

This document is made available through the declassification efforts  
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

# The Black Vault

---



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)  
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are  
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages  
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

**Discover the Truth** at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

Date : 08/04/98

Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM-----  
AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS  
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10214  
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 215

-----  
DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD  
FROM :  
TO :  
TITLE : INSTITUTIONAL PLANNING OPERATION MONGOOSE  
DATE : 03/12/62  
PAGES : 8  
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM  
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET  
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98  
OPENING CRITERIA :  
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
TO DECLASSIFICATION  
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

CIA OSD  
DATE: MAR 2016

-----  
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

(176)  
(216)

SENSITIVE

13 March 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Institutional Planning, Operation Mongoose

As desired by General Taylor on 12 March, the planning for Operation Mongoose is now prepared on a format of separate planning for each Department and Agency involved. Revised planning along this line is submitted herewith.

Activities already approved are marked with an asterisk. Further planning must await determination of policy questions raised in my 12 March 1962 memorandum to the members of the Special Group (Augmented).

Planning transmitted to you by my memorandum of 10 March 1962 should be returned to me for destruction as a matter of security.

The Department of State releases this document in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Attachments

Reviewed on 7/30/98 mjm

Distribution:

Portion(s) Postponed Under 6.1(C)

Copy: To:  
1 - General Taylor  
2 - The Attorney General  
3 - Secretary Rusk/Deputy Under Secretary Johnson  
4 - Secretary McNamara/Deputy Secretary Gilpatric  
5 - General Lemnitzer (through General Craig)  
6/7 - Mr. McCone (through Mr. Helms/Mr. Harvey)  
8 - Mr. Murrow/Mr. Wilson  
9/10 - Chief of Operations

USD: NO OBJECTION  
AS REACTED 25/1/98

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
AS SANITIZED 23 June 98 mhh

6(1)(B)

Excluded from automatic  
regrading: DOD Directive  
5200.10 does not apply.

Document contains 12 pages.  
Copy No. 3 of 10 copies. Series A.

K 8/7/98

OASD(PA) DFOISR	
TOP SECRET CONTROL	
Copy No.	<u>91-FOI-0336</u>
Case No.	<u>91-TS-39</u>
T.S. No.	<u>18</u>
Document No.	<u>18</u>

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

(DOC 5) #215  
8 PP

PHASE I (CIA)

1 - 15 March 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

1. \* Dispatch one intelligence agent operation to key area selected by CIA.

Collect and report intelligence on anti-regime attitudes, on potential resistance, and on vulnerabilities and strengths of Communist security system.

There is a risk that this action will disclose this U.S. intelligence activity within Cuba. Selected personnel are being intensively trained. This first team has 2 agents. An area in which resistance has been reported has been selected. Agent operations must stay alive, make useful contacts, and report securely to CIA. Physical risk to personnel is substantial, due to lack of intelligence. First reports from first team are expected by the end of March, while reports from the second and third teams, dispatched in March, are expected to start in April.

Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection, with the thought that they will be in place inside Cuba and ready to act whenever paramilitary operations are decided upon. However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.

To collect intelligence.

These staff intelligence officers may also be used in the future for communications or agent handling, if future developments warrant. (C)

To collect intelligence.

2. [redacted] intelligence staff officers in place in Havana. (C)

To collect intelligence.

3. [redacted] intelligence officers, readied to travel in Cuba for temporary periods. (C)

To collect intelligence.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
4. * Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.	To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)
5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.	To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

6. \* Continue negotiating for help in contaminating locomotive lubricants. (c) To cripple Cuba's rail transportation. (c) assistance is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced. (c)

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16 - 31 March 1962

7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.
----------------------------------------------	--------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

b1+3  
8. Establish 2 additional [redacted] agents in Cuba. (C)

To collect intelligence. ✓

Possible future use in communications and support. ]

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.

To ready agent operations.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.

10. \* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.

To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)

11. \* Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.

To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. [redacted] Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in Mexico City, [redacted] San Juan, Puerto Rico, [redacted] are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

b1+3  
(C)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

1 - 15 April 1962

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

12. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Number of agents undetermined as yet.

b1+3

13. [redacted] agents, temporarily travelling legally, in Cuba. (C)

To collect intelligence.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 30 April 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

14. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.

b1+3

15. [redacted] agent in Havana. (C)

To collect intelligence.

Possible use for communications and support.

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

1 - 15 May 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

16. \* Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.

To collect intelligence.

Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances.


b1+3

17. [redacted] 3 legal resident agents in Cuba. (C)

To collect intelligence.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
(b)1+3 18. 	To collect intelligence.	
19. Ten legal travellers in Cuba	To collect intelligence.	"Legal travel" means persons are in Cuba visiting, some for extended periods.

#### OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

16 - 31 May 1962

#### INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS.

20. * Four teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Teams of 2 to 5 agents each, depending on circumstances. CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can.
21. One possible singleton agent operation, Isle of Pines.	To collect intelligence.	Difficult
22. Four additional resident agents inside Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	CIA will be attempting to cover as much of Cuba as it can. The main factor of determining location of resident agents is to find a place where a trained agent can stay viable.
23. Five "legal travel" agents inside Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	
24. By 31 May, selection of 50 additional agents and train 35 additional agents.	To ready agent operations.	

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE



10 - 31 May 1962 (cont)


ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

OTHER OPERATIONS

25  To debase the economy of Cuba.



1 June - 31 July 1962

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

26. \* 10 to 15 teams of agents dispatched to Cuba. To collect intelligence.

Number of agents in each team and selection of areas will be determined by developments of the previous actions and by conditions.

27. Reinforce and resupply agents and teams previously placed or activated inside Cuba. To reinforce and resupply, as possible.

Numbers, areas, and supplies are completely dependent upon conditions at the time, and upon policy approval of methods to be used (that is, if air delivery can be used, or if this activity must depend upon maritime delivery).

28. By 31 July, select 100 additional agents and train 70 additional agents. To ready agent operations.

29. \* Collection of psychological material. To provide documentary and photographic evidence of the tyranny of the Communist regime.

This evidence will be used by CIA and USIA to neutralize the influence of Castro and the Communists in the Western Hemisphere.

30. \* Survey airfields, military installations, and communication centers. To provide current intelligence on key security resources of the regime.

This is conceived of as ground surveys, and the possible recruitment of military and other official personnel as intelligence agents.

31. \* By the end of July, have operations to penetrate the regime. To provide current intelligence on the actions and intentions of the regime.

This requires attempts to place trained agents inside government organizations, or to defect officials "in place."

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

<u>ACTIVITY</u>	<u>PURPOSE</u>	<u>CONSIDERATIONS</u>
<u>OTHER OPERATIONS</u>		
None.		
	<u>End of July 1962</u>	
32. * Comprehensive and definitive intelligence report on attitudes and abilities of the population inside Cuba.	To provide the Special Group (JSC 5412 augmented) with a hard estimate of the Cuban situation.	The intelligence estimate will provide a vital basis for a Special Group recommendation on whether or not the U. S. should undertake actions to make maximum use of Cuban resources as a justification for decisive U. S. military intervention.

\* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE