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## BACKGROUND

In April, 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) published their Final Report (Book V) which in essence faulted the CIA for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's on-going plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its attempts on the life of the premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's rationale is detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings, but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized that CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. Those officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CIA had no evidence of a foreign conspiracy." (p. 7, Book V)

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect" that Book V occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer, at least within the Agency, the critical questions posited in the SSC Final Report. However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow response to the Warren Commission's quest for all possible relevant information. ("Relevancy" is, of course, the "buyword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.) On page 10 of the Agency's conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that:

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to re-inforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too, could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time. ....The Agency should have taken broader initiatives, then, as well." (p. 10, 1977 Report)

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It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA with regard to the significance to the work of the Warren Commission of the CIA's Castro assassination attempts and to resolve the parties controversy as to the operations' importance. Instead, this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all the facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in the CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-1963. Certain influences and conclusions will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivation of the syndicate participants in the operations.

INVOLVEMENT OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN CIA PLOTS  
TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO

The genesis of the utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.\*\* (1967 IG Report, p. ; Interim Report, p. 74) Edwards assigned the specific tasks of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Maheu,\*\* who had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive covert operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

Although Maheu and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Roselli's name for consideration, there was a meeting between Maheu and Roselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1960. (Interim Report, p. 75)

Comment: Maheu seems the logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In the

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\*\* Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp. 74-75, Interim Report.

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Office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the Mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that: "Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a high ranking member of the syndicate and controlled all the ice making machines on the Strip." Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was, in fact, a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.")

(Comment: Confirmation of the earliest Maheu-Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959 from Maheu to Roselli.) (See Roselli Write-up)

(Comment: Maheu and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1960, including Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.)

Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to discuss further details. (Interim Report, p. 76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 November 1970) Although the Inspector General's Report placed the meeting at the Plaza Hilton on 14 September 1960, Roselli recalled that the discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

(Comment: Tony de Varona admits going to New York City at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Roselli at this time or (testimony of de Varona) that his visit had an assassination motivation. According to a 19 November 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd.")

0002151 (Comment: The timing of the introduction of both Giancana ('Gold') and Trafficante ('Joe') is important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. According to the 1967 IG Report, the entrance of Giancana took place "during the week of 25 September 1960"... (1967 IG Report, p. 18))

In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p. 76, does not fix a date certain for Giancana's initial appearance but (although it was "certainly prior to October 18." (p. 76)) because of conflicting evidence between the 1967 IG September date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the initiation in November 1960. As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned that Giancana had been introduced to Maheu "prior to October



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18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960; and (2) DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo, dated 18 October 1960, which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro". (FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 from Hoover to Bissell, Interim Report, p. 79)

(Comment: Each of the dual reasons listed in the Interim Report on p. 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately below.)

(Comment: Although the 1967 IG Report stated that "Maheu pointed out 'Gold' to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either 'Gold' or 'Joe'", the Interim Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "the Support Chief, who was using the name 'Jim Olds'," said he had met 'Sam' and 'Joe', once, and then only briefly. (O.C. 5(30)75, pp. 26-29; Interim Report, p. 77))

(Comment: Conflicts appear also on several relatively minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in New York City and Miami. For instance:

1. Did Roselli know from the beginning that the operation was CIA?

a. O'Connell stated that Maheu told Roselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Roselli testified that Maheu told him that O'Connell was CIA (Interim Report, p. 76). Also, footnote 1 on page 76 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about three weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Giancana, that "I am not kidding. I know who you work for."

The importance of Roselli's recognition of CIA initiation is that it is doubtful if Giancana and Trafficante could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2. Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some business interests of Wall Street that had... nickel interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli; 6/24/75, pp. 9, 17)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of January 19, 1971, which stated that "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy?....None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

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In Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli and William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of Phase I, it is another example of serious discrepancies which exist between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3. The alleged "surprise discovery" by Maheu and O'Connell as to the true identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, although it is possible that the Senate Committee staff overlooked the specific Miami newspaper Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included pictures of Giancana and Trafficante, thus graphically showing Maheu and O'Connell the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Parade magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ex post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were delivered to Roselli, et. al, until approximately March 1961. Whatever, the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Parade article. (Interim Report, p. 77, fn. 1)

The principals in Phase I of the operation also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a 'key' role, (Maheu, 7.2.975, p. 34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination", Roselli downplayed Giancana's part to that of a "back-up" man. (Roselli, 6/24/75, p. 15) (Whether Roselli received a "message" from Giancana's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open to question.) Roselli's Senate characterization of Giancana's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged recountment of Giancana's due to his "knowledge of the Cuban crowd" which the 19 November 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficante(s) involvement in Phase I is even more jumbled by the available evidence. The 1967 IG Report and Senate Interim Report state that "'Gold' identified 'Joe' to Maheu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there". (IG Report, p. 19; Interim Report, p. 77) To support the description of Trafficante as a courier, the Interim Report quotes p. 19 of the 1967 IG Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business".

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(Comment: This factually unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records of other agencies. As an example, State Department files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport in Cuba on October 7, 1959, and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960. (See Trafficante file, State Department) No records available to the Committee from INS, State Department, or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during this period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante recalled that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release from prison. (Testimony, pp. 4-53, Oct. 1, 1977) His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the red by mid-1960, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.)

By the time of the Senate testimony of Roselli, however, Trafficante's role had diminished to a point even below Giancana's. He had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate conversation between Roselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Interestingly, Trafficante and Roselli's 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the facts as they were being reported in 1963 by the principals.

(Comment: The Senate testimony of Trafficante and Roselli needs to be outlined with a view to contrasting the "courier vs. interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross-examine either man on this discrepancy nor did the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.)

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Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method to be employed to accomplish the foal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight-forward approach of shooting Castro, but this plan was rejected by Giancana. In a comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that would be put into Castro's food and drink...Trafficante (Joe, the courier) was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister, Castro. The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to received kickbacks from the gambling interests but had since lost that source of income and needed the money. (I.G. Report, p. 25)

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(Comment: The observations quoted above of the 1967 I.G. Report are extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill modus operandi originated with Giancana, not the Agency, a point which is crucial to the final conclusions presented below. Secondly, Trafficante is identified as having access to and providing for the putative assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent with his self-serving role description of "interpreter". His ability to recruit Orta apparently was directly tied to his former gambling empire associations which formed a constant pattern for all his alleged conduct both during and after his Cuban days.) (See Trafficante profile.)

(Comment: Speculation concerning Orta's role arose during the Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News. Sturgis was quoted as saying, "the third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidels' private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana).

What was disturbing to the writers of the 1977 Report was the fact that Orta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's, Norman Rothman. (See Rothman profile) Coupled with Sturgis' alleged mob relationships is the allegation that Sturgis had a role in inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Orta in receiving gambling kickbacks."

A second aspect of Meskill's news series concerned a claim of Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 in attempting to poison Castro, which dovetailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Giancana's electronically surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's". (Memo, Hoover to DCI A.H., DD 10/18/60)

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

(p.21) It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...."

Additional considerations:

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1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been on-going, when CIA reactivated plan in 1962, April.

2. Syndicate operators could have had activities such as these in New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of the syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation with Orta, it was not CIA; could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from Miami in 1965 after Orta returned there.

Neither the 1967 I.G. Report or the SSC Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency processed the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Roselli. (Interim Report, p. 80) The chain of custody, according to the 1967 I.G. Report was for the lethal pills to be delivered from Roselli to Trafficante. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February-early March 1961. (Interim Report, p. 27; Interim Report, p. 80)

(Comment: The Senate Interim Report reported the version of Joe Shimon whose memory was that the money and pills for the operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fountainbleau Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by "Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante and the Cuban." (Interim Report, p.81) Shimon's story is filled with vivid details, which are documented on p. 82 of the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question as his account is not shared by anyone else connected with the plan nor is his relationship with Roselli, Giancana, or Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971, which fixed the date of the passage of the poison at the Fountainbleau by Roselli as March 13, 1961, and contained the report that Castro became ill a few weeks later.

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The real problem with Shimon's story is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta could or would not attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to Anderson and his Senate testimony.) *ASA. Orta was reported to be involved in the leak (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27)*

(Comment: One additional fact concerning Orta's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Orta "lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington"...It would seem though that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27)

With the failure of Orta to produce the desired results, the project was at a standstill until, once again, Santo Trafficante assumed command. Roselli told O'Connell that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 29; Interim Report, p. 80)

(Comment: The exile leader was, of course, Tony de Varona, who was the subject of speculation in an FBI memorandum of 18 January 1961 associating him with receiving financial aid from American gangsters for anti-Castro activities which pre-dated the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction into the CIA-mob plots, de Varona was already being funded by the Agency through the Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in CIA planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was imminent.

Interest in de Varona was also being expressed in 1960-61 by Mike McLaney whose advertising agency was engaged in promoting Varona's image in collaboration with McLaney's friend "Chirri" or "Chilli" Mendoza (Mendoza is described in Trafficante's FBI files as a close Cuban associate.))

Completing the picture of support for Varona is the promotional efforts of Dino and Eddie Cellini, McLaney and Lansky business associates, who were reportedly working through a Washington, D. C. public relations firm, Edward K. Moss and Associates. Moss [redacted] and was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini benefactors with the understanding that this group would have "privileged treatment 'in the Cuba of the future.' Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 30)

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The Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a mutiny in Miami in approximately 1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts to "educate the American people about Castro, which may be a euphemism for anti-Castro plots. (See Varona transcript.)

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Varona, probably independently, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine turmoil. De Varona was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. Government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors. (See Varona testimony).

Although de Varona has no specific memory of meeting Trafficante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interpreter" in several meetings attended by de Varona, Roselli, Giancana and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante gambling partner from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during the 1960's. Trafficante claimed that Roselli had previously recruited Gener, but this appears unlikely in view of Trafficante's long-standing friendship with Gener in Cuba, and Roselli's admission to O'Connell that Trafficante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta, who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

(Comment: Paralleling the situation at the Senate hearings during 1975 when Roselli's description of Trafficante's role changed from his "courier" characterization in 1960-61 as reported by the Agency to Trafficante's "interpreter" statement, is the recent interview with Gener who agrees with Trafficante's Committee testimony that he was an intermediary with de Varona only for Roselli. The net result in both instances is to minimize Trafficante's exposure. (Cf. Fonzi interview with Gener, May , 1978 and Trafficante testimony, October 7, 1977.))

If ambiguity exists as to the specifics of the introduction of de Varona into Phase One of the Castro assassination plots, more confusion surrounds de Varona's actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I.G. Report indicates that de Varona attempted a second poisoning before the Cuban invasion but Roselli was positive that only one attempt<sup>(Orta's)</sup> was made. He was also positive that he delivered

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both pills, money and supplies to de Varona which is corroborated by O'Connell during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating "that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that... (de Varona) was the contact in the United States who arranged for... (Orta)... to administer the poison.

(Comment: There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts, especially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills from Rosselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. (See Varona transcript).)

(Comment: The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots

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ever, "steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate plan but (they) were apparently ineffective." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 32))

## PHASE TWO

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, and it was not until April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Rosselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going operation." (I.G. Report, p. 33) The exact details of what that operation might have been has not been uncovered, but Rosselli's ability to regenerate his forces in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Varona was to provide the individuals who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and seriousness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

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First: In Phase One, Rosselli, et. al., demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source, who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the modus operandi and the ability of the putative assassins was deliberately vague. After Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the lethal material was to be introduced into Castro's food (which involved) an asset of Varona's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 47) By June, 1962, after Varona had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the pills into Cuba, "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned their names or anything about them." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51)

(Comment: As the 1967 I.G. authors correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" poisoning opportunity was familiar in that Edwards had described precisely the same plan." The fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

1. Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an on-going operation in April 1962; or
2. The mob had been using de Varona before, during and after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
3. De Varona was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directions from organized crime.)

Second: The cast of underworld characters changed. Harvey had insisted that Maheu and Giancana be dropped from the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's "interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names Garcia-Gomez and Godoy.

(Comment: "Maceo's" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history, without any attempt made by the Agency to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely "to bed" with the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

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Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes "Maceo" as "Rosselli's man", it is probable that this individual was drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

The termination of the CIA-Mafia plots was slow and undramatic. Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to Harvey that the pills and guns which had been delivered to Varona in Miami in April had arrived in Cuba, and an unidentified three-man team had been dispatched in June to execute the plan. (Interim Report, p. 84)

During September 1962, Rosselli related to Harvey that de Varona was readying a second three-man team who were "supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate Castro's body guard. During this period, the 'medicine' was reported as still in place and the three men of the first team safe." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 51) However, the second team never made Cuba and a series of alibis were constructed during December and January, 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona supposedly collected \$2,700 for the maintenance of these individuals from Rosselli who had received the payment from Harvey. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52)

In mid-January, 1963 both Harvey and Rosselli agreed that "nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 52) Rosselli was instructed to ease his way out of touch with Varona which he presumably did. The last meeting between Harvey and Rosselli occurred in Washington, D. C. in June 1963, when he was Harvey's overnight guest. However, their meeting ostensibly was not directly related to any assassination plots.

