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As discussed in an earlier section of this report, the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's production from in Mexico City until an advance stage in its investiga-The record reflects that Mssrs. Willens, Slawson, tion. from CASCONCE Cilleconce a participant and Coleman did not review the production funtil they visited Mexico City on April 9, 1964. At that time, they reviewed a number o from the Soviet and Cuban Ancluded one call to the These Embassies. Soviet Embassy on September 27, believed to have been made by Oswald, two calls made by Silvia Duran from the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call from the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassy, made by an unidentified caller. (Cite Salwson memo of April 21, 1864.)

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cecordeda On September 28 the call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate. (Cite.)

recorder two On October 1 th calls made by a person la ified as Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.)

The Commission representatives were also supplied with the two conversations that transpired between the Cuban President Dortica and the ^Y Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations concerned Silvia Duran's arrest, whether Oswald had been It's very hard for to see what ist proint is being ber program proint or few program

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az redi offered money while at the Cuban Embassy and the general state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22, 1964, pp. 45-46). The Committe's A review of CIA files - corromonorandum regeliting borateon of Slawson's recounting provided to and reviewed by the Commission. 🐲 On 🥙 supporting Slawson's negora is po CIA document, a blind memorandum 🛹 entitled "Material from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald would File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This document records that the Warren Commission was shown calls These included three of the made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. conversations September 27 listed above, one call of jt. September 28, two calls of October 1, and one call of October : - 5 sculment While this does not correspond to the listing of calls set forth by Slawson, it does independently establish on November 22, 1963 were shown to that ino calls -maac Hhe Warren Commission. In addition, this document corroborates the showing of the two Dorticas-Armas conversations of November 26, 1964 to the Warren Commission The Committee has queried former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine if a transcript

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of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren

Commission. The response **A**n both accounts has uniformly been that the Calderon conversation was never made available to the Commission nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission. (Rankin dep; Slawson interview, Willens response to letter, but see Rocca deposition wherein he states that he is sure the Commission knew of it, Helms hearing.) In addition, the Calderon 201 file bears no reference to the conversation nor does it indicate that it was ever made known or provided to the Warren Commission for its analysis.

Thes, the available evidence supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information or the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her commentary following the assassination, it may well have given more serious investigative consideration to her for Knowledge of Dewald and the Cubean governments the possibility of Cuban knowledge about Oswald or

P**/ble involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President
Kennedy.

(Quote Rankin on MANNA would have been done.) Two difficult issues remain which are raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't the Agency provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the War-;** ren Commission their full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus.

The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and published its report. However, this conversation could have also been withheld deliber has been unable to initive The Committee xplanation for the Agency's maction, ngggibilit The Committee can state, however, that Calderon whatever the truth may be the conversation did terms ment and the transdiprt was not provided the Warren Commission.

As for the question surrounding the withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (Cite 5 May memo.) The memoranda which provided more extensive examination of her intelligence background were not made available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written by

- 4 -

as replacter and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed 75 to be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because (out 1.+ ct Head the allegation was in fact true. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious for it would demonstrate that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed information prior to the assassination regarding Oswald ervices and/or his relationship to Cuban Intelligence, and that Services possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

Calderon

Regarding possible association with the CIA,

MAANENNE # the Committee has examined Calderon's file. files rout reveal# no ostensible connection between Calderon and

However, there are indications that such contact the CIA. between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. А September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic exploitation section might be in a position to follow up on this lead... Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity. 1935, Sept. 1, 1963)

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that:

> Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-or her mother may make the trip--details not clear. 21849, July 31, 1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches evidences an interest in Calderon's activities and those of her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

The Committee has queried the author of the abovecited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section."

David Ronis, the dispatch's author, was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was the responsible for recruitment and handling of of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons. A function what perform is awed by this autometer

response to these requests. It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sis-Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollection ter. of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August 31, 1978)

Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August 9, 1978, p. 136; Rocca, Dep.-p.148, July 17, 1976; harrowsof Interview of August_, Piccolo, Interview of_)

Thus, the Agency'file and the testimony of former the former for the file is incomplete, the most glaring mission being the the termination of President for the former former for the f is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (Langosch memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal $\downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow \downarrow$ Section B N 68894 24 April 64) This-section was responsibile for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (Personal Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April 64)

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A-1 knew who were the Cuban Intelligence officers assigned to Mexico City. In this regard he intially identified Alfredo Mirabal, Manuel Viga, and Rogelio-Ródriguez and the Commercial attache as DGI officers posted at the Cuban Embaesy in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

> In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debriefing of A-1, 30 April 64)

for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (Brief, May 14, 1964, FOIA 695-302A).

At Tab E of McCone's brief it states:

Within the past week, significant information has been developed by the CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect (cite supra May 14, 1964 FOIA 695-302A).

The significant information referred to therein is the information A-1 provided. -Tas conclusory

On May 15, 1964, the day of the Mc(soc's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-1. However, the Agenty did not at that time identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (See May 15 Letter from Helms to Rankin FOIA_). The May 15 communication did state that the Agency had established contact

"with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direcion General de Intelligencia." (Cite)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 re-

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garding A01's knowledge of Oswald's probabl \mathcal{G} contact with the DGI in Mexico City. (Cite above.) The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. - Significance.

As set forth in the section of the report concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the information set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the question for the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector collaborating with the CIA. (Cite Arthur Dooley memo, 19 June 1964, FOIA 739-319).

Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon was withheld from the Warren Commission This information was derived (Cite Calderon section). from meren debriefings of A-1. (Cite May 7 and 8 Langosch memos.) From the Committee's review of the A-l file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible Destion ? /the evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1 other to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. info Z However, in its review the Committee has determined that W/Loldspecific documents referenced in the A-1 file is not present

in that file.

The missing item of considerable concern to the Committee.

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This is a debriefing report of A-l entitled "The Oswald Case." (Dispatch **9**035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Cite supra.) Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report ' is the handwritten mation "SI." A CIA employee who has told a Committee worked extensively with the Agency files system bel Known as Ctattine misor affert warthasympalfor this notation to stand for the CIA component Special In-/ telligence. Other CIA representatives believed the notition to stand for the CIA component Special Intel Agence. Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated , it is stated

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Quote Barbara's memo.

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The Agency has been unable to locate this document and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the substance of the missing materials.

The Committee has queried A-1's case officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied regarding Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August 21, 1978) he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1's debriefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (Cite also Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does not CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCLIMENT as redacted

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recall that where provided any other information on Oswald's contact with the DGI other than the memoranda discus 64 Mays, 7, contis and suber horein hersin Cite Calloro interview.)

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In a further effort to clarify the substance of information that <u>AAHUG</u> provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the .Committee has attempted to locate Attens. The CIA has also attempted to locate AMMUG (give date of separation from CIA) but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts. A C.A Thus, gaps do exist regarding information AMAUG may have supplied the CIA about Oswald. But on the basis of CHT'S With the goney, except for the Calderon recordithe the written information episode, provided the Warren Commission with all of investigative significance \$# A broader question remains however. The Agency as noted earlier did not reveal to the Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the Washington, D.C. area and under controlled conditions, accessible to the Sivindue consideration to Commission. Eve n considering the CIA's serious concern for protecting its sources, the fact that A-l's status was 1 And a APAK not disclosed Goreclosed the Warren Commission from exercising a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1 as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. 0n this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency unilaterally rejected the option It-should_not he CIA-did-not fact, in A-1's case the have dono enormous problems establishing bona fide as it did with Nosenko.

> <u>Despectably</u> In light of the establishment of A-1's bone fide 5(Cite Langosch's quote supora), his proven reliability and his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, this Option might well have been considered by, the Warron Current Stike in Anne at the very least, had the opportunity for such commiss

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THE AMLASH OPERATION

During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (67 IGR pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who,during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (1967 IGR p.84). As a result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to eliminate Fidel Castro. (1967 IGR pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks (1967 IGR pp. 104-106). During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (1967 IGR pp. 107-110).

In its examination of the AMLASH operation in the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (1967 IGR p. 80). The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states: it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and givinghim an assassination device for use against CASTRO. (1967 IGR p. 94)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the MALASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Report does note that in 1965 when AMLASH was tried in Havana court, November 1964 was given as the initial point iff time at which AMLASH's actions were tied to CIA support. (1967 IGR p. 111)

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC, Book V, pp.2-7, 67-69) The Church Committee concluded: The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission work that the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots, the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investigated a

- 2 -

connection between the AMLASH operation and President Kennedy's assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination. (Church Committee, Book V, Final Report, p. 5)

In 1977, the CIA issuesed a second Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report in large part was intended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot and that the treatment of the issue by the Church Committee was both imprecise and misleading. If M(19771 IGR Tab D, p. 28)

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:

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it would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenue of investigation). The CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most then saw in general terms--the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point to erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then as well. That CIA employees at the time felt-as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (1977IGR p. 11)

It-should be noted that Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission of a regular basis, testified to the Rockefe ller Commission نمون that he did not believe the AMLASH operation to have been relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391, 2) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before the Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Richard Helms, Executive Session testimony, 8/9/78 pp. 26-27).

A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for (hereinafter SAS). During 1963, the Special Affairs Staff was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Affidavit of Langosch, Sept. 14, 1978, p.1) The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible for the AMLASH operation (Church Report, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79) Thangosch as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services. (HSCA staff, , supra) It was Langosch's recollection

> that the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA.

