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JOINT STAFF  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
1 FEBRUARY 1962

COVER AND DECEPTION

1. General Situation:

a. The Department of Defense has been directed to take action to disrupt the Cuban sugar cane harvest. In order to achieve this mission, it is necessary to interfere with the civilian labor force to the extent that they would be unable to conduct or support the harvest.

b. The sugar harvest period is 15 January through 15 April. The most critical period is from 1 February to 1 April. Therefore time is of the essence.

c. A general call-up of the Cuban militia would have a deleterious effect upon the Cuban sugar harvest by reducing the size of the available labor force.

d. Enclosure 1 is an outlined plan for the test of CINCLANT Cuban Contingency Operation Plans simultaneously with a test of CINCONAD's plan for the defense of southern Florida (Southern Tip, CONAD OPOD 1-61).

e. Procedures and command relationships outlined or directed by this plan effect only this plan and do not effect nor constitute a precedent for future command arrangements.

f. Assumptions:

(1) Information can be passed to the Government of Cuba that the test of CINCLANT Contingency Plans and the test of the Air Defense of southern Florida is in reality a cover for an invasion of Cuba by the United States.

(2) The conduct of the operations involving the test of the contingency operation plans and the air defense of southern Florida will cause Castro to call-up militia for the defense of Cuba.

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(3) The call-up of the militia will disrupt the sugar cane harvest to a major degree.

2. Mission:

a. CINCLANT and CINCONAD will plan for and execute the simultaneous tests of CINCLANT Contingency Operation Plans 314/316-61 and CINCONAD Operation Order 1-61 in accordance with Enclosure 1. CINCSTRIKE, CINCPAC and other theatre <sup>Augment and</sup> and force commanders will support as directed herein.

b. Information will be passed through appropriate channels to the Government of Cuba that these tests are, in reality, a cover for the invasion of Cuba by the United States. It is recognized that this information may result in an alert of Cuban forces thus tending to jeopardize a successful accomplishment of the OPLAN 314/316-61 mission, if the OPLAN were to be necessarily executed. However, any Cuban mobilization thus engendered might cause a related economic harassment, considered an underlying desirable result.

c. Normal publicity will be given to the test operations. Foreign observers will be invited if practicable. Although SOLIDARITY I, conducted in 1961, was attended by high level Latin American officials, a similar group should be invited to observe the Vieques demonstration; on a 1-day show of progress in armament, technique, materiels, equipment, and procedures. Their presence in the area as guests of the US would tend to give an air of Western Hemisphere solidarity to this portion of the exercises.

d. The operation will be conducted in early March 1962, if basic task remains to be disruption of the sugar harvest. If policy considerations, military impracticality, or other factors affect the timing of a policy decision (required by 12 February 1962), alternative slippage dates of 1 May 1962, to

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coincide with the Communist "May Day" celebration (a time which would find a semi-military alert, probably not desirable yet possible quite concentrated in the Havana area), or 26 July 1962 which would coincide with "Castro" Day (again confronting a semi-mobilized situation but which imaginatively could be interpreted as a deliberate taunt to Castro). Other dates are under study. Additional guidance concerning slippage dates will be provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff if the arrangement of other currently scheduled exercises conflicting with this plan make changes militarily or politically desirable.

3. Operations:

a. Concept:

(1) Enclosure 1 directs CINCLANT and CINCONAD to prepare operation orders for the testing of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 in conjunction with a test of CINCONAD Opord 1-61.

b. Phases of Operations:

- (1) Deception
- (2) Alert CINCLANT, CINCONAD, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCARIB.
- (3) Alerting and Prepositioning of Forces
- (4) Maneuvers
- (5) Withdrawal of CONAD forces
- (6) US Courses of Action if Attacked
- (7) Withdrawal of CINCLANT forces
- (8) Cover

c. Phase I - Deception

(1) Tasks - To cause the Cuban ruling body to believe that an attack/invasion is imminent.

(2) Concept - To be accomplished through pre-planned leaks.

(a) Deception Story - Covertly release to reliable Cuban agents a deception story that an invasion of Cuba is going to take place under the guise of an air defense exercise.

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Aircraft are deployed in Puerto Rico, and are being carefully guarded. Special shipments of armament have been received at deployment bases and aircraft crews are under constant guard.

d. Phase II - Alert CINCLANT and CINCONAD

(1) Tasks - JCS forward Enclosure 1 to CINCLANT and CINCONAD for execution on or about 14 March 1962, as directed by the JCS.

(2) Concept

(a) CINCLANT and CINCONAD prepare Operation Orders to implement Enclosure 1.

(b) Continue deception through an increased tempo of activities and interest, i.e. Notices to commercial users of the Caribbean area that major military operations are to be conducted in that area (NOTAMS).

e. Phase III - Alerting and Prepositioning of Forces

(1) Tasks

(a) To place forces in position to accomplish the mission; to include the conduct of the exercises while maintaining an optimum readiness posture for any actual contingency action ordered by higher authority.

(b) Commence normal publicity for a scheduled operation to test the air defense of Southeastern United States.

(c) Commence normal publicity for a scheduled operation to test the capability of US Armed Forces to react to emergencies in the Caribbean area.

(2) Concept

(a) A "tailored" CINCLANT Joint Task Force to be in position to conduct airborne and amphibious operations in the vicinity of Vieques as outlined in Enclosure 1.

(b) Normal Guantanamo augmentation forces to be available to reinforce Naval Base Guantanamo should the need arise.

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(c) CINCPAC forces required for support of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 will be alerted and deployed in accordance with Enclosure 1 and Annex A thereto.

(d) CINCSTRIKE forces required for support of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 to be alerted on a test basis. (CINCSTRIKE forces participating in the "tailored" Joint Task Forces as outlined in Tab A to Annex A to Enclosure 1).

(e) Available CINCLANT forces not participating in the operational test of OPLANS 314/316-61 or the air defense of Southeastern Florida to be alerted and engaged in loading drills and other maneuvers on the East and Gulf coasts of the US.

(f) CONAD forces (an ADC target fleet, AEW & C aircraft and interceptors) to be in position to conduct operations as outlined in Annex B to Enclosure 1.

(3) Forces required - As specified in Enclosure 1.

### f. Phase IV - Maneuver

#### (1) Tasks

(a) To maneuver in such a manner as to convince the Cuban Government that an attack/invasion is imminent or in progress.

(b) To take such protective measures as necessary to retain integrity of all elements of the joint and other participating forces.

(c) To maintain a readiness posture for any actual contingency situation which might develop.

#### (2) Scheme of Maneuvers

(a) CINCLANT (Joint Task Force 122) forces will be alerted for Cuban contingency operations as a test of applicable contingency operations plans. Certain tailored elements of these forces will maneuver in the Caribbean Sea in such a manner that while ostensibly conducting an air/sea assault on

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Vieques Island the Joint Task Force could launch an assault/landing against the Cuban land mass.

(b) CINCPAC force programmed for employment in CINCLANT OPLAN 134/316-61 will be deployed enroute to, and transit the Panama Canal for CHOP to and utilization by CINCLANT, as requested by CINCLANT.

(c) Additional CINCLANT (JTF 122) forces will conduct loading drills and deployment maneuvers along and off the Gulf and East coasts of the US, further signifying a mounting-out operation in a test of existing contingency plans.

