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Calderson

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
as redacted.

Need a  
better transition into this section

JFK 22  
Folder 22  
Mem #2

As discussed in an earlier section of this report, the Warren Commission did not gain access to the CIA's production from ( in Mexico City until an advanced stage in its investigation. The record reflects that Messrs. Willens, Slawson, <sup>from CIA surveillance operations</sup> and Coleman did not review the production until they visited Mexico City on April 9, 1964. At that time, they reviewed a number of ( from the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. These ( included one call to the Soviet Embassy on September 27, believed to have been made by Oswald, two calls made by Silvia Duran from the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate, and one call from the Soviet Embassy to the Cuban Embassy, made by an unidentified caller. (Cite Slawson memo of April 21, 1964.)

give  
date

On September 28 the ( recorded a call by Silvia Duran at the Cuban Consulate to the Soviet Consulate. (Cite.)

Confusing  
transcription  
from  
previous  
pages.

On October 1 the ( recorded two calls made by a person identified as Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. (Cite.)

The Commission representatives were also supplied with the ( two conversations that transpired between the Cuban President Dorticos and the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas. These conversations concerned Silvia Duran's arrest, whether Oswald had been

Conversations  
Don't  
transpire  
at least  
I don't  
think  
they  
do

It's very hard for  
me to see what  
point is being  
made on these  
pages.

offered money while at the Cuban Embassy, and the general state of affairs at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City following the assassination. (Slawson memo of April 22, 1964, pp. 45-46).

The Committee's

A review of CIA files ~~corroborates~~ independent corroborates of Slawson's ~~recounting of~~ <sup>memorandum regarding</sup>

provided to and reviewed by the Commission. ~~One~~ <sup>supporting Slawson's record is</sup> CIA document, a blind memorandum ~~is~~ entitled "Material from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission" (Station Oswald File) and is dated April 10, 1964. (FOIA 653-828). This document records that the Warren Commission was shown calls made by Oswald to the Soviet Embassy. These included ~~three of the~~ <sup>conversations</sup> ~~conversations of~~ September 27 listed above, one call of September 28, two calls of October 1, and one call of October <sup>?</sup> ~~1~~ - <sup>check document</sup>

While this does not correspond to the listing of calls set forth by Slawson, it does independently establish that ~~no calls made on~~ <sup>from</sup> November 22, 1963 were shown to the Warren Commission.

In addition, this document corroborates the showing of the two Dorticas-Armas conversations of November 26, 1964 to the Warren Commission.

The Committee has queried former Commission and CIA representatives in an effort to determine if a transcript of the Calderon conversation was ever shown to the Warren

Which memo? You refer to this to much earlier to expect reader to remember it.

Why not just say + let Agency has acknowledged + let Calderon conversation was not given to W.C.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

- 3 -

Commission. The response on both accounts has uniformly been that the Calderon conversation was never made available to the Commission nor was its existence ever made known to the Commission. (Rankin dep; Slawson interview, Willens response to letter, but see Rocca deposition wherein he states that he is sure the Commission knew of it, Helms hearing.) In addition, the Calderon 201 file bears no reference to the conversation nor does it indicate that it was ever made known or provided to the Warren Commission for its analysis.

~~Thus,~~ the available evidence supports the conclusion that the Warren Commission was never given the information or the opportunity by which it could evaluate Luisa Calderon's significance to the events surrounding President Kennedy's assassination. Had the Commission been expeditiously provided this evidence of her intelligence background, association with Silvia Duran, and her commentary following the assassination, it may well have

given more serious investigative consideration to her ~~and~~ <sup>potential</sup>

~~Knowledge of Oswald and the Cuban governments~~  
~~the possibility of Cuban knowledge about Oswald or~~

<sup>possible</sup> involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

(Quote Rankin on <sup>what</sup> ~~what~~ would have been done.)

Two difficult issues remain which are raised by the Committee's finding. First, why didn't the Agency

provide the Calderon conversation to the Warren Commission; secondly, why didn't the Agency reveal to the Warren Commission <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ full knowledge of Calderon's intelligence background, her possible knowledge of Oswald and her possible connection to the CIA or some other American intelligence apparatus.

Has CIA been asked for an explanation?

The first question can be explained in benign terms. It is reasonably possible that by sheer oversight the conversation was filed away and not recovered or recollected until after the Warren Commission had completed its investigation and published its report. However, this conversation could have also been withheld deliberately.

No evidence of this.

The Committee ~~has been unable to establish a definitive explanation for the Agency's inaction, their possibility.~~ means to determine the truth of either possibility.

too little

The Committee can state, however, that whatever the truth may be, <sup>Calderon</sup> the conversation did <sup>occur</sup> ~~take~~ place and the transcript was not provided the Warren Commission.

No. Lot's not repeat the obvious

<sup>Agency's</sup>  
As for the ~~question~~ ~~surrounding~~ ~~the~~ withholding of information concerning Calderon's intelligence background, the record reflects that the Commission was merely informed that Calderon may have been a member of the DGI. (Cite 5 May memo.) The memoranda which provided more extensive examination of her intelligence background were not made available for the Commission's review. Significantly, the May 8 memorandum written by ~~Joseph~~ <sup>Joseph</sup> ~~Karsosich~~ <sup>Karsosich</sup> following his debriefing of AMMUG-1 indicated that AMMUG-1

Calderon

and a second Cuban Intelligence officer believed ~~the~~ to be a CIA operative. It is possible that this information was not provided the Warren Commission either because there was no basis in fact for the allegation or because the allegation was in fact true. If the allegation were true, the consequences for the CIA would have been serious. ~~for~~ <sup>It</sup> would <sup>have</sup> demonstrated that a CIA operative, well placed in the Cuban Embassy, may have possessed information prior to the assassination regarding Oswald and/or his relationship to <sup>the</sup> Cuban Intelligence, <sup>Services</sup> and that <sup>Services</sup> possible involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy.

true  
but  
sound a  
bit  
stilted.  
try  
to  
modify.

Regarding <sup>Calderon's</sup> possible association with the CIA,

the ~~Committee has examined Calderon's file.~~ ~~THE~~ ~~FILE~~ ~~the~~ Agency

Files reviewed

reveals no ostensible connection between Calderon and

the CIA. However, there are indications that such contact between Calderon and the Agency was contemplated. A

September 1, 1963 CIA dispatch from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico

City states in part:

...Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas, married to an American of Mexican descent. If (CIA asset) can further identify the sister, our domestic exploitation section might be in a position to follow up on this lead...Please levy the requirement on (CIA asset) at the next opportunity.

(1935, Sept. 1, 1963)

Has  
CIA  
family  
been  
asked  
about  
this?

*as redacted*

An earlier CIA dispatch from the CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City to the Chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division records that:

Wilfredo of the Cuban Consulate, Tampico, reported that Luisa Calderon has a sister residing in Reynosa, Texas...Luisa may go up to the border to visit her sister soon-- or her mother may make the trip--details not clear. ( ) 21849, July 31, 1965)

At the very least, the above dispatches evidenced an interest in Calderon's activities and those of her family. Whether this interest took the form of a clandestine-agent relationship is not revealed by Calderon's 201 file.

The Committee has queried the author of the above-cited dispatch requesting that Calderon's sister be contacted by the CIA's "domestic exploitation section."

David Ronis, the ~~dispatch's~~ author, was a member of the CIA's Special Affairs staff at the time he wrote the dispatch. He worked principally at CIA headquarters and was ~~was~~ responsible for recruitment and handling of agents for collection/intelligence data. Mr. Ronis, when interviewed by this Committee, stated that part of his responsibility was to scour the Western Hemisphere division for operational leads related to the work of the Special Affairs staff. Ronis recalled that he normally would send requests to CIA field stations for information or leads on various persons.

*often*  
*what purpose is served by this sentence?*

*as reflected*  
response to these requests. It was Ronis' recollection that the above-cited domestic exploitation section was a task force within the Special Affairs Staff. He also stated that in 1963 the CIA's Domestic Contacts Division might have been requested to locate Luisa Calderon's sister. Ronis told the Committee that he had no recollection of recruiting any person associated with the Cuban Intelligence Service. He did recall that he had recruited women to perform tasks for the Agency. However, he did not recall ever recruiting any employees of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate in Mexico City. Finally, Mr. Ronis stated that he had no recollection that Luisa Calderon was associated with the CIA. (HSCA Staff Interview August 31, 1978)

*Should make formal request for a written response*  
Various present and former CIA representatives were queried whether Luisa Calderon had ever been associated with the CIA. The uniform answer was that no one recalled such an association. (Cites: Helms, Hearing, August 9, 1978, p. 136; Rocca, Dep. p. 148, July 17, 1978; *Lungosich* Interview of August \_\_, Piccolo, Interview of \_\_)

*Calderon*  
Thus, the Agency's file and the testimony of former CIA employees *have* reveal *between and* no connection *to* Calderon *to* the CIA. Yet, as indicated earlier, this file is incomplete *absence from Calderon's 201 file* the most glaring omission being *the transcript of Calderon's* her cryptic remarks following the assassination of President Kennedy.



is a bona fide defector or that he has furnished us with accurate and valuable information concerning Cuban intelligence operations, staffers, and agents. (Langosch memo to Director of Security, 23 June 1964)

As an officer of the DGI, A-1 from August of 1963 until his defection was assigned to the DGI's Illegal Section B ( ) IN 68894 24 April 64) <sup>which</sup> ~~This section~~ was responsible for training agents for assignment in Latin America. His specific responsibility pertained to handling of agent operations in El Salvador. (Personal Record Questionnaire 4 June 1964; Otta In 68894 24 April 64)

~~identified for the CIA~~  
A-1 ~~knew who were~~ the Cuban ~~Intelligence~~ officers assigned to Mexico City. In this regard he initially identified Alfredo Mirabal, Manuel Vega, and Rogelio Rodríguez and the ~~Commercial~~ ~~attache~~ as DGI officers posted at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. (supra) Langosch described A-1's knowledge of DGI operations in Mexico as follows:

In Mexico City, he knows who the intelligence people are. One is the Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal. He is called the Chief of the Centre. That is his title but he is actually the intelligence chief, or at least he was until the 16th of April at which time a replacement was sent to Mexico to take over. This fellow's name is Manuel Vega. The source says that the Commercial attache whose name is Ricardo Tapia or Concepcion (he is not sure which is an intelligence officer) and another one is Rogelio. (I might say that some of these names are familiar to me.) (p. 5 or reel 4, 23 April 1964, debriefing of A-1, 30 April 64)

for Presentation to the Warren Commission outlining various positions adopted by the CIA vis a vis its investigative efforts and assistance to the Commission. (Brief, May 14, 1964, FOIA 695-302A).

W. H.   
 → At Tab E of <sup>45</sup>McCone's brief it states:

Within the past week, significant information has been developed by the CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect (cite supra May 14, 1964 FOIA 695-302A).

The significant information referred to therein is the information A-1 provided. *- Too conclusory*

On May 15, 1964, the day of ~~the~~ McCone's interview, the Warren Commission received its first formal communication regarding A-1. However, the Agency did not at that time identify A-1 by his real name or cryptonym nor did the Agency indicate that the source of this information was a defector then residing under secure conditions in the Washington, D.C. area. (See May 15 Letter from Helms to Rankin FOIA\_\_). The May 15 communication did state that the Agency had established contact

Do not insert.   
 "with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia." (Cite)

Attached to the May 15 communication was a copy of Langosch's above referenced memorandum of May 5, 1964 re-

garding A-1's knowledge of Oswald's probable contact with the DGI in Mexico City. (Cite above.) The attachment made no reference to the source's status as a defector from the DGI. *Significance?*

As set forth in the section of the report concerning Luisa Calderon, on June 18, 1964, Howard Willens of the Warren Commission reviewed Langosch's May 5 memo and the questions upon which the information set forth in the memo was elicited. Neither the questions <sup>p</sup> or the memo shown to Willens made reference to the source's status as a defector collaborating with the CIA. (Cite Arthur Dooley memo, 19 June 1964, FOIA 739-319). *SO. How important is this really?*

Based upon review of the Langosch memoranda, the Committee has determined that significant information regarding Luisa Calderon was withheld from the Warren Commission (Cite Calderon section). This information was derived from ~~her~~ debriefings of A-1. (Cite May 7 and 8 Langosch memos.) From the Committee's review of the A-1 file provided by the CIA, the Committee has not found any credible evidence indicating that other information provided by A-1 to the CIA was relevant to the work of the Warren Commission. However, in its review the Committee has determined that specific documents referenced in the A-1 file <sup>are</sup> ~~is~~ not present in that file. *What info. Was it this covered in previous section? Any other info? w/ held?*

<sup>One</sup> ~~The~~ missing item <sup>is</sup> of considerable concern to the Committee.

