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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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Also attached are 51-63, 50-63 and 49-63.

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

## Declassification Review/Postponement Form

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Original Level of Classification: \_\_\_\_\_

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE  
JOINT STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

~~DECLASSIFIED BY [REDACTED]~~  
~~DATE [REDACTED]~~

26 December 1963

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report  
Number 52-63 covering the period from 180800 to 250800 December  
1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

*for* *C. M. Mount, Jr.*  
C. M. MOUNT, JR.  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, Pacific Division  
Operations Directorate

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demonstrates that the US Government will give protection to the "so-called Malaysia" and that the US, with the approval of the Indian Government, is inviting danger to Southeast Asia.

(2) On 24 December, a Communist-led youth demonstration was conducted in the square across from the US Embassy to protest the US 7th Fleet extension into the Indian Ocean.

(3) The Indonesian Navy and Air Force may replace their Western transport and ASW aircraft with Soviet equipment. Defense Minister General Nasution reportedly bought six Soviet AN-12/Cub transports during his recent trip to Moscow. He allegedly also said when he was in Washington that the Navy would replace its ASW-configured Fairey Gannets with Soviet Bloc ASW-aircraft. Indonesia is said to claim that it can get out of the AN-12 contract if allowed to purchase five more Lockheed C-130 s. This suggests that any deal with the Soviets is tentative. The acquisition of AN-12 s and ASW counterparts of Indonesia's 14 Gannets would require additional Soviet technicians to provide local maintenance.

(4) The Indonesian Air Force (AURI) visualizes only a limited role in the event of an open conflict with British and Malaysian forces; operations would mainly consist of

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air drop of troops, equipment, and supplies. Despite this judgment, the Army has requested that the AURI be prepared to furnish air support to the ground troops in Borneo -- a request which it is reported, has angered the AURI. Lacking suitable airfields in Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) from which to mount jet fighter escort missions, the AURI is extremely reluctant to make unescorted TU-16/Badger strikes against Malaysian Borneo targets.

c. Malaysia/New Zealand/Australia. The Malaysian Government asked the New Zealand Government, on 19 December, for aid in training its Army and for assistance in Sarawak and Sabah, to include special service units, AAA units and assist at airfields New Zealand is prepared to allow its transport aircraft now at Singapore, and perhaps others, to be used for ferrying to and within Sarawak and Sabah, to commit a naval frigate and make one battalion available if the situation in Borneo deteriorates. However, the New Zealand Government, like the Australian, is reluctant to commit forces directly in defense of Malaysian Borneo. Both believe that such involvement would reduce greatly or destroy their political influence with Indonesia and perhaps stimulate Djakarta to take even more aggressive action against the territories.

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d. Cambodia

(1) Prince Sihanouk apparently has reached the stage where he is preparing to cut all ties with the West, except France, and to align Cambodia more closely with the Communist Bloc. His recent directives reportedly are spreading consternation, even among Cambodia's royal family. On 22 December, a wealthy Cambodian, Songsakd Kitchpanich, president of the Banque de Phnom Penh, landed in South Vietnam and asked for political asylum.

(2) On 22 December, the Cambodian Government announced the signing of a civil air agreement with North Vietnam. Both countries announced that an airline would link Phnom Penh with Hanoi.

d. Thailand. The Thais have already stated that any US action to agree with the reconvening of the Geneva Conference to discuss Cambodian neutrality would be a critical phase in US/Thai relations and cause the Thais to re-evaluate their foreign policy commitments.

e. Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

(1) As many as 29,000 Viet Cong (VC) may have entered the Republic of Vietnam from North Vietnam in the last four years according to a CINCPAC recapitulation. From 1960 through 1962

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confirmed Viet Cong infiltrators numbered 10,397. The 1963 figure is low but is expected to catch up with last year's 4,247, as more evidence comes in. CINCPAC estimates that twice as many Viet Cong infiltrate as are eventually confirmed.

(2) MACV reports no change in VC capabilities in the past week. In view of the Viet Cong "National Resistance Day" holiday on 19 December and the anniversary of the formation of the National Liberation Front on 20 December, both falling under favorable weather conditions for guerrilla activities, an increase in VC action can be expected in the near future. VC propaganda now centers around neutralism as the solution for saving the country.

## 2. OPERATIONS

### a. Laos

(1) Pathet Lao forces, bolstered by North Vietnamese, that recaptured Lak Sao on 16 December, have also re-occupied Kham Keut. The advance apparently was made against negligible opposition from the Royal Lao (FAR) defenders.

(2) On 22 December, Communist artillery shelled the airfield at Muong Kheung for the first time. The airfield was being utilized by FAR forces to airlift the FAR 6th Infantry Battalion to Muong Kheung to replace the 24th Infantry

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Battalion. The replacement was halted when half completed because of the Communist shell fire.

b. Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong and RVNAF activities for the period 11-16 December and the previous period of 4-11 December follows:

	<u>4-11 Dec</u>	<u>11-18 Dec</u>	<u>Change</u>
Viet Cong			
Incidents	403	402	- 1
Armed Attacks	59	66	+ 7
Casualties	475	348*	-127
(KIA)	(370)	(277)	(- 93)
Defections	23	24	+ 1
Weapons Lost	138	96	- 42
RVN			
Initiated actions			
Bn or larger	51	58	+ 7
Small Unit:			
Contact	135	114	- 21
No contact	<u>4,420</u>	<u>4,405</u>	- 15
Total Actions	4,606	4,577	- 29
Casualties	396	396*	
(KIA)	( 89)	( 90)	(+ 1)
Weapons Lost	115	230	+115

\* RVN and VC personnel and weapon losses are for the period  
10 - 16 December

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(2) Viet Cong-initiated incidents for the week of 11-18 December were at the same level as the previous week. However, activity in the important delta area declined. The II Corps Tactical Zone had a 25 per cent rise in insurgency incidents, with the coastal Binh Dinh Province bearing the brunt of the actions. VC attacks on strategic hamlets in that province have increased sharply since the 9th RVN Army Division deployed to the delta area last September. The one company-size attack during the week was the first large-scale operation in December, as compared to 17 in November and a 1963 monthly average of 12. In this assault of two strategic hamlets in Phuoc Thanh Province on 14 December, the government forces suffered one killed, 2 wounded, and 13 missing in action. Also lost were 27 weapons and radios. No enemy casualties were reported. There is no indication that the VC stepped up their efforts in connection with National Resistance Day on 19 December.