*Comment: Harvey and Rosselli continued their relationship in 1967-71*

#### CONCLUSION

The available evidence suggests the thesis which, in part, is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way...In a sense, CIA might have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." (1977 I.G. Report, p. 20)

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The relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 October 1960 re: Giancana ELSUR:

...Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions...Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro. (1977 I.G. Report, p. 19)

Comment: Although the dates of initial meetings between Maheu, Rosselli, and Giancana are subject to different interpretation, it is clear that no plans were finalized between the parties until sometime after October 18, 1960, the date of the FBI's intercepted conversation of Giancana.

The poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February-early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Giancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro, to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer its support. The mob was then in a perfect position. If their private plot actually worked, and Castro died, then the syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against the CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their intrigue back-fired, then their position would be that they were only attempting to execute the wishes of their government.

Additional Comment: The actions of Giancana's "hired hand", Richard Cain, raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission to the FBI that he had joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Giancana's payroll, Cain's approach to the CIA Chicago Office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer information on the Cuban community appears a little more than coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life Magazine (one story), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-President Prio (second story), the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Giancana to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain could be the "assassin-to-be" whom Giancana referred to in the FBI memo of October 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

(Tie in memo on Cain with Salerno's view which is strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing

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second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of October 30, 1960. Maheu needs to be questioned on this point.)

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August, 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

In September, 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture", a directive which is subject to several interpretations, including the fact that the CIA was a willing participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain, now the Chief Investigator for Cook County Sheriff's office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in Chicago in April 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the assassination rifle in March 1963.

## 2. Recruitment of the Potential Assassin(s)

In describing the putative poisoner, Giancana spoke in October 1960 of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Giancana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit one of Castro's Cuban mistresses due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles.

It was common for American gamblers to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McLaney) unescorted on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

(Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness, to say the least, and her potential as a assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has been previously discussed. However, she was also Charles Tourine's mistress and, thus, could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative and Lorenz was not asked about her relationship

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with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment: Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangsters' contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former receipt of gambling "kickbacks".

One fact is extremely bothersome, however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the 1967 I.G. Report (p. 28), Orta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Orta receipted for the pills in late February-early March 1961 and "kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them". (1967 I.G. Report, p. 27) If the mob was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his position of accessibility. The other possibility exists, i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to give to de Varona when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises, then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase Two of the operation which began in April 1962, the same possibilities exist. If Harvey and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into an "on-going operation", then it can be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Varona, which pre-dated CIA participation according to FBI memos of 21 December 1960 and 18 January 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs. With the resumption of the CIA's participation, funding and material support could, once again, be returned to the Agency although de Varona would continue to deal through his mob contacts, Rosselli and "Maceo".

Due to the loose structure of Phase Two in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of attack, the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harvey upon Rosselli's word that activities were actually being carried out, the Agency's lack of interest or ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the speculation arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence on Castro's Cuba. Being solid businessmen, Trafficante, Lansky and other Cuba casino owners must have realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg, and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly,

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the evidence shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic, and a new opportunity for ~~belly~~ operations in Florida with the tremendous influx of Cuban exiles. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era even if Castro and all his Communist associates could be eliminated.

Despite the relatively useless business sense in continuing the assassination attempts against Castro in a substantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along". First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was providing full logistical support for Varona. Secondly, there was the mounting pressure from the FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (FBI). A brief look at the record shows the employment of this strategy at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1. Robert Maheu

- Quashing of Long Committee subpoena in 1966. (Interim Report, p. 79, note 3; Interview Edward P. Morgan)
- Solidification of position with CIA and with Hughes Organization. (Hughes was definitely told of the project by Maheu in November 1960 and was himself in an alliance with the CIA which, in fact, occurred later when Maheu was Hughes' principal agent.) (Interim Report, p. 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony ?)
- Dispute with Hughes. See memo 20 May 1971 in Office of Security file on Edward P. Morgan.

2. John Rosselli

- Avoiding criminal prosecution. (Interim REport, p. 85, note 4)
- Use in legal memo in March 1971 to attempt to reduce sentence.
- Attempt to delay deportation hearings with INS which included Jack Anderson's personal intervention with IRS. (See Anderson Interview; CIA Rosselli file; CIA Office of Security file re: Edward P. Morgan)

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3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat" for him by claiming the tap was a result of the CIA plots.
- Early 1962, intervention with FNU Farrell of INS re: possible deportation. (See Tab C Rosselli CIA file, stating that only Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca and Houston know.)
- Attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963. (1967 I.G. Report, p. 129)
- Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967, Sam commented that Giancana and Rosselli have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation". He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Rosselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people." (1967 I.G. Report, p. 131)

NOTES RE: JACK ANDERSON  
"CASTRO RETALIATION" THEORY

March 3, 1967)  
March 7, 1967)      Drew Pearson article

Source:

1. 1967 I.G. Report:

- It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients. (p. 126)
- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from nits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source, Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked. (p. 126)

Impact

The Rosselli-                      contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination

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in retaliation for U. S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this. (p. 127)

Maheu

Does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Rosselli and urge discretion.

-- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is only found in Phase Two: the three-man team.

Comment: Not necessarily since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the three-man team initially and only briefed Rosselli on the concept in Phase Two or Rosselli just didn't mention the three-man team to Maheu or O'Connell during Phase One.

Comment: In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, Agency makes the following point:

-- If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. (p. 125)

Since Agency cannot figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Rosselli is drinking too much and talking to Morgan, who is also drinking and talking to Greenspun (and Pearson).

Comment: Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best goodies: the story of the pills and the fact of the State Department meeting. (p. 127)

Comment: See p. 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Department of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I.G. speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which was attended by Harvey. (p. 112)

(RFK was not present.)

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2. Other Sources

a. Memo re: 15 February 1972

DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosselli or someone in his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident." (Memo in Office of Security file re: Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971  
Subject: Intertel

[redacted] (former CIA), now with Intertel, said Maheu and Anderson together on some oil mix deals...Recent exposure of Anderson re: Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Maheu using his son Peter, as an intermediary. [redacted] theory is that Maheu probably would "scare them off" (i.e., Intertel would not want CIA stuff to embarrass Hughes).

Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement with CIA (Memo in Security file re: Morgan).

4. Memo - 19 November 1970

-- Harvey had contacts with Rosselli in November-December 1967 and January 1968 following Rosselli Conviction.

-- 17 November 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who represented Rosselli that Rosselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCI decided to ignore threat and Maheu agreed.

"Maheu further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally."

5. 19 December 1967

-- Series of conversations instigated by Harvey on Rosselli's behalf to get CIA intervention

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directly or at least discover how good Government case against Rosselli was.

- Calls from Rosselli began in October to Harvey. Rosselli knew what Agency had done for Maheu with Senator Long because Ed Morgan told Rosselli.
- Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harvey a news clipping re: Agency use of Giancana (presumably the August 1963 Chicago story by Sandy Smith).

Rosselli said that the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Attorney General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Pearson story.
- Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase One operation due to Agency delaying on Long Committee subpoena.
- Maheu visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maheu) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes.
- Maheu denied discussing with Rosselli latter phase of ~~operation~~ and said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962.
- Rosselli met Morgan through Hank Greenspun in the 1950's.
- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Rosselli met with Garrison in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the impression that Rosselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances.
- Rosselli under pressure from FBI, drinking heavily and had a 19-year-old girl.
- Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson and did know that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintance with Morgan.

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-- Morgan also tight with Pat Cayne of NSC.

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(SSC)

In April 1985, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities published their Final Report (Book II) which in essence faulted the CPTA and to some extent for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and ~~its~~ <sup>the</sup> attempts on the life of ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's report is ~~presented~~ <sup>discussed</sup> on pages 6-7 of its ~~Findings~~ <sup>Findings</sup> but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P. 7  
Book II

have

"Senior CPTA officials also should have realized that their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should <sup>have</sup> realized that CPTA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an overt, but without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, advised the Warren Commission that the CPTA had no

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0002479 evidence of a foreign conspiracy?

SSC Strung by the Senate criticism and the "leaking effect" that Book V ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the C.I.A. prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posed in the Final Report. However, even the 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the C.I.A.'s <sup>in this instance</sup> response to the Warren Commission's quest for all relevant information. ["Relevancy" is of course the "buzzword" upon which the Senate and Agency each base their position of the <sup>in this instance</sup> anti-Castro plots to the communis work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that: "We

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. C.I.A. could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement <sup>SECRET</sup> in the assassination (etc.) because of tensions of the time.

..... The Agency should have

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P 10  
1977 ~~Final~~  
Report

taken broader initiatives, then,  
as well."

*Conflicting* It is not the purpose of  
this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the  
viewpoints of the SSC and CPTA  
with regard to the significance  
of the CPTA's Castro ~~unsuccessful~~  
attempts and to resolve <sup>the parties</sup> ~~the~~  
controversy as to <sup>the operations</sup> ~~the~~ importance.  
~~Rather~~ Instead this paper seeks  
to present a comprehensive  
review of all the facts, drawn from  
a variety of sources, of organized  
Cubans' involvement or potential  
involvement in CPTA operations  
against Cuba during 1960-63.  
Certain inferences and conclusions  
~~it~~ will then be drawn upon  
the nature, scope, and motivations  
of ~~the participants~~ of the syndicate  
participants in the operations.

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Involvement of Organized Crime in  
CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

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The genesis of the <sup>utilization</sup> ~~use~~ of the United States criminal syndicate of the CIA attempt to assassinate Castro is of the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~was~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.<sup>+</sup>  
[1967 IG Rpt. p. 74; Interim Rpt p 74; Section 1]  
Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate or assassinate" Castro, to James "Big Jim", O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Mahon <sup>who</sup> ~~was~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive cover operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

<sup>+</sup> [Mahon's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Interim Report]

0002181 Although Mahon and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Mahon and Rosselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1968  
[Interim Report, p 25]

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[Comment: Mahon seems the

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logical person to have thought of and contacted Roselli for several reasons. In an office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Mahan's attorney, there is a memo to the DCP dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that "Mr. Mahan advised that he had met one John Roselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a 'high ranking member of the syndicate' and controlled all the ice-making machine on the Strip. Mahan advised that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the Club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

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[Comment]

Confirmation of <sup>see</sup> ~~star~~ earliest Mahan - Roselli contact is found in Roselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959. [See Roselli write-up] from Mahan to Roselli

[Comment]

date?

Mahan and Roselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1959. Mahan, Harry Samson, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.

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Rosselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Mahon and Council to discuss further details.

[FBI Report p. 16; Office of Soviet Memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Duggett version's Report places the meeting as the Playa taken on 14 September 1960, Rosselli recalled that the ~~event~~ discussion took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment:

Tony de Valera admits going to NY at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Rosselli at this time or [Festung of de Valera, that his visit had an assassination motivation]

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the D.C.I., it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Rosselli "agreed to introduce him (Mahon) to a friend, 'Sam Gold', who knew the Cuban crowd."

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both ~~Frank~~ <sup>Sam</sup> Gold and Traffim ("Joe") is ~~an~~ important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plot. According

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77 to the 1967 I. G. Report, the ~~entry~~ <sup>entry</sup> of biancana took place <sup>(1)</sup> during the week of 25 September 1960: ....

[ 1967 I. G. Report, p. 18 ]

In contrast, the SSC Informant Report at p. 76, does not ~~state~~ <sup>state</sup> ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> biancana's initial appearance ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~it was~~ <sup>it was</sup> "cutting" prior to October 18." (p. 76) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ <sup>testimony</sup> evidence between the 1967 I. G. September date and Mahan's Senate testimony which set the introduction in ~~at~~ <sup>in</sup> November 1960. As a compromise, the Informant Report reasoned that biancana had been introduced to the Mahan "prior to October 18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960, and (2) ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 which revealed an FBI FLSA quoting biancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro. <sup>(1)</sup> FBI memo, dated 18 Oct 1960 from Horrocks Bissell, Informant Report, p. 79 ]

[ Comment:

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Each ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> dual reasons listed on the Informant Report on p. 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately ~~in the~~ <sup>in the</sup> below.]

