wherein he states that the only reason
for not providing the Warren Commission with
access to CIA surveillance materials
was due to the Agency's concern for
protection of its sources and methods)

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On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA conferred regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (Letter of J. Lee Rankin March 16, 1964, JFK Doc. # 3872, Slawson Memorandum, March 12, 1964)

81 The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. ~~Slawson~~ → Slawson Memorandum, March 12, 1964 Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. ✓ You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrases are complete." (Letter of J. Lee Rankin, March 16, 1964, paragraph 2, JFK Doc. No. 3872) (1616)

Rankin further indicated that the same procedure was to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22,

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1963 which had not as yet been furnished because it concerned sensitive sources and methods. (Ibid.,
✓par. 3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (FOIA # 622-258) by two separate communications. (CIA Doc. DDP4-1554, hereinafter CD 631, 3/24/64, CIA Doc., DDP4-1555, 3/24/64, CD 674 hereinafter) CD 631 provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (and to the Secret Service on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. ^{CD 631} The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had ^{from the Navy} requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. ^{ibid} Furthermore, the CIA stated, though it did not indicate when, that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald. ^{ibid} The Agency explained that it had checked the ^{photograph} against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963, ^{ibid}

CD 674 reveals that on Nov. 22, 1963 immediately followir

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the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. (CD 674) Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. ^(i.b.d) The Agency wrote that the subject of the photo referenced ^(i.b.d) in these cables was not Oswald. It was further stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the original copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA Doc. BDP4-1555-CD674, 24 March 1964) ^(i.b.d)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24, 1964 (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested." (Memorandum of William Coleman, March 26, 1964)

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the

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assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 [★] of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry." (Ibid.)

March 27,
→ The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. [Memorandum of Samuel Stern, March 27, 1964]

Sterns' memorandum ~~of his visit~~ reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. ^{ibid.} Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. ^(ibid.) The file also contained:

"Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photograph of the unidentified individual mistakenly believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA." ^{ibid.} ~~(Memorandum of Samuel Stern, March 27, 1964)~~

Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the

★ Paragraph 4 of CD 631 stated that CIA concluded the photograph of unidentified individual did not depict Oswald based upon press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963

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Warren Commission on March 24, 1964. ^(ibid) He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. ^{ibid} In addition, Stern examined the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background information on Oswald." (Ibid.) Stern recorded that these messages were paraphrased accurately as set forth in the CIA's January 31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. ^(ibid)

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. ^(ibid) He stated "there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased." (Ibid.)

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.

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II D.

Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish.

(CIA Doc. FOIA MEXI 7105, 11/27/63, 173-615, attachment)

This call had been intercepted and recorded by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its LIENVOY (tel. tap) operation. (Ibid.) The Mexico City Station, as subsequently reported to CIA headquarters, identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate. (Ibid.)

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard
(of the assassination)
the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

(Ibid.)

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Paraphrasing the telephone intercept transcript, it states that the caller told Luisa the person

what authority?

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apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the
"President of one of the Committees of the Fair
Play for Cuba." ^{ibid} Luisa replied that she also knew
this. ^{ibid} Luisa inquired whether the person being
held for the killing was a "gringo." ^{ibid} The unidenti-
fied caller replied, "yes." ^{ibid} Luisa told her caller
that she had learned nothing else about the assassina-
tion and that she had learned about the assassination
only a little while ago. ^{ibid} The unidentified caller
commented:

We think that if it had been or had
seemed...public or had been one of
the segregationists or against
intergration who had killed Kennedy,
then there was, let's say, the
possibility that a sort of civil
war would arise in the United States;
that contradictions would be sharpened...
who knows ^{ibid}

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that
makes three. (She laughs.) (Ibid, p. 2)

Raymond Rocca, in response to a 1975 Rocke-
feller Commission request for information on a
possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

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Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto
suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the
only item in the intercept coverage of
the Cubans and Soviets after the assassina-
tion that contains the suggestion of fore-
knowledge of expectation. (CIA Doc.,
Memorandum of Raymond Rocca for DC/OPS,
5/23/75, p. 15)* (see p. 55a for K)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic
comments do not merit serious attention. Her words
may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassina-
tion but may equally be interpreted without such a
sinister implication. Nevertheless, the Committee
has determined that Luisa Calderon's case should
have merited serious attention in the months following
the assassination.