*as redacted*

- 7 -

*This*

is a debriefing report of A-1 entitled "The Oswald Case."

(Dispatcher *( )* 5035, 23 March 1965) On March 23, 1965, a CIA dispatch records the transmittal of the report, along with eleven other A-1 debriefing reports. (Cite supra.)

Next to the listing of the "Oswald Case" debriefing report

is the handwritten notation "SI." A CIA employee who has

worked extensively with the Agency files system <sup>told a Committee</sup> believed ~~Staff member that~~ <sup>was the symbol for</sup> this notation ~~to stand for~~ <sup>known as</sup> the CIA component Special In-

*Has CIA been asked to respond in writing to this issue?* ~~telligence. Other CIA representatives believed the nota-  
tion to stand for the CIA component Special Intelligence.~~

Other CIA representatives believed the notation was a reference to the Counterintelligence component CI/SIG. In a CIA memorandum dated \_\_\_\_\_, it ~~as~~ stated

Quote Barbara's memo.

The Agency has been unable to locate this document and therefore the Committee cannot pass judgement upon the substance of the missing materials.

The Committee has queried A-1's case officers regarding additional information that A-1 may have supplied <sup>about</sup> ~~regarding~~ Oswald. Joseph Lanogsch when interviewed by the Committee stated that (HSCA staff interview Joseph Langosch, August 21, 1978) he did not have contact with the Warren Commission and does not know what information derived from A-1's debriefings was supplied to the Warren Commission. (Cite also Hidalgo and Piccolo.) He also stated that he does not <sup>interview</sup>

*as redacted*

- 8 -

*A-1*  
recall that ~~AMMUG~~ provided any other information on Oswald's  
contact with the DGI other than *set forth in the 6/8 May 68, 7, and 8*  
*as discussed herein*  
herein. (Cite *Calderon* interview.)

In a further effort to clarify the substance of informa-  
tion that ~~AMMUG~~ *A-1* provided to the CIA regarding Oswald, the  
Committee has attempted to locate ~~AMMUG~~ *A-1*. The CIA has also  
attempted to locate ~~AMMUG~~ *A-1* (give date of separation from CIA)  
but has been unable to determine his present whereabouts.

Thus, gaps do exist regarding information ~~AMMUG~~ *A-1* may  
have supplied the CIA about Oswald. *and* But on the basis of  
the written record *with the* of the Agency, except for the Calderon  
episode, *the CIA* provided the Warren Commission with all information  
of investigative significance. *A-1* A broader question remains  
however. The Agency, as noted earlier, did not reveal to  
the Warren Commission that A-1 was present in the Washington,  
D.C. area and, under controlled conditions, accessible to the  
Commission. *Giving due consideration to* Even considering the CIA's serious concern  
for protecting its sources, the fact that A-1's status was  
not disclosed *prevented* foreclosed the Warren Commission from exercising  
a possible option, i.e. to take the sworn testimony of A-1  
as it concerned Oswald and the Kennedy assassination. On  
this issue, as the written record tends to show, the Agency  
unilaterally rejected the *possibility of exercising this* option. *It should not*  
*have done so.* The CIA did not face, in A-1's case, the  
enormous problems establishing bona fide as it did with Nosenko.

*State  
Source  
Training  
Contributions  
and  
other  
information*  
*Desperately* In light of the establishment of A-1's bone fide  
(Cite Langosch's quote supra), his proven reliability and  
his depth of knowledge of Cuban intelligence activities, *this*  
*option might well have been considered by the Warren Commission.*  
*It should have at the very least, had the opportunity for such consideration*

## THE AMLASH OPERATION

During 1967, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report which examined CIA supported assassination plots. Included in this report was discussion of the CIA-Mafia plots and an Agency project referred to as the AMLASH operation (67 IGR pp. 1-74, 78-112). The AMLASH operation involved a high level Cuban official (assigned the CIA cryptonym AMLASH/1) who, during 1962 while meeting with a CIA representative, expressed the desire to assassinate Fidel Castro (1967 IGR p.84). As a result of AMLASH's expressed objective and the CIA's desire to find a viable political alternative to the Castro regime, the Agency subsequently provided AMLASH with both moral and material support designed to eliminate Fidel Castro. (1967 IGR pp. 80-94). The AMLASH operation was terminated by the CIA in 1965 as the result of security leaks (1967 IGR pp. 104-106). During 1965, AMLASH and his conspirators were brought to trial in Cuba for plotting against Castro. AMLASH was sentenced to death, but at Castro's request the sentence was reduced to twenty-five years imprisonment. (1967 IGR pp. 107-110).

*what  
do you  
mean  
by  
this  
term?*

In its examination of the AMLASH operation ~~in~~ the 1967 IGR concluded that the CIA had offered both direct and indirect support for AMLASH's plotting (1967 IGR p. 80). The most striking example of the CIA's direct offer of support to AMLASH reported by the 1967 IGR states:

it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO. (1967 IGR p. 94)

The 1967 IGR offered no firm evidence confirming or refuting Castro's knowledge of the MALASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Report <sup>id</sup> does note that, in 1965, when AMLASH was tried in <sup>a</sup> Havana court, November 1964 was given as the <sup>date tying</sup> initial point ~~the~~ time at which AMLASH's actions were tied to CIA support. (1967 IGR p. 111)

*make point more explicit*

The Church Committee in Book V of its Final Report examined the AMLASH operation in great detail. (SSC, Book V, pp.2-7, 67-69) The Church Committee concluded:

The AMLASH plot was more relevant to the Warren Commission work than the early CIA assassination plots with the underworld. Unlike those earlier plots, the AMLASH operation was in progress at the time of the assassination; unlike the earlier plots, the AMLASH operation could clearly be traced to the CIA; and unlike the earlier plots, the CIA had endorsed AMLASH's proposal for a coup, the first step to him being Castro's assassination, despite Castro's threat to retaliate for such plotting. No one directly involved in either investigation (i.e. the CIA and the FBI) was told of the AMLASH operation. No one investigated a

connection between the AMLASH operation and President Kennedy's assassination. Although Oswald had been in contact with pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups for many months before the assassination, the CIA did not conduct a thorough investigation of questions of Cuban government or Cuban exile involvement in the assassination. (Church Committee, Book V, Final Report, p. 5)

In 1977, the CIA issued a second Inspector General's Report concerning the subject of CIA sponsored assassination plots. This Report, in large part, was intended as a rebuttal of the Church Committee's findings. The 1977 IGR states:

The Report (of the Church Committee) assigns it (the AMLASH operation) characteristics that it did not have during the period preceding the assassination of JFK in order to support the SSC view that it should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (1977 IGR p. 2)

The 1977 IGR concluded that, prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, the AMLASH operation was not an assassination plot and that the treatment of the issue by the Church Committee was both imprecise and misleading. (1977 IGR Tab D, p. 28)

*state why?*

Nevertheless, the 1977 IGR did state:



it would have served to reinforce the credibility of (the Warren Commission) its efforts had it taken a broader view of the matter (of normal avenue of investigation). The CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most then saw in general terms--the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination because of the tensions of the time. It is not enough to be able to point to erroneous criticisms made today. The Agency should have taken broader initiatives then as well. That CIA employees at the time felt--as they obviously did--that the activities about which they knew had no relevance to the Warren Commission inquiry does not take the place of a record of conscious review. (1977IGR p. 11)

~~It should be noted that~~ Richard Helms, as the highest level CIA employee in contact with the Warren Commission on a regular basis, testified to the Rockefeller Commission that he did not believe the AMLASH operation <sup>was</sup> ~~to have been~~ relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death. (Rockefeller Commission, Testimony of Richard Helms, 4/24/75 pp. 389-391, 2) In addition, Mr. Helms testified before the ~~the~~ Committee that the AMLASH operation was not designed to be an assassination plot (Richard Helms, Executive Session testimony, 8/9/78 pp. 26-27).

*Good* A contrasting view to the testimony of Mr. Helms was offered by Joseph Langosch who in 1963 was the Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (hereinafter SAS). During 1963, the Special Affairs Staff *take area of resp of this staff* was the CIA component responsible for CIA operations directed against the Government of Cuba and the Cuban Intelligence Services (HSCA Affidavit of Langosch, Sept. 14,

1978, p.1) The Special Affairs Staff was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald and was responsible for the AMLASH operation (Church Report, Book V, pp. 3, 8, 79). Langosch as the Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff was responsible for safeguarding SAS against penetration by foreign intelligence services, particularly the Cuban Intelligence Services. (HSCA staff, , supra) It was Langosch's recollection

that the AMLASH operation prior to the assassination of President Kennedy was characterized by the Special Affairs staff, Desmond Fitzgerald and other senior CIA officers as an assassination operation initiated and sponsored by the CIA.

Langosch further recollected that as of 1962 it was highly possible that the Cuban Intelligence Services were aware of AMLASH and his association with the CIA and that the information upon which Langosch based his conclusion that the AMLASH operation was insecure was available to senior level CIA officials including Desmond Fitzgerald. (HSCA Langosch Affidavit p. 4 supra)

However, the issue before this Committee is not simply whether the AMLASH operation was an assassination plot prior to President Kennedy's death. The broader and more significant issue, as the 1977 IGR has identified it, is whether the AMLASH operation was of sufficient relevancy to have been reported to the Warren Commission.

In the case of the AMLASH operation the determination is a most difficult matter to resolve. Reasonable men may differ in their characterization of the Agency's operational objectives.

Based upon the presently available evidence it is the Committee's position that such information, if made available to the Warren Commission, <sup>might</sup> ~~may~~ have stimulated the Commission's investigative concern for possible Cuban involvement or complicity in the assassination. As J.

Lee Rankin commented before this Committee:

...when I read...the Church Committee's report--it was an ideal situation for them to just pick out any way they wanted to tell the story and fit it in with the facts that had to be met and then either blame the rest of it on somebody else or not tell any more or polish it off. I don't think that could have happened back in 1964. I think there would have been a much better chance of getting to the heart of it. It might have only revealed that we are involved in all these things and who is involved in it and who approved it and all that. But I think that would have at least come out. (Rankin p. 91)

The Committee is in agreement with Mr. Rankin that had the AMLASH operation been disclosed to the Warren Commission, ~~it may~~ <sup>the Commission might</sup> have been able to foreclose the speculation and conjecture that <sup>has since been the mainstay of the</sup> the past decade ~~has been~~ <sup>is</sup> history now. <sup>Records, the AMLASH operation remains a</sup> a ~~prominent~~ footnote to the turbulent relations between Castro's Cuba and the United States.