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which Langosch based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials including Desmond Fitzgerald. (HSCA Langosch Affidavit p. 4 supra)

However, the issue before this Committee is not simply whether the AMLASH operation was an assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

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In the case of the AMLASH operation the determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objectives.

Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that such information, if made , graf available to the Warren Commission may have stimulated the Commission's/investigative concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J. Lee Rankin commented before this Committee:

> ... when I read... the Church Committee's report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to, be met and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any moré or polish it off. don't think that could have happened back I think there would have been in 1964. a much better change of getting to the heart of it. It might have only revealed that we are involved in all these things and who is involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that would have at least come out. (Rankin p. 91)

The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin

that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to the Warren the Coorman ission in ight

Commission, it may have been able to foreclose the specu-

lation and conjecture that the past decade has been As history and records, the Attunish operation remainss a a provide to the turbulent relations

between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

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Berk - Write-ups

You need an introductory section the purpose of study prion to On study's score outline On April 23, 1976 the Senate Select Committee to

Scope of Study

Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC) issued its \mathcal{N} report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies." This report set forth a limited study of those federal agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, that provided assistance to the Warren Commission in its investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. In particular, the SSC examined the relevancy of certain information pertaining to alleged assassination plots by the CIA against Fidel Castro and the withholding of this information from the Warren Commis-The SSC conclusions pertaining to these alleged CIA sion. sponsored assassination plots have generated additional public and private inquiries regarding the substance and quality of information reported by the CIA to the Warren Commission.

During 1977, the CIA issued a report prepared by the Agency's Inspector General (hereinafter 77IGR). This report was intended to be, in large part, a rebuttal to the findings of the SSC pertaining to alleged CIA sponsored assassination plots. The 77/IGR response concluded:

- That the SSC Book V final report "contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected operation (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents";
- 2) "While one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept, Book V of the Senate Select Committee Final Report went to such lengths in its treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize it more generously.* (CIA 77IGR, p. 9)

The 77/IGR further concluded that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of limited effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission in its work. The 77/IGR was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports." (Introduction to Tab E of 77/IGR).

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^{*} The 77 IGR comments regarding Warren Commission lack of knowledge of anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. government will be addressed at least in another section of this report.

In order to further demonstrate the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77/IGR compiled a comprehensive listing of CIA general ted material provided to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. In this respect, the Committee agrees with the 77 IGR wherein it is stated that

> "This compilation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort." (77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E)

Therefore, in order to examine the broad issue of the CIA's scope and quality of support to the Warren Commission in both an objective and disciplining manner, the Committee has reviewed in detail the 77 IGR's listing of information pertaining to the assassination provided the Warren Commission and the U.S. Intelligence Communit The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, whether the misinforming or withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission was the result of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employes, In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA generated material referenced above, the Committee has paralled its review to the structure given to these materials by the 77 IGR. In this regard, the 77 IGR details four interrelated compilations of Kennedy assassination material. These four compilations are:

- Agency dissemination of information to the Intelligence Community (Formal and Informal Disseminations)
- 2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission
- 3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al regarding rumors and allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination
- 4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the Warren Commission on Rumors and Allegations Relating to the President's Assassination (Introduction to Tab E, 771 JSR)
 Format Compilation management above was reviewed by
 a staff member of this Committee. This review focused
 upon those documents identified in the compilation as having been made available to member agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community but not having been made available
 to the Warren Commission for its review. It should be noted
 that merely because a specific document was not made available
 to the Warren Commission does not necessarily imply that
 substantive information relevant to the Warren Commission's

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tion may have been made available in a subsequent communication or report to the Commission. Nevertheless, these materials have been analyzed to determine if the and substantive relevant information related to President Kennedy's assassination was provided by the CIA to member agencies of the U.S. Intelligecne Communities in not provided by the CIA in some manner to the Warren Commission.

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Marries Compilation set forth above consists of those materials provided by the CIA in written form to the Warren Commission. These materials were reviewed, analyzed, and contrasted against those materials related to President Kennedy's assassination provided by the CIA to member agencies of the U.S. intelligence Community.

Those materials set forth in the compilation (3) listed above were in fact included in the first compilation cited herein. Therefore these materials were subject to the same standards of review applied to the compilation (1)

Those materials set forth in the **Compilation(4)** listed above were in fact included in **Compila**tion **Compila**tion **Compilation**. Therefore, these materials were subject to the same standards of review applied to **Compilation**

As a visual aid to the analysis of the materials contained in the four compilations discussed above, a chart

+ Link remainder of your rest should be field into the chart more directly. has been prepared which illustrates the flow of written inthe CIAnconcerning President Kennedy's assassinaformation the Warren Commission and the U.S. intelligence tion sets forth communi This chart the CIA's 🛲 desia-Sor enchdocument ists the a desseminateon . whether was made available to the Warren Commission 🐲 the U.S. Intelligence community or both. purpose of This chart **will convert here a** indicat 🖴 🚥 for selected subjects the volume of information provided to the U.S. Intelligence community as opposed to the Warren Commission.

During the course of this study, additional Agency files have been reviewed. These files have been examined in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the review of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these Where significant substantive issues have arisen gaps. related to the kind and quality of information provided the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result, approximately thirty files, comprising approximately ninety astaff member of this volumes have been examined and analyzed by the Committee. tion-ot this rep The findings set forth herein are subject to modification due to the following considera-

During the course of the past fifteen years, the tions. CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system, certain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. Whether these documents have merely been filed incorrectly or destroyed, eitheras th regulation or (individual whim), gaps in the written record 🚅 still exist. to we Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of relevancy adopted by certain files requested by the Committee for review have either not been made available by the Agency or have been made available to the Committee in a sani-Therefore, to the degree reflected by the tized fashion. Agency's denial of access and/or sanitization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the best evidence available to the Committee though this may not be all releavant evidence to which the Agency has access.

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One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance of these discussions, briefings, and meetings in not always reflected by the written record made the

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subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session staffandmembers hearings with key Warren Commission and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to fill the gap created written new by the structure of communication. The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject for discussion herein. d to fabel this I. 1 stion エム之 . a) <u>Warren</u> Commission relationship with CIA regarding in-

formation made available by CIA to Warren Commission

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The Committee has queried both representatives of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA generated information to the Warren Commission. The general hese recessions and and a consensus of these-queried was that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation Depo of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18) William Coleman, a senior ongen ne staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson; on thin matters which interest utilized at the CIA's interest of the CIA's resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and (See HSCA staff interview 8/2/78). intelligent. Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's

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cooperation and quality of work. (Executive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, November 15, 1977, p. 17, see also JFK exh. 23.)

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured that the Agency would cooperate in its work. (HSCA deposition of J. Lee Rankin, August 17, 1978, Classified, p. 4).

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA deposition of John McCone, August 17, 1978, p. 5) Mr. McCone testified that he was personally responsible for determining whether Lee Harvey Oswald was ever associated with the Agency. Mr. McCone was further responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission. (McCone deposition pp. 5-6) Mr. McCone Further testified that:

> The policy of CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him--giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satisfied. (McCone Deposition p. 9)

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Mr. Raymond Rocca, one of the CIA's key representatives to the Warren Commission during its investigation, also characterized the Agency's role as one of full support to the Warren Commssion. Mr. Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA recalled under oath that Richard Helms had directed that give $+\omega$ full wing directive:

> All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CI staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded indications--they were verbal in so far as I know--that we were to leave no stone unturned. (HSCA Deposition of Raymond Rocca, July 17, 1978, p. 24)

Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. O (Rocca deposition, p. 24) Mr. Rocca concluded: +L

> A somehwat different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation and who was directly responsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Rocca dep. p.23) testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (HSCA Executive Session

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testimony of Richard Helms, August 9, 1978, p.10) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Commission. He stated:

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An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Commission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Helms hearing p.10-11)

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It was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. Under oath he supported this proposition:

Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to speci-

Mr. Helms: That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which something different might have occured, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them.

fic requests by the Warren Commission?

As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a case by case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility. Mr. Rankin was subried by Committee Counsel whether **Arrestion** worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that -ronde, were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission. Mr. Rankin testified: as follows: Chuck. let's discuss your use of hargouge that precedes a colon. Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission communicate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd (Rankin deposition p. 4) Rankin's Mr. Slawson added support to are position testi-Warren Commission fying that 🐲 requests to the CIA were rarely specific. "The request was made intially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation." (Slawson Dep. p.29) The unfortunate consequences we re of not asking the right questions are graphically illustrated by the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Paradoxicully Castro assassination plots (SSC Book V). hon the Agency in its dealings with the Warren Commission, the andytical even if the Warren Commission had requested information The plats) on such plots would have been able to plausibly deny 🖘 As Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had CIA involvement. Francusk + Lat no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investiga-400 outbind tion of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. (Rocca

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thres earch and report on a ciller a noti- Castro a ssassi nation operations, Roccas efforts would have produced no substantive Halta Rocca Deen I cy u SACKIN Information [Boccodup P49] 1. Stant and WARING Constilli Ther dep. p.50) in providing all relevant information to the arren Commissi orking-level of contact (inte?) uested to rese existence plots, his efforts word have produeed no substantive information. state CIA desk ficer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr.

Helms to investigate for the CIA, Lee Harvey Oswald, the Such plot and the assassination of President Kennedy. (SHCA deposition of John Scelso, May 16, 1978, p.73, 111-112) Mr. Scelso testified that, had he known of such assassination plots; Le the Maxing estim would have been taken.