(d) CONAD (USAF ADC target fleet) aircraft will fly predetermined routes. A flight of 19 B-57 aircraft out of Wyndall AFB, will fly to approximately 10 miles off the Northeast coast of the Yucatan Peninsula and then head for the west coast of Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off of Cuba, the aircraft will turn to maintain a track that will parallel the North coast of Cuba approximately 10 miles off shore. Upon reaching a position directly south of Key West, the aircraft will turn north and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or MacDill AFB. The 15 B-57 aircraft being scheduled out of Ramey AFB will initially fly southerly and then head for the CINCLANT Vieques Joint Task Force; then changing to northerly course, fly around the east end of Puerto Rico; taking a course to the north of the Island of Hispaniola; then heading directly toward military and governmental targets in Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off shore (initiating turns at 15 miles), the aircraft will alter course to maintain a track parallel to the North coast of Cuba approximately 10 miles off shore. Upon reaching a position due south of Miami the aircraft will turn north and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or MacDill AFB. The target force will be launched at a time to have the forces from Ramey AFB arrive

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DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
11. (Continued)			(6) Commence special operational weather observations and broadcasts.	WX SERVICES
12. C-Date minus 48 hours to 3-24 hours	Provide necessary intelligence for operation	Obtain ELINT and Electronic Order of Battle	TAC ELINT aircraft commence snooper flights	JCS, USAF TAC
13. C-Date minus 24 hours	General Readiness to prevent surprise in event of hostile Cuban reaction	Increase readiness	Increase alert of all commands and forces participating in exercise.	JCS, SERVICES ALL PARTICIPATING COMMANDS
14. C-Day H-Hour	Conduct Air Defense Exercise	a. Test CONAD Op Ord 1-61	CONAD Target and ELINT aircraft approach Cuba on courses simulating an attack to harass Cuba. Break off at 10 miles and parallel Cuban coast at minimum of 10 miles distance. Continue to US and make simulated attacks against US targets to test CONAD air defenses.	JCS CINCONAD TAC
		b. Provide close air cover for CONAD target fleet from attack by CRAF	CINCLANT forces provide close air cover for CONAD target aircraft within 50 miles of Cuban coast line and until CONAD aircraft enter US ADIZ	CINCLANT
	Conduct test of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61 and 316-61	(a) alert all forces and scheduled for maneuvers. Conduct token amphibious assault at Vieques. Conduct token air resupply at Vieques.	(1) All forces scheduled for operations in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61 will be on alert. All transportation will be assembled and on stand-by alert. (2) The ready 1st Ron with embarked	CINCLANT

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DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
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14. (Continued)

- BLT to be at sea in vicinity of Guantanamo.
- (3) Standby Phib Ron with a BLT embarked (or Lant Phiblex forces) conduct amphibious exercise at Vieques with token forces in landing.
- (4) Conduct token or simulated air-drop of supplies
- (5) Airlift the standby battalion of Marines at Cherry Point, N.C. to Guantanamo.
- (6) Pacific fleet augmentation unit (1/3 Marine Division/Wing team) will be at sea in the Caribbean area, but at sufficient distance that their location will not be known in Cuba.

CINCLANT

2. Conduct Weapons Demonstration (1) if determined feasible and appropriate

CINCLANT host 1-day weapon demonstrations for Latin Americans recommended by CINCARIB - (CINCARIB to assist with invitations, transportation, etc.)

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at the East coast of Cuba at the same time as the target forces from Tyndall AFB arrive at the West coast of Cuba. When in-bound toward CONUS, these forces will simulate attacks on US targets in the Southeast US area to test the US Air Defense.

(e) CINCLANT will make provision for carrier and land based fighter escort in support of the CONAD Target Fleet aircraft as outlined in Annexes A and B to Enclosure 1. Basically, the fighter escort will be provided from the time the Target Fleet elements approach within fifty (50) nautical miles of the Cuban land mass until they enter the coastal ADIZ. Close air cover operations will also be made available to support AEW & C and ELINT operations on an "as required" basis. In the event that CONAD (ADC Target Fleet and AEW & C) aircraft are attacked by the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF), escort aircraft will take action in accordance with Appendix I to Annex A to Enclosure 1. CINCLANT fighter escort will carry live loads with ammunition fed into the chambers. All pilots, will be briefed on and adhere to the "Rules of Engagement" as specified in Appendix I to Annex A to Enclosure 1.

(f) Prior, during and subsequent to the above operations, intelligence information will be gained by all means. Elements of TAC performing ELINT operations will comply with Annex D to Enclosure 1. Target aircraft crews will be provided with cameras. ELINT aircraft, shipborne and land-based communications will actively seek out and retain intelligence information.

(g) In the event that CONAD (ADC Target Fleet) aircraft are attacked by CRAF elements, they will evade away from the Cuban coast and terminate their participation in the exercise.

(h) To heighten the illusion of the threat CINCLANT will direct the evacuation of selected civilians from Guantanamo.

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(i) Air activity in the Cuban area will be increased by extra flights scheduled from Key West.

(j) "Heckler" flights will be directed, with aircraft moving toward Cuba at a high altitude, diving for the deck about 30 miles out and returning to base. Thirty minutes to an hour later these procedures may be reversed with flights going out low and returning high. All "heckler" aircraft will remain at least 10 miles from the Cuban land mass.

(k) Resupply of the Guantanamo Naval Base will be accelerated; to include planning for water resupply.

(l) A series of unusual Washington, D.C. activities will be suggested, i.e., meetings of senior US personnel; special White House/JCS meetings; re-call of senior representatives to Washington for White House meetings, etc.

g. Phase V - Withdrawal of CONAD (Target Fleet) aircraft.

(1) Tasks -

(a) To withdraw the CONAD Target Fleet aircraft from the vicinity of Cuba and terminate the tactical evaluation of the CONAD air defense test participation in the exercises in the event of hostile action by the CRAF; and ensure integrity of all elements of US CONAD forces.

(2) Concepts -

(a) The CONAD Target Fleet elements will withdraw and the tactical evaluation of CONAD Opord 1-61 will be terminated immediately upon positive hostile action by CRAF aircraft against the Target Fleet. AEW & C aircraft will remain on station unless directly attacked, in which case evasive action will be taken by the aircraft under attack. TAC ELINT aircraft will continue to fly the routes specified in Annex D to Enclosure 1, unless directly attacked, at which time action will be taken as directed by CINCLANT. Hostile forces attacking elements of the CONAD Target Fleet, AEW & C aircraft

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TAC ELINT aircraft or elements of JTF 122 forces will be engaged as directed by CINCLANT. CINCLANT will be prepared to implement CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 as directed by the JCS.

h. Phase VI - US Courses of Action if Attacked by Cuban Forces

- (1) Implement CINCLANT Operation Plan 314/316-61.
- (2) To intervene against the attacking force with air superiority fighter aircraft in airspace outside of acknowledged Cuban territorial waters and/or airspace.
- (3) To intervene against the attacking force with air superiority fighter aircraft to the extent of hot pursuit into acknowledged Cuban territorial waters and/or airspace.
- (4) Call on OAS for mutual support against Castro Regime because of the unprovoked attack on US forces.
- (5) Protests to the United Nations and Organization of American States.
- (6) Deny any provocation or violation of Cuban airspace.
- (7) Exploit through the press, UN and OAS the hostile actions by the CRAF against unarmed US aircraft acting as targets in an air defense tactical evaluation.

i. Phase VII - Withdrawal of CINCLANT Forces.

- (1) Tasks -
  - (a) To withdraw the CINCLANT (JTF 122) Joint Task Force forces from the vicinity of Vieques should there be no hostile Cuban reaction.
  - (b) To withdraw the CINCLANT (JTF 122) Joint Task Force forces participating in loading and other operational maneuvers along and off the East and Gulf coasts of the US for return to prealert posture should there be no hostile Cuban reaction.
  - (c) To return CINCLANT temporarily allocated PACOM forces to a prealert posture should there be no hostile Cuban reaction.

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(d) To return the CINCLANT Ready Caribbean amphibious forces, including embarked Marines, to normal Caribbean operations.

(e) To return any evacuees to Guantanamo, to signify the determination of the US to retain the Naval Base.

(f) To return all US forces involved in the execution of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 to normal posture following the successful accomplishment of the 314/316-61 mission and the establishment of a Cuban government friendly to the US.

(2) Concept:

(a) Should there be no hostile Cuban reaction to the exercises described herein the following will pertain:

a Upon completion of the Vieques area air/sea exercise outlined in Annex A to Enclosure 1, participating CINCLANT forces will be returned to home bases and parent commands as directed by CINCLANT.

b When directed by the JCS, CINCLANT will return those OPLANS 314/316-61 designated forces participating in East and Gulf coast exercises to a prealert status. Similarly, when directed by the JCS, CINCSTRIKE will return all other alerted STRIKECOM forces to a prealert status.

c When released by CINCLANT, the temporarily allocated PACOM forces will be returned to the PACOM area by CINCLANT.

d When directed by the JCS, CINCLANT will return the Ready Caribbean amphibious forces, including embarked Marines, to the normal Caribbean readiness and training operations.

e When directed by the JCS, CINCLANT will return the/any selected evacuees to Naval Base Guantanamo.

(b) Should US military intervention in Cuba become desirable and CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 executed, upon

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accomplishment of the mission, the phase out and withdrawal of participating US forces will be in accordance with OPLANS 314/316-61 as directed by CINCLANT and with the approval of the JCS.