Berk - Write-ups

*You need an introductory section on the purpose of the study prior to this section on the study's scope.*

I. Scope of Study

*Intro. should outline structure of the rept. How about preparing an outline?*

On April 23, 1976 the Senate Select Committee to *reviewing*  
Study Governmental Operations (hereinafter SSC) issued its *it w/*  
report regarding "The Investigation of the Assassination *me?*  
of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies." This report set forth a limited study of those federal agencies, primarily the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, that provided assistance to the Warren Commission in its investigation of the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. In particular, the SSC examined the relevancy of certain information pertaining to alleged assassination plots by the CIA against Fidel Castro and the withholding of this information from the Warren Commission. The SSC conclusions pertaining to these alleged CIA sponsored assassination plots have generated additional public and private inquiries regarding the substance and quality of information reported by the CIA to the Warren Commission.

During 1977, the CIA issued a report prepared by the Agency's Inspector General (hereinafter 77IGR). This report was intended to be, in large part, a rebuttal to the findings of the SSC pertaining to alleged CIA sponsored

assassination plots. The 77/IGR response concluded:

- 1) That the SSC Book V final report "contains numerous factual errors, both in the extensive treatment of a selected operation (AMLASH) and in a number of separate incidents that it presents";
- 2) "While one can make the point in principle that the Warren Commission could well have broadened its review to include the anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. Government, in trying to make the case for that concept, Book V of the Senate Select Committee Final Report went to such lengths in its treatment as to detract from the point at hand. It is difficult to characterize it more generously.\* (CIA 77IGR, p. 9)

The 77/IGR further concluded that the SSC Final Report conveyed an impression of limited effort by the CIA to assist the Warren Commission in its work. The 77/IGR was in fundamental disagreement with this characterization of the SSC findings and noted that "CIA did seek and collect information in support of the Warren Commission. Additionally, it conducted studies and submitted special analyses and reports." (Introduction to Tab E of 77/IGR).

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\* The 77 IGR comments regarding Warren Commission lack of knowledge of anti-Cuban programs of the U.S. government will be addressed at length in another section of this report.

*split information*  
In order to further demonstrate the scope of support provided by the CIA to the Warren Commission, the 77 IGR compiled a comprehensive listing of CIA generated material provided to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and the Warren Commission regarding the assassination of President Kennedy. In this ~~regard~~ <sup>respect</sup>, the Committee agrees with the 77 IGR wherein it is stated that

"This compilation (of CIA generated material) is appropriate to consideration of the extent of the CIA effort, to the extent that it reveals something of the results of that effort."  
(77 IGR, Introduction to Tab E)

Therefore, in order to examine the broad issue of the CIA's scope and quality of support to the Warren Commission in both an objective and disciplinary<sup>ed</sup> manner, the Committee has reviewed in detail the 77 IGR's listing of information pertaining to the assassination provided the Warren Commission and the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Committee has particularly focused its attention on the specific issue of whether the CIA or any employee or former employee of the CIA misinformed, or withheld information relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy from the Warren Commission. In addition, the Committee has attempted to determine whether, if the Warren Commission was misinformed or not made privy to information relevant to its investigation, whether the misinforming or withholding of evidence from the Warren Commission was the result of a conscious intent to do so by the Agency or its employees.

In examining the Agency's comprehensive listing of CIA generated material referenced above, the Committee has paralleled its review to the structure given to these materials by the 77 IGR. In this regard, the 77 IGR details four interrelated compilations of Kennedy assassination material. These four compilations are:

- 1) Agency dissemination of information to the Intelligence Community (Formal and Informal Disseminations)
- 2) Dissemination of material to the Warren Commission
- 3) Agency dissemination to the FBI et al regarding rumors and allegations regarding President Kennedy's assassination
- 4) Memorandum submitted by CIA to the Warren Commission on Rumors and Allegations Relating to the President's Assassination (Introduction to Tab E, 77 IGR)

*far should explain at the outset why this is a significant distinction for it?*

~~The~~ <sup>(1)</sup> ~~Compilation~~ ~~imposed~~ above was reviewed by a staff member of this Committee. This review focused upon those documents identified in the compilation ~~as~~ having been made available to member agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community but not having been made available to the Warren Commission for its review. ~~It~~ It should be noted that merely because a specific document was not made available to the Warren Commission does not necessarily imply that substantive information relevant to the Warren Commission's work was withheld from it. The substance of such informa-

tion may have been made available in a subsequent communication or report to the Commission. Nevertheless, these materials have been analyzed to determine if ~~the~~ <sup>and</sup> substantive<sup>and</sup> relevant information related to President Kennedy's assassination was provided by the CIA to member agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Communities <sup>that was</sup> ~~not~~ provided by the CIA in some manner to the Warren Commission.

(2)  
~~Materials~~ Compilation set forth above consists of those materials provided by the CIA in written form to the Warren Commission. These materials were reviewed, analyzed, and contrasted against those materials related to President Kennedy's assassination provided by the CIA to member agencies of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Those materials set forth in the ~~Materials~~ Compilation (3) listed above were in fact included in the first compilation cited herein. Therefore these materials were subject to the same standards of review applied to the ~~first~~ Compilation (1)

Those materials set forth in the ~~Materials~~ Compilation (4) listed above were in fact included in ~~the~~ <sup>(2)</sup> ~~Materials~~ Compilation. Therefore, these materials were subject to the same standards of review applied to ~~the~~ <sup>(2)</sup> ~~Materials~~ Compilation.

As a visual aid to the analysis of the materials contained in the four compilations discussed above, a chart

In light of this, why not have just 2 categories. Otherwise, at least specify why more precisely why 4 categories are being used.



*Where is this chart?  
I think reminder of your report should  
be tied into the chart more directly.*

has been prepared which illustrates the flow of written in-  
formation <sup>from</sup> the CIA concerning President Kennedy's assassina-  
tion to the Warren Commission and the U.S. intelligence

community. This chart <sup>sets forth</sup> the CIA's ~~dissemination~~ designa-  
tion <sup>for each document listed</sup> and <sup>sets forth</sup> the subject matter of each document <sup>and</sup> the date of <sup>its</sup> ~~document's~~ dissemination. The chart also indicates <sup>whether</sup> ~~the document~~ was made available  
to the Warren Commission ~~and~~ the U.S. Intelligence community or both.  
*secondary purpose of* this chart ~~is to~~ indicate <sup>is to</sup>

for selected subjects the volume of information provided  
to the U.S. Intelligence community as opposed to the Warren  
Commission.

During the course of this study, additional Agency  
files have been reviewed. These files have been examined  
in an effort to resolve certain issues created by the re-  
view of the Agency's compilations discussed herein. Where  
apparent gaps existed in the written record, files have  
been requested and reviewed in an effort to resolve these  
gaps. Where significant substantive issues have arisen  
related to the kind and quality of information provided  
the Warren Commission, files have also been requested and  
reviewed in an effort to resolve these issues. As a result,  
approximately thirty files, comprising approximately ninety  
volumes have been examined and analyzed by ~~the~~ Committee. *a staff member of this*  
~~tion of this report~~ *in preparation*

*#* The findings set forth herein  
are subject to modification due to the following considera-

tions. During the course of the past fifteen years, the CIA has generated massive amounts of information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In spite of the Agency's sophisticated document retrieval system, certain documents requested by this Committee for study and analysis have not been located. Whether these documents have merely been filed incorrectly or destroyed, either as the result of ~~Government~~ regulation or individual whim, gaps in the written record ~~do~~ still exist. *do we have any evidence of this? If so, indicate in a fn + deal w/ in a later section.*

Secondly, due to dissimilar standards of relevancy adopted by ~~the CIA and this Committee~~, certain files requested by the Committee for review have either not been made available by the Agency or have been made available to the Committee in a sanitized fashion. Therefore, to the degree reflected by the Agency's denial of access and/or sanitization of certain materials, this study's conclusions are based upon the best evidence available to the Committee though this may not be all relevant evidence to which the Agency has access.

One must, moreover, give due consideration to the role that oral discussions, oral briefings, and meetings of Warren Commission and CIA representatives may have played in the supply of assassination-related information by the CIA to the Warren Commission. The subject and substance of these discussions, briefings, and meetings ~~may~~ not always reflected by the written record made the

subject of this study. Therefore, the Committee has conducted interviews, depositions and executive session hearings with key Warren Commission <sup>staff and members</sup> and former or present CIA representatives in an effort to <sup>resolve questions that are</sup> ~~fill the gap created~~ <sup>not addressed) + the written record.</sup> by ~~the [redacted]~~ informal means of communication.

The results of the Committee's efforts to chronicle this aspect of the working relationship between the Warren Commission and the CIA will be a subject for discussion herein.

There is no section II b) ~~to~~ <sup>∴</sup> no need to label this II a).

II. a) Warren Commission relationship with CIA regarding information made available by CIA to Warren Commission

The Committee has queried both representatives of the Warren Commission staff and those representatives of the CIA who played significant roles in providing CIA generated information to the Warren Commission. The general consensus of those <sup>whom represented</sup> ~~queried~~ was that the Warren Commission and the CIA enjoyed a successful working relationship during the course of the Commission's investigation <sup>Rankin, cites? -</sup> (Depo of R. Rocca 7/17/78, p. 18) William Coleman, a senior staff counsel for the Warren Commission who worked closely with Warren Commission staff counsel W. David Slawson, on matters which ~~utilized~~ <sup>ed</sup> the CIA's ~~resources~~ resources, characterized the CIA representatives with whom he dealt as highly competent, cooperative, and intelligent. (See HSCA staff interview 8/2/78). Mr. Slawson expressed a similar opinion regarding the Agency's

try not to use the same word in consecutive sentences.

He may no longer agree w/ this

cooperation and quality of work. (Executive Session Testimony of W. David Slawson, November 15, 1977, p. 17, see also JFK exh. 23.)

J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel for the Warren Commission, testified that the Warren Commission and its staff were assured that the Agency would cooperate in its work. (HSCA deposition of J. Lee Rankin, August 17, 1978, Classified, p. 4).

John McCone, Director of Central Intelligence at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation, supported Mr. Rankin's testimony in this regard by characterizing the CIA's work vis a vis the Warren Commission as both responsive and comprehensive. (HSCA deposition of John McCone, August 17, 1978, p. 5) Mr. McCone testified that he was personally responsible for determining whether Lee Harvey Oswald was ever associated with the Agency. Mr. McCone was further responsible for ensuring that all relevant matters were conveyed by the CIA to the Warren Commission. (McCone deposition pp. 5-6) Mr. McCone further testified that:

The policy of CIA was to give the Warren Commission everything that we had. I personally asked Chief Justice Warren to come to my office and took him down to the vault of our building where our information is microfilmed and stored and showed him the procedures that we were following and the extent to which we were giving him--giving his staff everything that we had, and I think he was quite satisfied. (McCone Deposition p. 9)

date \_\_\_\_\_

This is out of place here.

again, try to avoid using the same word

in consecutive sentences.

Mr. Raymond Rocca, one of the CIA's key representatives to the Warren Commission during its investigation, also characterized the Agency's role as one of full support to the Warren Commission. Mr. Rocca, who served as the Chief of the Research and Analysis Division for the Counter-Intelligence Staff of the CIA recalled under oath that Richard Helms had ~~directed that~~ *given the following directive:*

All material bearing in any way that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission should be seen by CI staff and R and A and marked for us. He issued very, very strictly worded indications--they were verbal in so far as I know--that we were to leave no stone unturned. (HSCA Deposition of Raymond Rocca, July 17, 1978, p. 24)

Mr. Rocca added that, to his knowledge, Mr. Helms' orders were followed to the letter by all CIA employees. *o*

(Rocca deposition, <sup>*date*</sup> p. 24) Mr. Rocca concluded *that*

*On 4/1 basis,*

*"[+] the CIA was to turn over and to develop any information bearing on the assassination that could be of assistance to the Warren Commission."* (Rocca deposition, p. 26)

*Do not  
insert:  
fewer than  
5 lines.*

A somewhat different view of the CIA's role regarding the supply of CIA's information to the Warren Commission was propounded by Richard Helms. Mr. Helms, who served as the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans during the Warren Commission investigation and who was directly responsible for the CIA's investigation of President Kennedy's assassination (Rocca dep. p.23), testified to the Committee that the CIA made every effort to be as responsive as possible to Warren Commission requests. (HSCA Executive Session

*Clarify the distinction that you're trying to make here. ie Helms did not view CIA as being an initiator of information*

testimony of Richard Helms, August 9, 1978, p.10) Mr. Helms added further testimony regarding the manner in which the CIA provided its information to the Warren Commission. He stated:

An inquiry would come over (from the Warren Commission). We would attempt to respond to it. But these inquiries came in individual bits and pieces or as individual items...Each individual item that came along we took care of as best we could. (Helms hearing p.10-11)

It was Mr. Helms' recollection that the CIA provided information to the Warren Commission <sup>only</sup> on the basis of the Commission's specific requests. primarily Under oath he supported this proposition:

Mr. Goldsmith: In summary, is it your position that the Agency gave the Warren Commission information only in response to specific requests by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Helms: That is correct.

I want to modify that by saying that memory is fallable. There may have been times or circumstances under which something different might have occurred, but my recollection is that we were attempting to be responsive and supportive to the FBI and the Warren Commission. When they asked for something we gave it to them.

As far as our volunteering information is concerned, I have no recollection of whether we volunteered it or not.

Mr. Helms' characterization of fulfilling Warren Commission requests on a case by case basis rather than uniformly volunteering relevant information to the Warren Commission stands in direct opposition to J. Lee Rankin's

this is a horrible lawyer's war.

perception of the CIA's investigative responsibility.

Mr. Rankin was <sup>asked</sup> ~~queried~~ by Committee Counsel whether ~~he~~

<sup>he</sup> worked under the impression that the Agency's responsibility was simply to respond to questions that

were addressed to CIA by the Warren Commission. <sup>In response,</sup> Mr. Rankin

testified as follows:

[Chuck. let's discuss your use of the language that precedes a colon.]

Not at all and if anybody had told me that I would have insisted that the Commission communicate with the President and get a different arrangement because we might not ask the right questions and then we would not have the information and that would be absurd (Rankin deposition p. 4)

Rankin's

Mr. Slawson added support to ~~the~~ <sup>Warren Commission</sup> position testifying that ~~the~~ requests to the CIA were rarely specific.

"The request was made initially that they give us all information pertinent to the assassination investigation."

(Slawson Dep. p.29)

The unfortunate consequences ~~of not asking the right questions~~

~~the CIA~~

were

~~of not asking the right questions~~ graphically illustrated by the subsequent exposure of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots (SSC Book V).

Paradoxically

the Agency in its dealings with the Warren Commission,

even if the Warren Commission had requested information

on such plots, would have been able to plausibly deny

CIA involvement. As Mr. Rocca's testimony reveals, he had no knowledge at the time of the Warren Commission investigation of Agency efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro. (Rocca

Getting into the plots at this point gets us seemingly far astray from the analytical

the plots' existence

framework that you outlined in the previous section.

I disagree. we would have had to have gone upstream with this request.

544-117-51  
seeking  
level  
representative  
of the Warren  
Commission  
Has Rocca been questioned by the  
research and report on CIA anti-Castro assassination  
operations. Rocca's efforts would have produced no substantive  
information. [see Rocca dep p 49]

dep. p.50) Therefore, in providing all relevant informa-  
tion to the Warren Commission on the CIA's working-level  
point of contact (if any?) if requested to research the  
existence of such CIA plots, his efforts would have pro-  
duced no substantive information.

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ The record also reflects  
that \_\_\_\_\_ of the CIA desk of-

ficer who was initially given the responsibility by Mr.

Helms to investigate for the CIA, Lee Harvey Oswald, <sup>had no knowledge of such plots during his investigation</sup>  
and the assassination of President Kennedy. (SHCA deposi-

tion of John Scelso, May 16, 1978, p.73, 111-112) Mr.

Scelso testified that, had he known of such assassination

plots, the following action would have been taken:

"we would have gone at that hot and heavy.  
We would have queried the agent (AMLASH) about  
it in great detail. I would have had him poly-  
graphed by the best operative security had to  
see if he had (sic) been a double-agent, in-  
forming Castro about our poison pen things,  
and so on. I would have had all our Cuban  
sources queried about it."

Undoubtedly, had the CIA initially investigated  
and reported on the anti-Castro assassination plots after  
the JFK assassination, the information would have become  
available to the Warren Commission, as it eventually was  
discovered by the SSC.

As the record reflects with the CIA  
However, these plots were known by few, and Mr.

Helms' testimony regarding these plots reveals that the

Agency compromised its <sup>promise</sup> ~~position~~ <sup>to</sup> supply all

relevant information to the Warren Commission. Both DCI  
McCone and General Counsel Rankin had believed to be in <sup>this policy</sup> ~~redundant~~.



*[Cite supra McCone  
Rankin testimony]*

- 14 -

effect. The following exchange between Committee Counsel and Mr. Helms illustrates the acute ~~lack~~<sup>laxity</sup> of the Agency's compromise:

Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Helms, I take it from your testimony that your position is that the anti-Castro plots, in fact, were relevant to the Warren Commission's work; and, in light of that, the Committee would like to be informed as to why the Warren Commission was not told by you of the anti-Castro assassination plots.

Mr. Helms: I have never been asked to testify before the Warren Commission about our operations.

Mr. Goldsmith: If the Warren Commission did not know of the operation, it certainly was not in a position to ask you about it.

Is that not true?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but how do you know they did not know about it? How do you know Mr. Dulles had not told them? How was I to know that? And besides, I was not the Director of the Agency and in the CIA, you did not go traipsing around to the Warren Commission or to Congressional Committees to to any place else without the Director's permission.

Mr. Goldsmith: Did you ever discuss with the Director whether the Warren Commission should be informed of the anti-Castro assassination plots?

Mr. Helms: I did not, as far as I recall.

~~Mr. Helms:~~ Mr. McCone testified that he first became aware of the CIA's anti-Castro assassination plots involving CIA-Mafia ties during August 1963. He stated that upon learning of these plots, he directed that the Agency cease all such activities. (McCone deposition, p.13)

McCone had knowledge in Aug '65 - Why didn't he go to WC15 - with this?

~~However~~, when asked ~~whether~~ the CIA desired to withhold information from the Warren Commission about the Agency anti-Castro assassination plots to avoid embarrassing the Agency or causing an international crises he responded *gave the following response*:

"I cannot answer that since they (CIA employees knowledgeable of the continuance of such plots) withheld the information from me. I cannot answer that question. I have never been satisfied as to why they withheld the information from me. (McCone deposition, p.16)

Thus, the evidence indicates that, <sup>had</sup> ~~Helms~~ ~~to have~~ approached McCone <sup>to discuss informing the</sup> ~~Warren Commission~~ <sup>of past and ongoing CIA</sup> ~~anti-Castro assassina-~~ <sup>it</sup> ~~tion plots~~ <sup>cost</sup> ~~might have~~ ~~Helms~~ ~~his job~~ <sup>To do so would have meant</sup> ~~informing~~ McCone that plots were still being considered by the Agency <sup>[ But see Helms testimony — ]</sup>

Regarding the relevancy of such plots to the Warren Commission's work, <sup>Warren Commission counsel's Slawson and</sup> ~~Commission's work~~

<sup>Spector</sup> ~~were in agreement~~ (Slawson dep., p.27) that such information should have been reported to the Warren Commission. (See also Spector, p.46) (But see Liebel, depo. <sup>From the CIA's perspective</sup> p.47) Mr. Rocca testified that had he known of the anti-Castro assassination plots, his efforts to explore the possibility of a retaliatory assassination against President Kennedy by Castro would have been intensified. He stated:

"...in light of what has happened a completely different procedural approach probably would and should have been taken. I mean, there are any number of things that one can say in

*This belongs in some sequence as the earlier Sub-Exposition.*

*...too slantish  
2. We can't really support this conclusion.  
I don't think this section is relevant should go last.  
I am not sure that we really need to deal w/ relevancy question explicitly.*

the light of history.

What I can't accept is that leads were deliberately or otherwise ignored. (Rocca dep., p.45)

*Is this  
in  
context?  
What  
does he  
mean  
by  
this?*

John Scelso, the above-cited CIA desk officer who ran the CIA's initial investigation of President Kennedy's assassination until that responsibility was given to the CIA's counterintelligence staff, offered a highly critical appraisal of Helms' non-disclosure to the Warren Commission:

Mr. Goldsmith: Do you think Mr. Helms was acting properly when he failed to tell the Warren Commission about the assassination plots?

Mr. Scelso: No, I think that was a morally highly reprehensible act, which he cannot possibly justify under his oath of office, or any other standard of professional public service. (Scelso dep., p.153)

*Agency concern for the sanctity of*

### III. Introductory Section/SS+M

The length of time required by the CIA to respond to the Warren Commission's requests for information has been shown to have been dependent upon 1) the availability of information, and 2) the complexity of the issues presented by the request, *and 3) the extent to which the relevant info touched upon sensitive CIA SS+M.* On *the first two* this point, Mr. Helms testified that when CIA had been able to satisfy a Commission request, the CIA would then send a reply back:

"and some of these inquiries obviously took longer than others.

For example, some might involve checking a file which was in Washington. Other inquiries might involve trying to see if we could locate somebody in some overseas country.

Obviously, one takes longer to perform than the other. (Helms Exec. Session hearing, p.25)

CHIEF OF COLLECTION TO  
OPERATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
*as reflected*

Mr. Rocca, as the day to day CIA working level contact with the Warren Commission stated that on the average it took less than one week for the CIA to transmit its information to the Warren Commission, after such information had been processed by the Agency. (Rocca dep. pp.66-67) (Add the opinion of WC staffers.)

*ambiguous & probably unnecessary. Also, it didn't make a great point because, if it took CIA 3 months to produce info in response to a request, the one week transmittal time is meaningless.*

However, ~~in some instances, risking the exposure of its~~ *at times* the CIA's sensitive sources and methods, caused the Warren Commission to experience greater difficulty in getting ~~relevant~~ *relevant* information than when the protection of such sources and methods was not at issue. J. Lee Rankin expressed the opinion that the Agency's ~~effort~~ *effort* to protect its sensitive sources and methods did ~~not~~ *not* affect ~~the~~ the quality of the information to ~~the~~ *which* the Warren Commission and its staff were given access.

(Rankin at p.23) *As a result the* In some instances ~~the~~ *made the* Agency ~~would~~ *would* make unilateral decisions ~~regarding the~~ *to withhold or limit* ~~access to CIA~~ *access to CIA* materials ~~to be~~ *by* the Commission. (Scetso dep. p.158) *At some point, you should refer to testimony by CIA people who acknowledged this*

~~Two areas of concern to this Committee in which the protection of agency sources and methods were at issue during the Warren Commission investigation involved and impeded the Warren Commission investigation to some degree:~~

- 1) ~~Withholding information from the Warren Commission Staff~~ *Withholding information from the Warren Commission Staff* pertaining to the photosurveillance and operations of the CIA's Mexico City Station *effects of the*
- 2) As a related consideration, the controversy sur- *get better explaining. Also, this is not*

*See also Angleton dep. was of concern in which the Agency is desire to protect its sensitive sources and methods. I predict the Warren Commission investigation has been:*

*as redacted*  
rounding <sup>the</sup> photograph now referred to as that  
of the "Mexico City Mystery Man"

Each of these concerns will be examined ~~herein~~  
herein.