> "we would have gone at that hot and heavy. We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about it in great detail. I would have had him polygraphed by the best operative security had to see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, informing Castro about our poison pen things, and so on. I would have had all our Cuban sources queried about it."

Undoubtedly had the CIA in tially investigated and reported on the Istro tevelor the states the miormation fould have, the assassi Tlash the worten Commission, as it sentually was discovered by the SSC. with the CIA Asthe record reflects Heven, these plots were known by few, Mr. Helms' testimony regarding these plots reveals that the promi 52 supply all Agency compromised its this policy redundant. relevant information to the Warren Commission 👐 McCone and General Counsel Rankin had believed to be in

effect. The following exchange between Committee Sounsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the acute of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Heems, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith:

If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

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Is that not true?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees to to anyplace else without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall.

Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)

Mc Cone had knowledge in Ag'65 - Why didid he go to walts - with this? whether the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarassing the Agency or causing an international crises he responded gave the following responde :

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (McCone deposition, p.16)

had Thus, the evidence indicates that 😎 Helms 😓 happroached McCone to discuss informing the

Warren Commission warren anti-Castro assassinacost tion plots might have grant Helms Todoso would have meant his job,) informode McCone that plots were still being considered by the Agency S But see Helms testimony

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Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Warren Commission Coursel's Shud sonand Commission's work, the second se

Spector the domning ion were in agreement (Slawson dep., p.27), that

their section such information should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (See also Spector, p.46) From the CIA's perspective (But see Liebeler, & Po. P. 471Y Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President

Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated: Lord Lot

"... in light of what has happened a completely different procedural approach probably would Mand should have been taken. I mean, there uny exprisery are any number of things that one can say in

- 16 -the light of history. What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep., p.45) John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer Mean

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who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (Scelso dep., p.153)

Agency concern for the sinchesty of

III. Introductory Section/SS+M

The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information has been shown to have been dependent upon 1) the availability of information, and 2) the complexity of the issues prelo and 3) the content to which a he relevant On this point, Mr. Helms testified to al sented by the request, the first two that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back:

> "and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (Helms Exec. Session hearing, p.25)

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as reduce - 17 Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep., pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.) white answe ad times However, i randern to protecting 1 ts be cause, the CIA's sensitives sources and methods, caused il a tush the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty CIA 3 relevant month in getting see information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin processing. effort expressed the opinion that the Agency's to propoma tect its sensitive sources and methods did **performence** Affect the quality of the information to 🖬 week vansmittal the Warren Commission and its staff were given access. time is Laning loss 🕫 a resu (Rankin at p.23) In some instances 🗰 unilateral decisions 🗰 Agency w access to C/A materials t the Commission. (Scetso dep. ogne point, you should refer 64 CIA p.158) in which Ion of en Commission investigation involution and impeded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree: WITH HOLD AL ANGINTON TO STORE HE WO 1-) Egnemilission Stat. person the photosurveillance and operations of the CIA's Mexicos City Station effects of the 2) As a related consideration the controversy surlet better abrusing. Also. +his



rounding photograph now referred to as that of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined to the second seco

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was evident from the ception of the Warren Commission. Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep. p.158) Scelso further testified:

> We were going to give them intelligence reports which derived from all our sources, including technical sources, including ind the information gotten from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for example, which corresponded almost exactly with the information from

() (Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5) Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by examination of the background to the first major CIA report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. (Cite.) Much of the information provided to the Warren Commission in this report was based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification of which had been deleted completely from the report.

The policy **The policy** limiting Warren Commission knowledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of

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)in order to protect your continuing opp. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave 554 (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29Jan1964)

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The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal Special Investigations Group of the CIA Counterintelligence/Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison man to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of that had been j Decmeber 9, 1963 submitted to the Warren Commission. Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was asked him in Mexico, Papich-queried O'Neal whether the FBI could Where . supply the Warren Commission with source of (The FBI had knowledge of CIA operations in Mexico City, see CIA SQCI-3/779/510) sho we O'Neal's memorandum m that he discussed this matter with Scelso, who, in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. (O'Neal wrote:

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He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBIsensitive information which could relate to (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald) Negi memorandum and ide characterization

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized fashion.

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all information as med significant as received by CIA (or found in CIA files, irrespective of the nature, sensitivity or reliativity of sources, there i, was promitly relayed to your Bureau. 1964 TA dissem to FBI, CSC1-3/779/510) Jan, when Helms, in the second his concern regarding exposure of Agency sources by the FBI to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

> called to the attintion of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have informa-

called upon to provide additional information acquired

suggest that certain policies be employed to enable CIA

cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods.

enabled the Agency to control the flow of information :

foriginated by it and In this way check the possibility of

revealing its sources and methods inadvertantly. The poli-

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to work with the Commission and with the Commission's

Among the policies articulated 2005 two which manha

from checks of CIA records and agency sources.