(3) Military control of two critical provinces has been shifted to strengthen antiguerrilla operations in the delta area as follows: The 7th Division, III Corps, took over the Kien Hoa sector from the 9th Division, IV Corps on 16 December. At the same time, the VC-infested Long An Province was removed

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from the 7th Division control and made a special sector under the Airborne Brigade which reports directly to the III Corps Commander.

(4) Three US Army aircraft crashes during the week took the lives of 10 US personnel. In IV CTZ on 12 December, a CH-37 was hit by VC ground fire while evacuating a downed OV-1. Although the pilot jettisoned the sling-loaded plane, he could not control the CH-37 and it plunged to the ground burning on impact. In another incident, three US personnel were killed and one is missing and presumed dead as a result of a U-1A crashing into the side of a mountain approximately 200 miles northeast of Saigon. On 14 December, a UH-1B crashed into the sea about one-half mile off the shore of the Binh Dinh Province. The co-pilot swam to shore but the remaining crew members drowned. Causes of the latter two accidents have not been determined.

(5) In order to meet requirements for additional artillery in the delta area, certain 105-mm howitzer batteries have been increased from 4 to 6 tubes each. Forty-two additional 105-mm howitzers were airlifted to South Vietnam by 22 December to meet this requirement.

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c. Indonesia

(1) Evidence continues to suggest that Indonesia intends to pursue its confrontation policy with Malaysia while attempting to stay clear of overt military exchanges with British forces. However, serving to heighten the already tense situation was the shooting down of a British aircraft on 18 December. A British Auster liaison aircraft on a mail drop mission in the Sarawak-Borneo border area was hit by automatic weapons small arms fire and crash landed in Sarawak. The pilot was injured and a passenger, an RAF chaplain, was killed. On 13 and 15 December, RAF helicopters were hit by small arms fire.

(2) Indonesian Air Force C-130 aircraft have been observed carrying out airdrop operations on the Kalimantan/Sarawak border on 10 and 15 December. Paratroopers and supplies were observed in the operation.

(3) Air raid warning drills are currently being conducted in Surabaya. Attempts are made to black-out the whole city during the drills. In addition, preparations for war are being made such as deploying 57-mm AA guns around key areas and airfields.

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d. Cambodia

(1) Prince Sihanouk has asked for the speedy withdrawal of US aid missions but nonetheless he had expected that US aid in the pipeline would arrive and is reported annoyed to learn that it had been diverted. All US MAAG personnel and dependents will depart Cambodia not later than 31 December except for a small clean-up detail which will depart by 15 January 1964.

(2) The US mapping program in Cambodia has been declared part of the US military and technical aid by a Cambodian official and the official states that the mapping program must be terminated.

e. Burma. The FY 64 training of Burmese military personnel has been reduced from 118 to 22. The cancellation of projected training reaches 90 per cent for Army, 93 per cent for Air Force and 44 per cent for the Navy. The explanation of this reduction is given that personnel are required for a planned major offensive against insurgents.

f. Pacific Area. On 21 December, a Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (probably an SS-7) was fired into the 6,500 nautical mile Pacific impact area. The missile was tracked by Alaskan BMEWS and re-entry was observed by US facilities in the impact area.

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
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g. Republic of China (GRC). Joint GRC-US Amphibious Exercise BIG DIPPER ended with all units satisfied that their training objectives had been accomplished. All units proved that they are capable of conducting combined arms exercises involving air, naval gunfire, artillery, tanks and other ground weapons in a team effort.

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# SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE  
JOINT STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.


18 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report  
Number 51-63 covering the period from 110800 to 180800 December  
1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

  
C. M. MOUNT, JR.  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, Pacific Division  
Operations Directorate

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE  
JOINT STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION  
REPORT NUMBER 51-63

18 December 1963

1. INTELLIGENCE

a. Laos:

(1) Royal Lao Army (FAR) forces have taken Lak Sao, an important road junction on Route 8, main Communist supply line to central Laos from North Vietnam.

(2) In the north, FAR, Neutralist and Meo leaders have been planning a coordinated effort against Xieng Khouang and Tha Lin Noi. Although this operation was planned for 8 December, there has been nothing to indicate the attack had begun.

(3) The Pathet Lao have yet to manifest a strong reaction to recent FAR successes. However, they are unlikely to allow many positions of the caliber of Lak Sao and Xieng Khouang to be lost without reacting.

b. Republic of Vietnam (RVN)

(1) COMUSMACV has added the 310th Battalion to his Viet Cong (VC) order of battle, with a strength of 380 men thereby raising the number of confirmed VC battalions in South Vietnam

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to 38. COMUSMACV has also accepted another group of 40 infiltrators from North Vietnam; this brings the confirmed 1963 infiltration total to 954. This unit was formed last January, worked its way south through Laos, and entered Quang Ngai Province last May. Seven members later formed part of a 57-mm recoilless rifle platoon to provide fire support for rifle elements of the 310th Battalion.

(2) DIA estimates that in spite of an increase in number of RVN offensive operations, the government has been unable to reduce the strength of the VC to any appreciable extent. Available evidence indicates that while the VC have not made spectacular gains, they have prevented the government from gaining effective control over much of the countryside. It is apparent that the VC are maximizing their present capabilities, aided substantially by resources captured from the government. It is further evident that the VC have sustained, and in some instances, improved their combat capabilities despite RVN advantages in firepower, armor, mobility, communication and airborne operations. The VC have demonstrated extensive capability to exploit the provisional government's preoccupation with its political reorganization.