In connection with the assassination, Luisa
Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1963
in a cable sent by then Ambassador Mann to the State
Department (CIA Doc. DIR 85573, 11/27/63).

In that cable Mann stated:

"...Washington should urgently consider
feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities
to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue,
Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two
men are Cuban national and Cuban consular
officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary
in Cuban Consulate here." (ibid.)

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*Regarding the issue of whether Calderon's comments could reasonably be interpreted to indicate possible foreknowledge, the CIA position is as follows:

During the Rockefeller Commission inquiry, Calderon's conversation was identified as a possible item of information from the Agency's Cuban and Soviet telephone intercepts that might suggest foreknowledge of a plot to assassinate the American President. This involves a faulty translation of an answer Calderon gave to her caller. In answer to the latter's question as to whether she had heard the latest news, Calderon said: "Si, claro, me entere casiantes que Kennedy." The verb entere is mistranslated. Me entere (the first person of the verb enterarse, past tense) should be translated as "...I found out (or I learned) /about it -- the assassination/ almost before Kennedy /did/." In other words, Calderon was saying she heard about the shooting of Kennedy almost at the time the event took place..." (CIA Doc., Memorandum Regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, p.1).

The Committee fundamentally disputes the narrow interpretation of Calderon's comments assigned by the Agency. It is the Committee's position that translation of Me Entere as either "I found out" or "I learned about" does not foreclose interpretation of Calderon's comments as a suggestion on her part of possible foreknowledge of President Kennedy's assassination. *The interpretation, in any event, should have been left to the judgment of the Warren Commission, not the CIA*

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This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon.* ^(ibid.) However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. ^(CIA Doc. DIR 85573, 11/17/63) That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann for Sec Rusk re: ...persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy." Mann went on to state in urgent terms: "They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican government could use them as witnesses." (Ibid.)

According to CIA files, Calderon made reservations to return to Havana on Cubana Airlines on December 11, 1963, less than four weeks after the assassination. (CIA Doc. CSCI-316/01783-65, 4/26/63)

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have

~~At the time of the assassination...~~
*It is the Committee's belief that Mann was prompted to request the arrest of Calderon on the basis of Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte's allegation that Calderon was present at the Cuban Embassy when Oswald was allegedly given a sum of money presumably to carry out the assassination of President Kennedy. (CIA Doc. DDP4-2741, 1 June 1964, Attachment C)

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had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions. (CIA Doc. DIR 84950, 11/23/63, CIA Doc. DIR 85471, 11/27/63)

During her second interrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with Calderon. There is no indication in the reinterrogation report accounting for the questioning of Duran about Calderon. (CIA Doc. DDP4-0940, 2/21/64) The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964, more than two months after Calderon had returned to Cuba. (Ibid.)

Information was reported to the CIA during May 1964, from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was himself a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cuban Intelligence operations. (CIA Doc., Memorandum of Joseph Langosch to Chief, Office of Security, 6/23/64) Calderon's

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ties to Cuban intelligence were reported to the Warren Commission on June 18, 1964. (CIA Doc. FOIA #739-319, 6/19/64) However, the Committee has determined from its review that the CIA did not provide Calderon's conversation of November 22 to the Warren Commission. Consequently, even though the Warren Commission was aware that

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Calderon had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this regard may have foreclosed the Commission from actively pursuing a lead of great significance.

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1963, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (CIA Doc. Dispatch HMMA21612, no date given) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City station and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). (CIA Doc. Dispatch JFCA-10095, 7/15/63) That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The

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notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. (Ibid., p. 3 of attachment) No such report is present in Calderon's 201 File. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first recorded by the CIA on May 5, 1964. (CIA Doc. Blind Memorandum of Harold Swenson, FOIA 68-290 5/5/64) At that time, Joseph Langosch, Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, reported the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum stated that AMMUG-1 had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban Intelligence Service officers. (Ibid.) Specifically, AMMUG-1 was asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Langosch "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion

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Cuba Intelligence

General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez." (Ibid.)