(3) Forces Required

See Implementation Schedule - Annex E.

j. Phase VIII - Cover

(1) Tasks - To mold world opinion that the United States forces conducted routine exercise aimed at determining defensive capabilities of the forces deployed to the southeast US. Target aircraft flew routes over the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea to simulate enemy bombers approaching military and civilian targets in the southeast US and at no time penetrated Cuban airspace.

(2) Concept - In the unlikely event that Cuban authorities would make no protest, release to the press within two hours after maneuvers time a prepared statement announcing a routine air defense exercise of the forces in the southeast United States. No mention should be made of the proximity of the target routes to the Cuban land mass.

(a) Should the Cuban government protest concerning provocation or violation of Cuban airspace, the United States should make an emphatic denial, setting forth as a major effect the fact that radar control aircraft were positioned over international waters at least 50 to 100 miles from the Cuban land mass to assure positive control of US aircraft, to provide navigational assistance and to preclude a violation of Cuban airspace. However, it was necessary to deploy the target fleet overseas and to transit overwater routes in order to exercise the air defense capability of US fleet units and

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also to simulate the routes that might be flown by a force attacking US targets in the US. If aggression by the Cuban forces is attempted, immediate protests through Press, UN, and State Department channels should be made from prepared statements or releases.

(b) Advance press releases should be prepared to reveal that an air defense tactical evaluation of the forces deployed to defend the US is being or was conducted using the target fleet of USAF ADC B-57 aircraft. These aircraft were specially modified as target aircraft, unarmed and with bomb bays sealed to provide space for special equipment used in evaluations and to provide a realistic environment for training of the air defense forces. Further, it was necessary to fly near but outside of the recognized Cuban airspace to add realism to a simulated attack against US fleet units as well as US targets. In addition, special actions were taken by radar controlling aircraft to provide navigational assistance on the overwater portions of the routes flown by the target fleet and to prevent inadvertent penetration of recognized Cuban airspace.

#### 4. Timing

a. Deception - Covert release of deception stories until USAF target fleet is launched from deployment bases.

b. Alerting and Prepositioning of forces -

(1) In accordance with Annex E to Enclosure 1.

c. Maneuver - Forces will deploy in accordance with Annex E to Enclosure 1 or as directed by CINCLANT. Proposed date for ADC tactical evaluation and CINCLANT amphibious exercise is 14 March 1962, or as modified by the JCS.

#### 5. Command Arrangements

a. The maneuver portion of this plan will be conducted as three separate and distinct exercises.

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(1) Commander in Chief, Atlantic will plan for and conduct both the air/sea exercises in the Vieques area as well as maintaining a ready Guantanamo augmentation capability. CINCSTRIKE will <sup>augment CINCLANT</sup> ~~support~~ with those forces outlined in Annex E to Enclosure 1.

(2) Commander in Chief, Atlantic, <sup>augmented</sup> ~~supported~~ by CINCSTRIKE, will plan for and conduct preloading, loading, and readiness for sea operations along and off the east and Gulf coasts of the US, utilizing those forces designated in OPLANS 314/316-61 that are not participating in the Vieques portion of the exercise.

(3) Commander in Chief, CONAD will plan for and conduct the air defense operation and the tactical evaluation thereof. Air superiority forces required to protect the target, AEW & C and TAC ELINT aircraft will be provided by Commander in Chief, Atlantic.

(a) CINCONAD will retain responsibility for controlling the target fleet of aircraft, determining the routes to be flown (within guidance provided in Annex B to Enclosure 1), flight timing, adherence to the scheduled operation; identification of faker aircraft; and termination of the evaluation and recall of the target fleet as specified herein. This will include provision of navigational assistance to the target fleet aircraft, the scheduling and control of the AEW & C aircraft, and briefing of CONAD aircraft crews. In case hostile reaction by the CRAF is encountered, operational control of the special station AEW & C aircraft (Annex B) will be assumed by CINCLANT, or his designated representative, to provide interim warning and control of fighter escort aircraft.

(b) Operational control of air defense forces deployed for the defense of the southeast US will be as directed by CINCONAD.

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(c) CINCLANT will exercise operational control over all other forces involved in the conduct of the air defense exercise, including air superiority fighter escort aircraft operating outside of the ADIZ, as well as TAC ELINT aircraft. Rules of Engagement will be as specified in Appendix I to Annex A to Enclosure 1.

(d) Should hostile actions against the target fleet of faker aircraft occur within the coastal ADIZ, CINCONAD or his designated representative will direct the recall of CONAD aircraft, terminate the air defense portion of the exercise and increase the air defense posture of the US.

b. Command coordination and control of the over-all simultaneous exercises will remain in the JCS.

#### 6. Implementation

a. Upon approval of the over-all mission and concept of this plan by the Secretary of Defense, the implementation schedule will be annotated to reflect C-day; the JCS will direct that detailed operation orders be prepared and implementation actions initiated. Tentative target dates are 12 March 1962 with an alternate liability period from 1 April to 15 April 1962, or as modified by the JCS.

b. This plan will not be implemented until a policy decision has been reached by higher authority and implementation subsequently directed by the Secretary of Defense.

c. To preclude a lowering of contingency combat readiness, individual and unit basic loads of ammunition, supplies and equipment will be provided to all forces in this plan (Target fleet aircraft excepted).

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ANNEX E

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR OUTLINE PLAN "(NICKNAME)"

DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
PHASE I - PREPARATION				
1. As soon as plan is approved	Provide cover to plan	Assign Codeword to plan	Provide using agencies with codeword and related meaning	JCS
2. C-Date minus number of days	Assume State Department is aware of plan and prepared to counter any protest or to initiate protest if appropriate	Have prepared statement ready release to press or to use in protests to fit all contingencies cited in this plan. Have prepared statements for release to press concerning exercise if queried by press	Specific guidance will be issued by DOD to all participating departments, agencies and commands concerning releases to press on all aspects of operation.	DOD STATE JCS SERVICES USIA
PHASE II ALERT CINCLANT AND CINCONAD				
3. As soon as plan is approved	Test of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61 and 316-61 and CINCONAD's Op Ord 1-61.	a. Forward Enclosure 1 (with Annexes) to CINCLANT and CINCONAD b. Direct preparation of implementing plans and orders.	CINCLANT and CINCONAD prepare implementing orders and directives to accomplish mission	JCS CINCLANT CINCONAD
4. C-Date minus number of days	Conduct test operations	Warn interested activities of forthcoming military exercises	Indicate increased interest and activity in Caribbean Area (i.e. notices to commercial users of Caribbean area that major military exercises are to be conducted in the Caribbean Area.(NOTAMS)	DOD FAA HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE

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DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
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PHASE III ALERTING AND PREPOSITIONING OF FORCES

5. C-Date minus 30 days	Support movement of contingency forces	Obtain MSTS shipping to move contingency forces	JCS authorize and CINCLANT requisition MSTS shipping as required to effect sea lift of seaborne contingency forces that cannot be accomplished by available amphibious shipping	JCS CINCLANT CINCPAC
6. C-Date minus 22 days	Provide CINCPAC contingency force in support of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61 and 316-61	Obtain 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team from CINCPAC Forces to support CINCLANT Contingency operations	JCS authorize and CINCLANT alert CINCPAC to provide 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team for test of CINCLANT Contingency plans. CINCPAC commence loading and movement.	JCS CINCLANT CINCPAC
7. C-Date minus number of days	Support operations	Commence normal publicity for test of U.S. Armed Forces ability to react to emergencies in the Caribbean Area.	DOD, JCS, CINCLANT make appropriate press releases for exercises in the Caribbean area	DOD JCS CINCLANT
8.		Commence normal publicity for test of Air Defense of the Southeastern U.S.	DOD, JCS, CINCONAD make appropriate press releases for air defense exercise in the Southeastern U.S.	DOD JCS CINCLANT
9. C-Date minus appropriate number of days	Provide availability of CINCLANT lift and forces for contingency operations if required	JCS, CINCSOUTH and CINCLANT alert forces to insure availability for assault on G-Day, if required, and test reaction times.	(1) JCS direct CINCSOUTH to alert SEBTHOM forces and transportation to insure availability of all forces designated for contingency operations in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61.	JCS CINCLANT CINCSOUTH

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DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
9. (Continued)			a. Forces to be alerted in time frames envisaged in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61 to test reaction times. b. Forces and transportation to be positioned to make assault landing on C-date, if required, or in position to execute operations directed in Annex A and this schedule.	JCS CINCLANT CINCSRIKE
10. C-Date minus appropriate number of days	Provide availability of COMAD Forces for test of CINCONAD Op Ord 1-61	CINCONAD alert forces in preparation for test of CINCONAD Op Ord 1-61	CINCONAD alert and preposition forces for test of CINCONAD Op Ord 1-61. Test to be conducted on C-Date in accordance with Annex B and this schedule.	JCS CINCONAD
11. C-Date minus appropriate number of days	Preparations for operations	Complete preliminary tasks	(1) Alert and increase Air/Sea Rescue Activities (2) Obtain facilities for Air operations (Mayaguana, etc.) (3) Commence MATS flights to preposition supplies (4) Publish additional NOTAM's notifying all concerned of prospective military operations in Caribbean area. (5) Begin loading of assault forces for operations directed in Annex A	CINCLANT, USAF USCG, NAVY COM NAV BASE GTMO  STATE, DOD CINCARIB JCS, MATS, CINCLANT, CINCARIB, SERVICES  JCS, FAA HYDO. OFFICE  JCS, CINCLANT CINCSRIKE USAF, USN





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OUTLINE PLAN FOR THE EXERCISE OF DESIGNATED US FORCES

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NICKNAME:

- References: a. CINCLANT CONTINGENCY OPLANS 314-61 and 316-61  
b. CINCONAD OPORD 1-61 (Southern Tip)

1. Situation

a. General

(1) The Cuban Revolution of 1959 under the leadership of Fidel Castro, a self-professed communist, has resulted in the growth of a full-fledged communist satellite in the Western Hemisphere. Through Soviet economic, military and technical assistance, the military structure in Cuba has rapidly developed into a threat to the US and other Western Hemisphere nations. Soviet Colonial Empire and Chinese communist infiltration of influence, personnel, and military equipment is expected to proceed at an increased tempo. Effective governmental control over the institutions and daily life of the Cuban people is likely to increase, making effective internal opposition more difficult and risky. There is no foreseeable development in the internal economic or political situation which would be likely to bring about a critical shift of popular opinion away from the present government. On the contrary, all indications are that the existing communist ruling body in Cuba will consolidate its dominant political position, and will continue to present a constant threat of harassment and a potential base for hostile actions against the US. This threat will increase with the passage of time.

(2) Incident to the communist threat presented by Cuba, CINCLANT has been directed to and has prepared contingency plans for execution in the event that the JCS determine that US military operations in Cuba are necessary. (Reference a)

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(3) Incident to the communist threat presented by Cuba, CINCONAD has been directed to and has prepared and implemented plans for an increased air defense capability in the southeast United States area. (Reference b)

(4) In the event of US-Cuban overt military hostilities, it is probable that both CINCLANT contingency operations and CINCONAD air defense operations would be required and conducted concurrently.

(5) In accordance with existing directives that require military forces to be exercised and evaluated to determine their capability to perform their assigned mission, and in order to practice the coordination required in the event of US-Cuban overt military hostilities, this Outline Plan provides for the conduct of concurrent CINCLANT/CINCONAD exercised which will accomplish the following:

(a) Test and evaluate CINCLANT Contingency OPLANS 314-61 and 316-61 as realistically and thoroughly as possible, utilizing a joint airborne/amphibious task force in the Caribbean area.

(b) Test and evaluate CINCONAD Operation Order 1-61 (Southern Tip), including the capabilities of the air defense forces assigned.

b. Enemy Forces

See Annex C (Intelligence)

c. Friendly Forces

(1) CINCSAC

Provides base services as required in support of this plan.

(2) CINCARIB

Provides base services as required in support of this plan.

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(3) COMSTS

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SPECIAL HANDLING

Provides and operates seaborne transportation in support of this plan.

(4) COMATS

Provides and operates air transportation in support of this plan.

(5) COMTAC

Provides electronic reconnaissance aircraft and air rescue aircraft in support of this plan.

(6) STATE DEPARTMENT

Provides support to the Department of Defense as directed by higher authority.

(7) CIA

Provides support as available, in accordance with accepted requirements, or as directed by higher authority.

(8) USIA

Provides support to the Department of Defense as directed by higher authority.

d. Assumptions

None

2. Mission

CINCLANT and CINCONAD will conduct concurrent training exercises in the Caribbean/Southeastern US area in order to increase the readiness in conducting contingency military operations and air defense operations in this area.

3. Execution

a. CINCLANT

(1) Conduct operations to tactically evaluate CINCLANT contingency plans for military operations in Cuba in accordance with the concept in Annex A hereto.

(2) Provide fighter escort for CONAD aircraft in accordance with Annexes A and B hereto.

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(3) Collect ELINT on Cuba in accordance with Annex D hereto.

(4) Provide search and rescue services for the joint exercise.

b. CINCONAD

(1) Conduct operations to tactically evaluate the CINCONAD air defense capability in the southeast United States in accordance with the concept in Annex B hereto.

(2) Provide navigational assistance to over-water aircraft as required to prevent overflight of Cuban territory.

c. CINCSTRIKE

(1) Provide Army and Air Force combat-ready forces to CINCLANT in support of this plan.

d. CINCPAC

(1) Provide and deploy designated forces to CINCLANT in support of this plan.

x. Coordinating Instructions

(1) This plan is effective for planning upon receipt and effective for operations as directed by JCS.

(2) Planned effective date for operations is early March 1962.

(3) CINCLANT and CINCONAD shall maintain close liaison for planning and coordination of operations.

(4) Reproduction of this plan in part as required in preparation of supporting plans is authorized.

(5) Use of nuclear weapons is not contemplated in executing this plan.

4. Administration and Logistics

In accordance with existing directives and references (a) and (b). To preclude a lowering of actual contingency readiness, individual and unit basic loads of ammunition, supplies and equipment will be carried.

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5. Command and Signal

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a. Command Relations

(1) This is a joint CINCLANT/CINCONAD operation under the JCS. CINCLANT and CINCONAD shall conduct their respective phases of the exercise keeping one another informed of schedules and operations to insure integration of effort and non-interference.

(2) CINCLANT shall act in support of CINCONAD in providing fighter escort for CONAD aircraft.

(3) CINCSTRIKE forces required for support of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 will be alerted as requested by CINCLANT and placed in appropriate DEFCON as directed by the JCS. Actual STRIKECOM forces participating in the "tailored" JTF 122 Vieques exercise and the coastal loading-out maneuvers will CHOP to CINCLANT as directed by the JCS.

(4) CINCPAC forces required for support of CINCLANT OPLANS 314/316-61 will be deployed and CHOP to CINCLANT as directed by the JCS.

b. Communications

(1) As mutually developed by CINCLANT and CINCONAD.

(2) Code word for this operation is \_\_\_\_\_ (TS).

c. Headquarters Locations

JCS	Washington, D.C.
CINCLANT	Norfolk, Va.
CINCONAD	Colorado Springs, Col.

ANNEXES

- A. Concept and Forces for CINCLANT
- B. Concept and Forces for CINCONAD
- C. Intelligence
- D. ELINT Collection
- E. Implementation

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ANNEX A

FORCES AND CONCEPT FOR CINCLANT

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**SPECIAL HANDLING**

1. Forces

a. CINCLANT will plan for exercising all of the forces currently listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61. The General concept in paragraph 2 below indicates forces to be deployed, forces to be repositioned, forces to be alerted, etc.

b. In addition to the above, CINCLANT will plan with COMTAC for the exercise of COMTAC electronic reconnaissance aircraft and air rescue aircraft as required in the Cuban area to support the joint exercises. It is estimated that five electronic reconnaissance aircraft will be required for a three-day period and three air rescue aircraft will be required for a one-day period.

2. General Concept

CINCLANT's directives in compliance with this outline plan will support the following general concept:

a. A realistic tactical evaluation of CINCLANT's OPLAN 314-61 is required.

b. "C-Day" will be the term used for the day that US military forces commence the exercise initial assault. This will be the same day on which CONCONAD faker aircraft conduct their simulated attack on southeastern US.

c. C-day operations will include amphibious assault, air drop, and air landed (if feasible) operations at Vieques.

d. Operations at Vieques will include one PHIBRON with embarked Marine and Army elements, Army airborne elements, and required air and sea support.

e. About C-22 days, CINCLANT will request those PACOM forces designated in CINCLANT OPLANS 314-61 to be deployed enroute to Lantcom.