(3) The provisional government of the RVN replaced its air force and marine brigade commanders recently in another

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move to sack politically unreliable commanders and assign potential troublemakers to desk jobs abroad. Colonel Nguyen Cao Ky is the new commander of the Vietnamese Air Force and succeeds Colonel Do Khac Mai who is the military attache designated to Bonn. Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Lien, the former chief of staff and deputy commander of the marine brigade, has stepped up to the top job as commander to replace Colonel Le Nguyen Khang.

c. Indonesia:

(1) The US Air Attache in Djakarta states that the Indonesian Air Force neither confirms nor denies the press-reported shootdown of British aircraft over Indonesian territory. UK Government spokesmen have officially denied Indonesian claims of four British aircraft shot down. The Air Attache in Djakarta considers that, had the shootdown occurred, the Indonesians would have publicized it extensively.

(2) Indonesia is reportedly planning to step up its efforts against some 2,000-3,000 rebels on Celebes. The 17 infantry battalions and one mountain artillery unit on the island have been reinforced by eight mobile brigade police battalions; security forces there now total about 18,000. Rebel activity in Celebes could interfere somewhat with the campaign against Malaysia by tying down considerable Indonesian strength.

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(3) Pro-Communists are to receive their first ministerial posts in the cabinet as Minister of Justice and Minister of State; the latter is assigned to the cabinet presidium which consists of three Vice Prime Ministers. This will be a blow to the anti-Communist army. President Sukarno, however, will continue his longstanding practice of maintaining his dominant position by playing the army and the Communist Party against each other.

d. Malaysia:

(1) The British plan to augment their ground forces in Malaysia by one battalion.

(2) London plans to recall a 70-man Special Air Services Squadron from Malaysia in late December and replace it by a similar unit from England. The marine commando battalion now on Sarawak will be relieved by a Gurkha infantry battalion in January; the commandos there now will return to Singapore. The 8th Battalion, Royal Malay Regiment, will leave for the Borneo territories within the next few weeks. This unit was activated only last January but is well trained and fully operational.

(3) The Australian Government is reluctant to send its forces to Sabah and Sarawak since it believes that the current situation does not warrant such a course of action and that

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good relations with the Indonesians are desirable. Relations between Indonesia and Australia seem normal. Australian aircraft regularly overfly Indonesia, and some troops land at Djakarta while en route to the Butterworth base in Malaysia.

(4) British officials are deeply concerned over Indonesia's potential to sponsor terrorism in Singapore and Malaya and the inability of local police to cope with the threat. Singapore authorities recently arrested the Malayan leader of a saboteur group which had been trained in the nearby Indonesian Riau Islands. He admitted that he was accompanied by seven others and revealed the location of a cache of explosives near the residence of the British High Commissioner in Singapore. The bombing of an automobile in Singapore on 9 December was probably a "trial run" by Indonesian-sponsored saboteurs as yet incapable of hitting a military target.

e. Cambodia:

Prince Sihanouk continues irrationally to isolate Cambodia from its Free World contacts and to move closer toward Communist China. At the same time, however, he is seeking expanded aid from France and he continues to press for an international conference to "guarantee" Cambodia's neutrality. Both France and Communist China have responded only cautiously to Sihanouk's appeals for aid although Peiping has promised

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all necessary help should Cambodia be "attacked." Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has indicated its support of a new conference but the principal Western powers are reluctant to agree hastily. Thailand and the Republic of Vietnam continue adamantly to oppose Sihanouk's conference.

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## 2. OPERATIONS:

### a. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong (VC) and RVNAF activities for the period 4 - 11 December 1963 and the previous period of 27 November - 4 December 1963 follows:

	<u>27 Nov - 4 Dec</u>	<u>4 Dec - 11 Dec</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>Viet Cong:</u>			
Incidents	518	403	-115
Armed Attacks	84	59	-25
Casualties:	662	475*	-187
(KIA)	(533)	(370)	(-163)
Defections	23	23	0
Weapons Lost	88	138	+50

### RVN:

Initiated Actions:			
Bn or Larger	63	51	-12
Small Unit:			
Contact	146	135	-11
No Contact	<u>3,850</u>	<u>4,420</u>	<u>+570</u>
Total Actions	4,059	4,606	+547
Casualties:	598	396*	-202
(KIA)	(135)	(89)	(-46)
Weapons Lost	374	115	-259

\*RVN and VC personnel and weapons lost are for period 3 - 9 December 1963.

(2) In Phuoc Tuy Province on 3-4 December, the VC attacked and inflicted 80 per cent damage on a strategic hamlet, in the face of government airstrikes. Five hundred

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hamlet residents were reported missing. In Binh Duong Province, the VC entered several hamlets within a three mile radius and kidnapped about 100 young men employed on a nearby rubber plantation. According to COMUSMACV, all but 20 had returned to their hamlets by 10 December. Kidnappings were heavy throughout the country, accounting for more than half the total incidents in each corps area.

(3) VC activity, however, continued to decline. There were a total of 403 incidents reported, of which 59 were attacks. All categories of incidents have returned to normal pre-coup levels except terrorism which continues to run at nearly twice the level established during the summer and fall. There were no battalion or company-sized attacks for this period, in fact, none so far this month.

(4) RVNAF ground operations employing forces of battalion-size or larger decreased by 12, from 63 to 51. This is four below the weekly average of 55 operations per week for the preceding 12 weeks. Battalion days of operation increased from 401 to 425, the third consecutive week over 400.

(5) In summary, the continuing decline in the over-all number of incidents was expected, although the unusually high percentage of terrorism incidents to the total

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(68 per cent) was not. The yearly over-all percentage is 51. This is a period of re-supply, training and preparation for a new campaign. A fresh surge of attacks is anticipated by COMUSMACV on or about 19 December to celebrate the founding of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam (NLFSVN). VC weapons losses of 138 compared with RVN weapons losses of 115 mark the first time that VC losses have exceeded the RVN since initiation of Phase II of the National Campaign Plan on 1 July of this year.