The CIA's concern for revealing the existence of  
sensitive technical operations, as outlined above, was  
evident from the <sup>in</sup>ception of the Warren Commission.  
Mr. Scelso commented that "we were not authorized at first  
to reveal all our technical operations." (Scelso dep.  
p.158) Scelso further testified:

*Not a  
great fuck  
bec it wasn't  
what we  
was not going to  
be given*  
We were going to give them intelligence re-  
ports which derived from all our sources, in-  
cluding technical sources, including  
and the information gotten  
from the interrogation of Silvia Duran, for  
example, which corresponded almost exactly  
with the information from  
(Ext to Scelso quote, all of p.5)

Mr. Scelso's characterization is supported by  
examination of the background to the first major CIA  
report furnished the Warren Commission regarding Lee Harvey  
Oswald's trip to Mexico City. <sup>{31 Jan memo}</sup> (Cite.) Much of the informa-  
tion provided to the Warren Commission in this report was  
based upon sensitive sources and methods, identification  
of which had been deleted completely from the report.

<sup>CIA</sup> The policy ~~limiting~~ limiting Warren Commission know-  
ledge of CIA sources and methods was articulated as early  
as December 20, 1963, at which time a cable was sent from  
CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station which stated:

Our present plan in passing information to the  
Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 01-10-2001 BY 60322  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
as redacted

- 19 -

in order to protect your continuing ops. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet Consular file which Soviets gave <sup>State</sup> (CIA cable DIR 97829 FOIA 498-204, 29 Jan 1964)

The basic policy articulated in the December 20, 1963 cable is also set forth in a CIA memorandum of December 17, 1963. In that memorandum, Birch O'Neal of the CIA Counterintelligence <sup>Special Investigations Group</sup> Staff wrote that he had been advised by Sam Papich, FBI liaison ~~man~~ to the CIA, that the FBI was anticipating a request from the Warren Commission for copies of the FBI's materials which supported or complimented the FBI's five volume report of December 9, 1963 <sup>that had been</sup> submitted to the Warren Commission.

Papich provided O'Neal with this report which indicated that some United States Agency was <sup>and asked him</sup> in Mexico, ~~Papich queried O'Neal~~ whether the FBI could supply the Warren Commission with <sup>the</sup> source of

(The FBI had knowledge of CIA operations in Mexico City, see CIA SQCI-3/779/510)

O'Neal's memorandum <sup>shows</sup> ~~that~~ that he discussed this matter with Scelso, who, in turn, after a discussion with Helms, was directed by Helms to prepare CIA material to be passed to the Warren Commission. O'Neal wrote:

He (Scelso) was quite sure it was not the Agency's desire to make available to the Commission at least in this manner--via the FBI--sensitive information which could relate to (Birch O'Neal, Memo for File, 20 Dec 63, Subj: Lee Harvey Oswald)

this portion of sentence does not follow that well in light of the basic point in issue.

restructure this sentence

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

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~~O'Neil memorandum and its characterization~~

The opinion expressed by Scelso as of December 17, 1963 was set forth on January 14, 1964 in a formalized fashion. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
all information deemed significant as received by CIA (or found in CIA files, irrespective of the nature, sensitivity or reliability of sources, thereof, was promptly relayed to your Bureau. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
Jan, 1964 CIA dissem to FBI, CSC1-3/779/510)

when Helms, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~, expressed his concern regarding exposure of Agency sources by the FBI to the Warren Commission. Helms wrote that the CIA had become aware that the FBI had already:

called to the attention of the Commission, through its attorney, that we have information (as determined from Agency sources) coinciding with the date when Oswald was in Mexico City and which may have some bearing on his activities while in that area. (CSCI-3/779/510)

Mr. Helms further indicated that the CIA ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ be called upon to provide additional information acquired from checks of CIA records and agency sources. He ~~then~~

suggested that certain policies be employed to enable CIA to work with the Commission ~~and with the Commission's~~ cooperation protect CIA information, sources and methods.

Among the policies articulated ~~two~~ which ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ enabled the Agency to control the flow of information:

~~originated by it. and~~ In this way check the possibility of revealing its sources and methods inadvertently. The policies articulated were:

An unnecessary quotation. No need to use this quote or its not all that misinterpreted. Summary not in text.

I don't really see any expression of Helms' concern.

I have changed the meaning of sentence slightly. Is it still OK.

redundant

were Helms claimed would be Agency originated

+ no CIA could

→

Chuck: The preceding page is confusing because you appeared to be - 21 - speaking generally of policies & then it turns out you are referring to

- 1) Your Bureau not disseminating information received from this Agency without prior concurrence

a policy arrangement between POT

+ CIA.

Please modify.

- 2) In instances in which this Agency has provided information to your Bureau and you consider that information is pertinent to the Commission's interest, and/or compliments or otherwise is pertinent to information developed or received by your Bureau through other sources and is being provided by you to the Commission, you refer the Commission to this Agency. In such cases it will be appreciated if you will advise us of such referral in order that we may anticipate the possible further interest of the Commission and initiate certain preparatory to meeting its needs. (CSCI -3/559/710)

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
CIA of  
This policy ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ eliminating ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ reference to

Agency sensitive sources and methods is further revealed by examination of an Agency cable, dated January 29, 1964, that was sent from CIA Headquarters to the CIA Mexico City Station. That cable indicated that knowledge of Agency sources and techniques was on that date still being withheld from the Warren Commission. Therein, it ~~was~~ stated that on Saturday, February 1, 1964, CIA ~~was~~ to present a report on Oswald's Mexico City activities to the Warren Commission. However,

lets not use these types of words



*as redacted* which would *appropriately* ~~was to be in a form that would~~ the form of this presentation ~~be~~ protect <sup>we of</sup> the CIA's Mexico City Station's sources and techniques.

(CIA Cable Dir. 90466, FOIA 420-757, 20 Dec 63)

*See also: Angleton memo.*  
IV. and Photo Surveillance

Mr. Helms offered testimony regarding the CIA's reticence to inform the Warren Commission, at least during the initial stage of the CIA <sup>of the Commission's work</sup> : and photo surveillance operations in Mexico City, ~~discussing the~~

~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Helms testified:

The reason for the sensitivity of these <sup>and</sup> surveillance was not only because it was sensitive from the Agency's standpoint, but

and therefore, if this had become public knowledge, it would have caused very bad feelings between Mexico and the United States, and that was the reason. (Helms Exec Session hearing, pp.51-52, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~)

Nevertheless, the CIA had provided information to the FBI regarding the Mexico City surveillance operations prior to the assassination and during the post-assassination period <sup>(CIA system CSCI 3/779/510 1/14/64)</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Furthermen as of November 28, 1963 the White House, through information made available by DCI McCone to National Security Council's Director McGeorge Bundy, <sup>had been made</sup> aware that the CIA had ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ in operation against the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates and that through these ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Oswald's presence in Mexico City prior to the assassination had been corroborated. *[cite McCone memo to McGeorge Bundy]*

*But, of course, FBI had knowledge of the assassination*

*This acts going point your seeking to make. It puts points on WH & NSC.*

as reflected

unwillingness

The CIA's ~~unwillingness~~ to inform the Warren Commission of the above-described surveillance operations ~~and to~~

~~in the early stages of the in-~~

vestigation ~~the transcription of all conversations and~~

~~those of certain Soviet and Cuban officials~~ is a source

of concern to this Committee. It is indicative of an ~~Agency~~

~~policy designed to skew in its favor the form and~~ substance ~~of~~ ~~the Agency's part to~~ ~~unilaterally~~ ~~the~~

substance ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~Agency's part to~~ ~~unilaterally~~ ~~the~~ ~~the CIA felt uncomfortable~~ ~~provided~~

the Warren Commission. (See Scelso dep. T) This process

might well have hampered the Commission's ability to pro-

ceed in its investigation with all the facts before it,

~~even those which might have meant exposing certain sensi-~~

~~tive operations to the Commission.~~ We'll have to give examples.

i.e. WC was proceeding on

As noted previously, on January 31, 1964, the CIA ~~completely~~

provided the Warren Commission with a memorandum that

chronicled Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City visit during

September 26, 1963 - October 3, 1963. That memorandum

~~did~~ ~~not~~ mention ~~that~~ Oswald's various conver-

sations with the Cuban and Sovieti Embassy/Consulates had

been ~~( )~~ and subsequently transcribed. Furthermore,

that memorandum ~~did~~ ~~not~~ mention ~~that~~ that the CIA

~~( )~~ transcribed conversations between Cuban

Embassy employee Sylvia Duran and Soviet officials at

the Soviet Embassy/Consulate nor was mention made of the

conversations between Cuban President Dorticos and Cuban

Ambassador to Mexico ~~( )~~ and

transcribed.

Agency  
policy designed to skew in its favor the form and  
the CIA felt uncomfortable  
mistaken assumption  
re CITO  
in WC  
prior to  
MC  
trip  
by  
WC  
personnel  
in  
April  
I believe  
this was  
in the  
WC  
3/30  
Stanton  
memo.

Armas

*as redacted*  
On February 1, 1964, Helms appeared before the Commission (see above) and likely discussed the memorandum of January 31, 1964. On February 10, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote Helms in regard to the CIA memorandum of January 31. A review of Rankin's letter indicates that ~~at least~~ *his writing* as of ~~the date~~, the Warren Commission had no substantive knowledge of

or the production i.e., the tapes and transcripts, from that operation. Rankin inquired in the February 10, 1964 *letter* whether Oswald's direct communication with employees of the Soviet Embassy (as stated in ~~the~~ *#* of the January 31 memorandum) had been facilitated by telephone or interview. Manifestly, if the Warren Commission had been informed of *(* and its success *)* Oswald this inquiry by Rankin would not have been made. *Good point.*

Raymond Rocca's testimony tends to support this conclusion. It was Rocca's recollection that between the time period of January 1964 - April 1964, Warren Commission's representatives had visited the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia and had been shown various transcripts resulting from the CIA's *(* in Mexico City. (Rocca dep. p.89) However, Mr. Rocca did not personally make this material available to Commission representatives and was not able to state under oath precisely the point in time at which the Warren Commission *first* learned of these operations.

*as redacted*

On February 19, 1964 the CIA responded to Rankin's inquiry of February 10. The Agency response did indicate that Oswald had phoned the Soviet Consulate and was also interviewed at the Consulate. However, the Agency did <sup>neither</sup> not reveal the source of this information in its response to the Commission <sup>for</sup> indicated that <sup>this source</sup> it would be revealed by other means (e.g. by oral briefing).

V. *Title?* - *shouldn't that be a subsection of + 4*  
During the period of March - April 1964, David

Slawson drafted a series of memoranda which among other issues concerned Warren Commission knowledge of and access to the production material derived from the

*Good!*  
( ) in Mexico City. A review of

these memoranda tends to support the Committee's belief - *Why?*  
that the Warren Commission, through Messrs. Slawson, Coleman, *Please should*  
and Willens did not obtain access to CIA *be given at this point.*

( ) until April 9, 1964. At that time, Coleman, *Scott*  
Slawson and Willens met with Win Scott, the CIA's Chief of Station in Mexico City, *SC* provided them with various transcripts and translations derived from

( ) of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy/Consulates. (Slawson memorandum of April 22, 1964, subject: \_\_\_\_\_ T)

*However, Prior to April 9,* it appears doubtful that the Commission had been given even partial access to the referenced material. Nevertheless, by March 12,

*as redacted*  
1964, the record indicates that the Warren Commission had at least become aware that the CIA did ( )

( ) of the Cuban Embassy/Consulate.

(Slawson memorandum, March 12, 1964, Subj: meeting with CIA representatives). Slawson's memorandum reveals

~~that~~ the Warren Commission had learned that CIA ~~had in its~~ possessed transcripts of conversations between the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, Armas, and the Cuban President Dorticos.

*Dorticos-Armas*  
The ~~conversations~~ <sup>memo</sup> conversations, requested by the Warren Commission representatives at a meeting with CIA officials, including Richard Helms, ~~afterwards~~ concerned Silvia

Durfa's arrest and interrogation by the Mexican Federal Police (cite?). ~~On that date,~~ <sup>standing</sup> Helms responded to the Commission's request for access, ~~stating~~ that he would

attempt to arrange for the Warren Commission representative to review ~~this~~ this material. (Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

It should be noted that the records reviewed do not reveal the manner in which the Commission learned of the Dorticos-Armas ( ) As detailed above, both the FBI and White House (through McGeorge Bundy) were aware of the CIA ( ) in Mexico City.

*supn*  
(Cite) One or the other could well have provided the Warren Commission with this information. Nevertheless, Raymond Rocas' testimony as cited herein (Rocca dep. )

lends some support to the position that the Commission had been informed of the Dorticos-Armas conversations through the CIA's initiative.

*as reflected*  
Another Slawson memorandum, dated March 25, 1964 concerned Oswald's trip to Mexico. Slawson therein stated that the tentative conclusions <sup>concerning</sup> ~~to~~ Oswald's Mexico trip, that he had reached were derived from CIA memoranda of January 31, 1964 and February 19, 1964, and, in addition, a Mexican federal police summary ~~of~~ of interrogations conducted shortly after the assassination with certain Cuban Embassy employees. Slawson wrote:

A large part of it (the summary report) is simply a summation of what the Mexican police learned when they interrogated Mrs. Silvia Duran, (sic) an employee of the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, and is therefore only as accurate as Mrs. Duran's testimony to the police.

These comments indicate that Slawson placed limited reliance upon the Mexican police summary. Moreover, there is no indication that Slawson had been provided the Duran transcripts. In fact, by virtue of Slawson's comments concerning the Mexican police report, it would appear that the Warren Commission, as of March 25, had been provided little substantive information pertaining to Sylvia Duran. ★ insert p 28

The Committee's belief that Slawson had not been given access to the Duran transcripts is further supported by reference to his memorandum of March 27, 1964 (Cite) wherein he states his conclusion that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on three occasions. This conclusion <sup>Wrote was</sup> he ~~writes~~ is based upon an analysis of Sylvia Duran's testimony before the Mexican police. This memorandum bears ~~no~~ is no

as reflected  
indication that he had reviewed any of the Duran transcripts. Furthermore, Slawson had been given access to these transcripts, certainly their substance would have been incorporated into his analysis and accordingly noted for this purpose. His analysis ~~would~~ have reflected the fact of this review either by its corroboration or criticism of the Mexican police summary report. <sup>above cited</sup> ~~Insert p29~~

Insert from p27  
As ~~March 25, 1964, the record demonstrates that the Warren Commission, in its efforts to investigate Oswald's activities in Mexico City had not been given access to the Duran transcripts.~~ <sup>As Slawson reveals,</sup> The Commission had been forced to rely upon the two memoranda that did not make reference to the surveillance operations, and a <sup>suspect of a</sup> summary police report. Thus, the Agency had been successful for over three months in not exposing the surveillance operations to the review of the concerned Warren Commission staff members. As was stated in the CIA cable of December 20, 1964 to its Mexico City Station:

Our present plan in passing information to the Warren Commission is to eliminate mention of <sup>state</sup> in order to protect your continuing operations. Will rely instead on statements of Silvia Duran and on contents of Soviet consular file which Soviets gave here.

(CIA cable, DIR 90466, FOIA 420-757, Dec. 20, 1964 CIA p.2144)

On March 27, 1964 Slawson wrote that he had determined that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy three

ON 11/10/00 QUESTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AVOID  
RELEASE OF DOCUMENT  
as redacted

times. He stated that this conclusion was based upon his review of Silvia Duran's testimony to the Mexican police. (Slawson memorandum, March 27, 1964, CIA p. 1872) However, Slawson does not state that his conclusions were also drawn from review of any of the production from the Mexico City station surveillance operations. Slawson does indicate, however, that his reasoning <sup>of a modification</sup> ~~was~~ ambiguous regarding Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy. Logically, access to the

( production would have clarified some ambiguities. For example, on September 27, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran telephoned the Soviet Embassy, and stated that an American was presently at the Cuban Embassy requesting an in-transit visit to Cuba. This American was later determined by CIA analysts to be Oswald. Again on September 28, at 11:51 a.m. Duran telephoned the Soviet Consulate stating that an American, <sup>subsequently</sup> identified by CIA analysts as Oswald <sup>was</sup> at the Cuban Embassy. Thus, ~~the CIA had twice~~ ~~on a specific~~ ~~occasion~~ definitively established that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy on at least two occasions.

Moreover, the specific dates and exact times of his presence in the Cuban Embassy <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ established as the result of the

( Had this information been made available to Slawson, his calculations of Oswald's activities in Mexico City would have been more firmly established than they were as of March 27, 1964. These transcripts

What  
about  
the  
convention  
at  
4:16 pm



*as reflected*  
~~could have been made available to the Warren Commission at its inception, but as the record indicates they were not then made available.~~

The record supports the Committee's finding that as of April 2, 1964 the Warren Commission had still not been given access to the above-referenced series of ( )

*You have not as yet really made reference to the complete set of*  
( ) In a memorandum of that date by Coleman and Slawson, they ~~articulated~~ *acknowledged* one question to the CIA and two requests for information from the Agency. (Ambassador

Mann file memo April 2, 1964, CIA p. 1975) (my notes?) *Coleman and Slawson wrote:*

- 1) What is the information source referred to in the November 28 telegram that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa;
- 2) We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the ( ) translated if possible, in all cases where the ( ) *refer* ~~refer~~ to the assassination or related subjects;
- 3) We would especially like to see ( ) in which the allegation that money was passed

at the Cuban Embassy is discussed

*by (KRM)*  
The question ~~initially~~ posed in the above-referenced

memorandum of April 2 concerns the CIA ( )

of September 27, 1963 at 10:37 a.m. (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, CIA p. 3223). *Obviously,* Necessarily, if Slawson ~~found it~~ *found it*

*necessary to request*  
~~that~~ the source of the information, he had not been

*as yet*

*This should be considered w/ Hordberg.*

NO SECTION TO  
INFORMATION AND/OR  
SENSE OF THE DOCUMENT  
as indicated

access to the original material.  
- 31 -  
to the CIA

provided that source which in this ~~document~~ telephone  
interview ~~discussed her in~~

(Item Number Two) the above listing

because? tends to show the Commission that they ~~did not~~ had not been  
given access, ~~the Commission~~

state the  
obvious  
indicates

concerning the assassination (as is clearly corroborated  
by the Commission ~~has not been given complete access to the relevant~~  
by the question set forth above). Moreover, this request  
Agency transcripts  
could well be interpreted to mean that they had not been  
given access to any of the subject materials.

The second request, (item number three of the above  
listing) reveals that ( ) of the Dorticos-Arman  
conversation of November 22, 1964, in which the passing  
of monies ~~was~~ discussed had not as of April 2 been provided  
to the Commission. The Commission had specifically requested  
the Dorticos-Armas transcripts. ~~at~~ the March 12, 1964  
meeting between Commission representatives and Agency re-  
presentatives. (Cite.) ~~the meeting~~

On April 3, 1964, Coleman and Slawson ~~articulated~~ <sup>expressed</sup>  
their concern for receiving complete access to all materials  
relevant to Oswald's Mexico City trip: They wrote:-

The most probable final result of the entire  
investigation of Oswald's activities in Mexico is  
a conclusion that he went there for the purpose  
of trying to reach Cuba and that no bribes, con-  
spiracies, etc. took place.

...In order to make such a judgment (that all reasonable lines of investigation that might have uncovered other motivations or possible conspiracies have been followed through with negative results), we must become familiar with the details of what both the American and Mexican investigatory agencies there have done. This means reading their reports, after translation, if necessary, and in some cases talking with the investigators themselves.

*Awkward.*  
The thoroughness of investigation which Coleman and Slawson articulated as a vital concern to the Commission's work had been ~~thwarted~~ <sup>lest its</sup> thwarted by the CIA's ~~concern~~ <sup>however</sup> concern ~~the~~ <sup>be exposed, considering</sup> ~~sources and methods, relevant~~ <sup>withholding of</sup> to the Commission's investigation, the limited number of persons engaged in an investigation of a gravity and historical significance unprecedented in this nation's history. <sup>+ this material</sup> ~~from the Warren Commission staff was inexcusable.~~

On April 9, David Slawson, Howard Willens, and <sup>clearly</sup> ~~improper~~ William Coleman flew to Mexico City, Mexico to meet with the representatives of the State Department, FBI, CIA, and the Government of Mexico. Prior to their departure, they met with <sup>the</sup> Thomas Mann, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico during Oswald's visit to Mexico City and at the time of President Kennedy's assassination. Ambassador Mann <sup>told</sup> ~~indicated~~ the Warren Commission representatives that the CIA's Mexico City Station was actively engaged in photosurveillance operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. )

NO OBJECTION TO  
DISSEMINATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
*as reflected*

- 33 -

Upon the group's arrival in Mexico City, they were met by U.S. Ambassador Freeman, Claire Boonstra of the State Department, Clarke Anderson of the FBI, and Winston Scott of the CIA.

That same day during a meeting between the Commission representatives and Win Scott, Scott made available to the group actual transcripts of the <sup>(accompanied with)</sup> and English translations <sup>for lawyerly fine language</sup> of the same. In addition, he provided the group with reels of photographs for the time period covered by Oswald's visit that had resulted from photosurveillance of the Cuban and Soviet Embassy entrances. David Slawson wrote:

"...Mr. Scott stated at the beginning of his narrative that he intended to make a complete disclosure of all facts, including the sources of his information, and that he understood that all three of us had been cleared for TOP SECRET and that we would not disclose beyond the confines of the Commission and its immediate staff the information we obtained through him without first clearing it with his superiors in Washington. We agreed to this." (Slawson memo, April 22, 1964, p. 22)

Mr. Scott described to the Commission representatives the CIA's course of action immediately following the assassination, Scott indicated <sup>immediately</sup> that his staff ~~at that time~~ began to compile dossiers on Oswald, Duran, and everyone else throughout Mexico whom the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald (p.22). Scott revealed <sup>that</sup> all known Cuban and Russian intelligence agents <sup>were</sup> had immediately been put under surveillance following the assassination. Liaison was set up with Mexican officials, particularly Luis Echevarria, Acting Minister of the Mexican Gobernacion (pp. 23-24). Slawson then concluded ~~in~~

*what's the point of this sentence?*

DATE: 10/10/64  
BY: [illegible]  
REASON: [illegible]  
AS REDACTED

"Scott's narrative plus the material we were shown disclosed immediately how incorrect our previous information had been in Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Mexican Embassies. Apparently the distortions and omissions to which our information had been subjected had entered some place in Washington, because the CIA information that we were shown by Scott was unambiguous on almost all the crucial points. We had previously planned to show Scott, Slawson's reconstruction of Oswald's probable activities at the embassies to get Scott's opinion, but once we saw how badly distorted our information was we realized that this would be useless. Therefore, instead, we decided to take as close note as possible from the original source materials at some later time during our visit."

(p. 24) of what?

8/11/64

Slawson's memorandum of April 21, 1964 records the results

of the notetaking from original source materials that he did following Scott's disclosures. These notes dealt exclusively with ( ) pertaining to, respectively, to the Duran and Oswald conversations ~~South~~ the period Sept 27-Oct 1, 1963.

It is evident from Slawson's record that the Agency's denial of original source materials, in this case ( ) seriously impaired the Commission's ability to draw <sup>accurately reasoned</sup> conclusions regarding Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City, ~~which was a major factor in the Commission's~~ ~~conclusion that Oswald was a~~ ~~single individual~~. It meant that as of April 10, 1964, nearing the halfway point of the Warren Commission investigation, the Commission was forced to retrace the factual path by which it had structured Oswald's activities in Mexico City. It further revealed that the Agency had provided ambiguous information to the Commission when, in fact "on almost all the crucial points" <sup>fr</sup> significantly more precise materials ~~were~~ <sup>could have been made</sup> available for analysis by the Commission.

*associated*  
The preceding section (III)<sup>35</sup> is labeled *photo*  
surveillance, yet there was almost no treatment of photo  
surveillance. We do have organizational problems.  
Thus, the Agency's early policy of not providing the Commission  
with the vitally relevant information derived from certain  
sensitive sources and methods had seriously undermined the  
investigation and possibly foreclosed lines of investigation  
that might have been more seriously considered had this  
material been expeditiously provided; (e.g., Cuban involvement.)

*- shouldn't address conversation  
be in this section?*

#### VI. Mexico City Mystery Man

On November 23, 1963, Marguerite Oswald was shown by  
FBI Special Agent Odum a photograph of a man bearing no  
physical resemblance to her son. <sup>fr</sup> This photograph had been  
supplied to the FBI on November 22 by the CIA's Mexico City  
Station after Agency representatives had searched their files  
in an effort to locate information on Oswald. <sup>fr</sup> This photograph  
was one in a series ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ the  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~, resulting from the CIA's photosurveillance  
operations against the Soviet and Cuban Embassy/Consulates. <sup>fr</sup> It  
had been linked by the Mexico City Station Prior to the  
assassination, <sup>fr</sup> to Lee Harvey Oswald. Richard Helms, in a sworn  
affidavit before the Warren Commission, stated that the  
photograph shown to Marguerite Oswald had been taken on October 4,  
1963 in Mexico City and mistakenly linked at that time to  
Oswald. *(cite Helms affidavit in WCR)*

On February 10, 1964, Marguerite Oswald testified before  
the Warren Commission and recounted the circumstances under  
which she was shown the photograph. Mrs. Oswald testified that  
she believed this photograph to have been of Jack Ruby. <sup>WCR II?</sup> (p. 153)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 08-10-2001 BY 60322  
RELEASE OF THE DOCUMENT

as redacted

and an  
explanation  
of the

Thereafter, on February 12, 1964, J. Lee Rankin wrote  
**Thomas Karamessinis Assistant DDP** regarding both  
to ~~Thomas Karamessinis, Helms, et al.~~ regarding the  
~~circumstances of the assassination~~ <sup>by which</sup> ~~of this photograph~~ <sup>(had been maintained)</sup> by the  
Central Intelligence Agency. Rankin ~~requested that~~  
the Commission be ~~informed of~~ <sup>told</sup> the identity of the individual  
depicted in the photograph if that information ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> available.

this could be combined into a sentence.

this  
document should  
explicitly  
state the  
materials were  
made available  
to the  
Commission  
by the Mexico City Station as

On that same day, in a separate letter to DCI McCone,  
Rankin wrote that the Commission had been informed by the Secret  
Service that, the CIA had disseminated since November 22, 1963 several reports or  
communications concerning the assassination to the Secret  
Service since November 22, 1964. Rankin requested copies of these  
reports and other materials. <sup>These materials included</sup> Three ~~CIA~~ <sup>CIA</sup> cables that were  
concerned ~~with~~ the photograph of the individual <sup>originally identified</sup>  
~~by the Mexico City Station as~~ <sup>by the Mexico City Station as</sup> Oswald and subsequently shown to Oswald's mother.  
~~At the time of the assassination, Rankin was in Mexico City and~~ <sup>what was shown to the mother? - the photo of the individual</sup>

as what?  
What  
additional  
point  
is being  
made?

unknown to Rankin and the Commission, among the materials  
disseminated <sup>by the CIA</sup> to the Secret Service was a November 26  
dissemination (DIR85177), a ~~copy of which was transmitted to~~  
~~the Secret Service~~. That cable concerned the <sup>+icos</sup> ~~Dor~~ <sup>Armas</sup>  
conversations and disclosed the existence of  
operations in Mexico City at the time of the  
assassination and Oswald's earlier visit.

John Scelso testified regarding the circumstances  
surrounding the eventual explanation given to the Commission  
of the origin of the photograph in question. Scelso stated:

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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

as redacted

"We did not initially disclose to the Warren Commission all of our technical operations. In other words, we did not initially disclose to them that we had photosurveillance because the November photo we had (of MMM) was not of Oswald. Therefore it did not mean anything, you see?"

Mr. Goldsmith: ...So the Agency was making a unilateral decision that this was not relevant to the Warren Commission.

Scelso: Right, we were not authorized, at first, to reveal all our technical operations.

(Scelso deposition, p. 150)

By February 12, 1964:

~~the [redacted] which the Warren Commission [redacted] had unknowingly requested~~ access to a source of concern to the CIA. production' (as discussed in the preceding section), the ~~the~~ disclosure of the photosurveillance operations, ~~to the Warren Commission had begun~~ <sup>Similar</sup> to cause concern within the Agency. <sup>Unclear what is + he some of concern?</sup>

On March 5, 1967, Raymond Rocca wrote in an internal memorandum to Richard Helms that "we have a problem here for your determination." Rocca outlined Angleton's desire not to respond directly to Rankin's request of February 12 regarding CIA material forwarded to the Secret Service since November 23, 1964. Rocca then stated:

Check.  
The preceding  
copy of [redacted]  
refers to [redacted]  
of letter, yet  
this particular  
letter is just  
2 paragraphs  
clearly

"Unless you feel otherwise, Jim would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter covered by paragraph 2 (of the above-referenced February 12 letter). If they come back on this point he feels that you, or someone from here, should be prepared to go over to show the Commission the material rather than pass them to them in copy. Incidentally, none of these items are of new substantive interest. We have either passed the material in substance to the Commission in response to earlier levies on the items on the items refer to aborted leads, for example, the famous six photographs which are not of Oswald..."  
(Rocca memo 5 March 64, FOIA 579-250)



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RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

On March 12, 1964, representatives of the Warren Commission and the CIA conferred regarding the February 12 request for the materials forwarded to the Secret Service by the Agency. (See Rankin letter of March 16, 1964 and Slawson memo, March 12, 1964)

The record indicates that the Commission at the March 12 meeting pressed for access to the Secret Service materials. Rankin wrote to Helms on March 16 that it was his understanding that the CIA would supply the Commission with a paraphrase of each report or communication pertaining to the Secret Service materials "with all indications of your confidential communications techniques and confidential sources deleted. You will also afford members of our staff working in this area an opportunity to review the actual file so that they may give assurance that the paraphrase are complete." (Rankin letter of March 16, 1964, #2)

Rankin further indicated that the same procedure <sup>was</sup> to be followed regarding any material in the possession of the CIA prior to November 22, 1963 which had <sup>as</sup> not yet been furnished because it <sup>concerned</sup> ~~is~~ sensitive sources and methods. (Rankin letter of March 16, #3)

Helms responded to Rankin's March 16 letter on March 24 (DDP4-1554, CD631 and DDP4-1555, CD 674) by two separate communications. CD631 provided the Commission with a copy of the October 10, 1963 CIA dissemination to FBI, State Dept., INS and Navy Dept. (SS on 22 Nov.) regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his presence at the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City. The response further revealed that on October 23, 1964, CIA had

When? requested two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald in order to check the identity of the person believed to be Oswald in Mexico City. Furthermore, the CIA stated that it had determined that the photograph shown to Marguerite

Oswald on November 22, 1963 did not refer to Lee Harvey Oswald. <sup>This</sup> was done by checking the photograph against the press photographs of Oswald generally available on November 23, 1963.

CD 674 reveals that on November 22, 1963, immediately following the assassination, and on November 23, 1963, three cabled reports were received at CIA headquarters from the CIA Mexico City Station regarding photographs of an unidentified man who had visited the Cuban and Soviet Embassies during October and November 1963. Paraphrases of these cables, not revealing sensitive sources and methods, were attached to CD 674. The Agency further stated <sup>d</sup> that the subject of the photo referenced in these cables was not Oswald. It <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ further stated that:

"In response to our meeting of 12 March and your memo of 16 March, Stern and Willens will review at Langley the regional copies of these 3 disseminations to the Secret Service and the cables on which they were based, as well as the photos of the unidentified man." (CIA, p. 116444 of notes)

On March 26, William Coleman wrote in a memorandum for the record:

"The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin on March 24, 1964 (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us the additional information we requested."

Coleman went on to state:

"As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 (CD 631) sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry."

The following day, as agreed by Warren Commission and Agency representatives, Samuel Stern of the Commission visited CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Stern's <sup>of his visit</sup> memorandum reveals that he reviewed Oswald's file with Raymond Rocca. Stern indicated that Oswald's file contained those materials furnished previously to the Warren Commission by the CIA. The file also contained:

"Cable reports of November 22 and November 23 from the CIA's Mexico City Station relating to the photograph of the unidentified individual mistakenly believed to be Lee Harvey Oswald and the reports on those cables furnished on November 23, 1963 to the Secret Service by the CIA."

Stern noted that these messages were accurately paraphrased in the attachments to CD 674 provided the Warren Commission on March 24, 1964.

Stern also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA's Mexico City Station to the CIA headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. He also reviewed the October 10, 1963 cable from CIA headquarters to the Mexico City Station reporting background information on Oswald.

- you should  
clear the  
contents of  
para. 4.

style  
try to  
diversify more.

For this  
a quotation?

style

*Check: You must read Dar's report because sections of it are 41 - directly relevant & must be integrated - i.e. failure to provide photo & typerecording style*

Stern noted that these messages were also paraphrased accurately as ~~set forth~~ in the CIA's January 31 memo to the Warren Commission reporting Oswald's Mexico City trip. *Do you agree?*

Lastly, Stern noted that Rocca provided him for his review a computer printout of the references to Oswald-related documents located in the Agency's electronic data storage system. He stated "there is no item listed on the printout which the Warren Commission has not been given either in full text or paraphrased."

Thus, by the 27th of March, a Warren Commission representative had been apprised of the circumstances surrounding the mysterious photograph.

*Give reference to where these circumstances are discussed*

VII. Allan Dulles' Role vis-a-vis the CIA-Warren Commission Relationship

It has been alleged that Allan Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence and one of the seven members of the Warren Commission, ~~concealed~~ *did not report* crucial information ~~from~~ *to* the Warren Commission. Specifically, the Senate Select Committee concluded:

*When it comes to table this info?*  
"With the exception of Allan Dulles, it is unlikely that anyone on the Warren Commission knew of CIA assassination efforts...Allan Dulles, who had been Director of Central Intelligence until November 1961, was a member of the Warren Commission and knew of the CIA plots with underworld figures which had taken place during his tenure at the Agency." (SSC, Book V, pp. 67-68)

However, the SSC did not explore further the relationship and allegiance of Dulles as a Warren Commission member and Dulles as a former DCI of the CIA. The Committee has consequently reviewed files maintained by the CIA related to Mr. Dulles'

service on the Warren Commission. In the course of this review, a memorandum was uncovered which indicates Dulles ~~was~~ providing<sup>ed</sup> information to the CIA regarding Warren Commission activities and investigative policies. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>This memorandum tends to show</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>at least one</sup> that Dulles acted as an informant on occasion for the CIA. ~~This memorandum~~ <sup>is memorandum</sup> concerned in ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>which was written by</sup> the controversial case of the Russian defector Nosenko. The memorandum was written by David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, particularly concerned with who was ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>Nosenko's</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>case, particularly</sup> ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ <sup>the defector's</sup> interrogation.

David Murphy's memorandum of July 8, 1964, concerned his discussions with Allan Dulles <sup>about</sup> ~~regarding~~ Nosenko's knowledge of Oswald. ~~This memorandum~~ <sup>which</sup> was prepared for DDP Helms, ~~In relevant part,~~ Murphy wrote:

"Mr. Dulles, with whom I spoke today recalled his earlier conversation with you on this subject and said that there were still some members of the Commission who were concerned lest they suppress the Nosenko information now only to have it surface at a future date. They expressed concern that this could possibly prejudice the entire Warren Commission Report."