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Annex A

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1. From C-1 to C+2 days, one PHIBRON with embarked Marines and supporting Marine air will be within 4 hours distance of Guantanamo (GTMO reinforcement listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61).

g. At C-1 day, one Marine Infantry Battalion (minus) will be airlifted from CONUS to Guantanamo (GTMO reinforcement listed in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61).

h. Starting at C-3 days, one PHIBRON will be in the Morehead City-Camp Lejeune area conducting loading and training drills.

i. H-hour (time of commencement of the Vieques amphibious assault) will be scheduled no earlier than six hours after the first scheduled faker aircraft ADIZ penetration. Participating exercise units will be ready to shift from a "training" status to a ready contingency status of all times.

j. CINCSRIKE combat-ready Army and Air Force forces will be chopped to CINCLANT in sufficient time before C-day to ensure their effective utilization and as mutually agreed between CINCLANT and CINCSRIKE. These forces will be used in the Vieques area, the North Carolina area deployed to loading/staging areas, or alerted at home base as CINCLANT requests in order to realistically test his contingency plan.

k. CINCLANT will request required MSTs forces in sufficient time to make them available for operations envisaged in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61. Although conditions may preclude all the individual MSTs ships from active participation, in order to properly evaluate the exercise, CINCLANT should determine:

- (1) Names of MSTs ships designated
- (2) Location of these ships
- (3) Degree of readiness
- (4) Time of availability of individual ships at loading ports
- (5) Capabilities of ships in speed, troop capacity, etc.

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Except for some of the MSTs ships discussed in j above, all forces will participate at least to the level of alerting them for contingency operations at their home bases.

m. CINCLANT shall arrange for Navy, Marine or Air Force fighter escort of all CINCONAD fakes waves from the time they approach within 50 nautical miles of Cuba until entering the ADIZ on their simulated strike missions.

n. Exercise forces shall at all times maintain a quick reaction capability in event of actual hostilities; to include individual and unit basic loads of ammunition, supplies, and equipment.

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OUTLINE FORCE REQUIREMENTS

SPECIAL HANDLING

TAB A - Total Forces Assigned in CINCLANT Oplans 314/316/61

TAB B - Forces (Tentative) to be Deployed to <sup>V</sup> Vieques Area

TAB C - Forces (Tentative) to be Deployed to Guantanamo Area

TAB D - Forces (Tentative) to be Deployed (or Employed) in  
Camp Lejeune/Camp Davis, South Carolina Area

~~TAB E - Forces (Tentative) to be Employed in Execution of  
CINCONAD's Test of Air Defenses of Southeastern U.S.~~

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TAB A

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TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED IN OPLAN 314/316-61

(NOTE: All forces listed herein are on alert status except those operationally employed as listed in Tabs B through E)

ARMY

Hq. XVIII Airborne Corps

82nd Airborne Division

101st Airborne Division

1 Artillery Group (1 Bn 105s; 1 Bn 155's)

4 Helicopter companies

2nd Infantry Brigade (5th Infantry Division)

1 Medium Tank Battalion

1 Armored Cavalry Regiment (Combat Command A)

Combat Support, Logistic, and Administrative units as required.

AIR FORCE

1 Command Headquarters

6 Squadrons Troop Carrier Aircraft (72 C-123)

5 Squadrons Troop Carrier Aircraft (80 C-130)

14 Squadrons Troop Carrier Aircraft AFR (C 119)

(NOTE: AFR Squadrons to be mobilized)

16 Squadrons Transport Aircraft (C 124)

9 Squadrons Transport Aircraft (C 118/121)

3 Squadrons Transport Aircraft (C 133)

Total - approximately 164 Transport Aircraft

2 1/3 Recon Squadrons (204)

17 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (243 /)

1 Tactical Aircraft Command Control Center (Reduced)

Aerial Refueling Aircraft as required

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SPECIAL HANDLING

NAVY STRIKING, COVERING AND LOGISTIC FORCES

- 1 Command Ship (CLC)
- 2 Attack Carriers (CVA)
- 3 Cruisers (CA/CAG/CLG)
- 32 Destroyers (4 Squadrons)
- 1 ASW Group (ASW Carrier plus 8 destroyers, 2 land based air patrol squadrons)
- 1 Airborne Early Warning Squadron
- 4 Submarines
- 4 Tankers
- 2 Ammunition Ships
- 3 Seagoing Tugs

Amphibious Task Force

- 20 Destroyers
- 16 Mine countermeasures ships
- Amphibious ships as available and assigned

MARINES

- One Marine Division/Wing Team (less 1 Battalion landing Team)
- 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team (from Pacific Command)
- Combat and Service Support Units as available and assigned

GUANTANAMO REINFORCEMENT FORCE (NOTE: These forces are included in the compilation above)

- 1 Marine Infantry Battalion (-) airlifted from CONUS.
- 1 Battalion landing Team from the Ready Caribbean Amphibious Squadron
- 1 Marine Aircraft Squadron
- Other naval units as available and assigned.

ON CALL FORCES AS REQUIRED AND DIRECTED BY THE JCS. (NOTE: these forces are in addition to forces listed in the compilation above)

- (1) Army - One Infantry Division  
One Combat Command (Armor)
- (2) Navy - Uncommitted Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

One Marine Division/Wing Team (less 1 Battalion landing Team)  
1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team (from Pacific Command)  
Combat and Service Support Units as available and assigned

GUANTANAMO REINFORCEMENT FORCE (NOTE: These forces are included in the compilation above)

- 1 Marine Infantry Battalion (-) airlifted from CONUS.
- 1 Battalion landing Team from the Ready Caribbean Amphibious Squadron
- 1 Marine Aircraft Squadron
- Other naval units as available and assigned.

ON CALL FORCES AS REQUIRED AND DIRECTED BY THE JCS. (NOTE: these forces are in addition to forces listed in the compilation above)

- (1) Army - One Infantry Division  
One Combat Command (Armor)
- (2) Navy - Uncommitted Forces, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

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TAB B

SPECIAL HANDLING

FORCES (TENTATIVE) TO BE DEPLOYED TO VIEQUES AREA

- 1 Airborne Battle Group
- 1 Amphibious Squadron (1 attack Transport, 1 attack Cargo Ship,  
2 Landing Ships, Tank, 1 Landing Ship Dock)
- 1 Marine Battalion landing Team (Embarked in the Amphibious  
Squadron)
- Tactical Air Command Transport Aircraft as required to lift  
the Airborne Battle Group.
- Naval striking and support shipping as available and assigned

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TAB C

SPECIAL HANDLING

FORCES (TENTATIVE) TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE GUANTANAMO AREA

- 1 Marine Infantry Battalion (minus) (to be airlifted into Guantanamo Naval Base on C Day)
  - 1 Marine Battalion landing Team (To be within 4 hours of the Naval Base, embarked in the Ready Amphibious Squadron)
  - 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team, Pacific Command (Embarked in amphibious shipping from the Pacific Fleet. To be in the vicinity but not detectable from Cuba)
- Guantanamo Naval Base Forces
- |   |           |
|---|-----------|
| Marine  | Transport |
| Aircraft as required to lift the Marine Battalion from Cherry Point, S.C., to Guantanamo  |           |
| Naval Striking and support shipping assigned  |           |
| Amphibious shipping necessary to lift the Pacific Command 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team and the Ready Amphibious Squadron (Approximately 4 or 5 Amphibious Squadrons) |           |

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SPECIAL HANDLING

FORCES (TENTATIVE) TO BE DEPLOYED (OR EMPLOYED) IN THE CAMP  
LEJEUNE/CAMP DAVIS AREA

*Regimental*  
1 Marine ~~Battalion~~ landing Team (3 BLTs)  
1 Amphibious Squadron (+)  
Other units as available and assigned

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APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO ENCLOSURE 1

Rules of Engagement with Cuban Aircraft

1. The following rules of engagement for aircraft are applicable if Cuban aircraft are encountered.

2. Rules

a. If a Cuban aircraft commits a hostile act, fighter aircraft in immediate area of attack will follow in immediate pursuit of the Cuban aircraft that has fired upon US forces, flying over Cuban territory if necessary in order to destroy it.

b. If Cuban aircraft have been guilty of harassment only and have not fired upon US forces, fighter aircraft will make presence known to harasser by flying close aboard until Cuban aircraft withdraws to Cuban territorial airspace.

c. US forces are prohibited from conducting prolonged pursuit deep into Cuban territory and shall not deliberately and systematically organize and dispatch a pursuing force to effect reprisal unless otherwise directed by higher authority.