(6) COMUSMACV reports that, effective on 16 December, Kien Hoa Province was transferred to control of 7th Division, III Corps from 9th Division, IV Corps. Additionally, Long An Province was removed from control of 7th Division and became a special sector reporting directly to the Commander, III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ).

b. Cambodia:

(1) As a result of Prince Sihanouk's outburst of 12 December, the Cambodian Government (RKG) has recalled its ambassador to the US. The US, on 13 December, directed its ambassador to Cambodia to return to Washington for consultation.

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(2) The Cambodians terminated negotiations for the liquidation of US aid on 13 December and requested US AID, MAAG and Information Services personnel to depart not later than 15 January 1964 to prevent possible incidents against Americans. The RKG will insure protection of American personnel and facilities only until 15 January.

(3) In response to a RKG request, all Cambodian military students attending MAP supported courses in CONUS will be returned to Cambodia immediately.

c. Thailand:

Following the death of Prime Minister Sarit on 8 December, there has been an apparently orderly takeover of the government by General Thanom Kittikachorn, formerly the Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister. Rumors of coups have abated because of the rapid moves by Thanom to consolidate his position. The cabinet appointed by Thanom is basically the same as Sarit's; however, major changes have been made in military commanders. Thanom assumed the position of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. General Praphat is the new Deputy Supreme Commander and Deputy CINC of the Thai Army. Thanom's chief potential political rival, General Chitti Nawisathern, was relegated

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to the powerless position of Assistant Supreme Commander and is slated to be named to a cabinet position. The new government remains pro-west oriented and friendly to the US. No changes in military policy are expected as a result of the military command changes.

d. Indian Ocean Task Force:

Detailed revised guidance for scheduling a US Naval Task Force to the Indian Ocean area has not yet been received from State/Defense. As soon as received, CINCPAC will be requested to resubmit a schedule for the first deployment. It has been indicated unofficially that DEPSTATE guidance will have the initial deployment begin sometime after 1 March and that it will include Naval Task Force support for a Pakistan/US combined exercise to be conducted concurrently with a US/Iranian exercise presently scheduled for the period 5 - 30 April.

e. Pacific Area:

On 11 December, the Soviets fired an ICBM 6,500 nautical miles to the mid-Pacific impact area. This is the first such firing in the current series which they announced would continue until 25 January 1964. The limited telemetry detected during the missile's flight suggests that the firing probably was for troop training and limited research and development, rather than for testing a new missile. This was the twentieth ICBM fired to the Pacific area that has been observed.

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f. SEATO:

Pote Sarasin resigned as Secretary General of SEATO on 13 December in order to assume new ministerial duties in the Thailand cabinet. For the present, SEATO Deputy Secretary General Worth will assume Pote's SEATO duties. The Thailand Government continues to hold the strong position that the next Secretary General should again be a Thai, and Konthi Suphamongkhon, present Thai SEATO Council representative, has been indicated as Thailand's choice. The US Ambassador to Thailand comments: "Although Konthi may not be ideal for the position, there is no other Thai candidate at hand with appreciably better qualifications, and Konthi is believed to be much superior to Ambassador Ingles, who was the Philippines contender for the position of Secretary General the last time.

g. Operation HIGH TAIL:

The movement of 9 US Army Caribou aircraft from the Republic of Vietnam to CONUS is proceeding on schedule. The aircraft departed Moron, Spain, 18 December, for the Azores, with crew rest scheduled for both the Azores and Argentina; ETA at McGuire AFB is 21 December.

3. LOGISTICS

a. Republic of China: OSD (ISA) has approved a plan to provide the GRC with a five year supply of World War II vehicle

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
repair parts from the MAP Depot at Tokorozawa. The GRC is the only country in PACOM requiring World War II vehicle parts other than a token amount for Laos. Execution of the plan will reduce the flow of gold to Japan by reducing overhead and maintenance expense at the MAP depot.

b. Republic of Vietnam: The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) has been authorized to proceed with the Engine Overhaul programs for Vietnam. In addition, AFLC has been authorized to exchange 7 each R-1300-3 engines from available USAF stocks and to exchange O-470-11 and R-830-90 D serviceable engines if these engines are available in stock.

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# SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



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130

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE  
JOINT STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

11 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report  
Number 50-63 covering the period from 040800 to 110800 December  
1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

*C. M. Mount Jr.*

C. M. MOUNT, JR.  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, Pacific Division  
Operations Directorate

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DISTRIBUTION

CJCS	6
Dir, J-1	1
Dir, J-3	12
Dir, J-4	4
Dir, J-5	4
Dir, J-6	1
SA/MAA	1
SA/P&B	1
SACSA	6
Secy, JSSC	1
DJS	3
Secy, JCS	3
CSA	18
CNO	12
CMC	7
CSAF	5
AFCIN	1
AFSMS	1
OSD	12
NIC	1
AFCP	1
DIA	4
WH Sit. Rm	1
M/A to President	1
Dir, CIA	10
3/A Pres., NSAFF	1
The Attorney General	1
Ag. for Inc. Dev.	1
US Del., MSC UN	1
Dir, NSA	4
ANMCC	1
State FE Aff.	7
PR&A	1

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE  
JOINT STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION  
REPORT NUMBER 50-63

11 December 1963

1. INTELLIGENCE

a. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) Since the initial intense outburst following the 1 November coup, over-all Viet Cong (VC) activity has continued its slow decline. It did, however, remain at a relatively high level during the period 28 November through 5 December when compared to pre-coup activity levels. There were 518 enemy initiated incidents reported, of which only 84 were armed attacks, the lowest number since mid-October. All other categories of VC actions declined except that propaganda incidents continued at a relatively high rate, indicating perhaps a possible change of VC emphasis on the type of activity to be conducted. The decline of Communist activity in recent weeks is reflected principally in the sharp decrease in the number of armed attacks and acts of sabotage. Terrorism - assassination, kidnappings, and harassing fire - although declining, remained at a relatively high level. Most of the Communist activity continues to be centered in the delta region. There was a sharp drop of VC activities in 3d Corps

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Tactical Zone (CTZ) and a slight decline in 2d CTZ. The 1st CTZ remained at the same level as the previous week.

