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MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES AND SUBVERSIVE  
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Review Date

8/19/2015 By *Ken E. [Signature]*

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OSR 353-CUBA

4/17/63

FM 1/20/63

April 17, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 31 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)  
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)  
MAJOR GENERAL C. W. ABRAMS, JR., USA  
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN  
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF  
BRIGADIER GENERAL M. M. ELWOOD, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs:  
First Progress Report, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

Attached for your information is a copy of the First Progress Report  
prepared by the Subcommittee on Subversion of subject Committee.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.  
Special Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army

Attachment  
As Stated

cc:  
Mr. Califano  
LtCol Patchell  
ASG

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SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

30 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING  
COMMITTEE ON CUBAN AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: First Progress Report, Sub-Committee on Cuban  
Subversion

ENCLOSURE: Progress Achieved in Impeding Travel to Cuba

1. On 8 March the President approved certain actions proposed to combat Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America. Subsequently, the related departments and agencies undertook to execute those decisions. This is the first report of progress achieved.

2. The three-week period covered by the report has been sufficient to set the program in motion and to bring about the following principal developments, which come within the purview of the sub-committee:

a. In addition to the program on control of subversive travel, approved by the President on 8 March, four companion action programs have also been completed and forwarded for approval, covering the movements of arms, the movement of propaganda materials, the exchange of intelligence, and surveillance of the Caribbean.

b. Action programs on the control of the movement of funds for subversive purposes and the training of Latin Americans in the United States are in preparation.

c. Preparations have been made, including the development of a set of action objectives, for use in the ministerial meeting on security in Managua on 3 April.

d. Tangible progress is evident in the effort to impede and monitor the travel of subversives through Mexico. That country, as a result of efforts by the Department of State and the Central

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Intelligence Agency, is now taking informal, though useful, steps to regulate travel to and from Cuba, and has agreed to prohibit the introduction by Cubana Airlines of Russian-made aircraft on the Mexico-Havana route.

3. Specific actions taken to date by each department and agency concerned are summarized in the enclosure. Subsequent reports will be submitted on the first day of each month. These reports will cover further progress achieved in the now on-going program to control subversive travel, and in implementing decisions, as they are taken, on the additional anti-subversion programs which have been submitted by the sub-committee for approval.

For the Sub-Committee:



V. H. KRULAK  
Major General, USMC  
Chairman

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PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN IMPEDING TRAVEL TO CUBA

1. The Department of State has:

a. Determined that a Committee of the Council of the Organization of American States has prepared a program of travel control measures which will be recommended for implementation to member governments within the next several weeks.

b. Consulted our Ambassador in Mexico concerning the possibility of institution by that country of administrative procedures to delay, or otherwise make difficult, the carrying of passengers to Cuba. The Ambassador has reported that essentially all feasible control measures, short of discontinuing Cubana flights, are being taken by the Mexican government.

c. Determined that Mexico is now requiring that visas for Cuba be placed securely in passports of all travelers departing for that country, and is stamping passports to indicate that a person has departed or arrived from Cuba.

d. Determined that Mexico is prepared to furnish manifests of all carriers departing for or arriving from Cuba to Latin American countries which request them.

e. Forwarded a memorandum to the President recommending that we seek action in the Council of the Organization of American States to prohibit Latin American ships from serving Cuba and to prohibit member countries from granting overflight or landing rights to Soviet aircraft.

f. Persuaded Mexico, through the good offices of Senator Mansfield, to refuse to permit Cubana Airlines to employ Soviet-made Ilyushin 18 aircraft on the Havana-Mexico route.

g. Pursued arrangements for a conference at Managua on 3 April, to be attended by representatives of the Isthmian states and the United States, for the purpose of considering measures to control Castro-Communist

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subversive activities to include development of action topics for presentation at the meeting as well as preparation of background material for the U.S. delegates.

h. Informed Venezuela, Colombia, Jamaica, Trinidad and the Dominican Republic of plans to consult with Isthmian countries at the San Jose Conference in regard to increasing the Caribbean surveillance effort with U.S. training and material support, and stated U.S. willingness to provide similar assistance to the countries addressed. Replies from Trinidad and Venezuela have been negative. Other countries have not yet responded.