3. In the event that CINCLANT OPLAN 314/316-61 is ordered executed by higher authority, the order of execution will place normal wartime Rules of Engagement in effect.

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Appendix I to Annex A  
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**SPECIAL HANDLING**

FORCES AND CONCEPT FOR CINCONAD

1. FORCES

a. CINCONAD shall plan for exercising those of his forces he considers necessary for a realistic tactical evaluation of his air defense capability in the southeastern United States area. In general these forces will be:

(1) Approximately thirty-four faker aircraft to conduct simulated air attacks.

(2) Four airborne early warning and control aircraft to provide navigational assistance to overwater aircraft.

(3) Forces of the Montgomery Air Defense Sector as required.

2. GENERAL CONCEPT. CINCONAD's directives in compliance with this outline plan will support the following general concept.

a. CONAD (USAF ADC target fleet) aircraft will fly predetermined routes.

(1) A flight of 19 B-57 aircraft out of Tyndall AFB, will fly to approximately 10 miles off the Northeast coast of the Yucatan Peninsula and then head for the West coast of Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off shore, the aircraft will turn to maintain a track that will parallel the North coast of Cuba approximately 10 miles off shore. Upon reaching a position directly south of Key West, the aircraft will turn North and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or MacDill AFB.

(2) The 15 B-57 aircraft being scheduled out of Ramey AFB will initially fly Southerly and then head for CINCLANT Vieques Joint Task Force; then changing to

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northerly course, fly around the east end of Puerto

Rico; taking a course to the North of the island of Hispaniola; then heading directly toward military and governmental targets in Cuba. Upon reaching a point approximately 10 miles off shore (initiating turns at 15 miles), the aircraft will alter course to maintain a track parallel to the North coast of Cuba approximately 10 miles off shore. Upon reaching a position south of Miami the aircraft will turn North and recover at Key West NAS, Homestead or McDill AFB.

b. The target force will be launched at a time to have the forces from Ramey AFB arrive at the East coast of Cuba at the same time as the target forces from Tyndall AFB arrive at the West coast of Cuba. When in-bound toward CONUS, these forces will simulate attacks on US targets in the Southeast U.S. area to test the US air defense.

c. Faker aircraft will at no time approach closer than 10 miles to the Cuban coast. The waves should arrive at IP 10 miles off the Cuban coast at the same time.

d. Time and space factors, as determined by CINCONAD, will affect the detailed flight plans.

e. CINCONAD will provide sufficient airborne early warning and control aircraft off the Cuban coasts to assist faker aircraft in their navigation to insure that they stay at least 10 miles from Cuban territory.

f. AEW and C aircraft will also be exercised in their AEW and radio relay missions.

g. Provision will be made for positive control to recall participating forces and to terminate the exercise.

h. CINCLANT fighter escort will carry live loads with ammunition fed into the chambers. All pilots, however, will be briefed on the "Rules of Engagement" as specified in Appendix 1 to Annex A to Enclosure 1.

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Annex B

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SPECIAL HANDLING

FORCES (TENTATIVE) TO BE EMPLOYED IN EXECUTION OF CINCONAD's  
TEST OF AIR DEFENSES OF SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES

15 B-57's from Ramey, AFB, Puerto Rico

19 B-57's from Tyndall AFB, Florida

4 AEW&C aircraft

5 or 6 ELINT collecting aircraft

Fighter and escort aircraft as assigned by CINCLANT

Aircraft carriers and supporting ships as assigned by CINCLANT

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TAB A

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ANNEX C

SPECIAL HANDLING

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. Mission.

Intelligence estimate outlining Cuban offensive and defensive capabilities and estimating possible Cuban, Soviet Communist Chinese and South American reactions and possible courses of action.

2. Situation.

a. General

(1) Cuba has by far the most formidable military machine, except for its Navy, in the Latin American area. Cuba is a Communist beachhead in the defense system of the Western world, and the Soviet Bloc nations have put forth special effort to entrench their influence in the present Cuban government. It is apparent that this government fits very closely into the world domination plans of the Communist conspiracy. The amount of control exercised by the Soviet Bloc over Cuba is unknown, but is probably considerable. A "lend-lease" arrangement between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba whereby Cuba furnishes territory for actions against the US in return for arms and technical assistance from the Bloc is a distinct possibility. There are believed to be over 500 Soviet Bloc technicians in Cuba traveling under various guises. Generally, these technicians can be broken down into groups as follows:

(a) Soviet - Government advisors, military construction experts, economic advisors, military planning and training advisors, and military equipment instructors - especially instructors for the jet aircraft which Cuba is receiving from the USSR.

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(b) Communist Chinese - Experts on guerrilla warfare and camouflage.

(c) Soviet Bloc personnel - Jet fighter instructors, factory technicians and instructors on use of smaller military equipment, such as automatic and anti-aircraft weapons.

(2) It is conceivable that the military advisors will play an important part in decision making if and when the Cuban leaders are faced with the problem of whether or not an actual attack is underway. The Soviets, being past masters at "brinkmanship", might exert a sobering influence on such decisions.

(3) The Cubans have trained approximately 200 pilots to fly MIGs. However, the Cuban pilot training program is only about 18 months old and it may be expected that the Cuban fighter pilots are not equal in ability to pilots of the US forces. In the event of actual hostilities, it is possible that Soviet or Soviet Bloc pilots flying MIG-19 FARMERS will be encountered. These pilots are of the instructor category, and would be flying high performance aircraft with possible air-to-air missile capability.

(4) The EW/GCI capability of the Cuban military runs the gamut of radar types from GCS to SCR-627. EW capability may extend as far out as 250 and possible 350 miles from the Havana area. The capability of Cuban radar technicians and operators is not known; however, technician and operator assistance must be expected from Soviet Bloc instructors in the event of suspected hostilities. This assistance should provide a marked increase in radar detection capability over that of Cuban operators.

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Little information is available on the GCI/AI capability of the Cuban Rebel Air Force (CRAF).

(5) Guerrilla warfare holds a high priority in Cuban army training. The average Cuban adapts well to military life and especially to guerrilla warfare. He is small in stature but rugged, strong, inured to hardships, and able to subsist on a simple diet for a long period of time. It should be expected, therefore, that if the Cuban Army were confronted with an unprofitable military situation it would revert to guerrilla warfare which could be long and costly.

(6) The average Cuban fights well while winning, but may tend to offer less and less resistance as the situation becomes more untenable. The Army is reasonably mobile with good ground communications. Areas of special activity such as supply depots, are usually surrounded by prepared defenses with tanks, troops, trenches, and automatic weapon (AW) positions. The AW positions normally are unoccupied; however, mobile amounts of quads, etc., could be moved into these positions on short notice. Areas of heavy military activity and airfields are usually further protected by AA weapons up to 57 mm. Larger numbers of .30 and .50 calibre machine guns are included in AA and ground defense installations. Ground forces are well equipped with mortars, AT guns, assault guns, tanks, submachine guns and rifles.

b. Characteristics of the Area of Operations

(1) Transportation

(a) There are over 5,000 miles of all weather roads in Cuba, some 3,500 miles of which are paved.

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An additional 3,200 miles of road are passable in the dry season. The most important artery of communication and chief connecting link between Cuba's major cities is the Central Highway. Over 700 miles long, it runs between Pinar del Rio and Santiago de Cuba following the central axis of the island except where it turns north of Havana and Matanzas and south to Bayamo and Santiago de Cuba. From the Central Highway, a road and highway network extends outward toward the coast, and ranges from farm roads, at times unusable, to all weather highways connecting important coastal areas. The mountainous area east of Santiago de Cuba is completely unserved by roads or railroads, and air or sea transportation is the only reliable means of reaching some eastern tip areas such as Baracoa.

(b) Total railroad trackage in Cuba is over 11,000 miles. The rail network closely parallels the highway network along the central island axis with connecting lines to all areas of commercial importance. Basically, Cuba's railroads are in support of the sugar industry and their financial stability and operative effectiveness have fluctuated with this industry. Castro has probably seen to it that both rail and highway systems have been brought up to a higher level of effectiveness than in the pre-revolutionary days. Assuming that the rail and highway systems are in good repair, rapid deployment of ground forces to any part of the island is a distinct capability. This deployment will be further enhanced by the three (3) self-sufficient territorial commands designated as the Armies of the West, the Central and the East. Each of these Armies has full operational control of all regular and ready reserve units in its area.

