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USUN, New York NIACT
Ambassador BRUSSELS
INFO: Ambassador LEOPOLDVILLE
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An Consul ELISABETHVILLE

One of most difficult problems facing Adoula and GOC is continuing psychological handicap they face in virtual freedom of air enjoyed by Katanga Air Force in North Katanga. From recent conversations with UN officials re bombing missions of KAF in North Katanga and need to re-establish credibility of UNOC air capability, we know they are concerned over this problem and are anxious to find practicable solution within UN mandate. After careful consideration, we have concluded that following course of action is appropriate under circumstances.

Accordingly, request you discuss course of action with U Thant or Bunche in context above and on basis we are in effect responding to informal UN request for advice.

Only way of meeting problem of neutralizing KAF, without giving GOC effective and independent air force, is to use UNOC planes against Katangan planes. We recognize difficulty, given vast area to be covered and limited number UN planes, of intercepting Katangan aircraft in flight. Accordingly, best method assuring they are put out of commission is probably to strafe them on ground. As we see it, there are two major elements to be considered in such action: 1) adequate justification; 2) advance notification.

IO:UNP:MBBaffum:PRutter/jf,ck 12/12

M - Mr. McChase

AF - Gov. Williams (draft)

IO - Mr. Wallner (draft)

UNP - Mr. Sisco

DOD:ISA - Col. Greene (draft)

The White House - Mr. Bundy

The Secretary (in substance before his departure.)

EUR - Mr. Burdett (draft)

FORM
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Re (1), we believe it essential that UN establish clearly that any military action against Katangan planes is in fact taken in response to hostile activities of such aircraft and pursuant to UN Resolutions e.g., we assume this would be pursuant to Res authorising use of force if necessary to prevent civil war, but would welcome UN comment on this point. This means that UN should not repeat not attack Katangan airfields or Katangan planes in flight unless the commanding officer, UNOC air forces in Katanga, was assured from positive evidence Katangan planes had committed hostile act. In North Katanga positive identification of aircraft in air space by UNOC officer after appropriate UNOC announcement of policy and rules of engagement would constitute such evidence. In South Katanga it would be necessary to identify, by UNOC ground or air observation, planes in act of committing hostile act (i.e. bombing, strafing or even making low level pass with view intimidating ANC or UNOC forces). Actions of this sort in either area would result in pursuit of planes and attempts to destroy in air. Furthermore, even if pursuit not feasible or planes escape, identified hostile actions would serve as signal for UNOC to attempt destroy on ground all Katangan planes with combat capability. To minimise casualties, UNOC would make reasonable effort to warn people in vicinity airfield before attacking planes on ground.

Re (2) we believe it important that UN clearly be on record in advance of any military action against Katangan planes as to precisely what the rules of engagement would be. This is necessary in order to assure there be no misunderstanding either by Katangans or world public opinion as to circumstances in which UN would fire on Katangan planes. Announcements heretofore have been couched in such general terms as to leave this unclear. Moreover, such advance notification would, in our view,

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serve as substantial deterrent to any further flights by Katanga mercenaries.

FOR BRUSSELS: Embassy should discuss foregoing with Belgians.

END

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