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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM  
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LeMay, Wheeler, McDonald, Greene re: attached  
evaluation of the situation in South Vietnam.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION  
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Situation in South Vietnam

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are becoming increasingly concerned over the way in which the situation in South Vietnam, particularly the military situation, is being reported and evaluated. They feel that inadequacies in intelligence procedures have resulted in placing before the President and his principal advisers a picture of the anti-Viet Cong campaign which is sometimes of uncertain validity. This situation arises largely from the following factors:

a. Intelligence reports on South Vietnam reach Washington by several channels: State, Defense, CIA, AID, USIA and the [Military Attaches]. They are not correlated in Saigon and given a Country Team interpretative evaluation there; rather, they are forwarded piece-meal to Washington with no evaluation or with only that of the originating agency.

b. There is need for greater effort in South Vietnam to identify reports of low reliability as such.

c. There are too many reports on the military situation from non-military sources and too little use of US military observers stationed throughout South Vietnam.

d. USIB evaluates the situation in South Vietnam from intelligence analyzed at a distance from the scene of operations without participation in the over-all evaluation by the responsible military commanders in South Vietnam who should be, of all US officials, the closest to the true situation.

2. To correct these deficiencies which are affecting the governmental view of the situation, the JCS recommend the following actions:

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