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-cies articulated were:

tion (as determined from Agency sources) coinciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his

activities while in that area. (CSCI-3/779/510)

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA

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
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confusing because Chuck: The preceding, saye you uppeared to be-21 - speaking generally Your Bureau not dissemination information re- a

ceived from this Agency without prior concurrence

2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider $ple_{\alpha,\mu}$ that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710)



Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, that way sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. That cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was on that date still being withheld from the Warren Commission, Therein, it dated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, CIA dats to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission. However, It and the the type of your of the type of your of the type of aeredacted oein aform that would the form of this presentation he protect the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

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(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

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Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the CIA : and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City discutions

> The reason for the sensitivity of these and surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but

Helms testified:

and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination Tis/510 1/14/64) Furthermore period 🐜 ALL AND ALL of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Councils had been made Director McGeorge Bundy, we aware that the CIA had in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulatesand that through these bswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been " pour porroborated. Zite McCone mens to McGeorge Brindy] WHOUS

as ridacted unwillingness The CIA's man to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations, in the early stages of the investigation the theref antain Is is-a-source Agenca of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an' Dolliag designed to skew in its favor the form of AVENCY S DALE +0 recia felt unconfortably substance of orm generated information white provided a the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep.) This process might well have hampered the Commission's ability to proceed in its investigation with all the facts before it. even those which might have meant exposing certain sensitive operations to the commission. We'll have to give example. i.e. UC Who proceeding Of

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As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA completely mitaka provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that assomption chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during re (140 MC September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum prion to dia +hat notmention Oswald's various conver-MC 4: -++ sations with the Cuban and Soveti Embassy/ConsulateShac hy WC and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore, beer eljour not mention **manuface** that the CIA that memorandum 🛥 Hm: l transcribed conversations between Cuban Q beliers Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the 3/30 conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban ft mes sla-uso-Ambassador to Mexico and meno. transcribed.

On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 3/, 1964. On Feburary 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that his writing the least as of the least as of the Warren Commission

or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 I^{a++cr} whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in I^{a}_{---} of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of

by Rankin would not have been made. Good point.

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion.' It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley; Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's

in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren fint Commission flearned of these operations.

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On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate an was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did retter not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission pr indicate that it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

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Title? - Shouldn't that be a male that of the During the period of March - April 1964, David Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the In Mexico City. A review of these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief - Why? that the Warren Commission, through Mssrs. Slawson, Coleman, Nuclei and Willers did not obtain access to CIA

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Salwson and Willens met with Win Scot ., the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from

) of the Cupan and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: ______T) However, Prior to Herrig it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access

to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did

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of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate. (Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals where the Warren Commission had learned that CIA had in possess conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos. Docticos-Armas The conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including concerned Silvia Richard Helms, Durna's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police (cite?). Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, that he would attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission' representatives to review 📣 this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas) As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA) In Mexico City. (Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rogas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep. lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative. as replacted Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated Concernis that the tentative conclusions • Oswald's Mexico trip, (that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda f of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, and in addition a Mexican federal police summary interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

> A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Salwson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Salwson had been provided the Duran transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments conerning the Meixcan police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. The Insert P28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion wrote was based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testihė wi mony before the Mexican police. This menerandum bears

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indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, Slawson had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis should have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or aboveciled criticism of the Mexican police summary report. WINSTPA9 AR March 25, 1964, the record deminstates that Werren Comes in its forts the estigaite Oswald rexico City had not been given activities access to the Duran transcripts. The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make (suspect reference to the surveillance operations and a summary po-Thus, the Agency had been successful for lice report. over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

> Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave here. (CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964 Blawson wrote that had determined that swale had visited the Cusan Embassy three

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He stated that this conclusion was based upon his times. review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican por (Slawson memorandum, March 27 1964 CIA p. 1972) However. Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations does Indicate, awson however, that his feasoning regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy of requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate au bucertly stating that an American, identified by CIA analysts as Oswald 🚜 at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions. Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence

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Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calcuations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These-transcripts

in the Cuban Embassy established as the result of the

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could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception.but as the record indicates they were not then made available.

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not or been given access to the above-referenced series of In a memorandum of that date by Coleman ~Dosed and Slawson, they articulated one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency (Ambassador Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) Colemanand 1) What is the information source referred to in vore the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa; 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the Aranslated if possible, in red all cases where the to the assassination or related subjects; 3) We would especially like to see in which the allegation that money was passed at the Cuban Embassy is discussed The question initially posed in the above-referenced memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April Opviausly, Necessarily, if Slawson - Found 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). necessarytorequest mthe source of the information, he had not been ind they way

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moterial provided that source (Item Noumber Twos I Cøleman-Slawson request finande 6mmission had that given access, cit's a phil the provide concerning the assassination (as adicates + abou. cripts had not been rpreted-to mean Inat ene subject Malerials. given apcessed any

The second request, item number three of the above listing reveals that () of the Dorticos-Arman conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing of monies (24) discussed had not as of April 2 been provided to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. (At the March 12, 1964 meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re-

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson articulated their concern for receiving complete access to all material relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:

> The most probable final result of the entire investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is a conclusion that he went there for the purpose of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, conspiracies, etc. took place.