Langosch thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico during January 1963 and departure for Cuba within one month after the assassination. (Ibid.)

On May 7, 1964, Langosch recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. (CIA Doc FOIA 687-295, attach. 3, 5/7/64) Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence. (Ibid.)

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On May 8 Langosch further disclosed AMMUG's knowledge of the Oswald case. (Ibid, attach. 5)

Langosch paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Piñeiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...(Ibid.)

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On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information Swenson had elicited from AMMUG (CIA Doc. FOIA 687-295, 5/11/64, Rocca Memorandum). Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG-1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing." (Ibid. p. 2)

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. (CIA Doc. FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64, Helms Memorandum) Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of Langosch's May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.) In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were set forth. However, that attachment made no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum,

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access to the questions used in Langosch's
interrogation of AMUG. (CIA Doc. FOIA 739-316, 6/19/64,
Memorandum) On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of
Rocca's Counterintelligence Research and Analysis
Group took the questions and AMUG's responses to
the Warren Commission's office's for Willen's review.
Willens saw Langosch's May 5 memorandum. The only
mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise
relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not
clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from
which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." (Ibid.)
However, Willens was not shown Langosch's
memoranda of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained
much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon,
including her possible association with Lee Harvey
Oswald and/or American intelligence. (Ibid.)*

The Warren Commission as of June 19, 1964,
had little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon
lead. It had effectively been denied significant

* It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5,
7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not
referenced in the Calderon 201 file. (See CIA
Computer printout of Calderon 201 file) Their
existence was determined by the Committee's
independent review of other agency files.

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background information. This denial may have impeded or prevented the Commission's pursuit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. But even if the Warren Commission had learned of Calderon's background and possible contact with Oswald it still had been denied the one significant piece of information that might have raised its interest in Calderon to a more serious level. The Warren Commission was never told about Calderon's conversation of November 22, 1964.

The Committee has contacted former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine whether a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren Commission. The response has uniformly been that the Calderon conversation was never made available to the Commission nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission.

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HSCA Interview of W. David Slawson, 8/17/78, p.5;
Willens response to letter of HSCA Class. Exec.
Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 132; CF
deposition of Raymond Rocca, p. 156 wherein he
states that he is sure the Commission knew of it,)

~~See p. 66. *~~ the Calderon 201 file bears no
reference to the conversation nor does it indicate
that it was ever made known to or provided the
Warren Commission for its analysis. (CIA Computer
print-out of Calderon 201 file)

In an effort to determine the manner in which the CI
treated the Calderon conversation this Committee
posed the following questions to the CIA:

1. Was the Warren Commission or any Warren
Commission staff member ever given access
to the transcript of a telephone conversa-
tion, dated November 22, 1963, between a
female employee of the Cuban Embassy/
Consulate in Mexico City, identified
as Luisa, and an unidentified male speak-
ing from outside the Cuban Embassy/Con-
sulate? If so, please indicate when
this transcript was provided to the Warren
Commission or its staff, which CIA official
provided it, and which Warren Commission
members or staff reviewed it.
2. Was the Warren Commission or any member
of the Warren Commission or any Warren
Commission staff member ever informed

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orally or in writing of the substance of the above-referenced conversation of November 22, 1963? If so, please indicate when and in what form this information was provided, and which CIA official provided it. (HSCA request letter of August 28, 1978)

The CIA responded by memorandum:

"Although the (Mexico City) Station considered the conversation of sufficient possible interest to send a copy to headquarters, the latter apparently did nothing with it, for there appears to be no record in the Oswald file of such action as may have been taken. A review of those Warren Commission documents containing information provided by the Agency and still bearing a Secret or Top Secret classification does not reveal whether the conversation was given or shown to the Commission."
(CIA Doc., Memorandum Regarding Luisa Calderon conversation, p. 1)

The available evidence thus supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information nor the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her comments following the assassination, it may well have given more serious investigative

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consideration to her potential knowledge of Oswald and the Cuban government's possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Two difficult issues remain which are raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the Warren Commission its full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus.