2. The Department of Defense has:

a. Continued U.S. air and sea surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba.

b. Continued the improvement of communications in Latin America by: (1) installation of a multi-channel radio station in Costa Rica, (2) continuing work on a similar facility in Nicaragua, (3) continuing negotiations for installation of military radio facilities in Honduras, Colombia and Ecuador, (4) commencing installation of a submarine cable between Fort Sherman, Canal Zone, and Jamaica, to be completed about 1 April, (5) leasing six channels in this cable for communication between the U.S. and the Canal Zone, and (6) making minor improvements in radio facilities previously installed in Bolivia and Guatemala.

c. Initiated a study, to be completed during the first week in April, on the feasibility and desirability of establishing intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters for rapid processing and dissemination to countries concerned, via the American Ambassadors, of the intelligence on the movement of subversives.

d. Directed establishment of a U.S. military alerting system for the Caribbean area, by which intelligence on subversive movement can be rapidly transmitted to United States Ambassadors in countries concerned. CINCARIB has sufficient communication facilities to initiate the system, and improvement of these facilities is continuing.

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e. Developed modified military assistance guidance to provide selected countries with necessary small patrol craft, training and logistical support for patrol of their coasts.

f. Taken the following actions to provide training assistance as required to improve coastal patrol capabilities of Latin American military forces:

(1) Commenced appraisal of a proposal by CINCARIB to establish a Small Craft Training and Inspection Facility in the Canal Zone.

(2) Established liaison with the Coast Guard in regard to training assistance. The Coast Guard has stated that it can provide a Mobile Training Team, as an interim measure, and can loan two 40-foot utility boats for training in the Canal Zone until replacement craft are provided under the Military Assistance Program.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency has:

a. Informed [ ] stations in Latin America of the program approved by the President and designated a Senior Officer at each station to supervise implementation at highest priority.

b. Intensified efforts throughout Latin America to discourage travel to Cuba. Progress in each country is summarized as follows:

(1) [ ] Station has urged the local security service to reintroduce travel impediments, such as a requirement that good-conduct certificates be obtained before leaving the country; and is attempting to persuade the [ ] to stamp passports "not valid for travel to Cuba". Liaison services appear mildly receptive. Advance information on Cuban travel by [ ] through Mexico will be sought from that country. Plans have been made to send two agents to Cuba to seek information on the mechanics of travel. Propaganda against Cuba subversion is being intensified.

(2) [ ] Efforts to discourage travel to Cuba through liaison with the [ ] government have been unsuccessful. The station is concentrating on the penetration of Castro-Communist groups.

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(3) [ ] Because of Government policy, efforts through the [ ] National Government have shown little promise. The Station is working through the armed forces and friendly State security services to arrange travel impediments as feasible. The possibility of requiring State good-conduct certificates prior to travel is being explored. Propaganda assets are being utilized by the Station to support its actions.

(4) [ ] Station is attempting to persuade the [ ] Government to limit travel on [ ] passports to countries specified before departure. Clandestine collection of information on travel to Cuba is being intensified.

(5) [ ] Through local services, and covertly through the Foreign Office, the Station is exploring means of impeding travel to Cuba. Arrangements have been made for passing selected information on travel to the [ ]. Coverage of [ ]-Cuban institutions and attempts to identify and interrogate [ ] who have traveled to Cuba are being expanded.

(6) [ ] Station is making arrangements to pass information on Cuba travelers to the [ ] Government on a regular basis and to provide guidance and covert support.

(7) [ ] Both the President and the Security Service have been approached in regard to preventing travel to Cuba, and both seem willing to cooperate fully.

(8) [ ] Since the Government of [ ] makes little effort to control travel to Cuba, the Station is relying on covert assets, including some in the police, to impede and harass travelers. Efforts continue to persuade the government to take restrictive measures.

(9) [ ] Station liaison has resulted in the arrest of several returnees from Cuba. Informal arrangements already exist for denying or delaying exit permits to persons going to Cuba and for harassing returnees.

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(10) [ ] Efforts to identify illegal travelers and methods employed have been increased. Arrangements have been made to facilitate processing of travel information received from Mexico.

(11) [ ] The status of our relations with the [ ] Government has precluded cooperation. Station has instructed assets to report Cuban travel information.

(12) [ ] The Station has proposed to the Ministry of the Interior a travel control system, including card indices. Unilateral assets have intensified intelligence collection efforts related to travel with a view to passing selected information to the President and the Security Police. Names of returnees from Cuba will be screened and an effort made to expand patrols on the north coast.