[ Comment:

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Although the 1967 I. G. Report stated

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that "Mahon pointed out 'bold' to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either 'bold' or Joe", the Intern Report disjuncts this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's Senate testimony and stating that "The Support Chief, who was using the name 'Tom Jels', said he had met 'Sam' and Joe, once, and then very briefly".  
S.O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Intern Rept p. 5

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Comment  
~~Comment~~

Conflicts appear also on several occasions on ~~a variety of~~ minor points surrounding the September 1965 meeting in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Roselli know from the beginning that ~~that~~ the operation was CFA?

a) O'Connell stated that Mahon told Roselli that they were representing international business interests where Roselli testified that Mahon told him that O'Connell was CFA (Intern Rept p. 1). Also, footnote 1 on p. 26 indicates that Roselli told O'Connell "about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Roselli, that "I am not kidding, I know what you work for".

The ingenuity of Roselli's recognition of CFA ~~is~~ <sup>SECRET</sup> ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> that it is doubtful if Brennan and Traffante

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could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. This theme will be developed more fully below.

2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some summer interests of Wall Street that had... rich interests and properties around Cuba..." (Roselli, 4/24/75 pp 9, 17)

CF. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that (4) Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? ... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

Inf. Anderson's source for this article were Roselli and ~~William~~ William Henry, who was not privy to the details of Phase F, it is another <sup>example</sup> of serious discrepancies between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~discovery~~ "surprise discovery" by Mahon and O'Connell as to the true identity of "Sambo" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~all~~ although it is

possible that the Senate Committee Staff overlooked the <sup>specific</sup> Miami newspaper Sunday supplement (Pamphlet) which purportedly included pictures of Pomona and Tampana, their ~~addresses~~ <sup>addresses</sup> ~~showing~~ <sup>showing</sup> Mahan and O'Connell ~~etc~~ <sup>etc</sup> the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Pamphlet magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that ~~they~~ O'Connell and Mahan were working for an ~~ex~~ post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafia in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the sub-synopsis stage and no file was delivered to Pomona et al until approximately March 1961, whatever the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Pamphlet et al. Inter. Sec. Rep. RTI, FH 1

The principle in Phase D of the operation ~~et al~~ also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ the pre-Play of Pigeon phase of the operation.

"Although Mahan described Pomona as playing a "key" role,

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6/24/75, p. 15) ~~All of the intermediate steps~~  
 [Whether Roselli received a message  
 from Bronck's murder four  
 days before Roselli's Senate appearance  
 is open for question.] Roselli's  
 characterization of Bronck's role  
 as minor <sup>in contrast to</sup>  
 his alleged ~~discovery of~~ <sup>recruitment of</sup> Bronck's  
 "knowledge of the Cuban word" which  
 the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

in Phase I is even more justified by the  
 available evidence. The 1967 Feb. Report and  
 Senate Intern Report ~~say~~ state that "  
 'Goel' identified 'Goel' to Mahan  
 as a man who would serve  
 as a courier to Cuba and  
 make arrangements there" (Feb. Report  
 p. 19; Intern Report, p. 77). To  
 support the description of Trafficante  
 as a courier, the ~~1967 Feb. Report~~  
 Intern Report quotes p. 19 of the  
 1967 Feb. Report in stating that  
 "At that time, the gambling casinos  
 were still operating in Cuba  
 and Trafficante was making  
 regular trips between Miami  
 and Havana in syndicate business."

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Comment

factually

This unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records <sup>of other agencies</sup>. As an example, State Department files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport <sup>in Havana</sup> on October 7, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February 2, 1960. (See Trafficante File, State Dept). ~~None~~ <sup>These</sup> records. No records available to the Committee from DNS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and State~~ maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during the period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante ~~admitted~~ <sup>stated</sup> that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release. <sup>from prison</sup> Testimony, pp 4-53, Oct. 1, 1970. His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos <sup>in Havana</sup> were either closed or operating in the mid-1960s, and law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in the~~ during the pre-Maguy Bigs period.

By the time of the Senate testimony of ~~Rosen~~ <sup>Rosen</sup>, however, Trafficante's role had diminished to a point



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even below Biancanas, <sup>from "courier"</sup> he had been reduced to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate ~~communications~~ <sup>communications</sup> between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. ~~Initially~~ <sup>Initially</sup> Trafficante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~my~~ facts as they were being reported in 1973 of the principals.

### Comment 8

The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~specifically~~ <sup>specifically</sup> with a view to contrasting the "courier is interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not rigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Defense Report "hint" at the problem.

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplest, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this <sup>SECRET</sup> plan was rejected



Comment

Comment - <sup>part above</sup>  
The observation of the 1967 F.O.  
Report ~~has~~ are ~~of~~ extremely significant  
in several respects. First, the person  
gilt ~~of~~ <sup>most</sup> ~~SECRET~~ <sup>important</sup> ~~original~~  
with ~~himself~~, not the Agent; a person



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writings of the 1977 Report was the fact that Onta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Stugis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante, Norman Rothman (See Rothman Papers). Coupled with Stugis' ~~alleged~~ <sup>known</sup> relationships, is the allegation that Stugis had a role in ~~the~~ inspecting the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an interest with Onta in running gambling "high rollers."

A second aspect of Mushkil's ~~the~~ news series concerned a claim by Paula Jorony that she had acted on behalf of Stugis in 1960 in attempt to poison Castro who dove failed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on domestic electronically surveilled curriculum in which he stated that "the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' <sup>SECRET</sup> some drink or food of Castro" (Memo, Hqs to DCI, SAH, DOR, 10/19/60).

the tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows?

It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities...

### Additional considerations:

1. Current syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own undiscovered prior to CPTA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been Agency when CPTA was still active in 1962 but
2. Syndicate operators could have had accounts such as those in New York Daily News story in 1975 and 1976.
3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with, but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.
4. Sturgis was not seen a while ago. He probably knew Otto in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Otto assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation w/ Otto, it was not CPTA: it could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have been or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from them in 1965 after Otto was shot.

Neither the 1967 I-C Report  
or the SSC Interim Report can

pinpoint the precise date on which  
the Agency processed the poison pills  
which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli  
{ Interim Report, p 83. The chain of  
custody, according to the 1967 I-C-  
Report ~~then~~ was for the lethal  
pills to be delivered from Rosselli  
to Trappanico. Although the next  
intervening steps remain a  
mystery, Rosselli reported to O'Connell  
that the pills had been delivered to  
Ota in Cuba in late February - early  
March 1961 { Interim Rpt. p 27; Interim Rpt p 8

### Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported  
the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~  
~~and~~ whose memory was that the  
money and pills for the operation were  
delivered at a meeting at the Fontainebleau  
Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by  
'Mahan, Rosselli, Trappanico, and the  
Cubans'. { Interim Rpt p 13. Shimon's  
~~memory~~ story is filled with  
vivid ~~and~~ details which are documented  
on p 2 of the Report, but his credibility  
as subject of serious question as  
his account is not shared by  
anyone else connected with the plan  
and nor is his relationship with

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0002198 Roselli, biancano, or Trafficante appear as "copy" as he would lead me to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for ~~John~~ <sup>William</sup> column of January 9, 1961, which fixed the date of the passage of the person at the Fontainebleau <sup>by Roselli</sup> as March 13, 1961, and confirmed the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's stay is that the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta could or would not, attempt the poisoning; a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leak" to ~~William~~ and his Senate testimony.]

### Comment

One additional fact concerning Orta's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final phase of this report. Orta lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while the planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington.

It would seem though, that the gangster did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro [1967-5, Report p. 27]



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"Pierri" or "Chilli" Mendezal Mendez  
is described in Truffante's FBI files  
as a close Cuban associate.

Completing the picture of  
support for Varona is the promotional  
efforts of the Dins and Eddie  
Cellini, McHenry and Ramsey Busen.  
ancestral, who were reportedly  
working through a Washington DC,  
public relations firm, Edward  
& Moss and Associates. Moss had

was supposed acting as a courier  
for funds supplied by the Cellini  
benefactors with the understanding  
that this group would have  
"privileged treatment" in the  
Cuba of the future. Attempts  
to verify these reports were  
unsuccessful [1967 FBI Report  
p 30]

The Ramsey influence  
using the Cellini brothers as a  
"front" is particularly interesting  
in light of Varona's admission  
that Jorge Pijol arranged a  
meeting in Miami in ~~the~~ <sup>my</sup> ~~agreement~~  
1960 wherein Ramsey offered to  
financially "back" Varona's  
efforts to ~~again~~ "educate"  
the American people about Castro,  
which may be a euphemism for  
anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript]



0002201

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ engaged ~~some~~, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime, had settled upon de Vanna, as an <sup>excellent</sup> individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~other~~ multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine feud. de Vanna was understandably pleased to permit both the U.S. government and criminal syndicate to offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors.

[ See Vanna testimony - ]

Although de Vanna has no <sup>specific</sup> memory of meeting Traffante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interceptor" in several meetings attended by de Vanna, Rosselli, Bernieria, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael, "Macho" Jener, a Traffante family partner from Havana who continued to serve Traffante in Miami during the 1950s. Traffante claimed that Rosselli had primary contact with Jener but this appears unlikely in view of Traffante's long-standing friendship with Jener on Cuba. And Rosselli's admission to

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O'Connell that ~~Trappanese~~ ~~Trappanese~~ provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta who had escaped [redacted]

[redacted] in April 1961.

Comment: <sup>Paralleling</sup> ~~Paralleling~~ the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Roselli's depiction of Trappanese's role ~~changed~~ changed from ~~the~~ his "counsel" ~~characterization~~ in 1960 as reported by the Army to conform to Trappanese's "interpreter" state ment, is the recent interview with Gen. who agrees with Trappanese's ~~implied~~ testimony that he was an <sup>interpreter</sup> ~~interpreter~~ <sup>with de la</sup> ~~interpreter~~ for Roselli. ~~the~~ the net result in both instances is to minimize Trappanese's exposure (see CF. Forgi interview with Gen. May 7, 1978 and Trappanese testimony, Oct 7, 1977)

~~Happening, the meetings with~~  
~~de la Varna came to pass, the~~  
~~ambiguity~~  
If ~~confusion~~ exists as to the <sup>ambiguity</sup> introduction of de Varna into Phase one of the Castro assassination plots, more ~~clear~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Varna's ~~as~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The I & Report indicates that de Varna attempted a second ~~person~~ ~~person~~ ~~person~~ before the ~~Bay of Pigs~~ invasion that Roselli was positive that only one

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attempt, (Cortez) was made. He was also positive that he delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Varna which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~points~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in specifying that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that... [de Varna] was the contact in the United States who arranged for... [Cortez]... to administer the poison.

### Comment

There appears to be no factual way to resolve de Varna's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Varna denies ever having received poison pills from Roselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time. [See Varna transcript]

### Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varna participate in the mob's plots. [redacted]  
[redacted]

However, "Steve" <sup>was</sup> ~~stated~~ to end his participation in the syndicate plan but [Hay] was apparently influential. [redacted]  
[redacted]

See I.G. Report, p 323

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Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until, April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both Harvey and Council swore that Harvey "took over a going operation". I.E.O. Rept p 3. The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discerned~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ <sup>in</sup> response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous ~~de Vanna~~ was to provide the ~~individuals~~ who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and

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survivors in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

Fact. In Phase One, Roselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the matter operational and the ability of the ~~person~~ <sup>personne</sup> assassin was deliberately vague. After ~~Harry~~ Harry contacted Roselli in Miami in April 1962, Harry reported that "the manner in which the actual material was to be introduced to Castro's Ford (which involved) an asset of Vanna's who had access to someone in <sup>at the</sup> restaurant frequented by Castro." By June 1962 after the Vanna had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had personally sent the goods into Cuba, ~~the~~ "Roselli" reported to Harry on 21 June that Vanna had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harry said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harry never heard

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their names or anything about them  
 [1967 DO. Report p513]

### Comment

As the 1967 DO author correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "Lorraine restaurant" poisoning apparently ~~was the same plan that Edwade~~ was familiar in that Edwade had described precisely the same plan. The fact that Vauna related the exact modern equivalent to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwade in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

- (1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or
- (2) the plot had been underway before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and prompted the CDA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or
- (3) de Vauna was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain <sup>their</sup> financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime.

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### Second

The cast of unknown

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character changed. Harry had insisted that Mahon and Boncane be dropped from the operation which Roselli readily acceded to. Traffante's "in person" role was assumed by "Marco", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the name Boncane and today.

### Comment

"Marco" introduction into one of the most sensitive C.I.A. covert actions in history without any attempt <sup>by the Agency</sup> to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely to bed ~~to~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>some</sup> of the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the R.F.B. Report characterizes Marco as "Roselli's man", it is probable that this individual was ~~never~~ drafted by Traffante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

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2.

mafia <sup>was</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> slow and undramatic  
Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to  
Hany that the guns and grenades which  
had been delivered to Varma in Miami  
in April had arrived in Cuba, and an  
unidentified three-man team had been dispatched  
in June to execute the plan. [Inform Report  
p845]

7.