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The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and published its report. *(See p 65, circled portion as footnote herein)* (See above CIA explanation)

As for the Agency's withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (CIA Doc. 5/5/64, Swenson Memorandum)

The memoranda which provided more extensive examination of her intelligence background were not made

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available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written by Joseph Langosch following his debriefing of AMMUG-1 indicated that AMMUG-1 and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed Calderon to be a CIA operative. (CIA Doc. FOIA 687-295, attach 5, 5/8/64) It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was of substantive concern to the Agency. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. It would have demonstrated that a ^{possible} CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed information prior to the assassination regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to the Cuban Intelligence Service, and that Services' possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Regarding Calderon's possible association with the CIA, Agency files reviewed reveal no ostensible connection between Calderon and the CIA.

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However, there are indications that such contact between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic exploitation section might be in a position to follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. (CIA Doc. HMMW-1935, 9/1/63)

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon--or her mother may make the trip--details not clear (CIA Doc. HMMA 21849, July 31, 1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches evidenced an interest in the activities of Calderon and her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

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The Committee has queried David Ronis, the author of the above cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section." (HSCA Class. Staff Interview of David Ronis, 8/31/78) Ronis was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection of intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. Often he would receive no response to these requests, which normally indicated that no follow-up had either been attempted or successfully conducted. It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division

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might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sister. Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (Ibid.)

Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, p. 136; HSCA Class. Depo. of Raymond Rocca, 7/17/78, p. 148; HSCA Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78, Piccolo, Interview of August 11, 1978)

Thus, the Agency's file on Calderon and the testimony of former CIA employees have revealed no connection between Calderon and the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete; the

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most glaring omission being the absence from
her 201 file. of ^{Calderon's} cryptic remarks
following the assassination of President Kennedy.

Background and
AMMUG-1 - Information Provided to CIA concerning
Luisa Calderon

This Committee's investigation of Luisa
Calderon has revealed that a defector from the Cuban
Intelligence Services provided the CIA with signi-
ficant information about Lee Harvey Oswald's contacts
with the DGI in Mexico City. This defector was
assigned the CIA cryptonym AMMUG-1 (A-1 hereinafter).*

CIA files reveal that A-1 defected from the
DGI on April 21, 1964 in [REDACTED]

When he defected, A-1 possessed a number of DGI
documents which were subsequently turned over to
the CIA. (CIA Doc. [REDACTED] IN 68894, 4/24/64)

Following his defection, a CIA officer, Joseph H.
Langosch, went to [REDACTED] to meet A-1, debrief him,
and arrange for A-1's travel into the United States.
(Ibid.) On May 1, 1964, 22 reels of Langosch's

*It is now known that A-1 did provide significant
leads to the CIA regarding Luisa Calderon. It is
further apparent that little of this information
was made available by the CIA to the Warren Commission.
Therefore, the possibility exists that A-1 had
provided other information to the CIA
relevant to the Warren Commission's work which
was not properly reported to the Commission.

debriefing of A-1 were forwarded to the Chief of Station in [] (CIA Doc. Dispatch [] 7763, 5/1/64) Effective on May 1, A-1 was under contract with the CIA for operational purposes.

(CIA Doc. Contract Approving Officer Memo, 6/6/64)

insertion ★
p. 13

By June 23, 1964, Langosch was convinced that A-1 would be of great value to the Agency. He stated:

There is no question in my mind that AMMUG-1 is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (CIA Doc. Langosch Memo to Director of Security, 6/23/64)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B (CIA Doc. [] IN 68894 4/24/64) which was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (CIA Doc. Personal Record Questionnaire 6/4/64; CIA Doc. [] In 68894 4/24/64)

A-1 identified for the CIA the Cuban Intelligence officers assigned to Mexico City. Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

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In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (Langosch debriefing of A-1, 4/30/64, p. 5 of reel 4, 4/23/64)

Thus, A-1 was able to provide the CIA soon after his defection with accurate information regarding DGI operations and DGI employees in Mexico City. *★ Insert from p 72*

The Committee has reviewed the CIA's files concerning A-1. This examination was undertaken to determine: 1) whether A-1 had provided any valuable investigative leads to the CIA pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy; and 2) whether, if such leads were provided, these leads and/or other significant information were made available to the Warren Commission.