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(c) Cuba has good facilities throughout the island for air transportation. Approximately 95 airfields in various stages of usability from highly efficient international airports with 10,000 feet (plus) runways to 2,500 feet landing strips of sod, dot the countryside. Over 45 transport/cargo type aircraft are presently in service with additional Soviet made CRATE aircraft being procured.

(d) A negligible coastal trade is in effect in Cuba which in some instances uses sailing vessels for cargo carriers. There are a number of excellent ports with modern facilities for international trade. The main ports are Havana, Santiago de Cuba, Cienfuegos, and Nuevitas.

(2) Telecommunications

(a) The entire island of Cuba is criss-crossed with a complete network of communications including landline, manual and automatic telegraph, teleprinter, both UHF and VHF voice links, and facsimile circuits. All communications are controlled by the Ministry of Communications and communications systems are available for use by the military as required. Complete portions of the present communications systems were installed by RCA and Philco Corporations and are considered to be very reliable. Along with tele-communications systems, the island is covered with an extensive network of radio and TV stations. Nearly all areas, no matter how remote, may be recipients of regularly broadcast radio and TV programs. The US embargo and the lack of adequate telecon equipment producing industry in Cuba together with an acute shortage of engineers severely limits maintenance or expansion of

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the present system. However, some development programs are in progress and equipment for these programs is being obtained from Hungary, Switzerland and the Soviet Bloc.

(3) Political

(a) The present regime in Cuba is in the process of reorganizing the government into a totalitarian political system. The traditional provincial and municipal governments are being replaced by Juntas for Coordination, Execution and Inspection (JUCEI). Already established in each province of Cuba, the JUCEI consists of a Provincial Congress, representative of all major economical entities in the territory which meets occasionally, the "plenum" of the Congress which meets every few months, and several smaller bodies which meet frequently and actually direct the provincial administration. The new totalitarian political machine is to be called the United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution, a merger of the amorphous 26 of July Movement with the well organized Communist party. Although Castro, is, of course, to be the supreme head of this party, the man who is pushing the project is Blas Roca, the Secretary General of the Communist party. Party membership is to be limited to the elite of the revolutionary struggle and will be prerequisite for appointment to any important political or economic position. The new organization will enhance the already extensive communist control of Cuban institutions and the influence of Blas Roca on policy.

(b) An important arm of the Castro political organization is the Association of Rebel Youth (AJR).

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It now numbers some 150,000 members. Many of these teenagers are of the type which elsewhere is found in juvenile gangs. Recognition and status accorded them by the regime makes them fanatical in its service. Active participation in the AJR is becoming requisite for educational advancement and eventual political preferment.

(4) Economics

(a) The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of three revolutionary changes: (1) the loss of experienced middle and upper level managerial and technical talent, (2) imposition of elaborate state control, and (3) a drastic shift in the trading pattern from primary dependence on the US to primary dependence on the Soviet Bloc. The elimination of the US quota for Cuban sugar has deprived Cuba of its major source of dollar income. US embargo has also produced economic difficulties especially through the denial of spare parts for previously acquired US equipment. Although Cuba's free world trade has declined sharply, and foreign exchange reserves have been exhausted, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough goods and machinery to keep the economy going. In addition, to trade, the Soviet Bloc has extended to Cuba 357 million dollars in credits for industrial development.

(b) In general, the Cuban economy is now characterized by major shortages and considerable disorganization. However, in view of the availability of Bloc assistance, it is not believed that the economy will deteriorate so far as to bring about Castro's over-throw or to force him to make basic changes in his policy.

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c. Cuban Military Situation.

(1) Strength

The Cuban ground forces are in the process of a thorough reorganization designed to enhance their effectiveness. The numerical strength of the Army has declined as Army personnel are absorbed into the militia as cadres. At the same time there has developed within the militia differentiation between various categories of units. Thus, meaningful distinction is no longer that between the Army and the militia, but rather that between the regular ready reserve and home guard type units. On this basis the ground forces available to the regime to suppress insurrection or rebel invasion are estimated to be:

Regular Forces - 75,000 (Army, Navy, Air and  
active duty militia)

Ready Reserve - 100,000

Home Guard - 100,000

(a) Army

25,000 of which 9,500 are performing internal security and police missions in the provinces.

1 Militia (Active Duty/Ready Reserve/Home Guard).

250,000 of which an estimated 50,000 is on active duty.

2 National Police.

9,000. The National Police were recently removed from Armed Forces jurisdiction and assigned to the Department of State Security.

(b) Air Force.

The present personnel strength of the Air Force is unknown. However, latest information indicates that there are about 200 Cuban pilots who have been trained by Bloc personnel in high performance aircraft.

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(c) Navy

The Cuban Navy is capable of moderately effective patrol operations along selected portions of the Cuban coast. But its combat capabilities are negligible. Mutinies, defections, and purges have left it few professionally trained and technically qualified men. Its present personnel strength is composed largely of new recruits and militiamen and is estimated at not more than 4,000. Defections among Navy personnel have been so high that active duty militia personnel are assigned to units as security against further defections.

(2) Uniforms and Insignia

(a) The uniform of the Cuban Army closely resembles that of the US Army's olive green, cotton, field uniform - although many combinations and variations exist. The lack of uniformity in dress may be attributed to a lack of discipline, which within certain limits permits many combinations of what is, in reality, a simple and practical field uniform.

(b) The majority of militiamen possess uniforms which they have provided themselves. The uniform of the Farmer's Militia is a straw hat, blue work shirt, and olive green trousers. The uniform of the Students' Militia consists of a black beret, maroon shirt, and gray trousers.

(3) Mobility

The Cuban forces are estimated to have the capability of reasonably good mobility for all active duty units. This mobility is enhanced by the acquisition of some 5,000 pieces of military transportation including US and Soviet made 4X4 and 6X6 truck and tractor-trailer type units. (See paragraph 2b(1), Transportation). The ability to

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rapidly deploy combat forces will further be enhanced by the recent reorganization dividing the island operationally into three self-sustaining Army areas of command. Operational control of all forces within the East, Central and Western Army areas is vested in the commander of the particular area.

(4) Availability of Reinforcements

The Peoples' Militia both male and female, with a potential strength of 500,000 spends several hours a week in training under the tutorship of the active duty forces. This militia is well equipped with Communist Bloc produced small arms, plentiful supplies of ammunition, and constitute an available source of reinforcements to add depth to the active forces. No outside source of reinforcements is known to be available.

(5) Serviceability and Operational Rates of Aircraft

(a) In the event that Cuba elects to act against an exercise force, the Cuban Rebel Air Force in an all-out effort could probably launch about 25 high performance jet aircraft. Conventional aircraft possessed would probably be held in reserve to repel ground and landing forces. Due to the early stages of training, probable early stages of organization and poor terminal facilities, the reattack capability of the CRAF jet fighters is considered to be relatively low.

(b) There is evidence to indicate that T-33 and other American type aircraft may display US military markings. The problem of turn around is complicated by the fact that parts and supplies for British and American type aircraft have been cut off. A pressure

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refueling capability is not indicated at any Cuban base supporting jet type aircraft. During combat operations MIG aircraft which normally fly from three Cuban fields could be expected to deploy to other more remote airfields.

c. Unconventional and Psychological Warfare Situation

(1) Guerrilla

Some guerrilla activity against the Castro forces can be expected by widely dispersed bands of anti-Castro groups operating from mountainous areas of the island. Due to the small size of the bands and lack of coordinated leadership, it is doubtful that they can do more than harrass the active forces by occasional cutting of lines of communications.

(2) Psychological

At the first indication of US operations oriented toward the area of Cuba, the Cuban Government is expected to charge the US with hostile intentions. Charges will undoubtedly be placed before the UN and the OAS, and to the world public through all propaganda media. In addition, it is expected that Cuba, through her representatives and/or agents in all South American countries, will try to bring pressure to bear to cause Latin American governments to condemn the action of the US Government.

(3) Sabotage

Sporadic cases of sabotage may be carried out by anti-Castro groups against the communications systems. However, they will probably be on such a small scale as to be an annoyance rather than a handicap to the Cuban Government.

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3. Cuban Capabilities.

a. Cuba is capable of interfering with the accomplishment of this training mission by:

(1) Launching high performance jet fighters and actively engaging the training forces.

(2) Launching both conventional and jet aircraft against exercise vessels.

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3. Cuban Capabilities.

a. Cuba is capable of interfering with the accomplishment of this training mission by:

(1) Launching high performance jet fighters and actively engaging the training forces.

(2) Launching both conventional and jet aircraft against exercise vessels.

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3. Cuban Capabilities.

a. Cuba is capable of interfering with the accomplishment of this training mission by:

(1) Launching high performance jet fighters and actively engaging the training forces.

(2) Launching both conventional and jet aircraft against exercise vessels.

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(3) Launching both conventional and jet aircraft against exercise vessels.

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ANNEX D

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ELINT COLLECTION

1. FORCES

As determined necessary by CINCLANT and as can be provided to CINCLANT by COMTAC.

2. GENERAL CONCEPT

a. The conduct of the concurrent exercises provided for in the basic plan in the Cuban area provides an excellent opportunity to acquire ELINT data on Cuban capabilities in this field.

b. This basic mission will be to locate and determine the capabilities of the various types of electro-magnetic radiation devices operating on the island of Cuba and adjacent territorial and international waters, and to collect all military communications and transmissions having intelligence implications.

c. It is contemplated that six RB-66s and qualified electronic reconnaissance personnel fly sorties in the vicinity of Cuba on E-2, E-1 and E-day. Sorties on E-day should accompany each of the faker waves from IP to the ADIZ.

d. TAC reconnaissance forces will be under the operational control of CINCLANT while in the target area.

e. CINCLANT fighter escort for ELINT forces will be provided as outlined in Enclosure 2.

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ANNEX E

IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR OUTLINE PLAN "(NICKNAME)"

DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
PHASE I - PREPARATION				
1. As soon as plan is approved	Provide cover to plan	Assign Codeword to plan	Provide using agencies with codeword and related meaning	JCS
2. C-Date minus number of days	Assume State Department is aware of plan and prepared to counter any protest or to initiate protest if appropriate	Have prepared statement ready release to press or to use in protests to fit all contingencies cited in this plan. Have prepared statements for release to press concerning exercise if queried by press	Specific guidance will be issued by DOD to all participating departments, agencies and commands concerning releases to press on all aspects of operation.	DOD STATE JCS SERVICES USIA
PHASE II ALERT CINCLANT AND CINCONAD				
3. As soon as plan is approved	Test of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61 and 316-61 and CINCONAD's Op Ord 1-61.	a. Forward Enclosure 1 (with Annexes) to CINCLANT and CINCONAD b. Direct preparation of implementing plans and orders	CINCLANT and CINCONAD prepare implementing orders and directives to accomplish mission	JCS CINCLANT CINCONAD
4. C-Date minus number of days	Conduct test operations	Warn interested activities of forthcoming military exercises	Indicate increased interest and activity in Caribbean Area (i.e. notices to commercial users of Caribbean area that major military exercises are to be conducted in the Caribbean Area.(NOTAMS)	DOD FAA HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE

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RESPONSIBLE

AGENCIES

DATE/TIME GROUP

OBJECTIVES TO BE  
SUPPORTED

TASK

IMPLEMENTATION  
ACTIONS

PHASE III ALERTING AND PREPOSITIONING OF FORCES

5. C-Date minus 30 days	Support movement of contingency forces	Obtain MSTS shipping to move contingency forces	JCS authorize and CINCLANT requisition MSTS shipping as required to effect sea lift of seaborne contingency forces that cannot be accomplished by available amphibious shipping	JCS CINCLANT CINCPAC
6. C-Date minus 22 days	Provide CINCPAC contingency force in support of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61 and 316-61	Obtain 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team from CINCPAC Forces to support CINCLANT Contingency operations	JCS authorize and CINCLANT alert CINCPAC to provide 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team for test of CINCLANT Contingency plans. CINCPAC commence loading and movement.	JCS CINCLANT CINCPAC
7. C-Date minus number of days	Support operations	Commence normal publicity for test of U.S. Armed Forces ability to react to emergencies in the Caribbean Area.	DOD, JCS, CINCLANT make appropriate press releases for exercises in the Caribbean area.	DOD JCS CINCLANT
8.		Commence normal publicity for test of Air Defense of the Southeastern U.S.	DOD, JCS, CINCONAD make appropriate press releases for air defense exercise in the Southeastern U.S.	DOD JCS CINCLANT
9. C-Date minus appropriate number of days	Provide availability of CINCLANT lift and forces for contingency operations if required	JCS, CINCSOUTH and CINCLANT alert forces to insure availability for assault on C-Day, if required, and test reaction times.	(1) JCS direct CINCSOUTH to alert STRIKE forces and transportation to insure availability of all forces designated for contingency operations in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61.	JCS CINCLANT CINCSOUTH

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DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
9. (Continued)			a. Forces to be alerted in time frames envisaged in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61 to test reaction times. b. Forces and transportation to be positioned to make assault landing on C-date, if required, or in position to execute operations directed in Annex A and this schedule.	JCS CINCLANT CINCSTRIKE
10. C-Date minus appropriate number of days	Provide availability of CONAD Forces for test of CINCONAD Op Ord 1-61	CINCONAD alert forces in preparation for test of CINCONAD Op Ord 1-61	CINCONAD alert and preposition forces for test of CINCONAD Op Ord 1-61. Test to be conducted on C-Date in accordance with Annex B and this schedule.	JCS CINCONAD
11. C-Date minus appropriate number of days	Preparations for operations	Complete preliminary tasks	(1) Alert and increase Air/Sea Rescue Activities (2) Obtain facilities for Air operations (Mayaguana, etc.) (3) Commence MATS flights to preposition supplies (4) Publish additional NOTAM's notifying all concerned of prospective military operations in Caribbean area. (5) Begin loading of assault forces for operations directed in Annex A	CINCLANT, USAF USCG, NAVY COM NAV BASE GTMO  STATE, DOD CINCARIB JCS, MATS, CINCLANT, CINCARIB, SERVICES  JCS, FAA HYDO. OFFICE  JCS, CINCLANT CINCSTRIKE USAF, USN

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DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
11. (Continued)			(6) Commence special operational weather observations and broadcasts.	WX SERVICES
12. C-Date minus 48 hours to C-24 hours	Provide necessary intelligence for operation	Obtain ELINT and Electronic Order of Battle	TAC ELINT aircraft commence snooper flights	JCS, USAF TAC
13. C-Date minus 24 hours	General Readiness to prevent surprise in event of hostile Cuban reaction	Increase readiness	Increase alert of all commands and forces participating in exercise.	JCS, SERVICES ALL PARTICIPATING COMMANDS
14. C-Day H-Hour	Conduct Air Defense Exercise	a. Test CONAD Op Ord 1-61	CONAD Target and ELINT aircraft approach Cuba on courses simulating an attack to harass Cuba. Break off at 10 miles and parallel Cuban coast at minimum of 10 miles distance. Continue to US and make simulated attacks against US targets to test CONAD air defenses.	JCS CINCONAD TAC
		b. Provide close air cover for CONAD target fleet from attack by CRAF	CINCLANT forces provide close air cover for CONAD target aircraft within 50 miles of Cuban coast line and until CONAD aircraft enter US ADIZ	CINCLANT
	Conduct test of CINCLANT Op Plans 314-61 and 315-61	(a) Alert all forces not scheduled for movement. Conduct token amphibious assault at Vieques. Conduct token air resupply at Vieques.	(1) All forces scheduled for operations in CINCLANT Op Plan 314-61 will be on alert. All transportation will be assembled and on stand-by alert. (2) The ready Phil Ron with embarked	CINCLANT

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DATE/TIME GROUP	OBJECTIVES TO BE SUPPORTED	TASK	IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES
14. (Continued)			BLT to be at sea in vicinity of Guantanamo. (3) Standby Phib Ron with a BLT embarked (or Lant Phiblex forces) conduct amphibious exercise at Vieques with token forces in landing. (4) Conduct token or simulated air-drop of supplies (5) Airlift the standby battalion of Marines at Cherry Point, N.C. to Guantanamo. (6) Pacific fleet augmentation unit (1/3 Marine Division/Wing team) will be at sea in the Caribbean area, but at sufficient distance that their location will not be known in Cuba.	CINCLANT
		n. Conduct Weapons Demonstration if determined feasible and appropriate	(1) CINCLANT host 1-day weapon demonstrations for Latin Americans recommended by CINCARIB - (CINCARIB to assist with invitations, transportation, etc.)	CINCLANT CINCARIB