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TAB H

INSPECTION

Strategic Delivery Vehicles

Verification of an agreement to freeze current inventories of strategic delivery vehicles would require first an exchange of data on facilities currently or recently engaged in such production and then an exchange of inspectors to monitor adherence to the agreement.

Manufacture of complete heavy or medium bomber aircraft would be prohibited. (The only aircraft in this category now being produced is the Soviet medium bomber "Blinder"). Manufacture of parts and modification of aircraft would be permitted to the extent that it related to increasing the life or reliability of the aircraft and not its military potential (speed, range, load, etc.)

If any reasonable inspection procedures were adopted, it should not be difficult to insure that no significant number of bomber aircraft were being produced. Further, it is not believed that modification of aircraft in current inventories could significantly effect the military balance of power.

Inspection of missile production, however, should prove a more demanding task. Since production of complete missiles would be authorized for purposes of replacement, a 24-hour a day inspection would be required to prevent, through illegal production, either an increase in missile inventory or incorporation of new developments in propulsion and guidance that could increase the capability of the existing missile force in terms of range, load, or CEP. While only limited improvement appears possible in existing rocket motores, more substantial changes might be achieved through

increased efficiency in the guidance system.

Manufacture of complete missiles would be permitted on the basis of a one-for-one replacement in kind. Production of complete missiles would be authorized as necessary to replace missiles expended in test firing or lost through accident etc. Since limiting production to a percentage of the inventory would require accurate data on the extent of the inventory, it is suggested that yearly production be limited to a specific figure, to be negotiated which would approximate the number of missiles expended in a reasonable test and training program. The danger of accepting a somewhat exaggerated Soviet figure is not great if we couple such acceptance with an effective system of confirming destruction of the old missiles before new missiles leave the factory. This would at least restrict the quantity of the inventory.

As in the case of bomber aircraft, production of parts for maintenance and modification of missiles would be authorized in so far as it increases the life or reliability of the missile and not its military potential (range, load, CEP, etc.). Parts production for missiles would also require negotiation since requirements vary for the different type of missiles (e.g. solid fuel vs. liquid fuel).

Fissionable Material

Basically, the controls envisioned in relation to fissionable materials are:

a. Exchange of lists of all plants currently or recently engaged in producing fissionable material for weapons.

b. Shutdown all such plants with such action confirmed by periodic inspection or continuous external monitoring.

c. Plants producing material for power, propulsion and peaceful uses would be subject to resident or periodic inspection with full access to the facility.

d. As a check against operation of clandestine facilities, environmental sampling of the entire country would be conducted with follow-up intensive monitoring and on-site visits for suspected sites. This would include a quota of six peremptory inspections in order to accommodate unilateral intelligence leads. The entire system would require, for monitoring of the Soviet Union, about 350 personnel.

Thsi system is estimated to be capable of detecting annual diversion from the declared facilities amounting to 0.5 percent of the 1963 USSR stockpile of U-235 and 1 percent of the plutonium stockpile. A maximum inspection effort would reduce possible annual diversion of U-235 to 0.05 percent of stockpile and plutonium to 0.2 percent of stockpile, but would be very costly in men and dollars and would involve serious interference with plant operation and administration. If only external access to the plants were allowed, possible diversions are estimated at 2.0 percent and 4.6 percent of the U-235 and plutonium stockpiles, respectively. As for clandestine production, it is very likely that production of U-235 at a rate as large as 1 percent of the USSR stockpile per year would be quickly detected, as would clandestine plutonium -- equivalent capacity as large as 3 percent of stockpile per year.

The amount of cheating possible under the proposed system does not appear strategically significant, so long as each side retains large stockpiles. If significant reductions in weapons stockpiles are made, possible diversions should be measured, not against the 1963 stocks as above, but against the retained levels; the diversions may then become quite significant. Also, the inspection system does not address, nor can it be expected to alleviate, the problem of clandestine stockpiles amassed before the cutoff.