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The Committee's initial review of the materials provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission did not disclose the existence of the AMMUG files. However, the Committee did during the course of its review examine a file containing material passed to the Rockefeller Commission. That file made reference to A-1. Included in this file was a memorandum of May 5, 1964 written by Joseph Langosch which concerned information A-1 provided about the Oswald case. (CIA Doc. FOIA 68-290 Langosch Memorandum, 5/5/64) Also contained within this file were the A-1 debriefing memoranda of May 7, and May 8, 1964 previously cited with regard to Luisa Calderon. (CIA Doc. FOIA #687-295, attach's 3 and 5) Following review of the memoranda, the Committee requested access to all CIA files or concerning referring to A-1.

From review of these materials the Committee has determined that the Warren Commission did learn during mid-May 1964 that Lee Harvey Oswald probably had come in contact with DGI officers in Mexico City.

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~~the~~ Warren Commission

Prior to[^] learning of Oswald's probable contact with DGI officers, James Angleton, Chief of the CIA's Counter Intelligence Staff passed an internal memorandum to Raymond Rocca, also of the Counter-intelligence Staff, which stated that he had been informed by the DDP, Richard Helms, that J. Lee Rankin had contacted John McCone to request that the Director consent to an interview before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964. (J. Edgar Hoover also appeared before the Commission on that date prior to McCone's appearance. Warren Commission Report, ^{Vol. II} ~~AP~~ 97-29) (CIA Doc. FOIA 689-298, Memorandum of James Angleton, 5/12/64) Angleton also wrote:

I discussed with Mr. Helms the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive Western Hemisphere source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of the implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this carefully and made (sic) a decision as to the question of timing. (Ibid.)

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Western Hemisphere

Undoubtedly the White House source referred to in Angleton's memo was A-1. This conclusion is based in part upon the date of this memo which was quite close in time to A-1's defection. In addition, Rocca's staff prepared prior to DCI McCone's appearance before the Warren Commission for Presentation to the Warren Commission^a outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (CIA Doc. FOIA 695-302-A, 5/14/64)

At Tab E of this brief it states:

Within the past week, significant information has been developed by the CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect. (Ibid., Tab E)

On May 15, 1964, the day of McCone's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-1. (CIA Doc FOIA 697-294, 5/15/64). However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information

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was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (Ibid.) The May 15 communication did state that the Agency had established contact "with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia." (Ibid.)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 regarding knowledge of Oswald's probable contact with the DGI in Mexico City. The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. (Ibid., attachment)

As set forth in the section of this report concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the information set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the questions nor the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector collaborating with the CIA. (CIA Doc FOIA 739-319, 6/19/ 64).

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Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon, specifically of Nov. 22 details of her her conversation and association with Cuban Intelligence were withheld from the Warren Commission. This information as described above, was derived from debriefings of A-1. However, from the Committee's review of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that a specific document as referenced in the A-1 file is not present in that file.

The missing item is of considerable concern to the Committee. It is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case." (CIA Doc Dispatch UFGW-5035, 3/23/65) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Ibid.) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has worked extensively with the Agency files

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system told a Committee staff member that this notation was the symbol for the CIA component known as Special Intelligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated September 27, 1978, the CIA has adopted the position that debriefing Report No. 40 is a duplication of the original Langosch memorandum of May 5, 1964 concerning AMMUG's knowledge of Lee Harvey

Oswald's possible contact with the DCL.*
(skip to a fork)
Nevertheless, the Committee has not resolved to its satisfaction whether Debriefer Report No. 40 is indeed a duplication of the May 5, Langosch memorandum.
The Committee has questioned A-1's case

officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied about Oswald. Joseph Langosch, when interviewed by the Committee, stated that he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1's debriefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (HSCA

✓ Staff Interview of Joseph Langosch, 8/21/78; Cite also *Baines Mikes 4/18/78 Joseph 8/11/78*
Interviews of Hildago & Piccolo) He also stated that

he does not recall that A-1 provided any other information

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*The CIA memorandum states in part as follows:

When CI Staff learned of AMMUG-1's defection and considered the possibility that he might have some knowledge of the Oswald case, CI Staff submitted a list of questions to WH (Western Hemisphere) for debriefing AMMUG-1...WH desk records reflect that AMMUG-1 was debriefed on 4 May 64 regarding this questionnaire.../B/ecause the debriefing on the Oswald case was handled as a sensitive matter, it was dictated directly to a CI (Counterintelligence) stenographer on 5 May 1964. /Note: A-1 was debriefed on several subjects on 4 May 64. The procedure was to assign each subject discussed a debriefing number and they were written up in contact report form by the WH case officer. The instructions from CI staff were to handle the Oswald case debriefing very closely and not to keep any copies in WH Division/. The "Oswald Case" was logged in the WH notebook log as debriefing report number 40, but the report itself was dictated by the WH Case Officer directly to a CI staff stenographer. There would be no reason to include the number 40 on the report of this special debriefing for CI staff, since it was their only debriefing report. We are certain it is the debriefing report (#40) because the date is the same; it is the only debriefing report on Oswald listed in AMMUG-1 records; and it is (sic) the only AMMUG-1 debriefing report in Oswald's 201 file.

(CIA Doc., Memorandum for the Record, Regarding AMMUG-1 Debriefing Report on the Oswald Case, 27 September, 1978, p. 1)

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on Oswald's contact with the DGI except for that set forth in the Memoranda of May 5, 7, and 8 as discussed herein. (Ibid.)

In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that A-1 provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the Committee has attempted to locate A-1. The CIA has also attempted to locate A-1, whose present relationship with the Agency is ambiguous, but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts.* (see p 81 a for *) The CIA's inability to locate A-1 has been a source of concern to this Committee, particularly in light of his long association with the Agency.

Copy the w/ results of interview.
Thus, the Committee's record of review* information A-1 remains incomplete with regard to may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. However, with the exception of the Calderon episode and on the basis of the CIA's written record, it appears that the CIA provided the Warren Commission with all A-1 information of investigative significance.

A separate question remains, however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the

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*An April 1978 CIA communication to the FBI regarding
A-1 states in pertinent part:

Since 1971 (A-1) has not been involved
in any CIA operation in Miami or elsewhere.
Joseph Norris is the alias of a CIA
representative who periodically debriefs
(A-1) on personalities and methods of the
DGL. There is no other CIA involvement with
[redacted] (CIA Doc. 080760Z, CIA 202417,
Vol. 4, A-1 File 201-749651)

However, a CIA handwritten index card concerning
the Agency status of A-1 states:

Informed "Calvia" on 15 April 1977 that
(A-1) is still an active contact, not
receiving any salary, but could be paid if
and when used in an operation. No problems
here. SPOB will keep his contract in an
active folder. (CIA Doc., Handwritten Note,
15 April 1977, contained in Vol. 4 of A-1 file
[redacted])

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Washington, D.C. area and, under controlled conditions, accessible to the Commission. Giving due consideration to the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-1's status was not disclosed prevented the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the possibility of exercising this option.

In light of the establishment of A-1's bona fides, , his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission.

The AMLASH Operation (to be incorporated into criticism directed at Book I, SS)

During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an

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Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (CIA Inspector General Report 1967 pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (Ibid., p. 84). As a result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to depose Fidel Castro. (Ibid., pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks. (Ibid. pp. 104-106) During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (Ibid. pp. 107-110).

In its examination of the AMLASH operation the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (Ibid. p. 80)

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The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (Ibid.)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The 1967 IGR did note that in 1965 when AMLASH was tried in ^aHavana, ^{court}press reports of Cuban knowledge of AMLASH's association with the CIA were dated from November 1964, approximately one year after President Kennedy's assassination. (Ibid. p. 111).