(2) Maj. Gen. Tran Van Don, Minister of Defense, said the recently planned change in corps commanders was not implemented because the generals did not want to give the impression of yielding to pressure from Buddhists and students who want Maj. Gen. Do Cao Tri replaced as Commander of 1st Corps.

(3) Elements of the Government's 7th Division on 3 December captured a 75-mm recoilless rifle in Dinh Tuong Province, south of Saigon. COMUSMACV J-2 technical intelligence says the weapon is of Chinese Communist origin. The first VC weapon of this type was captured in the same general area about a month ago.

(4) COMUSMACV's acceptance of the reported infiltration in July of 130 men into the RVN from North Vietnam via Laos and Cambodia, brings the 1963 total of confirmed infiltrators to 914. The July entrants were reportedly to form the nucleus of a main force battalion in Phuoc Tuy Province. COMUSMACV also says that although 984 more reported infiltrators cannot be confirmed in Vietnam, he strongly suspects many of them are there.

(5) At least 400 "corrupt" Vietnamese officers, including many with good combat records, are to be purged from the

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military rolls. This represents approximately 2.4 per cent of the total 16,443 officers. Some of the alleged wrongdoings include falsification of official records and embezzlement of pay.

(6) The Vietnamese Government apparently wants to exploit the experience of the Philippines in its successful fight against the Communist Hukbalahap. Maj. Gens. Duong Van Minh, Chief of State, and Tran Van Don, in talks with Philippine Ambassador Farolan in Saigon on 30 November, discussed sending a high-level Vietnamese delegation to Manila to ask the Philippines to help out in the Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort. The two generals hope that a group of Filipino officers experienced in tactics and techniques will be sent to Vietnam. Ambassador Farolan has recommended favorable consideration to his government.

b. Indonesia/Malaysia:

(1) An Indonesian TU-16/Badger jet medium bomber circled over Kuching on 6 December and another "buzzed" Tawau on the 7th, according to the US Army Attache in Singapore. These flights are probably for reconnaissance; TU-16s have previously been noted in this role. Reported crossings of the Sarawak border by Indonesian helicopters on 8 and 9 December may also have been to reconnoiter troop dispositions of Sarawak security forces. British and Malaysian forces are not known to have reacted to any of the flights.

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(2) British forces in Singapore are being augmented by the deployment of one squadron of eight VICTOR jet medium bombers, one of which is photo reconnaissance equipped, from the RAF V-bomber force. The temporary transfer of these bombers, which can carry nuclear bombs or air-to-surface missiles but can also be employed in a conventional role, is believed to be a contingency measure against a possible showdown with Indonesia as well as a psychological deterrent. British Canberra bombers already based in this area cannot reach all targets on Java and are limited to low-level attacks.

(3) Some senior staff officers of the British Far East Command are becoming more convinced that a major military action with Indonesia is likely despite Djakarta's apparent intentions to avoid open conflict. Indonesia is continuing to build up its forces on Borneo and its violations of Sarawak's airspace could provoke an incident and British retaliation. The British Far East Air Force's upgrading of strike plans and targeting materials is emphasizing aircraft and airfields.

(4) The Malaysian Government has turned down President Sukarno's proposal for a second UN survey of the Borneo territories in the belief that it is not a sincere attempt at reconciliation and would not affect Indonesia's confrontation policy.

(5) Chinese Communist Vice Premier Marshal Ho Lung, as personal representative of Chief of State Liu Shao-chi, reportedly informed President Sukarno of the Chinese Government's 100 per cent support of Indonesia's opposition to Malaysia. He is said to have promised that Peiping would provide Indonesia all moral or material assistance "within its power." Ho Lung had several personal contacts with Sukarno while in Djakarta as head of the Chinese delegation to the GANEFO games. Such assurances, while providing a psychological boost to Sukarno, must be viewed in the light of the basic Indonesian anti-Chinese bias as well as Peiping's ability to provide material assistance.

c. Laos:

(1) Royal Lao Army (FAR) and Neutralist units have taken Kham Keut, a Communist-held position along Route 8. Lak Sao, adjacent to the junction of Route 8 also held by the Communists, has reportedly also fallen. The Pathet Lao (PL) have thus far evidenced little strong reaction to the friendly thrust. A coordinated FAR, Neutralist, Meo drive in the Xieng Khouang area has been planned but there has been no evidence of its implementation. The PL are unlikely to remain passive for too long in the face of friendly gains, particularly of the caliber of Xieng Khouang and Lak Sao.

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(2) The assassination of Col. Leuang on 5 December has had an impact on Neutralists and has given rise to accusations and increased tension both among Neutralist ranks and between Neutralists and the rightist element. No one group has been linked to the death. Leuang was widely disliked and distrusted because of his involvement with various interests.

(3) A Laotian official has reported a Chinese Communist proposal for a commercial air link between Communist China and Laos. The route would be via Nanning, Hanoi, Xieng Khouang, Vientiane and return. The 2 December proposal requested a Laotian delegation to Peiping and reportedly pointed out that the air link would "strengthen friendly relations between the two countries." The Laotian response to the proposal is unknown.

d. Thailand:

(1) The succession problem following the death of Field Marshal Sarit on 8 December has thus far been handled very smoothly and Bangkok remains quiet. General Thanom Kittikachorn, first Deputy Premier and Defense Minister, has been named Premier and has stated he will name a new Cabinet this week. Major changes are not anticipated and General Praphat and Air Chief Marshal Dawee will very likely retain key positions. Deputy Army Commander Chitti will probably be named

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Army Commander while Thanom will probably retain the Defense Ministry himself. There will be no shift in the Government's strong pro-West orientation.

(2) Possible difficulty may arise from the fact that Thanom, Praphat and Dawee hold no direct command of troops. General Krit Sivara, however, who has frequently been mentioned in coup plots, presently commands the key Bangkok 1st Army Area. Krit, as well as Army Commander Chitti, will have to be considered carefully in the new governmental organization.