(13) [ ] The [ ] Government already effectively controls travel to and from Cuba. A travel control program has been discussed with [ ] security officials, who will cooperate.

(14) [ ] Station has arranged for harassment of Cuba travelers and for stamping passports to show travel to Cuba. Airport travel lists are obtained and passed to other stations. Efforts are being intensified to identify disaffected travelers who might provide information.

(15) [ ] Station is pressing efforts to develop travel information.

(16) [ ] Arrangements have been made to interview at least ten persons who have returned from Cuba. Station will pass selected information to [ ] officials.

(17) [ ] The [ ] Government already discourages travel by threat of arrest, questioning and surveillance. Station has emphasized the potential threat of Cuban subversive activities with good results.

(18) [ ] A [ ] source recently returned from insurgency training in Cuba has been developed and is providing valuable intelligence. The

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possibility of harassing and impeding travelers to Cuba has been discussed with [ ] officials. Efforts to promote greater cooperation are being made, to include passing of selected information.

(19) [ ] Station will attempt to collect information on travel and seek cooperation of local security service, although the attitude of the government in regard to establishing a travel control program is not highly promising.

(20) [ ] [ ] law permits travel to any country. Clandestine assets have agreed to arrange, on request, administrative delays of as much as two months. A plan is being developed to pass derogatory information to the [ ] Ambassador on prospective travelers to Cuba via Mexico. [ ] travellers using false passports have been identified.

(21) [ ] The need to improve travel controls has been impressed upon [ ] security services. Station has influenced the [ ] Government to establish a commission to study [ ] border crossing controls. Establishment of a special frontier police organization is under consideration. Station regularly exchanges information with local security services and is expanding efforts to obtain travel information.

4. The U. S. Information Agency has;

a. Issued News Policy Notes providing guidance to public information media designed to further attainment of the following objectives:

(1) Alert the Hemisphere to the dangers of subversive training in Cuba of nationals of other countries,

(2) Discredit those who have received subversive training,

(3) Discourage prospective trainees, and

(4) Impress Latin American governments and peoples with the need to halt travel to Cuba.

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b. Initiated preparation of a Circular Instruction to the Field, based on the News Policy Notes mentioned above, to be completed by 3 April 1963.

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OSA 353-CUBA

MAR 27 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Movement of Subversive Trainees to and from Cuba (U)

1. References:

a. Memorandum for the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, 20 March 1963, subject: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs (ICCOCA): Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Approved by the President.

b. Secretary of the Army Memorandum, 15 March 1963, subject: ICCOCA: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees.

2. No new actions have been initiated to implement the measures which were proposed by the ICCOCA Subcommittee on Subversion and approved by the President. However, the Army is continuing its program to contribute to improvement of Latin American internal security by increasing the intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities of Latin American armies.

151 James J. Fuda  
BREIGHTON W. ADAMS, JR.

Major General, GS  
Assistant Deputy Chief of  
Staff for Military Operations

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1963 MAR 27 00 FILE

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March 27, 1963

OSA 353-CUBA

3/27/63

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**MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL KRULAK**

**SUBJECT: Status Report of Actions Accomplished by Elements of the Department of Defense**

**Reference: SecArmy memo to multiple addressees, Subj: ICCOCA: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees, March 5, 1963**

Attached are copies of Project Control Sheets on those actions which are the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense.

At Tab A through Tab D are specific reports provided by the Joint Staff, ASD/ISA, Army, Navy and Air Force. The Marine Corps representative indicated by telephone today that the accomplishments of the Marine Corps are incorporated in the report of the Joint Staff.

In reference memorandum, the responsible elements within the Department of Defense were directed to assist and support, as necessary, the implementation of those portions of the program within the primary responsibility of other Government departments and agencies to insure that those portions of the program are carried out effectively. The Army report at Tab C specifically indicates the continuation of its program to contribute to the improvement of the intelligence and counter-intelligence capabilities of the Latin American countries.

Signed  
James K. Patchell  
Lt. Colonel USA

James K. Patchell  
Lt. Colonel USA

Attachments  
As Stated

OSA, ASG Control No. 781/115

cc:  
Mr. Califano  
LtCol Patchell  
ASG

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