Murphy responded to Dulles' statement by stating that the Commission's concern was understandable but that the Agency felt the Commission's final report should make no mention of Nosenko's information. Murphy indicated that a possible alternative would be to use language "which would allude to the existence of other, unverified information on the Oswald case." This language, Murphy contended, would permit the Warren Commission to state, if challenged on this point at a future time, that it had given consideration to the Nosenko information.

could  
be  
combined  
into  
1  
sentence

Murphy continued:

"It was agreed an effort would be made to find such language if Mr. Dulles is again unsuccessful in persuading his colleagues to eliminate any reference to the Nosenko information from the report. To attempt this, however, we would have to know precisely in what context the Warren Commission intended to make use of the Nosenko information. This, Mr. Dulles will have to determine from Mr. Rankin. He will do this as soon as possible. He knows that I am leaving this week and therefore, will contact you as soon as he has the information he needs from Mr. Rankin."

Whether by design or as an unintended result, the quoted language indicates that Mr. Dulles, as a member of the Warren Commission, was prepared to compromise his position with the Commission in order to supply the CIA, specifically Murphy and Richard Helms, with sensitive information ~~about~~ the Commission's attitudes towards the Nosenko case. It also appears that the AGENCY had communicated to Dulles the information it desired regarding the Commission position on Nosenko, and that Dulles was prepared to act in this regard as a high level and very well placed informant for the CIA.

Murphy prepared a second memorandum dated 28 July 1964. The subject of this memorandum concerned use of Nosenko's information in the Warren Commission's report. Participants in the discussion upon which the memorandum was based included Allan Dulles, Lee Rankin, David Slawson of the Commission, and Richard Helms, David Murphy and Tennant Bagley of the CIA.

Check -  
before we  
can take all  
this for  
for, Murphy  
should be  
asked about  
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section  
should

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qualified.

*This should be included in an  
earlier section on the tops.*

VIII. Luisa Calderon

Approximately five hours after President Kennedy's assassination, a Cuban government employee in Mexico City named "Luisa" received a telephone call from an unidentified man speaking Spanish. (MEXI 7105, 27 Nov. 63, FOIA 173-615, attachment) This call had been ( ) by the CIA's Mexico City Station as the result of its ( ) ( ) (op cit) The Mexico City Station identified the Luisa of the conversation as Luisa Calderon, who was then employed in the Commercial Attache's office at the Cuban Consulate.

During the course of the conversation, the unidentified caller asked Luisa if she had heard the latest news. Luisa replied in a joking tone:

"Yes, of course, I knew almost before Kennedy."

*awkward*  
The caller went on to tell Luisa that the person apprehended for Kennedy's slaying was the "President of one of the Committees of the Fair Play for Cuba." Luisa replied that she knew this also. Luisa inquired whether the person being held for the killing was a gringo. The unidentified caller replied, "yes." Luisa told her caller that she had learned nothing else about the assassination; that she had learned about the assassination only a little while ago. The unidentified caller commented:

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We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against intergration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened...who knows

Luisa responded:

Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three. (She laughs.)

Raymond Rocca, for [REDACTED] is

for [REDACTED] in response to a 1975 Rockefeller Commission request for information on a possible Cuban conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy wrote regarding Calderon's comments:

Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge. This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation. (Rocca memo for DC/OPS, 23 May 1975, p. 15)

Standing by itself, Luisa Calderon's cryptic comments do not merit serious attention. Her words may indeed indicate foreknowledge of the assassination but may also equally be interpreted without such a sinister implication. Nevertheless, as will be discussed herein, the Committee has determined that Luisa Calderon's case did merit serious attention in the months following the assassination. However, Calderon's comments were not reported to the Warren Commission, apparently an agency oversight.

Should go at  
end of this  
section

we should  
consider  
that HSCA  
consider  
this to be  
a good  
only  
suggestion  
possibly  
foreknowledge

Too  
largely



In connection with the assassination, Luisa Calderon's name first surfaced on November 27, 1964 in a cable sent

by then Ambassador Mann to the State Department. (DIR 85573

WH, FBI and CIA).

~~In that cable, Mann urgently requested that the State Dept. initiate actions that would enable the Mexican govt.~~

Information was reported to the CIA during May 1964, to arrest

from a Cuban defector tying Luisa Calderon to the Cuban

Intelligence apparatus. The defector, AMMUG-1, was him-

self a Cuban Intelligence Officer who supplied valuable

and highly reliable information to the CIA regarding

Cuban Intelligence operations. Calderon's ties to Cuban

intelligence were reported to the Warren Commission on June 15, 1964

(Did the State Department supply the cable to the Warren

Commission? Have we reviewed their Mann file?) However,

the Committee has determined that the CIA did not provide

Calderon's conversation to the Warren Commission, thus,

even though the Warren Commission was aware that Calderon

had connections to intelligence work, as did other Cuban

Embassy officers, the vital link between her background

and her comments was never established for the Warren Com-

mission by the CIA. The Agency's oversight in this re-

gard may have foreclosed the Commission from actively

pursuing a lead of great significance.

\* In that cable Mann stated:

...Washington should urgently consider feasibility of requesting Mexican authorities to arrest for interrogation: Eusebio Azcue, Luisa Calderon and Alfredo Mirabal. The two men are Cuban national and Cuban consular officers. Luisa Calderon is a secretary in Cuban

Calderon, along with Alfredo Mirabal  
Eusebio Azcue  
of the Cuban Consulate

(cite Doyle memo)

from its file review

after p 46

Consulate here."

This cable does not state the basis for arresting Calderon. However, the CIA's copy of this cable bears a handwritten notation on its routing page. That notation states: "Info from Amb Mann ~~for~~ See Rush re: ...persons involved with Oswald in Cuban Embassy.

Mann went on to state in urgent terms:

"They may quickly be returned to Havana in order to eliminate any possibility that Mexican government could use them as witnesses."

According to CIA files, Calderon returned to Havana on December 16, 1963, less than four weeks after the assassination.

Calderon, Azcue and Mirabal were not arrested nor detained for questioning by the Mexican federal police. However, Silvia Duran, a friend and associate of Calderon's and the one person believed to have had repeated contact with Oswald while he was in Mexico City, was arrested and questioned by the Mexican police on two separate occasions (Cites). During her reinterrogation, Duran was questioned regarding her association with Calderon. No explanation is given in this report for the questions concerning Calderon (Cites). The information regarding Duran's interrogation was passed to the Warren Commission on February 21, 1964 (DDP4-0940), more than two months after Calderon had returned to Cuba.

*How do you know?*  
What do you mean? What type of explanation should have been given

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 01-10-01 BY 60322  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE  
as redacted

Calderon's 201 file reveals that she arrived in Mexico City from Havana on January 16, 1964, carrying Cuban Passport E/63/7. Her date of birth was believed to be 1940 (Dispatch ( ) 1612) Calderon's presence in Mexico City was first reported by the CIA on July 15, 1963 in a dispatch from the CIA's Miami field office to the CIA's Mexico City Section and to the Chief of the CIA's Special Affairs Staff (for Cuban operations). That dispatch had attached to it a report containing biographic data on personnel then assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. At page three of the attached report Luisa Calderon was listed as Secretary of the Cuban Embassy's commercial office. The notation indicated that a report was pending on Calderon. The Agency has attempted, without success, to locate the report.

On September 1, 1963, a dispatch was sent from the Chief of the Special Affairs Staff to the Chief of the Station in Mexico City (Dispatch ( ) 1935). <sup>insert</sup>

Luisa Calderon's association with the Cuban DGI was first reported by the CIA on May 5, 1964. At that time, ( ) Chief of Counterintelligence for the Special Affairs Staff, recorded the results of his debriefing of the Cuban defector, AMMUG-1. The memorandum states that AMMUG had no direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based upon the comments of certain Cuban In-

\* This dispatch reported that:  
(over) ?

*As redacted*  
telligence Service officers. Specifically, AMMUG-1 had been asked if Oswald was known to the Cuban intelligence services before November 23, 1963. AMMUG-1 told Swenson, as recorded in the May 5 memorandum that "Prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the Direccion General De Intelligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez.

( ) thereafter wrote that Calderon's precise relationship to the DGI was not clear. As a comment to this statement he set forth the CIA cable and dispatch

*December 1964*  
traffic which recorded her arrival in Mexico and departure, during for Cuba.

On May 7, 1964, ( ) recorded additional information he had elicited from AMMUG-1 regarding Oswald's possible contact with the DGI. Paragraph 3 of this memorandum stated in part:

- "a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.
- b. Source (AMMUG) has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the "Empress Transimport." Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

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REFUSED TO SIGN  
RELEASE OF DOCUMENT  
as redacted

- 49 -

On May 8, [redacted] further disclosed AMMUG's knowledge of the Oswald case. [redacted] paraphrased AMMUG's knowledge of Calderon as follows:

I thought that Luisa Calderon might have had contact with Oswald because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer... I had commented to (him) that it seemed strange that Luisa Calderon was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. (The case officer) told me that hers was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel Pineiro, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, (the case officer) had investigated Luisa Calderon. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by Hernandez should be spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different. As I understand the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa Calderon. I also understand from (the case officer) that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been Oswald...

On May 11, Raymond Rocca wrote a memorandum to Director Richard Helms regarding the information [redacted] had elicited from AMMUG. Rocca proposed that "the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this

*as reflected*  
takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing. (11 May 64, Rocca memo, FOIA687-295 with/4 attachments).

On May 15, 1964, Helms wrote Rankin regarding AMMUG's information about the DGI, indicating its sensitivity and operational significance. Attached to Helms' communication was a paraphrased accounting of ( ) May 5 memorandum. (Helm's memo, May 15, 1964, FOIA 697-294). In that attachment the intelligence associations of Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez <sup>were</sup> ~~are~~ set forth. However, that attachment <sup>made</sup> ~~makes~~ no reference whatsoever to Luisa Calderon.

Howard Willens of the Warren Commission, requested as a follow-up to the May 15 memorandum, <sup>access to</sup> ~~to look at~~ the questions used in ( ) interrogation of AMMUG. (Dooley memo to Rocca, 19 June 1964 FOIA 739-310). On June 18, 1964 Arthur Dooley of Rocca's counterintelligence research and analysis group took the questions and AMMUG's responses to the Warren Commission's officers for Willen's review. Willens saw ( ) May 5 memorandum. The only mention of Calderon was as follows: "The precise relationship of Luisa Calderon to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964." However, Willens was not shown th ( ) memorandum of May 7 and May 8, 1964 which contained much more detailed information on Luisa Calderon, including her possible

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association with Lee Harvey Oswald and/or American intelligence.

It should be noted that these memoranda of May 5, 7, 8, 11 and June 19 with attachments, are not referenced in the Calderon 201 file. Their existence was determined by the Committee's independent review of other agency files.

Thus, the Warren Commission ~~had~~ as of 19 June 64, <sup>had</sup> little if no reason to pursue the Luisa Calderon lead. It had effectively been denied significant background information which may have impeded or prevented its pursuit of Calderon's potential relationship to Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. <sup>even</sup> Unfortunately,

~~One must keep in mind that even if the Warren Commission had been apprised of Calderon's background and possible contact with Oswald it still <sup>had been</sup> was denied the one significant piece of information that might have <sup>raised</sup> aroused~~ its investigative efforts <sup>regarding possible Cuban complicity in the assass.</sup> to a more serious level. The

Warren Commission never was <sup>Unexplainably,</sup> told about Calderon's conversation of November 22, 1964. <sup>This conversation is not referenced in the Calderon 201 file. Its existence was determined by the Committee's independent review of other Agency files.</sup>

(Give details of how we know not reported cite

testimony of Rankin, Slawson; give section possible motive for not telling of detailed information on Luisa

(mentions CIA association; site the dispatch close out with Rankin quotes.)

Committee staff

Be sure you mention that the Calderon conversation was transmitted to HQ on 11/27/67.