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## 2. OPERATIONS

### a. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong (VC) and RVNAF activities for the period 27 November - 4 December and the previous period of 20 - 27 November follows:

	<u>20-27 Nov</u>	<u>27 Nov - 4 Dec</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>Viet Cong:</u>			
Incidents	666	518	-148
Armed Attacks	106	84	-22
Casualties	929*	662**	-267
(KIA)	(746)	(533)	(-213)
Defections	64	23	-41
Weapons Lost	85*	88**	+3

### RVN:

#### Initiated Actions:

Bn or Larger	62	63	+1
Small Unit:			
Contact	137	146	+9
No Contact	3502	3850	+348
<u>Total Actions</u>	<u>3701</u>	<u>4059</u>	<u>+358</u>
Casualties	696*	598	-98
(KIA)	(156)	(135)	(-21)
Weapons Lost	312*	374**	+62

\* Casualties and weapon losses are for period 19-25 November.

\*\* Casualties and weapon losses are for period 26 November - 2 December.

(2) Government forces conducted a total of 63 battalion-size or larger operations during the reporting period and a total of 3,996 small-scale operations. This represents

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an increase over last week. The number of small units actions making contact with the VC rose slightly from last week (from 137 to 146).

(3) There were two company-size and one battalion-size attacks by the VC reported during the past week. This brings the number of VC large-scale attacks for November to 14 (3 battalion and 11 company) which is only slightly above the 1963 monthly average of 12. According to COMUSMACV, VC large-scale attacks mounted towards the end of November were generally more effective from the communist point of view than those conducted immediately following the coup. Of particular significance, was the VC departure from their normal practice of breaking off their attacks at sunrise and when confronted with equal or superior forces. Recently there were two good examples of this. In the 30 November battalion-size attack against the Bau Co Civil Guard post in Tay Ninh Province, the VC did not break off the attack when illuminated by air-dropped flares or after daylight. VC willingness to stand and fight under unfavorable conditions was also apparent on the 24 November attack against the Hiep Hoa Special Forces training camp in Hau Nghia Province. In recent weeks, there has been a slight but noticeable increase of a tendency by the VC to conduct attacks during daylight hours.

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(4) The weapon loss ratio continues to show a wide disparity and continues to favor the VC. In this past week, the VC lost 88 weapons to government forces, while the latter lost 374 weapons. Thus far this year, government forces have a net loss of nearly 2,400 weapons, roughly enough to equip six VC main force battalions. This illustrative comparison is based on a 400-man VC battalion and on a one-weapon per man basis.

(5) The US Air Attache in Saigon reports that Col Ky May is scheduled to replace Col Mai as commander of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). The change of command reportedly will take place 16 December with Col Mai being given the military attache post in Germany. The reasons given the attache for the change are Mai's lack of operational experience and his former association with the Cao Lao party. This former VNAF political group was identified with the Diem regime and it has now been abolished.

b. Laos/Thailand:

CINCPAC has directed Chief JUSMAG, Thailand, in coordination with the US Embassy Bangkok, to determine if the Thais would be agreeable to the release of two T-28s to Laos in order to replace the two lost there since September, with the understanding that these two, and the original six provided Laos last summer, will be replaced in June 1964.

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c. Cambodia:

The US Army Attache Phnom Penh reported that on 6 December, a two-seater MIG 15 with Cambodian insignia completed its first flight. The flight was of about ten minutes duration and the attache believes the pilot was a Russian.


d. PACOM Strategic Mobility Exercise and Exercise QUICK RELEASE:

Tentative plans for the conduct during March 1964, of a FY 64 strategic mobility exercise to Korea have been cancelled. Rescheduling will be considered at the joint/combined exercise scheduling conference to be held 21-24 January 1964. In the interim, CINCPAC has been directed to recommend a date for exercise QUICK RELEASE, the object of which will be to test the concept of the "Forward Floating Depot". A brigade task force airlifted from Hawaii to Okinawa, and utilizing equipment prestocked in three commercial type ships now stationed at Subic Bay, will participate in a three day field training exercise on Okinawa. Upon termination of the exercise, the three ships will reload and return to the Philippines. The brigade will return to Hawaii by air.

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# SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE  
JOINT STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.


4 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Southeast Asia Situation Report (U)

Attached hereto is the Southeast Asia Situation Report  
Number 49-63 covering the period from 270800 November to  
040800 December 1963.

FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

  
C. M. MOUNT, JR.  
Colonel, USA  
Chief, Pacific Division  
Operations Directorate

GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DOWNGRADING & DECLASSIFICATION

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*cy 38/2*  
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SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Special Handling Required  
Not Releasable  
to Foreign Nationals

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DISTRIBUTION

CJCS	6
Dir, J-1	1
Dir, J-3	12
Dir, J-4	4
Dir, J-5	4
Dir, J-6	1
SA/MAA	1
SA/P&B	1
SACSA	6
Secy, JSSC	1
DJS	3
Secy, JCS	3
CSA	18
CNO	12
CMC	7
CSAF	5
AFCIN	1
AFSMS	1
OSD	12
NIC	1
AFCP	1
DIA	4
WH Sit. Rm	1
M/A to President	1
Dir, CIA	10
S/A Pres., NSAFF	1
The Attorney General	1
Ag. for Int. Dev.	1
US Del., MSC UN	1
Dir, NSA	4
ANMCC	1
State FE Aff.	7
RR&A	1

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE  
JOINT STAFF  
Washington 25, D. C.

SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION  
REPORT NUMBER 49-63

4 December 1963

1. INTELLIGENCE

a. Laos:

(1) To date, there has been little Communist military reaction to strong Royal Lao Army (FAR) and Neutralist thrusts in the Vang Vieng and Kham Keut areas. The Neutralists have secured Vang Vieng town and its airfield and reportedly control Route 13 north to Ban Pha Tang and south to the Nam Lik river. The opening of Route 13 and Neutralist control of Vang Vieng airfield should make logistic support of forces in that area easier.