... In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investigatory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves.

The thoroughness of investigation which Coleman and Slawson articulated as a vital concern to the Commission's work had been concern the the CIA's concern in lest its the commission's investigation sources and methods, relevant be exposed of the commission's investigation, the limited number of persons engaged in an investigation of a gravity and historical significance unprecedented in this nation's history. this material on April 9, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the

representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. Prior to their departure, they met with Thomas Mann, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. Ambassador Mann independent the Warren Commission representatives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p.)

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Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the for the former of the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrance **5** David Slawson wrote:

> "...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination, Scott indicated that his staff at the prime began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Governacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded immediately is a state of the state

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"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit. (p.24,) 1 ulat A 41 20169

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes deal exclusively with pertaining period sept exclusively, the Duran and Oswald conversations Sorthe period Sept a7-Oct1,1943. It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's

denial of original source materials, in this case

ability to draw conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City, Control of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" significantly more precise could have been made materials whe available for analysis by the Commission.

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Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission with the vitally relevant information derived from certain sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation that might have been more seriously considered had this material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement. - thouldn't aldera w be in this section?

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Mexico City Mystery Man VI.

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surveillance, yet the wo

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no physical resemblance to her son. This photograph had been supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Agency representatives had searched their files in an effort to locate information on Oswald. This photograph was one in a series http://www.com/www.com/www.com/be the CIA's photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates Jit had been linked by the Mexico City Station Prior to the assassination, hoLee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4, 1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to Oswald. (cinter Hatins affiliant in wer)

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that 'she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. 153) (p.

- 36 -REFERENCE as reducter his could be willied into a Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Thomas Kournamesines Assistant DDP Logarding the A to 👹 brukreshich That been worder this made 4. circumstances of this photograph by the Oxaluation , - 4 La Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin Conversion requested that toto the Commission be the identity of the individuaD available. depicted in the photograph if that information On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone, Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret SINCE November 22, 1963> انرا Services that the CIA had disseminated several reports or communications concerning the assassination to the Secret A. Rankin requested copies of these Service sin Meyombor The materials included originally identifiedi concerned with the photograph of the individual by the MEALS City Station as Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother. that was shown to prayver te julivideal underhause de la company and the materials bythecia disseminated^to the Secret Service was a November 26 Matio dissemination (DIR85177), a copy of which was transmitted to Munt That cable concerned the Dor -Armas the Secret Service. . K conversations and disclosed the existence of ping operations in Mexico City at the time of the assassination and Oswald's earlier visit. made John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

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"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

- Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.
- Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

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(Scelso deposition, p. 150) By February 12, 1964. h the Warren unthoundly concerned Commission working access to a source of concern to the CIA. production' (as discussed in the Similarifaisclosure Lunclean wh preceding_section), the • of the photosurveillance operations, To the Walner Commussion had begun r Loncer . to cause concern within

the Agency.

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On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in feesponse to earlier levies on the items on the items where items on the items on the items (Norefer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..." On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA confered regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrase are complete." (Rankin letter of March 16, 1964, #2)

Rankin further indicated that the same procedure \mathbf{x} to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, 1963 which had not yet been furnished because it is sensitive sources and methods. (Rankin letter of March 16, #3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (DDP4-1554, CD631 and DDP4-1555, CD 674) by two separate communications. CD631 provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (SS on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

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requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald, This by checking the photograph against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963.

> CD 674 reveals that on November 22, 1963, immediately following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency further states that the subject of the photo referenced in these cables was not Oswald. It is further stated that:

> > "In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the regional copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA, p. 116444 of notes)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24,19 (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested."

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Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry."

Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

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Sterns memorandum reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The file also contained:

> "Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photograph of the unidentified individual mistakenly believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA."

Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964.

> Stern also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to the CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background information on Oswald.

Church: You must read Dar's report because section of it an 41 - directly relevant a must be integrated - i.e. failure to provide photo + typerecording the. Stern noted that these messages were also paraphrased set for the

accurately as many in the CIA's January 31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. Do 70°

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased."