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC, Book V, pp. 2-7, 67-69) ✓ The Church Committee concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots, the AMLASH

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operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investigated a connection between the AMLASH operation and President Kennedy's assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination. (Ibid. p. 5)✓

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In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot.

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

It would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenue of investigation). The CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most then saw in general terms-- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point

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to erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (Ibid. p. 11) ✓

Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation was relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391, 392) ✓
In addition, Mr. Helms testified before this Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Exec. Sess. Test. of Richard Helms, 8/9/78, pp. 26-27). ✓

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff. ✓
The Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Class. Affidavit of Joseph Langosch,

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Sept. 14, 1978, p. 1) ✓ The Special Affairs Staff
was headed by Desmond FitzGerald and was responsible
for the AMLASH operation (SSC, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) ✓

Langosch, as the Chief of Counterintelligence
for the Special Affairs Staff, was responsible for
safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign
intelligence services, particularly the Cuban
Intelligence Services (HSCA Classified Affidavit
of Joseph Langosch, 9/14/78, p. 3). ✓ It was
Langosch's recollection that:

...the AMLASH operation prior to the
assassination of President Kennedy was
characterized by the Special Affairs
staff, Desmond Fitzgerald (sic) and other
senior CIA officers as an assassination
operation initiated and sponsored by the
CIA. (Ibid., p. 4) ✓

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962
it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence
Services were aware of AMLASH and his association
with the CIA and that the information upon which
he based his conclusion that the AMLASH
operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA
officials, including Desmond FitzGerald. (Ibid., p. 4) ✓
(see p 88 a for #)

However, the issue before this Committee is

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Classified by derivation: C. Berk

Classification: Secret

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)

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*In response to Langosch's sworn statements, this Committee has received from the CIA an affidavit executed by Kent L. Pollock (CIA pseudonym) who "served as Executive Officer for Desmond FitzGerald during the entire period in which he was Chief of the Special Affairs Staff...and discussed with him the AMLASH operation as it progressed." (CIA Doc., Affidavit of Kent L. Pollock, executed Oct. 5, 1978, p. 1) Mr. Pollock specifically contested Langosch's assertion that the AMLASH operation was characterized by the Special Affairs Staff, Desmond FitzGerald, and other senior level CIA officials as an assassination operation. In pertinent part, Pollock drew the following conclusions:

To the best of my knowledge, Mr. FitzGerald considered the AMLASH operation to be a political action activity with the objective of organizing a group within Cuba to overthrow Castro and the Castro regime by means of a coup d'etat. I heard Mr. FitzGerald discuss the AMLASH operation frequently, and never heard him characterize it as an "assassination operation." Mr. FitzGerald stated within my hearing on several occasions his awareness that coup d'etat often involves loss of life. (Ibid., par. 3, p. 2)

He also stated:

Desmond FitzGerald did not characterize the AMLASH operation as an "assassination operation"; the case officer did not; I, as Executive Officer, never discussed any aspect of the AMLASH operation with Joseph H. Langosch; the Deputy Chief, the other branch chiefs and the special assistants could not have so characterized it since they did not know about the pen (the pen was specially fitted with a hypodermic syringe in response to urgings by AMLASH for a means to start the coup by killing Castro.) The case officer offered the pen to AMLASH on the day of President Kennedy's death. AMLASH rejected the pen with disdain. (Ibid., par. 4, p. 2), (Ibid., par. 6, p. 3)

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Classified by derivation: C. Berk

not simply whether the AMLASH operation was an assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

In the case of the AMLASH operation this determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objectives.

Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that such information, if made available to the Warren Commission, might have stimulated the Commission's investigative concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin commented before this Committee:

...when I read...the Church Committee's report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any more or polish it off. I don't think that

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could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better chance of getting to the heart of it. It might have only revealed that we are involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that would have at least come out. (HSCA Class. Depo. of J. Lee Rankin, 8/17/78, p.91)

The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to the Warren Commission, the Commission might have been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture that has surrounded the AMLASH operation during the past decade. As history now records, the AMLASH operation remains a footnote to the turbulent relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

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