(2) FAR and Neutralist troops took Kham Keut, near Route 8 in central Laos on 27 November. The friendly forces have halted their advance halfway to Lak Sao, a vital Pathet Lao (PL) position astride Route 8 which is one of the PL main supply routes into central Laos. FAR forces, consisting of a paratroop battalion plus guerrilla units, have reinforced the initial assault group. General Amkha, Chief of the Special Military Cabinet in Vientiane has requested fuzes for 100-lb

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bombs for use against a Pathet Lao 37-mm gun position at Lak Sao. Prime Minister Souvanna and Ambassador Unger concurred in not releasing the fuzes on the ground that the PL provocation here is remote and that bombs should be used only in case of Viet Minh attack, heavy PL action in the Plaine des Jarres or the like.

b. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) Communist military activity in the RVN slackened during the week ending 3 December but there has been no real lessening of the intensity of the war. On 28 November, a Viet Cong (VC) company attacked a US Special Forces Center at Chau Lang, An Giang Province, in southwestern Vietnam. On 30 November, an estimated VC battalion attacked a fortified hamlet at Bau Co, Tay Ninh Province, which is largely inhabited by the Cao Dai quasi-religious armed sect.

(2) COMUSMACV has commented on the possible emergence of a more active VC campaign against US personnel. Propaganda leaflets now being distributed throughout the RVN stress the anti-American theme. COMUSMACV expects the VC to expand this campaign with attacks against Special Forces installations, sabotage, and acts of terrorism to include assassinations. It is probable that the seven American military prisoners now in the hands of the VC will be displayed in an attempt to lower American prestige.

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(3) COMUSMACV has received additional evidence of Communist Bloc support to the VC. Vietnamese forces captured two VC 50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, one AA speed sight, two mounts, and one hand-held lead and range estimation device. The machine guns were US but the other equipment was similar to that of Soviet manufacture and used by the Chinese Communist Army. The use of the 50-caliber machine guns with the other equipment provides an effective weapons system against low-flying aircraft and helicopters.

(4) A Vietnamese military delegation, headed by Major Generals Minh, Chief of State, and Tran Van Don, Minister of Defense, plans to visit Bangkok on 9-12 December for talks with the Thailand military.

c. Cambodia:

(1) Prince Sihanouk is already hinting that certain types of aid should continue and that perhaps some "new formula" could be found for a resumption of US assistance. He appeared to be thinking of a plan under which there would be no large US missions in Cambodia.

(2) Also, in the opening session of talks to implement the termination of US aid, the chief Cambodian negotiator took the somewhat startling position that his government did not want the immediate termination of aid but merely to negotiate the subject. He further argued that Cambodia was entitled to

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have certain important aid projects completed. The US Ambassador comments that a major Cambodian tactic - apparently dictated by Sihanouk - will be to obtain a continuation of some aid projects without appearing to ask for such a continuation.

(3) Meanwhile, both France and the Bloc appear to be dragging their feet on the question of providing new aid to Cambodia while Sihanouk appears to be increasingly frantic in his efforts to convene a new international conference to "guarantee" Cambodia's borders.

(4) The US Air Attache Saigon reports that three Russian MIG aircraft have been uncrated at Phnom Penh. One of the aircraft has been run up and reportedly will be flown on 5 December.

d. Indonesia/Malaysia:

(1) Decisions made at a 23 November Malaysian Defense Council meeting included the appointment of British Major General Walker as Director of Operations in Sarawak and Sabah, the transfer of operations headquarters from Brunei to Labuan, and the retention of the intelligence center at Kuching, Sarawak. Additionally, the Malaysian defense commitment in Sarawak and Sabah will be increased to three battalions by 15 February 1964, which will then total three infantry

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battalions, two reconnaissance squadrons, and 1-1/2 engineer squadrons. As Director of Operations, General Walker will command all Commonwealth and Malaysian armed forces and police in operations against the guerrillas.

(2) In western Borneo, four P-51s and three B-25s at Pontianak were observed on 21 November being armed with rockets and 100-lb bombs, respectively. The P-51s had four rockets under each wing; each B-25 had eight rockets under each wing, a .50 caliber machine gun in the tail, twin .50 caliber machine guns and a 20-mm cannon in the nose, and twin .50 caliber machine guns on each side. Also on 21 November, 400-500 paratroopers were observed in trucks proceeding north from Pontianak; their destination was said to be north of Sambas, near the Sarawak border.

(3) The first reported infiltration of Sarawak by sea was revealed in the interrogation of six Indonesians who were captured by Sarawak security forces on 27 November. These were members of an original group of 14 Indonesians and three Chinese who had landed at three points presumably along the west coast of Sarawak to give local sympathizers weapons training and then return overland to Indonesian Borneo. Apprehension of the six at Simanggang who had completed their mission resulted in the arrest of 9 locals in western Sarawak.

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6 (1) (c)  
According to British intelligence sources, there is greatly increased Indonesian patrol activity along the eastern and western Sarawak border areas; the number and scope of incursions is therefore expected to increase, particularly on the 8 December anniversary of the abortive Brunei rebellion.

(4) There is continuing evidence that saboteur agents are being trained in the Riau Islands for infiltration into Singapore and Malaya to carry out subversive as well as sabotage activities.

~~6 (1) (c)~~  
(5) Foreign Minister Subandrio recently told the Australian Ambassador in Djakarta that Indonesia could not accept Malaysia "as a fact of life" even if it took three or more years to prove it. He further stated that he recognized the danger of military incidents and realized that, if it came to war with the British, Indonesia would lose. In his view, however, this would end British influence in Southeast Asia, which was Indonesia's ultimate objective.

(6) President Sukarno's trip to Manila appears to be indefinitely postponed, due to a sudden decision by President Macapagal to visit Africa, but may still occur during this month. A recent unofficial report states that Armed Forces Chief General Nasution will go to Manila soon for talks with Macapagal.

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e. Burma:

Removal of Brigadier Clift, head of the Burmese Air Force, on 27 November, completes the "cleaning" of the three top defense posts by Ne Win. The closing of a part of Rangoon University and the release of a number of anti-Fascist Peoples League leaders point up Ne Win's determination to weaken and eliminate Communist opposition.