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.

mysterious photograph. Gise reference to where these circumstances are discussed VII. <u>Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission</u> <u>Relationship</u>

It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence and one of the seven members of the Warren Commission, concealed crucial information from the Warren Commission. Specifically, the Senate Select Committee concluded:

With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency." (SSC, Book V, pp. 67-68) However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship and allegiance of Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former DCI of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles'

service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which indicates Dulles 🐜 providing information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission This memorandus me tends to show activities and investigative policies. atleastone that Dulles acted as an informant on occasion for the CIA. 15 memorandarm. concerned in the controwhich an written ST versial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. The memorandum was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division Particularly concerned with who was NUSCALIS end definition's interrogation. David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964 concerned Jones his discussions with Allan Dulles Nosenko's knowledge

of Oswald. This memorandum was prepared for DDP Helms, In relevant, with, Murphy wrote:

> "Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report."

Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language "which would allude to the existence of other, unverified information on the Oswald case." This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a future time, that it had given consideration to the ^Nosenko information.

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Murphy continued:

"It was agreed an effort would be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Warren Commission intended to make use of the Nosenko information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin."

Whether by design or as an unintended result, the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the Warren Commission, was prepared to compromise his position with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case. It also appears that the AGency had communicated the information it desired regarding the commission position on Nosenko, and that Dulle was prepared to act in this regard as a high level and very well placed informant for the CIA.

Murphy prepared a second memorandum fitted 28 July 1964. Move The subject of this memorandum concerned use of Nosenko's information in the Warren Conversion's report. Participants in the discussion upon which the memorandum was based included Allan Dulles, Thee Rankin, David Slawson of the Commission, and Richard Helms, David Murphy and Tennant Bagley of the CIA. VIII. Luisa Calderon

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Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attachment) This call had been by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its ()

this should be included in earlier section on the top

op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, for a second president in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful <u>ex post facto</u> suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknow ledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15)

for Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments do not merit serious attention. Her words may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may also equally be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assassination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent by then Ambassador, Mann to the State Department. (DIR 85573 -couble thank arapentity requested th WH, FBI and CIA) the State Dept. initiate actions that would enable the plekiest out Information was reported to the CIA during May 1964, to arrest CALLETON from a Cuban defector, tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban orsno Alfrylo 14 Calora Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was him-State and self a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable M2 up & al ofine and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding Cyber Consala Cuban Intelligence operations. Calderon's ties to Cuban intelligence were reported to the Warren Commission on June 15. 1964 (Did the State Department supply the cable to the Warren Commission? Have we reviewed their Mann file?) However, fromits fileneview the Committee has determined that the CIA did not provide Calderon's conversation to the Warren Commission, thus, even though the Warren Commission was aware that Calderon had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban Embassy officers, the vital link between her background and her comments was never established for the Warren Commission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this regard may have forecased the Commission from actively pursing a lead of great significance.

In that cable Mann stated:

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...Washington should urgently consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban

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Consulate here."

This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann See Rush re: ...persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy.

Mann went on to state in urgent terms:

"They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican government could use them as witnesses."

According to CIA files, Calderon returned to Havana on December 16, 1963, less than four weeks after the assassination.

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions (Cites). During her reinterrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with Calderon. No explanation isgiven in this report for the questions concerning Calderon (Cites). The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964 (DDP4-0940), more than two months after Calderon had returned to Cuba.

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is reducted Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed 1612) Calderon's presence in to be 1940 (Dispatch, Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City Section and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containg biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending The Agency has attempted, without success, on Calderon. to locate the report.

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On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of the Station in Mexico City (Dispatch 1935).

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Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, (, ,) Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum states that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-Th, S dispatch reported that: (o Ve) As reductes telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson, as recorder in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure during December 1964

for Cuba.

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On May 7, 196 recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

> "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.

b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

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further disclosed AMMUG's know-

paraphrased AMMUG's

ledge of the Oswald case. (knowledge of Calderon as follows:

On May B

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI althought she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestineprofessional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez are set forth. However, that attachment makes no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested a c. e 255 as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, to look at the Interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley questions used in memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. May 5-memorandum. Willens saw The only mention of Aclderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964. However, Willens was not shown the memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

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as remote

association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intelligence.

It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5, 7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced in the Calderon 201 file. Their existence was determined by the Committee's independent review of other agency files.

Thus, the Warren Commission hard as of 19 June 64, Mark little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead. It had effectively been denied significant background information which may have impeded or prevented its pursuit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. Unfortunately,

One must keep in mind that even if the Warren Commission had been apprised of Calderon's background and hadden possible contact with Oswald it still was denied the one significant piece of information that might have aroused regarding possible Cubin complicity in the as 1 AST. its investigative efforts to a more serious level. The Warren Commission never was told about Calderon's converhis conversation is not referenced sation of November 22, 1964. This can was determined by The details of how we know not reported cite testimony of Frankin, Slawson; give section possible motive for not telling of detailed information on Luisa (mentions CIA association; site the dispatch close out with Be sure you mention that the Calderon conversion Nos transmitted to HQ Rankin quotes.)

Committee state

on 11/27/67.

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