During September 1962, ~~and~~ Rosselli  
related to Hany that de Varma ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup>  
readying a second three-man team  
who were "supposedly military men  
whose assignment was to penetrate  
Castro's body guard. During this period  
the 'medicine' was reported as still in  
place and the three men of the first  
team safe. [1962 I.G. Report, p51]  
However, the second team never  
made Cuba and a series of alibis  
were constructed during December and  
January 1963. Nevertheless, de Varma  
supposedly collected \$200 for the maintenance  
of these individuals from Rosselli  
who had received the payment from  
Hany. [1962 I.G. Report p52]

In mid-July 1963 both  
Hany and Rosselli agreed that "nothing  
was happening and that there was  
not much chance that anything would  
happen in the future" [1962 I.G. Report p51]  
Rosselli was instructed to ease  
his way out of touch with  
Varma ~~which~~ <sup>which</sup> ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> ~~doing~~ <sup>did</sup>.  
The last meeting between Hany



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and Rosselli occurred in Washington  
D.C. in June 1963. when he was  
Harvey's ~~guest~~ ~~for~~ overnight guest. Hence  
their meeting ostensibly was not directly  
related to any assassination plots.

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# CONCLUSION

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in part, the available evidence suggests ~~that [redacted] [redacted]~~ the thesis which is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Directorate Periodic Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CFT singly found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... In a ~~sense~~ <sup>sense</sup>, CFT may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 DC Rpt p 208]

7. The relevant evidence is as follows:

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Biancane ET SUR:

... Biancane reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. ... Biancane claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a "gill" in some fruit or food of Castro. [1977 DC Rpt p 195]

Comment

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Although the initial meetings between Mahon, Ponder, and Biancane

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are subject to different interpretation,  
it is clear that no plans were  
finalized between the parties <sup>0002211</sup> until some time after October 1961, the  
date of the <sup>FAPS</sup> intercepted conversation  
between them.

The grim joke, reported by the  
CIA at Ponce's request, will  
not stay for delivery until late  
February - early March 1961, so that it  
is difficult to see how Ponce's  
November 1960 assassination plot  
could be a part of the CIA operation.  
Rather, it appears that the mob had  
its own plan in progress, using  
a mixture of Castro, to accomplish the  
deed, when the CIA fortuitously  
happened along to offer its support.

The mob was then in a perfect  
position. If their ~~private~~ private  
plot actually worked and Castro died,  
then the Syndicate had enormous  
blackmail potential against the CIA  
which it could exercise at the  
opportune moment. However, if their  
~~plot~~ back-fired, then their position  
would be that they were  
only attempting to violate the  
wishes of their Government.

#### Additional Comment

The action of Ponce's  
"hired hand", Richard Cain ~~was~~  
~~not to~~ raise some interesting  
possibilities. Given Cain's admission

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to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on ~~prisoner's~~ payroll. Cain's approach to ~~the~~ the CPTA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community appears ~~as a little more than~~ <sup>a little more than</sup> coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (and me stay), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-President Priio (second stay) the coincidence seems more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by someone to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain called me the "arranger to be" when someone refused to introduce him to the CPTA, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

I tie in memo on Cain with Salinas' view which ~~is~~ strongly supports of the inference, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the Las Vegas writing of Oct 30, 1960. Mahan needs to be questioned on this point.

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CPTA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency.

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*M* In September 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CPTA that DRB was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture" ~~with~~ a document which is subject to review in typewritten. It includes the fact that the CPTA was a willing participant in the deal. Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain, now the chief investigator for CPTA, being Sheriff's office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in ~~Chicago~~ Chicago in Sept 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the ~~measures~~ rifle in March 1963.

## 2. Recruitment of ~~potential~~ <sup>the potential</sup> Assassins

In describing the potential poisoner, <sup>in October 1960</sup> Brancana spoke of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CPTA pills was Juan Dorta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry. The identity of the "girl" referred to by Brancana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit ~~at least one~~ one of Castro's Cuban ministers due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gambling and prostitution circles.

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It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman, and Torrence were typical examples. Also, one woman told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arriving at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McManis) seven or eight on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for a young woman to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

L Maria Loring is a compelling witness, to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Stupin has been previously discussed. However, one interesting point is that she was also Thomas Torrence's mistress and, there would have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Torrence is totally uncooperative and Loring was not asked about her relationship with Torrence in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment

— Juan Orta, the man identified to the Agency as the gangster's contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably enlisted by Trafficante, due to Orta's former receipt of gangster "kickbacks". One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's involvement in using Orta to execute the assassination plan. According to the 1947 FBI Report Loring

Osta "lost his position in the Puerto Rican Office on 26 Jan 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington". According to the official version Osta accepted for the pills in late February-early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 Feb Rpt p 273]

7. If the mob was close enough to Osta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Osta had lost his position of accessibility. The other possibility and most likely, is that the pills were left in the United States and then were available to him at a time when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CFA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the CFA for its ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there is~~ the same possibilities exist. If Hany and Council are correct in assuming that Hany had walked into an "ongoing operation, then it can ~~be~~ be assured that the mob's relationship with de Vries, which predated the CFA participation according to the FBI Memo of 21 Dec 1960, and 18 Jan 1961 had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs with the revolution.

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Jack Anderson's journal intervention  
with PRS (See Indian interview; and  
CFA Roselli file; ~~re~~ CFA office  
of Security full re Edward P. Morgan.)

### 3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas  
where Giancana got Martin to "take the heat"  
for him by blaming the tap was a  
result of the CFA plots.

- Early 1962, intervention with FNU  
Farrell of FNS re possible deportation  
[See Tab C, Roselli CFA File,  
stating that inf. Edward Osborn, Stephen  
Locca, & Houston know]

- attempts to ward off FPD surveillance  
in 1963 & 1967 [F.G. Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Papish  
on 3 May 1967, Sam comments that  
Roselli and Giancana have CFA  
'over a barrel' because of "that operation".  
He said that he doubted that the FBI  
would be able to do anything about either  
Roselli or Giancana because of their  
previous activities with your people."

(1967 F.G. Report p 131)

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Notes re Jack Anderson  
"Castro Retaliation" theory

0002219

March 3, 1967 }  
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Office

Source:

1967 I.O. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Andum and Pearson the recipients  
(p 120)

- We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked

(p 120)

- Fragment

71  
The Rosselli-bureau contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Bureau may also have been this (p 121)

- Mahan

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does have good reasons for not wanting the story aired further. Unhappily, publicity might cause him to lose his narrative

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Client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and urge disinter-

- The Pearson story, which is now carrying so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team  
Comment

Not necessary since Pearson was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and may have Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3-man team to Mahan or O'Connell during Phase I  
Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a link to Pearson, Agency makes the following point -

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. Ep 12:

Since Agency c/n figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is drinking too much and ~~is~~ talking to Morgan who is also drinking and talking to Pearson.

Comment

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Don Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best gordies: the story of the job

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting.  
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GOC2222 P 1275  
Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I-6 speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 September meeting of the Special Group (Secretariat) which was attended by Harvey. (p 112)  
E R F K was not present

## 2. Other Sources

2.1 Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCP aware that Russell was going to expose plot. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Russell or someone on his staff furnishing Jack Braden details of the incident."

(Memo in office of Luntz Feb 16 Morgan)

3. Memo: 20 May 1971

Subject: Internal

Mr [ ] [ ] saw with [ ] said Mahen & Braden together on some oil mix deal. ... Recent exposure of Braden re Mahen oil on the Carter Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Mahen using his son Peter as an intermediary.

theory is that Mahan probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (re. Intell w/ a new CIA stuff to influence Hughes)

-Morgan makes noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement with CIA  
Σ Memo in Security File re Morgan

#### 4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

7. Hany had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and January 1968 following Roselli's conversion.  
- 17 Nov 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Wadden who reported Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCP decided to ignore threat and Mahan agreed.

"Mahan further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally."

#### 5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Summary conversation instigated by Hany on Roselli's behalf to get CIA interested directly or at least discover how good overt case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October 8 Hany. Roselli knew what Hany had done for Mahan with Sen. Long because Ed Morgan told

Roselli

- Also, the Director Belmont had sent Harry a news clipping re Agency use of binocular (purportedly the Bryant 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office where Kennedy was still Acting General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- J. Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Rumyn story

- Mahan admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase 7 operation but to Agency delaying on long committee subpoenas

- Mahan visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Mahan) had been identified as the "client" by Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity. His relationship with Hughes with Roselli

- Mahan denied discussing latter phase of Rumyn & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

- Roselli met Morgan through Kent Reenspur in the 1950s

- Mahan recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with Baum in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~impression~~ impression that Roselli sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances

- Roselli under pressure from FBI hunting ~~happily~~ had a 19 yr old girl

- Believed Morgan had done some

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work for Pearson and did know  
that Anderson had more than a  
passing acquaintance with Morgan.  
- Morgan also fought with  
Pat Coyne of N 82

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John Handell  
Review of Office of Security File

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Jan 16<sup>th</sup>

15 Jan 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade City  
investigator for information on  
8 Cubans:

1. a. Ramon Don Pesteray  
b. Rolando Masferrer Regas  
c. Luciano Nieves  
d. Jose de la Torre  
e. Jose Quintana  
f. Joaquin Arturo Cortez  
g. Manuel Artime  
h. M.L.H.

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in  
Roselli (SSCP) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a 9 Dec  
1970 Office of Security memo.

v. No background investigation done on  
Roselli or Brancana

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect  
between Roselli & Agency officials reported  
approx. 1971.

ix. O'Connell has always been informed  
by Dade City.

x. Office of Security has no such  
evidence that Cuban Fulbrights have ever been  
involved or Cuban agents in Miami area  
during time of his death.

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Nieves

- c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20yr sentence for anti-Castro plot; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to [redacted]
- August 1965 entered US
  - Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shannon

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shannon knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown.

30 August 1970 report by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Ota

Was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Ota was reportedly selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Vanna

When Juan Ota was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Vanna be used. Roselli contacted Vanna. Vanna was to use

assets of his son to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son's influence to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the mission.

3. Roselli had a man, also known as 'Miami', known to Harvey as 'Marco', who also used the names Garcia Gomez and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Marco, who was described as Cuban who spoke Italian.

517-339-3523 F. No info in regard to death or redaction threats against Roselli or Cuban in G/L or Mexico, Panama - Tropic, SUMMIT, or MAGNUM inc/

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCP decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that might occur if the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack & William details of the incident.

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Memorandum 20 May 1971

Subject: Inter Tel

OPS

Magan had been engaged by Hughes Tool company thru Mahan's efforts. He [redacted] [former agency] wants to know, said Magan makes no sense to continue Hughes operations, but they had better take it easy on Mahan because of his past involvement w/ LFT

[redacted] in 1962-64 was in touch w/ Mahan & simultaneously working out details

[redacted]

For past several years Magan had been quite well.

In May 10, 1971 [redacted] said Mahan

[redacted] are involved together in some oil field deals. I would like to see this fall together

[redacted]

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Mama

19 Nov 1970

For: D C I

Subj: Roselli, John

2. In August 1969 Mr. Richard M. Bissell advised Col. Raffaele Edwards to inform of the office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring guerrilla-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Maken advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while visiting him. He did know him casually thru clients, but was given to understand that he was a "high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and involved all of the old money matters on the steps."

Maken seemed sure, if R was in fact a member of the club, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban guerrilla efforts.

6. Maken to approach R who knew M as a per-  
sone. hardly ~~private~~ & frequent.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza. His initial reaction was to sound pretty good but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the Cuban crowd. No money required or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Maken introduced to Sam Stagg at the Fontainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was ~~advised~~

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to him [ ] operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade 9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving high-level payments from the quantity units, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of repeated attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & was let out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts without success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Gregory Vann ... had become disappointed w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the project and was willing to handle the mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he may be given \$10,000 for operational expenses & \$100 for compensation.

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7 Feb 62

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secret had R.F.K. on Cuckoo's nest and up  
to make it in front in work. At our agent's presence  
17. May 1962 Harry told me as Case  
officer & it is not known by this office  
whether R. was used spontaneously for  
that point on

0002233

17. [REDACTED]

18. 2 Dec 1968 R arrested by F.B.I.

19. Harry reported to office of [REDACTED] his  
contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1968 & Jan 1969.  
It was his belief that John W. [REDACTED]  
the Agency for [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]  
unless he actually found [REDACTED].  
R expressed confidence that he would win  
an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Mahon called O'Connell to advise  
that Mahon's attorney, Ed Morgan, had  
rec'd a call from Tom Wadden who stated  
appeal exhausted & R faced deportation.

If someone did interfere on R's  
behalf, he would make a complete  
expose' of his activities in Agency.