2. OPERATIONS

a. Republic of Vietnam (RVN):

(1) A comparison of the Viet Cong (VC) and RVNAF activities for the period 20-27 November and the previous period of 13-20 November follows:

	<u>13-20 Nov</u>	<u>20-27 Nov</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>Viet Cong:</u>			
Incidents	795	666	-129
Armed Attacks	149	106	- 43
Casualties	639*	929**	+290
(KIA)	(458)	(746)	+288
Defections	31	64	+ 33
POWs	60	48	- 12
Weapons Lost	124*	85**	- 39
 <u>RVN:</u>			
Initiated Actions:			
Bn or Larger	48	62	+ 14
Small Unit:			
Contact	166	137	- 29
No Contacts	<u>3,504</u>	<u>3,502</u>	<u>- 2</u>
<u>Total Actions</u>	<u>3,718</u>	<u>3,701</u>	<u>- 17</u>

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	<u>13-20 Nov</u>	<u>20-27 Nov</u>	<u>Change</u>
Casualties	641*	696**	+ 55
(KIA)	(163)	(156)	- 7
Weapons Lost	407*	312**	- 95

\* Casualties and weapon losses are for period 12-18 November.

\*\* Casualties and weapon losses are for period 19-25 November.

(2) VC activity declined still further from the level of the week following the coup, however it is still at a high level compared with weekly activity during the previous ten months of the year. While VC initiated attacks declined in number, they increased in intensity. This trend is reflected by an overwhelming attack on the Hiep Hoa Special Forces camp in the III Corps area and the damage inflicted to 20 aircraft in one day in the IV Corps area. In addition to RVN losses, these incidents resulted in two US personnel KIA and four US personnel captured. Further evidence of this intensification of activity is indicated by the sharp rise in VC casualties.

(3) RVNAF ground operations employing forces of three rifle company equivalent or larger rose to 62. This is well above the weekly average of 53 for the preceding 12 week period. Battalion days of operation rose from 356 to 429. As of 26 November, 64 of the 130 infantry battalions were conducting or supporting offensive operations; 35 other battalions were available for operations on a limited basis, and the remaining 31 were engaged in training, security and other activities.

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(4) The 33d Special Zone (Lam Dong, Binh Thuan and Binh Tuy Provinces) has been redesignated Binh Lam Special Zone. The Capital Military District is reported as a separate military command under III Corps. Reports are rendered to, and orders emanate from the III Corps Tactical Zone Commander.

(5) VNN activity decreased slightly this week. River force employment showed the most significant decline as fewer boats were called upon to provide combat support.

(6) The planned reduction in the US military strength in the RVN by 1,000 started on schedule 3 December when the first increments of 300 departed Saigon. The remaining 700 will have departed Saigon by the end of December. Appropriate press releases have stressed that the reduction at this time is a vote of confidence in the GVN and an indication of the progress accomplished in the training of Vietnamese military personnel. The returnees consist mainly of personnel who have worked themselves out of a job.

b. Japan:

CINCPAC's request for a 90 day extension of the TAC F-100 squadron on rotation at Itazuke, Japan, has been approved. This squadron is covering certain SIOP targets for the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing which is undergoing conversion to F-105s. The F-100 squadron is now scheduled to return to CONUS in March 1964.

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c. Soviet Missile Firing:

(1) The Soviets have announced that missile firings into two areas of the Pacific will be conducted between 2 December 1963 and 25 January 1964. The two areas are generally the same as those announced for previous missile firings. The southern area is south of Johnson Island, 6,500 nautical miles from the Tyuratan range head, and the northern area is east of Japan, 4,800 nautical miles from the range head. The three Soviet missile range instrumentation ships have been on station in the southern impact area since 24 November and have been engaged in practice re-entry procedures.

(2) The new Soviet defensive missile displayed in the 7 November Moscow parade has been officially nicknamed "GRIFFON" by the American, British and Canadian Missile Committee.

d. Laos:

(1) CINCPAC reports that the MAP supported training of FAR and Neutralist units at Camp Erawan in Thailand is progressing satisfactorily. Since the training started on 9 September, the following units have completed prescribed courses of instruction and returned to Laos:

- 2 FAR Inf Companies
- 2 FAR Arty Batteries
- 2 FAR 81-mm Mortar Sections

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- 1 FAR Heavy Weapon Platoon
- 1 Neutralist 4.2 in. Mortar Platoon

As of 1 December, the following units were undergoing training:

- 2 FAR Inf Companies
- 2 FAR 4.2 in. Mortar Platoons
- 1 FAR Arty Battery
- 1 FAR 81-mm Mortar Section
- 1 Neutralist Arty Battery
- 1 Neutralist 81-mm Mortar Section

(2) Training in Thailand of 6 Lao pilots and 8 mechanics to operate and maintain 3 U-17A commenced on 4 November and will last for 30 days.

(3) The US Ambassador in Vientiane has reported that Colonel Ma, the RLAF commander, has informed the US AID Requirements Office representative at Savannakhet that he (Col. Ma) has authorized the Royal Thai Air Force to conduct F-86 reconnaissance flights over Laos. The Ambassador is attempting to discourage these flights on the grounds that they might prove embarrassing to Souvanna.

### 3. LOGISTICS

#### a. Thailand:

Negotiations have been completed between the British and the Royal Thai Governments for construction of a military logistics airfield at Mukdahan. Public announcement of this decision will be made at Bangkok and London. The Australian and New Zealand Governments have been invited to associate

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themselves with this project. Tentative plan and schedule is to use the period December-March for improving the Ubon-Mukdahan road and building a construction camp. Work is to begin on the airfield in April utilizing about two companies of Royal Engineers.


b. Cambodia:

Numerous problems are arising in regard to the cessation of the Cambodia Military Assistance Program. Disposition of materiel, unloaded in Cambodia but not formally turned over to the country, is presenting the hardest problems which must be settled by individual case negotiations.

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# SOUTHEAST ASIA SITUATION

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION



SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION