

This document is made available through the declassification efforts
and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are
responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages
released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10002-10025

RECORD SERIES : PAPERS OF SMITH, NSC STANDING GROUP MEETING, JFK, VOL. 1, BOX 24

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM : BROMLEY SMITH
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/09/1963
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY RECORD OF NSC STANDING GROUP MEETING
CLASSIFICATION : ~~Unclassified~~
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #26

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 9/63
July 9, 1963 -- 5:00 PM

1. Progress report on integrated action program toward Cuba

Desmond Fitzgerald reviewed developments and actions of the past three weeks since the approval by the group of the integrated action program for Cuba. He mentioned two events which are scheduled for the 26th of July. He was reading from notes.

Mr. Harriman called attention to the relation of action in Cuba to his mission to Moscow. He said he hoped to be out of Moscow by the 25th or 26th of July. He appeared anxious to avoid giving the Russians an opportunity to raise with him our Cuban policy on the basis of actions which had taken place during the time he was in Moscow.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be a discussion of the State/USIA paper containing a draft statement of what we hoped to see develop in a post-Castro Cuba.

There was a discussion as to how to handle press inquiries about developments in Cuba such as raids from outside Cuba and sabotage actions within Cuba. It was agreed that we should flatly deny any U.S. Government involvement in any of these activities. Further consideration is to be given to the suggestion that President Betancourt take credit for certain actions as reprisals to sabotage actions which have occurred in Venezuela.

2. Report on Spain (copy of paper attached)

There was general agreement with the report on U.S. policy toward Spain. However, doubt was expressed that the offer proposed in the report would appear sufficiently attractive to the Spanish to cause them to renew the base agreement.

There was general agreement that we must not let the Spanish think we are eager to obtain the base renewal agreement. Mr. Johnson said there may be a period of cliff hanging in the fall. However, we

SECRET - SENSITIVE

SECRET - SENSITIVE

must not rush matters even though the present agreement expires in September.

There were two views as to what would have to be offered, in addition to our present offer, to induce the Spanish to renew the agreement. Mr. William Bundy thought that we would have to offer the Spanish bilateral military consultation even if such consultation was merely a facade comparable to that we engaged in in CENTO. Mr. Johnson thought that we would probably have to increase the amount of military assistance we are prepared to give the Spanish.

Secretary Dillon doubted that we could give more military assistance to Spain than that contained in the report. He said there was strong Congressional opposition to military assistance to Spain. In addition, Congressmen were strongly opposed to giving assistance to countries which are buying gold (Spain is one of the most consistent gold buyers in the present market). Mr. Bell felt that we would have major difficulty with Congress over the Spanish aid program. He recalled General Clay's opposition to the amount of our military assistance in Spain.

Mr. Nitze noted that the military felt that our bases in Spain were a major addition to our military posture. We should not try to convey to the Spanish that the bases were valueless to us. Mr. McGeorge Bundy responded that in a conversation with Secretary McNamara earlier in the day, the Secretary had stated that as far as he was concerned, we should tell the Spanish that we could do without the bases. He asked if there was a difference of view within the Department of Defense. Mr. Nitze said there was not but that he did not think we should mislead the Spanish to the extent of telling them that our bases in Spain were worthless to us.

There was a discussion as to when we need to bring to a conclusion the Spanish base negotiations. Mr. William Bundy said the first time point was the decision whether or not to continue our plan to build a \$6 million breakwater in Rota harbor. Without the breakwater, anchorage in Rota would be difficult. The second time point was the planned arrival date of the nuclear submarine tender. Although we could operate on a temporary agreement extended month by month, it would be better for all concerned if we could reach agreement in the early fall with the Spanish.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Mr. Bell noted that the report under discussion did not include mention of the ways Spain now benefits from the presence of our troops in Spain. He suggested that any document to be used as a background for the negotiations include a discussion of this aspect of the Spanish problem. He felt that the Spanish did obtain major benefits from us, including U.S. Government expenditures in Spain as a result of our presence there.

The Attorney General recalled that the Spanish Ambassador had told him that all our problems with Spain would be resolved if the President would spend an hour with Franco. The discussion which ensued revealed that the group did not favor the President visiting Franco but did approve of some device, such as a Presidential letter delivered by a high ranking emissary which would help satisfy the Spanish desire for recognition as a first-class ally even though not a member of NATO.

There was a discussion as to when the Presidential letter should be delivered. The general view was that it should not be presented at the crucial terminating point of our negotiations nor at the very beginning, but rather at a time which would not increase the Spanish price for renewal of the base agreement.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy called attention to the various people the Spanish Ambassador had been talking to and cautioned that everyone should be alert to the Spanish effort to involve officials in several departments and agencies of the Government.

Mr. Johnson said he had been assigned responsibility for negotiating with Ambassador Garrigues. Ambassador Garrigues had presented a letter stating that the Spanish Government had named him as the base agreement negotiator. However, a Spanish military representative, Munoz Grandes, had said that the Ambassador was charged with the political aspects of the agreement while he would negotiate the military clauses of a renewal agreement. Mr. Johnson thought that the Ambassador may have been given a time period, for example, three months, during which he would be operating with a free hand. At the termination of this period, Franco might shift the locale of the negotiations and possibly the negotiator if Garrigues had not by then been able to carry out his promise to obtain an agreement highly advantageous to Spain.

SECRET - SENSITIVE

- 4 -

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Mr. Johnson reviewed his efforts to obtain from Ambassador Garrigues the Spanish price for a renewal. So far the Spanish Ambassador had spoken only in general terms. The first objective is to pry out of the Spanish what it is they are asking for a base agreement renewal. When we know the Spanish terms, we will be in a much better position to decide how to proceed with negotiations.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested, and Mr. Johnson agreed, that when we know the Spanish terms, a negotiating guidance memorandum should be prepared. This memorandum would be circulated to the group for any comments prior to being approved by the President.

Bromley Smith

SECRET - SENSITIVE