21. 18 Nov 1970. D.C.F. [REDACTED] & [REDACTED]  
not to arrest R. Mahon was so  
pleased by Agency's position & he was a  
complete [REDACTED] w/ [REDACTED]. He further  
advised that he was not concerned about  
any publicity in it [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

London [REDACTED] Jan 18, 1971

to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

SECRET

stop: last of Feb or first of March 1963  
 000255: March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his  
 contact at Fontainebleau  
 - a few weeks later contact with

000255

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on the racket boss  
 Sam Giancana to line up a contact.  
 The confidential files report Platt & had  
 "gambly interest and an interest in the  
 shrimp business in Cuba". However, the  
 Chi gangster tests no direct part in the  
 assassin plot.

19 Dec 1967.

Memo For Record

Telephone conversation Harry & Howard Osborn  
 2. The first involved Dir of Security  
 the subject of our last Sunday conversation  
 re J.R. the validity of the FBI Dept case  
 against him; & whether or not the King plans  
 to consider any possible information on  
 his behalf

3. Harry indicated that he thought the  
 policy of "sitting tight" might be alright,  
 but that he felt it would be a simple  
 matter for the Dir to see Howard personally  
 & determine on an unofficial, confidential basis  
 what actual case the FBI Dept had.

Osborn - speculates / Harry suggests  
 find out validity of case for purpose of King  
 (Harry to work for Mayor)

SECRET



Page 0002234  
not in this folder

---

0002236

11 Dec 1967

1. Harry reported luncheon meeting w/ Papich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th
2. 26 Nov. 1967 R calls Harry who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Jim Byrd & Harry intro'd R as "Mr. Ralston."

28 Nov. Spent 11 hours at Bethesda

4. Harry to Harry, Country Club.

R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worked re which he brought.

- R said he had not seen someone since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harry)

- R I/n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

6. Goly told Harry re luncheon meeting w/ Col. Edwards in 1964 & they meeting O'Connell had w/ Madu & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Taiwan.

7. Harry insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, then Harry feels the Agency must exert influence to have the matter "handled". If it is not a good case, then Harry will tell Goly & he will recall it over.

10. Harry independent as regarding his interest was more than to protect Agency.

SECRET

0002237

He had my the highest regard for ~~Harry~~  
and the way we had handled his problem.

8 Nov 1967

2. Harry is source

R called on Oct 2nd & 27th. but  
Harry refused to swear R's attorney  
- R wondered if Nguyen could not  
do as much for him as it did for Mahm.  
Ed Morgan knew what Nguyen did for Mahm  
w/ Sen. Long & had told Nguyen about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harry at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re  
Mahm indirectly Mahm would "sell anyone  
down the river to protect his interest."

- Dor had sent Harry news clipping  
re use of banana. R said leak came  
from Sen. Kennedy office whom Harry was still to

Ex. Org. Mahm

28 April 67

1. Canal - Nguyen allegedly contacted some high level  
officials in port indirectly he had a client  
who had been involved in an extrajudicial  
~~in Mahm~~ record & said he had told Morgan  
when Nguyen alleged on Long subpoena.

2. Mahm possibly upset to find if he  
had been identified as client source

SECRET

0002238

publicly on his relationship w/ Hayes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 1961 & never discussed latter phases w/ R. Mahan - R met Magan thru Pearson in 1950's when Magan was legal work for Lar Vign Sun.

R & Magan in Vegas sometime in March. Jim Garrison in town "it was Mahan's recollection that these individuals spent some time together. He was under the impression that they sought legal advice from Magan but did not have any other conversation.

7. Claimed R had daughter rapidly developing, 14 yr old girl & advised of <sup>Shirley</sup> same for fully to register. R putting pressure for Mahan to give his funds.

8. Believed Magan had done some work for Pearson & did know that Friedman had more than a passing acquaintance w/ Magan.

Magan fight w/ Pat Cayne for NSA.

9. Knows very many problems of the FBI but don't know details.

10. It is evident that Mahan is deeply concerned about possibility of being implicated w/ Castro project but placed cooperation in a deep involvement.

1002239

Sen Long Mahu

S. Shonker, Long's personal staff, told him that Mahu arrived at Hanoi.

7 June 66

Mahu reported by Morgan is that w/ St. Louis staff, a personal friend of Long, re Mahu's appearance.

3. Fensterwald. had identified same names, etc by name to O Connell & Col. Edwards.

In the case of Sam, Ed Dubois & a couple of his technicians now aware of Mahu's tie-in w/ Hanoi.

31 May 1966

Mahu asked if "Sam grant" was in the unit

12. Morgan had advised Mahu that he knew Long's personal staff who exerts great influence on Long. They flew to St. Louis & then the 3 men flew to D.C. & met w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald wanted Mahu as his "ace in the hole" in that Mahu creates some great appeal for T.V. Hbs that Mahu was not just enough to make a point. When Long says so, Fensterwald would proceed.

13. Mahu claims some reports to

SECRET

Sam thru a series of circumstances  
 that were planned at our request.  
 The Hon. R.B. NFX was orally  
 briefed on the background that led up  
 to Mahui's involvement & a Top Secret  
 document furnished to Justice Dept  
 which served as a backup of the  
 supply

000790

0002241

July 14

1967 I.C. Rpt

0002242

SECRET

P3

Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Govt attitude toward the Cuban reg.

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally. By inflaming his behavior or by attacking his appearance.

b. August 1960 to April 1961

Plots against regime planned; views of at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime culminated in BOB.

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Bay of Pigs was called off after BOB & remained dormant for several months.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of Monrovia.

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After Monrovia & collapse of Project Mongoose, aggressive scheme began Bay of Pigs; revised in April 1962; were finally terminated early 1963.

P6

Drew Pearson column of 2 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed

b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ gifts

SECRET

5. If syndicate ~~embodiment~~ is more  
quantitative, tends to reinforce thought  
that details named have been  
characterized by direction or security degree  
FBI Oct 1942 report.

plus Final Report requires that prob-  
plots have no relation in a procedure  
they

---

### Reply - Transmittal

#### I the Reported Assassination Attempts

5 agent messages were identified that  
made reference to plans to kill Castro or  
proposing such action. Three of the  
messages related to the same operation  
the other two relating to separate  
proposals; there is no indication  
that any of these proposals was the  
result of CFA initiative.

[PMARMC/5] JMW 29 May 1942  
and was identified 30 August 42. He has  
been reported as never admitting that  
he was a CFA agent. His name not  
given to me. Three other were

0002243

SECRET



AM LABA

0002244

SECRET

SSC

1) infer that AM LABA a cut agent  
with the mean of providing a plot agent later  
so that Costo had participation for relations.

or

2) AM LABA so indicate the details could have  
been known since providing Costo

whatsoever should have been reported to WSC

Agony - the character of the relationship  
between CIA and AM LABA, prior to Costo's  
murder of Peter Kandy, was so insular  
and in confidence that it provided no back for  
AM LABA to feel that he had any kind of  
CIA support for plotting against Castro.

..... there was little for him to  
report or leak?

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August  
1962 and Sept 1963 when he was not  
contacted by CIA. In terms of the  
relationship that he had with CIA the  
critical period, since is therefore between  
5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963.

Reason for hiatus is that  
CFP 13  
Final report AM LABA If a name Cuba, he was  
recontacted due to his potential.

SECRET

SECRET

0002245

Cable on Sept 7th says "BMH/ASH ~~very~~  
totally spoiled that who will always  
be a control problem.

... is best approached as a  
chief conspirator allowed to recruit  
his own cohorts among whom we  
may then find persons susceptible  
to long distance and covert action.

" Clearly, at that point, while BMH/ASH  
was viewed as potentially important, he  
was also viewed as a person of uncertain  
loyalties, requiring careful but long  
range development for whatever course  
of action that might later ensue.

p3-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, present  
BMH/ASH as an ~~unreliable~~ person  
& inferred is that Carter Sept 7th  
speech might have been a result of leak  
by BMH/ASH

p10 " The fact remains that whatever  
views BMH/ASH may have expressed, he  
had no response from his CIA contacts  
of any support for his proposals at that time.

Fitzgerald meeting still be reported  
high-power up w/ religious rights

SECRET

14 Nov WHP reported that BMLH  
 satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy  
 over fact he had not been given  
 technical assistance. He can understand  
 why he had not been given 'cutari small piece  
 of equipment which provided a final solution  
 to the problem'.

### Comment

In essence he [BMLH] was told  
 there would be no U.S. support until after  
 the fact, and then only if he was  
 successful. While that may not seem  
 a very realistic way in which to bring  
 about the overthrow of a govt, it is  
 directly relevant to the question of what  
 BMLH was told and what he understood.  
 It is contrary to the statement in  
 the SSC Final Report (p.18) to the effect  
 that it was not clear how  
 BMLH interpreted the put off of U.S. aid.

After July 1964 FFI Report states that  
 BMLH was unhappy with CIA regime and  
 As. Kennedy had refused to support the plan.

19 Nov 63 Fitzerald 'approved' policy  
 BMLH he would be given a  
 cache inside Cuba. The cache

SECRET

0002248

could, if he requested it, include...  
high-power rifle w/ scope...

19 Nov. MURKIN tells CIA he is  
returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him  
to delay for 1 more meeting.

MURKIN agrees "if it is really  
important"

p 19 SSC speculates that this is fact  
indicates he might receive specific info  
Army - it's just a piece of highly  
speculative analysis, not supported by  
the evidence.

[Fails to mention per w/ meeting  
Opinion]

MURKIN read.]

p 24

"A"

"unaware of MURKIN 1963 association  
with CIA"

No info at least 1 1/2 years  
after death of JFK; no idea of 1963  
CIA ties w/ MURKIN what were  
very intricate

SECRET

SECRET

0002251

c. CFA twice (first in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to US gambly syndicate members... The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed of gambly rep. to a Cuban wife leader Fila who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the wife leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

cf ... while the events described of New Season did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unproven."

Q18: During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell's Mahan went to Miami where Roselli introduced my Mahan to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Mahan provided out "Gold" to O'Connell from address but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe".

Q19 At that time the gambly career was still operating in Cuba. Trafficking was making regular trips between Miami & Havana as syndicate business.

SECRET

00022529

p. 24 Despite the dilemma that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets.

(Comment - Giancana was fully apposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival's escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Trag. (Joe, [redacted] was on touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and personally of a sort that would enable him to smuggle poison into Castro. The gangster named this man inside as Juan Ocho who was then Official Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister. The gangster said that Ocho had once been in a position to receive bribes from the gangster interests, had since lost that source of income and needed the money.)

p. 27. Late Feb - March 1961

As passed the pills to Trag. Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Cuban Ocho. Ocho is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before using them. According to the gangster, Ocho got cold feet.

Comment Ocho lost his position on 8 Mar

SECRET

SECRET

offer on 26 Jan. 1961, while going for the  
operation was still going on in Miami & Washington.  
He took refuge in the Singapore Embassy

0002254

April 1961...

... It would seem that the  
gangster did know that Data had already  
set his name to Castro.

p 30. The Cuban brothers were believed to  
in touch with Varna. Some Mossad were  
reported to have offered Varna large sums  
of money for his operations against Castro, with  
the understanding that they would receive  
privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future".  
Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p 31. Traff appeared Varna and told him  
that he had clients who wanted to do away with  
Castro & that they would pay big money for the  
job.

Roselli said as a loyal Italian he would  
whenever he could & would never divulge  
the operation.

p 31. R. Traff deliver money to Varna for expenses.  
- O'Connell recalls 50,000; Edwards recalls  
25,000; Pennington recalls 25,000

p 32 Roselli gave the jills and money to Varna. When  
Roselli died

Signed Varna

SECRET

p. 32 <sup>22</sup> Edwards recalls something about a contact who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

0002255

p. 33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April 1962 but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was started April 1962, Harvey took over a "gongy operation".

p. 34. O'Connell believes he must have passed the pills, but he has no specific recollection of doing so.

p. 49. Rosell needed Gran. & Traff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Valera. However, it would be naive to assume that Rosell did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate but he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.

p. 51 <sup>51</sup> ~~49~~ June 1962 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt. <sup>perhaps using the pills.</sup>

SECRET



Harry never named their names or anything about them.

Q 52 Harry says Roselli wasn't badly hurt. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p. 201 RFK - I trust that if you ever <sup>try</sup> to do business with organized crime - with gangsters, you will let the Attorney General know before you do it. Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 66. The Attorney General's copy of the memo for the record of that meeting (May 62 by Edwards [Houston]) is in Archives of the AG's office.

p. 67. Chicago Sun-Times article of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Oswald never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept done to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected by his use of co-operation w/ another govt agency."

Article puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Reports McBain's bugging incident.

SECRET

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent taking down what allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone?  
I'm one of you.

Person pictured as being approached by  
CIA but denying

00002258

AMLABH

- 079 - DR took Presidential Oath which they  
refused to surrender to the; Mr. de la Torre  
- Cuba believed to be one participant in  
assassination of Lt Col Antonio Blanco Rico, head  
of Batista's military in Havana  
- DR quite apart from 20th of July but  
signed a note just

= ... Agency was primarily involved in helping  
Cuba's action in [MASH PRON] program directed  
against Cuban military leaders, with receiving help  
plus for technical assistance in an assassination  
attempt. The obvious project files and info  
furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cuba's case  
officer, do not wholly support these conclusions.  
The Agency offered both direct and indirect  
support for Cuba's attempts.

087 14 Sept 1963

Cuba wrote Tuzendino - "I don't intend  
to see (be interviewed by) your friend again!  
whom you should tell them," so they don't

SECRET

make the top: I want to get away from politics completely!

192 Sandy says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced rifle w/ an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

### The Drew Pearson Story

#### a) Published Details

Robert Kennedy may have ~~is~~ not true. He was briefed on Phase 1 after it was over - He was not ~~briefed~~ briefed on Phase 2

#### b) Three (3) hard assassins were caught in Havana; one still in prison

It tells Kiang on 21 Jan 67, that Kiang says 3 men included. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof that they were actually disabled. Most of the announced

Captain and Lieutenant during this period of this team

SECRET

Who saved enough at ~~that~~ <sup>that</sup> this report has come out  
to beneath of H was ready to tell in the future investigation. It  
him. He is reported to have was also stated by Castello in  
the Philippines under secret  
information. We have no  
direct corroboration of any sort. (We  
that Camison met w/ Randall  
in Las Vegas March 1965)

0002260

SECRET

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967

Beamboroff apparently to be used as a source  
of information to show Oswald a CIA agent  
& was to be used to assassinate Castro. Beamboroff  
alleges he has letters signed by CPT rep  
or by Sen. RFK asking Cuban leaders  
to work with Cubans for removal of Castro.  
This memo is intended to record that  
such letters were signed & therefore could  
not be in Beamboroff's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

0002265

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain  
Richard Scalpette  
DOB OCT 1931 Chicago

FBI memo

- 21 Dec 1960 not found after

- 18 Jan 1961  
identified individuals

- Identity of W1 ROBERT

- April 61 to April 62 hiatus  
- ~~some~~ 'something going on'  
independent of Agency.

- RFE security called on 4 March 67  
to obtain memo; already saw article  
of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65

Bango in Madrid & claims group  
in Cuba ready.

- Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 arrests in Cuba

Trial resumed up to late fall 64 & early 65  
w/ Airline meetings

SECRET

10 Jan 64 "Report" Brucchi Rums approach The WH.

SECRET

0002266

O'Connor's interview of Malcom in May 1970

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SB contained in material previously shared for review on Sturgis
- Chicago Trib  
Dec 28, 31, 1973
- Cain
  - Fall 1960, contact in Chicago
  - Summer 1961 Mexico City
  - April 1962 Mexico City
  - 4 June 62 departed
  - 19 Aug 63 Chicago
  - 26-30 May 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami
  - 12 Sept 63 DRP arms purchase
  - told to get out of picture
  - 1 May 1972 Disappears.

27 NOV 63

- Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907
- ~~S. S.~~ S. Spaulding under direction Michael Criley
- LHO purchased rifle March 63
- Strong suspect LHO in Chicago 1963 April-

SECRET

SECRET

0002267

1.

[REDACTED]

DOB

[REDACTED]

2

[REDACTED]

DOB

[REDACTED]

3.

[REDACTED]

4.

[REDACTED]

5.

[REDACTED]

DOB

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

6.

[REDACTED]

Edward Prescott Morgan

DOB

[REDACTED]

SECRET



TAB B

(2-9-78)

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

[redacted]  
[redacted] negotiation for School of Howard  
Duff Studios & John Hopton Wares.  
Amended & Approved March 1951 to include

Morgan [redacted]

Discard

Cain

According to De Mar, Cain in  
Mexico 1941 into 1942  
-1964-65

SECRET

SECRET

0002269

7-Mar-35  
St Pauli Minn  
3641

Bradley Earl Ayers  
Eglin AFB Fla.

April 17, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Tracing sites  
Palo Alto Key  
Upper Key Camp  
Card found in edge of P. [unclear]

Date 10 Aug 1964  
Secrets Approval

Referral 23826 (DDP/WH/SH)

Case No. 366085

Request For Recruit Return

Serial No  
366085

Nature  
Separation Return to Parent SVC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations:  
DDP/SHS  
US Field Office  
Forward operator Station - JMWAVE  
Paramilitary Branch Section 17  
Rensselaire C.R.C. Indiv Pol Groups

SECRET

SECRET

6002270

2R/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic being 2R/RIFLE to  
be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief  
FI/Dev. D. 15024 Bly only

- Personally. approved of DD Plans

Harry  
Chief FI/Dev D

19 Feb 1962

To Harry re authorization of ATWIR  
for 2R RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962

Because of sensitive nature of this  
activity, accounts for funds will be of  
general category & of your category

2. Salary \$500 per yr; 750 in addition to salary

3. Money to be considered in lieu of  
project & constitute authorization for all travel  
per diem; operational & other expenses

4. Eyes only

Rich. D. Helms.

---

Hand written notes

Morgan - Roselli - Mahan - Gamm

Mackin Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Hudson

1) Puerto Rico

2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOS)

3) April 61 to late 61

4) late 61 to late 62 (Customs misfe error)

5) late 62 to mid 63

SECRET

Roselli op started in Sept 66  
(Mahn to Roselli to Gracena)

to Supd 7 May 67

Taylor became chairman of FCS  
on 9 Aug 67

Rush, McNamee, Taylor, Bundy,  
Ordover, Gilpatric, Lamont,  
Munn, McCone

Memo For Record

Rept at request of DCF; conveyed  
to FO on 23 March 67

The one stayback been copy (FO)  
all notes, & other derived source material  
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chug WH (Daren)

From DO of Security

Subject: WH (Security Paper)

Final account of memo exposed on  
a sensitive paper of interest to DD/P, Chug WH  
& DO of Security

Disbursed.

25 Sept 1960 thru 6 Feb 1961

SECRET

TO Contact

0900.

SECRET

0002272

11 Feb 1961 To Penney April 1960  
 31 Jan 1961  
 14 Feb 61 CMMMO Symposium 1/043  
 26 Sept 1961  
 12 Feb 1961 993

Page 3  
 I/O Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis Oct 62 & collapse of McNamara, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1960; covered in April 1962, was finally smashed in 1963

Two other plots were organized in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them

P 7

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Keynote) wherein McNamara brooded subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

See (C)

Result - Project MIMODE memo by Lansdale

31 Jul 64

Decum at Special Group of a Chamberlain serves memo of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. No & had no interest.

Missing page

and Ossetian

P 2 Gonzalez Ballanterra


Press Release 9 March 1966

-prisoner of conflict for intelligence; not

truth to form support

-Jose ROBERTO, Adm Blanca Ramon and Taped

Should have  
been deleted.



not in ~~Texas~~ with Odom Agency

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1940

Edward O'Connell, Bessell of plane  
inspector; L. Swords then brief  
Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Mahon called O'Connell & pointed out  
Paradise sector sunny Gold & Joe  
(Presumably in time, Mahon & O'Connell  
know names)

[redacted] to Cuba & make  
arrangements there re entry to Gold

Traff making regular trips to Havana

10. 7 Jan '59 - casino closed

13 Jan '59 - Casino reopened & open

17 Feb '59 - Casino reopened opening

30 Sept '61 - last casino closed

P 23 Technical Chief TSD

4 approaches: (1) high force like shellfish  
poison to be administered in a pin (Collier's Condition  
Roosevelt's suit was supplied to Gary Powers  
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar  
(4) handwriting

P 29 March April 1941

Roselli told O'Connell that Traff knew a  
man high up in exil movement. (Vanna)  
Rpt from ~~SECRET~~ suggest Sun Traff

SECRET

6002274

Man V. Amos.

at 21 Dec 1968 FBI memo re gangster  
financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro  
b) 18 Jan 1961 Amos to V with these  
scholar: Had hired Moss as a fence man

CIA had contact in Miami but no indication  
of any involvement in Cuba.

[March 1959 for use in NR Dism as  
consultant to Indian Embassy]

- Nov 62 by CIA Staff under 22 MATS  
a program for exploitation of political consultants.]

Roselli to deliver \$ to V. Estimate  
very but Esterline says 10,000 + 100,000 of  
communication as per secret memo.

Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev.  
Front & many involved in BOP. Steps  
taken to end his participation in syndicate  
plan but apparently ineffective.

People who knew:

1. O. O - original man to poison
2. A V -
3. son-in-law of HV.

SECRET



Phase 2

SECRET

6002275

Harry briefed by authority of Bissell  
in Feb 1961 in connection with a general  
stand-by capability for Executive action

Harry had already discussed problem  
w/ [Arnold Silver] Sidney both of whom  
were parties probably cut in to Cuba  
project.

Helmus briefed on general concept but  
not on ongoing Cuba plot.

[in Congo;] QJ WIN account of [Silver] [in use]  
Justin O'Donnell summit acct.

ZRRIFLE covered as a FIELD operation  
(ostensibly to develop a capability to enter system  
& kidnap carriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harry discusses applicability of  
ZRRIFLE to Cuba; initiated by Bissell  
to run syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harry in  
charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harry busy

Early March 62

- March 62 Harry takes over Castro
- Harry view-

came to think of Castro operation &  
ZRRIFLE as being synonymous.

- Exec Action is synonymous w/ QJWIN

- ZRRIFLE ~~SECRET~~ related to Exec Action  
ZRRIFLE alone meant Castro

Harry's  
interpretation

SECRET

0002276

A review of his correspondence was  
unrevealing

[redacted] handled Castro operations  
& L/N use any of assets being developed  
in ZR RIFLE

- Memo of Hany after he left Task  
Force W & going to [Rome] on 27 June  
1963 to Chief FI / Staff that <sup>original</sup> ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup>  
to keep QJ Wm no longer work & support  
himself.

- Records [OLLA-1974,] 24 April 64  
show termination of [L. W. H. S. S. S.]  
on 21 April 64.  
Copy of [redacted] in no indication in the file that the Exec Action  
Copy of [redacted] 2R/RIFLE / QJ Wm ever used  
Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until  
Hany met Roselli & reactivated April 62.

- Edwards met contact w/ RFK  
over McGuire wiretap

- 14 May 62 - Hany called Edwards &  
indicated he was bringing Roselli from further use

742  
Hany - took over a "gray" operation.  
since he described plan for getting position  
to a favorite Castro restaurant. The machines  
were identified to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase one's  
- O'Connell thinks "something gray on"  
before April 61 & April 62 but can't remember

SECRET

SECRET

0002277

April 8<sup>th</sup> 1947

- Harry met w/ Russell & O'Connell
- O'Connell pointed Mahan there
- Harry says he would have recognized Mahan; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when they came to Agency; not since '52 when Harry sent to [Berlin]
- Edwards, deliberately did not mention Mahan when he first

p45 O'Connell out of June 62 when he was assigned PCS to [Olmstead]

p47 18 April 62

O'Connell gets  
p48 for Russell  
meeting w/ Harry  
in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harry took it over altho he cd remember when V was started.

Harry specified that Brian not to be brought in for 2nd phase & further Riddle bound upon.

Roselli right that Brian asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" Brian - "Too bad"

p48 Macco - unlikely a V-associated person known MACEO Macelle who Harry probably would have known. Also, 1st clue Macco was "Riddle man".

Riddle connected to 2nd phase as a contact to Valona.

SECRET

p 49. When the folks were given to Vanna from Vanna. Vanna reported arms and equipment needed for his end of the operation.

6002278

SECRET

April 1962

- a) explosives
- b) detonators
- c) 20.30 caliber rifle
- d) 20 45 cal. handgun
- e) 2 radios
- f) 1 bat radar

V reported arms & support & Raul's journal went to Harry. With help of Shaddy, chief of TMWAHS, about 5M of weapon & equipment.

Harry & Shaddy sent U-Haul. & put truck in parking lot for delivery to Maco, V, or via son in law. Harry & Shaddy set up watch on do Raul & Connel.

Shaddy not aware of plan.

230 May 62 - Raul's report that the folks were in Cuba at the restaurant regularly used regularly by Castro.

Jan 62 V had <sup>disposable</sup> 3 man team to Cuba Sept 1962

Harry saw Raul in Miami on 7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team of militia men assigned to penetrate Castro's body guard but never happened. "Medicine" reported still in place and first team safe Sept 62 - Jan 63

p 51  
Militia men  
used to  
take off

Harry in Miami. 22 Dec - a son & saw Raul & Maco several times. Gave Raul 2700 to V for expense of 3 militia men who never left (in Fla Keys)

Delay due to  
at conditions in

Feb 63

Harry left word for Maco in Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked as if dead off. (Just how Harry left this word for Maco is not clear)

SECRET

SECRET

0002279

April May 63

Helms approved a last meeting  
w/ Harry Roselli before Harry left  
for [Rome]

P 55 People who knew  
[Bruce Chiver] (Harry died 1962)  
knew Harry meeting w/ gangster in  
Reno in winter of '62

May 62

Sluf Edwards & Lawrence Houston brief  
RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to  
pursue writing case but wanted to be  
informed of Agency's deal w/ "gangster" again.  
RFK asked for a memo of  
the meeting via a phone call. Memo  
prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston  
NO briefing of McLean, <sup>Carson</sup> Carter, or Helms

RFK not told that Phase II had  
begun; that V had little or no in late phase

On 14 May 62 Harry briefs Helms;  
advises against briefing McLean & Carson  
Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli  
is not going to be used

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67  
to obtain Edwards' memo. He knew

SECRET

SECRET

0002280

of Plamen article of 7 March 67 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helms had turned w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He did not have a copy.

---

1954-55 Mahon Involvement by Neardness to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British govt & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connor rept'd that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Mahon stated he might buy his attorney to manipulate in past activities.

SECRET

9 March 61 [redacted] met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by [Carlos] [Tepedino] [redacted] a long-term friend. Cubela then [redacted] Havana where he was once assigned.

Cubela and leader of DR are like group of leftist students, signed in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Chela wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Ex-filtration called off as report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans.

[Comment: First of 3 rumormongers within [redacted] & Cubela - unknown if Cubela aware of rumormongers in Cuba! Other two links are even more dubious]

15 April 61 Report 61

message from airline store (good friend) [Tepedino] that Cubela going to Paris & wanted to talk to [redacted] no indication of any meeting.

SECRET

15 Jan 62

[Lucia Echevarria Branci] told an asset [redacted] that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

SECRET

Would stop in Paris to see [Tepedino]

0002283

27 June 1962

[Tepedino] appeared FBI in Miami on 11 June with idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew [Tepedino] to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

[Tepedino] dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61 so he contacted FBI. Stated his success with CIA claims for defection were

30 July - August 62

[redacted] met w/ Tepedino a few times in NY & both went to Helsinki, Cuba. Talked into being recruited "in place" & not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries; kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet leaders.

7-9 August 62

Meetings in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met [Tepedino] in Helsinki.

SECRET



10-11 Aug 62

SECRET

[redacted] Tarduno & Cubela in  
Copenhagen [redacted] 00022  
& Cubela insisted [redacted]

14-23 Sept 62

Cubela Tarduno [redacted]

[redacted] from [redacted] met in Paris

Cubela given S/W training &  
supplies; shown a demolition document.

Refused to be photographed.

[redacted] cables that no physical  
elimination missions be given as a  
request but he might do it on his  
own initiative. Headquarters strongly advise that  
no physical elimination missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brayil - met by [redacted]

[Tarduno] Nestor Sanchez who became  
case officer.

Cubela denied 2 S/W missions but  
only 1 rec'd. afraid of total censorship  
that might [redacted]

[AMTRUNK-10] who was badly injured

[redacted] who had  
been sent to recruit [redacted]

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brazil Cubela flew to Paris  
& was going to tell Castro after the fact

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cubela who had written [Tapeduo] saying that he didn't want to continue.

[CIA had to tell French Govt that contacts were for purposes of defense, French unilaterally keeping Cubela under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy cables that Cubela insists on meeting w/ RFK; announced Cubela going to try an attempt in Castro even w/out US support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgibbon, Ury & HS, go to Paris & get approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cubela that US would have no part in attempt in Castro's life.

Watten went from Sandy in contrast.

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states Fitz assumes that Cubela would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request.

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting gen w/ ~~Robert Kennedy~~ as per mem.

Sandy says Cubela accepted gen but stated he would not take it to

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287

Cubela asked for a cable of arms to be placed at [AMTRUNK] [2 high-powered rifles w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 2000 rounds of ammo]. As they left morning, heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he rec'd an OP in cable from Fitzgerald that everything is "off" but nothing in AMTRUNK fell.

Cubela w/ a take 5/10 with him to Prague  
1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba  
19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 re  
[AMTRUNK VII]

24 April 1964

[Tegedino] had been brief to meet [Carlos Jorge ROBLES many] who has message from Cubela.

091 3 May 64 [Robles] says Cubela wanted a silence  
30 August 64

Arturo rec'd info from Madrid that a group of dissident members of Castro regime wants to ~~be~~ establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Arturo sends

Alberto BLANCO Romeros.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Arturo agrees to talk to AMTRUNK-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissent group. Arturo

SECRET

think if AMZAS#-1 is chief of immediate group we can forget about ops  
4 Dec 64

Sandy prepares a memo for 6570 for Arteme to maintain contacts w/ dissident groups' reps in Prague. Arteme does  
6-7 Dec 64

Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was told group to continue his plans  
Told US. could not be involved.  
10 Dec 64.

Arteme didn't know nor Cubela that CIA in direct contact with them. Rather SAS continued to put both men together.

CIA didn't want to put silver weapon in ~~the~~ Cubela's hands directly. But could do it. Here Arteme -  
27 Dec; 30 Dec (mb line)

Cubela & Arteme meet in Madrid. Arteme reports to Sandy that Cubela had requested a silver for FAT rifle but Americans w/n gave him one.

Arteme to come up w/ silver or different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ silver & Belgian FAT rifle w/ silver from Arteme's secy. ~~SECRET~~ Both weapons come from ~~the~~ U.S. & are now in Madrid.

Conflict

12 Feb 65

SECRET

6002289

Artemio has never talked to Cubela in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source is friend of Tepedino's who tells him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Director arrives in Madrid from Cuba & informed [a station officer.]

Probably close friends of Cubela; & claims to be in touch w/ group of wealthy leaders planning to overthrow Castro.

Jack in July 62 for sup. Traff. as lawyer for Coppi Hotel. Traff. - ex-mayor. [Another name - Smith]

June 1945 [Victor ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former PM friend who was arrested as a militant on 20 March 1946, contacted FWS now Sup. FBS on 3 June 65.]

Espinosa told he had rec'd letter from a friend in Paris urging him to meet w/ Albert Blouin who had a message from Cubela who wanted it delivered to CIA.

Message - Cubela in a position to help Castro & would CIA & US Govt be willing to support them if "yes"; then details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted money in Paris on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & upset.

0002290

16 Feb 65

game him too.

7,000 in NY C.

SECRET

23 June 1965 - Headquarters sent cable Kennedy contact. 'convincing proof that evidence from RRR, Group insurance, Semuto RRR'

1 March 66 - Cubela & binin arrested for activities w/ CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Ballarreto, Alberto Blanco Romany, Juan Alsina Navarro. Confined

Also appearing - Guillermo Cuenhill Alvarez, Angel Hernan Vally

Gonzalez Ballarreto - attempts in Spain  
[contact of former Noel <sup>was "owner"</sup> ~~with~~ official  
at US Embassy in Madrid.]

Cubela met w/ Artime in Spain  
in Feb. 1965.

Artime sent Ballego to US to get Helicopis sight & silencer. Delivered to Blanco Romany who delivered it to Gonzalez Ballarreto then to Cubela the day before he left Madrid.

Tasco Sighted in Cuba's residence were  
Helicopis sight, F&L rifle.  
9 March 66

Castro sent personal letter that  
death sentence not be asked.  
10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

Silencer did not work; I threw it  
away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

000229 I spoke to Fidel in Jan 64. He opened  
the door to me <sup>SECRET</sup> but I did not have

the courage to tell him  
(Comment)

Trial studies confined to trip to  
Europe in mid 64 & mid 65 to meet  
w/ Hoffman. No mention of Macbeth then  
Nov 65 contacts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out,  
Castro would have little to complain of.  
Speculating in past to create some in our back.

2 high-level  
intelligence meeting  
where Castro  
announced  
discovery

Special Group (August)  
18 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)  
State: Dean Rusk, Alexi Johnson, Edwin  
Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwicz  
which was

Maxwell Taylor, McHenry Bundy (RFK absent)  
Deputy:

McNaman, Belmont, Tammeter, Lunsdale  
CIA - McCone Harry

USIA - Edward Murren, Donald Wilson

Secy - Thomas Parrot

Parrot's note & a number of  
but Macbeth & very small McNamara ~~number~~  
raising it & Murren's comment.

No one raised exception to McNamara  
'happy agent' <sup>SECRET</sup>

Lunsdale wrote memo on 13 August  
to Harry, Hurwicz, Harris, & Wilson which

SECRET

Lansdale memo argued drafting papers  
for various subjects related to Cuban  
operation. A portion excised from CIA  
copy of memo was "immediate elimination  
of Castro? Lansdale repeatedly tried to  
raise assassination of Castro in Bay over  
next several weeks but Bay did not.

0002292

It met 5 people in Lansdale's office  
from MWAVE & Lansdale's interest in  
assassination as part of it.

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room  
of White House.

McBryde Bundy, Vance, Malone, Thomas  
Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion  
of Cuba.

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jensen as secy.

18 June 64 memo from DD/P to Don  
re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 upsur.  
Cuban exile; Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch,  
Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He opposed  
JMWAVE for US participation. Refused to sign.

19 August 64

DCI (McGuire) to Bundy - re  
FBI interest w/ all participants

SECRET



SECRET

Probab Pearson's info re a high-level  
mety was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Mahan in May 67  
& wrote a report:

- 1 - Mahan taught Morgan in Phase I
- 2 - Never heard of Phase II from Roselli  
or anyone

0002293

3. Roselli started to Morgan by transpenn
- 4 - Mahan suspects Roselli in chum of Morgan
- 5 - Roselli definitely heavy; Morgan in  
Vegas recently "induced"

6 - Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas  
in March. <sup>business with</sup> In truck w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

It is Our impression that Greenspan also involved  
in the conversation.

<sup>pizz</sup> Point finger to Roselli as source of info.  
and to confirm Morgan as Pearson's source.

<sup>pizz</sup> Summer of 62 - Edwards, Mahan, & Roselli  
had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli  
he in front RFX of Roselli's confidence.  
Pearson's story seems to rely on ref  
there. Could be hang if ref, source.  
Probably from 2 sources:  
State Dept meeting + not against  
so Roselli's chief suspect.

SECRET

Dr. Fuma: Roselli definitely too much &  
Morgan definitely talking to a newspaperman friend (unconquered)

SECRET

0002294

Publicity has not run its course:

- a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & effect of State Dept meeting
- b) Baum has not revealed full case; CIA should be promptly displayed when he does
- c) P wants to remain in custody & will be deported

Pearson stay in chds, 1 detail found  
only in place the 3 man team.

put in it but light - that there is no  
subter motive in Speedy's stay

P 127. We do not know that Castro actually  
tried to retaliate, but we do know  
that there were such plots against Castro.  
Unhappily, it now appears that Baum  
may also know this.

P 129. Mahan reports that Taylor fallen Tampa. Emilio  
planned not to go in for Vegas, being expected to  
register <sup>with police</sup> and he is in town. None of  
them would have connections about staying  
in his CIA connections when he was picked  
by law enforcement author. Pearson saw  
Calley alone when the Fort was under  
him in 1963, Emilio appeared to say it on  
his conversation with Margaret Baum.

P 131. French - 3 May 1967

Communist Red ~~has~~ over a barrel

Tab A

SECRET

6002295

241 July 75 memo

Samuel Tropp

4. ST desired person full to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T suggested another candidate (cancelled re BGP)

- Make formal contact subject w/ office of security
- Rosselli conviction

Nov 1967 - illegal entry

Dec 68 - Fingerprint

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff

NO 838-75

9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-10 Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on continuing the action capability)

5. Who is  (yet another

(alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIRROUZ's operational aliases?

- who was WIZARD 14 (John Stein's memo)

- 2 young officers who contacted WIRROUZ DDO

- Want to know John Stein's all WIRROUZ file by Walt Elder

SECRET

Memo

SECRET

5 May 1967

July - Wm K. Harvey

G002296

1. <sup>Bill</sup> ~~Harvey~~ <sup>Harvey</sup> contacted Papich to report to Papich some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his corp to FBI. He explained to Papich --

Missing

16 May 67

Tab B <sup>Attorney Edward Cohen</sup> <sup>Fun. Bureau</sup> 7 April 77

<sup>cc Duke City</sup> Morgan associated w/ Gary circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Stuart Pierpont Morgan

DDO 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain

MKA - Richard Scalpette

1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Boldin refused to testify before Warren Com. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daily Day by Maggie Day - rumor that assassination planned against <sup>FD of Chicago</sup>

SECRET

1 Sept 67 issue of life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marino,  
a henchman of Marcello, as far as  
known denied knowledge of Marinos' connect  
to Marcello.

TO Chgo SRS  
Sulz. Carr

9 Oct 1967

Info re meeting of Fair Play  
under Richard Criley (# 346 116)

[Source of info on Guillermo WSCOBOR  
who was 'int of' Horace Speeds' (SAS)  
leads obtained from Ralph PEREZ (444265)  
Speed # (199499)]

WSCOBOR recruiting Cubans for Communist  
Party in Chicago.

0002297

SECRET

1000  
File

9 Dec 1970 DCT for Doc of Secy

Ruselli, Jolly

9 Aug 1976

SECRET

Behind memo "Sally" Jolly Ruselli

0002298

Tab B & C

Added info re Traff, Ruselli, &  
Brenner contained in material previously  
released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Bruckner  
re Arthur Ballitto & Fred Hume and

1. 12 Jan 1961 memo told FBI he  
recommended DuBois to an L.A. atty whom  
he will disclose

2. A Hay is James Cantillon per a  
13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re interview  
w/ Col. F. Swann who said he contacted  
Mahan in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out"  
for Havana. Swann gave any indication  
to Mahan he would attempt to accomplish some  
clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974

Memo: Chief Warden Hampton Brown

Subj: Salvatore Bramante & Richard Cain

Re Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31

Dec. 1973

Richard S. Cain # 272141

DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left Vice Squad in 1960; Accurate  
Lohnman.  
a J.T. from

### CIA contacts

SECRET

0002299

A. Fall 1960

Cain contacted contact w/ Chicago office  
& volunteered info on Cuban exile groups in  
Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohnman of Chicago Field Office  
re a Mr. Krougansky who was met w/  
President of Panama & investigated Communism.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in [Mexico City by CIA staff]  
identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohnman from Panama  
offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain made unnamed visit to Hong  
Kong. Wonken Scott & [William Dean in Mexico City]  
says he had an investigative agency w/  
branches in Chicago & LA which he used to  
provide training to Mexican Secret Agents

F. 4 June 62

Reported from Mexico for board review  
has handles & impersonates Mexican official  
& working

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Hotel  
Club & Ralph Club & [Trace Speed] w/ H  
Dev staff officers & Chief of Chicago DCD office

SECRET

0002300

He would like to work overseas  
for CIA

Cain worked for Cosh Co Shuff  
& ~~was~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago  
area & would provide info on underground  
activities of Cubans particularly Pablo Sierra  
H. 26-38 Aug 1963

Cain info re the Student Directory,  
a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cordoyos info re  
guerrilla arms

12 Sept 63 J. DRP people who had guerrilla  
arms. [Horace Speed] from Washington & Chicago  
told Cain to get out of the picture  
H. 1967

FBI investigating Cain's associations  
& recommended CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico  
City; then disappeared. May 1972 says he  
was going to Latin America. Involved  
in illegal arms deals (international) &  
on various occasions stated he was CIA  
M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in [Mexico City] used  
[Mexico City Station for] traces on Cain  
Eastern Airlines got ed. Cain as  
steakhouse new friend named Henderson. 5 May 72

SECRET



SECRET

0002301

27 Nov 63

By ROBT B. P. Lohman

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Wiley, Secy Chicago Chapter. Assassination of President Kennedy
3. LHO provided info in March 1963 Shuff's office had not interviewed LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the officers of UPT
4. Shuff indicated in like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba. If they developed anything definite they would notify inform FBI.

~~Could not recall~~ "that early in 1963 the Chicago folks over apartment in U.S. for Fair Play

---

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sam Turner following up a lead that he call c/h re report Bureau would get info from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Butthorn. but to someone in Butthorn's office (justified)

## Buchenridge Memo to Dad of request

1. Passes in Sec H of paragraph 3 is contained in the 50 volume of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens.  
Contact is minimal
3. Quarter in Section C  
B1 is Arteme; Also used by  
Mafia in auto operation

Detectives have already interviewed a couple who is related.

Tao C

1. Tamm Don Estervey Dimonguy (shortly)  
DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family  
DOB 12 Jan 1948
3. Luciano Nieves (shortly)
4. Jose de la Tormenta (shortly)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45  
report of name to Dad
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortez DOB 10 Jan 45
7. Manuel Arteme

TABC

SECRET

6002303

14 March 1974

Mufson w/ Terry Longman

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Corp.

- O'Malley knew Hughes is client of Mullen's; this information pushed up in course of a cordial relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Full Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan

- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt possible impact on cover placements caused consternation.

- Hunt approached O'Malley for an individual having access to secretariat only staff.

- Thomas C. Amato apparently refused job.

- Houston

- Kaufman intervention w/ Farrell of ISNS re possible deportation of Brancusa

- ref people who knew well P. Swann, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET

0002304

AmTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use suspected  
personnel in current forces in Cuba.

Part 63. Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez  
[redacted] developed Fernando  
Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/  
George Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin.  
Presumably USSR<sup>1940s</sup> & then in Political Force under  
[redacted] Married Cuban & arrived in  
Miami May 61.

Part 63 Volsky contacts Tad Szulc & met w/ [redacted]  
& Herwitch (State). CIA assigns plan  
to Miami Station & it is known as AmTRUNK

Never progressed very far & by Sept 61  
had 3 sources including Guin

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from  
AmTRUNK due to indiscution. He was going to  
appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Szulc.

Had some contacts but no real action  
capability; In '65 Guin & Piaz arrested.

Szulc & Volsky both Political & met in Cuba  
in 195-60

SECRET

Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez  
suspected agent who defected Dec 62 &  
joined AmTRUNK; returned to Cuba on her own

SECRET

0002305

x in 65 to infiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RABBIT a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibility -

DMTRUNK might have been an important Cuban plan from the beginning. Inf action was laying cables & some info's infiltration.

M.D.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Mackell, - quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan data to bomb Castro. I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US).

Sturgis' id of RFA, prior to its disclosure by external investigator, raises question as to what he knew.

Office of Security wrote memo on 1975 noting connection between Sturgis & Rothman in 1960 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News story)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that mob had their own plan

SECRET

- Lorenzo claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

Vaona

SECRET

0002307

FBI 21 Dec 1960

- MRS support for exile

FBI 18 Jan 1961

V receiving some of that support

Stugis could have learned of Cuba's role after Gato settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report

14 August 1964 would a statement by a person jailed in Cuba w/ Traff.

### Other Proposals

1. May 1975

Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he was given a rifle & a mission to kill Castro. Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed.

2. May 1977 Anderson Column re Antonio Veciana

On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Hydco) he proposed to C/S. The unsuiting of Castro

In 1970 report he made a proposal to an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

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1. 3 of messages involved same group of agents

so probably same plan

0002308

1. 27 March 1961 [AMBRONE 15]

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with different  
driver on 30 March but no communication  
assassination

3. 5 April 61

only runs for 50 min; would try  
9 April but need military aid.

a) [AMBRONE] infiltrated several times  
& finally executed 30 August 62 after May  
62 arrest. Reported as some identity he was  
CIA; & not mentioned in McBrewn Book

b) [AMCOX 11] <sup>the</sup> ~~both~~ persons in

c) [AMPU 11] touch w/ [AMBRONE]

d) [AMPANIC 17] & mentioned in McBrewn book, Doug  
38 yr sentenced

All 3 people sentenced prior to Bay of Pigs  
none had assassination mission. Only  
[AMBRONE] mentioned that!

4. 4 June 61 Moratori of Italian Embassy  
claimed he had plans for mission w/in  
30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was  
untrue & Moratori condemned.

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5. 3 May 61

- 6002309
- from a member of Revolutionary Recovery Movement saying they would try to hit "Fidel today"
  - Reply was "Lay low"
  - Maybe [HMP 481]

Tab D

AMLAASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.
- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963.
- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intel performer; but approach in which consequences allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

p 3-4 Summary & Findings  
Book V leaves inference that Castro's speech to Dan Barker after AMLASH leak but CIA had not processed anything at that time & did not meet until 2 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov he was reported to delay until Fidel arrived "if something untoward" AMLASH

p 26 SSC Final Rpt.

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On 24 Nov. Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico City



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0002310

Payne was to determine significance  
LHO's contact w/ Soviet

But in reference to contact between a member  
of the Soviet Embassy & a Cuban cultural  
attache. NOT a report of a contact between  
HMLASH/11 and the Soviet

"H" role - Chief did not know of  
HMLASH 1963 association w/ CIA

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### Table E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban President's Policy  
Assessment of Pen Kennedy

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)  
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FIP report, Agency reports Almeida  
be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)  
Subj: Wilson, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SCD)  
Subj: Jack Ruby - LHO

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20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780/612 (SR/CP/R)  
Photos of individual closely resembling LHO

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10 June 1964 CSCI - 3/781,841 (CJ/R&D)  
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI - 3/6/61446-64  
[U/ADUCT] interview on 9 Sept 1964  
His Comments on 7 Photos Forwarded ~~725~~

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

0002311

SECRET

June 21, 1978

1977 D.B. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Prologue

The contents of the CFT are more a series of summaries of how various intelligence staffs were handled, and in the con-sequencing of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been followed to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the quality of the intelligence against Cuba showed a negative influence on the quality of their support for the U.S. intelligence.

"If your package .... contains p 2  
they should have .... facts ... p 7  
Certainly .... information, p 7

A central feature of the report is the concept that if Castro had been one of these activities it would have provided serious information against Cuba. Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that if your this they should have been passed and accepted at the time of the intelligence against not to mention the U.S. intelligence a review of the various intelligence programs to see what it might reveal.

Agency review the program they in  
the Final Report a point from of "the

result of an evolution in perception.  
 i.e. Provocation ~~is~~ in 63 from  
 both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs.  
 Minkinis, 'along with the army of US  
 Cuban program.

"The SSC Field Report has shifted to  
 emphasis instead CTA operational activity  
 against Cuba requiring specific attention.

Review of Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~ <sup>very</sup> know details of 1963  
 & 1964 operations for the most part are no  
 longer available. Primary reliance on memory.

CTA has now conducted such a  
 review - looking at "the other end"  
 of a possible chain of evidence, where they  
 theoretically could have started. This has  
 produced no new evidence bearing on the  
 assassination, altho' it has produced the basis  
 for new lines of speculation. In fact, the  
 review sometimes seemed to become  
 a little exercise in trying to put  
 facts to the provocation theory  
 rather than being able to identify  
 evidence actually bearing on the  
 assassination of Mrs. Kennedy. To explain  
 sometimes blamed on a theory of that  
 activity (which are under review)  
 could have provided basis to order  
 the assassination ~~SECRET~~ Kennedy had

Red Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLABH operation actually fit the thing for which the SSC's operation seemed to be tailored!

### Tab C

AMLABH

The Agency had only a tentative relationship with this man during Pres Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Rpt - in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate column in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pres. Kennedy's death the relationship with AMLABH was unproven and without substance. Had Castro heard of it he could ~~not~~ claim only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

### p14 New Consideration on the Syndicate Question

In a series of stories by Paul Mares in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturges as follows:

"The Fund (unscrupulous) involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had

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access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturge said. "I know Fidel's private security guard Ota. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (American Embassy in Havana)."

"He (Sturge) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CITA, although there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CITA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency."

Ota was the director of the office of the Prime Minister, which gave him <sup>full</sup> access that would make it possible for him to pass letters. The plan failed because Ota lost his position, and with it his access, in late June 1961. This was just to delivery of the poison pills to him in the Feb or early March 1961. Ota's role in this campaign was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

and on 13 June 1974  
Same news source discuss a possible relationship between Sturge and [redacted], also mentioning a minor [redacted] as a family partner of [redacted]. [redacted] wrote a memorandum in 1975, noting

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6002316

a connection between Stungs and Portman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

But even that Stungs' reports to her had a role in gambling and. On this availability due to her "lost pygmy." One could deduce that Stungs and Chika could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men behind the gambling operations.

June 1976 Stung also reports claim by Maria (Mami) Loring that she acted on behalf of Stungs in 1960 re poor pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes - FBI memo on "Bianca."  
"This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Carter with poison. Known, the delivery of poison does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, there were no CIA pills for selling until February 1961. It suggests that the syndicate may have been moving ahead on its own."

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In fact, it is probable that Bianca already was involved in independent

squads with the criminal syndicate when first appeared prior to 1942 in Madrid to carry out the Castro assassins. The 1947 DB Report refers to two FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1940, indicates support by the criminal underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 Jan. 1941, suggests that Varna was one of these receiving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... to late 22 June 64 another group plot in Mexico for 150,000.

Speculation that when Washington in April 1942 can observe that there was something already "ongoing."

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way.

In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate even in addition to its material contribution was also supplying an aura of official sanction.